



Iowa Research Online
The University of Iowa's Institutional Repository

Department of Political Science Publications

6-1-2002

Constitutional Process: A Social Choice Analysis of Supreme Court Decision Making. By Maxwell L. Stearns. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 2000. 420p.

Timothy M. Hagle
University of Iowa

Copyright 2002 American Political Science Association. Used by permission. <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=PSR>

American Political Science Review, 96:2 (2002) pp. 432-433. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055402590249

Hosted by [Iowa Research Online](http://lib-ir@uiowa.edu). For more information please contact: lib-ir@uiowa.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory

Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy. By Andrew Arato. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 352p. \$72.00 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

Andreas Kalyvas, *University of Michigan*

Recent years have witnessed momentous political transformations across the globe. From Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union to South Africa, these changes are often described as transitions from state bureaucracies, party dictatorships, and authoritarian rule to liberal constitutional democracies and market economies. Andrew Arato, moving gracefully among the fields of political theory, sociology, history, constitutionalism, and comparative politics, redirects our attention to the originary moment of constitutional creation, when ordinary lawmaking recedes in favor of extraordinary politics and higher lawmaking. It is also a moment when fundamental constitutional norms emerge as the main point of contest within political debate and action. Combining empirical and descriptive analysis with normative considerations, Arato persuasively demonstrates how the mode of creation of new constitutions affects the democratic and institutional content of these transformations as well as the prospects for future consolidation of the newly developed constitutional norms.

By focusing mainly, but not exclusively, on the various forms of constitution-making in Eastern and Central Europe during the early 1990s, Arato not only proposes an original and comprehensive theory of comparative constitutional politics, but also revisits the old dichotomy of revolution and reform that has bifurcated modern politics between the rebellious desire for an absolute break with the past and the piecemeal introduction of gradual changes through already established legal mechanisms. Thus, while he acknowledges the democratic appeal of total revolutionary transformations invoked by theories of extralegal popular constituent power, such as those of Emmanuel Sieyès and Carl Schmitt, he follows Hannah Arendt in denouncing the juridical vacuum caused by absolute legal ruptures. Revolutions, he warns, divest individuals of their legal protections and rights, endangering their security and freedoms. At the same time, however, Arato recognizes that continuity with the past suffers from a democratic deficit and from considerable legitimization problems. Whereas such continuity avoids the perils of violence, permanent dictatorship, and illegality, it often preserves elements from previous authoritarian regimes.

To avoid the hackneyed polarization between revolution and reform, Arato opts for a different alternative for achieving genuine political change. Interestingly enough, given his previous writings, he does not relocate the power of making constitutions in civil society as, for example, Ulrich Preuss does. As he convincingly argues, such an approach poses more problems than it can solve. Because civil society is composed of a plurality of voluntary associations, it can hardly function as the unitary subject of the constituent power. Moreover, these groups not only lack the electoral support that could enable them to play a genuinely representative role, but also manifest significant inequalities of resources. Finally, although Arato does not explicitly mention it, the notion of a constituent civil society entails a dangerous overpoliticization of society by blurring of the crucial distinction between the political and the social. In a similar vein, Arato rejects the parliamentary road to constitution-making

through established amendment procedures by pointing to the logical inconsistencies and political dilemmas that ultimately obliterate the crucial difference between ordinary and higher lawmaking. He also dismisses the more traditional method of constituent assemblies, like that of the French National Assembly of 1789, because of the potential for dictatorial powers, excessive majoritarianism, voluntaristic fantasies, and procedural perplexities, which historically have led to permanent instability, civil wars, and restoration.

In contrast to these flawed models of constitutional politics, Arato, by engaging in a critical but fruitful dialogue with Bruce Ackerman, proposes an innovative theory of dual constitutional origins: He places radical political change in the context of legal continuity. Although the concept of legal continuity could be misinterpreted as just another version of parliamentary constitution-making that Arato has repudiated, in fact it represents one of his most remarkable contributions to the theory of constitutional politics. The call for legal continuity consists of two complementary normative arguments, which are derived largely from the recent political and legal experience in the Hungarian transition. On the one hand, the founding of new legal and political orders should always take place within the framework of the rule of law. On the other hand, it is obvious that in the cases of Eastern and Central Europe, the rule of law did not exist prior to the collapse of state Communism. For this reason Arato conceives of legal continuity as a necessary fiction. The framers should act *as if* they were operating under the rule of law even if they are not and should treat the inherited constitution *as if* it were actually a valid basic law of the land although it is not. However, as Arato explains, the appeal to a fictional continuity functions in reality as a break with the illegality of the previous regimes; a strategy of explicit constitutional rupture, in contrast, would represent a continuity with the lawless practices of the past.

It is on this point that Arato's approach runs into problems. He is at pains to find an institutional analogue for the notion of fictional continuity. After rejecting parliamentary transitions and having conceded that the American founding experience is unique and therefore nonreplicable, he is left with only one option: the method of roundtable negotiated transitions. Although he is attracted by the ability of roundtables to be self-limiting, to respect legality, and to institute a modern system of rights, he admits that historically they have taken an undemocratic path to democracy insofar as they are composed of self-appointed elites who negotiate and bargain in secrecy. This explains why he opposes Preuss's move to endow them with the originary power to make constitutions. To rectify these shortcomings, which point to the normative deficit of negotiated transitions, Arato introduces the principles of openness, publicity, deliberation, consensus, and reflexivity. But it remains unclear by which mechanisms the free and open discussion within the public sphere and the deliberations within the roundtables would actually influence one another. If by these five principles he means that the constitutional decisions adopted by the roundtables must be ratified by a popular referendum of an informed and engaged citizenry, I do not see how he can avoid implicitly endowing these instances with constituent powers. This uncertainty regarding how constitution-making would be conducted and by whom reflects a deeper ambiguity in Arato's work toward the notion of the constituent power itself. It is not clear whether he is rejecting it altogether or simply wishes to decenter and dedramatize it so as to allow for a more differentiated and pluralist formulation, which is also free from any voluntaristic and extralegal connotations.

Notwithstanding these doubts, Arato offers one of the most original theories of constitution-making to date. Comprehensive in its range, interdisciplinary in its ambitions, erudite, and challenging, it marks a turning point in the study of democratic transitions that will surely influence future discussions of democratic constitutionalism.

Friends and Citizens: Essays in Honor of Wilson Carey

McWilliams. Edited by Peter Dennis Bathory and Nancy L. Schwartz. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. 311p. \$50.00.

Philip Abbott, *Wayne State University*

Wilson Carey McWilliams is certainly one of the great teachers of American political thought in his generation. *The Idea of Fraternity in America* (1973), as well as his series on presidential elections and many essays, has captivated both his students and his colleagues. There are, of course, many prominent figures who have addressed the complexity of political thought in America in recent years but few whose influence is acknowledged so centrally on these terms. Of course, it is sometimes difficult for those influenced by a master teacher to convey thoughts once they are removed from the electricity of the seminar or conference. McWilliams is a good example of this phenomenon. At one level his understanding of American political culture is Whitmanesque. McWilliams is not primarily a jeremiadic thinker and much of his writing has the same breezy celebration of America as Whitman's. Added to this perspective is an intense appreciation of Mark Twain's comedic iconoclasm. Both foci are juxtaposed with what is his central preoccupation, a deep attachment to the Puritan vision of the human experience. McWilliams generalized the latter in *The Idea of Fraternity in America* as a tradition of fraternal politics that was enriched by other European immigrants. Although "Puritanism. . . was here first," (113) it was superseded, though not replaced, by the powerful symbols of "Enlightenment liberalism." McWilliams' model of cultural dualism offered the first systematic critique of Hartz's liberal society thesis and has since been replicated and expanded by many others including Robert Bellah and Rogers M. Smith. In fact, there is some irony in his alternative to Hartz's single-factor explanation of American culture, since it returned the study of American political thought to the traditional dualist perspectives developed by Progressive scholars, who are villains in McWilliams' own reading of American political thought. Moreover, McWilliams' focus on Puritan conceptions of community has led him to an attachment to premodern conceptions of politics as well as to a decided antipathy toward the political world of the American founders.

How does this mixture of Aristotle, Calvin, Winthrop, the antifederalists, Twain, and Whitman cohere? An unsympathetic reader might conclude that McWilliams' America is a space occupied more by himself than the political culture he studies. The essays in this festschrift are directed toward explaining this unique perspective. The only essay that directly attempts to answer the question above is Mac McCorkle and David E. Price's fine effort. A powerful vision offered by a teacher can create a hermetic scholarly community. McCorkle and Price offer a corrective by showing how McWilliams' thought can be connected to the liberal/communitarian debate that *The Idea of Fraternity in America* actually prefigured. Though they admit that McWilliams' political thought is composed of "dazzling eccentricities," they identify him as a religious communitarian who rejects both a "faddish existentialist notion of community" and a "romantic Gemeinschaft dream." While Michael Sandel identifies the problem of modern democratic

regimes as resting upon an "unencumbered self," the authors conclude, "Although writing from Massachusetts Bay, the Harvard professor chooses to bypass Winthrop and his 'Model of Christian Charity,' all successor Puritan divines, as well as the rest of Puritan thought and culture. *Democracy's Discontent*, moreover, has no Great Awakenings, one passing mention of evangelical abolitionism, no Social Gospel, no Reinhold Niebuhr, and only one reference to Martin Luther King, Jr., as a preacher" (p. 242). William Galston is ostensibly more sympathetic in his *Liberal Purposes* but the contribution of religion to his conception of community is one of accommodation and management of a stolid "traditional morality" that is "monolithically conservative" (p. 246). McCorkle and Price recommend that Sandel and Galston attempt to incorporate covenant theory into their accounts and that McWilliams engage in "constructive family deliberations" with the secular communitarians.

It is no accident that five of the essays in this volume focus directly upon friendship. Though McWilliams has focused upon fraternity as the key to the submerged tradition in American political thought, he has been uncomfortable with its association with the modern revolutionary project. The Aristotelian conception of friendship is what he really means to uncover and enhance. The theoretical problem with this perspective, of course, is not only finding a space for this kind of friendship in a liberal society but also accommodating the Aristotelian conception to the practicalities of a democratic demos. Patrick Dennen imaginatively explores these issues in his "Friendship and Politics: Ancient and Modern." In the process, he discovers two little-remembered Progressive reformers, H. C. Merwin and Mary Kingsbury Simkhovitch, who tempered their commitment to political rationality with a sympathy for the real world of average working men and women. So too does Bob Pepperman Taylor find Aristotelian sensibilities in versions of Progressivism. Taylor presents a well-deserved reevaluation of Jane Addams as a much more complex thinker with regard to democratic citizenship than both the "Saint Jane" interpreters and the revisionists. Jean W. Yarbrough reviews the Jefferson-Adams correspondence and finds an exemplary case of friendship in a liberal republic that "leaves space for noble souls to pursue equal, if not more important private interests" but does not promote philosophy at the expense of politics and political life (p. 77). If the Jefferson-Adams friendship, late blooming as it was, modified the political excesses of both figures, the friendship between Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren, according to Marc Landy, also had beneficial consequences for the republic.

The most profound essay in this grouping is Norman Jacobson's short, eloquent response to Thoreau's discussion of friendship in "A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers." Jacobson titles his essay "'Damn Your Eyes!' Thoreau on (Male) Friendship in America" and he argues that Thoreau judged friendship to be impossible in a society that conceived of all relationships in terms of contract and utility and was "bold enough to hold himself up for scrutiny as an example of one crushed by such circumstances" (p. 123). This is also the only essay that considers the submerged gendered implications of friendship and Thoreau's exposure is an important commentary on masculine identity in America.

Other essays include a treatment of the hero in American political culture by Gerald Pomper that offers a theoretically provocative typology; a brief treatment by Harvey Mansfield of Aristotle and Tocqueville animated by deeply skeptical vision of democratic practice; an analysis of the Creation by Thomas Prangle, which, interestingly, is the only essay devoted fully to a religious subject; a case study of neighborhood activism in Philadelphia by Edward A. Schwartz;

a study of Lincoln as (re)founder by Joseph Romance; and an attempt to apply Aristotelian conceptions of citizenship to modern conditions by Dennis Hale. Two effective essays (one by Tracy Strong on Rousseau and Tocqueville and one by Sidney Milkis on political parties in America) actually seem to be arguing directly against McWilliams' teaching.

Friends and Citizens is a model festschrift. Particularly recommended are the cluster of essays on friendships and politics. Though it cannot be said successfully to bring order to the "dazzling eccentricities" of Wilson and Carey McWilliams' teachings, it does illustrate their capacity to stimulate.

Rereading Power and Freedom in J. S. Mill. By Bruce Baum. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000. 360p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Ronald J. Terchek, *University of Maryland at College Park*

This is a rich and rewarding book, weaving familiar themes in the literature on John Stuart Mill into a discussion of Mill's conception of power. Bruce Baum convincingly shows that Mill's liberalism requires more than toleration and individualism and invites a broader understanding of liberalism, one which goes beyond noninterference, rights, and neutral procedures. Meaning to show the "emancipatory possibilities of liberal political theory," the author argues that Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls, and Robert Nozick focus too narrowly on negative freedom and do not sufficiently probe how power and freedom are related (p. 15). In contrast, Baum's liberalism aims at the self-development and self-governance of each member of a liberal society.

This book is meant to "challenge the common view that there is an inverse relationship between power and freedom" as well as the idea "that the more society leaves people alone—free from external interference—the greater is their freedom" (p. 5). Baum sees his work as offering an argument for "the emancipatory possibilities in the liberal tradition" that pays attention to "the positive side of freedom," something that he associates with autonomy and that requires enabling conditions (as well as the elimination of disabling constraints). Thus, someone who "lacks powers of self-determination" is not free (p. 6). In this early formulation, Baum offers us a concept that is general and broad; in later chapters, he sets out to give us concrete instances where some lack "powers of self-development."

As Baum's vehicle to unfold this generous liberalism, Mill is said to seek the autonomy of everyone and appreciate how freedom and power are inexorably tied together. We are taken through Mill's examination of the psychological processes that enlarge or contract our capacities for self-development by shaping our desires, beliefs, and identity. These processes are then linked to political and social relationships that nurture or stifle these capacities. For all of his admiration of Mill, Baum recognizes several weaknesses and draws on participatory democratic theory, feminist critiques, and other contemporary theories to fill in the blanks that Mill is said to have ignored.

The author shows the many ways that Mill ties power to autonomy. We find chapters, for example, on gender, economy, and democratic politics in which Baum details how Mill sees asymmetrical power relations diminishing the freedom of many. Mill is not content to rely on or malism or proceduralism to promote and protect freedom. Power has to do with the opportunities as well as obstacles that individuals face when they chose a plan of life and seek to implement it.

However, Baum's parts turn out to be richer than the whole. Take his chapters on public opinion and on Millian economics, for example. In the former, Baum does an admirable

job showing how influential Mill takes public opinion to be and how it can stunt moral development. In the chapter on economics, we find a Mill who seeks maximum economic freedom, meaning "considerable equality with respect to educational and occupational opportunities, income, and property holdings" in which people have a share in the governance of firms. The government's role is to tax (including inheritances), regulate property, educate, and provide poor relief. But from Mill's perspective, all of these economic reforms cannot adequately lead to self-development, or what Baum calls freedom as autonomy, and the reason has to do with the force of public opinion. Baum fails to appreciate in this chapter what he nicely developed earlier—that public opinion as currently constituted is the major obstacle to autonomy. If all of the other emancipatory moves that Baum believes Mill supports were to come to fruition but public opinion remained fixed, then the homogeneity, dullness, and commercialism that Mill detects in liberal society would stifle self-development.

Why should this be so? On Mill's account, a new orthodoxy has replaced the old order, penetrating all sectors of modern life and displacing strong, viable alternatives that might challenge it. The new orthodoxy is commercialism, promising money and mobility as a means to success and ultimately to happiness. However much people give verbal approval to noncommercial standards, Mill believes that their commitments are to making and spending money. Even education is judged by its commercial utility, not by its capacity to build a liberally educated person or promote a critical spirit.

Baum does not spend much time with the Mill who is concerned with how freedom and newly-won power can turn against its beneficiaries. We see this in Mill's critique of public opinion and education, topics about which Baum devotes considerable time but does not push his argument for enough. The problem for Mill is not primarily about curriculum but about the ways the commercial mentality has invaded society, including its schools. For Mill, life is spent learning and the primary teacher is society, instructing people in what is valued and what is not. Mill laments that schools reinforce rather than challenge commercial norms; the lessons learned are about the primacy of production and economics.

Here and at various other places in the book, Baum fails to see that Millian freedom comes with struggle, and it is a struggle not only with those who use their power to dominate but also with ourselves when we succumb too readily to public opinion, especially with respect to commercial norms. Mill's challenge comes not in his particular policy recommendations but in the questions he asks and the issues he raises. He asks us, as Baum clearly demonstrates, to explore how economic inequality can subvert political equality, how domination becomes acceptable through constant use, how the various expressions of power penetrate liberal society, and how we often unreflectively accept the situation in which we find ourselves. Baum's considerable contribution comes with his careful demonstration that a generous liberalism needs to focus on power in its many guises and how it enables or disables the freedom of men and women.

The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics. By Jane Bennett. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 213p. \$55.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Kennan Ferguson, *University of South Florida*

At first, it may seem that Jane Bennett is attacking Max Weber. Against his famous assertion that modernity has disenchanted the world, rendering it potentially understandable and thus devoid of the power of transcendent meaning, Bennett engages in a traditionally theoretical explication and

critique. She traces those thinkers who arise from this tradition, whether or not acknowledged, and addresses (and celebrates) those whose philosophies of the modern world provide alternative readings, most notably Kant and Deleuze.

But it is quickly apparent that Bennett's goal is much more demanding and rewarding than to summarize and critique. Instead, the purpose of this spirited and absorbing book is to call attention to those sites of contemporary experience that, far from being anesthetizing, continue to make experience meaningful. Indeed, it points to those aspects of contemporary existence that have the potential to reenchant, to recapture meaning from meaninglessness.

Bennett notes what few Weberians are willing to admit: The rationalism that he alleges is overtaking modernity actually conjoins everywhere with inventiveness, playfulness, and excitement. Human lives, far from always being dour, overdetermined existences, are frequently lived in wonder and marvel. The trick, therefore, lies in discovering the sources of this enchantment and encouraging its recognition and continuation.

This creative theorization arises from diverse and eclectic sources. From classic philosophy, Bennett finds the Epicurean notion of the "swerve," the conception that all matter has an intrinsic motility and unpredictability, the most inspiring to contemporary students of politics. From Kant, she takes the recognition that the supersensible world imposes itself upon our purported understanding of nature. And from animals' learning to speak, to Wim Wenders's films, to Deleuze and Guattari's "body without organs," she draws out the exotic and transformative roles that our attachments to the nonhuman can play.

Perhaps most tellingly, Bennett uses Kafka to ambush her reader from odd hiding places and in surprising disguises. This is not simply the Kafka who denounces the hyperbureaucratized, modern life, though; Bennett's attention goes instead to the combinations of the animal and the human, the rational and the absurd, the stultifying and the exhilarating that Kafka introduces to literature. Kafka's characters, who transform from *Homo sapiens* to beast (and vice versa), who ride in strangely animate and politicized objects, and who are entranced by the agencies that entrap them, are the avowed inspiration for Bennett's political vision.

Bennett clearly has an implicit narrative of disenchantment herself here, but it is not the disenchantment of the world as much as it is the disenchantment of those of us who attempt to make sense of the world. Those theorists who depict an impotent humanity in the vise of the modern world, those social scientists who want to hew as close as possible to "science" yet insist on the most sterile, impoverished versions of it, and those who rigorously police the boundaries among ethics, politics, and aesthetics (guarding each from the contamination of the others): These are the nihilistic forces that actually disempower political will and discourage receptivity to difference and inspiration.

At the center of the book stands a chapter dedicated to explaining a materialism that springs, Phoenix-like, from the ashes of Marxist rationality. For Marx and his followers, the fetishization of commodities subtracts attention from the work that has produced them and, thus, ultimately subtracts meaning from humanity. Conversely, Bennett celebrates the ability of commodities, even mass-produced consumer commodities, to transfix and transform us, adding significance and import to human existence. Though this celebration has its dangers, she argues, the reductionisms that view commodities as no more or less than the circumstances of their manufacture (or the institutionalized economies of their exchange) loom far more ominous, for they disparage the bodily, historical, sonorous, emotive, and intellectual engagements that these commodities provide.

Perhaps the highest compliment one can pay to a book (and one that can all too rarely be paid to books in political science) is to say that it transforms the reader's outlook and behavior. For me, Bennett's book awakened what Thoreau (the subject of her 1994 book) also does in his writing: the recognition of how convention and routine are the enemies of creation and engagement. It is customary, toward the end of a book review, to articulate an objection to some aspect of the work. Not only do the strengths of Bennett's book far outweigh any weaknesses, but also, more significantly, the very inspiration that it provides challenges the rote following of normative practices. To tack on an admonishment, even an apophantic one, would be to privilege ritual over innovation. This is a groundbreaking book, encompassing a theoretical commingling of diverse techniques of thought from Lucretius to the inventors of nanotechnology, a profound challenge to traditional critiques of modernity and materialism, and an embrace of the contingent and the marvelous. Bennett not only shows us the way to an enchanted world, she shows us that we are already there.

Politics Out of History. By Wendy Brown. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 193p. \$45.00 cloth, \$14.95 paper.

Leslie Paul Thiele, *University of Florida*

Wendy Brown argues that the metanarratives of modernity stories of the historical march of reason, the rule of truth, the fruits of expanding freedom, the benevolence of growing equality, and the prospect of endless peace and progress have been undermined by the experiences of our times. These narratives once provided banisters for political thought and staircases for political life. They are now left in tatters, and there are no viable replacements. *Politics Out of History* explores the deformities of politics in these times. Despite the heralded triumph of liberal capitalism, the world does not appear to be blessed with an overabundance of stable, just, pluralistic societies in which poverty, environmental degradation, and social cleavages are but faint memories. Confronted with enduring problems and denied consoling ideals, denizens of the postmodernity are left to their own devices. They must negotiate a world where power is without logic, political life is deprived of teleology, nature has become contested terrain, and conviction often appears as a retreat to the indefensible.

For Brown, the theorist is a diagnostician. The chief symptom of decaying life in the wake of the battered narratives of modernity, at least among the liberal left, is moralism. Understood as a self-righteous reproach to (all cohabitations with) power coupled with an unproductive whining about past injuries, moralism is a reactionary gesture. It is the nay-saying of (political) life that accompanies the historical loss of teleological support for our ethical impulses. Moralism, Brown asserts, is antidemocratic in that its reproachful attitude deprecates open debate. (There is an intriguing analysis of Brown's own encounter with feminist moralizing, where her critical approach to the status of a women's studies program elicited accusations of collaborating with the enemy.) To the extent that moralism promotes an uncompromising politics of truth, Brown (like Hannah Arendt) condemns it as totalitarian.

In lieu of a retreat to moralism, Brown promotes an agonistic politics that embraces contingency, invention, and compromise. Her theoretical comrades-in-arms in this venture are Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, and their influence is everywhere. Brown is a superb reader of Nietzsche and Foucault. In these essays, she seldom strays from their shadows. Brown's chapter on Marx is more original, as she assesses

Marx's tendency both to dismiss and to rely heavily upon the power of superstructure and culture. (Of course, Lenin already pointed out that ideology was vested with power.) Although the essay bears a noticeable Foucaultian slant, Brown criticizes Foucault's genealogy for "sharing some of the same conceits about power's inherently logical yet hidden operation discerned in Marx" (p. 90). Unfortunately, Brown does not defend this claim. And in a subsequent chapter, she appears to contradict it, eulogizing Foucaultian genealogy precisely for its rejection of all continuous histories and its assertion that power does not demonstrate a clear logic (p. 117) but rather develops into "varied and protean orders of subjection" (p. 104). One is left unsure of the status of the former criticism.

Brown believes that the pursuit of practicality hinders intellectual life, at least for the theorist. Hence *Politics Out of History* offers little in the way of prescription. Yet we may glean a constructive, and hopeful, message from Brown's subtle readings of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Benjamin, Foucault, and Derrida. It is a message quite similar to that provided by Hannah Arendt, though Brown largely ignores this linkage. For Arendt, the exercise of judgment allows us to win back our human dignity from what she called the "pseudo-divinity named History." By denying history's prerogative to define our lives and world without denying its importance, Arendt hoped to resuscitate our capacity for judgment and, through judging, to validate the particular and the contingent. (*The Life of the Mind* (1978) and *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy* (1982)). Brown suggests that the one-dimensional metanarratives of modernity, however seductive, are much less conducive to the development of sound political judgment than the contested, multifaceted micronarratives that might emerge in their wake. The politics that develop out of enlivened, agonistic historical readings may, Brown concludes, offer "modest new possibilities for the practice of freedom" (p. 173).

Recalling Nietzsche's teutonic motto that "what doesn't kill me makes me stronger," Brown extols the practice of freedom in the space once occupied by the banisters and staircases stabilizing and directing modern political thought and life. Brown assumes contemporary democratic politics to be strong enough to survive such challenges. Should we share her optimism? Helping tattered narratives slide into oblivion may indeed "incite" virtue and, in a technocratic age, challenge domination, as Brown asserts. And I couldn't agree more with Brown's statement that the "permanent resistance" of the state by its citizens ensures their democratic life, even though the state guarantees their freedom to resist. But such resistance, if carried out in the absence of all ideals and principles, may harbor much political malfeasance—malfeasance that makes moralism appear to be, at most, a relatively benign annoyance.

Brown decries moralizers for being parasitic upon the power-infested social order that they spurn, and for which they offer "no real remedy" (p. 60). She's dead on the mark here. Yet, in many respects, Brown's own work nourishes itself upon the ragings of the moralists, and, like them, she does not stoop to offer concrete remedies. Brown also slides into nostalgia. Like the moralists she condemns, Brown occasionally pines for a former day when politics was ostensibly a realm of heightened freedom. She states, for instance, that "we inheritors of a radically disenchanted universe feel a greater political impotence than humans may have ever felt before" (p. 139). This sensibility, though popular among postmodernists, is hard to square with an historical sense. Are we to assume that the level of political impotence felt by various peoples of the past—the slaves of antiquity, medieval serfs, or colonial peasants, for instance—pales in comparison

to that experienced by the people of our generation, say those citizens across the globe who regularly surprise the pundits at the polls, or those who helped topple the Berlin Wall? No doubt, the technocultural juggernaut that streamlines our world is an awesome force. Yet we must acknowledge that political freedom and opportunity can, and often do, coexist with increasing cultural homogeneity.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, *Politics Out of History* provides insightful, well-crafted essays addressing many important thinkers and texts. Readers will benefit from its critical exchanges, which extend a perspective developed in *States of Injury*, Brown's (1995) earlier work.

The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects. By Barbara Cruikshank. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. 160p. \$41.95 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Clarissa Rile Hayward, *Ohio State University*

There is a certain comfort, a certain ease, with which many contemporary political thinkers reach for an ideal they call "democratic citizenship" in response to a wide range of problems produced by relations of power: problems of social and political inequality, for instance, problems of injustice, problems of exclusion and marginalization. In *The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects*, Barbara Cruikshank undertakes the important task of disturbing that ease. "Citizen," she argues persuasively, is not the atonym of "subject." Instead, a citizen is a particular kind of a subject, a subject forged in ways that not only enable but also, unavoidably, constrain human social and political possibility. Those who would criticize relations of power need to examine, Cruikshank suggests, the ways in which citizens are made: what she calls the "technologies of citizenship" (for instance, the pedagogic programs, the social services, the social movements) through which modern democratic societies produce members capable of acting politically—and inclined to act politically—to advance their individual and their shared interests.

Cruikshank examines these technologies through four case studies, which she uses to map the political logic of "empowerment" from a Foucaultian perspective. She considers, first, nineteenth-century reform movements led by philanthropists, social workers, and others, who emphasized self-help as a means to promoting the autonomy and the self-sufficiency of the poor. She turns, next, to the American antipoverty movement of the 1960s, in particular, the Community Action Program's mandate for "maximum feasible participation" by the poor in developing and implementing the programs meant to serve them. She considers, in addition, the self-esteem movement of the 1980s and the early 1990s, as well as recent efforts by welfare rights advocates to empower the poor to pursue and promote their own interests and to resist the forms of scapegoating practiced by conservatives since the Reagan years.

Cruikshank uses these case studies to advance three principle claims. First, she stresses that power need not be exercised by the state. Second, she argues that it need not be channeled through the actions of powerful agents who will and intend its effects. Third, she emphasizes that it need not take the form of overt coercion or force. On the contrary, Cruikshank's central claim is that the most effective forms of power solicit people's voluntary participation in efforts to mold them into the right kinds of subjects: to mold them, that is, into self-sufficient, politically active, empowered democratic citizens.

Cruikshank is certainly correct when she claims that "[d]emocratic relations are still relations of power" (p. 18)

and that “empowerment is a power relationship” (p. 86). She gestures toward important distinctions when she writes that self-government can be performed “well” or “badly” (p. 2) and that empowerment, similarly, “can be used well or badly” (p. 86). She fails, however, to do the hard work of explaining and defending her view of what it means to engage in collective self-government “well,” or to empower “well,” as opposed to “badly.”

Consider her treatment of the book’s opening vignette, in which she describes her fruitless search for the face behind a local exercise of power. In 1989, Cruikshank writes, the trash dumpsters in her neighborhood suddenly were locked, preventing homeless people and others from scavenging for food and other discarded goods. She details her unsuccessful efforts to locate the agent(s) responsible for the decision, using the story to illustrate how power can operate in anonymous ways, through small decisions not directed by a powerful actor. As she elaborates this story, she alludes to a set of imprecise normative commitments that seem to play an important role in motivating the larger study. For instance, she explains the significance of the locks on the garbage bins this way: “Those struggling to stay out of the arms of the poverty industry now had no recourse but to steal their subsistence or submit to case management in one or another shelter or social service program. *It seemed obvious to me that the space of freedom was shrinking . . .*” (p. 10; emphasis added).

However, despite repeated references to freedom throughout the book, neither here nor at any other point in the argument does Cruikshank explain how she envisions this “space of freedom.” The closest she comes is at the end of a chapter on welfare rights activism, where she rejects as “not an effective mode of resistance” efforts to challenge publicly false claims about welfare fraud (p. 121). It is better, she asserts, to follow Foucault’s counsel and “refuse what we are,” that is, to probe critically and to resist and to challenge the processes through which subject categories—such as “welfare queen” and “democratic citizen”—are socially constructed, maintained, and policed. But Cruikshank never explains *why* such probing and contesting is a more effective form of resistance than the welfare rights activists’ strategies that she dismisses. She never identifies the criteria she employs to determine that such forms of resistance are the best.

Producing citizens “well,” she enigmatically suggests near the close of the book, is a matter of producing them “democratically” (p. 124). It is hard to imagine, however, what “democratically” might mean in the context of Cruikshank’s larger argument that the democratic citizen itself is an effect of power. Nor is it clear why one would identify as a specifically *democratic* practice the Foucaultian notion of “refusing what we are.”

Its shortcomings notwithstanding, *The Will to Empower* is an engaging book that raises important questions about social power and democratic citizenship. The text is clearly written and provides Foucaultian insights into these questions that will be accessible even to those not familiar with poststructuralist theory.

Our Sense of the Real: Aesthetic Experience and Arendtian Politics. By Kimberly Curtis. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. 224p. \$39.95 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

Robert Pirro, *Georgia Southern University*

Of particular interest in the proliferating scholarship on Hannah Arendt is how her thought has recently attracted sympathetic attention in areas of theoretical inquiry once considered problematic for her. So, for example, the Graecophile Arendt, previously dismissed by many feminist

thinkers for failing to take adequate account of the machismo and misogyny of ancient Greek culture, has inspired a volume of sympathetic feminist readings of her work (Bonnie Honig, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt*, 1995). Respectful reconsiderations of the Eichmann controversy at symposia and in a recently published volume (Steven E. Aschheim’s *Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem*, 2001) signal that the shadow once cast on Arendt’s theoretical and personal integrity as an investigator of the nature and significance of modern Jewish identity has largely been lifted. To these efforts to engage sympathetically what were once considered the most problematic elements of Arendt’s thought can be added Kimberly Curtis’s highly interesting and rewarding book.

The main premise of Curtis’s book is that a notion of aesthetic experience underlies Arendt’s vision of political and human affairs, providing an ethical basis for the sort of participatory politics of which Arendt was such a prominent promoter. In casting Arendt as a theorist for whom aesthetic experience was not merely an analogy for politics but a constituent element of political thought and action, Curtis invites objections from several theoretical perspectives. To communarians of the Left, the “aesthetic-existential drive” called for by Arendt’s political vision would seem to lend itself too easily to a politics of self-indulgent, individualistic bluster (p. 34). Feminists might reasonably suspect that Arendt’s affirmation of an “ontology of display” encourages an inappropriate attitude of aesthetically informed detachment from, if not contempt for, the material bases and requirements of life (p. 31). Liberal-minded theorists might justifiably wonder about the ethical implications of a polity in which people’s relationships to each other and the world are so centrally mediated by aesthetic experience. Curtis responds directly to these and other challenges by theorizing the positive ethical significance of the aesthetic dimensions of Arendt’s thought.

For Curtis, the ethical promise of Arendt’s aestheticism lies fundamentally in the compelling ways in which her thought fosters a basic attentiveness to difference. “Her aestheticism is mindful—indeed driven—by the need for a world sufficiently common that human particularity and plurality can be cherished and saved, a world in which the texture of reality is fullness as opposed to force” (p. 20). In Arendt’s late reflections in “Thinking,” Curtis finds an “ontology of display,” according to which “reality in an appearing world is something born out of a highly charged mutual sensuous provocation between actors and spectators” (p. 31). Delineating this ontology against the backdrop of Arendt’s encounter with Merleau-Ponty’s later writings and her emphasis on the theatricality of the political world, Curtis emphasizes the mutuality of this impulse to self-display. Far from endorsing “a uni-directional, megalomaniacal urge to be admired by others,” Arendt’s intent is to show that political actors must take account of others because “our capacity to experience a world in common, to constitute a certain worldly solidity is utterly dependent on the engendering ground of plurality itself, on aesthetic provocation among multiple, distinct appearing beings” (pp. 33, 36).

The notion of an aesthetic pleasure founded on, and attentive to, difference and variety also underlies Curtis’s insightful discussion of Arendt’s “apparent devaluation of bodily existence and the concerns, practices, experiences, and outlooks peculiar to it” (p. 39). Acknowledging the deficiency in Arendt’s conception of biological necessity, Curtis nevertheless attempts to wring some positive significance from this conception by considering it in relation to a notion of plurality and difference. According to this notion, appreciation of the unique rewards to be gained in the realm of freedom depends significantly on the existence of a realm of necessity whose

different modalities foster an awareness of what freedom is and provide vitalizing respite from its demands.

The notion that attentiveness to plurality and difference carries with it a sort of aesthetic pleasure also frames Curtis's defense of the ethical relevance of Arendt's notion of thinking. Taking up Arendt's suggestion that the "inherent duality (of thinking) points to the infinite plurality of the earth," Curtis argues that the dialogical activity of thinking conditions us "when. . . we return to the world of appearances. . . to feel pleasure in the plurality of meanings that dialogue engenders," with the result that "our attentiveness to the world of particulars is enhanced" (p. 61).

In the middle chapter of the book, Curtis gives central place to the notion of oblivion, arguing that Arendt's theorizing, particularly her critique of modernity for its lack of public spaces, was driven by a recognition of the serious existential injury done to those who are deprived of the reality-enhancing rewards of public action. In aesthetically recasting Arendt's concern for "the insult of oblivion," Curtis rightly reminds us that the effectiveness of claims for social justice significantly rests on an underlying politically conditioned context of attentiveness to the reality of different others (p. 68). The dysfunctions of living in oblivion are especially manifest to Curtis in the examples of economic and social "enclaving"—gated communities and *maquiladora*-style labor districts—with which she begins her book.

Having emphasized the promise of Arendtian thought and politics to enhance aesthetically our appreciation of plurality and difference, Curtis poses judgment as a faculty capable of enhancing our sense of shared identity; it is the "means by which we join our 'particularized' selves to, and thereby engender . . . a world we . . . communicatively share" (p. 116). What Curtis contributes to the extensive secondary literature on Arendt's notion of judgment is a clearer understanding of how judging aesthetically fosters a sense of shared membership (which had in former times been passively dependent on the functioning of authority) by inviting us to "find (each others' judgments) beautiful insofar as they illuminate the profound and difficult need we have for countenancing others. . ." (p. 121).

In the last chapter, Curtis analyzes two episodes of political judgment from Arendt's life (concerning Zionist activities in the founding years of Israel and actions taken by Jewish councils under Nazi rule) and a story of a KKK official's personal and political transformation to illustrate the links she theorized earlier among the aesthetic, ethical, and political dimensions of human affairs. There are some missteps in the discussion of Arendt's controversial judgment of Jewish councils, including a not insignificant misquote—Arendt felt more grief by the wrongs done *by*, not *to*, her own people (p. 135). Also, Curtis does not consider the complexities of Arendt's "membership in the community of Jews"—To what extent was there *one* community? and In which respects, if any, was that community "political"? (pp. 132, 135).

All in all, this book stands as an insightful defense and creative articulation of the aesthetic dimensions of Arendt's thought. Whether one is drawn to or put off by Arendt's aestheticism, this book is worth reading.

The Odyssey of Political Theory: The Politics of Departure and Return. By Patrick J. Deneen. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 275p. \$35.00 cloth.

Aryeh Botwinick, *Temple University*

This thoughtful and innovative book seeks to locate the polarities between which the Western intellectual and political

traditions move in terms of a struggle within Odysseus's soul between endless departures and explorations and burstings of limits and "homeward returns" to family and polity that register his awareness of the perdurability of limits. In the end, Odysseus identifies (however ambivalently) with those limits, and his struggles and resolutions as recounted by Homer help to establish a framework in terms of which Deneen locates and evaluates the debate between Martha Nussbaum and her critics concerning the attractions and deficiencies of cosmopolitanism as both an ethical and a political program and set of values.

The debate surrounding cosmopolitanism frames the book in its opening and concluding chapters—and the categorical distinction between "homecoming" and "cosmopolitanism" serves as the central organizing framework of the book. I believe that it is theoretically vulnerable. Part of the problematic of the "homecoming" versus "cosmopolitanism" distinction is that some version of localism and communitarianism tinges and links both notions. Cosmopolitans rhetorically promulgate and defend their views to establish a community with other cosmopolitans. Given the variety of voices in the international political arena, ranging from the anarchistic to the most vociferously nationalistic, cosmopolitans (at least at this stage in the development of their political program) are trying to cultivate a community of like-minded individuals who perceive the world political situation and diagnose the moral imperatives residing within it in ways similar to their own.

Conversely, for those who give their loyalty to some version of a local nationality or political community, what is at stake is not something concrete in relation to the abstraction of "cosmopolis." As Benedict Anderson and others have argued, because of the variety of ways in which populations can be configured in relation to territorial units, nation-states themselves are imaginary or imagined communities conjured up out of the heterogeneous givens endemic to any recognizable political entity. The idea of any particular nation is underdetermined by the factors conducive to nationhood. In this important sense, nations are as fully abstract and "floating" as is cosmopolis.

The three middle chapters of this book are devoted to Plato's *Republic*, Rousseau's *Emile*, and Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*—where Deneen argues that the character of Odysseus plays an important symbolic and subliminal role in the formulation of the argument. Deneen is interested in the reciprocal relationship between how these theorists construe Odysseus and the interpretive afterglow that those readings cast upon the "Odyssean metaphysic" in making sense of the Western past.

Part of the originality in this conception resides in its displacement of a Jewish Biblical point of origin for Western political and theoretical sensibility with a bipolarity within the Greek thought-world itself—between unbounded "departures" and the irrevocability of "return." The "return" aspect—the fastening upon the unimpeachability of limits (ethical, metaphysical, moral, religious)—is what traditionally has been identified as the Jewish pole of Western origins in works as diverse as Matthew Arnold's "Hebraism and Hellenism," Erich Auerbach's *Mimesis*, and Leo Baeck's "Romantic Religion." James Joyce, in *Ulysses*, effects a displacement in a direction contrary to the one pursued by Deneen in his book. The "homeward" drives in Odysseus' personality lead Joyce to translate him into a Jewish Everyman and Everywoman in the persons of Leopold and Molly Bloom. Apparently, Joyce perceives the homeward-bound constituents of Odysseus's self as having their greatest theoretical, cultural, and political efficacy when embodied in the tenets and practices of monotheistic religion. There is a

cryptic but tantalizing sentence early in *Ulysses* that reverberates with such an understanding. Joyce refers to the medieval Islamic philosopher Averroes and to the medieval Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides as “dark men in mien and movement, flashing in their mocking mirrors the obscure soul of the world, a darkness shining in brightness which brightness could not comprehend” (James Joyce, *Ulysses*, Gabler ed., 1986, p. 23).

Following in the footsteps of Vico in *The New Science* (who also serves as an important guide for Horkheimer and Adorno in their investigations), Deneen (p. 174) says that “the creative poet par excellence is Homer, from whom the West can credit its religious origins.” Deneen sees the Odysseus who enjoys an exalted status in Plato’s retelling of the Myth of Er at the conclusion of *The Republic* (presumably because of “the depth of his wisdom and prudence” and his pursuit of “the road of the philosopher”) as suggesting on an implicit level a reconciliation of the vocations of the poet and philosopher whose coexistence within the confines of the same polity Plato finds so disturbing on an abstract theoretical level (p. 112). Deneen’s reading provokes a question that it is not able to answer. If Plato is reinventing Homer to domesticate him to the requirements of philosophy, what are the background understandings of philosophy impelling Plato in this direction? Far more historically plausible and theoretically satisfying, it seems to me, is Hannah Arendt’s reading of Plato’s relationship to Homer in *The Human Condition* as inaugurating a series of unending “reversibility maneuvers” that characterize the enterprise of Western philosophy until the present day. According to Arendt, Plato turns Homer upside down. It is not life after death that is located in a cave, but “ordinary life on earth”; “the soul is not the shadow of the body, but the body the shadow of the soul”; it is those wedded to a cave-like existence here on earth who live a shadowy existence, and not “the soul after death in Hades” (Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 1958, pp. 265–66). Apparently, these reversibility maneuvers can be engaged in because Plato has detached words from things—has metaphysically identified an unbridgeable distance between words, concepts, and categories and the worldly furniture and phenomena to which they ostensibly refer.

If Deneen, in some not-fully developed way, did indeed want to locate a Greek placeholder for a monotheistic philosophical position that envisions an ever-expanding metaphysical middle, a much more promising source might have been Plato’s *Parmenides*, where the One as the ultimate explanatory factor for phenomena has to be denied reality to preserve the integrity of its Oneness. If the One is accorded reality, it means that there are embodiments and analogues to it in experience that vitiate its Oneness. Tracing a Platonic, rather than a Homeric, source for the idea that our craving for contact with ultimate transcendence is inevitably thwarted, and that we are poised for a “homeward return,” would enable Deneen to deal more charitably with Horkheimer and Adorno, and Rousseau, than he in fact does. Horkheimer and Adorno are best understood from a Platonic perspective as rearticulating in a catastrophic twentieth-century context the pathos of attempting to bridge the gap between the One and the Many. The One is now the solitary individual and the Many are the political community—but the solitary individual now harbors within himself traces of all those yearnings for and gropings toward transcendence that Plato prefigures in the *Parmenides*, and thus the absences and aborted deliverances that he experiences become the only palpable traces and reminders for him of all of those institutions from God to the political community that he is not able to sustain theoretically in a more direct, positive way. The solitary individual becomes the icon of the absent God.

Rousseau’s and Horkheimer and Adorno’s valorization of a beginning (the early phases of the state of nature a pure moment of enlightenment that does not get mired in the reifying and distorting mechanisms of myth [Deneen, pp. 152 and 185]) to which the imperative to return is overwhelming and the possibility of recovering is close to zero resonates with monotheistic sensibility derivable in one of its strands from Plato’s *Parmenides*. This dialogue posits a God who is both the consummation of the intellectual exploratory quest and the existentialist quest for anchorage and who, precisely because He is the consummation of those quests (and logically distinct from our everyday existences), can never be retrieved on a literal level into any human present.

One final note: Perhaps, as Peter Green (*The New Republic*, July 12, 1999, p. 43) has reminded us, Homer’s world (including Odysseus) is representative of a “joyful creed, preserved in oral tradition, of a Bronze Age aristocracy that loved life with a manic fierceness, and treasured it all the more for its brevity and perils.” Perhaps there is an historical optical illusion here. What looks like a moment of return, an embrace of the middle, is really a single-minded, ecstatic embrace of life not as a pulling-back from a futile pursuit of transcendence but as representing the highest moment of intoxicating transcendence itself. If this is the case, then Deneen’s reading of *The Odyssey* and its shaping influence on Western thought is a deliberately anachronistic reading that is already suffused with those Platonic and post-Platonic subtexts that I have described. In this case, I have (in at least some respects) only rendered explicit what is more submerged and contextual in Deneen’s valuable book.

Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective. Edited by Bob Edwards, Michael W. Foley, and Mario Diani. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2001. 340p. \$25.00.

Steven Johnston, *University of South Florida*

Tocqueville observed, “I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America.” Moreover, he continued, “Freedom of opinion does not exist in America.” With the United States committed to a war (not to be called a crusade) against terrorism, these words from Tocqueville seem apt. If indeed the world changed on 11 September 2001, perhaps it became Manichean. Good versus evil, civilization versus barbarism, modernity versus medievalism, freedom versus fundamentalism, us versus them: These are the terms of political discourse. In the new order, you are either with the United States and the World or you are against it. Time to decide. War abhors ambiguity.

I start with 11 September since the future of the American democracy is very much in question. What kind of insight might the “civil society debate” provide on the current situation? Social capital, collective trust, networks of association, social structures: Don’t we need these things now more than ever? Robert Putnam would think so. In fact, in a *New York Times* op-ed piece of 19 October 2001, he says so. Fortunately, Americans are answering the call. They are giving blood, donating money, waving flags, and attending church. Concerned that the “new mood” might not last, Putnam offers recommendations to take advantage of “this resurgence of community involvement.” For him, World War II has been recovered. This generation has its Pearl Harbor, and the greatest generation may have a worthy successor after all. The opportunity must not be squandered.

Beyond Tocqueville operates in and around the world according to Putnam. In one sense, the essays collected here challenge it. First and foremost, this means that Putnam's unidirectional causal logic is questioned. He contends that the health of democracy depends on the quality of its associational life. The editors and authors of this volume wish to contextualize this assessment. Edwards, Foley, and Diani, invoking Michael Walzer, argue that "a democratic civil society seems to require a democratic state, and a strong civil society seems to require a strong and responsive state" (p. 18). The essays in part one of this volume make a convincing case that Putnam's analytic needs to be complicated. Of course, I'm not sure that Putnam would object. Certainly the Putnam of the *New York Times* op-ed piece would not. For him, the state is key.

Where the Putnam debate gets interesting is on the question of politics. By and large, it seems to be missing in action. Ironically, then, *Beyond Tocqueville* performs the limitations of the civil society/social capital problematic. Thus the essays by Mark R. Warren, Debra C. Minkoff, and Jackie Smith, which seem to have been forced into the collection, stand out. They deal with politics at the local, national, and transnational levels, respectively. Here the struggle with Putnam and his interlocutors heats up. As Warren writes, "Although we need to reestablish a cooperative basis to American politics, the communitarian version of democracy is insufficient because it fails to appreciate politics as the realm of conflict and power as well as collaboration" (p. 172). What is more, the idea of social capital can be problematic, as Putnam concedes when he asks: Does it have a dark side? Is it inimical to liberty and tolerance? In *Bowling Alone* (2001, chap. 22), Putnam is pleased to report that tolerance actually seems to rise with civic engagement and participation in voluntary associations. If anything, the stay-at-homeers are a cause for concern. Curiously, Putnam does not address the question of liberty—at least not what Berlin would call positive liberty. This is no accident. Tolerance can be tolerated because it is compatible with marginalization and exclusion. But liberty as self-determination may prove tougher to control. Social and political life might become messy, unruly.

Thus politics is suspect in Putnam's optic because it divides rather than unites. The editors observe, "Neo-Tocquevillian liberals and conservative proponents of civil society tend to ignore or actively exclude from consideration those sorts of organizations and activities that are associated with advocacy and political action . . ." (p. 6). Hence the importance of Eastern Europe and Latin America, where contending conceptions of civil society feature contestation, struggle, life and death, politics. This volume suggests that there is a need to go not just beyond Tocqueville but also beyond Putnam. Consider the *Times* piece. Speaking of World War II, he writes, "Sacrifice was reinforced by popular culture from radio shows to comic strips. All Americans felt they had to do their share, thereby enhancing each American's sense that her commitment and contribution mattered." Yet as he celebrates mass loyalty oaths (16,000 strong in Chicago), he ignores Japanese-American citizens in internment camps who refused military induction and were sent to (another) prison. In short, not all Americans felt the same way. Putnam's wish for the present has become fact in the past, though surely he knows it's untrue—just as it is untrue today regarding Operation Enduring Freedom (not to be called Infinite Justice). Fortunately, pace Putnam, not all American citizens, let alone citizens elsewhere around the world, feel the same way about or agree on "the basic issues."

Nevertheless, America is united, though there seems to be a necessary underside to unity. George Bush redeems the

imperial presidency and Congress abdicates its constitutional responsibilities. Homeland security demands the contraction of core liberties and the ACLU monitors the degradation. Be politically incorrect and challenge the dominant war narrative on ABC, and you will have to apologize to save your job, perhaps much more. Speak against the war at a college or university and you can find yourself on a McCarthyite hit list. It might be tempting to say that politics stops at war's edge, but Americans have been trained to hate politics in the best of times; in the worst of times, politics is un-American. What is wrong with this picture of democracy?

In the aftermath of 9–11, Robert Putnam has been pleasantly surprised by the "solidarity" Americans have displayed. "[T]his new period of crisis can make real to us and our children the value of deeper community connections." No doubt. But does Putnam's idealized civil society of blood-donating, flag-saluting, war-bond-buying Boy Scouts make for a healthy democracy? If you equate democracy with representation, stable majority rule, and ordered consensus, perhaps. But if you affirm a Machiavellian ethos and conceive political contestation as constitutive of freedom, you wonder. Where civil society theorists think socialization, democracy theorists suspect normalization.

Matters don't necessarily improve when *Beyond Tocqueville* takes an economic turn. Essays by Charles Heying, Michael Schulman and Cynthia Anderson, and Lane Kenworthy offer alternative accounts of declining social capital. Reversing the neo-Tocquevillian analysis, they address the dislocations stemming from globalization and economic restructuring. Grant them the primacy of economics in their causal arguments. Assume that production reigns supreme in the order of things and social capital follows. America's citizenship crisis cannot be solved by prosperity or government-induced economic cooperation. The latter are not designed to address the former. Once again, the civil society problematic proves to be of limited value in contemporary politics.

Fortunately, Minkoff and Smith prefer to explore the workings of national and transnational social movement organizations (SMOs). Entities like EarthAction and Greenpeace may or may not be "productive of social capital" (p. 183), but insofar as they embody democratization and pluralization the question becomes moot—especially if you don't presume that democracy invariably tends to anarchy as participation and enfranchisement flourish. These SMOs privilege social justice, human rights, and peace. Not surprisingly, then, the most interesting essays in this volume ultimately leave behind the civil society and social capital framework (as overly liberal democratic and state-centered) to ponder and research new social and political forms. To think about democracy principally in terms of social capital and trust may be to force it into an impoverished theoretical framework. A Mobilization for Global Justice campus chapter would trump a bowling league any day.

Social Rights Under the Constitution: Government and the Decent Life. By Cecile Fabre. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 202p. \$72.00 cloth.

Katherine Fierlbeck, *Dalhousie University*

The relationship between economic redistribution and democracy has experienced a profound political shift in the past two decades, which we are only now beginning to analyze with any perspicacity or insight. This conceptual shift has consisted primarily in the ability of the administrations of Thatcher and Reagan, among others, to convince even the less well-off to support policies that seemed to widen the income

gap, with the promise of securing greater absolute gains for all. Social reformers, who for the previous century had viewed democratic procedures and institutions as means of achieving a wider redistribution of wealth, were clearly flummoxed.

This book addresses this relationship directly and yet, ultimately, misses the substantial point underlying this shift. Fabre's aim is to explicate the relationship between social rights and democracy and thereby to make the case for the constitutional entrenchment of rights to adequate minimum income, housing, health care, and education. The novel aspect of Fabre's position is her claim that one ought not to base an argument for social rights on their intrinsic necessity to a "democratic" culture (e.g., the argument that social rights are required as a component of democratic citizenship). Indeed, she maintains that social rights are for the most part largely "undemocratic," but that this is nonetheless insufficient reason to reject them.

Instead of making social rights derivative of democratic rights, Fabre constructs her argument for an equal fundamental interest in having a decent life upon the principles of autonomy and well-being. This first step is both the most and the least contentious. It is contentious because her definition of autonomy is made to do a great deal of work. Autonomy, for Fabre, involves having not only personal capacities and the opportunities to choose from various opportunities, but, most significantly, *access* to opportunities (pp. 9–12). The reason we ought to have rights is not merely because we are autonomous (we generally hold that even nonautonomous individuals such as newborns have rights) but rather because "the kind of person who leads a decent life has special moral value" (p. 17). Thus, "if some of their needs are not met, people cannot be the kind of person who leads a decent life, because they cannot be autonomous and they cannot achieve well-being" (p. 18). The reason this claim is so contentious, of course, is that needs are socially determined (p. 35), and thus we are, in the author's account, obliged to provide something that we cannot clearly define, and that shifts from place to place and from one time period to another. And yet this is *not* a particularly contentious claim insofar as most liberal democracies do in fact make a sustained effort to provide such social goods at some minimal level precisely to provide a decent life for their citizens.

The real issue, then, is whether such rights ought to be constitutionalized; and the reason this leads to such dissension is because it raises the issue of political control over the monies raised through taxation. Democratic representation was, in both England and the United States, historically the product of a propertied class who felt that they were being taxed without having a say in how their monies were spent. Small surprise, then, that the same issue should raise the hackles of modern liberal democrats. One of the many strengths of this book is the sheer philosophical weight brought to bear by the author to address this single point. Fabre engages a wide range of major theorists in this debate (although, interestingly, Hayek is missing); and she does not hesitate to address the canon of liberal thought on their own terms to make her case.

Disputing the argument that "social rights ought not to be constitutionalized because they are *positive* rights," Fabre argues that social rights ought to be considered for their substantive importance rather than because they are the result of procedural fairness. This is the nub of Fabre's case: Because democracy is essentially a process, rather than a value system, one can coherently hold that social rights ought to be protected while, at the same time, asserting that to do so would be "undemocratic" (simply because such constitutional entrenchment might not be supported by the democratic majority). This is a lively but unconvincing discussion:

Simply to say that "democracies can and often do act unjustly" (p. 114), for example, is not itself persuasive, as one can just as easily (and more precisely) say that countries with democratic procedural systems can come to decisions that do not reflect democratic values. Further, Fabre argues that social rights are not democratic rights, as it is not necessarily true that poverty prevents people from being able to participate politically (except, perhaps, insofar as education allows us to comprehend political issues): Empirically, perhaps, this holds true, although one might object that insofar as a casual correlation can be established at all (i.e., the more indigent one is, the less likely one will be to participate politically), it ought to serve as grounds for the provision of social rights.

Nonetheless, this is not a severe objection to Fabre's case. It is admittedly much snappier to say that "social rights are undemocratic but ought nonetheless to be constitutionalized"; but one can still hold that social rights *are* a reflection of democratic values *and* ought to be constitutionalized, without relying upon the democratic nature of these rights. Thus Fabre constructs a lucid, tightly constructed, and intelligent argument against grounding social rights upon democratic criteria. The problem for proponents of social rights (among whom she counts herself) is that she is more persuasive in her defeat of democratically based social rights than in her construction of an alternative basis for social rights (*viz.*, upon the values of autonomy and well-being); as noted above, much of this rests upon a very subjective appraisal of what ought to be required to live an autonomous and decent life. As most states do attempt to provide such necessities, the issue is not the principle of whether to provide them, but the *level* at which they ought to be provided. Fabre takes aim at this position and, in essence, asks liberals to put their money up front: If in fact they do accept that such services ought to be provided, why not allow nonelected officials (i.e., some level of judiciary) to determine the level? Ultimately, Fabre attempts to walk a middle ground between political representation and judicial protection by attempting to sketch out a system in which judges would determine whether or not the level of provision was acceptable, but elected governments would be responsible for finding a way to correct any deficiencies.

This is an excellent, cogently argued, and intellectually edifying book: and one that thinks about basic principles without divorcing them from the political context. However, the political force of the "new right revolution"—and the point that Fabre misses—is the claim that inequalities are justified (and that the level of taxation can never be taken out of the hands of the political representatives) simply because of the changing way in which wealth is produced: to wit, through a greater reliance upon international trade. Those who produce wealth, on this account, cannot be fettered by the demands of taxation (no matter how just those claims are) simply because by doing so we forfeit the larger social gains to be made if national enterprises can compete effectively internationally (which, again, on this account, requires minimal taxation). The problem, quite simply, is that counterfactual claims play a much greater role today in thinking about redistributive justice. As Fabre herself concedes, a government cannot justly interfere in favor of one beneficiary if by doing so "it undermines other people's prospects for a decent life" (p. 177). In just such a manner, Thatcher convinced a significant part of the electorate that the British welfare state interfered with people's prospects for a decent life and that the markets, rather than the courts or the executive, could provide this. This is not to condone this position, or to dispute the substance of Fabre's articulate and engaging argument. But the political success of this position, for better or for worse, does perhaps suggest that too much comes down to the issue of "Who determines what a decent life is?" and it is doubtful

that the majority itself would be willing to let a few appointed officials decide.

Rebel Writer: Mary Wollstonecraft and Enlightenment Politics. By Wendy Gunther-Canada. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001. 224p. \$38.00

Gina Luria Walker, *The New School*

This is a brave, important book that identifies and responds to the black holes between scholarly discourses and across genres to explain why and how Mary Wollstonecraft's texts should be recognized as "interrupting the fraternal conversation of political thought" (p. 42) among the men she herself described as "canonized forefathers." Reading carefully through selections from Wollstonecraft's writings—letters, educational treatises, novels, the *Vindications*—Wendy Gunther-Canada elucidates the continuum of Wollstonecraft's radical political theory about gender differences. *Rebel Writer* traces Wollstonecraft's transformation from "arguably the eighteenth century's most rebellious female reader [to] its most revolutionary feminist author," as she contested the portrayal of women in Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Locke, Fordyce, and Gregory, struggling to devise a feminism characterized by "the powerful confrontations between woman and the word, between literature and philosophy" (p. 16).

Gunther-Canada deliberately situates Wollstonecraft in the existing abyss between Virginia Sapiro's (1992) "path-breaking examination," *A Vindication of Political Virtue*, and literary theorist Gary Kelly's (1992) *Revolutionary Feminism: The Mind and Career of Mary Wollstonecraft*. Sapiro, Gunther-Canada advises, attempted to add Wollstonecraft to the lineage of masculine canonical thinkers but failed to examine the reasons for Wollstonecraft's continuing "marginalization" as an authoritative contributor to political theory. Kelly, she opines, "does a better job of theorizing genre, placing Wollstonecraft's works within the discursive context of the period, but he is . . . blindsided by the politics of gender" (pp. 6–7). This is somewhat turgid going until Gunther-Canada begins to read out loud, moving through Wollstonecraft's words, demonstrating her openness to fruitful insights wherever they may be found. She is stronger in literary studies than history. For example, she misses Barbara Taylor's ongoing, innovative formulations (Barbara Taylor, "Mary Wollstonecraft and the Wild Wish of Early Feminism," *History Workshop Journal* 33 (1992); "For the Love of God: Religion and the Erotic Imagination in Wollstonecraft's Feminism," in Eileen Janes Yeo, ed., *Mary Wollstonecraft and 200 Years of Feminism*, 1997), particularly their focus on the unresolved tension between reason and desire in Wollstonecraft's thought, as in her life. And I assume that Janet Todd's trenchant biography, based on the correspondence, appeared too late to be considered (Janet Todd, *Mary Wollstonecraft: A Revolutionary Life*, 2000).

Nevertheless, the book overall is concise, brilliant, and readable, with the successive chapters linking and building upon the texts in chronological order. In "A Voice from the Void," Gunther-Canada scrutinizes Wollstonecraft's earliest surviving letters and publications to reveal a developmental approach from girl to woman that anticipates Gilligan. "The Rebel Writer and the Rights of Men" explores her extraordinary response to Edmund Burke's (1790) *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. "The Feminist Author and Women's Rights" offers a superbly integrated analysis of the nexus of the two *Vindications*. "Writing the Wrongs of Politics" is a bold exegesis of the posthumously published, uncompleted fiction, *The Wrongs of Woman; or, Maria*, in which

Gunther-Canada claims that Wollstonecraft's change in literary genre from treatise to novel intentionally "highlighted a critical challenge to the discourse of political philosophy." Wollstonecraft, Gunther-Canada explains, "politicized the relationship of women to both fiction and philosophy by arguing that the sexual distinctions in eighteenth-century discourse structured and reinforced the social distinctions institutionalized by the law. Wollstonecraft radically contested the *very terms* upon which women enter the conversation of political theory" (p. 130).

I emphasize the impulse that compels Gunther-Canada to cast a wider conceptual net than is customary because, in addressing women's texts, it is crucial to acknowledge that they frequently emerge out of no codified, much less canonized, historical tradition and so demand to be considered from multiple directions. *Rebel Writer* demonstrates ably that this can be done.

This approach serves Gunther-Canada well in her analysis of Wollstonecraft's difficulties in writing women into the history of political thought. Interestingly, it is in her detailed analysis of *The Wrongs of Woman* that Gunther-Canada negotiates most skillfully between and among previous commentators from differing intellectual reference points, filling in what she declares is "missing" from our understanding. Wollstonecraft's final, fragmentary text, she writes, "offers a significant challenge to the foundations of eighteenth-century political thought. Both republican theorists on the Continent and liberal philosophers in England had defined their conception of the good society by constructing a public sphere composed of citizen fathers and an opposing private sphere of patriotic mothers. Wollstonecraft disputed the symmetry of this political cosmos, claiming that the power relationships that structured the institutions and processes of government were coterminous with those existing within the family" (p. 151). Wollstonecraft held the British government culpable, leaving women unprotected in the power struggles within their homes; she also held women responsible for complying with the distorted female representations they found in novels, conduct books, and existing laws that did not accurately or adequately reflect or respond to the realities of their lives.

Gunther-Canada concludes with a critique of two portrayals of Wollstonecraft that she describes as "fictions": *Memoirs of the Author of 'A Vindication of the Rights of Woman'*, written by William Godwin (1798), Wollstonecraft's husband, six months after her death from the aftereffects of childbirth, and Frances Sherwood's (1993) *Vindication*. In her criticisms of Godwin's Wollstonecraft, Gunther-Canada joins other modern readers who blame Godwin for the repudiation of Wollstonecraft's feminism by women as well as men during the 150 years since his account appeared. Here Gunther-Canada falters, surprisingly. In William Pitt's repressive witch hunt in the late 1790s, Wollstonecraft was identified as the witch even before the *Memoirs*. That Godwin struggled to articulate what Wollstonecraft had described to her lover Gilbert Imlay as "a new language" that exploded the gendered conversation between men and women about the discursive categories of "masculinity" and "femininity" is an index to how contested the subject was. And why should we expect Godwin to have been better than his male contemporaries at learning or deploying this lexicon? My own research on Wollstonecraft's feminist colleague and intimate friend Mary Hays (1759–1843) suggests that there were other progressive "generous men" who supported the efforts of individual women, but no man embraced "revolutionary feminism" as a necessary part of the male agenda for advancing "unlimited toleration." We may be disappointed that Godwin's Wollstonecraft reflects more his reformist interests than hers, but writing with

Wollstonecraft's manuscripts before him, Godwin achieved a new kind of ventriloquism, incorporating her ideas and phrases—"intellectual beauty," for example—into his narrative. I hope that Gunther-Canada will take another look.

Gunther-Canada's criticisms of Francis Sherwood's recent biographical fiction about Wollstonecraft, however, hit the mark. Godwin was on his own. Sherwood had at her disposal feminist thinking about Wollstonecraft from numerous perspectives over the past 30 years. Given the vagaries of trade publishing, Sherwood wasted a precious opportunity to give common readers access to an accurate amalgam of Wollstonecraft's life and work.

The freshness of Gunther's general evenhandedness as she reads her way along the parallel tracks of primary and secondary texts is welcome. Feminist scholarship is mature enough now to encourage inventive approaches to important thinkers that make use of other disciplines, even as they are grounded in the scholar's own. Joan Wallach Scott proposes a generous litmus test by which to calibrate commentary on Wollstonecraft: "The history of Wollstonecraft as a feminist . . . is the history of the uses made of her by subsequent generations" (Joan W. Scott, "The Imagination of Olympe de Gouges," in *Mary Wollstonecraft and 200 Years of Feminisms*, 1997, p. 37). Wendy Gunther-Canada has used her very well.

The Re-Enchantment of Political Science: Christian Scholars Engage Their Discipline. Edited by Thomas W. Heilke and Ashley Woodiwiss. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. 266p. \$70.00 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

Jeanne M. Heffernan, *Pepperdine University*

The postmodern challenge to the rationalist paradigm long regnant in American higher education has shaken the foundations of the secular academy, opening it up to a diversity of voices hitherto unheard. Under this new dispensation, Alan Wolfe observes, "Room can be made for any group, including conservative Christians" ("The Opening of the Evangelical Mind," *Atlantic Monthly* [October 2000]: 76). Various Christian scholars have indeed received at least a hearing—if not a welcome—in this more open atmosphere. The work of historians, such as Mark Noll and George Marsden, and philosophers, such as Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, has commanded national attention in secular academic circles; they have brought a distinctively Christian voice to their discipline.

Thomas Heilke and Ashley Woodiwiss endeavor to do the same. In *The Re-Enchantment of Political Science*, Heilke and Woodiwiss present a collection of essays that attempts to respond to two difficulties that have created a double bind for Christian scholars: first, the lack of a distinctive tradition of intellectual inquiry among evangelicals and, second, the hostility of the mainstream academy to faith-informed scholarship. With the weakening of the philosophical foundations supporting the latter, the editors argue, Christian scholars are now well positioned to remedy the former. Specifically, Christian political scientists can bring their religious commitments to bear on the analysis of various topics within the discipline. *The Re-Enchantment of Political Science* presents this kind of integrated scholarship on a wide range of subjects in political theory, public policy, and international relations. In the estimation of Heilke and Woodiwiss, the nine essays in *Re-Enchantment* reflect "an awakening of fresh and creative ways whereby Christian academics are reassessing how their theological commitments inform and shape their responses to the reigning orthodoxies that constitute their disciplines" (p. 3).

The editors themselves present the most provocative essays in the collection. Each proposes a radical alternative to well-entrenched orthodoxies in mainstream political science. Heilke, for instance, argues that social science inherited the epistemological weaknesses of liberalism in understanding human phenomena and in consequence has been "ethically incoherent" (p. 56), unable to render an adequate moral assessment of the American regime. He contends that an Anabaptist perspective, in light of its rich anthropology and social vision, provides a better vantage point from which to critically assess political phenomena. Only a metanarrative like this, grounded in an "ontology of peace" (p. 55) and instantiated in a nonhierarchical, nonpolitical church, can adequately critique the powers that be and offer effective witness of a different model of human relationships.

Woodiwiss, too, delivers a spirited criticism of social-scientific historiography, challenging what he considers the standard Whiggish account of the rise of the liberal state and its purported commitment to religious toleration. If one adopts an "ecclesiocentric narrative" (p. 77) instead, he insists, a very different and more accurate story emerges. According to this counternarrative, the liberal state under the ruse of toleration actually displaced religion from its ecclesial context, thus privatizing it and rendering it susceptible to state manipulation. Such manipulation continues unabated, for Woodiwiss, most obviously in Rawls and Macedo, more subtly in Galston and Perry. The work of these liberal theorists reveals "liberalism's essential, necessary and ineliminable commitment to exclusionism . . . [its] permanent fingering of the Church as requiring scrutiny, surveillance and policing" (p. 79). As evidenced by various "public" theologues, Christians have too often been co-opted by the liberal regime and hoodwinked by its appeal to reasonableness and toleration. Rather than accommodate this view, he argues, Christians should adopt a postliberal democratic theory, recognizing the "agonistic" (p. 157) character of politics as well as their own status as a "subaltern counterpublic" (p. 158) in a post-Christendom world.

Not every essay in the volume offers quite as provocative, novel, and well argued a thesis as Heilke's and Woodiwiss', but the collection as a whole is very strong. Nearly every piece provides a stimulating, sophisticated argument that brings a distinctive theological perspective into dialogic contact with mainstream research. In so doing, the essays make a powerful case for faith-informed scholarship. Ironically, however, they also reveal the difficulty of creating a "Christian political science" (p. 5). While the editors acknowledge that such an enterprise "will not be univocal in its evaluations and interpretations" (p. 9), they may have underestimated the depth of divergence within the collection. Serious and seemingly intractable differences surface in several of the essays. Fault lines emerge along ecclesiological, hermeneutical, and ethical lines. Dan Philpott, for instance, eloquently appeals to "Christ's love expressed as benevolence" (p. 250) as part of a justification for military action in the service of humanitarian intervention, an effort that Heilke's Anabaptism would prohibit. Likewise, Philpott's anthropology, rooted in the Thomistic natural law tradition, would differ markedly from Paul Brink's "relational" (p. 89) conception, informed as it is by Luther, Calvin, and Barth. So, too, would Clarke Cochran's commendation of Roman Catholic ecclesiology draw Heilke's criticism, while Cochran's reliance upon the concept of the "common good" might strike Woodiwiss as a "Constantinian" (p. 159) concession.

Despite these points of difference, the essays also reveal even deeper convergences. The common assumptions they share about creation, the nature and mission of Christ, and the social orientation of the Gospel are profound. From

these commonalities exciting possibilities emerge. The work of Timothy Sherratt and Stacy Hunter Hecht, for instance, suggests that in combination the Calvinist and Catholic concepts of “sphere sovereignty” (p. 126) and “subsidiarity” (p. 201) have important theoretical and practical utility in assessing the performance of the modern state. Also, Brink’s endorsement of pluralistic politics as best aligned with the relational character of the *imago Dei* dovetails well with the “counterpublic” model of Christian political action espoused by Woodiwiss. These kinds of ecumenical overlap indicate that the Christian “community of scholars” (p. 32) Michael LeRoy anticipates will have much to discuss.

Fortunately, if the essays in *The Re-Enchantment of Political Science* are predictive, this discussion will not simply be intramural. It will engage other scholars from across the discipline in an open and vigorous exchange of ideas. Such an enterprise, as Alan Wolfe suggests, would enrich secular and religious scholars alike.

Public Space and Democracy. Edited by Marcel Hénaff and Tracy B. Strong. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001. 256p. \$49.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Margaret Kohn, *University of Florida*

Until recently space was a highly suspect concept in political theory. The linguistic turn that has dominated the discipline for the past 20 years has multiple roots. Derrida’s critique of pure presence, Foucault’s discourse analysis, and Habermas’s communicative action, in different ways, contributed to an emphasis on language over place. Recent work in geography and cultural studies, however, has begun to reserve this trend.

The essays in *Public Space and Democracy* contribute to this renaissance by exploring “the nature and status of the space in which human beings encounter each other with the intention of determining how their lives should be lived” (p. 1). The editors, Tracy Strong and Marcel Hénaff, pose two questions that link together the diverse essays. Does political life require a space in which collective concerns can be expressed and contested? And do modern technologies such as television and the Internet transform the possibilities of public space? The latter question is motivated by the suspicion that new technologies diminish the importance of space by transgressing geographical borders and undermining the need for face-to-face contact.

Before it is possible to answer these questions, it is necessary to provide a preliminary definition of space. The essays rely on a wide range of approaches; in fact, the editors point out that “the word space has taken on a metaphorical meaning and designates an ensemble of social connections, political institutions, and judicial practices. The literal meaning has almost been wiped out” (p. 35). My question is whether the concept of space can help us draw needed analytic distinctions if it becomes a synonym for such diverse alternatives as representation, discourse, or social relations.

While none of the essays in the collection engages in a sustained consideration of space as a concept, the editors provide a useful framework in their introduction. They distinguish among public, private, sacred, and common space. A public space is a human construct that facilitates seeing and being seen. Public space has both a physical and a social dimension. The social dimension is captured by the term “theatrical,” which suggests the importance of visibility and self-presentation (p. 5). A public space also has a distinctive architectural property: openness. Open spaces like the ancient agora and the renaissance piazza are public in a way that back alleys are not. A private space, on the other hand,

is characterized by the way in which individuals or groups can exclude outsiders. Thus private space is a matter not only of ownership but also of regulation and control of access.

Strong and Hénaff wisely present these definitions as poles at opposite ends of a continuum rather than stable categories. It is immediately apparent that some of the most important contemporary sociopolitical sites seem to undermine this distinction. For example, shopping malls (the topic of Benjamin Barber’s essay, “Malled, Mauled and Overhauled: Arresting Suburban Sprawl by Transforming Mall into Usable Civic Space”) provide a stage for seeing and being seen. Malls are open, theatrical, and constructed and therefore they meet Strong and Hénaff’s definition of public space. While malls clearly entice and invite the general public, they are also based on the ability to exclude anyone who potentially disrupts the carefully calculated atmosphere of safety, cleanliness, order, leisure, and desire. As Barber points out, the most urgent problem today is the way that private simulacra come to replace public places; shopping malls and theme parks sell a sanitized substitute “where people can experience the thrill of the different without taking any risks” (p. 206). Similarly, new urbanist developments turn community itself into a commodity that can be purchased for the price of a white picket fence and wraparound porch.

Other sites transgress the line between public and private in politically significant ways. Publicly owned places such as the sidewalk in front of the post office are open and generally accessible but only to consumers and not to citizens. By this I mean that individuals who want to exercise their first amendment rights by gathering signatures, soliciting donations, or handing out leaflets may be forbidden from doing so, even on the publicly accessible portions of government property. Conversely, places such as back alleys and back rooms, which fail to meet Strong and Hénaff’s criteria of “openness,” are often important political sites precisely because limited visibility prevents surveillance and control. This raises the possibility that semiprivate spaces such as the Masonic lodges that made up Habermas’s public sphere may nurture counter-hegemonic ideas and practices more effectively than public places. While public space is undoubtedly political, the mass rituals of the Fascist and Nazi regimes suggest that it is not necessarily democratic.

Anne Norton’s lyrical essay “Writing Property and Power” effectively captures the ambivalent quality of public space. She takes graffiti as a point of departure for her Heideggerian-inspired analysis of dwelling in urban space. For graffiti artists, writing on walls is a way to acquire “a place of shelter. . . to persist when one is absent” (p. 198). It is a way to take possession through ownership that is based not on alienable or exclusive custody but on what Henri Lefebvre called a right to the city. Through graffiti, the invisible becomes visible and the silent speak. Norton’s discussion provides the ideal counterpoint to Barber’s description of the decline of public space. She draws attention to the way that the city serves as a site of contestation over legibility, habitability, and power.

The other eight essays in the collection place less emphasis on the political and cultural effects of the built environment. Instead, they employ space as a metaphor for social relations or the phenomenal world of appearances. In “Voice and Silence of Public Space: Popular Societies in the French Revolution,” Shigeki Tominga traces the rise and fall of political clubs in France. He focuses on the contested role of voluntary associations in French revolutionary theory. On the one hand, the political clubs seemed reminiscent of feudal corporate bodies, which constrained the freedom of the individual and decreased identification with the state as a whole. On the other hand, they could potentially contribute to revolutionary praxis by linking print and oral culture, thereby

providing political education and fostering deliberation. However, the radical politics of the Popular Societies, combined with the general suspicion of intermediary associations, ensured their demise. Tominga concludes that the disintegration of the nascent public sphere “suggests that the rational social processes . . . contained the very seeds of irrationality” (p. 92). The flaw in this otherwise interesting essay is that Tominga fails to explain the descent from deliberation to denunciation (what he calls “voice” and “noise”) in the Popular Societies.

In “Theatricality in the Public Realm,” Dana Villa provides the explanation missing from Tominga’s piece. According to Villa, Hannah Arendt thought that the search for “intimacy and warmth” in the *fraternité* trumpeted by the French Revolution was among the causes of its downfall. The decline of theatricality and the rise of intimacy and community had political consequences. By reconfiguring politics as a function of personal identity, this tendency made “it less likely that one’s political opponents will escape demonization on the basis of who *they* are . . .” (p. 168). The implication is that coming together in voluntary associations or political clubs does not create a public realm if such places do not reflect an ethos of worldliness.

Since the conceptual boundaries of “space” are not yet established, a wide array of concerns can potentially illuminate the theme of public space and democracy. The unevenness of the collection probably reflects the difficulty of beginning to theorize relatively uncharted terrain. My primary reservation about the book is that its title is something of a misnomer. Perhaps “Theatricality and Representation in Political Theory” would better capture the themes that the majority of the essays explore. For example, in chapter 2 Paul Dumouchel focuses on the issue of representation in Hobbes. In chapter 3 Jacqueline Lichtenstein explains why the French dramatist Corneille is “no doubt the most important political thinker of the seventeenth century.” Peter Euben’s “Aristophanes in America” (chapter 5) shows how ancient comedy and its contemporary progeny (the Simpsons, the Honeymooners) reinforce a democratic ethos by denaturalizing our most hallowed political conventions. While the latter essay, in particular, was a delight to read, students of political space should not overlook the editors’ provocative conclusion that “we should say farewell to the old model of a monumental public space” (p. 230). In nine short pages, Strong and Hénaff raise the most urgent problems in the whole book; most notably they reflect on the way new technologies facilitate “unsited spaces” (p. 224), which transform our understanding of space itself. Had the majority of contributors followed their lead, the book could have done more to advance our understanding of public space and democracy.

Ecology and Historical Materialism. By Jonathan Hughes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 219p. \$59.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Terence Ball, *Arizona State University*

What can Marx and Marxian theory teach us about environmental problems and their possible solutions? One view is: not much, except about how *not* to think about the natural world and human beings’ place in it. Marx himself sometimes spoke in the hubristic nineteenth-century idiom of the coming human “mastery” or “conquest” or “pacification” of nature, and most self-described Marxists have assumed that human happiness and social harmony go hand in hand with the human domination of nature. This interpretation of Marxian theory, when put into practice, has produced ecologically dis-

astrous results of the sort described in depressing detail in Judith Shapiro’s (2000) *Mao’s War Against Nature*. But there is another way to read Marx that leads to altogether different conclusions, as we see in the work of Alfred Schmidt (*The Concept of Nature in Marx*, 1971), Howard Parsons (*Marx and Engels on Ecology*, 1977), Reiner Grundmann (*Marxism and Ecology*, 1991), and now in Jonathan Hughes’s *Ecology and Historical Materialism*.

While it is true that Marx spoke of the human mastery of nature, he also emphasized humans’ dependence on nature, and vice versa. That human beings are a part of nature and can never be apart from it is a view that Marx shares with modern environmental or “green” thinkers. It is this “interdependence” view that provides a point of entry for greens who seek a *rapprochement* between Marxian theory and modern ecology. A central feature of Marx’s materialism, Hughes argues, is the idea that the natural world sets constraints upon what human beings can do and produce while, at the same time, human beings transform the natural world, thereby altering the constraints. But there are natural limits to the degree and kind of such alteration: Nature is malleable and transformable, but not infinitely so. Marx recognized this, albeit through a glass darkly: He had hardly an inkling of what twentieth-century technology might produce. That said, his theory is interpretable and adaptable in ways that allow us to address twenty-first-century environmental problems in a newer, subtler, and more illuminating way than most “green” political theory does. This is the task that Hughes sets himself, and at which he very largely succeeds.

On the whole, Hughes’s view of the environmental or green movement is highly critical but broadly sympathetic. He holds that their theorizing is weaker than it would be if it were informed by Marxian theory, properly understood. For example, although greens acknowledge human dependence on nature, they balk at acknowledging that nature as we (can) know it is in turn dependent on human beings. They see nature as pristine, unspoiled, and best left alone by humans. But this, Hughes argues, is not an option. It is the nature of our species to transform nature and thereby ourselves. But such transformation need not—*pace* orthodox reds and radical greens—be tantamount to human exploitation or domination of nature. Moreover, many greens are (in an older Marxian idiom) philosophical idealists instead of materialists. That is, they think that a particular mind-set—anthropocentrism—is the root cause of environmental problems and that a change of mindset will bring about the desired changes and humans can then live humbly and harmoniously with nature. This, Hughes argues, is to take a too-simple view of the human-nature relation and thus of the environmental problems that arise therefrom. A big bracing dose of Marxian materialism can serve as a useful antidote and corrective.

Much of modern environmental discourse is implicitly Malthusian, in that it asserts (or assumes) that a population tends to outstrip the resources required to sustain it. This theme is sounded in the “limits to growth” studies, in the efforts of Zero Population Growth and other groups, and in the work of Garrett Hardin, Paul and Anne Erlich, William Catton, and other environmentalists. Hughes goes straight to the source—Parson Malthus’s (1798) *An Essay on the Principle of Population*—examining the arguments and then turning to Marx and Engels’s critiques of Malthus, which, in broad outline, Hughes finds persuasive but in need of qualification. Marx and Engels argued that the growth of scientific knowledge and technological innovation extend the human capacity to produce resources beyond the limits that Malthus foresaw. Hughes turns their argument against the “green Malthusians” but allows that the upshot of the Marxian critique is to (technologically) extend and

“relativize” the natural limits to growth (chap. 2). The green Malthusians are right to be worried but wrong to be absolutists and pessimists.

Hughes then considers arguments (or more often assertions) advanced by green thinkers to the effect that the “scientific method” is mechanistic, atomistic, and reductive and is thus unable to grasp the complex interdependencies that characterize the natural world. Insofar as Marxian theory claims to be scientific, it too is tarred with brush. Hughes rejects this as so much outdated metaphysical mumbo jumbo, and defends Marxian theory as being acutely sensitive to complexly causal interdependencies and therefore more adequate than rival theories in addressing ecological problems (chap. 3). He next considers (chap. 4) critics who claim that historical materialism, as developed by the “mature” Marx, abandons the ecological sensibilities of the “young” Marx. Instead of an “ecological break” between the two Marxes, Hughes finds theoretical consistency and continuity.

The remainder of Hughes’s book attempts to show that the “productive forces” *can*, but *need not*, develop in environmentally destructive directions, thereby paving the way for an “ecological Marxism” (chap. 5). One troubling feature of Marx’s vision, however, is his claim that the development of the productive forces is accompanied by ever-expanding human *needs*. Must the satisfaction of these needs result in further environmental degradation? Hughes strives mightily, and with mixed success, to show that the answer is: may be not, especially under socialism (chap. 6). This is a rather equivocal end to Hughes’s sustained and systematic defense of the possibility of an ecological Marxism. He does, however, succeed in forcing readers to reexamine a number of key questions that must be addressed by any adequate environmental theory.

Christian Faith and Modern Democracy: God and Politics in the Fallen World. By Robert P. Kraynak. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001. 352p. \$49.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Politics, Theology and History. By Raymond Plant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 380p. \$69.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Clarke E. Cochran, *Texas Tech University*

Religion and politics is a burgeoning subfield. Liberalism–communitarian literature now includes attention to religious communities. Theorists of civil society recognize that religious organizations implement a considerable range of policies. Since pluralism entails the presence of multiple voices in public conversation, theorists debate how a liberal society should treat religious voices. Theorists within religious traditions debate the bearing of faith on political action and the extent to which churches should cooperate with state institutions.

The present books, both by political theorists, contemplate these topics and others. Raymond Plant delivers the more comprehensive treatment of political theorists (philosophers and political scientists) and political theologians (theologians and clergy). Robert Kraynak offers an iconoclastic account of the relationship of Christian faith to modern democracy. It is the more unified and tightly organized book, but one whose style is more popular and tone more polemical. The same two themes organize each book: (1) Does liberal democracy require a moral foundation? and (2) What is the proper orientation of Christian political theology toward liberal society? Plant and Kraynak answer “yes” to the first question and agree that establishing this foundation is difficult, Plant because there is no single Christian political

theology. Kraynak, on the other hand, believes that there is a single Christian political theology, but it is neither liberal nor democratic. Kraynak’s is thus the more stimulating book, rethinking liberal democracy and Christian political theology.

Politics, Theology and History contains three parts. Chapters 2–6 consider the possibility of a Christian political theology. That is, can Christian beliefs be related in a coherent and rigorous way to the problems of politics, economics, and society? Chapters 7–10 ponder the moral foundations on which modern liberal democracies rest. Part III is Plant’s theoretical resolution of the issues.

Plant focuses on the tension between universal and particular. A political theology deduced from the doctrine of God, creation, and the human person in principle is universal, but its high level of generality cannot ground particular judgments. On the other hand, political theology grounded in the particular is fragmented (p. 19). Plant finds this dilemma analogous to the liberal–communitarian debate, in which the liberal side achieves universality, but at the price of empty proceduralism. Communitarians achieve particularity but are trapped in cultural relativism.

Plant approaches the problem through accounts of four theological systems and their principal proponents. In the first system *history* mediates the universal and the particular. Its chief representatives are Augustine, Calvin, and Hegel and, more recently among the theologians, John Cobb and Wolfhart Pannenberg. Plant is strongly attracted to the necessity and possibility of a theology of history but concludes that modern theology cannot overcome the limits of Hegelianism. He does not consider Kraynak’s strategy of resurrecting an Augustinian theory of history.

If historical theology fails, perhaps *systematic theology* (represented chiefly by older figures such as Karl Barth and T. H. Green) or *narrative theology* (represented by contemporary theologians George Lindbeck and Stanley Hauerwas) can ground political theology (chapter 5). Narrative theology, however, furnishes a devastating critique of any attempted systematic political theology, yet it fragments moral community, leaving no foundation for liberal culture. Natural law theology (chapter 6) remains. Plant furnishes a solid, though brief, account of natural law and the contemporary challenges to it, concluding that the fact/value dichotomy, the naturalistic fallacy, and moral diversity undermine natural law’s foundational capacity.

Plant’s preliminary conclusion is that “there can be no wholly definitive or authoritative political theology and, indeed, no authoritative political praxis associated with it, since the methodological controversies are so profound” (p. 173). This being the case, believers have two unattractive alternatives: either to privatize their most profound beliefs or to become internal exiles within liberal democracy. Yet the most important political, social, and economic issues of modern life call upon moral principles. Plant uses Part II to make this case, showing that markets have moral underpinnings (chapter 7), that neoliberal market theory is inadequate (chapter 8), that rights by themselves cannot supply the basis for a liberal society (chapter 9), and that neither theological nor philosophical communitarians can make community the sole support for liberal society (chapter 10).

Part III promises Plant’s account of the contribution of political theology to liberal society. Yet the failure of liberal neutrality (in its utilitarian, contractarian, Rawlsian, and perfectionist forms) occupies most of these two chapters. Only briefly does Plant articulate his own commitment to establishing common moral ground through dialogue among persons situated in particular communities. Such dialogue seems the place for Christian political theology.

There is much to admire in *Politics, Theology and History*. Most useful for political scientists is the careful attention to major political theologians. Those seeking a précis find sure-footed guidance. Nevertheless, the book is very slight on Plant's own proposals, and his conclusions are not always clear among the summaries of a wide variety of theorists. Nor is it evident why certain materials receive major attention (V. A. Demant, in chapter 6) or whether certain "set pieces" are necessary (the dated discussion of communitarianism in chapter 10).

Kraynak's focused polemical argument is more satisfying for those seeking a definite position strongly defended. Where Plant argues that liberal society needs a moral foundation, but cannot find a suitable candidate, Kraynak asserts that liberal democracy "needs God" (xiii) and that Christian foundational beliefs about creation, fall, and redemption supply the hidden intellectual capital sustaining modern democracy. This is the briefer of Kraynak's two main arguments. Its ironic counterpoint is that, looked at afresh, Christianity is far less liberal and democratic than its proponents realize. Another ironic twist, of which Kraynak is less aware, is that secular liberal democrats readily accept the truth of this second argument, employing it to undermine his first.

Kraynak principally targets those who accept the amalgam of Christianity and liberal democracy. He claims that they too readily accept the legitimacy of democracy and the human rights regime, reading such notions uncritically back into biblical concepts such as humanity's creation in the image of God. The amalgam, however good it is for democracy, is dangerous to Christianity. He traces the growth of Christian support for democracy primarily to Kantian enlightenment ideas (chapter 3), founded on principles of human individuality and autonomy at odds with Christian faith.

The core of *Christian Faith and Modern Democracy* is a review of Scripture and the tradition of Christian theology (primarily Western, but Orthodoxy makes a welcome appearance) to establish that the Christian conception of persons, politics, and church is hierarchical and incompatible with modern human rights. Chapter 2 argues that this position is the Bible's and that it belongs as well to the central tradition of Christian theology, especially Augustine, but also Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin. Augustine's two-cities analogy figures prominently. The image of God, Kraynak admits, exalts humanity, but only in the spiritual realm, not the political. Moreover, the spiritual includes hierarchical degrees of perfection that do not fit modern, democratic principles. The earthly city displays no single, best form of government; rather, prudence points to different forms in different times and cultures.

Kraynak effectively challenges shallow identifications of liberalism with Christianity, but some of his Biblical interpretation is tendential and over simple (covenant in chapter 2). The claim of Christian democrats at their most sensible is not that the Bible touts democracy, but that its view of human dignity, when enriched by historical experience and developing Christian reflection, grows toward modern human rights and political equality.

The heart of the book's positive claim is the argument for the superiority of "Christian constitutionalism" (chapters 4 and 5). There are two separate contentions here, which Kraynak yokes too closely. The first is that liberalism's commitment to Kantian-style human individuality and moral autonomy is antithetical to Scripture and Christian theology. This argument seems correct. Christian social theory is social, not individualistic, and it insists that human freedom, precious as it is, must be oriented to truth and the will of God. Yet this does not entail Kraynak's second claim, that Christian theol-

ogy cannot articulate a strong theory of rights and democratic government on its own terms. Yet even Kraynak admits that Christian democracy, if it could keep Kant firmly in a theoretical box, can be a legitimate expression of Christian theology (pp. 120–24, 163–66).

Kraynak, however, doubts the likelihood of controlling Kantian assumptions, so he argues instead the superiority of constitutional monarchy to modern democracy. His great heroes are Augustine and Solzhenitsyn. Yet he recognizes that, prudentially, democracy is the most likely near-term political system. Therefore, the second-best regime is "constitutional democracy under God," a democracy that recognizes its limits and guarantees independence to divinely ordained institutions such as church and family.

This final argument, despite its appealing challenge to conventional pieties, is perhaps the least satisfactory, for it is rather a hodgepodge of historical and theoretical claims. Too many difficult questions receive little exposition, and other nonliberal possibilities are not explored. Ultimately, Kraynak fails to make clear just how different "constitutional democracy under God" is from a liberal democratic alternative that would restrain its Kantian elements. Moreover, if on Kraynak's assumptions, there is a single normative biblical model of the family and the church, why should Christians not follow also a biblical model of government without any element of constitutionalism? In addition, why does the communitarian alternative appear so seldom? It has appeal for many Christians (Plant, for example) and in some versions challenges the same liberal assumptions as does Kraynak. Finally, the book's appreciation of prudence is a welcome relief from universalist arguments, but the politics of prudence may well be more culture-dependent than Kraynak allows.

Each book is a worthy addition to a literature growing in size and sophistication. Plant is the more useful for a graduate seminar; Kraynak, for an undergraduate class. Their serious engagement of theological materials, despite flaws, is a refreshing sign of the revival of political theology. Its reemergence in political science signals a welcome broadening of our discipline's vision.

Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy.

By Muhsin S. Mahdi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. 240p. \$37.50.

Joshua S. Parens, *University of Dallas*

Mahdi's book marks a watershed in scholarship on medieval political philosophy. For the specialist, chapter 5, on the *Book of Religion*, alone would be worth the price of the book as a whole. The same could be said for the most synoptic chapter, chapter 7. For the more general reader and, especially, the teacher of political philosophy, the introductory section of the book will prove to be an indispensable resource. Introductions to medieval Islamic philosophy have appeared in great profusion in recent years. Part One of this book constitutes the best introduction to medieval Islamic political philosophy and may do the same for Islamic philosophy as a whole. Until now, no one has explained sufficiently why the first truly great efflorescence of philosophy within the Islamic world should be so deeply political. The peculiar character of this founding of medieval Islamic (political) philosophy has much to do with the relative inattention to Alfarabi in Western scholarship, despite his towering role in medieval Islamic and Jewish thought. With this book, we have reason to hope that Alfarabi will begin to garner the attention he deserves.

Recent events underscore the need for us to take great Muslim thinkers, especially underutilized and understudied

political philosophers, more seriously. Of course, this is not to say that Alfarabi holds immediate solutions to contemporary problems, but at a minimum he can remind us when we become forgetful of the “broad historical impact of these (revealed) religions” (p. 169). Furthermore, he may offer clues about how better to adjudicate the conflicting claims of politics and prophetic religion in the modern Muslim world, an objective no longer wished for merely by Muslims.

The following are all of special contemporary relevance: Alfarabi’s assessment and transformation of the Muslim teaching on war (pp. 139–44), the advantage he takes of the relatively minor role played by prophecy in the founding of Islam to expand the role of reason in guiding the religious community (pp. 164–65), and the difference between Alfarabi’s medieval cyclical view of history (pp. 233–35) and the modern effort to “unbend” the circle of history (p. 239).

Of these especially “relevant” arguments, the second is directly linked to the central argument of Mahdi’s book. His argument is that Alfarabi’s *Enumeration of the Sciences* (ES) and the *Book of Religion* (BR) form the theoretical core of Alfarabi’s “philosophy of religion.” Consequently, the oddities of his *Political Regime* (PR) and *Virtuous City* (VC) become more comprehensible as two possible applications of the theoretical teaching of ES and BR. Mahdi’s account is superior to Miriam Galston’s (1990) in *Politics and Excellence* because it distinguishes properly between the theoretical role of BR and the lesser, applied role of PR and VC.

The core of Mahdi’s argument about BR is that revelation or the royal craft plays the role of “determination” of particulars (p. 103) played by “practical judgment” (*phronesis*) in Aristotle (p. 105). In contrast, “actions and opinions as universals and general rules. . . remain the preserve of practical and theoretical philosophy” (p. 103). The only challenger to the preeminent role of *phronesis* is imagination in VC. Indeed, it would seem that the prophetic imagination lays claim to both the particulars of *phronesis* and the universals of practical and theoretical philosophy. (Mahdi gives a broad but extremely telling analysis of the roots of this widely-held view in his elegant introduction to this chapter [chapter 5, pp. 147–50].) Yet Alfarabi allows prophecy such pretensions only within the confines of a “pre- or subpolitical” treatment of revelation (pp. 159–61). In Alfarabi’s political treatment of “the achievement of a human being’s highest perfection and for the excellence of the city he founds and rules,” revelation and its philosophic supplement fill the role previously played by prophecy (p. 162). In the light of Mahdi’s argument, not only do the apparent redundancies within Alfarabi’s teaching fade away but also the apparent absence of a direct treatment of *phronesis* in Maimonides’ *Guide of the Perplexed* (a source of some contemporary scholarly controversy) begins to make more sense.

Mahdi describes Alfarabi’s political philosophy as a whole as the “philosophy of religion,” especially in the central chapter on BR, chapter 5. In contemporary usage, this phrase usually refers to the study of “religious experience” as the subjective experience of the believer. Because this contemporary approach to religion is an inheritance of the Enlightenment’s subjectivization and privatization of all religious claims, we will be misled if we expect such a treatment from Alfarabi. In his Introduction, Mahdi gives an appropriately sketchy portrait of Alfarabi’s “philosophy of religion” as establishing a connection between Platonic political philosophy and revealed religion (p. 2). In the body of his text, he does not begin to treat it explicitly until page 97, where he contrasts it with the ancient “philosophy of the city” and the modern “philosophy of the state.” Here the reader begins to appreciate more fully that Mahdi, following Alfarabi, understands

religion in a sense altogether foreign to most contemporary readers. Religion, in the original, premodern sense of the revealed religions, is a political phenomenon similar at least in genus to the ancient city and the modern state. (For a beautifully nuanced treatment of the relevant Arabic term translated religion [*milla*], see pages 108–109, especially page 109, note 3.) What, then, distinguishes religion from the city and the state? It is tempting to suppose that the difference is merely one of scale. If so, however, there would be no significant difference between ancient and medieval political philosophy. Perhaps the most significant difference is revealed in the concluding section of Mahdi’s book on Alfarabi’s cyclical view of history. Although in the pagan world the cycle was returned to its beginnings by natural cataclysms, revealed religion interrupts this cycle at an inopportune moment (pp. 233–35). This fact may account for the characteristically modern effort to unbend the circle by cutting out part of it, indeed, the very part of greatest interest to Alfarabi and his student Maimonides (pp. 237–40). Mahdi’s conclusion, in particular, outlines with great clarity the distinction between medieval and modern political philosophy, a distinction that it has become all too popular to efface in recent scholarship.

Politics, Philosophy, Writing: Plato’s Art of Caring for Souls. Edited by Zdravko Planinc. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001. 261p. \$19.95

Brent S. Lerseth, *Dickinson State University*

The edited volume *Politics, Philosophy, Writing* attempts to contribute to the reinterpretation of Plato’s dialogues by clarifying some issues they addressed. In each chapter the author attempts to expand on specific mystical, poetic, or political themes in individual dialogues that have not previously received enough treatment. For example, Leon Craig elaborates on the politic elements of Plato’s *Meno*, a dialogue usually considered a primarily epistemological work. This reinterpretation of Plato tries to overcome some of the recent misuse of Plato by modern and postmodern thinkers that has resulted in Plato being reduced to “a footnote in the works of other philosophers” (p. 1). The authors of *Politics, Philosophy, Writing* succeed in raising some interesting issues in the dialogues and refuting several prevalent misconceptions as they detail Plato’s attention to caring for souls.

Two chapters in this edited volume should be especially interesting to readers of Plato because they address two important debates that cross multiple dialogues. The first, the importance of shame, is discussed in “Shame in the *Apology*” by Oona Eisenstadt. Eisenstadt describes in detail how Plato’s Socrates utilized shame to attempt to instruct his listeners in the *Meno* and the *Apology*, and how the two dialogues are connected. She points out how it is in the *Meno* that we find out why Socrates was brought to trial by one of his accusers, Anytus, because Socrates showed him to be shameless (pp. 44–45).

More importantly, Eisenstadt discusses the importance of shame to understanding the teachings of Socrates. Socrates used shame to overcome the half-truths and misconceptions of his audience by shaming them into realizing how their assumptions were unjust. The shameless, like Anytus, are unchanged, since they cannot be shamed (p. 46). What remained is resentment without improvement, leading to hatred of Socrates. Her discussion demonstrating the use of shame is critical to interpreting Plato because of the political importance of honor and dishonor. For Plato and Aristotle (see the *Republic* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, respectively), honors are critical tools for the statesman

to instruct and alter behavior to improve the soul. Modern thinkers tend to downplay the importance of honors, as individualism has eroded the close connections of the Greek community. Where honors were emphasized, such as in the former Soviet Union, the assumption by Western thinkers usually was that material incentives would always be more influential. One exception comes from the theory of civil disobedience. Martin Luther King, Jr., in his *Letter from a Birmingham Jail*, discussed how shame must be used to confront moderate America and force it to reexamine the injustice of American laws. It is interesting that he attributed this method to Socrates and compared himself to Socrates. Shame is a tool for politicians and philosophers.

This analysis could help to explain a passage of Plato's *Republic* that is often much debated. Toward the end of the confrontation between Socrates and Thrasymachus, Socrates remarked about Thrasymachus blushing for the first time he had ever seen (Desmond Lee, trans., 1987, p. 36). This blush could indicate that Thrasymachus felt shame for the first time. He was a sophist, one of the great enemies of Plato's philosophy, and it was unlikely that he ever really considered the justice of his positions. When backed into a corner in the *Republic* by Socrates he was forced to acknowledge the problems with his expressed views on justice. Perhaps his first-ever display of shame may indicate that for the first time Socrates had succeeded in getting him to question his unjust "convictions." Of course, being the type of man he was, Thrasymachus responded by resentfully withdrawing, not by learning from his shame. At least he was not completely shameless like Socrates' accusers in the *Apology*. Eisenstadt does not discuss this part of the *Republic* in connection with her chapter. It would be interesting to see whether she would agree with this proposition.

Eisenstadt also formulates an interesting hypothesis about why Socrates was convicted based on his use of shame. She argues that he relied on shaming the dicasts by appealing to their sense of justice. He could not reach the shameless or the followers of Unjust Speech, but he hoped that he could convince the followers of Just Speech that he was no atheist or sophist (p. 56). He was convicted and judged to die because he failed to convince enough of them through shame and instruction.

"Homeric Imagery in Plato's *Phaedrus*," by Zdravko Planinc, introduces another interesting topic, the connections between Plato's dialogues and Homer's *Odyssey*. According to Planinc, the *Phaedrus* is intentionally structured to resemble Homer's work, and several other dialogues are also meant to reflect Homer (p. 124). This is interesting because of the animosity that exists between philosophy and poetry in the *Republic*. Poets are forced out of the just city, and it is clear that education in poetry interferes with instruction in philosophy (*Republic*, Part Three). However, Socrates repeatedly used references to Homer and other poets to support his assertions in that work. This could indicate that Socrates and Plato were aware that it is important to appeal to the materials with which their listeners are most familiar. Whatever the reason, Planinc's discussion brings earlier assumptions about the relationship between philosophy and poetry into question since Plato utilized such a format.

The other chapters in this volume include discussions of the mystical elements of Plato in the *Republic* and the *Seventh Letter* and elaboration on soulcraft in the *Charmides*. The subjects and perspectives presented in this volume succeed in stimulating further interest in the dialogues of Plato, as demonstrated above. There are other issues that need to be addressed in relation to each of these topics, especially regarding how they relate to the other works of Plato and other

thinkers such as Aristotle, but that is often not the intent of an edited volume. The authors do succeed here in showing that Plato needs to be reexamined to save him from recent misconceptions and misuse.

The Political Philosophy of James Madison. By Garrett Ward Sheldon. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 143p. \$32.00.

Franklin A. Kalinowski, *Warren Wilson College*

Interpreting the entire body of work of a political theorist as prolific as James Madison is a dicey matter. Perhaps more than any other American of his intellectual stature, James Madison can be viewed as shifting ideological positions throughout his long and active life. Reputable scholars such as Marvin Meyers (1973), in his Introduction to *The Mind of the Founder*, Ralph Ketcham (1971), in *James Madison: A Biography*, and Douglas Jaenicke's ("Madison vs Madison: The Party Essays v. The Federalist Papers"), in Maidment and Zvesper's (1989) *Reflections on the Constitution*, have argued with some effectiveness that it is difficult to garner a consistent set of philosophical positions throughout Madison's life. Other scholars, however, such as Lance Banning (1995), in *The Sacred Fire of Liberty*, Drew McCoy (1980), in *The Elusive Republic*, and Richard Matthews (1995), in *If Men Were Angels*, make a case for a more consistent Madison who, although altering positions on specifics, remained remarkably dedicated to a set of core philosophical positions.

In his latest book, *The Political Philosophy of James Madison*, Garrett Ward Sheldon combines these positions. Drawing on the recent debate over classical republican and liberal traditions, Sheldon argues that Madison went from liberalism to republicanism and back to liberalism again as the historical situation changed. Throughout these shifts, however, Sheldon sees a consistent philosophical underpinning. According to Sheldon, the political philosophy of James Madison exhibits an unswerving dedication to the premises of Calvinist theology, with its assumptions of human depravity, sin, quarrelsomeness, pride, and envy. Sheldon argues that this fundamental Calvinism, learned during Madison's days at Princeton under the tutelage of John Witherspoon, "displayed a cerebral, intellectual Christianity that did not divorce reason from faith but saw the two working together in complementarity for the greater glory of God" (p. 2). Indeed, Sheldon's Madison becomes something of an early American version of Jerry Falwell or Pat Robertson: single-mindedly focused on helping humanity struggle against sin, defining "sin" as opposition to his policies, and manipulating the political system to further his theological agenda. Not that Sheldon gives this interpretation of Madison's thought any negative connotation. On the contrary, Sheldon leaves little doubt that he finds this blending of political theory and religious bias both historically accurate and philosophically appealing. More than a few readers will find it neither.

Sheldon takes a perfectly reasonable proposition—there are links between Calvinist assumptions regarding human "depravity" and liberalism's premise that humans are self-interested and conflictual—and extends it far beyond what logic or the evidence will support. While cultural connections between the two most likely exist, one need not be a fundamentalist Calvinist to be a liberal, and there is abundant proof that Madison held positions exactly opposite to those Sheldon advocates. Sheldon associates Witherspoon and Princeton with extreme examples of the eighteenth-century irrational "New Light" theology and then assumes that, since Madison studied at Princeton with Witherspoon, he adopted

these views (even while admitting that “during his years in government service Madison never explicitly mentions his personal beliefs” [p. xvi]). During this hyperbole, Sheldon often uses Biblical citations (none of which can be linked to Madison’s political thought) and engages in crude proselytizing that many readers will find intellectually offensive, for example, “Emphasizing the spiritual New Birth that Jesus told Nicodemus was necessary to enter the Kingdom of Heaven (John 3:5–8), this move to the Holy Spirit across America, like that in the Biblical account of Pentecost (Acts 2:3–13), upset many staid religious leaders who preferred highly order, rational worship and experience . . . [C]onservative ‘Old Lights’ like Harvard College rejected the evangelical ‘enthusiasm’ and emotion of this move of the Spirit (and eventually rejected the Spirit of Christ altogether by becoming predominantly Unitarian, highly intellectual, and sophisticated); lively ‘New Lights’ welcomed the conviction of sin, sincere repentance, comfort of the Holy Spirit, and the personal commitment to Christ . . .” (pp. 6–7).

The handling of Madison’s argument for religious disestablishment in the “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments” is revealing of Sheldon’s distorted thesis. Most analysts hold that Madison distrusted all factions that inflamed the passions, fearing that religious emotion, in particular, led to social instability since it tended toward extremism and intolerance and was not susceptible to resolution by rational argument. Hence, Madison sought to exclude religion from the political sphere. This, at least, is the argument put forth by scholars such as David Epstein (*The Political Theory of the Federalist*, 1984). According to Sheldon, however, Madison’s intentions were exactly opposite. He contends that Madison believed that the established Anglican Church in Virginia had become “lax and decadent” as well as “cold and lifeless” (p. 28). What Madison wanted, says Sheldon, was to free Virginian religion from the influence of dull, rational Anglicans and open it to “those evangelical churches that faithfully taught Christ” (p. 29). Madison wanted Virginian society to experience more sectarian passion, more self-righteous emotion, and more “vital, faithful churches which strive to carry on the work of the gospel and evangelists” (p. 29). It would help if Sheldon produced some shred of evidence to support what many Madison scholars will consider an absurd argument, but no such evidence is forthcoming (probably because it does not exist). James Madison, no doubt, had his share of human faults, but it is difficult to believe that Christian fanaticism was among them.

This bizarre thesis might be considered innovative and interesting if it were supported with some solid research, but unfortunately, the other crippling weakness of *The Political Philosophy of James Madison* is its dearth of substantial scholarship. Sheldon’s discussion of liberalism and classical republicanism is particularly thin and uninformed. He equates liberalism with the most simplistic form of Lockean thought, ignores the equally important Scottish strain of interest-group liberalism, and displays no acquaintance with the considerable work of such noted scholars as Albert Hirschman, Morton White, Garry Wills, Jack Rakove, Forrest MacDonald, or the legendary Douglass Adair. While it is unfair to criticize a book for not being the one the reviewer would have written, it is entirely proper to expect an author to display a familiarity with the literature on the subject. Instead, Sheldon gives us the briefest rehash of Merrill Peterson’s (1974) *James Madison: A Biography in His Own Words* and Ralph Ketcham’s (1990) *James Madison* (over half the endnotes are to these two sources), and while these are fine studies, much more has been written concerning Madison’s thought. Richard Matthew’s (1995) *If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason*, with its extensive documentation and tightly reasoned

logic remains, by far, the best source on Madisonian thought. Readers familiar with Garrett Ward Sheldon’s (1993) earlier *The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson* will find this latest project immensely disappointing. It is not the intention of this review to be mean spirited, but the sad truth is that of the many books on James Madison, this is the one that least deserves to be read.

Conscious Acts and the Politics of Social Change: Feminist Approaches to Social Movements, Community and Power.
Edited by Robin L. Teske and Mary Ann Tetreault.
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2000. 320p.
\$34.95.

Valerie Sperling, *Clark University*

Rarely does a political science book undertake the simultaneous task of contributing to both scholarship and activism. This edited volume explores the theory and practice of social movements, examining “success” stories, such as the struggle for women’s suffrage in the United States, as well as “failures,” embodied in this case by an ill-conceived attempt to carry out a charity program in early 1990s Russia. This lens on the lived realities of activism makes it an instructive and unusual book. The volume also discusses how feminist theory and practices influence social movements and power relations. The explicit intention of the editors is to contribute to theory-building, as well as to help design more effective activism. To that end, the contributors include social change activists as well as academics, several of whom combine both identities.

The well-written introductory chapter discusses several concepts to which all the chapters in the book are, in one way or another, tied: feminism, power, civil society, social movements, and community. Although each chapter brings its own interesting perspective to the volume, the volume’s coherence might have been improved had the editors pushed their contributors to tie their chapters to these central concepts more closely and explicitly.

At the outset, the editors pose a number of thought-provoking questions surrounding the interaction of gender and social movements. These include, Do social movements differ from each other when the activists in them are predominantly male or female? and Why do feminism and non-violence seem to go together? They also seek to explore the concept of “interests” beyond the liberal conception of self-interest. They raise questions about community, and how or whether self-interest, differences, and power differentials between people can be overcome. In the volume, these issues are taken up in part in a few theoretically and philosophically oriented chapters exploring the spaces “in between” people—in other words, the realm of human interaction that comprises politics, economics, and nearly the entirety of societal life. These spaces are often filled by relationships of hierarchy and domination, where miscommunication and manipulation are rampant. Can such spaces be converted through the application of *agape*, one of the Greek concepts of love, and nonviolence? Such are the far-ranging questions raised by this volume.

The book is divided into two parts. Part I contains six chapters, largely concerning social change at the theoretical level. These somewhat disparate chapters range from theoretical analysis of social movements to the utility of “testimonies” as a means of making marginalized voices available in the study of international relations and globalization. Several chapters in this section problematize boundaries, reconceptualize human interaction, and consider nonviolence as a source of power. The successes of human rights movements in bringing

down violent repressive states in Eastern Europe and South Africa are brought in as examples of the latter.

Part II turns to concrete cases of feminist (and not explicitly feminist) social movements and modes of activism. Only some of the case study chapters build on and illustrate or develop the nonviolence issue explicitly, while all are directly or indirectly related to the editors' desire to derive lessons of effective activism from scholarship on that subject. One of these discusses the women's suffrage campaign in the United States and derives from that experience lessons about the later, unsuccessful campaign for the ERA. The next chapter contains an interview with an ERA activist, wherein she provides her response to the scholar's suggestions. The pairing of these two chapters makes for an insightful combination of activism and scholarship in dialogue with each other.

Several of the volume's most successful chapters bring alive women's movement activism in Kuwait, the United States, Russia, and Czechoslovakia. Chapter 8 provides a fascinating history of women's activism in Kuwait, of state cooptation of women's groups, and of state encouragement and sponsorship of divisions among women to its own advantage. It also addresses how changes in political opportunity structure gave certain women's groups differing degrees of voice at different times (such as after the Gulf War, for example). Similarly based on empirical research is Chapter 13, which explores, in lively ethnographic style, the power dynamics between Western and Russian activists engaged in charity work in early 1990s Russia. This chapter illustrates the power relations between the Western leader of the organization and the Russian women who carried out the charity work on the ground. The penultimate chapter concerns the largely unrecognized and uncelebrated activity by women dissidents under communist-ruled Czechoslovakia. There, a Czech activist reveals first-hand stories of how the regime was subverted at the ground level through networks and the type of power that relies on trust rather than dominance. This chapter fleshes out the stories of how "underground" materials were secretly replicated and spread by women taking advantage of traditional gender roles (such as exchanging dissident literature hidden in shopping bags while queuing at stores). This chapter, as well as one on women's activism in Chile, makes the point that "conventional stereotypes" were thus used "for unconventional ends" (p. 274).

One of this volume's main themes concerns the varied types of power. Relying on Marilyn French, Hannah Arendt, Simone Weil, and other theorists, the authors show how non-violent movements use "power-to" (or mutual empowerment through collective action) instead of striving for "power-over" (the classic understanding of power, where A compels B to do something that B would not otherwise do). Several contributors eloquently link feminism and nonviolence, explaining why a social movement's means and ends must be consistent: If the goal is to eliminate domination and oppression that rests on hierarchies of ostensible superiority and inferiority, then movements must use means that are in keeping with those ends or risk replicating an oppressive system. Several of the case study chapters illustrate the alternative understanding of power. Chapter 12, for instance, describes a Virginia-based grassroots organization called Common Ground, which fomented coalitions and, thereby, eschews a classic hierarchical pyramidal structure. Instead, they apply a "wheel" model (with hub, spokes, and rim), illustrating the differences in power dynamics between a hierarchical and a coalition-style organization and the consistency of the latter with the principles of feminism and nonviolence.

While undergraduates would find this book challenging, it would serve well in a graduate course on social movements,

providing both theory and wide-ranging examples for discussion and analysis. This is a thought-provoking text whose editors offer a radical vision of the world, one in which domination, discrimination, and hierarchy can be replaced by non-violence and where revealing the gendered nature of social movement activism provides clues to both how this vision could be accomplished and what pitfalls lie before it on the path.

De Tocqueville. By Cheryl B. Welch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 294p. \$21.95.

Joshua Mitchell, *Georgetown University*

It is a testimony to his greatness as an author that Tocqueville has emerged in a new light with each of the more significant events of the twentieth century: the New Deal, the Cold War, the Post-War years. In the last decade, in particular, American scholars of all political persuasions have seen in Tocqueville a point of departure for their consideration of the rudiments of robust democracy and the associational life it seems to require. Democracy perhaps being the only genuine alternative for the future, American scholars have tried to learn from Tocqueville what might be necessary to make it thrive, in places where the political alternatives have been exhausted and the rhetoric, but not yet the substance, of democracy now prevails. In a race to establish democracy before the rhetoric of democracy becomes a hollow caricature, Tocqueville studies have had an urgency about them that the study of other canonical figures in the history of modern political thought—Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, etc—simply have not. We shall see, of course, whether the Post-War years were merely a hiatus and whether we more properly live in an Inter-War period, perhaps in perpetuity. We shall see, as well, whether the recent military confrontations in Afghanistan are able to be contained under the category of politics rather than of religion. Whatever the future holds, however, we can be sure that the writings of Tocqueville will not be exhausted by the events whose outlines we cannot yet foresee. Tocqueville had a great deal to say about war and, most readers may be surprised to discover, a few very interesting and provocative things to say about Islam as well. But these matters, as I say, must wait for the future.

Welch's book is not about these future possibilities. Rather, it is a superb account of the political terrain that shaped Tocqueville's thinking, the internal logic of his writings, and the current state of Tocqueville studies. Her book is nuanced and insightful throughout, and considered as a whole, it makes several important contributions to the current debate that warrants attention here.

First, there is the matter of the sort of project in which Tocqueville is involved. Tocqueville has never found a completely comfortable place in political philosophy or political theory, notwithstanding the many fine efforts to educe ideas from his writings that would do so. Political philosophers have yet to make up their minds about Tocqueville's place in the cannon of great writers, as the many efforts to situate him against the backdrop of Aristotle, Augustine, Pascal, Montesquieu, and the American founders, among others, attest. Tocqueville's observation about philosophy, that "there is nothing so infertile as an abstract idea," certainly does not help their case, though it does not wholly argue against it either. Political theorists have been equally frustrated by Tocqueville because it is so difficult to glean a theory of democracy from his work. He uses terms in nuanced and sometimes contradictory ways, which makes operationalizing his ideas difficult, if not impossible. As Welch points out (p. 51), Tocqueville himself never took the time to define

what he meant by “liberty.” How can democracy be *theorized* at all if this key idea remains unspecified? In Welch’s words, “Tocqueville considers collective rather than individual attitudes, the thoughts of typical people rather than elites, unspoken general assumptions rather than elaborate philosophical theories, and the general structure of beliefs rather than their specific content” (p. 104). This observation helps us understand why Tocqueville was never enamored of the suppositions of political economy, since individual “preferences” cannot explain the larger contours of a culture, and why he never set forth a deterministic theory of history, since what rules a society is never univocal, easily identified, or reducible to formulas.

The second important contribution Welch’s book makes is to remind readers about what might be called “the weight of history” (p. 234) in Tocqueville’s writings. Oakeshott once said, with some disdain, that “the American cannot help but think of himself as a self-made man.” Much of the scholarship on Tocqueville in America, in both political philosophy and political theory, has not given sufficient attention to this burden, perhaps because Oakeshott was right: The weight of history has never much seemed to bother Americans, who are themselves generally optimistic about the future. Only a civilization that looks backward rather than forward is attentive to the weight of history. Americans do not look back. Tocqueville did. American scholarship has tended to focus on the “new beginning” about which Tocqueville writes in his account of the New England Puritans—a thought that preoccupied writers during the Cold War, who sought a way out of the supposed iron logic of Marxism. Marxism could not take hold here, Hartz and others said, because the categories of experience were not feudal, as they were in Europe. Yet the obverse Tocqueville’s “new beginning” was the legacy of the durable and perhaps intractable patterns of relations between blacks and whites. (This is Tocqueville’s usage, so I

invoke it here.) Welch has a keen eye for this matter. My one small quibble would be that while the burden of history seems to be the final word in volume I of *Democracy in America*, the very first thoughts in volume II move in a contrary direction: The “philosophical method” of the Americans, Tocqueville says, abrades all things inherited and ancient. Indeed, one way to understand both volumes as a whole is as a gloss on the question, “Which is more powerful, the atavisms of history, or what could be called a sort of ‘logic of equality’ through which all inheritances are overthrown and only abstract universals prevail?” If the latter eventually dominate, then indeed the burden of history would be lifted, and Tocqueville’s assessment of the intractability of race relations would give way to a more benign arrangement, in which race was trumped by universal rights and equality under national—not local—law. This is, as I say, a minor quibble, which is not meant to diminish the importance of Welch’s insights into Tocqueville’s thinking about the burden of history.

The third contribution made by this book is its recognition of the importance of mood in Tocqueville’s writings. Tocqueville, as I said, was not much enamored by philosophy. Neither is he a social scientist, or a moralist. Yet, as Welch says, “Tocqueville’s particular combination of sociological, historical, and moral insight has played a unique role in uncovering certain fault lines in contemporary democratic life” (p. 218). Moments of penetrating insight in Tocqueville’s writing have this luminous and sometimes maddening quality about them, which blurs the line among social science, prophecy, and confession. Tocqueville scholarship has not paid enough attention to this aspect of his writing, in no small part because the perceived task has been to excise from this unified whole coherent ideas that suit the purpose of one or another narrow investigative community. Welch resists this temptation, and the result is a book that does not try to bend Tocqueville to her own purposes.

American Politics

The Politics of Language in Puerto Rico. By Amilcar Antonio Barreto. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001. 221p. \$55.00.

Steve C. Ropp, *University of Wyoming*

Puerto Rico has often fallen between the cracks of the subfloor that undergirds not only the study of American politics but also the field of political science in general. Although it has certain nation state-like properties, the fact that it is not a nation state *de jure* means that those who study international and inter-American relations have given it little attention. This also holds true for Latin American comparativists, who treat it as one of the many small and nonindependent territories that dot the Caribbean. If it had been incorporated into the federal structure of the United States, it would be studied by those within the field of American government who focus on comparative state politics. But its special status as a semiautonomous commonwealth prevents this from happening.

The primary goal in this book is to explain a puzzle relating to a 1991 decision that briefly made the commonwealth a “Spanish only” territory. Puerto Rico had been officially bilingual (Spanish and English) since 1902, following the Spanish–American–Cuban War. Although there had long been efforts by adherents of the separatist Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) to promote a “Spanish

only” policy, they had never before had much success. This was due to a combination of factors including resistance to such change by the leadership of the commonwealth-backing Popular Democratic Party (PPD) and the statehood-backing New Progressive Party (PNP). Moreover, public opinion polls indicated that a majority of supporters of all three major parties supported the continuation of official bilingualism.

How, then, is one to explain the fact that the Puerto Rican legislature passed “The Official Language Act of 1991” and that it was subsequently signed into law by Governor Rafael Hernandez Colon of the dominant and centrist PPD? The general unpopularity of this measure is attested to by the fact the PPD and its candidates (including Governor Hernandez Colon) were severely punished in the next election, and the Language Act was subsequently repealed.

Barreto attempts to solve this puzzle by using a somewhat modified version of Anthony Downs’s classic vote maximization model to appeal to voting constituencies. While it at first seems puzzling from a Downsian rational actor perspective that the PPD would “irrationally” support a language bill that would risk alienating not only its own constituents but also potential defectors from the PIP and PNP, Barreto sees a second level of rationality at work. He believes that the PPD was involved in a two-level game in which Spanish language preservation was such a cherished goal for the Puerto Rican “culture state” that a higher rationality overruled normal

electoral expediency. Here, Barreto relies in part on George Tsebelis' (*Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*, 1990) nested games approach as it has been applied to solve puzzles associated with seemingly irrational patterns of legislative cooperation in consociational European democracies.

A major strength of this book is that Barreto grounds his analysis of Puerto Rican politics in the work of a highly respected scholar and student of American politics. Since Downs first wrote his seminal *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) close to half a century ago, the debate among those who study American legislative behavior has been not so much about the merits of the rational choice approach but rather about how various differences in institutional structures influence and affect legislative outcomes. Thus, by using such a mainstream approach to study political behavior in Puerto Rico, Barreto's book helps to bridge the gap between comparativists, who would attempt to understand commonwealth politics through the use of theories that stress factors such as dependency, ethnicity, and cultural nationalism, and the broad community of students of American politics.

At the same time, this use of Down's rational choice theoretical framework to solve this particular puzzle seems to place rather severe limits on the range of alternative explanations for passage of the Official Language Act that Barreto might otherwise have considered. For example, the very fact that the preservation of a Spanish linguistic heritage became such a "vital objective" and "cherished goal" that it required a second and higher level of rational action begs the question of why this might have been the case. From a constructivist perspective (what I want and thus rationally attempt to get depends on who I consider myself to be), this apparently irrational act might be explained in terms of individual and/or collective shifts in the Puerto Rican sense of identity. Indeed, there is much evidence in recent studies such as those by anthropologist Arlene Davila (*Sponsored Identities: Cultural Politics in Puerto Rico*, 1997) that Puerto Rican identity was being radically transformed during the 1970s and 1980s through various forms of party and corporate related cultural activity. Such a radical transformation of national identity could have hypothetically then been "externalized" in the form of new kinds of voting behavior such as that which made the Official Language Act of 1991 possible.

Fundamentally, Barreto views the PPD leadership (and, for that matter, the leadership of Puerto Rico's two other major political parties) as using language and other identity-related issues as tools to achieve rationally calculated goals related to vote maximization. Those who study the politics of identity sometimes call such usage "strategic essentialism"—the deployment by leaders of symbols of identity as part of a broader rational (and sometimes cynical) calculus aimed at maximizing leadership goals, whatever these goals might be. It is unfortunate that Barreto did not choose to explore some alternative avenues of explanation, particularly those that relate to values and associated identities as causally consequential in their own right.

Barreto's book is a welcome addition to the literature on American politics not only because it takes the long-dominant Downsian approach to the study of legislative action seriously but also because it broadens the debate concerning what Puerto Rico is actually all about. While there are many excellent books that treat it as fundamentally a social and cultural entity (*el estado jibaro*), this book suggests that we should treat it as a normal American state with a few special historical characteristics.

Olympic Dreams: The Impact of Mega-Events on Local Politics. By Matthew J. Burbank, Gregory D. Andranovich, and Charles H. Heying. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 203p. \$49.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Michael A. Pagano, *University of Illinois at Chicago*

Cities' pursuit of economic development activities sits at the interstices of the economic marketplace and political power. Private-sector investment is not realized in a power vacuum; political institutional and politicians' behavior influence, alter, and in many ways determine the kind and location of those private investment decisions. It is no wonder, then, that both economists and political scientists have much to say about the efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and impact of urban economic development. And it is no wonder that volumes have been written on the vast array of urban development projects from a comparative or idiosyncratic perspective. Attracting the quadrennial Olympic games is no exception. Matthew Burbank, Gregory Andranovich, and Charles Heying have performed an impressive task of compiling documents and accounts on the politics and economics surrounding the successful efforts of Los Angeles, Atlanta, and Salt Lake City in luring the Olympics to their cities and regions.

They begin their account with a lengthy review of the theoretical and empirical literature on cities, urban development, and regime politics. They argue that declining federal aid in the early 1980s and global competition for businesses have meant that cities were pushed to compete on a world stage, that they had become more entrepreneurial in a "postfederal" environment, and that they chose aggressive economic development strategies. Further, the authors argue that cities with strong growth regimes and an interest in creating an image of their city were characteristic of these three cities' pursuit of the Olympic games, an economic development project they refer to as the "mega-event strategy." Case studies on each of the three cities are presented serially and are informed by a wealth of secondary sources, from journalistic accounts of the bidding, negotiating, and unfolding of the games to feasibility and postgame studies by city agencies and scholars. Each case is carefully described, the motivations and behavior of key actors and institutions are explored in detail, and lengthy discussions of winners and losers in the siting and financing of the games are presented. They conclude that image-building and revenue generation are important motivations to hosting the Olympic games, but they also contend that mega-events "establish a pattern of treating the city as a commodity" (p. 161). Their argument, then, is that the commodification of the city ignores the people who live there. A mega-event, they conclude, "serves only narrow purposes" (p. 171).

The strength of the narrative about three cities and their pursuit of the dream of hosting the Olympics is that they put a political and corporate face on the nonathletic side of the games. Their study places city governments and private-sector investors in the broader picture of development projects, even if the Olympics are on a grander or what some might call an extreme scale. The limitations of the study inhere in its reliance on secondary sources and its most similar-city design. Instructive to our understanding of the political and economic dimensions of hosting the Olympic games would be a comparative assessment of those cities that failed to attract the games. The authors provide some information about the failure of Denver and Seattle in bidding on or attracting the games, even though those cities appear to have the same needs and criteria of the successful cities (growth regime, image creation, loss of federal funds, global linkages). Do "failed" cities ignore the people who live there? Do the "narrow purposes"

of hosting a mega-event transcend Olympic cities, or are these outcomes peculiar to the successful cities only? The evidence from a similar-cities research design raises many questions for future research. As it is, however, the three cases establish a useful baseline of comparison for future work.

Rethinking Democratic Accountability. By Robert D. Behn. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 317p. \$41.95 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

Peter Kobrak, *Western Michigan University*

Everybody seems to talk about accountability but no one ever does anything about it, Robert Behn argues in this thought-provoking book. This is scarcely due to a lack of enough overseers. Behn rattles off the innumerable "accountability holders"—including the GAO, lawyers, journalists, and inspectors general—who dish it out while the wretched public administrators take it. These accountability adversaries exclusively pursue either accountability for finances or accountability for fairness, doling out punishments where rules are inadequately met and feeling no obligation to consider those performance considerations that may have driven managerial choices. Public managers may be confronted by an "accountability dilemma" in pondering the trade-offs between finances and fairness and performance, but that is not the accountability holder's problem.

Behn supplies an even-handed discussion of why the "traditional public administration paradigm," with its concern about corruption and laws governing finances and fairness, evolved, along with a balanced, though critical, explanation of the work of Max Weber, Frederick W. Taylor, and James Q. Wilson and their accountability holder progeny. Furthermore, even as a supporter of the new public management and its emphasis on a "culture of performance," Behn concedes that the paradigm requires its own theory of democratic accountability.

While fuzzy about just what accountability is, Behn is clear on what question a performance-based paradigm must answer: "How will we hold *whom* accountable for *what*?" It is fine for new public management paradigm supporters to say that agencies should be held accountable for results, but that is hardly enough. *Who* decides *what results*? Behn answers that elected officials, political appointees, members of the accountability establishment, and, yes, citizens too must consider "how empowered, entrepreneurial, responsive civil services can make innovative decisions in a decentralized yet democratic government" (p. 64).

The problem is that most of the existing mechanisms evaluate administrative fairness or financial irregularities rather than performance, which, as Behn reminds us, is the fundamental purpose of administrative agencies. The solution must be some form of "collaborative accountability"—where accountability is not merely hierarchical or focused on one organization but instead engages all of the relevant stakeholders in mutual and balanced evaluation of not only finances and fairness but also performance. Rather than relying on an overabundance of rules to anticipate violations in finance and fairness before they occur, such collaborative accountability would evaluate retrospectively whether public entrepreneurs achieved their goals and consequently should be allowed more discretion and trust. Indeed, the "accountability catch" is that without such discretion, there can be no real accountability. James Madison and William Proxmire notwithstanding, a "culture of mistrust" creates a "fear of discretion" that permeates the world of Congress and the overhead regulators. While there then must be some trade-

off between discretion and accountability, Behn joins Ronald Reagan in proposing that we must "trust but verify."

If public agencies are "to convince the citizens that government performance is not an oxymoron" (p. 119), stakeholders concerned with performance must form a "new compact of mutual, collective responsibility." Those public managers, citizens, and accountability holders willing to weigh fairness, finance, and performance must voluntarily join in making an informal ethical commitment to accept responsibility for the pursuit of democratic accountability. Everyone in the accountability environment thus assumes some responsibility for agency performance.

Behn works hard to show that this "cooperation challenge" can be met. He supplies successful case studies and even draws on advanced versions of the prisoner's dilemma and the tragedy of the commons to overcome the problem of collective action. He also feels that such cooperation can be fostered through altering professional norms and public expectations. The cooperation challenge must be met by enforcing the necessary reciprocity.

One product of such a mutual compact could be a "charter agency" that would accept additional accountability for performance in exchange for fewer rules and other constraints on its efforts to comply with finances and fairness. Such agencies would not be created but rather would evolve over time. Volunteers among the stakeholders would initially enter into such compacts and then gradually seek to expand their membership through incremental performance achievements.

In concluding his argument, Behn takes the high ground by distinguishing between accountability as merely answerability to justify actions and responsibility as "the moral obligation to work collectively with public employees, collaborators from nonprofit and for-profit organizations, and citizens in pursuit of the public interest" (p. 196). Such responsibility requires "360-degree evaluation" akin to those corporate efforts to evaluate personnel by seeking the views not only of superiors but also of subordinates, peers, and other internal and external stakeholders. Such multiple perspectives provide a more accurate view of performance and stand in contrast to the "360-degree harassment" that too often today masquerades as accountability. Such 360-degree accountability holds out the potential to engage citizens actively in goal setting and evaluation. It can thus enlarge citizen trust through informed consent and produce "institutions motivated less by personal, self-interest than by our mutual, collective public interest" (p. 217).

The book requires considerable optimism in that democratic accountability assumes that numerous individual and institutional actors will do the right thing. The discussion of Congressional professional norms depends heavily on Donald Matthews' 1960 discussion of the folkways of the Senate and neglects the more recent literature that shows a decline in such Congressional professional norms. Behn's reliance on the public interest in making his case is unusual for a new public management advocate and requires more than a limited discussion in the Notes. And his interchangeable discussion of charter schools and charter agencies is curious in that the charter schools rely on an end run around rules governing finances and fairness, while charter agencies would presumably seek a creative tension among finances, fairness, and performance.

Behn, however, provides in *Rethinking Democratic Accountability* a well-reasoned and original contribution. His lively writing, balanced assessment, and ambitious recommendations are rare in the well-plowed field of accountability literature. The book would be suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate seminars in public administration, American politics, and organization theory.

In making a vigorous case for mutual and collective accountability, Behn moves the accountability debate to a new level. The approach is well calculated to stimulate debate at a time when the nation appears to be serious about a change in strengthening government capacity.

Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy. Edited by W. Lance Bennett and Robert M. Entman. Cambridge University Press, 2001. 489p. \$74.95 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

Tali Mendelberg, *Princeton University*

Nothing energizes a field of study more than a revolution. The explosion of new forms of mass communication is just such a revolution for the field of political communication, to judge by this volume. As its 22 chapters demonstrate, profound changes in the technology and institutions of mass media have prompted a wide-ranging and stimulating effort to document, interpret, and theorize.

The volume demonstrates like no other that the changes in communication technology and in the media industry over the past 15 years have been great in number and in kind. On the technology front we have witnessed the sharply increasing availability and use of cable and satellite television, with their explosion of channels; the proliferation of VCRs and devices that allow people to select what they wish and ignore all else; and Internet communication, which allows people to connect with either like-minded or foreign strangers in virtual communities or opinion forums, offering people the chance to disconnect from their immediate surroundings. Media businesses too operate differently in kind from what they were doing 20 years ago: They are conglomerating more and competing less; they target finely segmented audiences at the expense of unifying citizens; they treat audiences as simple-minded consumers to be entertained with sordid scandal, campaign horse-race coverage, or speculative melodrama rather than as educable citizens to be neutrally and fully informed and politically empowered; they are increasingly blurring the lines between the genre of news and that of entertainment; and they ignore federal guidelines meant to ensure fair access on matters of public concern. A revolution, it would seem, has arrived.

This revolution demands answers to a host of important questions: Does the new technology affect citizens' engagement in politics? Are the quantity and quality of information available to citizens truly different than before? Is the public indeed more Balkanized than before, and have people's social allegiances and civic sensibilities really eroded? Are market forces dissolving the glue that binds individuals into a public? Have traditional sources such as local newspapers survived? Has inequality between social and informational classes been exacerbated or remedied? What does all this portend for the health of democracy, and what standards should we use in determining the prognosis? Lending greater urgency to these questions is the possibility that the answers can shed light on what appear as concomitant trends in citizen politics: a decline in nationalism in postindustrial societies; growing cynicism and distrust of government; and, more controversially, falling voter turnout rates. (Some point to an erosion of partisanship, but recent work shows otherwise. See Larry M. Bartels. "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952–1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 [2000]: 35–50; Marc Hetherington. "Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization." *American Political Science Review* 95 [2001] 619–32; John Zaller, in reviewed volume.)

Lance Bennett and Robert Entman have gathered together many of the eminent authorities on political communication

to puzzle over these questions. The ambitious introductory chapter lays out general themes that go some way toward binding the chapters into a coherent whole. The book then proceeds in several parts, from general essays on the interplay of mass communication and public affairs, to examinations of new and old institutions of mass communication, to systematic studies of the intersection of mass communication with public opinion, to a focus on political campaigns.

Common to many of the chapters is a sense that political communication should be civic-minded rather than market-driven. The concept of the public sphere plays a prominent role here. In the ideal construction of theorists such as Habermas, the public sphere is the set of informal gathering places in which free conversation thrives. This mutual exchange is in turn expected to help citizens to understand their common goals and to motivate and enable them to participate in public affairs. Pear Dahlgren and Colin Sparks provide useful discussions of the concept and then apply its normative standards to the case of the Internet, with mixed conclusions. Underwood argues against the widely held claim that news outlets seeking profit must treat audiences as customers rather than citizens.

These and similar chapters (such as that by Don Slater) illustrate a strength and a weakness of much of the volume. While they pose questions central to democracy and seek to understand important new trends, the conclusions often rest on less than robust evidence. To be sure, some chapters stand on much stronger ground than others. Michael Delli Carpini and Bruce Williams, for example, offer a compelling analysis of the blurring lines between news and entertainment. Kathleen Jamieson engages in a detailed analysis of the content of issue-advocacy ads, a phenomenon of the 1990s designed to circumvent spending limits. While explicitly avoiding candidate advocacy as required, many ads implicitly violate important deliberative requirements. Several other chapters, however, testify to the need to analyze more and better evidence about how people actually communicate in the public sphere and how communication actually affects citizens.

There is a productive tension in the volume between the pessimism of many chapters and optimism, the minority view. Pessimists tend to believe that contemporary democracies do not allow enough public participation or influence. Elites, increasingly abetted by the media, have latitude in a representative system and can ignore many types of public opinion. The new media trends exacerbate social inequalities, further limiting citizen influence. Increasingly sensationalist or commercialized news coverage fosters political ignorance or quiescence. Often, pessimists predict a great impact on politics from the massive changes in communication.

Optimists are not as wedded to a civic conception of democracy. They worry less that people may not participate heavily in politics, that discourse may be uncivil, that the public will may go unheeded, or that some citizens have less say than others. Often, optimists argue that the changes are less than they seem or carry few consequences.

Among the pessimists are Entman and Susan Herbst, who provide an original and vigorous challenge to the way scholars conceptualize the public opinion, with important implications for our understanding of the media and democratic governance. While others no doubt will challenge the empirical analysis of defense spending presented here (e.g., Larry M. Bartels. "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Build Up." *American Political Science Review* 85 [1991]: 457–74), any student of public opinion will have to grapple with the argument. Bennett and Entman as well as Oscar Gandy worry about the gap between "the electronic haves and have nots" (p. 19). Gadi Wolfsfeld's

pessimism is born of his fascinating study of waves of news coverage, with their sudden, confusing dissipation. Doris Graber argues that young people are the most politically disengaged, that today's youth are more different from their elders than were previous young generations from theirs. However, according to the evidence, there may not be a bigger generational gap for today's young people (Table 20.1). Rather, there seems to be a long-term disengagement that has affected several cohorts, and if anything, the oldest generation appears distinctive (Tables 20.2 and 20.3). Thus the pessimists tend to offer provocative and original frameworks, although the empirical analysis is sometimes not as persuasive as it might be.

Among the optimists is Timothy Cook, whose distinctive argument, developed elsewhere and persuasively presented in chapter 9, is that despite the many changes, the media continues to function as always. The media has never served the citizenry primarily. Rather, the media is used by and serves the needs of elites John Zaller's systematic argument, with attendant evidence, convinces that even the highly sensationalist coverage of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal need not—and perhaps cannot—alter the public's criteria for evaluating the president. Partisanship and the president's performance on the basics—the nation's pocketbook and its physical safety—govern the public will even in the face of sensationalism. Rodevick Hart offers a multifaceted look at letters to the editor, with data on thousands of letter-writers and on editorial decisions and readers' perception about them. The study is on the optimistic side, showing no across-the-board decline toward political apathy (Table 19.2).

So which is the more accurate way to characterize the media trends and their consequence: revolutionary change or seamless continuity? And does political communication enable democracy to work effectively, or do the flaws fail to pass a critical threshold? The evidence so far is with continuity and democratic health. But that may be due not so much to a closer fit with reality as to the disadvantage of advocates of the change thesis in conducting systematic empirical analysis.

In any case, perhaps the dichotomy is a bit too simple. A notable chapter that does not fit the dichotomy and in some ways benefits from it is William Gamson's, in which he summarizes his extensive empirical work on media frames. Gamson finds that some issues generate media frames that, by highlighting citizens' agency, promote the kind of collective action lauded by participatory theorists. Under some conditions pessimism is warranted; under others, optimism is. An interesting question provoked by this study is whether agency really comes from the nature of the issue or instead is heavily influenced by the tactics and alliances of activists.

Also stepping outside the dichotomy are Wendy Rahn and Thomas Rudolph. They argue—with persuasive survey evidence—that young people are less attached than older people to national identity and politics in part because of trends in communication. The Internet acts as a globalizing force that erodes citizens' identity with the nation-state and engagement with its political system, though the consequences need not be negative if a supranational organization (the European Union) is on the rise.

This volume proves that questions about audience segmentation, use of the Internet, and the merger of entertainment and news not only shed light on the nature of media change but also prompt us to revisit the meaning of basic democratic requirements. While one hopes to see more systematic analysis in future work, this volume is notable for the big and worthy questions it tackles. Much useful theorizing awaits the reader.

The Debate over Slavery: Antislavery and Proslavery Liberalism in Antebellum America. By David F. Ericson. New York: New York University Press, 2000. 216p. \$55.00 cloth, \$19.00 paper.

Democracy and Slavery in Frontier Illinois: The Bottomland Republic. By James Simeone. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000. 290p. \$38.00.

Manisha Sinha, *University of Massachusetts, Amherst*

Both the books under review deal with the development of a distinctly American political tradition of liberalism and liberal democracy and its relationship to the thorny issue of racial slavery. However, the authors employ very different means to explore this common goal. While David Ericson, as in his previous work, concentrates on the level of national politics, James Simeone examines the local political culture of "bottomland republicanism" in early Illinois.

In his book, Ericson seeks to revive Louis Hartz's "liberal consensus thesis" or the idea that ideological consensus rather than conflict marks American history by exploring its "toughest [test] case" (p. 8), the sectional conflict over slavery and the Civil War. According to him, antislavery and proslavery advocates, despite their differences on slavery, shared an underlying belief in liberalism. In bringing the Old South's defenders of slavery under the umbrella of liberalism, he goes further than Hartz himself, who had dismissed the South's reactionary defense of slavery as a short-lived feudal dream. Interestingly enough, he presents us with a far closer, textual reading of proslavery than of antislavery works. Perhaps the author is well aware of the skepticism that will greet his attempt to portray proslavery ideologues as nineteenth-century American liberals.

Ericson's classification of antislavery and proslavery arguments as deontological, consequentialist, and contextualist is limiting rather than illuminating. Historical arguments are far messier and complicated, as he sometimes seems to acknowledge, than the neat categories social scientists would assign to them. Labeling Lydia Maria Child's abolitionist pamphlet as mainly consequentialist, he fails to do justice to its pioneering antiracism arguments. And while he does discuss the writings and speeches of his subjects ably for the most part, the historical context in which they were uttered is at times lacking. James Henry Hammond's conditional unionism, for instance, was a product of the increasingly pro-Southern Democratic Party's domination of the federal government throughout the 1850s and not due to some primordial loyalty to the Union, which he supposedly shared with Calhoun.

Most problematic is Ericson's attempt to push renowned conservative proslavery thinkers into a liberal straitjacket. His differentiation of liberal, or slavery is the best state of liberty for African Americans, and nonliberal, or African Americans as a race are suited to slavery, proslavery arguments is not very convincing. Both arguments in fact are decidedly racist. In their open celebration of social hierarchy and stability and denunciation of the principles of the Declaration of Independence, men such as George Fitzhugh and Hammond sound more like followers of Sir Robert Filmer than Locke. Making a somewhat strange argument, Ericson claims that proslavery thinkers were liberals simply because they believed that slavery was a progressive institution. Nor can we view Calhoun's concurrent majority theory and Southerners' demand for the extension and perpetuity of racial slavery as merely pleas for tolerance and pluralism. Perhaps the one way in which many proslavery thinkers followed classical liberalism was their insistence on the sanctity of human property and their upholding of the slaveholders' right to property over the slaves' right to liberty. Here Ericson misses an opportunity to explore fully how much in common

champions of slavery had with bourgeois conservatives outside their section.

Ericson's portrayal of abolitionists as irresponsible, anti-institutional agitators is decidedly old-fashioned and revisionist in tone. At times, he fails to distinguish sufficiently between the more opportunistic arguments of antislavery politicians and those of abolitionists. To blame abolitionist arguments that allegedly "marginalized the freed slaves" rather than the violent opposition of white southerners to racial equality for "the failure of Reconstruction" (p. 89) is ahistorical and untenable. In his concluding chapter on the Civil War, Ericson, while claiming to develop a synthesis between the revisionist needless conflict school of Civil War historians and those who view the war as inevitable and irrepressible, leans far too much on the revisionist side. For example, he repeatedly characterizes Lincoln's famous house divided speech as a self-fulfilling prophecy rather than a perceptive statement on the sectional conflict and its underlying causes. Somewhat contradictorily, he then tries to enlist Lincoln for his liberal consensus view of the Civil War. But Lincoln viewed the Southern demand for the liberty to hold slaves as political tyranny and the essence of immorality, and not simply as a different version of liberalism.

Like Ericson, Simeone tries to rehabilitate the reputation of the advocates of slavery. If Ericson's proslavery writers were liberals at heart, those who fought for the introduction of slavery in Illinois in 1823–24, according to Simeone, were really champions of democracy. In his book, they emerge as the descendants of an antielitist, backcountry political culture extending back to the Old World. The fight for the introduction of slavery represented a battle between "white folk" and "big folk" such as Edward Coles, a former Virginia slaveholder whose apparently "aggressive antislavery views" (p. 17) offended the plain folks. Simeone explains that many of these white folk were slaveholding yeoman farmers rather than "plantation aristocrats" (p. 24) but slave ownership in antebellum America, as the economist Gavin Wright has pointed out, already put one in the ranks of the wealthy. Most self-working farmers in the mid-west ranked below in capital than a southern farmer who owned even one slave.

The white folk, Simeone argues, fought against the class above them, the race below them, and the "Yankees," Northerners who personified antislavery and pro-market forces. The white folk sought to preserve their economic independence and political equality by fighting for democracy in the name of slavery. They led a democratic revolution against men such as Ninian Edwards and Jesse Thomas, who dominated the territorial and state governments of early Illinois. However, as Simeone acknowledges, the white folk themselves were divided over the advisability of introducing slavery into Illinois. Indeed, some of his evidence points to a democratic republican critique of racial slavery. In short, the forces for democracy and slavery were hardly neatly aligned in this state. The author's explanation of the division among white folk over slavery as a cultural cum religious one—"whole hog Calvinists," or strongly democratic and proslavery, versus "milk and cider Arminians," or weakly democratic and antislavery—is less than convincing. He fails to explore the more obvious sectional or North–South division over slavery in Illinois fully, which, as he points out, does presage the sectional conflict of the 1840s and 1850s.

Simeone contends that Illinois' proslavery bottomland farmers were exponents of revolutionary republicanism and precursors of antebellum champions of majoritarian rule and popular sovereignty. They redefined the universalism of revolutionary republicanism in a particularistic fashion and became champions of the white folk in the Jacksonian

era. While Jacksonian democracy was indeed a white man's democracy, it was not an explicitly proslavery movement. Rather it was based on a national consensus on slavery and around the economic issues that Western republicans held so dear. Otherwise, the conflict between the staunchly proslavery John C. Calhoun and the champion of the plain folk, Andrew Jackson, would be inexplicable. Perhaps Illinois' advocates of slavery, like Ninian Edwards, were more Calhounite than Jacksonian. Moreover, the author does not explore the final conflict between the Western majoritarian, democratic vision represented by popular sovereignty and slavery during the Kansas wars. Despite his moral insensitivity to the issue of slavery, Stephen Douglas, to whom the author alludes throughout the text, finally had to confront slavery to save the white man's democracy.

Finally, for a book that purports to deal with the politics of slavery and racism, Simeone fails to explore either of these issues in any depth. The fight between the proslavery conventionists and the antislavery nonconventionists in Illinois sounds more like a battle of tin swords. His discussion of bottomland republicanism also tends to obfuscate rather than clarify these issues. All caveats aside, this book is well researched and Simeone is no doubt right in arguing that political development in Illinois foreshadowed Jacksonian democracy and the sectional conflict over slavery in the late antebellum period. He correctly concludes that the axis of political conflict in early America was republicanism and democracy against liberal constitutionalism and institutions but his effort to link proslavery forces with the cause of democracy is questionable. This is especially pertinent when one considers the fact that proslavery advocates in antebellum America relied far more often on formal constitutionalism and a supposed respect for tradition and institutions to make their case than their antislavery opponents.

By attempting to incorporate slavery in a broader liberal or democratic political tradition, Simeone and Ericson fail to deal sufficiently with the political significance of slavery and its impact on the politics of pre-Civil War America. Any account of this period of political history that does not explore how racial slavery affected the ideologies, political processes, and very nature of politics in early America is incomplete.

Corporate Power and the Environment: The Political Economy of U.S. Environmental Policy. By George A. Gonzalez. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 160p. \$60.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Clyde W. Barrow, *University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth*

George A. Gonzalez has authored a lucid and well-written book with a sharp thesis. He challenges the conventional claim that environmental policy is "an oasis of democracy" by developing a series of case studies to demonstrate that "members of the nation's economic elite—corporate decision-makers and other individuals of substantial wealth—are the dominant influences in the formation and development of U.S. environmental policies" (p. ix). In constructing his theoretical argument, Gonzalez combines G. William Domhoff's method of power structure analysis with James Weinstein's and others' historical analysis of corporate liberalism.

Gonzalez has selected environmental policy as a "hard case" for promoting the well-deserved and long overdue "rehabilitation" of Domhoff's method of power structure research. He observes that "environmental policies are widely perceived to be arenas where business influence is weakest" (p. 18) in American politics, but Gonzalez deploys a wealth of historical evidence to suggest that these policies are in fact "largely shaped by capitalist elites and generally serve

the political and economic interests of corporate America” (p. ix). As controversial and counterintuitive as this may seem, Gonzalez marshals an impressive array of historical evidence. Unlike many political scientists who have turned to history, Gonzalez does not merely rely on extant writings by historians but makes an original historical contribution to the subject by delving into the personal correspondence of key actors, government archives, the proceedings of professional associations, obscure government documents, and archival materials from leading organizations in the policy planning network.

Gonzalez draws on these sources to conduct a relentless and unequivocal polemic against theories of pluralism and state autonomy and, in doing so, provides a unique counterpoint to the conventional wisdom that business interests and environmental policy are necessarily antagonistic interests in the political arena. To illustrate his thesis, Gonzalez selects four environmental policy areas: management of the national forests, management of the national parks, federal wilderness preservation, and federal clean air policies. In successive chapters, Gonzalez analyzes the origins of the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Park Service, Redwood National Park, Yosemite National Park, and the Jackson Hole National Monument. His final case study examines the adoption of the Clean Air Act of 1990.

Gonzalez’s analysis also builds on the previous work of Murray Edelman by emphasizing that environmental policy has been deployed by political elites as an important symbol of democracy that helps legitimate the state by presenting these policies to the public “as a means to control economic interests and hold corporate powers in check” (p. ix). However, Gonzalez insists that a closer examination of these policies reveals that their implementation has “historically altered the operation of the economy to the benefit of capitalist concerns” (p. ix), while explicitly rejecting alternative, if poorly organized, conceptions of ecological policy.

Within this general theoretical framework, Gonzalez develops a distinct argument in each case study. For example, in his analysis of the origins of the U.S. Forest Service and the national parks system, Gonzalez examines the political conflict between the ideals of scientific forestry (wilderness preservation) championed largely by university professors and the ideals of practical forestry championed by Gifford Pinchot and other corporate liberals. In recounting the triumph of practical forestry, Gonzalez concludes that practical forestry was favored by “an upper-class and corporate-based policy network promoting the use of particular forestry practices in both private and public forests in the United States” (p. 23). However, Gonzalez’s argument is not merely a democratic critique of elite dominance. He also uses these case studies to illustrate the significant differences in policy outcomes that result from such dominance.

In the case of practical forestry, Gonzalez not only concludes that corporate interests triumphed in the policy arena, but finds that their policy planning network “intervened directly to mold the profession of forestry into a discipline that served the needs of the U.S. timber industry” (p. x). Thus, when the Redwood National Park was created many decades later, the form in which it was preserved “both accommodated and served the profit goals of the large timber firms involved” in the controversy (p. x), while defeating the plans of serious preservationists. In a similar vein, Gonzalez argues that “in the case of the park service, its centralized management, resources, and professionalism have been historically deployed to convert the national parks into a profit generating system of tourist centers” (p. 45).

Gonzalez’s thesis is less sharp in the case of wilderness preservation (e.g., Jackson Hole Monument), where he ar-

gues only that “active economic elite political support is a necessary condition” (p. 61) of its adoption, but it is the one case where he cannot link the policy to an unequivocally economic class interest. Similarly, Gonzalez argues that Clean Air Act of 1990 “was the result of industry efforts to create uniformity in clean air regulations” by having the 1990 Clean Air Act stave off and supplant more stringent and costly air pollution regulatory regimes enacted on the state and local level (p. 95). In this instance, the Clean Air Act served to “rationalize air pollution regulations to the benefit of business interests” (p. 95). While its adoption certainly removed the threat of more stringent and costly state and local legislation, it is not clear why such legislation should not be viewed as a “second-best” compromise for business that also defeated its first preference (i.e., no legislation).

Gonzalez has carved out a unique perspective on environmental policy that also has implications for the state theory debate. It is an important contribution to the emerging trend among many new political scientists of returning to works of Domhoff, Miliband, and the corporate liberal historians, while extending that work into new policy areas. It is also part of what some of us hope is a renewed interest in the study of corporate power by political scientists.

The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton. By Fred I. Greenstein. New York: Free Press, 2000. 282p. \$25.00.

Nicol C. Rae, *Florida International University*

The overriding theme of this very insightful work from distinguished presidential scholar Fred I. Greenstein is stated in the opening pages: “The United States is said to have a government of laws and institutions rather than individuals, but as these examples remind us, it is one in which the matter of who occupies the nation’s highest office can have profound repercussions” (p. 2). Greenstein’s analysis of presidential leadership styles from FDR to Clinton corroborates his theme by demonstrating the extent to which the aggrandizement of the presidency since the New Deal has left the American polity at the mercy of the skills and personalities of the holders of the office. As Greenstein himself points out (p. 3) parliamentary systems, with their more collective leadership, place more partisan and institutional constraints on the head of government. In contrast, the centrality of the presidency to the American system of government since the New Deal and the extent to which the institution is driven by the individual style of respective officeholders provide a recurrent and pervasive element of instability in American national government. Yet this very instability is also perhaps the office’s most useful attribute. In a system characterized largely by gridlock it provides intermittent and necessary innovation and dynamism. The presidency’s greatest shortcoming, its highly protean nature, is also, ironically, its greatest value as a political institution.

This should be a highly accessible and informative volume for undergraduate students, scholars of the presidency, and politically interested general readers alike. Having established the extent to which individual personality and leadership style are critical to the modern presidency, Professor Greenstein proceeds to provide the reader with succinct but absorbing sketches of the presidential styles of FDR and his successors. Each president is assessed in terms of what Greenstein sees as the six components of an overall presidential leadership style: “public communicator,” “organizational capacity,” “political skill,” “vision of public policy,” “cognitive style,” and “emotional intelligence.” The great advantage of

utilizing such a large number of factors is that it allows for a more nuanced analysis of presidential leadership than the traditional narrow focus on “political bargaining” or “personality.” A consistent and rigorous framework of analysis also enables Greenstein to avoid the perennial problem for works on the presidency: the tendency to lapse into simple narrative and anecdote. The recognition of the significance of communication skills and vision to the conduct of the modern presidency also reminds us of the curious nature of an office that demands the political skills of a head of government coupled with the demeanor and bearing of a head of state. Another strength of the book is the background information on each president both in the individual chapters and in the even more useful Appendix, which provides basic but essential information—cabinet members, family biographical information, and significant events—on each officeholder and his administration.

The subtlety and comprehensiveness of Greenstein’s framework for analyzing leadership style enable him to reveal shortcomings in the styles of presidents generally regarded as “successful” and, by the same token, the strengths of presidents usually dismissed as utter “failures.” Greenstein is critical, for example, of Franklin Roosevelt in one area that most presidential scholars (following Richard Neustadt) have always perceived to be one of Roosevelt’s greatest strengths—his organizational practices. According to Greenstein, FDR’s vaunted “chaotic organizational methods” were simply “chaotic” and generally got in the way of the objectives of his administration. In contrast, he finds more to admire in the more structured and formal presidential advisory and decision-making practices of Eisenhower and Gerald Ford. Greenstein also gives FDR relatively low marks for cognitive skills and, perhaps more surprisingly, vision, arguing that in domestic policy the New Deal was less effective simply because FDR’s improvisational approach to policymaking never allowed his administration to articulate an overall concept to the public of what it was trying to do. Professor Greenstein has played a major role in the rehabilitation of President Eisenhower among presidential scholars and he again provides a largely positive portrait here. His attribution of “vision” to Eisenhower is unconvincing to this reviewer, however. Greenstein argues that Eisenhower had “clarity” in his individual policy goals (p. 56)—such as the Interstate Highway System—but it seems to be stretching the concept rather far to say that this amounted to a “vision” in the same sense of Ronald Reagan’s mantra that “government is the problem.”

Greenstein’s framework also better enables us to understand the reasons for the “failures,” and *The Presidential Difference* includes a fair and measured discussion of the two presidents who constituted the most dramatic “failures”—LBJ and Nixon. Both of these men had high cognitive capacities and strong political skills, yet while both had extraordinary records of accomplishment in office, LBJ escalated America’s involvement in the most disastrous war in its history and divided the nation, while Nixon became the first presidential incumbent to resign in disgrace after exposure of his illegal actions in the Watergate cover-up. Greenstein attributes much of the blame for these disasters to the flawed “emotional intelligence” of both incumbents, that is, their inability to prevent their emotions from undermining the political goals of their administrations.

Ultimately this is a deceptively useful and insightful book. What initially appears to be a simple collection of biographical sketches on FDR and his successors turns out to challenge some of the prevailing tools of presidential analysis and to provide new ones that help illuminate the actual operations of the office. The focus on individuality and instability in the

institution of the Presidency is a welcome reminder of what a strange and volatile office it is. By reminding us of the degree to which the functioning of the contemporary political system is contingent on the styles, personality, and even emotional stability of individual presidents, *The Presidential Difference* should further enhance our regard for the wisdom of James Madison and John Marshall in establishing effective legislative and judicial checks on presidential power.

Wealth in America: Trends in Wealth Inequality. By Lisa A. Keister. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 307p. \$59.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Marilyn Dantico, *Arizona State University*

Lisa Keister’s work offers students of research methods, and of public policy, an ideal model. It also offers, albeit indirectly, a study that should inform policy makers as they discuss proposals to alter inheritance and estate tax policies and privatize Social Security. *Wealth in America* explores the distribution of household resources from 1962 through 1995. Questions regarding the distribution of wealth in the United States are seldom addressed directly because readily available data do not permit a straightforward approach. Because it is easier to deal with questions related to the distribution of income than with the distribution of wealth, research generally focuses on income distribution and we assume that there is a relatively straightforward relationship between the two. Keister tackles the data problems associated with measuring household assets allowing her to evaluate the distribution of wealth. Since measuring assets at any point in time is a challenge, it is all the more remarkable that she is able to examine changes in the distribution of household assets over time.

Her painstaking assembly of data, her resourceful use of simulations to supplement existing data sources, and her skilled analysis are the foundationstones of her contribution. They are the basis of her argument, and permit her to accomplish her goal of producing “a longitudinal picture of household wealth distribution and accumulation processes” (p. 260). Keister’s database, comprised of historic data, surveys, aggregate household wealth data, estate tax records, simulation estimates, and experiments based on simulated data, is massive. She draws on government documents for the period 1962 to 1995. Her simulation model allows her to answer a variety of questions, including the questions related to the effects of stock market fluctuations or booms in the housing market.

This work addresses basic questions regarding social structure, some of which have been examined empirically by others. But no other work is as painstakingly thorough. Consistent with studies of income distribution, Keister reports that the top 1% of wealth holders expanded their holdings over time. What is surprising is that the maldistribution of wealth far exceeds the maldistribution of income. Some of the change is attributable to individual choices, or, one might argue, to the limits set on less-well-off individuals by their access to choices. She points out, for example, that the poor, especially the nonwhite poor, have fewer and more expensive banking services than other segments of the population. Thus, their debt load is increased relative to others’ when they borrow money for a mortgage or when they conduct routine banking transactions. Moreover, the wealthy, unlike those with few assets, keep relatively much of their money in “high-risk” assets; middle-class and low-income families have relatively much of their money invested in housing and cash accounts, which are low-risk and low-reward assets. Demographic variables account for some differences; wealthy Americans, for example, have smaller families than

other Americans. Raising children, while clearly necessary and sometimes eulogized by policy makers, is inconsistent with asset accumulation. More important than family size, though, is where one starts out in the system; while education may improve one's earning capacity, it is not sufficient to change one's position relative to the wealthy. Keister argues that the wealthy control so many assets that for any change in the distribution of wealth to occur, they must hold fewer assets.

While these findings may seem obvious to some, her exploration of race effects is less so. She reports that there are virtually no nonwhite families among top wealth holders. Keister's simulated data inform an experiment removing the direct effects of race from wealth accumulation. The experimental data indicate that variables such as education and family size, which interact with race, are sufficient to sustain patterns of wealth inequality. When the question of family wealth is entered into the question of well-being, racial inequalities are greater than research on income, education, and other social status indicators suggests. The effects of race on wealth accumulation are shockingly robust.

Keister's work draws from a number of traditions, and it speaks to each in turn. Those familiar with the life cycle studies of Franco Modigliani, and Edward Wolff's explorations of the distribution of wealth, will be intrigued by Keister's additions to the field. Those who have followed the efforts of Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro to examine the effects of race will be drawn by the scope of Keister's undertaking as she examines the wealth distribution among African-American and Latino families, and with her speculations about wealth accumulation among Asian-American families. Those interested in the impacts of age on wealth accumulation will also benefit from a careful review of Keister's work.

Keister's work leads to some painful conclusions. She documents wealth inequalities far in excess of income inequalities and an increase in wealth inequalities over time. She is bold in her evaluation of some of the impediments to wealth accumulation, noting, for example, the negative impacts of inconsistent banking practices and casting a shadow over the promise that education and thrift will lead to social mobility. Yet her evaluation of policies intended to move middle-income wage earners into long-term investments is somewhat timid; she argues that more time must lapse before we can reach conclusions regarding social experiments such as Individual Retirement Accounts.

This is not a book for the untrained. It is a sophisticated methodological treatise suitable for classroom use in upper-division undergraduate seminars and by graduate students. It will also serve staff members for policymakers, who will be able to use this work to point to the persistent causes of inequalities that require attention as policies are developed.

Tangled Up in Red, White, and Blue: New Social Movements in America. By Christine A. Kelly. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 192p. \$67.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Karen Beckwith, *The College of Wooster*

Research on political movements remains peripheral to the discipline of political science, or, to put it more optimistically, outstanding research on political movements has relied upon interdisciplinary and intersubfield research strategies and is building an increasing presence within the discipline. The importance and emergence of this arena of scholarship make it difficult not to celebrate Christine Kelly's *Tangled Up in Red, White, and Blue*, a work that offers a synthesis of political theory and empirical political movement research, employing

comparative case studies of several new social movements in the United States.

Christine Kelly's thesis is that broad structural explanations for social movement emergence, form, and success are insufficient for understanding new social movements in the United States and that "national institutional settings and ideological traditions" (p. xii) are essential components that shape the context within which movements act. Accepting the construct of "new social movement" for the U.S. case, Kelly argues that the U.S. movements have been trapped between a co-opted liberal interest group model, on the one hand, and marginalization and defeat, on the other, a "bifurcated pattern [that] has its roots in the early Civil Rights movement" (p. 103). Kelly's goal is to provide the theoretical basis upon which U.S. movements can escape this pattern, engage in greater ideological reflexivity, and, ultimately, succeed.

Kelly begins by recuperating liberal democratic tenets of modernism—"rule of law, public accountability, and autonomy"—against modernism's "instrumental modes—concentrated capitalist accumulation, administrative rationality [and] natural resource exhaustion" (p. 4). She offers accounts of Hobbes's, Kant's, and Dewey's notions of reason and citizen responsibility in the state context to position her arguments concerning the value of Enlightenment traditions of freedom, moving to an evaluation of Habermas' contributions to democratic practice and renewal, particularly his concept of "communicative action." On the basis of her theoretical analysis, Kelly concludes that "the only practical arena [for social movement action] is . . . the state itself" (p. 65) and that social movements, in targeting the state, must ensure the institutionalization of radical democratic processes.

Three U.S. movements—Populist, Progressive, and Socialist—serve to exemplify the historical dimensions of antidemocratic resistance and cooptational strategies. Kelly employs these case studies to demonstrate the persistent failures to institutionalize radical democratic processes that would ensure a meaningful, progressive, and "class ethic"-based mass politics (pp. 161–64). She then turns to three post-1968 new social movements—the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Youth International Party (Yippies), and Redstockings, the New York City-based women's liberation group—and, finally, to two Reagan-era movement campaigns—the antiapartheid organizing and the anti-Gulf War protests—both of which are treated as student-based.

These multiple and various cases are employed to demonstrate the weaknesses of U.S. new social movements (NSMs), with their emphasis on identity, their antistate stance, and their "overemphasis on the prefigurative" (p. 139). Characterized by "opposition to representative institutions and universal (or shared) values and [relying] heavily on the symbolic" (p. 139), new social movements have been unable to challenge the state or to find ways of institutionalizing processes that would sustain mass citizen democratic participation. They have also failed, Kelly argues, to "[present] a coherent theoretical alternative to the dominant order" (p. 173). Kelly's solution to the ineffectiveness of the new social movements she examined is to embrace a "class ethic," to organize "a democratic confederation of the social movement base with parliamentary capabilities" (p. 171), and to engage in procedural institutional reform that would concretize mass democratic participation (p. 172).

Tangled Up in Red, White, and Blue has flaws that should give the reader/scholar/movement activist pause. Kelly's conclusions, for example, raise questions about the standards she employs to evaluate movement strategy and success. She concludes her book with a plea for a "more reflexive

ideology" and "constitutionally established procedures ensuring accountability (and recall) [that] must bind participants" (p. 161) and urges social movement activists "to thematize the impact of the accumulation process generally and in relations to NSM aims" (p. 162). Yet her emphasis on "electoral and related institutional reforms" (p. 171) is a call for procedural change, a move the Progressive movement advanced a century ago, resulting, according to Kelly, in its co-optation (p. 93). Although Kelly makes such a call in the context of "a class ethic and . . . a democratically structured confederalism" (p. 171), she does not explain how new social movements would escape the cooptation that she claims the Progressive movement experienced.

More serious is the outdated nature of the research and the citations. Chapter One's concern with resource mobilization versus new social movement theory focuses on a 1980s–1990s debate that has been superseded by political opportunity theorizing, claims about the role of emotions in social movements, and a clear cultural turn among many social movement scholars, as evidenced by Mary Fainsod Katzenstein (*Faithful and Fearless: Moving Feminist Protest Inside the Church and the Military*, 1998), Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield (eds., *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*, 1994), Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (eds., *How Social Movements Matter*, 1999), and Nancy Whittier (*Feminist Generations: The Persistence of the Radical Women's Movement*, 1995), among others. Moreover, a major theoretical work by Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato (*Civil Society and Political Theory*, 1992) is missing from Kelly's discussion and from her references; now a decade old, this work is a critical analysis of civil society, social movements, and democratic theory and is highly relevant to Kelly's arguments.

Kelly's insistence, in Chapter Six, that political opportunity theory is overly deterministic (pp. 164–67) has long been recognized. Political scientists and sociologists have theorized and documented the creation of opportunities by movement activists (see, e.g., Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 1998; Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 1996; and Lee Ann Banaszak, *Why Movements Succeed or Fail*, 1996). It is unfortunate that an energetic and passionate treatise such as *Tangled Up in Red, White and Blue* has failed to incorporate these major contributions to political movement research.

More generally, however, *Tangled Up in Red, White, and Blue* commits two major (and common) errors of political movement research. The first is *movement omniscience*, the unstated and often unrecognized assumption that a correct strategy and a correct set of choices are always available to political movements. To borrow a phrase from a famous leftist theorist, movements may not do exactly as they please, nor do they always have (nor can they always create) opportunities for success. In her discussions of specific movements, Kelly identifies missed opportunities, mistakes, and failures of social movements, without providing the context within which movement decisions might be evaluated. Omissions include the active strategizing of committed movement opponents, the violent and repressive actions of the state (a notable omission in the discussion of SNCC), the lack of support in public opinion, and disruptive historical events (such as assassinations). Kelly's claim that the U.S. student movement of the 1980s dissolved due to "its inability to discern and engage . . . the institutional and economic context in which it is enmeshed" (p. 128) suggests that a proper discernment might have led to its success, regardless of other factors. Similarly, her suggestion that "the eventual failure of the socialist movement . . . resulted from the

inability of movements to recognize" the political and ideological, rather than purely economic, nature of their struggle (p. 161) places the burden of proof solely on movements and employs the very determinism that she earlier rejects.

The second error is that of *movement myopia*, or generalizing from the scholar's own political involvement in or close experience with a specific movement. In Kelly's case, her activist history concerns campus-based anti-nuclear weapons and antiapartheid campaigns (pp. ix–xi); her selection of new social movement cases relies heavily on student movements. This emphasis obscures the strength and successes of national organizing in movements such as CISPES (the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador); the reader is given little sense of its national scope, the widespread involvement of nonstudent communities, especially churches, and the multiracial aspect of the coalition. Despite examples of antiapartheid organizing and of SNCC, there is too little discussion of race—perhaps the most distinctive "exceptionalism" of U.S. politics. Antiracist movements are discussed without reference to the long history and continuity of antiracist struggles and their different manifestations as these movements have responded to changing political conditions, shifts in electoral power, and alternations of support from and attack by state authorities. The lack of citations of the recent literature on SNCC, such as Cheryl Lynn Greenberg's (ed., 1998) *A Circle of Trust: Remembering SNCC* and Clayborne Carson's (1995) *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s*, is particularly lamentable.

Across the last decade, political movement scholarship has increased its presence within political science, incorporating methods and perspectives from a variety of research traditions, developing a sophisticated, interdisciplinary theoretical repertoire, and relying on and speaking from scholars' experiences of movement activism. *Tangled Up in Red, White, and Blue*—ambitious, wide-ranging, and passionate about new social movements—makes less of a contribution to this endeavor than it might have.

Bitter Fruit: The Politics of Black–Korean Conflict in New York City. By Claire Jean Kim. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000. 300p. \$37.50.

Richard M. Merelman, *The University of Wisconsin—Madison*

In this case study of the 1990 Red Apple Boycott of two Korean-owned produce stores in Brooklyn, New York, Claire Kim narrates a complex story of resurgent Black Nationalism, the rise of Korean resistance to blacks, and the fateful temporizing of Mayor David Dinkins, whose belated crossing of the boycott picket lines deeply injured his mayoralty. Kim has high ambitions in telling this story; she wishes to use it to displace a flawed "racial scapegoating" theory of black–Korean relations and to advance in its stead her own theory of "racial ordering" in the United States.

Kim's narrative of the Red Apple Boycott is more effective than is her theoretical analysis. While she offers an engrossing study of racial politics in New York City, her larger theory does not persuasively explain the events she describes.

Kim's 69 interviews, her extensive analysis of primary sources, her depiction of media coverage, and her sociodemographic data support her contention that the Red Apple Boycott was indeed an episode of resurgent Black Nationalism. Kim effectively connects the boycott to Black Nationalist activism during the Koch administration and black reactions to white racist attacks in Howard Beach and Bensonhurst. She demonstrates that well-known Black

Nationalist leaders quickly took over the leadership of the boycott, which emerged after an altercation between a Korean store owner and a Haitian woman customer. The leaders of the boycott did indeed intend their action to further Black Nationalist goals. Moreover, the boycott was part of a long tradition of Black Nationalist politics in New York City. That the boycott persisted for eight months sustains Kim's argument that previous Black Nationalist efforts had effectively prepared the black population for sustained political action.

Nevertheless, Kim does not quite achieve her goal of establishing that the Red Apple Boycott was an example of "purposive, collective action" (p. 3). Kim argues that the boycotters aimed to "punish the offending merchants, to defy and disrupt the power structure, to bring Black immigrants under the Black Power umbrella, and to raise Black people's consciousness about racial oppression in America" (p. 125). But these purposes emerged at different moments, and often appear as much to be rationalizations after the fact as established goals prior to the events. True, the boycott did harm the offending merchants (but not other Korean shopkeepers); however, its clumsy elevation of African Americans over immigrant Haitians seems unlikely to have extended Black Power to these immigrants. Nor did the boycott disrupt "the power structure," since, if Kim is correct, Koreans are not part of the power structure. Nor could it have raised black people's consciousness of racial oppression in America, since most American blacks probably knew nothing of it, and those in New York City hardly needed a boycott to confirm their consciousness of racial grievance.

And what, as a case of purposive collective action, did the boycott actually accomplish? Little good. The boycott alienated Koreans, who for the first time engaged in serious political countermobilization. The boycott helped bring down the first elected black mayor in New York City, David Dinkins, whose departure elevated to power the hostile Rudolph Giuliani and his police-friendly policies, which specifically targeted blacks. And the boycott further diminished the already reduced stores of Jewish liberalism in New York City politics. Of course, these facts don't demonstrate that the boycotters were *not* engaged in purposive collective action; however, they do make us question the rationality of these actions.

Need the boycott have faltered? Kim implies so; she states that "racial power cleans up after itself. It inevitably generates protest by subordinated groups, but it also names, interprets, and ultimately silences that protest" (p. 219). Kim draws this conclusion largely because of the theory of racial power she advances as antidote to a flawed theory of racial scapegoating, which marginalizes episodes of black-Korean conflict as irrational, decontextualized, emotional outbursts. In contrast, Kim asserts that a distinct structure of racial power in the United States consistently "racializes" new immigrant groups, orders racial minorities hierarchically, and utilizes such devices as "color-blind" language, myth (i.e., Koreans as a "model minority," blacks as an "underclass"), political exclusion, economic stratification, spatial segregation, and media bias to contain the inevitable episodes of conflict that racial ordering spawns. Within this order Koreans are a "triangulated" group; they possess a favored cultural position as a model minority, and they enjoy relative economic success, but they are permanently foreign and "unassimilable" (p. 45). As the failure of the Red Apple Boycott demonstrates, this racial order effectively resists disruption.

Although Kim's theory has virtues, it suffers from inaccuracies, nonfalsifiable propositions, exaggerations, anthropomorphism, and, most important, a gap between structure and agency. Kim inaccurately argues that the racial order "excludes Asian Americans from civic membership" (p. 16). This is historically false and, worse, denies to the Koreans in

her story their own repeated avowals of American civic nationalism. Perhaps such statements are part of the false consciousness bred by color-blind language, but the concept of color-blind language is itself problematic, for it makes Kim's theory nonfalsifiable. If color-blind language is, like explicitly racial language, a part of racial power, there is no empirical condition that could disconfirm Kim's theory of racialization. Also, Kim consistently exaggerates her arguments; for example, she repeatedly refers to unfavorable media coverage of the boycotts as the "official line" (p. 193ff), though she never identifies any "officials" who direct this coverage.

Most important, the theory of racial power produces a kind of anthropomorphic determinism that simply doesn't account for actors' interpretations of events. "Racial power" is a general structural concept, which operates only through the actions of real people. It is too far from Kim's structural theory to Sonny Carson's (a Black Nationalist leader) explanation of the boycott ("the reason for the boycott was that a Black woman was slapped" [p. 124]). Nothing in the theory accounts for either the slap or the reaction to it; moreover, little that is resonant of the theory surfaces in actors' statements of their own motives. A satisfying theory of racial politics must connect structure to agency more closely than does Kim's theory of racial order.

The Politics of Automobile Insurance Reform: Ideas, Institutions, and Public Policy in North America. By Edward L. Lascher, Jr. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1999. 160p. \$69.00

Martin Lubin, *Plattsburgh State University of New York*

Why do policymakers in any one given jurisdiction choose one approach rather than another for dealing with the common public policy challenge of deciding how to revise state and provincial automobile insurance regulatory regimes? And even within any one specific political jurisdiction (of a North American subnational "universe" of 50 states plus 10 provinces), why do policy outcomes change over time? What determines legislative policy decisions?

This readable and well-reasoned study examines how Canadian provincial and U.S. state levels of government, which exercise primary jurisdiction over the regulation of private passenger automobile insurance within each of these neighboring First World democratic federations, have tried in a variety of ways to lessen the extent of significantly increasing rates over the past 20 years. Among the people of both Canada and the United States, the automobile is widely believed to be a necessity. Given that auto insurance is virtually compulsory everywhere in North America, whenever insurance premium costs rapidly rise, citizens so burdened look to their elected politicians to provide some relief.

Conventional wisdom as well as a substantial amount of scholarship reviewed in chapter 2 highlights the impact of interest groups on elected policymakers. The existing literature on auto insurance politics per se claims that policy outcomes can be sufficiently understood as the result of varying pressures by a multitude of competing interested groups. Policy choices are explained in terms of responses to demands of politically relevant actors other than elected officials themselves. Thus, from a pressure politics perspective, auto insurance policy is understood as the end product of competition among insurance companies, consumer groups, and trial lawyers. In contrast, Lascher argues that power politics alone is insufficient to explain longitudinal variance over time within single jurisdictions whenever legislators enact or block reforms. Rather, adoption of major no-fault reforms stems from many policymakers' beliefs that such policy

initiatives are likely to bring about desirable consequences, i.e., lower rates, and, simultaneously, no significant decline in the number of insurance providers.

Beliefs about the practicality of specific reform proposals emanate from two competing stories. The latter furnish to elected officials divergent “villains” to blame, explanations as to why past efforts to control rates failed, elements needed to effect successful reform, and predictions of the likely effects of adopting one proposal rather than another (p. 40–41). The “Profiteering Story” portrays the insurance industry as inefficient, noncompetitive, and unaccountable to the public. Conversely, the “Pogo Story” attributes the premiums crises to sharply rising medical reimbursements and the machinations of trial lawyers. Politicians who embrace Pogo opt for some variation of no-fault; adherents of Profiteering prefer tight regulation or rate rollbacks.

There are also differences in public policy between provinces and states because the provinces’ parliamentary legislative systems make it easier to adopt as well as reverse far-reaching reforms whenever the problem diagnosis of party leaders shift. Westminster-style unicameral legislatures in Canada concentrate authority in fewer hands, and as a consequence, fewer points of interest group access exist than in separation of powers-style U.S. bicameral (except Nebraska) legislatures. Therefore, provincial governing majority party leaders have a greater ability to impose losses upon powerful vested interests opposed to drastic reforms than U.S. governors and legislative party chieftains do.

Chapters 3 through 7 distill and analyze information from the following sources: previously published aggregate data; surveys of people familiar with auto insurance reform throughout the 60 North American subnational jurisdictions (only five states failed to respond); and case studies based upon review of stories in newspapers of record as well as interviews with politicians, regulatory agency personnel, newspaper reporters, interest-group representatives, and academics involved with the issue.

The Pennsylvania case study in chapter 4 describes how, for the first time since the mid-1970s, a traditional tort state adopted any sort of no-fault system. This package also imposed mandatory rate reductions and a medical cost containment system. Three major groups considered to be highly influential in the Quaker state, all of whom opposed Act 6 (1990) were losers—namely, trial lawyers, insurance companies, and medical providers. In this jurisdiction, the legislation represents an instance where major change was effected despite opposition by well-entrenched interest groups. Moreover, the actual effects of the policy do in fact appear to be consistent with the claims of the sponsors of Act 6. On the other hand, the Rhode Island case study in chapter 5 examines the failure in 1993 to secure legislation similar to Pennsylvania’s Act 6. Instead of pressure theory, which appears to be insufficient to explain the divergent trajectories of policymakers in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, Lascher hypothesizes that Pennsylvania legislators more readily internalized the Pogo Story and rejected the Profiteering Story than did lawmakers in most other states including Rhode Island, because the facts support Pogo more than Profiteering. Chapter 6 describes and explains the Ontario Liberal government’s move from a rate control to a no-fault insurance approach between 1987 (when the industry’s advice was ignored) and 1989 (when its advice was followed) and the successor Ontario NDP government’s decision between 1990, upon coming to power, and mid-1991 to abandon plans for a public auto insurance system. Ontario Liberal leaders were unconvinced that a public system would be effective because it did not really address the real source of the problem—Pogo. Similarly, the NDP government’s abandonment of a

traditional ideologically driven party plank on public auto insurance is explained in terms of changes in what the NDP leaders believed about consequences of policy choices; they lost faith in the Profiteering Story while confronting the full reality of the costs of a public takeover.

In conclusion, I must concur with the author that politics is not always reducible to a “bargaining game” between powerful groups and politicians. We students of comparative politics and policy should “pay more attention to the stories decision makers tell about the nature of the problems they are asked to address” (p. 122), although such stories may well be deliberately put into the heads of elected officials by various political actors, including influential interest groups.

The Politics of Force: Media and the Construction of Police Brutality. By Regina G. Lawrence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 254p. \$45.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Fred Meyer, *Ball State University*

Regina Lawrence makes a major contribution to the criminal justice policy literature in her book, *The Politics of Force: Media and the Construction of Police Brutality*. She helps observers of the criminal justice system understand one of the reasons the crime control model is the dominant one in the United States. To do this she studies two major police departments, New York and Los Angeles, and the reporting of police use of force incidents in the *New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times*, respectively. Generally, the viewpoint of the police is presented in the newspaper accounts of the incidents. The police explanation involves blaming the individual wrongdoer without any serious discussion of systemic problems in the operation of the police department. In other words, the police view reinforces the crime control model, with its stress on the rapid and efficient removal of wrongdoers from the streets of this country. Thus Lawrence helps the reader understand why the views of police critics do not receive the same level of coverage as does the official view presented to the press by the police bureaucracy. In her concern with the definition of public problems, she contributes to a theory of issue construction. The significance of her findings is reinforced by her data sources: two major American newspapers including the *New York Times*, which is read by political elites throughout the United States. The data in the book are based on a content analysis of the *New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times* from 1984 to 1995. Also, an extensive analysis of the Rodney King case is presented. The information about the King case was garnered from a variety of newspapers and magazines. In addition, Lawrence gathered information for her study by interviewing reporters and police experts in New York, Los Angeles, and other cities.

In introducing the reader to her research design, Lawrence combines two literatures: that of political communication and that of political science and public policy. Thus the social construction of the news is seen as part of political competition to designate and define public problems. She looks at the problem of police brutality through this social constructionist lens. Thus the social construction of public problems in the news allocates resources in such a way as to benefit the owner of the problem. The political significance of the news is that it validates the view of reality of some players and marginalizes the reality of others. In the context of this study, the reality of the police bureaucracy is the one that is validated most frequently according to the data presented. One of the distinct disadvantages of nonofficials and grassroots groups is that they are rarely drawn upon as a primary news source by reporters. The major opportunity for such groups to present

systemic critiques of the police occurs when an unplanned event such as the Rodney King incident takes place. Then the alternative reality will be presented. Accidental events have the potential to reshape the public policy dialogue surrounding a particular problem. As Lawrence points out in her extensive discussion of the Rodney King incident, the public dialogue ultimately led to the dismissal of Chief Gates in Los Angeles. However, empirical confirmation is presented that the official view of issues predominates. It is the exception to the rule to find the article with extensive systemic critiques of police departments.

A variety of factors limits the ability of the critics of police in having their criticism presented. Lawrence points out that generally these people will not present an alternative explanation to that presented by the police. The police critics will stress the unreasonableness of the police use of force but will generally not have data to substantiate claims of a recurring pattern of violence based on race or socioeconomic status of the victim. The police response involved preemptive damage control. Lawrence found that the police would assert that the suspects who were killed were uncooperative, combative, violent, or threatening. The official explanation involved individualizing the causation and denying that the brutality is patterned.

The official explanation is reinforced by the norm of journalistic professionalism. Lawrence points out that the beat system used by reporters involves the use of officials as a source of news. Those at the top of the large bureaucracies such as the police have a distinct advantage. The norm involves the notion that the views of officials should be presented in as unbiased a manner as possible. Thus the reporter will present the views of the police bureaucracy since the most competent news sources are perceived to be the official sources.

The prevailing public discourse of crime control also is cited as a significant limit on the critics of the police. The predominant public view is that crime is a problem of the moral failings of weak and deviant individuals. Swift punishment is seen as a necessary response for the society to deal effectively with the behavior of these deviant individuals.

Lawrence presents a typology of critical story cues that influence how use-of-force incidents are presented. Competing accounts of events are greatly influenced by families of the victim. The accounts of witnesses are very important. The race of the victim is also a very important cue since it engages the norm of media reformism. The King case presented a combination of these cues. Of course, the videotaping of the event was of particular importance. Generally, those alleging police brutality do not have the resources to present their views in such a manner as to be considered newsworthy, however.

The style of presentation in this book is very engaging. Lawrence cites much of the significant literature in criminal justice policy. Also, her analysis is presented in such a way that the reader can make inferential leaps between her theoretical analysis and events that are currently taking place in police operations. The reader obtains insight into the Louima and Diallo incidents. When official explanations of such incidents do not involve a systemic analysis of the behavior, one might expect additional incidents such as these since the official explanation lacks a sanction for the behavior.

This book would be ideal for use in courses dealing with criminal justice policy, public policy, urban politics, and the media. It is written in a lively and interesting manner so that undergraduates should generally find it intriguing.

This reviewer would hope that Lawrence continues her work in this area. Specifically, her next book could look at political decision makers such as mayors and city council members to identify the relationship between media portray-

als of use-of-force incidents and the salience of the issue in the decision-making process of the political elite of a city.

Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation. By Frances E. Lee and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. 304p. \$48.00 cloth, \$17.00 paper.

Michael Bailey, *Georgetown University*

The principles of state-based representation in the Senate and "one person, one vote" reside comfortably, yet incongruously in the American political psyche. Few of us have lectured on the Senate without raising this point. We carry on about Wyoming and California and their equal number of Senators. Perhaps our lectures extend to discussion of policy issues: Would Clarence Thomas have been confirmed if the Senate were apportioned based on population? and so on. But seldom does the discussion go much further. And, strikingly, this has been true even in the academy. We have 1,001 ways to measure committee preferences, but we know relatively little about the effects of state-based representation in the Senate. Lee and Oppenheimer's book changes this state of affairs and offers an excellent account of the importance of state-based representation for the Senate and beyond.

The book is unflaggingly solid. The authors raise interesting questions and methodically parse them out and look to the data for answers. The opening section is on Senate apportionment in a historical perspective. Lee and Oppenheimer make the case that historical contingencies rather than functional design explain equal apportionment in the Senate. The strength here is not the novelty of the argument—for the main thrust is common in historical work—but the useful summary of the constitutional origins of the Senate. This provides helpful background for what is to come and, in fact, would provide excellent material for debate on the merits of the state-based representation in the Senate.

The next chapter discusses Senate apportionment and the representational experience. Do constituents in smaller states have different experiences with their Senators? Here, the authors show exactly what anyone would expect. Of course small-state Senators are more likely to know their constituents than large-state Senators. This kind of pattern emerges no matter how the data are sliced. But it is useful to know, rather than assert, this fact. And, what is more, the chapter makes our knowledge more specific: 38% of Delawarians had met Joe Biden, while only 3% of New Yorkers had met Al D'Amato. It is up to the reader to decide which state is better off.

Lee and Oppenheimer then turn to studying the effects of differential population on elections and fund-raising in the Senate. There are several interesting findings. Their statistical analysis indicates that small-state elections tend to be less competitive, but not because there is a larger incumbency advantage in them. This is fascinating in light of the earlier findings that small-state Senators have much closer personal ties to their constituents. What is the explanation for this? Elections are about differences and voters know that whomever they elect will have (or may already have) the close ties that the current Senator has. The authors also show that small-state Senators raise money much, much more easily. There appears to be a pretty fixed amount of PAC money that can be raised by all Senators. This ripe fruit falls to the ground easily and small-state Senators need little more to run effective campaigns. Large-state Senators need much more and so spend their time on ladders high up in the trees, struggling for every last contribution they can pull in. Little wonder, then, that Senate leaders hail from small states.

Representation in the Senate also matters for policy outcomes. The authors argue that policies are designed to benefit a majority of states, not necessarily a majority of House districts. This translates into more spending for small states. This effect is particularly strong for distributive programs, in part because, as the authors showed earlier, small-state Senators tend toward service-oriented committees rather than policy committees. For formula-based programs the advantages to small states accrue due to Senate efforts to ensure that any population-based funding formula sets a minimum level for each state, in effect ensuring disproportionate spending in small states.

In summary, this book succeeds at its stated goal of attracting attention to an important and understudied topic. They show that even though Madison has generally been right that politics has seldom divided big states against small states, the unequal power of small states in the Senate has, nonetheless, had important implications. As the authors say, state-based representation in the Senate “leaves no aspect of the institution untouched” (p. 225). Now that politics may be dividing more along state size lines (consider the famous red–blue divide in the electoral map of the 2000 presidential election), these questions will only increase in importance.

It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States. By Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks. New York: W. W. Norton, 2000. 379p. \$26.95 cloth, \$14.95 paper.

Martin Shefter, *Cornell University*

Although *It Didn't Happen Here* addresses a rather familiar question—Why is there no socialism in the United States?—this is an exciting book. Its central chapters discuss the major explanations for American “exceptionalism” that have been proposed over the past century—namely, the distinctive character of U.S. political institutions, the ethnic heterogeneity of the nation's population, the divisions between labor unions and the socialist party, the sectarianism of American socialists, the repression that radicals encountered, etc. Political scientists will find the topics of many of these chapters familiar too.

I say that the “topics” of these chapters will be familiar—rather than their “contents”—because there is much that even knowledgeable readers will learn from this book. Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks are extraordinarily erudite and productive: The list of their books at the beginning of this volume runs to 27 titles. Even more impressive than the breadth of the authors' knowledge of political and labor history is the ingenuity of the comparisons and contrasts they use to assess the various theories of American “exceptionalism” discussed in their book.

For example, Theodore Lowi suggests that federalism explains the absence of socialism in the United States. He argues that in the United States, “[e]ven as the economy became national . . . the states remained the source and focus of politics. There was, in effect, no national pattern of law, legitimation, or repression to confirm a socialist critique (“Why Is There No Socialism in the United States? A Federal Analysis,” in Robert T. Golembiewski and Aaron Wildavsky, eds., *The Costs of Federalism* 1984, p. 37.)

Lipset and Marks deploy both cross-national and within-country comparisons to challenge Lowi's argument. They note that federalism did not preclude socialism in Australia. The several British colonies on the Australian continent—Queensland, Victoria, New South Wales, etc.—formed a national government only in 1901. And the new national government of Australia was granted less power than the national

government of the United States. In other words, in Australia there was less of a “national pattern of law, legitimation or repression to confirm a socialist critique” than in the United States. Yet, contrary to what Lowi's argument would lead one to expect, within a decade of its founding, the Australian national government came under the control of the world's first labor administration.

Lipset and Marks also note that federalism enabled a number of socialistic or quasi-socialistic political movements to come to power at the provincial or state level in both Canada and the United States. In Saskatchewan, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and its successor, the New Democratic Party, controlled the provincial government for all but a dozen years from 1944 to the present; in British Columbia, for all but a half-dozen years between 1972 and 1999; and in Manitoba, for all but four years between 1967 and 1986. In the United States, the “semi-social democratic” Nonpartisan League (NPL) gained power in North Dakota in 1918. Upon gaining power, the NPL established state credit banks and state-owned grain terminals, flour mills, packing houses, and cold storage plants. Similar movements won elections in Oklahoma, Minnesota, Wisconsin, California, Oregon, and Washington in the 1920s and 1930s. In other words, federalism did not preclude socialism in Australia, Canada, or even the United States. Although socialists never won control at the national level in either Canada or the United States, in both nations federalism made it possible for socialistic or quasi-socialistic political forces to exercise substantial governmental power in those regions of the country where their support was concentrated.

By analyzing arcane cases—cases that, they readily acknowledge, may be extreme or deviant—Lipset and Marks do more than simply *challenge* the arguments of other social scientists; often they are able to *refine* these arguments. For example, it has often been suggested that radicals found it difficult to unite the American working class behind the doctrine of socialism, because many industrial workers were recent immigrants to the United States. But what was it about these immigrants that made them deaf to socialist appeals? Does the very fact that they had moved from their home countries to the United States indicate that immigrants believed America to be a land of opportunity and, hence, were not receptive to socialism? Or was it that the linguistic and cultural divisions between immigrants and other Americans were more salient than whatever economic problems they shared with their new neighbors?

Lipset and Marks assess these and other possibilities by analyzing deviant cases—cities where socialism was unusually strong. The socialist party dominated politics in Milwaukee for a longer period of time than in any other large American city. During the half-century of socialist strength (1910–1960), Milwaukee had a large population of first- and second-generation immigrants, but the great majority of them came from a single country, namely, Germany. That is, despite its large immigrant population, Milwaukee was fairly homogeneous ethnically. This suggests to Lipset and Marks that divisions flowing from ethnic *heterogeneity*, more than impediments stemming from immigration itself, created problems for socialists. They note that several other cities where socialists were unusually strong—such as Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Reading, Pennsylvania—had large, but ethnically homogeneous, immigrant populations. Surely, there are few sources to which political scientists can turn for an illuminating discussion of interactions among socialist parties, labor unions, and local singing groups in Milwaukee, Minneapolis, and Reading other than this volume by Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks!

Rediscovering the Democratic Purposes of Education.

Edited by Lorraine M. McDonnell, P. Michael Timpane, and Roger Benjamin. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2000. 280p. \$40 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Christine Rossell, *Boston University*

The public discourse on the purpose of education is dominated by functionalist or human capital theory, which argues that the primary purpose of schools is to impart to citizens skills that will be needed to compete and win in the U.S. marketplace and the global economy. This edited volume attempts to correct this imbalance by emphasizing civics education and political socialization as important functions of schools.

The nine chapters are authored by distinguished scholars who share a common concern for the scholarly neglect of schooling's political dimensions. There are three sections: (1) "The Philosophy and Practice of Civic Education," which contains five chapters on the historical origins of civic education and its current practice; (2) "Approaches to Studying the Politics of Education," which contains three chapters on school governance; and (3) "Focusing on Democratic Purposes: Implications for Education Policy," which contains one chapter on the extent to which school practices or strategies to increase educational equity have succeeded.

McDonnell argues in the introductory chapter that a strong case can be made for emphasizing the democratic purposes of education because we are at a low point in political participation in American civic life and perhaps in a crisis of legitimacy with regard to schools and government institutions. As McDonnell herself points out, however, it is easier to make the case that the current low levels of political participation and civic identity require a greater emphasis on schooling's democratic purposes than on demonstrating that such attention will solve or ameliorate these problems. McDonnell nevertheless presents evidence that suggests that it would.

This introductory chapter is followed by a chapter on the history of civic education by Lorraine Pangle and Thomas Pangle, another on that topic by Carl Kaestle, a chapter on the importance of civic education by Amy Gutman, and a chapter by Pamela Conover and Donald Searing on current levels of political socialization and knowledge among high school students. This first section, in short, focuses on the civic education or political socialization of American students.

The next section, "Approaches to Studying the Politics of Education," deals with the politics of school governance. The three chapters that comprise the section, one by Terry Moe, another by Ames March and Johan Olsen, and the third by McDonnell and Stephen Weatherford, are interesting and thoughtful analyses of the institutional structure of education and the process of school politics, but this book may attempt to do too much by including them. Without them, the book is about the democratic purposes of education—how and why schools teach students to be citizens and the extent to which school practices facilitate that. With them, the book is not only about the democratic purposes of education, but also about school governance and politics, that is, the democratic functioning of education—a much broader, and I think too broad, topic.

From my perspective as an empiricist, the most interesting chapters are Conover and Searing's "A Political Socialization Perspective," in section 1, and Hochschild and Scovronick's "Democratic Education and the American Dream," in section 3. The former presents research findings on what we know about students' political knowledge and the latter presents evidence on the extent to which schools, and school practices, achieve educational equity.

Conover and Searing detail the findings of a study of 15 year olds in four kinds of communities across the United States. They found that most students lacked a clear sense of their future selves as adult citizens and tended to believe that being a good citizen requires only that one obey the law, vote, and act patriotically.

What is especially interesting for our understanding of how to politically socialize students is their analysis of the Hispanic community in San Antonio, Texas. There students lived in the midst of grassroots community organizing and were socialized into a citizen ethos that stressed the importance of community ties and loyalty to the nation. In a conscious effort to make its citizens into "super-Americans," this community instilled a deeper understanding of citizenship than did the other three communities. From these findings, the authors derive several sensible and creative recommendations on improving civic education so that students engage in active, rather than passive, political learning.

The final chapter, by Hochschild and Scovronick, skillfully summarizes the research on the extent to which specific educational strategies—school desegregation, equitable school funding, distinctive group treatment, school choice, and tracking—achieve educational equity, another democratic purpose of education. There are, unfortunately, several significant omissions in the works cited, including a number of important studies that do not fit the "politically correct" position, although the authors do note in the text that such positions exist. Their overall conclusion seems to be that these reforms have not achieved much educational equity, which they typically blame on administrative incompetence or venality or lack of public support. I would argue, however, that there is a serious possibility that we ask too much of the schools and the reforms. For one thing, in the first 18 years of life, children are in school only 13% of their waking hours. For another, although racial differences in achievement can theoretically be eliminated, class differences in achievement cannot in a world in which social class is not randomly assigned to individuals but is, at least in part, a result of differences in intellectual ability as defined by an elite. Indeed, our means of measuring intellectual ability—standardized achievement tests, years of schooling, and prestige of school—magnify rather than reduce racial and social class differences and are constantly refined to maintain these differences. Under such conditions, no reform should be expected to have more than a small impact on eliminating inequity, even before taking into consideration the possible incompetence of administrators and lack of public support for educational reforms.

Overall the research and theory presented in this volume are impressive, and the recommendations sensible and creative, but it seems to me that another very important question was not given proper attention. How do you get educators to care about teaching students to be better citizens when they are constantly criticized for low test scores and for failing to prepare students for a global economy? Perhaps, more importantly, how do you get the public to care about civic education when they feel that students are not attaining the skills needed for success in the marketplace? It strikes me that the public must be properly educated about the actual quality of American education—for example, the facts that standardized achievement tests are designed so that only half of all students can be reading at or above grade level no matter how excellent American education is and that not only are international tests misleading given the differences in population and curriculums, but there is no evidence of any connection between economic productivity and technological innovation, on the one hand, and a country's average score on an international test, on the other. Perhaps civic education will rise to the place of importance it should occupy in a

country with an abysmally low rate of political participation and knowledge when the public is made aware of these facts.

The Political Party Matrix: The Persistence of Organization.

By J. P. Monroe. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. 156p. \$49.50 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

Andrew J. Taylor, *North Carolina State University*

It used to be an axiom in political science that American parties were weak. Now we are not so sure. During the 1980s and 1990s, the profession produced a great deal of theoretical and empirical work suggesting that U.S. political parties were "resurgent." J. P. Monroe's book, *The Political Party Matrix: The Persistence of Organization*, provides an interesting twist on the new literature. It argues that party change is the result not so much of strengthening but of adaptation.

Specifically, Monroe uses interviews with campaign consultants, party chairs, and congressional and state legislative staffers from southern California conducted in the early 1990s to argue that political scientists have missed critical characteristics of the contemporary American party. Trained to apply rigidly the "bureaucratic model" to our thinking about parties, we inevitably see them currently as highly decentralized and amorphous institutions. This infers that they must be ineffective at accomplishing their objectives. Monroe offers a different way to conceptualize the party as organization, suggesting that it should be understood "in terms of the activities it performs, using this as a guide to its structure" (p. 29). In other words, we should utilize a party's critical functions—and not least what E. E. Schattschneider considered the *raison d'être*, that is, winning elections—to drive our thinking about its physical appearance.

This leads Monroe to believe that "the parties' adaptive properties continue to make them effective agents in the political system" (p. ix). They are still tremendously proficient at electoral politics, but the personnel who undertake this task, because of our strict adherence to the bureaucratic model, are not conventionally thought of as being within the party. Consequently, political scientists incorrectly conclude that parties no longer dominate elections. According to Monroe, the dramatic rise of office budgets and member salaries at both the state legislative and the congressional levels has meant that the personal staff of lawmakers are the parties' new source of labor in the pursuit of electoral victory. These professional staff should therefore be thought of as an "informal" component of the party.

Monroe's data show that legislative staff form a candidate "farm league" for the party and work regularly on election activities for their patron's partisan colleagues as well as for the boss herself. The author also reveals that legislative staff cooperate with counterparts in the same party on casework, political issues, and outreach to community groups. This is collaborative work on behalf of the party undertaken by individuals generally believed to be "hired guns" working for self-interested and individualistic politicians.

The book's central problem is the theoretical wrapping in which the author ensconces the empirical work. It is simply too glittery and adorned with too nice a bow for its modest contents. Monroe uses a long and detailed discussion of the party resurgence literature—complete with excursions into comparative politics and the puzzling debate about how party organizations can have strengthened as the electorate has dealigned—as his starting point and clearly believes his work is a significant contribution to this important development in American politics. But when it comes down to it, interviews with and surveys of political staff in the Los Angeles area cannot really move the debate sur-

rounding such "big" questions along very far. This same criticism can be aimed at the book's title. *The Political Party Matrix*—whatever that really means—is too grandiose for this study.

There are a few other theoretical problems, too. First, by choosing to focus on California, Monroe cannot really reject his null hypothesis that the personal staff of professional legislators are not replacing traditional personnel and organizational components in the performance of electoral functions for parties. California state legislators, with the exception of their counterparts in New York, have more personal staff than any other state legislators in the country. Moreover, because of the state's Progressive tradition, California parties are weak in the bureaucratic sense. It is no wonder, then, that Monroe found what he did in California. But for this development to be important, we need to see it elsewhere.

Second, this is essentially a study of party response and adaptation. As such it needs to describe the political party at points t_1 and t_2 , prove that it looks different at these two times, and then show that it has responded in the interim to some kind of exogenous stimulus. Monroe does a super job of showing us what the party looks like at t_2 , but there is only a brief survey of the literature of the party at t_1 (the "Golden Age of Politics" or his "party benchmark") and the external element (the modernization of politics, including the rise of the media and professionalization of legislative and campaign staff). In addition, there is so much distance between t_1 and t_2 (about 100 years) that any adaptation or change is inevitable. Perhaps the 1950s would have provided a better "benchmark" to reveal the magnitude of the parties' present adaptation.

It is the empirical part of the book that is the real contribution. As Monroe says, "The incumbents' enterprises-in-office, and more specifically the linkages created and maintained between them, are reshaping the political process in profound ways" (p. 97). He makes a strong case that the party is still doing the heavy lifting in campaigns, it is just doing it with different people. The next step is to take this argument further. A detailed look at the collaborative and partisan work undertaken by congressional staffers in Washington would be beneficial, for example. Such activity includes working with the parties' campaign committees, supporting and organizing fundraisers, and coordinating with presidential campaigns—something that has taken people around the country; recall the Republican staffers in Florida protesting recounts and wearing their "Sore-Loser" buttons. Furthermore, the Bob Squiers, Frank Luntz, and Richard Viguerie of the world show that self-described "consultants" have become integral and permanent components of the political party. Such people also need to be brought into a more complete conceptualization of the new party structure.

Still, there is interesting material here for scholars of American political parties and Monroe's argument is important. The book is worth a look, even if its contents may have been more effectively presented in two or three journal articles.

Building a Legislative-Centered Public Administration: Congress and the Administrative State, 1946–1999.

By David H. Rosenbloom. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2000. 199p. \$34.95 cloth.

John S. Robey, *University of Texas at Brownsville*

In 1946, Congress passed the Administrative Procedure and Legislative Reorganization Act. In this legislation, Congress purposefully provided for itself a prominent role in the

administration of the federal government. David Rosenbloom writes that the "... purpose of this book is to explain how and why Congress adopted that role, its underlying coherence, [and] its durability ... for seemingly ever-increasing congressional involvement in federal administration ..." (p. ix). The author maintains that Congress was uneasy about this endeavor but was forced by the "federal administrative state" to reposition itself. Some even believed that Congress' place in the constitutional scheme-of-things had been altered. For example, it was asserted that Congress was abandoning constitutional principle if it allowed unelected governmental administrators to make rules (i.e., administrative law). The 1946 legislation has resulted in a merger between Congress and the federal bureaucracy. The author contends that federal agencies became "extensions" of Congress' authority to make law. In addition, this legislation resulted in the view that the administration of the bureaucracy was no longer to be seen as the private preserve of the executive branch of government. The concept of "legislative-centered public administration" is used to describe the results of this legislation.

Congress very reluctantly accepted the rise of technocrats. The growing complexity of many public policies gave it no choice but to share policy-making power. Rule making became a common way for Congress to delegate to federal agencies the authority to make policy. To retain some control, however, Congress provided that it would have supervisory authority over many of these agencies on an ongoing basis. The result of this decision has been "legislative-centered public administration." The cooperative effort by legislators and federal administrators to make policy has not always been peaceful. There has been conflict, for example, over the administrator's values of efficiency and economy and political/legislative needs for openness and responsiveness. The author maintains that the critics of Congressional oversight wrongfully charge that Congress "micro-manages." To demonstrate the development of legislative-centered public administration, Rosenbloom presents the reader with an analysis of an alternative view of policy making, or what he calls the "legislative process by other means."

Federal agencies had traditionally been looked upon as the implementers of public policy. They were allowed some discretion in the implementation of law, but they were not policy makers. With the passage of the 1946 legislation, there evolved a "... collective understanding by Congress that because agencies exercise legislative powers to regulate the economy and society, they should be considered as adjuncts" (p. 21). It followed that Congress should specify how "... legislation by other means—that is administration—should work" (p. 21). The author defends legislative-centered public administration as "... the only deliberate answer the nation has tried ..." (p. 155) to answer the question, What is the correct role for Congress in the administration of the federal government?

Professor Rosenbloom is critical of those who view public administration as a "business endeavor" that should be controlled by the President and his cabinet. He contends that one supporter of this view was Al Gore, who championed liberating agencies from Congressional "micromanagement" in his *National Performance Review*. Legislative-centered public administration rejects the politics-administration dichotomy. Rosenbloom writes, "There is no politics-administration dichotomy. Nor can constitutional structure and procedure be separated from administration. Public administration includes legislative functions ..." (p. 58). Legislative-centered public administration also views governmental oversight more positively. The "executive-centered" public management model viewed much public reporting as

time-consuming, inefficient, and meddlesome. Legislative-centered administration sees legislative intervention and reporting requirements "... in the federal agency decision making process as producing, rather than encumbering, proper results" (p. 102).

Rosenbloom contends that one of the results of legislative-centered administration has been the adoption of legislative values (i.e., openness, public accountability, representativeness, and responsiveness) by many public agencies. Another result has been the transfer of much constituency work from Congress to the agencies. When the Legislative Reorganization Act was passed, some members of Congress complained that three-fourths of their time was spent running errands for constituents. To solve this problem, Congress transferred "... some particularly unproductive forms of constituency service and infrastructure decision making to the agencies" (p. 105). The purpose of this was to make Congress more efficient and to strengthen it as an institution. Professor Rosenbloom contends that it has worked so well that, over time, the role of the agencies regarding constituency service has become even more important.

In the last chapter, the author provides a listing of the major principles of legislative-centered public administration (e.g., "administration involves legislative functions") as well as an analysis of legislative-centered public administration and its relationship with the principle of separation of powers. He also ties together arguments that were made in previous chapters so that logical relationships and connections are made between the topics that were addressed.

This text contains an interesting and well-documented and reasoned analysis of the evolution of Congressional/federal agencies relationships for the last half of the twentieth century. The author skillfully presents the rationale for viewing the structure of the federal government from a less rigid perspective than the traditional executive-judicial-legislative point of view. Although the arguments are thoughtfully presented, none of the author's propositions is ever quantified or empirically tested in any way. This is a volume that should be of interest to a wide variety of academics and practitioners. Students of Congress, public administration, and public policy analysis, as well as scholars of modern public history, will all find the volume to be a valuable addition to their library. Those desiring a more rigorous (i.e., quantitative) analysis of the topics presented may wish to pass on the volume. It is recommended for those who value a fresh and well-reasoned descriptive analysis of an important aspect of the evolution of the modern administrative state.

The Postmodern Presidency: Bill Clinton's Legacy in U.S. Politics. Edited by Steven E. Schier. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000. 304p. \$45.00.

Shirley Anne Warshaw, *Gettysburg College*

Steven E. Schier's latest book, *The Postmodern Presidency: Bill Clinton's Legacy in U.S. Politics*, provides a much-needed assessment of the Clinton presidency. Throughout the eight years of the Clinton administration, surprisingly few scholarly books were written that either assessed presidential performance or examined the political implications of the Clinton presidency. The few books that did emerge from the Clinton era focus on impeachment and on Mrs. Clinton, most in a less than scholarly way. Steven Schier has begun to fill this scholarly void by putting together an edited volume that examines both performance and political repercussions of the Clinton presidency. This volume of 12 articles offers

perspectives on the domestic, international, and economic policies of the administration. The contributors are all well-known scholars in presidential research and all have written significantly within their fields (i.e., domestic policy, international relations, electoral politics, etc.). Schier's choice of contributors is excellent and ensures substantial command of the subject matter within the chapters.

Schier approaches the Clinton presidency from the viewpoint of politics as he seeks to explain whether the Clinton presidency had an impact "on the future of American politics and public policy" (p. 15). Each of the essays in the volume offers a varying perspective, with no clear consensus reached. The volume is divided into four broad parts. The first part includes three essays on the institutional presidency and its impact on economic and foreign policy. Following the institutional presidency chapters are three essays on the mobilization of public opinion to support presidential positions. Three more chapters are devoted to electoral politics, and the final three chapters provide a rather broad look at "the culture war" in which Clinton engaged, as Schier calls it (p. 16).

The theme of politics is examined partly through the lens of Steven Skowronek's theme in *The Politics Presidents Make* (1993), in which the argument is made that presidents try to construct some "new political arrangements that can stand the test of legitimacy with other institutions" of government (pp. 20–21). Schier asks whether Clinton was able to construct new political relationships as a means to forge new institutional relationships. In other words, could Clinton construct new relationships with Congress, with state and local government, with the Democratic Party, and with other nations that were productive to his policy goals? The question is particularly relevant given the constraints of 12 years of Republican control of the White House (Reagan–Bush) in which smaller government, increased state programmatic control, and greater defense spending were the watchwords. Schier's answer is yes, Clinton was flexible and able to alter his governing style and his political relationships as the climate demanded. He was forced, in his first two years in office, to construct a political coalition that moved his domestic and economic programs forward, as defined by his 1992 campaign. During the remainder of his term, as the Republicans gained control of Congress, he was forced to develop completely new political alignments and new policy goals within the confines of such new alignments. Thus Schier neatly provides a broad array of substantive support for his central theme that Clinton was able to move policy forward in spite of a series of political roadblocks. These roadblocks were overcome as Clinton constructed variations on his policy positions to satisfy the shifting political coalitions he dealt with throughout his eight years in office.

I have two comments on the direction this book takes. First, not all of the 12 essays provide a clear and concise statement of Schier's theme. Some of the essays seem to be pulled from other venues and incorporated into the volume. It would be helpful if each essay established quite succinctly how Clinton's political relationships influenced the policies at hand. Second, the final section, on culture wars, seems somewhat out of character with the theme of the book. While racial issues and gender issues are an important part of the Clinton policy legacy, there is little within the three essays on these subjects in this volume to tie them to the other chapters. Perhaps they should have been incorporated into the domestic policy section—but even then there appears to be a lack of continuity within the thematic base.

In summary, I would commend this book for audiences on the presidency and American politics in general, with regard both to leadership and to institutional issues. Schier

has provided a well-grounded analysis of this rare two-term presidency, concluding that Clinton regularly refocused his broad goals within a changing political climate. Schier also notes that Clinton never lost his core policy goals in spite of broad refocusing and thus meets Skowronek's test of a preemptive president. This volume should spark considerable discussion of Clinton's meeting the test of a preemptive president, as other volumes seek to agree or disagree with Schier's central theme.

Constitutional Process: A Social Choice Analysis of Supreme Court Decision Making. By Maxwell L. Stearns. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000. 420p. \$65.00.

Timothy M. Hagle, *University of Iowa*

A not uncommon complaint concerning social choice models is that they tend to assume away everything of interest, leaving a model with little relation to the real world. The usual response is that one must start with the basic elements of a problem before moving to more complex and inclusive models. Unfortunately, few social choice models applied to legal studies have achieved sufficient complexity to be of significant value. Maxwell Stearns recognizes this problem and, in *Constitutional Process*, systematically presents a comprehensive social choice model and applies it to a complex legal doctrine.

The process of introducing, explaining, and applying the model makes *Constitutional Process* an integrated book whose six main chapters form a definite progression that must be followed from beginning to end. The introductory chapter presents the problem: cases that are considered anomalies in terms of legal doctrine. After a detailed description of these cases, chapter 2 presents the basics of social choice theory. Stearns starts with fundamental notions of rationality, progresses to the voting paradox, Condorcet winners, and three fallacies of social choice, and ends with a presentation of Arrow's theorem. In Part II (chapters 3 and 4), Stearns first examines several individual cases in the context of social choice. The goal is to identify and examine the decisional rules used by the justices to cope with, for example, potential intransitivities and issue multidimensionality. He terms this "static constitutional process." Chapter 4 carries the analysis forward to the consideration of an entire legal doctrine, which he terms "dynamic constitutional process." Stearns uses the legal doctrine of standing to illustrate the social choice model he is developing. In Part III (chapters 5 and 6), he provides a fuller examination of standing and tests his social choice model using the standing cases of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.

It is important to emphasize that Stearns does test his model. He approaches social choice from a scientific viewpoint. For social choice analysis to be of value to legal scholars as well as political scientists, it must explain more than current constitutional or political approaches to court decisions. By beginning with detailed descriptions of cases considered anomalies under prevailing constitutional doctrine, he lays the groundwork for the later test of his model. He then works to expand our overall understanding of the Supreme Court and its decision-making process by explaining these cases in a social choice context.

Even so, there are some difficulties with the analysis. Stearns first faces a dilemma in how much weight to give the opinions written by the justices. Legal scholars may give great weight to the opinions, while political scientists may be more likely to see them as rationalizations for the justices' votes. Stearns recognizes this problem and indicates that although the opinions should be taken seriously, they nevertheless cannot be taken at face value. Despite this recognition of

the potentially self-serving nature of opinions, an argument can be made that Stearns relies a bit too heavily on them. Moreover, some of the anomalous cases may be the result of a somewhat selective reading of the opinions.

For example, Stearns' analysis of *Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways*, 450 U.S. 662 (1981), suggests that an anomaly occurs when one considers the two issues in the case: whether to apply a rational basis or a balancing test and whether evidence not considered by the Iowa legislature when drafting the regulation can be admitted at trial. On an issue-by-issue basis, Stearns argues, the regulation should have been upheld. Five of the justices thought rational basis to be the appropriate test, and a different six that the additional evidence should be allowed. These are the two conditions required for the regulation to have been upheld, and separate majorities supported each, but the regulation was overturned because only three justices took the position satisfying both conditions. Arguably, the perceived anomaly was the result of Justice Brennan's opinion, which suggests that the rational basis test is appropriate, but new evidence should not be allowed. On closer examination, however, one might be inclined to discount this interpretation of Justice Brennan's opinion. Although Justice Brennan mentions rationality twice, each instance is in relation to the *purposes* of the legislature. At the same time, Justice Brennan twice mentions that the Court must balance the *burdens* imposed on commerce with local benefits. Thus, one could read Justice Brennan's opinion as applying the rational basis test at one stage and the balancing test at another. Moreover, Justice Brennan also indicates that a third question to be asked is whether the regulation at issue is protectionist. If so—and he finds that it is—then even a balance in favor of local safety will not save it. Thus, rather than a bidimensional analysis that produces an anomaly, perhaps there are three dimensions to the case.

Similar criticisms could be raised regarding the approach to the other cases selected as anomalies, but such concerns do not significantly detract from Stearns' overall argument. His systematic analysis argues that cycling in individual cases is avoided by outcome voting (as opposed to issue voting). Although this sometimes produces doctrinal anomalies, these are minimized through the use of *stare decisis*. *Stare decisis*, in turn, invites ideological litigant path manipulation, which is minimized through the use of doctrines such as standing. In applying a social choice model to Supreme Court decision making, Stearns provides an explanation of the doctrines adopted to cope with vote cycling and related problems at several stages in the process. Those who study judicial politics have long recognized that the justices act strategically. Stearns has taken this a step further by demonstrating that not only do the justices act strategically, but they do so in ways that both avoid vote cycling problems and preserve the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's decision making.

From the Puritans to the Projects: Public Housing and Public Neighbors. By Lawrence J. Vale. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. 460p. \$45.00.

R. Allen Hays, *University of Northern Iowa*

There is an unfortunate tendency for much public policy analysis to be ahistorical in its perspective. A program or policy is evaluated in terms of its success or failure in achieving its stated goals, and only the most immediate social, political, and economic factors are brought into the analysis to explain policy outcomes. In the case of public housing in the United States, an analysis of its failure to meet its stated goal of providing decent housing for the poor might lead us to blame (1) the federal government for poor design of the program,

(2) local governments for poor implementation, or (3) the recipients themselves for engaging in antisocial behavior that undermined the intent of the program.

Lawrence Vale's brilliant analysis of the development of public housing in Boston clearly reveals how limited and inaccurate such conclusions would be. To be sure, all of these actors have contributed to the problems of public housing, but Vale's work shows how their roles were played out in a much broader and deeper historical context, the roots of which can be traced to the earliest European settlers in North America. He shows that the failure of public housing is rooted in cultural attitudes toward the poor that have made it extremely difficult to develop rational and humane programs to meet their needs.

The central dilemma in dealing with the poor is what sort of aid society is obligated to provide them and who among them is most deserving of such aid. The individualistic values that support capitalism tell us that each individual is responsible for his/her economic fate and that each of us should evaluate his or her personal worth in terms of economic success. However, Americans have been reluctant to leave the poor entirely to their own devices for three reasons. The first two are pragmatic: (1) It is obvious that many people become poor for reasons not in their control (i.e., sickness, layoffs) and (2) chronically deprived persons trying desperately to survive may threaten social stability. The third reason is a moral imperative to help the less fortunate that is rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition.

Beginning with the Puritans who founded Boston, Vale traces the contradictions in public policy toward the poor that these conflicting values produced. Because he is dealing with housing, which necessarily involves the allocation of physical space, he focuses, in particular, on the spatial dimensions of the treatment of the poor. He argues that public housing, like the almshouses that preceded it, "encodes" society's conflicting attitudes in its distribution of physical space to the poor.

Vale tells us that in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Boston, as elsewhere in America, the poor were divided into two groups. The "deserving" poor (for example widows) were considered legitimate members of the community and were given relief in their own homes ("outdoor relief," in the terminology of the times). The "undeserving" poor (for example, itinerant laborers or alcoholics) were isolated in an almshouse ("indoor relief"), where they would not contaminate the rest of society. As Boston expanded, the almshouse was pushed farther and farther toward the periphery of the community, since no residents wanted to compromise their own social status by living next to it. In the mid-nineteenth century, almshouses took on another responsibility, that of "reforming" the poor through work and discipline, in hopes of returning them to society as productive workers.

As another antecedent to public housing, Vale traces the development of environmental and architectural determinism in American values. From Thomas Jefferson's belief in the virtue of the yeoman farmer to the Homestead Act's creation of individual plots of land for settlers, Americans have tended to assume that *where* one lives shapes *how* one lives. This idea influenced the development of the residential rings that grew around American cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Single-family houses located on individual plots of land were viewed as encouraging positive family values. At the same time, however, living in such areas was also seen as a *reward* for families who already possessed the values these developments were said to encourage. People who deviated from these norms were considered unacceptable neighbors.

The private housing industry fought long and hard to keep the federal government out of the provision of housing, but

when the Great Depression finally provided sufficient impetus for the creation of a federal program, its implementation clearly reflected the values Vale describes. In its early years in Boston, occupancy of public housing was seen as a reward to be given only to the most deserving poor. Careful screening of applicants was aimed at keeping out “undesirables,” and many public housing complexes were sought-after residences for people of modest income. Architects tried to design public housing in ways they thought would further enhance the virtue of those living there.

Vale’s account goes on to show how the role of public housing began to change after World War II. The rapid growth of suburbia created affordable housing for many of the white working-class families that had once occupied public housing. Moreover, the massive destruction of low-income neighborhoods by urban renewal flooded public housing with the more desperately poor, and screening of applicants ceased. Finally, low-income African Americans, excluded from the suburbs by discrimination, became increasingly ghettoized in public housing. In the face of these changes, public housing ceased to be a reward for the deserving poor and became a reservation for people considered undesirable by the rest of society. This new reservation status contributed greatly to its decline, to the point where many public housing projects are now being demolished.

Vale is clearly critical of the way the poor have been treated in American society, but if his analysis has a flaw, it is that he does not articulate an alternative vision of how the housing needs of the poor might have been addressed more justly. I am not suggesting that he should have provided “policy recommendations” for that is clearly beyond the scope of a historical work. Rather, the articulation of an alternative set of values that would result in more just treatment of the poor as legitimate members of society would have made it clearer what yardstick he was using to measure the failings of the policies that did emerge.

On balance, however, Vale’s work is an extremely insightful historical analysis that deepens our understanding of how flawed public policies emerge. It well deserves the award it received from the Urban Affairs Association as the Best Book in Urban Politics of the Year.

Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House of Representatives. By Gregory Wawro. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. 193p. \$39.50 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Sean M. Theriault, *University of Texas at Austin*

Why would any legislator in the U.S. House of Representatives invest the time and energy to pass good public policy? This simple question drives Gregory Wawro’s investigation of legislative entrepreneurship, which he defines as “invest[ing] time, staff, and other resources to acquire knowledge of particular policy areas, draft[ing] legislation addressing issues in those areas, and shepherd[ing] their proposals through the legislative process by building and maintaining coalitions” (p. 2). His introduction and description of the puzzle are exemplary. His answer, unfortunately, is wanting.

Wawro finds either nonexistent or weak results when he investigates the relationship between constituents and legislative entrepreneurs. Again, he reports nonfindings for the relationship between political action committee campaign contributions and legislative entrepreneurship. Only in the chapter where he investigates the connection between advancement in either political parties or committees are legislative entrepreneurs rewarded. When representatives need to fill committee or party leadership positions, Wawro finds that they turn systematically more often to legislative entrepreneurs. This robust finding is consistent across parties.

To introduce the subject of legislative entrepreneurship, Wawro describes, among others, Representative Dick Armey’s early legislative accomplishments. In the conclusion, he returns to Armey’s career to show, anecdotally, how his investigation rings true with our current political situation. Throughout the book, Wawro stays true to the question and politics as practiced in modern America. As such, his book—even when describing the minutia of statistical procedures—is an enjoyable and provocative read.

Chapter 6 most forcefully illustrates this strength. After completing the more rigorous statistical analysis, Wawro analyzes his theory and results in light of the Republican takeover in 1994. Again, anecdotally, he shows how legislative entrepreneurship can account for party and committee leader selection. That his argument works under a different regime is important; however, the most impressive thing about this chapter is Wawro’s concern for the real-world application of his argument.

Wawro’s question and his concern for explaining political realities are the book’s biggest strength. Its biggest weakness is the nonfindings that pervade most of the tables. Wawro is careful to embed his study in the long tradition of explaining congressional behavior by starting with the assumption made popular by David Mayhew (1975), in *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, that members of Congress are single-minded seekers of reelection. Yet when he explores the connection between reelection and legislative entrepreneurship, he comes up shooting mostly blanks.

Three explanations could account for the absence of a relationship between reelection and entrepreneurship. First, quite simply, there is no relationship between the two. Second, the relationship is confounding and contradictory. In sketching out his argument, Wawro outlines two arguments with opposite predictions. Constituents could either punish legislative entrepreneurs for taking controversial stands and trading off case work with legislation (à la Fiorina, in *Congress: Keystone to the Washington Establishment*, 1977) or reward them for being important legislative players. These two explanations could cancel each other out by being equally powerful and offsetting.

Third, Wawro’s operationalization of legislative entrepreneurship or the specification of his multivariate regressions may be inadequate to uncover the true relationship. With regard to the former, his comprehensive tables and extensive footnotes indicate that he considered many other functional forms. If a positive relationship between entrepreneurship and reelection exists—as I suspect—the non-finding culprit must be the operationalization of legislative entrepreneurship.

Rather than pan Wawro for his measure of entrepreneurship, I praise him for putting something on the table. He develops an “entrepreneurship scales score” based on five independent measures: the average numbers of cosponsors, leadership cosponsors, titles, and index terms for each member’s introduced bills and policy knowledge scores based on the number of testimonies the member has in committees. Admittedly, his measure is not perfect; but it provides congressional scholars with a starting point to quantify and to analyze, rigorously, the rather complex concept of “legislative entrepreneurship.”

Early on in the book, Wawro explains that his investigation is going to be concerned with legislative entrepreneurship as an independent variable. This direct approach leaves unanswered, perhaps, some of the most interesting questions. With null findings on the consequences of entrepreneurship, an investigation of the causes becomes all that more important. If part of that answer leads us to the representative’s district (à la Fenno’s *Home Style*, 1978), we might begin to discover a more complete answer to Wawro’s question.

In the end, the reader is asked to believe that legislative entrepreneurship is worth it for members because it increases their probability of obtaining committee and party leadership positions. A more complete examination would, in turn, impact this finding with the propensity of securing reelection. If this connection is true, what would propel some member to eschew more traditional reelection activities (such as gaining pork and servicing constituent case work) to engage in entrepreneurship? I look forward to reading part II of this research program, whether from Wawro's pen or someone else's.

The demand for a book to be both path breaking and conclusive is too high. Wawro's contributes mightily to the first of these. *Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House of Representatives* is a must read for anyone doing research on Congress. Although he does not resolve many major debates in the field of Congressional research, Wawro's evidence certainly impacts some of the most important debates about the institutions of Congress. Wawro's clear thinking and writing make this a good read also for those doing sophisticated quantitative methods—perhaps it is even better for those just beginning more formal training in econometrics. His multivariate analysis tool chest—including probits, instrumental variables, simultaneous equations, maximum likelihood equations, and ordered probits—provides quality examples of modifications and alternatives to ordinary least squares (OLS). He is careful to explain why he employs these various corrections or alternatives to OLS.

Wawro's findings are important for all of American politics and political science at large, but the preponderance of inconclusive findings probably makes reading an article version of his argument both cheaper and a more efficient use of time for those not explicitly interested in congressional questions.

Racialized Coverage of Congress: The News in Black and White. By Jeremy Zilber and David Niven. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. 160p. \$60.00.

C. Richard Hofstetter, *San Diego State University*

Jeremy Zilber and David Niven bolster a brief but cogent argument with evidence that news coverage of Congress has been "racialized" to the detriment of African-American congressmen and congresswomen, that African-American members of Congress are less favorably portrayed, less likely to be associated with a diverse agenda, and portrayed as more marginal than Caucasian members, factors other than race being equal (p. 90). By implication, the argument extends to all minority political activists and public officials. It also implies that constituencies represented by African-American politicians are greatly disadvantaged in the political process.

Written in an engaging style and using a multimethod approach, the study presents data from several perspectives and purports to show how coverage works against the personal and political interests of African-American members of Congress. Noting that the existence of dramatic racial differences between whites and African Americans in public opinion and political power poses a problem in America, the authors argue that the news media have contributed to the situation. News media "racialize" coverage of African-American politicians by nearly always highlighting race and emphasizing how they differ from white counterparts. Zilber and Niven organize the book around three themes: (1) the extent of news racialization concerning members of Congress, (2) the causes of racialized news coverage, and (3) the effects of racialization.

Content analysis of 1998 news coverage of three groups of members of Congress was conducted: 20 African-American members of Congress, 20 white Congressmen with "similar

ideology" (liberal) and service, and 20 white Congressmen selected to represent the entire Congress who tend toward conservative and Republican dispositions (pp. 18–23). Up to 10 articles ($N=2524$) "focusing on" the 60 members of Congress from major newspapers were selected for analysis during 1993–1999. When more than 10 articles about a Congressman appeared, 20% but no fewer than 10 were randomly selected.

Analysis revealed that no large differences in news coverage appeared among the three groups in number, length, or placement of articles (p. 23), but coverage of race was a different matter. The race of African-American members was stressed consistently compared to the white groups, whether it was mentioned in connection to the member or about an issue position implying that African American politicians are concerned solely with African American issues and constituents, rather than national issues and collective concerns. Coverage is also more locally oriented, failing to link members with national and international issues or with bases of power and leadership roles in Congress, and considerably more negative in tone.

Zilber and Niven conducted interviews with press secretaries and content analyzed member web sites to examine how members present themselves and the concerns they wish to stress. Despite common aspirations in how members wanted to be covered by the media, press secretaries for African-American members were much more likely to report unfavorable treatment, for instance, not being taken seriously, ignoring actions, and negative stereotyping, at the hands of the press than press secretaries for other members (p. 54). However, African American's web sites were much more likely to highlight civil rights, education, human rights, and poverty.

Drawing data from two survey samples of reporters who cover Congress, one of 100 political reporters and another of 10 reporters who were intensively interviewed, Zilber and Niven found support for a "distribution effect" that influences the content of what is reported about African-American members of Congress and may be a prime mover in racialization. The low number of African-American members of Congress influences news coverage; the commonly held view of disparity in race between reporters and members does not. Reporters from areas with few African Americans provide less favorable coverage (p. 91). Lack of familiarity may breed an unfavorable image of African-American members of Congress, if not contempt.

Analyses of 1994, 1996, and 1998 NES survey data from Congressional districts in which the 60 sampled politicians reside provide support for a "racial priming" hypothesis that white voters provide higher approval for Caucasian candidates, while African-American voters provide equal approval for African-American and Caucasian candidates. These dispositions parallel racialized coverage that incumbents receive bolstering the image of Caucasian politicians but undermining the image of African-American candidates, thus working to the detriment of African Americans who challenge Caucasian opponents (p. 102).

Zilber and Niven conclude that reports of racial issues coupled with the racial identities of African-American candidates alienate Caucasian voters and help to keep African-American politicians out of higher office (p. 113). The very sensitivity to diversity issues that appears in news coverage makes the racialized coverage worse. News will improve only when racial identification of minorities is reduced. They recommend that reporters permit politicians to speak for themselves rather than over interpret positions and that politicians should selectively punish reporters who identify race when unwarranted.

This thin volume by no means exhausts research on the question of adequate coverage. It has limitations in the scope of questions raised, breadth of data, and little multivariate analysis. It does, however, provide a near-textbook job of posing intriguing theoretical questions, collecting and applying data to answer these questions in a direct and relevant manner, and eliminating many of the most likely alternative explanations for what is observed. Zilber and Niven's work would be of particular interest to those interested in

racial politics, news media coverage of politics, and political behavior. It contributes to a research agenda about the coverage of minority officials by raising questions and suggesting requisites for analysis in studying media coverage. It skillfully demonstrates the utility of a multimethod approach by drawing on various kinds of data to study the role of communication media in political behavior. Like all good research it raises important questions that beg further study.

Comparative Politics

Communities and the Environment: Ethnicity, Gender, and the State in Community-Based Conservation. Edited by Arun Agrawal and Clark C. Gibson. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001. 232p. \$60.00 cloth, \$23.00 paper.

Pamela Stricker, *California State University, San Marcos*

Common pool (or property) resource studies attempt to address the puzzle of managing natural resources highlighted by Garrett Hardin's (1968) *Tragedy of the Commons* dilemma. In that scenario of an unmanaged commons, a resource (e.g., pasture) made available to a multiplicity of users will result in a free-for-all leading to the destruction of that natural resource. Traditionally, solutions to this resource overuse problem have come in the form of privatization or state control of natural resources.

Within the property rights regime, rights can be assigned to an individual via private property rights, or to the state through the use of public lands, or to a collection of individuals, usually a "community," through common property rights. However, the latter option has become problematic in the view of the editors and contributors of this edition, due to the treatment of community as homogeneous.

In a thought-provoking volume of case studies from the Global South, Arun Agrawal and Clark Gibson have delved into how governments have gone astray in decentralizing natural resource management. Knowingly or not, many policymakers have, in their bid to return control of a given area's resources back to the local inhabitants, shaped the results of the devolution policy by allowing outdated conceptualizations of "community" to inform the manner in which they distributed this political power.

The editors and their contributors have put forth, for the most part, a convincing argument backed up by the empirical data outlined in the six cases from Africa, South Asia, and North America for a more nuanced conceptualization of "community." They posit that the outmoded definition of *community* "as a small spatial unit, social structure, and set of shared norms" stymies meaningful decentralization of political power vis-à-vis full participation of all members of the subgroups within a given "community" over a particular body of natural resources.

Calling for a shift in perspective to one that considers divergent interests of multiple actors as well as consideration of the processes through which these interests are expressed, along with analysis of the institutions that affect these political outcomes, the authors collectively set forth a new set of criteria for natural resource management devolution programs.

Additionally, in their cases the contributors call on policymakers to factor in the diversity within the populations, be it gender, ethnicity, religion, class, or other identifiable subgroup category, when structuring what such policies will

look like "on the ground." A particularly interesting chapter (chapter 2) analyzes the problematic nature of crafting policymaking with gender concerns in mind. Many of those approaches have been colored by shortcomings in resource management concerns such as how traditional norms frame gendered relations of land access and ownership, but also how contemporary analyses have too frequently overlooked subgroup differentiation as in the intricacies of how caste, class, and ethnicity affect how both women and men utilize natural resources.

Also illustrative of the need for rethinking of "community" is Bettina Ng'Weno's chapter on Kenyan natural resource conservation. Government efforts to conserve more than half of the nation's rare plants were cloaked in the "mythic indigenous preservation model" that fell short of the conservation plans given the multiple interpretations of the sacredness of the *kaya* (coastal forested areas) as well as the not so homogenous nature of the Mijikenda or the subgroup Muslim Digo peoples.

Other contributors examine how differing social structures and relationships within communities and government representatives can affect natural resource conservation in Morocco (chapter 3) and Indonesia (chapter 6), respectively. Hughes McDermott's examination of the Philippine government's conflicted definition of community in forest management programs in Palawan is well crafted. This case dramatizes how networks can offer indigenous peoples support in their efforts to overcome the legacies of colonial pasts and resource control of authoritarian elites.

Community control of natural resources can reveal class, ethnic, religious, or gender lines. Resources will be controlled by elites who dominate these communities if the state simply passes the resource management baton to the local governing structure and turns its attention back to the capital. The state's role in ensuring that natural resource conservation takes place requires a consciousness on the part of the state of the various subgroups in the community as well as the political, economic, and social hierarchies existent in a given locus. Neither the editors nor the contributors fully answer the question raised by this proposed multiactor conceptualization of community. If a state is cognizant of the various players and their particular characteristics and the social, political, and economic hierarchies that underpin a community's governance (thus shaping the distribution of natural resources), then how far should the state go in the facilitation of democratic or equalitarian distribution of the resources so that a cohesive plan of management can be enacted? A conclusion drawing together the lessons of these cases and outlining how states could update their conceptualization of community based on the concerns raised would have strengthened this otherwise solid edition.

Nonetheless, *Communities and the Environment* takes the common pool resources literature as well as the practice of managing the commons in an important new direction,

a locally informed multilayered one. This volume calls on academics and practitioners alike to recognize the various members and their identities, actions, and access to participating in the design and implementation of conservation policies. While the book does not broadly guide states into that new direction, it sets forth a significant challenge to government policymakers and practitioners to factor in the multiplicity of interests and potential participants in community-based conservation programs. Further, it helps us get at the underlying conflicts underpinning many decentralized resource conservation programs that have been designed to limit the powerless from seeking to expand their demands in contested areas of valuable resources, fertile land, irrigation access, and, most importantly, political and economic power.

Bounded Missions: Military Regimes and Democratization in the Southern Cone and Brazil. By Craig L. Arceneaux. University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2001. 262p. \$35.00.

Harold A. Trinkunas, *Naval Postgraduate School*

This book provides a solid contribution to our understanding of regime transitions, although from an unusual perspective: that of the armed forces of an outgoing dictatorship. Since its inception, the literature on democratization has argued that modes of regime transition (and the actors empowered during this process) have a substantial impact on the success and quality of a new democracy. Craig Arceneaux's central insight is that who retains control of the process in a transition from a military dictatorship depends to a great degree on the cohesion of the armed forces and the coherence of their economic and political strategy. To establish this proposition, Arceneaux adopts an institutionalist approach to examine five cases of transition in South America, all drawn from the period of prolonged military rule that characterized the region during the 1960s and 1970s.

At least since the seminal work on democratization by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (*Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 1986), political scientists have noted a strong relationship between the issue of who is empowered by a political transition and the quality and quantity of democracy available in a new regime. Where the security forces are able to maintain control over the timing and sequence of the transition process, they are often able to embed checks on the power of elected officials into the institutions a new democracy. Commonly, these constraints are aimed at protecting members of the armed forces from prosecution for human rights abuses committed during a dictatorship, but they can also be designed to preserve institutional prerogatives and might even include limits on budgetary and economic policy, as in the case of post-Pinochet Chile. In the long run, the persistence of military-backed limits on the power of elected officials calls into question the very degree to which a regime can be considered democratic.

In this book, Arceneaux seeks to understand the circumstances in which the armed forces are able to carry out a controlled transition following a period in which they had directly ruled a country. He argues that two factors, military unity and strategy coordination, increase the likelihood that a military regime will succeed in controlling a transition. Arceneaux defines military unity in relation to the ability of the armed forces to maintain cohesion in the face of the challenges of participating in a military dictatorship; strategy coordination refers to the ability of a military regime to develop a successful and effective government program that achieves support from important social and political actors. Where both factors are high, he argues that we should expect to see armed forces

that retain control over transitions to democracy and are able successfully to defend institutional privileges in a new regime. In other words, where the armed forces have remained internally cohesive and authoritarian regimes are perceived as successful by the larger society, we should expect that the institutions of a new democracy should be strongly influenced by the preferences of the outgoing military government.

Arceneaux adopts an explicitly historical institutionalist approach to explaining military success and failure in achieving transition control. In this book, variation in the two independent variables is largely a product of the institutional rules of the game of the authoritarian regime, which means that transition control is largely predetermined even before the actual process of moving to a new regime begins. As Arceneaux correctly reminds us, all military dictatorships are caught on the horns of a dilemma: Greater direct participation in government increases the stake of the armed forces in a dictatorship's success (and their willingness to defend it), but such participation also politicizes the armed forces and reduces their ability to coordinate political and economic strategies that are likely to lead to regime success. Arceneaux finds that the ability of a military government to manage this dilemma successfully is a product of its internal institutional arrangements.

In each of the five authoritarian regimes examined in this book (Argentina, 1966–73; Argentina, 1976–83; Brazil, 1964–85; Chile, 1973–89; Uruguay, 1973–85), Arceneaux conducts a detailed analysis of the “rules of the game,” and he successfully shows how variations in these rules affected the ability of the armed forces to maintain high levels of unity and strategy coordination. At one extreme, the institutional arrangements developed during the Pinochet regime sustained high levels of military unity and led to successful strategies that allowed the armed forces to place numerous constraints on the power of democratically elected Aylwin administration following the 1990 transition. On the other hand, the Argentine armed forces' thorough penetration of the state apparatus during the 1976–83 dictatorship politicized the officer corps and produced internal conflicts over strategy, leading to poor decision making that eventually plunged the country into an unwinnable war with Great Britain in 1982. The resulting disarray in the armed forces initially placed them in a very weak position vis-à-vis the democratic government that followed. An interesting intermediate case is that of the military-backed “Argentine Revolution” (1966–73), where even though military institutional unity was sustained by excluding the bulk of the officer corps from a day-to-day role in government, poor strategy coordination led to a worsening economic and social crisis and the collapse of the regime. Given the paucity of studies focusing on this level of analysis of authoritarian regimes, each of the country cases analyzed in this book represents a valuable contribution in and of itself to our understanding of this period in Latin American politics.

However, the almost-exclusive focus on the institutional level as a source of explanation is also one of the few drawbacks of this book. By concentrating in such detail on the organizational arrangements and decision making processes within each of the dictatorships, Arceneaux dedicates little space to addressing the impact on his variables of external shocks, such as changes in world economic conditions. Also, given his attention to the success or failure of strategy coordination in military governments, the absence of substantial discussion of counterstrategies pursued by their opponents seems odd. For example, the Chilean military regime's strategy for winning a referendum in 1989 on extending General Pinochet's rule arguably foundered on the counterstrategies of the democratic opposition, forcing the regime to accept a transition to democracy at an earlier date than it had

originally planned. What is also likely to prove controversial is the degree to which Arceneaux believes that transition control is predetermined by the institutional arrangements of a military regime. Two of the central findings in the literature on democratization are that authoritarian regimes often lose control of liberalization processes and that transitions to democracy are often characterized by a high degree of uncertainty due to the fluid strategic interaction among the participants. It is not clear that the determinacy of Arceneaux's arguments and the institutionally centered explanations are compatible with these findings or provide sufficient evidence to disprove them.

Civil Society Before Democracy: Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe. Edited by Nancy Bermeo and Philip Nord. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. 320p. \$79.00 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

Michael Bernhard, *Pennsylvania State University*

The Polish philosopher and diplomat Piotr Ogorodinski has described "civil society" as a weasel word. It is hard to disagree, given that neo-Tocquevillians, Weberians, critical theorists, Christian fundamentalists, and World Bank analysts all unabashedly sing its praises while having completely different referents in mind for the term. Because it concerns itself with the historical development of civil society, rather than with some abstract idealized notion of it, this collection of essays by historians and social scientists is a sorely needed addition to the literature.

The editors have brought together a distinguished group of historians and social scientists to consider the issue of the development and emergence of civil society in nineteenth-century Europe. The conception of the nineteenth century is that of the long century running from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the end of World War I in 1918. The focus here is on the evolution of autonomous social actors in Western Europe beginning with the emergence of nineteenth-century liberalism.

The main question considered in the essays is how the emergence of civil society affected the transformation of liberalism into modern mass democracy. The first two sections of the book, overwhelmingly devoted to Western Europe, divide the cases considered according to whether the transition to mass democracy was successful or initially failed. The cases of failure considered are Portugal, Russia, Italy, and Germany. The second section is devoted to the success stories, Great Britain, France, Belgium, and The Netherlands. The third section, somewhat awkwardly titled "The Meaning of the Nineteenth Century Today," is a bit less coherent, composed of a learned historical essay by Valerie Bunce on the historical origins of the weakness of civil society in Eastern Europe (citing factors that go as far back as Roman times), an essay by Jan Kubik on the classic case of the reemergence of civil society under communism (Poland), and a nice synthetic conclusion by Nancy Bermeo.

Several broad lessons emerge from the essays. First, civil society is not inexorably linked to democracy, but historically has emerged in concert with several other forms of regime including monarchy, oligarchic liberalism, and mild or enfeebled types of authoritarianism. In certain European cases civil society emerged or held its own during the age of reaction in the first part of the nineteenth century, thrived in concert with liberal hegemony, and reemerged and challenged communism in its posttotalitarian phase. Second, civil society is not always good for democracy. Sometimes, in fact, its best-organized elements may be ambivalent or even antithetic to democracy. Elements within civil society often major players

in its breakdown. On this point the essays by Adrian Lyttelton on Italy and Klaus Tenfelde on Germany are quite good and build on the existing work in this vein by Sheri Berman and by Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein.

Third, the essays on the cases of failure all point out the difficulties in incorporating rural and traditional social formations into civil society. This observation both confirms and expands on the well-established insight that social formations with labor repressive and noncommercialized agriculture pose particular problems for democracy. Fourth, the essays that discuss cases of democratic success show very diverse patterns. Clearly, there is no single pattern by which civil society successfully connects with a democratic regime and/or promotes it. Britain represents one of the classic cases of how an associational culture developed and expanded in a slow and sure fashion. Whereas Robert Morris' essay in this volume does a very nice job of describing this, he does not whitewash the considerable failures of Britain in this regard, particularly with regard to Ireland. Raymond Huard's essay on France describes how civil society there eventually thrived despite the periodic attempts of the upper and middle classes to impede the ability of other social actors to organize and the relatively late institutionalization of freedom of association. And Thomas Ertman's essay on how democracy in Belgium and The Netherlands succeeded through the process of the "pillarization" of civil society points out how potentially strong social division and impediments to democracy and a robust civil society can be overcome. Kubik's essay on postcommunist Poland (based on his book with Grzegorz Ekiert) demonstrates that protest can function as a way to link the state and civil society in situations where the party system is weakly institutionalized and in flux.

Fifth, the connection between state and civil society emerges as a key variable in whether civil society plays a constructive role in building democracy. This is a point strongly made by Bermeo in her conclusion to the volume. This insight indicates that the role that political society plays in mediating between the state and civil society is a key area that demands more attention.

If I have one complaint about the book, it is that some of the essays by the historians are undertheorized. When I was reading them I was struck by how they could have been improved by a greater awareness of comparative historical social science on the origins of democracy and modernity or even the work of well-known historians who have participated in these debates such as Geoff Ely and Charles Maier. This is a strategy that, to my mind, succeeds admirably in the introductory essay by Philip Nord.

This is the sort of edited collection that merits wide reading because it treats an important concept that has suffered lately (from both overuse and conceptual stretching) in a nuanced, historically complex, and theoretically sophisticated matter. It reminds us about what is strongly problematic about doctoral dissertations using only canned data on NGOs and polity scores to generalize about the relationship between civil society and democratic consolidation. Finally, the case studies on their own are quite useful as a resource reference for those doing comparative historical research on modern Europe.

Power and City Governance: Comparative Perspectives on Urban Development. By Alan DiGaetano and John S. Klemanski. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 328p. \$57.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper

Michael Jones-Correa, *Cornell University*

The field of urban politics has been in the theoretical doldrums for some 20 years now. This is not to say there has been

a dearth of scholarship; on the contrary, empirical case studies taking political economy, policy, or institutional approaches have been common. But unlike the heyday of the study of the field through the 1970s, there has been no compelling debate that has held the attention of students of American politics and political scientists more generally. Alan DiGaetano and John Klemanski set themselves up for no small task, then, by seeking not simply to establish comparisons between cities in the United States and Great Britain, but to build a new theoretical foundation for the study of city politics and for urban political economy more generally. On the whole, while the authors provide a sweeping vista of the state of the field, the theoretical edifice they build is not solid enough to sustain the weight of their own hypotheses and claims.

The arguments in *Power and City Governance* are constructed around paired case studies in the United States and the United Kingdom. The authors pair Boston and Bristol, two seaport cities now turned toward advanced service economy, with Detroit and Birmingham, two industrial centers still struggling with their economic and civic redevelopment. The paired cases are designed not only to illustrate how differences in state structuring entail very different possibilities and constraints for cities in the two countries, but also to illuminate differences in the approaches cities have taken within each country.

The broader picture presented by the authors is that metropolitan areas in both countries have gone through fundamental economic restructuring over the last generation, leading to the deindustrialization of cities. In the United States, cities have dealt with this transition largely on their own, relying heavily on local resources to restructure their economies. In Britain, on the other hand, cities have been relatively insulated from the swing of the economic pendulum by substantial grants from the state. The flip side to this financial cushion is that cities in Britain have less autonomy in policy arenas, while the relative fiscal self-sufficiency of American cities also gives them greater autonomy in the political sphere.

Power and City Governance focuses on the period of the 1980s and 1990s, when urban policy in Great Britain and the United States seemed to be converging. The British government at this time encouraged an increasingly entrepreneurial approach in local governance, turning, for instance, to competitive grants to encourage policy innovation at the local level. This meant that there was room for British cities, like their American counterparts, to take a greater variety of approaches in their response to economic restructuring. (Note, however, that for differences within countries to become salient, differences across countries become less so. It is less than clear, at the book's conclusion, what difference national distinctions make.)

Through the 1980s and 1990s the redevelopment policies cities pursued in these two countries were very much shaped by the coalitions that governed them. These coalitions were led largely by city officials, business elites, and community activists and in different configurations pursued different kinds of agendas. DiGaetano and Klemanski posit at least four: growth coalitions, social reform coalitions, growth management coalitions, and caretaker coalitions. In addition, each of these coalitions has different characteristics. For one, they have different power structures, so they can be composed of rival factions, contingent coalitions, enduring coalitions, or prevailing coalitions, as well as by regimes. The power structures determine the power arrangements of coalitions, which can be dominant, bargaining, or preemptive. DiGaetano and Klemanski discuss nine cases in their book, a case being where a city changed governing coalitions. However, each of these coalitions also had at least one of three power arrangements and one of five configurations of

power (besides, of course, being in one of two countries). In their attempt to capture the nuance of urban power arrangements, the authors quickly plunge the reader into a bewildering array of coalitional possibilities and outcomes, resulting in a situation where the possible combinations of variables far exceeds the number of cases that can explain the outcomes.

To be fair, the purpose of the authors' careful and nuanced account is to avoid falling into what they feel has been the pitfall of much of the recent literature in urban politics, which is an overreliance on political economy as the principal explanatory variable for political outcomes. Political and economic variables need not be correlated, in their view. What DiGaetano and Klemanski wish to show is that the agendas pursued by coalitions are not necessarily linked to the economic fortune of their cities. However, a closer look at their cases shows otherwise. Birmingham and Detroit, the two cities most constrained economically during the period of the study, only ever had progrowth coalitions. Boston and Bristol, with middle-class constituencies in diversified high-end service economies, pursued a greater variety of developmental agendas. But these varied outcomes actually followed a pattern: In times of recession both cities pursued progrowth policies, while in times of economic expansion, both cities had room to experiment with slow-growth or reform agendas. Judging from the cases presented here, it seems that economics may explain rather a lot of the variance in political outcomes after all.

Alternative explanations that might have helped bolster their argument, in particular, greater attention to institutions and institutional variance and their impact on policy outcomes, receive rather short shrift in this study. Given the parameters of the book, then, the simpler and more elegant explanation for urban agendas is that cities are constrained by the imperative of economic growth, but once this growth is achieved, cities with greater resources have more room to pursue other alternatives, a situation nicely illustrated by David DeLeon's (1992) case study of San Francisco, *Left Coast City: Progressive Politics in San Francisco, 1975–1991* as well as by DiGaetano and Klemanski's descriptions of Boston and Bristol. However, the stories of Boston and Bristol versus Detroit and Birmingham in *Power and City Governance* are obscured, in the end, by the book's unwieldy theoretical construct.

Radical Women in Latin America: Left and Right. Edited by Victoria Gonzalez and Karen Kampwirth. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. 352p. \$55.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Georgina Waylen, *University of Sheffield*

In recent years more attention has begun to be paid to the different forms of women's engagement with the conventional political arena in Latin America. This interest partly reflects the impact of transitions to democracy and the demobilization of social movements. But it also reflects a change of approach by many of the scholars examining women's political activities as they have reassessed the importance of institutions and the salience of "politics."

This volume reflects these trends. Some of the contributions look at women who are organizing as women, but around political goals (using a narrow definition of what counts as political), not gender issues. Margaret Power, for example, examines right-wing women organizing for a "yes" vote in support of Pinochet in the Chilean plebiscite of 1988. Lisa Baldez looks at two groups of political women (often prominent members of political parties) organizing as what she

calls “political outsiders” in groups that operated outside the conventional political arena in Chile. One group, Poder Feminino, mobilized in support of military intervention to remove the Allende government in the early 1970s. The other, Mujeres por la Vida, mobilized to get the Pinochet regime out of power in the 1980s.

A number of the articles in the collection also look at women who are active within a range of political parties, although there is probably more discussion of those on the left, such as the ex-revolutionary parties in Central America and a new party like the PT, the Brazilian workers party, than those on the right. Indeed this is perhaps the book's greatest novelty. It analyses women identified with both the left and the right of the political spectrum, sometimes even in the same chapter. Karen Kampwirth, for example, examines women fighting for both the Contras and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. This juxtapositioning has been done only very rarely in the past. This is partly, as hinted at in the collection itself, because until now most of the analysis of women's organizing has focused on women's “progressive” organizing rather than organizing in favor of the status quo or right-wing political projects.

The focus on radical women of both the left and the right allows some important themes to come to fore. Many of the articles engage with the possibilities for and limits to coalition building—How far is it possible for women of different political persuasions to unite around certain issues? This notion of conjunctural coalition building is one that is currently also being explored by other scholars. Many of the articles demonstrate the limits of that coalition building. The coalitions that Baldez examines are possible only over relatively limited segments of the political spectrum. Only women from the right and center-right united to oppose Allende and only women from different parts of the left and center came together to oppose the Pinochet regime. It is often thought that more unity is possible around “gender issues.” However, a number of the articles in this volume reinforce the argument that gender rights are not one issue but many and different actors can take up a variety of different positions depending on the issue. Patricia Hipsher, in her analysis of postrevolutionary El Salvador, demonstrates that although there are some campaigns, such as those for child support, against domestic violence, and even for quotas, over which a range of women could unite, there are others, such as abortion and women's economic rights in Free Trade Zones, that remain too divisive.

The second theme that runs through many of the articles is the relationship of feminism to political parties, again not only on the left but also on the right of the political spectrum. Treading some quite well worn ground, Hipsher shows how the El Salvadorean feminist movement emerged out of the left and Liesl Haas argues that, despite problems, many Brazilian feminists have found the PT a more hospitable environment than the other political parties. How far the political left can be a constraint or an enabler for feminism therefore remains contentious question. More unusually, Victoria Gonzalez looks at the ways in which the Somocistas absorbed the Nicaraguan feminist movement that had emerged in the first half of the twentieth century and thereby also challenges the commonly held belief that Nicaraguan women did not organize until much more recently. In an extension of this theme of the relationship between feminism and politics, more discussion of whether there is any continued relevance to the old *feminista/politica* split might have also been useful.

In their introduction, the editors identify autonomy—defined as independence from political parties and guerilla organizations—as another theme that they believe is central to many of the contributions. The use of the term autonomy is perhaps to state the argument too simplistically. The more

complex issue of what should be the nature of the relationship with political parties and, more broadly, with the state and policymaking bodies has preoccupied many women activists and scholars. In her discussion of the decision not to have a women's section in the PT, Haas highlights some of the debates that have surrounded the question of how women should organize within political parties. The contributions in this volume therefore serve to reinforce the argument that the question of women activists' goals and how they are shaped by the institutional context in which they are operating is an important one that deserves further investigation.

Maternalism is the final theme that the editors identify. Again, this is an issue that has already quite rightly received a great deal of attention. The contribution of this volume is to challenge some of the more simplistic analyses by showing some of the ways in which motherhood has been used by the left at the same time as demonstrating that right-wing women do not always mobilize as mothers as is sometimes assumed. Power, for example, shows how some right-wing Chilean women wanted to be active in the public sphere as citizens rather than as mothers.

Although the focus on radical women of the left and right allows a number of key questions to be addressed in novel ways, it is perhaps too dichotomous, thereby obscuring some other important themes. Populism, for example, does not fit easily within this framework. As well as making the volume more balanced in terms of the number of contributions in each of the South and Central American sections, a discussion of postwar Argentina could have considered the relationship of women activists to Peronism in the 1950s and its contemporary legacy. This would also have provided some continuity with the article by Sandra McGee Deutsch that examines Brazil, Chile, and Argentina between 1900 and 1940. Unlike the first two countries, it is not followed up later in the volume with a more up-to-date discussion of Argentina.

These comments notwithstanding, this collection is grounded in extensive research and contains a number of timely and thought-provoking articles that will make a useful contribution to the increasingly sophisticated literature on women and politics in Latin America.

Constructing Sustainable Development. By Neil E. Harrison. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. 175p. \$55.50 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Rodger A. Payne, *University of Louisville*

Nearly 15 years has elapsed since the World Commission on Environment and Development—the so-called Brundtland Commission—popularized the idea of “sustainable development.” The phrase turned out to be unusually slippery, providing both political cover and ammunition for almost anyone engaged in debates about the global environment and/or development. Indeed, scholars and policymakers of all theoretical or ideological stripes found creative ways to employ the phrase “sustainable development” to support a wide array of arguments in these discussions.

Neil Harrison has written a clear and concise book that addresses important questions related to the ambiguous and multiple meanings. He analyzes, in the postmodern tradition, three dominant, yet often conflicting, policy narratives of sustainable development. These are efficiency, equity, and ethics. For each narrative, Harrison explains and evaluates the premises and arguments borrowed from various social, economic, or political theories. Then, over the course of five short chapters, he highlights logical inconsistencies that make viable policy goals literally impossible to achieve. The author reveals the conceit often hidden in these narratives and, in

turn, promotes greater humility. His arguments are sharp, but his purpose is not mere deconstruction. In fact, Harrison often notes the elements of a narrative that might be made to work and that should be preserved in some fashion.

Still, Harrison concludes quite forcefully that “sustainable development is a Holy Grail that does not exist. It is a legend, a myth. . . . [The term] cannot be objectively defined, cannot be known” (p. 99). So what would people have to do to make development sustainable, which is the goal the author establishes on the book’s first page (p. vii)? The answer is certainly not found in traditional literatures on economics, politics, or environmental ethics. The chapters on efficiency, for example, describe and critique biases in the neoclassical vision of the market and then dissect alleged technological fixes, which are not likely to be developed in the current political-economic context. The chapters on equity likewise explain why neither redistribution of wealth nor international cooperation is about to occur. Finally, Harrison demonstrates that no society can embrace ecologically ethical policies without first embracing environmental ideals. This presents a bootstrapping dilemma, since ideas cannot be changed absent education policies that promote ecology.

Harrison offers his own recommendations in the final chapter. He borrows from the postmodern tradition to find meta-narratives that might be able to transcend barriers across the political, economic, and social divides he has identified (p. 101). From this perspective, the author derives a need for a far more participatory politics and an ecological view of science that values flexibility and adaptability. Data need to be accumulated, and education promoted, he asserts, so as to match the most appropriate policy initiatives to local needs. Perhaps most controversially, Harrison wants sustainable development to be “the central concern of political discourse” (p. 118).

If most of these prescriptions seem somewhat vague and (at least to the informed reader) mundane, Harrison is unapologetic. On the last page, he returns to an earlier admonition (chapter 2) that policies supporting sustainable development (or virtually any policy goal) “are always stabs in the dark, best guesses in an uncertain world” (p. 118). Harrison’s broad challenge to “rational” economics, science, and policymaking, however, might tempt readers to question whether his preferred choices are better than those he critiques. After all, the author warns that sustainable development seems to be “the ultimate ‘postmodern’ issue” and “can be interpreted to support any agenda, or objective” (p. 102).

Consider Harrison’s plea for education. While the author means his claims to be taken differently, it is difficult to imagine that college administrators will be persuaded to build their general education or liberal arts curriculums around the idea of sustainable development precisely “because it can mean everything to everybody” (p. 118). Harrison stresses that education should be sensitive to ambiguity and that teachers should take diverse perspectives into account when considering something as elusive as sustainable development. In practice, however, his warnings literally seem to imply that nothing is valid and that everything is valid.

Why should an idea like the precautionary principle (pp. 16, 111), for example, presumptively favor environmental goals? A probusiness advocate might argue that caution demands favoring jobs and economic well-being over “risky” policies to defend the environment. During the Cold War, “worst-case planning” meant spending hundreds of billions of dollars on nuclear weapons to promote “security.” No one should assume that environmental goals would come out on top if the most basic societal goals started to be compared. Harrison’s argument for community and participatory politics could even subvert environmental objectives. In actual

debates about forest policies, loggers of the U.S. Pacific Northwest apparently prefer retaining their jobs to preserving owl habitats.

Anyone who has perused the right’s antienvironmental literature (e.g., see Ronald Bailey, *Eco-Scam*, 1993), quickly learns how postmodern insights and arguments can be turned against environmentalists. Scientists have often been wrong about past warnings of ecological or resource collapse, the skeptics assert, so why should anyone make costly policies based upon their latest warnings about global warming? The problem is magnified when a scientist or two challenges the environmental views.

Postmodernists, ironically, might fault Harrison for failing to embrace their project more fully. He acknowledges that his “approach is not specifically postmodern” (p. 112) and at times he seems to favor the employment of both material and instrumental measures. For instance, he advocates substantial increases in aid to poor countries, which would essentially bribe them to support sustainable development. He also supports higher taxes on consumption to influence consumer demand for resources. Yet material levers distort dialogue and would not necessarily promote an ecological mindset.

Harrison’s book seems most useful for educators who teach undergraduate or master’s-level courses about the environment. Students would benefit from the author’s succinct and lucid critique of prevailing economic, political, and ethical theories and from his application of postmodern theorizing. No doubt, Harrison’s arguments would provoke interesting and useful classroom exchanges.

Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets. By Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. 368p. \$54.00 cloth, \$18.00 paper.

Alexander Hicks, *Emory University*

This is surely the most ambitious and the most accomplished study of affluent post-World War II democratic welfare states. It uses statistical, case study, and comparative historical methods to describe and explain the course of social welfare policy over the second half of the twentieth century in 16 nations. Quantitatively, the study examines social insurance and service programs, major public expenditure and revenue aggregates, and an array of fine-grained indicators of state redistributive and safety net outcomes, from 1960 through 1994. Somewhat more qualitatively, the study extends its reach to encompass job and gender, labor market, and educational policies over the whole 1945–1996 period. Using both quantitative and qualitative methods of explanatory analysis, the work assesses various accounts of welfare state development and crisis, in particular, its authors’ institutionally amplified, class-analytical political resource theory.

The effort provides us ample explanatory and theoretical news and sets the benchmark for future work on its subject. The book’s central thesis, in broad strokes, is that partisan choice—grounded in partisan political economic mobilization and state governance and exercised under the constraint of constitutional structures and policy precedents (or “legacies”)—determines welfare policy. In more detail, the thesis is that over the long run—during the three-decade “Golden Age” following World War II most particularly—accumulated Left and Christian rule, aided by labor union mobilization and coordinated (as opposed to pure market) economic organization, drove a largely irreversible development of post-War welfare policy. The development is cumulative in the sense that causal forces largely are

limited to ratcheting up or containing welfare state advance. Importantly, Left/Christian prominence in directing the expansion of welfare states is unequivocally claimed only into early in a post-1973 "crisis" that transforms relentless development into adaptive slowdown, or reactionary devolution. Cumulative Christian—not *social*—democratic government is seen as relatively important for social insurance and transfer-payment programs, while Left government is seen as relatively important for social services, overall state scale, and income redistribution and poverty reduction. Left/Christian forces expanding welfare states are complemented by constitutional structures insofar as these engender consensual policy and few veto points. They are also complemented by female labor force participation, especially to the extent that this is politically aided by Left governance. Although the book's Left/Christian thesis is hardly original (dating back to 1970s works by David Cameron, Walter Korpi, and Stephens), its program and period specifications of the thesis, as well as its institutional and female-labor force amplifications of it, cap Huber and Stephens' innovative 1990s work.

Complementing the book's core developmental thesis is its account of crisis. Here Huber and Stephens argue that it is not economic *globalization* that has driven welfare-state "retrenchment." In particular, economic stagnation, rooted less in globalization than rising real interest rates (plus such conjunctural factors as the 1990-ish strains of German unification and collapse of Soviet imports), has—at least where neoliberal modes of economic thinking have been relatively circumscribed as in northern and Continental Europe. There stagnation, via a crisis of high and recalcitrant unemployment, has occasioned small downward adjustments of the welfare state. Where neoliberal views have been more hegemonic, neoliberalism itself, especially when facilitated by Conservative party government and majoritarian and unitary politics as in the 1980s United Kingdom and 1990s New Zealand, has driven deep and reactionary retrenchments. The book's account of these matters, while not systematic enough to provide a final word, should influence much opinion and further investigation.

As regards the particular hypothesis that female entry into the labor force buoys welfare policy, especially where left parties tend to rule, Huber and Stephens' important statistical case for this very plausible thesis is qualified by two statistical glitches. Estimates of female effects on policy might, due to simultaneity bias, be artifacts of policy effects on female labor force participation; and the cumulative measure of left rule is questionable. As regards state structure, the book's claim for "constitutional" constraints on the welfare state is very convincing.

The claim for Left and Christian Democratic rule as the prime determinants of post-War welfare-state policy is strongly supported by the convergence of findings across a range of outcome measures. In the crucial Tables 3.2–3.5 of 1960–1985 long-run analyses, this range encompasses both social security benefits and (more narrowly) transfer payments, government revenues as well as expenditures, and civilian public consumption spending—all as shares of GDP—in additions to measures of public civilian employment, the public share of health spending, and the *per-retiree* public share of GDP. Across these eight regressions, support for "Left cabinet" effects emerges at least six times, seven if social security benefits (analyzed under six notably varying explanatory specifications and apparently pro-welfarist in all but a case or two) is judged supportive, and nearly as much support for Christian Democratic effects is marshaled. (Further evidence is provided by a dozen more fine-grained safety net measures.) Case studies of nine relatively advanced welfare states, each specified to both "Golden Age" and "crisis" pe-

riods, is richly informative. Though lack of case detail on less generous welfare states limits systematic comparison (posing nagging puzzles about the likes of feckless British Labour and progressive French Conservatives), processes of welfare expansion and contraction are very valuably detailed for all of the most generous welfare states.

Despite all these strengths, some readers' assent to Huber and Stephens' claims for the explanatory preeminence of Left and Christian partisan government for welfare-state policy (especially prior to 1970s troubles) will be clouded by the authors' hardly compelling attempts to distinguish partisan rule from a few potentially competing, collinear explanatory factors. These include labor union strength and interest organization (e.g., neocorporatism), as well as political-ideological legacies (e.g., midcentury consolidation of welfare precedence and opinion) and broad secular trends in industrialization, aging, statism, and the like. They connote more technical issues of model specification (e.g., partisanship versus ideological climate interest-organization), measurement choice (cumulative versus noncumulative cabinet indexation), and estimation (e.g., static or dynamic) that can be neither ignored nor settled here. In summary, the book's core cases for the explanatory predominance of Left/Christian partisan governance—not merely of a broader amalgam of class-linked and labor- and left-centered forces—commands the most serious attention if not unanimous and full agreement.

In the social sciences major works are seldom definitive. This book will become an important political economic text and a mainstay of welfare-state and comparative political and policy studies for specialized students of the welfare state and comparative political economy. *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State* may lack the closure and elegance to settle its issues for social scientists or to reconcile humanists to its analytical density. It has the power to influence strongly belief and controversy in the fields of welfare-state, political economic, political sociological, and comparative historical investigation for years to come.

East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism. By Andrew C. Janos. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000. 488p. \$65.00.

Ilya Prizel, *University of Pittsburgh*

This is a learned and intriguing book covering the span of modern history of East Central Europe as well as the Balkans. The scope of the book is broad, including various theoretical approaches, historical analysis, and a rich discussion of economics. There is a particularly interesting description of technological innovations' impact on the region's economic and political structure. Unlike some earlier books on the region, which tended to treat Eastern Europe as a region outside the international context, Andrew Janos's work does an excellent job of both relating the impact of events in the "center" of the international system on the region and providing an outstanding comparison to Latin America, the other quasi-"peripheral" region of the international system during the last 300 years.

Given the scope of the book and its intellectual depth, it stands to reason that it is bound to raise questions, some of which go unanswered and thus warrant further discussion. Although Janos provides the reader with a detailed discussion of the decline of liberalism in Central and Eastern Europe and the rise of nationalism, several issues could benefit from greater elaboration and elucidation. First, the term "Liberalism" is never fully defined. While reading the book the reader is often confused about whether the author's use of

the term “liberalism” is the classic usage, which grew out of the Scottish and later enlightenment and culminated in the rise of the “Manchester School,” with its emphasis on tolerance and economic laissez-faire, or the French version, which is associated with rationalism and etatism but does not call for either cultural tolerance or a minimalist state (Gertrude Himmelfarb, “The Idea of Compassion: The British vs. French Enlightenment,” *The Public Interest* 145 (Fall 2001)).

The discussion focusing on the collapse of liberalism would have very much benefited from an analysis of the impact of the economic crash of 1873 and the ensuing economic depression, which, among other things, saw the birth of “racial” rather than “religious” anti-Semitism. Similarly, when dealing with the political radicalization in late nineteenth-century East Central Europe, there is, in this reviewer’s view, insufficient emphasis on the impact of intellectual trends emanating from Germany or the intellectual roots of modern political clericism; neither *Johann v. Herder*, Wilhelm Marr, German Romanticism, nor *Rerum Novarum* are even mentioned in the book.

When dealing with the interwar period, Janos gives us an outstanding and insightful account of the political strategies of Ion Antonescu in Romania, Miklos Horthy in Hungary, and Rev. Jozef Tiso in Slovakia. However, the lack of explanation of the intellectual origins of the political forces that shaped Central Europe in much of the twentieth century makes the otherwise lucid and interesting analysis of nationalism, clericism, and fascism somewhat incoherent.

In discussing events surrounding World War II, Janos gives one of the most coherent and substantive descriptions of the complex relationship of the conservative corporatist regimes of Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Croatia with Nazi Germany. A clear and detailed picture is presented of how the various axis regimes attempted to pursue their national interests within the “New European Order” without being fully dragged into the Nazi agenda, particularly after the German reversal at the battle of Stalingrad. In his discussion of the relationships between Germany and its allies, Janos gives a vivid account of the economic exploitation of the various axis powers by Nazi Germany, with Romania alone being able to avoid economic exploitation by the Reich. While Janos’s point that the agenda of Hitler’s Central European allies was far from identical to that of Berlin, the discussion of the collaboration of the regimes in the implementation of the “Final Solution” is puzzling at times. The Tiso regime is presented as one that is fighting rear-guard action to slow and possibly prevent the deportation of the Jews from Slovakia; however, there is no attempt to reconcile the fact that Slovakia was willing to pay to the Reich RM500 per person in “removal fees” for Slovakia’s Jews. Furthermore, most historians do accept Raul Hilberg’s typology, which claims that before the Final Solution could be implemented, a prolonged isolation and the dehumanization of the Jews had to take place. Given the various strategies, such as the “Numerous Clauses” pursued by Miklos Horthy in Hungary and the economic war against the Jews declared by Poland’s ruling “Sanacja,” a strong case can be made that much of the preparatory work for the Final Solution was carried out by the Central European regimes long before they fell into the orbit of Nazi Germany. Another puzzling statement in the book concerning World War II is the notion that Stalin did not grasp the importance of nuclear weapons (p. 330). While it is true that, when told by President Truman at the Potsdam Conference that the United States had managed to detonate a nuclear bomb, Stalin appeared to be oblivious, given the fact that the USSR had its “Manhattan Project,” presided over by Lavrentii Beria, as early as 1942 and given the intense Soviet spying on the Manhattan Project, there is

empirical evidence that Stalin grasped the importance of the nuclear age early.

The last third of the book is devoted to the dynamics of communization and the collapse of communism in the late 1980s. Janos gives one of the most lucid analyses and descriptions of the progressive decay of the Soviet imperial system and the rise of the corrupt rent-seeking elite in Brezhnev’s USSR and other countries of the socialist bloc. The last chapters present an excellent discussion of the dynamics of communist disintegration and a wealth of economic as well as sociological data, giving the reader a clear three-dimensional picture of the late communism and early postcommunist period.

The book concludes with a poignant and elegiac discussion of the emerging relationship between the East Central European “periphery” and the new “Center” in the guise of the patronizing European Union. This thoughtful conclusion is powerfully argued and should be read by all those who are interested in the “New Europe” and the particularly painful transition inflicted on the people of the periphery—once again, in the name of a “brilliant future.”

Despite the reservations noted above, which any book of this length and intellectual depth is bound to provoke, I believe that this book is an important scholarly achievement that will be of scholarly interest for a long time to come.

Election Studies: What’s Their Use. Edited by Elihu Katz and Yael Warshel. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001. 285p. \$36.00 paper.

Mark N. Franklin, *Trinity College Connecticut*

In 1999, Kathleen Hall Jamieson of the Annenberg School for Communications, University of Pennsylvania, was awarded a large grant to fund a survey-based study of the 2000 presidential election. In anticipation of that study, and to help in its design, a colloquium was held in the Fall of 1999, titled “What’s a Good Election Study, and What Are Election Studies Good for?” The chapters contained in *Election Studies: What’s Their Use?* are the product of that colloquium.

The title of the volume is provocative, but the contents are much less so. Though many of the chapters contain suggestions for ways in which election studies could be improved, all of them are addressed first and foremost to describing (and sometimes defending) existing procedures and past findings. Readers looking for a thoroughgoing critique of election studies in general and American election studies in particular will have to look elsewhere.

But the fact that *Election Studies: What’s Their Use?* does not live up to its title is not to say that it is a bad book. Rather, the reverse: This is a useful compendium of information about election studies that, though eclectic and somewhat haphazard, would be hard to come by in any other single publication. It is well written and engaging, and even someone who is steeped in the literature of election studies will find much that is interesting and useful in every chapter.

After an editors’ introduction that explains how the book came to be written, there are two chapters (by William McGuire and Larry Bartels) that focus on voting research in the United States. Though the first purports to be an assessment of past achievements and the second an agenda for future research, both are concerned mainly with summarizing (from different and complementary viewpoints) the major achievements of the American National Election Studies (ANES) since they were founded in 1948, and both contain a number of suggestions for directions in which future research might move. My problem with both chapters (as with most of the chapters in this book) is that they are

highly personal and idiosyncratic to the interests of each author. These are well-regarded scholars, and their viewpoints are certainly worthy of study, but there is no pretense of covering all aspects of ANES's achievements, and at the end of these two chapters one wonders what has been left out.

There follow four chapters (by Juan Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, and Richard Johnson) that might have been placed together as being "election studies from around the world," since they focus on Spain, Israel, Canada, and (Lipset's excellent contribution) the early history of voting research in the United States. In these chapters we learn about some of the concerns that have guided election studies other than the ANES, though the choice of which election studies to include in this section is not just idiosyncratic but arcane. The topics covered, with the exception of the Canadian chapter, which describes cutting-edge methods for studying election campaigns, do not include any that currently take center stage in major journals, and though several of the approaches discussed in these chapters could fruitfully be incorporated into American election studies, there is no reason given for focusing on these particular approaches at the expense of others. In particular, the failure to include any mention of Dutch election studies, which have been at the forefront of multiple innovations over the past 30 years, is incomprehensible.

The book closes with three chapters on rather more specific topics. Actually, the Canadian chapter might as well be included in this set, making four such chapters: campaign research (by Richard Johnson), issue voting (by Merrill Shanks), communications research (by Jay Blumler and Denis McQuail), and news management (by John Zaller). Of these, the last is a characteristically outstanding piece of original research that should probably have appeared in a professional journal; the others are largely surveys of what has been done, in the same vein as the book's earlier chapters.

These final four chapters are directed, more than any of the others, at making suggestions for innovations that might be incorporated in future election studies (particularly in future ANESs). However, again the reader is left with the questions, Why these topics? and What other topics might have been addressed?—questions which provide the leitmotif of my concerns about this volume.

Let me briefly address those two questions by summarizing three linked concerns: (1) the endogeneity problem that arises when dependent and independent variables are derived from interviews with the same people; (2) sampling problems in most election studies that make it hard for us to measure effects of the magnitude that often determine election outcomes in real life; and (3) the difficulty of fitting into any one survey all the questions that would need to be asked if all the research topics of interest to the academic community were to be addressed. These three concerns are linked in that a single solution can be imagined that addresses all three of them, but not one of these three concerns is specifically addressed in any of the chapters in the volume under review. (For those interested in research that does address these questions, see the special issue of *Electoral Studies* [21:1, 2002] edited by Mark Franklin and Christopher Wlezien.)

Overall, this is a volume that is well worth reading for the surveys it provides (which hardly overlap) and the ideas it contains. One ends the book with a fine appreciation for what survey research (particularly American survey research) has achieved in 50 years of studying electoral behavior. The fact that one does not learn much about the emerging crisis in electoral research would have been a fairly minor omission had the book's title not led one to expect some attention to that topic.

The Red-Green Coalition in Germany: Politics, Personalities and Power. By Charles Lees. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2001. 157p. \$69.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

M. Donald Hancock, *Vanderbilt University*

Charles Lees has produced a succinct yet compelling assessment of the Greens' "long march to power" in Germany through a succession of state governments to the Social Democratic-Green national coalition formed following the 1998 Bundestag election. His account is conceptually sound and (apart from several omissions) highly informative. It provides useful insights into the dynamics of SPD-Green politics that will interest German specialists and comparativists alike.

Lees's book is divided into nine chapters, including an introduction and a brief conclusion. He bases his narrative explication of the decisions by the SPD and Greens to share power on the state and national levels of government in Germany—as well as their record in office—on a coalition theory model of party politics. To this end, Lees begins with a nuanced review of coalition theory as initially formulated by Anthony Downs, William Riker, and William Gamson. Echoing criticism by Eric Browne and others that these early formulations lacked sufficient predictive power, Lees builds on arguments by Robert Axelrod, Abram de Swaan, and Kenneth Shepsle to construct his own model of coalition formation and maintenance. His empirical focus is on SPD-Green coalitions, but conceptually his formulation has heuristic value with respect to governing coalitions in general. Lees's "ideal type" of a Red-Green model embraces a selective emphasis on ideological affinities and policy-related priorities among parties, a leadership preference for minimal connected winning coalitions as a means to facilitate cabinet stability, and multiple institutional dimensions that include the distribution of ministerial portfolios and varying degrees of expertise among administrative officials serving each of the coalition partners.

Lees proceeds to a brief account of the origins of the SPD and the Greens, noting the persistence of ideological divisions within both parties and recounting the Greens's transition during the 1980s and 1990s from a grass-roots "antiparty party" into a mainstream party affirming basic tenets of postwar Germany's prevailing democratic and social market consensus. He then briefly describes the succession of SPD-Green coalitions formed since 1982, beginning with a short-lived cabinet in Hamburg and continuing through subsequent coalitions in Hesse, Lower Saxony, West Berlin, and ultimately the Federal Republic.

Lees utilizes the experience of the SPD-Green coalitions in West Berlin (1989) and Lower Saxony (1990–94) as chapter-length case studies to test his model of coalition formation and performance. Characterized from their appearance on the German political scene by a deep cleavage between fundamentalist (*fundo*) and pragmatic (*realo*) ideological factions within the party, the Greens managed to join the SPD in both state governments only because adherents of the latter faction managed to find common ground with the Social Democrats on a selective range of policy orientations. Among them were a shared concern with environmental and gender issues. Persisting tension between the *fundo* and the *realo* wings, however, complicated governance for both the Greens and the Social Democrats. Contributing to the Greens's frustration in office was their limited allocation of cabinet seats in comparison with the larger SPD and their difficulty in staffing "their" ministries with party loyalists sufficiently versed in administrative politics. Both coalitions thus unraveled—quickly in West Berlin because of a rapid escalation of policy conflicts, at the end of a four-year interval in Lower Saxony when the

SPD won a majority in the 1994 state election and could therefore dispense with Green support.

The larger, more populous state of Hesse constituted a more successful model of SPD–Green collaboration (and deserves a chapter in its own right) in the long runup to the 1998 Bundestag election. There, the two parties governed jointly from 1985 to 1987 and again after 1991; the coalition was reelected in 1995 (a first for the Greens). A key explanation for the party's success lies in the political competence of Joshka Fischer, their regional leader and Germany's first Green minister of the environment. Firmly identified with the pragmatic faction of the party, Fischer's moderation and solid achievements in office helped legitimize the Greens' claim to national power and pave the way to the formation of an all-German coalition government in 1998.

Lees's account of Fischer's rise to national preeminence prior to his appointment as foreign minister underscores a key subtext of his book, namely, the importance of personality in politics (which cannot be easily factored into a formal model of coalition formation). He provides an even more probing analysis of Gerhard Schröder, who began his own political ascent as leader of the SPD in Lower Saxony. Lees astutely dissects Schröder's attributes as a populist pragmatist with probusiness sympathies, his record (in both Lower Saxony and Berlin) as a tough negotiator, and his ideological embrace of a "new center" in German politics reminiscent of electoral politics pursued by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. Lees is equally observant in his assessment of Schröder's principal rival within the SPD, Oskar LaFontaine, former minister-president of the Saarland who served as minister of finance in the SPD–Green coalition until his dramatic resignation in March 1999. Their conflict, Lees correctly contends, epitomizes the SPD's own internal cleavage between neoliberal and Keynesian factions. Lees is less charitable about the depth of Schröder's ideological convictions, contending that the chancellor's triumph over LaFontaine and his turnaround in public esteem after a desultory first year in office are products more of *Fortuna* than shrewd political behavior.

Lees's well-informed and thoughtful analysis would have been strengthened if he had broadened the scope of his inquiry to include an account of the East German Greens and a more detailed treatment of the effects of German unification on party politics. He makes only a passing reference to the former when he notes resistance on the part of many West German Greens to a merger of the two parties and restricts his discussion of unification primarily to its immediate impact on the short-lived SPD–Green coalition of 1989 in West Berlin.

The continuing fluidity of German politics as the nation struggles to define a new international role for itself while managing complex domestic economic and social issues poses serious risks for the Greens as they compete for electoral survival between the more moderate Social Democrats and the more radical Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). A companion volume to Lees's study might well focus on the conditions and prospects of conceivable SPD–PDS coalitions on at least the regional level of German politics.

Mexico: The Struggle for Democratic Development. Daniel C. Levy and Kathleen Bruhn, with Emilio Zebadúa. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. 362p. \$48.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Roderic Ai Camp, *Claremont McKenna College*

Daniel Levy and Kathleen Bruhn, leading Mexicanists, use their scholarly expertise to provide a welcome addition to the literature on contemporary Mexican politics. This work is a lucid, well-integrated interpretation of Mexico's recent

transformation economically and politically. It benefits from the past research of both authors and from the insights of their Mexican colleague. The book's primary focus, as they argue in the introductory chapter, is the fundamental role of democracy in altering Mexico's developmental path and political discourse.

They argue that instead of Mexico shifting from an authoritarian to a democratic model in July, 2000, in the aftermath of Vicente Fox's election, it moved from a "semidemocracy," in the last two decades, to a democracy. The authors do not suggest that Mexico is a complete democracy, however, only that when using three common measures of democracy, these measures, including basic citizen rights, remain fragile and incomplete. One of the important underlying themes they explore is the relationship between a stable and an undemocratic political system. They correctly suggest that Mexican failures socially are numerous and that most Mexicans, despite certain macroeconomic benefits associated with North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have failed to improve their personal economic situation. In fact, they conclude that Mexico gained more jobs than the United States as a result of the free trade agreement. Nevertheless, they emphasize the irony of this severe economic gap occurring simultaneously with political liberalization, noting that the poorest Mexicans have been decisively excluded from the decision making process.

The other major theme they introduce, and revert to throughout the work, is the United States' changing role in Mexico and its bilateral relationship with Mexico. In their specific chapter on "Mexico in a U.S.-Led World," they analyze three important issues on the bilateral agenda in considerable detail: NAFTA, drugs, and migration. They argue that, generally speaking, international influences appear to be having a net positive impact on democracy.

The authors provide a foundation for analyzing political changes in the last decade, laying out important legacies of postrevolutionary development, the most significant of which are the lack of democracy and social/economic inequality. They provide an accurate and helpful interpretation of the rise of political competition, and they identify and give appropriate attention to newly active institutions under the rubric of organizational freedom. The Catholic Church deserves somewhat more attention in relation to its impact on the changing electoral process, as distinct from its recent, critical voice as a political actor, which they develop insightfully.

One of the strengths throughout this book is that it creates a careful structure for analysis by outlining and identifying, through chapter headings and imaginative subtitles, the fundamental issues that have molded the recent democratic process. The coherency of their overall arguments is linked strongly together throughout all of the chapters. Despite Mexican achievements to date, the authors see two major obstacles to a functioning democracy. First, it still must confront profound social inequalities (half of Mexico's population can be classified as poor). Second, the consolidation of democracy relies on institutions that have not yet developed democratic roots as deep as those that sustained authoritarianism for seven decades.

Any reader hoping to understand political developments in Mexico through 2000 will find this book invaluable. The authors were able to incorporate Fox's electoral victory into the text, given the publication date, but unfortunately they did not have an opportunity to analyze his surprise win at the polls or the consequences of PRI's defeat and the installation of a new administration. Despite the major changes the National Action Party (PAN) administration now poses for Mexico, domestic and foreign, this work is a gold mine of thoughtful interpretations of the Mexican experience, placed effectively

within the larger setting of the democratic transformation literature.

Market and Community: The Basis of Social Order, Revolution, and Relegitimation. By Mark I. Lichbach and Adam B. Seligman. University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2000. 177p. \$35.00 cloth, \$14.95 paper.

Mark Blyth, *Johns Hopkins University*

Market and Community is both more than the sum of its parts and less than what it promises. The book is more than the sum of its parts since it is a more a sequence of independent thoughtful essays than a unitary thesis. It is, however, less than what it promises because the links between the analytic and the empirical chapters are less than perfectly specified.

Market and Community revisits Brian Barry's distinction between economic and sociological understandings of order. The authors argue that, for rationalists, order is traditionally seen as a function of individual choices and unintended consequences that generate invisible hand pressures for spontaneous order. Meanwhile, for culturalists, order cannot be generated from such methodologically individualist premises and is instead seen as a property, not of markets, but of community. Such a division is a well-established one, and here the conversation usually ends. To the authors' credit, this is where they begin.

The core of the book is the second chapter, "Analytic Approaches to Social Order." Beginning with an excellent discussion of why different explanations of order ultimately rest upon very different conceptions of the "self," the authors develop a typology of alternative solutions to the problem of order along two dimensions; deliberation (Is order planned or unplanned?) and ontology (Is such an order spontaneous or contingent?) Mapping this out, four solutions to the problem of order present themselves: market, community, contract, and hierarchy. The key contribution of this chapter is to show why each of these solutions fails to explain order adequately. Market solutions fail since they presuppose the society they seek to explain; community solutions fail since common values rest upon prior exchanges and contracts; contract approaches fail since they rest at base on prior notions of what is legitimate—a community property; while hierarchy fails for the simple reason that force alone never works. This chapter is an excellent theoretical primer and *tour de force* on the limits of different social theories.

Yet after this impressive beginning the book becomes less than what it promises, for the next two chapters sit rather oddly with the foregoing discussion. Ostensibly, chapters 3 and 4 attempt to locate these insights in the study of revolution and regime building. However, here the authors fall short. While chapter 3 provides an excellent summary of the main theories of revolution and a critical exegesis of their shortcomings—a chapter that is sure to become a comp exam review classic—the point of doing so remains opaque. Having already specified why partial theories logically cannot provide sufficient explanations in the previous chapter, showing why everyone from Charles Tilly to Jock A. Goldstone indeed makes such errors adds little to the analysis, unless one is going to provide an alternative, which the authors do not do. Instead they provide a theory of postrevolutionary regime consolidation, which is something rather different from a theory of revolution. Given this, one cannot help but ask exactly how this is related to the previous chapters or even if this is a fair criticism of other theories of revolution. For example, does a theory of the origins of empires have to account for their dissolution too? Nonetheless, chapter 4 provides us with a very interesting theory of how postrevolutionary stability

is created. Postrevolutionary stability is explained utilizing a metaphor of entering, negotiating in, and exiting a "room." In this room, if elite expectations are congruent, resources are fungible, and if the bargains struck can be maintained, then a liberal type polity results. If not, an authoritarian reaction develops. These propositions, and the subsequent brief case studies, fail to satisfy on two levels. First, how this approach obviates the problems discussed in chapter 2 is unclear. It is unclear if the authors are attempting to transcend the four perspectives analyzed previously or are simply rehashing them. Second, some of the explanatory variables seem more descriptive than analytic. To take one example, the authors argue that to get into the "room" one must have "a statistically normal distribution of elite opinion" (p. 100). Moreover, size matters. The more "moderates" there are, the more agreement there will be. But this raises the question, Isn't a statistically normal distribution of elite opinion (where most people are moderate) precisely a description of a nonrevolutionary situation? If so, is this an explanation of how one constructs order, or a description of order?

While the empirics of the book fail to satisfy completely, its analytic strength comes roaring back in chapter 5. This chapter takes the form of a dialogue between the authors that ranges across issues of identity, preference falsification, reductionism, practice versus choice, the historicity of markets and self-interest, and a host of other topics. The dialogue is a joy to read and the passion of the authors shines through. If one ever wants a piece that explains to students what is at stake in the debates over rational choice theory and its alternatives, I can think of nothing better. However, the placement of the dialogue, coming as it does it at the end of the volume, adds to the sense of disconnect from the middle chapters and, thus, strengthens the sense of *Market and Community* being less a single argument and more two different conversations.

In fact, it is a shame that the dialogue ends the book rather than begins it. It would be a wonderful setup chapter for why market, community, contract, and hierarchy solutions are seen as alternatives and, indeed, what is at stake, or better, what is missing, in each of these perspectives. This would make the second chapter even more powerful and perhaps support the sections on revolution and relegitimation a bit better. *Market and Community* pushes the "rationalist" versus "culturalist" debate beyond the usual long-range oratorical bombardment and into truly fertile ground. And while it fails to satisfy completely as a theory of revolution and relegitimation, as an analytic discussion of order, it is superb.

The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century. Edited by David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. 282p. \$68.50 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Social Movements in Politics: A Comparative Study. By Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh. London: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997. 288p. \$32.00

Jillian Schwedler, *University of Maryland*

What does protest means in industrial societies? To answer this question, David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow bring together political scientists and sociologists from Europe and the United States to build on comparative insights. The 17 contributors include some of the most prominent voices in the study of contentious politics as well as a few new ones. Some chapters are organized around case studies (Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier on the African National Congress; Rucht on protest in Germany; and McCarthy and McPhail on protest in the United States), while others compare across cases (Crozat on Western democracies; Della Porta, Fillieule,

and Reiter on policing in France and Italy; Kubik on Central Europe; Hipsher on Latin America). The editors' introduction and the final two chapters (Katzenstein on feminist movements; Keck and Sikkink on transnational advocacy networks) advance cross-regional comparisons.

The editors advance three claims: (1) Protest is a more routine part of life in industrialized societies, (2) more protests address more diverse constituencies, and (3) professionalization of movements has led to a fundamental change in the character of protest in industrialized societies. They argue that new repertoires of contention have emerged, ranging from spontaneous protests by students and laborers advocating greater social justice and economic equality to carefully planned demonstrations led by party leaders and wealthy industrialists and supported by middleclass actors (pp. 1–4). Tactics have also spread geographically, within nations as well as cross-nationally and into transnational spheres.

Many of the contributors agree that protest has become institutionalized and professionalized, but with some interesting twists. In Kubik's study of four cases from Central Europe, she argues that the institutionalization of protest has not resulted in a shift from direct collective action (e.g., protests, strikes) to strategies of lower mobilization and less disruption (e.g., petitions); rather, direct action has itself been institutionalized (p. 148). In his study of Germany, Rucht argues that professionalization has not resulted in deradicalization. While it is true that "demands for fundamental social and political change" were largely absent from protest movements by the 1980s (p. 49), the *proportion* of illegal and violent protests actually increased. Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier reach similar conclusions. South Africa's political transition has brought decreased overall levels of political engagement, including within political parties, but this has not meant a "demovementization" of society (p. 191). For those who remain engaged, the level of participation is likely to be much higher.

Katzenstein presents a comparison of feminist activism within the military and the Church. She critiques conceptions of institutionalization that suggest a cessation of fundamental challenges to the system. Instead, the character of institutional location (habitat) may structure the form that protest takes, but it does not necessarily deflate its potential to bring about significant change. Hipsher also focuses attention on context. In Chile and Brazil, more disruptive and contentious forms of protest gave way as movements began to work almost entirely within state structures to achieve their goals (p. 168). In Chile, however, the institutionalization of dissent has resulted in more exclusionary politics; Brazil has seen the incorporation of movements within the system. This conclusion illustrates that the institutionalization of protest is fundamentally linked to state responses.

Two chapters focus explicitly on the changing role of the state, particularly the evolving policing practices. Della Porta, Fillieule, and Reiter argue that in France and Italy, police management of protest events has indeed changed over the past decades, from practices of intimidation to "minimalistic bargaining" with protestors (p. 125). As McCarthy and McPhail illustrate in their study of protest in the United States, the police tolerate minor violations of the law, and often even cooperate and coordinate with protestors to ensure "successful" events for all involved. Not only has the social organization of protest evolved into institutionalized forms over the past decades (p. 100), but so has policing of protests, from "escalated force" to "negotiated management" (p. 96).

This volume makes an important contribution to our understanding of contentious politics in industrialized societies and offers some counterintuitive conclusions. For the most part, the contributors agree that protest in industrialized societies has indeed become largely institutionalized but not tamed.

Rather, societies appear to be more accustomed to protest, and many states work hard to ensure the rights of citizens to express their diverse views. However, Crozat provides an important check on the enthusiasm such conclusions might evoke. Routinization of protest activities in everyday life, he argues, has not produced a corresponding change in public attitudes toward protest. In fact, tolerance of protest activities has perhaps decreased, rather than increased (p. 60).

What are the implications of these developments for civil society globally? Della Porta, Fillieule, and Reiter's conclusions suggest that policing trends strengthen civil society, particularly as antagonistic relationships, even between protestors and police, are framed as engagements *among* citizens (p. 128). Kubik's study cautions that institutionalization may not mean a strengthening of civil society if the latter is defined by the primary resort to democratic means to address political grievances. Yet if protest itself is considered part of civil society, then the institutionalization of protest is a positive force. Hipsher's conclusions imply that institutionalization of social movements can have contrary effects on civil society: If movements are institutionalized into only forms such as political parties, the outcome is less democratic than if a wide range of movements and tactics are institutionalized. And as Keck and Sikkink's study suggests, transnational social movement networks are already changing the shape of global civil society.

In another recent work on contentious politics, Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh provides a fascinating comparative study of three social movements in very different contexts: the West German Greens (an electoral party movement), Poland's Solidarity (a movement that emerged under an authoritarian system), and Peru's Shining Path (a movement that emerged in a nonurban and nonindustrial context). The author states that the book is intended both as a primer on the current state of social movement theory and as a comparative study aimed at advancing a new theory. It is only partially successful on both counts, but the comparative study provides much rich ground that clearly merits serious attention.

In the first section, Zirakzadeh characterizes what he sees as three generations of social movement theory over the past century: Social movements have been theorized as (1) responses to modernization, (2) responses to structural inequalities, and (3) products of identity struggles. The second section (actually three parts) examines each of the cases in light of these three generations of social movement theorists. The final section highlights the comparative findings, assesses the weakness of existing theoretical approaches for making sense of these cases, and argues for a fourth generation of theorizing. This new approach would "focus on (1) the plural viewpoints, interests, and ambitions that exist within any movement; (2) the conflicts over goals, priorities, and activities that naturally arise from members' different interests and aims; and (3) the methods that leaders use to reduce friction among activists and to promote agreement and unity" (p. 239).

Zirakzadeh overstates the originality of this approach, and he seems to suggest that only scholars of "identity-formation theory" have systematically attended to the importance of cultural factors. As much earlier work (e.g., Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, *International Social Movement Research*, Vol. 1, 1988; Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*, 1994; Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Meyer Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 1996) illustrates, the trend among social movement theorists since at least the early 1990s has been to *combine* the insights of political opportunity structures and resource mobilization with the study of cultural factors, not only identity but also

ideology, beliefs, dominant narratives, discourse, and framing processes. Few, if any, argue that any of these earlier “generations” of theorizing alone provide a sufficient explanatory model, though they may focus attention on different explanatory factors.

However, the strength of Zirakzadeh’s analysis is in stressing the need to pay close attention to the internal dynamics of social movements ranging from militants to political parties and across diverse contexts. Particularly valuable is his detailed examination of ideological debates within each party. Without attention to internal party politics, one would not recognize the extent to which debates over ideological orientation structure the behavior of these diverse movements. One would have liked to see more of the book focus on the details of his proposed “fourth generation” theory, which is implicitly developed in the case studies but formally stated only in the last 2.5 pages of the book. Nevertheless, this study is an important contribution to the growing and extremely important body of scholarship that compares social movements in very different contexts (e.g., Gay Seidman, *Manufacturing Militance: Workers’ Movements in Brazil and South Africa*, 1994; Elisabeth Wood, *Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador*, 2000; Misagh Parsa, *States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines*, 2001).

Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America. Edited by Kevin J. Middlebrook. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. 408p. \$59.95 cloth, \$21.00 paper.

Nancy R. Powers, *Florida State University*

Given the Right’s historic record of undermining democracy in Latin America, Kevin Middlebrook organized a conference in 1996 to examine its adjustment to the democratic rules of the posttransitions, post-Cold War era. This work began in that conference and is part of the editor’s larger research program.

Middlebrook begins with an extended introduction to the research problem and the contributors’ findings. Case studies by prominent country specialists follow, encompassing Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru, and Venezuela. The editor’s conclusion identifies questions for future research, followed by a marvelous appendix.

Edited volumes are notoriously tricky. This one’s occasional flaws are outweighed by its many contributions. One strength is the consistent structure across the chapters, each of which gives an historically grounded account of the Right’s place vis-à-vis the larger party and political systems.

In content, the chapters are largely unified by a focus on how socioeconomic elites accommodate themselves to democracy. (The major exception is the Brazil chapter, added after the initial conference.) Middlebrook’s underlying premise, drawing from Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber, and John Stephens’ work (*Capitalist Development and Democracy*, 1992) and also consistent with Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (*Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, 1986), is that democratic survival requires competitive conservative parties or other means within the party system, so that elites feel able to protect their class interests (cf. pp. 5 and 110). Scott Mainwaring, Rachel Meneguello, and Timothy Power argue that the Brazilian case only partially supports the premise (see pp. 217–19). Atilio Borón, Michael Coppedge, and John Dugas each argue that the Right has not necessarily needed its own party to protect itself in

Argentina, Venezuela, or Colombia, respectively. In Argentina, the Right has counted on the military and other proxies. In Venezuela and Colombia, the Right protected its interests via clientelistic relationships with centrist party politicians—although in both cases, the decline of those centrist parties threatens the Right’s continuing capacity to protect itself without its own party. Middlebrook concludes that while post-Cold War conditions may help the Right feel less vulnerable than in the past, nevertheless, a viable party would be the best means to its long-term sense of security under democratic rules. At the same time, he acknowledges the concerns of several contributors that the quality of that democracy may suffer when elites are electorally strong and able to use the democratic process to restrict civil liberties or social policy reforms (see pp. 286–88).

A key finding in the work is the variation, across both time and region, in the ways in which and degrees to which socioeconomic elites access power. Manuel Antonio Garretón argues that backward-looking extremists attached to the *pinochetista* past pull Chile’s two Rightist parties outside the mainstream. This makes them a “permanent electoral minority,” poorly able to represent elites’ interests (although oddly, his last paragraph calls into question the permanency of this minority status [pp. 72–79]). Elisabeth Wood explains how most Salvadoran elites came to be forward looking—discovering democracy as a feasible means to defend their new interests in the post-civil war economy, via the successful ARENA party.

In Peru, the Peruvian transnational business sector managed to convince former President Fujimori to enact their economic policy priorities, but Catherine Conaghan says that they then found themselves discombobulated by Fujimori’s popularity and locked out of decisions by his authoritarianism. Argentine business elites likewise used an electorally popular agent, Carlos Menem, to enact their economic program. Atilio Borón, however, sees them as contentedly ruling from behind the scenes, without need for a political party, thanks to their capacity to pressure the state and to control key institutions of civil society.

Michael Coppedge argues (controversially) that Venezuela had no conservative party, but he shows how voters became alienated by the factionalism, clientelism, and economic failures of the long-established centrist parties. Those parties virtually disappeared, supplanted by Hugo Chavez’s populism, and leaving elites with neither informal nor formal representation. For similar reasons, but less severely, Colombia’s traditionally strong Conservative and Liberal parties are losing electoral support. John Dugas argues that the National Front system they created to share their power and defend the elite economic interests has resulted in a self-preserving political class deaf to the interests and alienation of the popular sectors.

While largely unified in focus, the chapters are not unified on the meaning of the title concept, “conservative parties.” Inconsistent terminology is problematic for readers who believed Middlebrook’s introductory statement that “conservative parties are defined here as parties whose core constituencies are upper social and economic strata but that mobilize multiclass electoral support in a common political project” (p. 3). Readers eventually discover (e.g., in Coppedge’s chapter, footnote 18) that “here” does not refer to the entire book. Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power are, at least, explicit. They reject the core constituency definition, because the parties that Brazilians perceive as advocating conservative positions often draw disproportionate support from lower-class voters, not elite strata (pp. 165–67).

This conceptual pluralism not only is confusing, but also impedes the kind of cross-regional theorizing that Middlebrook

attempts in the first chapter. How can we draw conclusions about the formation of conservative parties from case studies that did not define those parties in a consistent way?

Middlebrook's focus on elite core constituencies comes from an innovation proposed by Edward Gibson (*Class and Conservative Parties*, 1996). The innovation in focus is a good one—elites protecting their economic and social interests, not conservative norms per se, were the key threat to Latin America's liberal democracies in the last century, making a compelling case for research on those elites' "accommodation" to democracy. Yet calling elites "conservatives" is a serious semantic problem, because it flies in the face of conventional usage. Even the editor does not use "conservative" solely to indicate the party's core of support. For example, both liberal and conservative parties in the nineteenth century were dependent upon and protective of socioeconomic elites. What made one "conservative" was its alliance with the Catholic Church on moral issues and church prerogatives. As I read Middlebrook's introduction, their ideological and programmatic positions, not their core constituency, distinguished them as "conservative."

This is a nuanced and sophisticated book. While it repays a close reading, it also requires one, particularly chapters 1, 2, 5, and 6. Readers not well versed in the parties literature may be frustrated, as key points are easily missed amid jargon, detail, and sometimes rather nonlinear argumentation.

This book does not yet build a theory of the Right under democracy but, rather, seeks to identify the essential empirical and conceptual elements of such a theory. All of the chapters are insightful in their own ways, some drawing more heavily on their author's previous work than others. Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power's unusually long piece is a tour-de-force on the Brazilian Right, including substantial new statistical analyses of its social bases.

This should be an essential reference for any scholar or graduate student studying party systems, conservatism, economic elites, or democratization in Latin America. The statistical appendix alone (pp. 293–328) is an asset. Prepared by Eric Magar and Kevin Middlebrook, the 19 tables provide hard-to-find election results for every national-level democratic election of the 1980s and 1990s in the seven countries, including very minor parties and identifying which are conservative (using Coppedge's definition).

Coalition Governments in Western Europe. Edited by Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 602p. \$90.00.

Christopher S. Allen, *University of Georgia*

This comprehensive volume analyzing Western European government coalitions from 1945 until 1999 is an impressive and meticulously researched work. Using a uniform, cross-national collection of data the authors examine both the governing institutions and the patterns of conflict resolution in the 13 Western European democracies that have experienced coalition government during the post-World War two years.

In a series of standardized tables that the editors established for the contributors, this volume provides clear comparable data on electoral performance, cabinet formation membership, and termination of these countries governing coalition's for the last half-century. In addition to this extremely valuable data, the contributors also placed their empirical findings within an analytical framework that recognizes the significance of political institutions and their role in both enhancing and constraining the performance of governing coalitions.

The editors began this study with the observation that 13 of the 16 major parliamentary governments in Western Europe have relied upon coalitions to govern their societies for anywhere from 20% to 100% of the post World War II period. Thus, any systematic comparison of developed democracies requires a comprehensive understanding of coalition performance.

The two primary goals of the volume are, first, to alleviate the 10-year absence of comparable data on coalition politics since the last wave of similar studies was completed over a decade ago and, second, to make a theoretical contribution to the study of coalition bargaining and politics in the tradition of game theoretical and rational choice methodologies. The editors specifically state that, while they will be happy to fulfill the first objective, their major ambition is to accomplish the second.

Unfortunately from the editors' perspective, they are much more successful with the former than the latter. The editors state in their introduction that the book is based on general and fundamental notions about the politics of coalition, namely, that it is (1) strategic, (2) manifested as a game between political parties, (3) institutionally conditioned, and (4) governed by anticipation. With such a goal, a reader might have assumed that the editors would position their work to evaluate political parties—the building blocks of coalitions—within an explicitly rational choice perspective. Yet rather than examine the individual motivations of cabinet members, provide a horizontal evaluation of intraparty politics, or use a hierarchical model in which followers impose constraints on their leaders, the editors opt for the more traditional, non-rational choice approach of treating parties as unitary collective actors (pp. 6–7). They state that explicit rational actor models would prove "daunting" due to the "complexity" of the exercise, making theoretical analysis "intractable."

Ultimately, they conclude that "empirical knowledge of the real work of cabinet politics firmly suggests that party unity is so much more the rule, rather than the exception" (p. 7). Thus they assume that "leaders of a political party may have a collective interest in cohesive behaviour vis-a-vis other parties." Why is this surprising? Isn't this what parties do? More specifically, why raise rational choice theoretical expectations that will be addressed only in "future studies"? If a rational choice perspective has something compelling to offer the study of coalition politics, why not offer it here?

These theoretical shortcomings notwithstanding, this volume is a superb reference work that scholars of developed democracies will cite for years. In their concluding chapter, the editors report several significant findings for understanding governance in parliamentary democracies. Among these are

- that coalitions account for 69% of the cabinets among the countries studied in the postwar period;
- that minority governments represent 37% of the cabinets and that the median legislator thesis—a common component of rational choice findings in similar, but more limited, studies—does not prove robust in this one, since coalition politics is not always unidimensional;
- that minority governments have been less likely to include the median position than majority ones and that the formation of coalitions—and the formation process leading to them—is often as important as the final results;
- that the formation attempts can be grouped in three categories—ones in which elections largely decide coalitions (Portugal, Germany, Sweden, Ireland, Norway, France), ones in which coalitions are made after elections but with expectations about the likely outcome (Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark), and ones in which the

postelection negotiation process among parties with a wide range of choices is significant (Belgium, Finland, The Netherlands); and

- that the dissolution of cabinets can take both technical and discretionary forms—the former representing 39% and the latter 61%—and the differences are cross-nationally significant, with Ireland, Belgium, and—of course—Italy having more than 75% of the latter.

While all of the individual country chapters are expertly done, with rich attention to detail in developing comparable data, several stand out for their analysis of counterintuitive phenomena. Thomas Saalfeld's chapter on Germany tells the story of a party system with a healthy dynamic tension; one that has produced stable governing coalitions that only alternate power after several successful terms in office. At the same time, new parties have attained representation and—in the case of the Greens—participated in coalition formation that few would have predicted when the party made its entrance into the Bundestag 15 years earlier. Also insightful is Hanne Marthe Narud's and Kaare Strøm's chapter on Norway, a country with a "fragile constitutional order" comprised of minority governments with comparatively few coalitions. Töbörjörn Bergman also offers a compelling explanation for the stable minority Social Democratic hegemony in Sweden. Arco Timmermans and Rudy B. Anderweg examine the apparent erosion of the legendary accommodationist coalitions in The Netherlands due to both the complicated negotiations over policies (aside from the knotty question of which parties actually form the coalitions) and the difficulties in enforcing the coalition agreement. Finally, Luca Verzichelli's and Maurizio Cotta's chapter on Italy provides a well-argued treatment of the country's remarkable transition from one of "constrained coalitions" to one of (apparently) more stable alternating governments.

In short, this is an exceptional piece of empirical scholarship that could have been enhanced theoretically with either a more courageous attempt to employ rational choice methodology or, perhaps, no mention of it at all.

Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin America. By Maria Victoria Murillo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 250p. \$59.95 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Heather L. Williams, *Pomona College*

In February of 1995, following the disastrous December 1994 devaluation of the Mexican peso, which sent incomes down temporarily by as much as 60% and threw more than a million laborers out of work, the nonagenarian labor leader Fidel Velasquez issued a curious statement. He declared that each Mexican worker (earning on average at that time about six dollars a day) should pledge one day's pay toward Mexico's external debt to show solidarity with Mexico's 24 ailing billionaires, some of whom were now merely several-hundred-millionaires. In a country where jokes are often the most telling form of popular political commentary, nobody knew whether to laugh or cry at doddering Velasquez's exhortation. After all, his long record as an advocate of painful wage caps and government downsizing suggested that he actually might be serious.

Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin America lends new insight into the question of why leaders like Fidel Velasquez could be so publicly loyal to government administrations presiding over the long neoliberal rout of the working class and labor unions in Latin America during the late 1980s and 1990s. Punishing programs of mon-

etary stabilization, privatization, and trade liberalization hit working people the hardest—sending prices of basic goods skyward, eliminating some of the best blue-collar jobs, and downsizing many popular services. One paradox for political analysts is why any rational labor leader would acquiesce to policies that threatened his or her base of power and political leverage. The answer, according to Maria Victoria Murillo, lies in a multilayered theater of political games and tradeoffs in which labor leaders make choices about costs of the cooperation versus militance and consider the relative dangers of their own replacement by rival union leaders.

Murillo takes up three cases of neoliberal transition: Argentina under President Carlos Menem, Mexico under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and Venezuela under President Carlos Andres Perez. Elected in 1989, 1988, and 1989, respectively, the three Carloses presided over sweeping programs of fiscal reform, financial liberalization, and deregulation of their economies. What is particularly notable about these rapid neoliberal reforms, argues Murillo, is that all three presidents came from labor-based parties. In past decades, Argentina's Peronists, Venezuela's ADistas, and Mexico's PRIistas had been associated with protectionism, large bureaucracies, food and fuel subsidies, and ambitious programs of state-led industrialization. One might have expected the party bases of any of these presidents to dissolve from under them as they attacked the strongholds of popular support and, more importantly, the founts of patronage that kept party bosses loyal and voting urns stuffed with votes for their own. Rather than provoke widespread unrest, however, market-oriented policies in each country produced a number of responses over time, ranging from protest to cooperation. This variation in labor responses, contends Murillo, is not well explained by current models of the politics of market transition.

Taking issue with structural theories that rely on macroeconomic factors to explain labor militancy and corporatist theories that point to organizational properties of unions and peak organizations as determinants of labor quiescence or unrest, Murillo argues that the choices of labor leaders in mobilizing dissent reflect labor unions' historical weakness in Latin America's less-industrialized and weakly capitalized economies. Labor leaders who owed their careers to ties with political elites rather than vast support from rank-and-file union members faced an ugly dilemma when their patron parties betrayed their interests. Labor leaders had to choose between keeping laborers quiet and hoping that their party allies would at least mitigate some of the losses to union members during transition or flexing what muscle was left in party-based labor unions by striking or taking to the streets. The problem with the former option, cooperation, was that the government still might throw a sucker punch and leave union leaders with nothing; the problem with the latter, militance, was that resistance might well be overpowered by management or even undermined by rival unions or parties.

Murillo's work usefully expands the literature on labor and market-oriented economic transition, much of which has concentrated on single industries or single countries. A good deal has also been focused on European case studies, whose conclusions often do not model Latin American outcomes well. Murillo's research design, encompassing five industries and their labor centrals over time, is elegant and ambitious, and many of her conclusions about the importance of party and union competition in determining labor choices are quite convincing. For example, there is little question that in Mexico, where labor confederations competed against one another in key industries but operated inside a context of party monopoly, party elites could usefully play union centrals against one another, rewarding only the most pliant. In

that country, most sectors remained quiet during the most difficult years of adjustment, and Murillo's framework helps us understand why that was the case. In contrast, labor leaders in Venezuela, who operated in an increasingly partisan-competitive environment in the early 1990s, had greater fears that staying quiet during adjustment would lose them their jobs to party rivals. As a result, they were more likely to mobilize protest, even against their patrons in the ruling Democratic Action government. This helps explain the more halting nature of Venezuela's market liberalization with regard to issues important to labor.

The scholarly conversation on labor's choices in hard times having been widened with Murillo's book, much remains to be done on the subject. The original premise of this study—the paradox of labor-based parties' political durability through round after round of salvos lobbed at the working class and at union power—has fallen apart. A decade or so after the initial events Murillo examined have passed, two of the three parties discussed are out of power. The third, Argentina's Justicialists, reassumed power by default after the meltdown of the country's international credit line and the resignation of its president, Fernando de la Rúa, at the end of 2001. Mexico's PRI has been in disarray since PANista Vicente Fox triumphed in the summer 2000 elections, and the AD was left in pieces in the tumultuous new landscape of populist ex-coup leader Chavez' Fifth Republic Movement in Venezuela. What indeed explains this?

This threefold party collapse points to one problematic assumption in Murillo's study, which is that the labor leaders in question were legitimate representatives of the rank-and-file and that they acted on behalf of their union members while attempting to keep their jobs as labor bosses. In this framework, quiescence is always interpreted as a rational bet on the part of labor leaders that loyalty to the government would earn gains for their membership. This is highly questionable in any number of contexts in Latin America. Certainly in the cases I know best in Mexico, union elections are perennially rigged and union leaders enjoy lifestyles grossly out of step with their official incomes. Even more disturbing, in the fastest-growing portion of the manufacturing workforce—the partial-assembly sector—the most prevalent form of union today is the infamous “ghost union,” or false union contract registered with the labor board. This arrangement fills the coffers of national labor confederations but, in fact, serves to keep workers from actually unionizing. In these instances, it may not be as accurate to call people labor leaders so much as extortionists. Until the field of comparative political economy is able to account for relative levels of corruption and lack of democracy in the ranks of labor unions, there will be certain hypotheses about labor leaders' choices that we are unable to test.

National Minorities and Citizenship Rights in Lithuania, 1988–93. By Vesna Popovski. New York: Palgrave, 2000. 255p. \$65.00.

Mark A. Jubulis, *Gannon University*

Compared to neighboring Latvia and Estonia, there has been little attention paid to nationality issues in Lithuania, a country with fewer ethnic minorities (making up approximately 20% of the population) and a more inclusive citizenship policy than her Baltic neighbors. Also, Lithuania's main problems have concerned relations with its Polish minority, whereas Latvia and Estonia have large numbers of “Russian speakers.” This means that Russia has been less critical and has not sought to draw international attention to minority issues in Lithuania. As a result, the international community

has praised Lithuania's laws for meeting international standards and has given a “pass” to Lithuania when it comes to the treatment of its ethnic minorities. Vesna Popovski seeks to challenge this positive assessment and is motivated by a concern for the actual *implementation* of laws, as opposed to the mere letter of the law, and seeks to discover the *perceptions* that minorities have toward their state and its policies.

Popovski's analysis contains many fresh insights based on dozens of interviews and she skillfully presents a detailed portrayal of the key differences between Lithuania's ethnic minorities as well as the subtle differences *within* each minority group. Popovski's analysis therefore serves as an important warning against the trap of ethnic nominalism: the assumption that ethnic groups have monolithic identity structures and that we can know an individual's outlook simply by knowing his or her group membership. As Popovski clearly illustrates, many different perceptions and goals existed within Lithuania's Russian, Polish, and Jewish communities. Indeed, the heterogeneous character of these groups provides a key explanation for the weakness of collective action on behalf of minority interests during Lithuania's transition from communism.

Popovski's point of departure is that Lithuania's ethnic minorities were unprepared for the emergence of a Lithuanian national revival in the late 1980s and that they felt threatened by the radical nationalism of Vytautas Landsbergis, the leader of *Sajudis* (short for *Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sajudis*, or “The Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring”; the word *Sajudis* means “movement,” not “restructuring” as Popovski suggests on page 51). The various minority responses to the nationalism of *Sajudis* “... differed in accordance with their support for Lithuanian independence” (p. 79). For example, Popovski identifies one segment of the Russian minority as “Lithuanian Russians” who were integrated into Lithuanian society and supported independence, but another group of “Soviet Russians” opposed independence and supported the pro-Soviet movement called *Edinstvo* (Unity). These pro-Soviet loyalists were not the largest group of Russians, but they were the most vocal. Most of the Russians in Lithuania shared a common difficulty in perceiving themselves as minorities at all, since they considered themselves to be part of the Russian nation, which was the dominant core of the USSR.

The Polish minority has been more active in seeking to protect its rights because this group is territorially concentrated in southeastern Lithuania and many Poles have ancestral roots in this area, which was ruled by Poland from 1920 to 1939. Popovski identifies a split between urban and rural Poles and states that the main cultural concern of Poles is to receive education in their native language. A small rural segment of the Polish community sided with the pro-Soviet *Edinstvo* movement and Popovski explains that as a result of their actions, *Sajudis* leaders often referred to the entire Polish minority as “Red Poles” and did not try to win their support for Lithuanian independence (p. 115). Unfortunately, Popovski does not address the interesting question of why a common religious heritage did not create a stronger bond between Poles and Lithuanians.

Popovski sympathizes with the plight of Lithuania's minorities, who were forced to react against the nationalist policies of *Sajudis*, and she criticizes the leaders of *Sajudis*, “... who did not push for the development of a democratic culture that would include respect for the rights of national minorities” (p. 73). However, the author does not adequately explain why *Sajudis* would have adopted inclusive citizenship legislation in 1989 and 1991 if it subscribed to such an intolerant form of nationalism. Furthermore, Popovski believes that democracy represents principles of “plurality, difference and

heterogeneity" (p. 11), but she does not consider a minimum set of traits or values that citizens of a state should share in common. Most states are concerned with the loyalty of their citizens, but Popovski does not believe that the actions of pro-Soviet minorities diminished their claims for rights in Lithuania.

The book would be strengthened by placing more focus on the context of Lithuania's struggle for independence. The emotional and liberating atmosphere of Lithuania's "reawakening" period as well as the drama of the tense confrontation with Soviet troops in January of 1991 are completely absent from Popovski's account. The author makes passing reference to these events while noting the radicalization of *Sajudis*, but she offers little criticism of the attempts by Soviet forces to crush Lithuania's drive for independence. Popovski argues that the emergence of pro-Soviet sentiments among some of Lithuania's Russians and Poles was to be expected due to a justified fear of *Sajudis* as a radical nationalist organization (p. 100). However, the reader is left puzzled as to why even a small segment of the Poles in Lithuania would trust the CPSU or the pro-Soviet *Edinstvo* organization more than *Sajudis*. Even if *Sajudis* was becoming less democratic during this period, it was clear that *Edinstvo* rejected all of the democratic values that Popovski hoped to see victorious in Lithuania. A more detailed and realistic treatment of the events of January 1991 would lead Popovski to a more positive assessment of *Sajudis* as a force for democratic change.

Furthermore, Popovski explains that the Polish minority had many demands for various cultural rights that it expected to receive from the Lithuanian government, but none of these rights had been granted by the communist government of the Soviet Union. Popovski fails to explain why the emergence of Lithuanian *nationalism* was perceived to be a greater threat than communist *internationalism*, which denied basic democratic rights and emphasized the "blending" of different nationalities into a Russified "Soviet people." Popovski also interprets the electoral victory of former communists in 1992 as a victory of tolerance over "the *Sajudis* policies of conflict and differentiation" (p. 58), whereas most observers at the time interpreted it as a victory of "technocrats" who were more qualified to tackle the problems of Lithuania's economic transition. Perhaps this is one accepted belief that needs to be reassessed in light of Popovski's interviews with representatives of minorities in Lithuania.

In the end, Popovski maintains a critical position toward Lithuania's treatment of ethnic minorities and therefore casts doubt on Lithuania's democratic credentials, arguing that these rights are "the litmus test of Lithuania's orientation towards democracy" (p. 3). However, it must be pointed out that Popovski embraces a *maximalist* definition of democracy that creates extremely high expectations for a state that recently emerged from decades of communist rule. Following John Keane (*Democracy and Civil Society*, 1988), Popovski states that democracy "... represents a striving to be open-minded, uncompromisingly pluralist, cosmopolitan and historically informed" (p. 9). Therefore, post-Soviet Lithuania fails to live up to these standards because "there was less and less respect for diversity and there was a tendency towards homogeneity" (p. 159). With such high standards, however, we are left wondering whether *any* self-proclaimed nation-state can also be democratic.

Moreover, by focusing entirely on the negative aspects of nationalism and the *Sajudis* era, Popovski overlooks the positive legacy established by Landsbergis in leading a non-violent struggle for Lithuania's independence. Popovski may have reached a more positive conclusion if she had adopted

a broader comparative perspective. Although Popovski reminds us that Lithuania has unresolved nationality questions, Lithuania's protection of minority rights appears much better compared to other postcommunist states or perhaps even some West European states, and Lithuania is far more democratic today than it ever was under Soviet rule. We must remember that Vytautas Landsbergis and *Sajudis* deserve much of the credit for ushering in this new era of freedom and democracy.

Fuzzy-Set Social Science. By Charles C. Ragin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 352p. \$48.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.

Philip A. Schrodt, *University of Kansas*

The department where I did my graduate training in the early 1970s was bitterly split between advocates of case-study and statistical approaches. At the time, both sides thought the other would fade away—statistical analysis was a fad; case studies, a relic from a prescientific past. But 30 years later, both methods persist, and the debate has recently intensified in response to King, Keohane, and Verba's (1994) assertion in *Designing Social Inquiry* that the methodology of case studies could be subsumed under that used in statistical research. The polite names for the two positions have changed—"case study" versus "large *N*" is more common now than the "traditional" versus "scientific" monikers of the 1960s and 1970s; the epithets—"slow journalism" versus "mindless number crunching"—remain much the same.

Into this debate comes a new contribution by University of Arizona, sociologist Charles Ragin focusing on the middle (and thinly populated) ground between the *N* = 1 of the classical case study and the large-*N* statistical studies. It significantly extends the set theoretic "quantitative comparative analysis" techniques that Ragin (1987) developed in *The Comparative Method* and is presented as a graduate-level textbook.

The work makes three arguments. The first, constituting about a third of the book, is a sophisticated discussion of case selection—explicitly framed (p. 14) as a rebuttal to King, Keohane, and Verba—using Lazarfeld's concept of "property spaces" (Paul F. Lazarfeld, "Some Remarks on Typological Procedures in Social Research," *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 6 [1937]: 119–39). Qualitative researchers, almost without exception, argue that some cases are more interesting than others and see informed case selection as a critical element of the qualitative method. Large-*N* researchers, in contrast, see this process as "selection on the dependent variable" that can only attenuate the strength of the underlying relationships. Ragin's arguments for the property space approach are not dependent on fuzzy-set methods and could stand on their own as a contribution to this debate. (Ragin also provides some cautionary notes on the prevailing canonical justification for case selection, John Stuart Mill's "method of agreement," noting (p. 204) that Mill explicitly said that this should *not* be applied to the study of social behavior.)

The second focus of the book is an extended discussion of logical necessity and sufficiency as an alternative to the additive models that characterize most large-*N* statistical work. These arguments largely parallel those made earlier by Ragin (1987) and mirror a larger body of work on logical conditions such as Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr's (1989) *Inquiry, Logic and International Politics*.

The remainder of the book extends these set-theoretic arguments to the more recent paradigm of "fuzzy sets," introduced in the 1960s by artificial intelligence (AI) researcher Lotfi Zedah (Lotfi A. Zadeh, "Fuzzy Sets," *Information and*

Control 8 [1965]: 338–53). The method has been employed in international relations research for quite some time—for example, by Claudio A. Cioffi-Revilla (“Fuzzy Sets and Models of International Relations,” *American Journal of Political Science* 25 [1981]: 129–59) and Gregory S. Sanjian (“Fuzzy Sets Theory and U.S. Arms Transfers: Modeling the Decision-Making Process,” *American Journal of Political Science* 32 [1988]: 1018–46)—although Ragin has apparently developed his applications independently. Within AI, fuzzy sets have settled into a utilitarian role as one of several methods that can represent deliberately vague decision-making heuristics. For example, many of the microprocessor-controlled components found in contemporary automobiles use fuzzy logic.

Fuzzy logic formalizes *degrees* of set membership, avoiding the strict “either–or” assessments of conventional set theory. For example, most observers would classify France as a democracy and North Korea as not a democracy. But what about Russia? Russia in 2001 is more democratic than the Soviet Union of 1937, and arguably more democratic than the Russia of 1994, but it is still not as democratic as contemporary France, Germany, or Sweden. Fuzzy-set theory allows the membership of Russia in the set of “democratic states” to be given as a number between zero and one. The theory then specifies a number of operations that can be done with these sets. Some of these operations parallel conventional set theory; others approximate “common sense” reasoning.

The attraction of fuzzy-set theory (to both Ragin and AI researchers) is the ability to deal formally with ambiguity. The disadvantage is the absence of a clear underlying theoretical justification—many fuzzy-set operations are essentially rules of thumb, albeit rules of thumb that allow a car to start smoothly on a cold morning. Epistemologically, fuzzy sets are still at a pragmatic level comparable to the status of large-*N* statistics in the late nineteenth century, before the intense philosophical debates of R. A. Fisher, Jerzy Neyman, Egon Pearson, and others in the first decades of the twentieth century led to our current norms for statistical inference. On the positive side, the recent “qualitative research methods” movement—instantiated in the Inter-University Faculty Consortium on Qualitative Research Methods (<http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/>; accessed 28 December 2001)—may be providing such a debate.

Most of the examples in the text are simplified hypothetical cases. While pedagogically appropriate, the resulting models are more parsimonious than usually will be the case when real data are analyzed. Chapter 10, however, provides two fully developed empirical examples, on protests against IMF austerity measures and on the level of generosity of welfare states. (Ragin’s examples generally involve such broad social–political phenomena rather than, say, the life of street mimes in San Francisco.) The methods have been implemented in a software package that can be downloaded from <http://www.nwu.edu/sociology/tools/qca/fsqca.html> (accessed 28 December 2001). There is no fee for the software, although the code is not open-source and works only on the Windows operating system.

I see two barriers to the wider adaptation of this approach. The first is the sheer complexity of the set-theoretic models, whether classical or fuzzy. Large-*N* statistical models appear to be parsimonious: Thousands of observations on dozens of variables are reduced to a few simple tables, and most readers only look to see which *t*-statistics are greater than 2.0. This apparent parsimony actually conceals the incredibly complex assumptions of the estimation methods, but it is familiar. Set-theoretical generalizations, in contrast, tend toward mind-numbing intricacy, particularly when one is not accustomed to Boolean (or fuzzy) algebra.

Second, the least satisfying aspect of the book was the question of measurement. While Ragin mentions the issue, measurement does not receive the same detailed attention accorded to case selection, and one is left with an impression of “Hey, what the heck, it’s just an approximation.” The implicit assumption seems to be that fuzzy sets represent such a dramatic improvement in validity over the dichotomous classifications of classical sets that their merits are obvious, but an explicit “theory of fuzzy data” would be helpful.

Ragin’s set-theoretic work is an important contribution to formalizing the issue of the scientific status of small-*N* studies. After more than 30 years of debate, the need for multiple approaches is likely to remain. Case-study researchers are always at risk that their cases may not be representative; large-*N* researchers are at risk that their data consist of subpopulations that behave in a fashion exactly opposite of that implied by an aggregate analysis. In addition, many interesting phenomena (for example, twentieth-century revolutions, states in the European Union, and U.S. third-party presidential candidates) provide far too few examples to generate robust statistical estimates. While Ragin’s fuzzy-set methodology is certainly not the final word on this debate, it is an important and accessible addition to the literature.

Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia. By Michael L. Ross. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 237p. \$49.95.

Alasdair Bowie, *George Washington University*

With his systematic study of the effects of timber windfall booms on the institutions of four Southeast Asian states, Michael Ross informs the often emotional debate about the relative costs and benefits of “openness” to international trade. Ross investigates the effects of such windfall booms in the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak on state institutions and finds that their openness to international trade has rendered these states institutionally vulnerable. In so doing, he makes an important extension to the contributions of Peter Gourevitch and Peter Katzenstein, who have focused on the effects that different state institutions have had on national responses to exogenous—usually unpleasant—shocks in European countries (e.g., see Peter A. Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times*, 1986, and Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets*, 1978). Contrary to expectations, Ross finds that *positive* shocks (revenue windfalls) have generally corrosive effects not only on the economy (the “Dutch disease” syndrome) but also—and this is the heart of Ross’s contribution—on the very institutions of the state. How this institutional corrosion sets in, why it does so, and why the effects prove to be so debilitating are the principal foci of this book.

Ross hypothesizes that when windfall revenues accrue to the state, state officials seek to control the allocation—in the form of economic rents—of these windfalls to others (Ross terms this *rent seizing*). By control, Ross means establishing direct, exclusive, and discretionary authority to allocate. In seeking to control the allocation of windfall revenues in this way, public officials will weaken those state institutions that restrict windfall use (p. 42). In short, an exogenous international shock leads to changed behavior of state officials at the national level, which in turn weakens state institutions. Ross sensibly limits his study to assessing the validity of these arguments in the four cases, rather than attempting to test their general applicability (p. 43).

In the Philippines, which lost 55% of its forest cover between 1951 and 1986, a combination of increased volume of timber exports and higher prices (in pesos, adjusted for

inflation) resulted in windfall profits that state officials in successive governments sought to allocate (p. 83). In so doing, they bypassed institutions created in the early part of the century to ensure the sustainable exploitation of the nation's forests, such as the Bureau of Forestry. Marcos, for example, appointed a series of cronies to direct the Bureau and wield control over the allocation of logging licenses (p. 72). Ross argues that the politicization of the state's forestry institutions and their adoption of policies that led to logging at rates many times higher than the maximum sustainable yield did not result from irrational, short-sighted euphoric behavior on the part of policymakers (p. 3), or from overwhelming rent-seeking pressures from companies or interest groups wanting to capture the windfall. Rather, it resulted primarily from the efforts of policymakers in both executive and legislative branches during the administrations of Presidents Magsaysay, Garcia, Macapagal, and Marcos to seize control of the windfall.

While the Philippines case offers convincing evidence for the undermining of state forestry institutions following a timber boom, Ross's argument that this resulted primarily from rent seizing, and not so much from a "get rich quick" attitude of politicians or from rent-seeking pressures from the industry, is less convincing. Indeed, Ross himself writes, of the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, that "officeholders held incentives to exploit their influence, and to spend the [timber] windfall, as quickly as possible" (p. 64). Moreover, the treatment of rent seeking per se is cursory, and the reader is left wondering whether the counter thesis (that rent seeking, rather than rent seizing, was the most important intervening variable) has been given adequate play. In addition, for the period under Marcos, the fact that all state institutions—not just those associated with forestry—were politicized (see Garry Hawes, *The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime*, 1987) undermines Ross's claim that timber windfalls specifically, operating through rent-seeking behavior, caused the politicization of state forestry bodies. Absent this broader context of institutional change, the reader may feel that sector-specific windfalls and rent seizing have been overlaid in Ross's study.

While the Malaysian state of Sabah in the 1950s and early 1960s had "an unusually sound set of forestry institutions" (p. 88), state officials dismantled these institutions beginning in the late 1960s and seized the authority to allocate rents to others (mainly forestry licenses) so that, by 1991, the World Bank was warning that Sabah's forests were so badly overlogged that the state faced a path to "destitution" (p. 88). Was this a case, then, of the timber windfalls of the 1960s and 1970s stimulating rent seizing, which contributed to institutional decline? Perhaps, but as Ross himself points out, Sabah enjoyed timber windfalls *before* 1963 (when it ceased to be a British colony) *without* experiencing the phenomenon of rent seizing or the reduced autonomy of state forestry agencies. This suggests that certain conditions must hold before a resource windfall will result in rent-seizing behavior. Ross argues (p. 114) that such conditions amount to a lack of security of tenure on the part of the chief executive. Implicitly, resource windfalls under conditions of party/leader insecurity (e.g., Sabah under Chief Minister Mustapha, 1967–75) will result in high levels of rent seizing; under conditions where leadership is secure (e.g., Sabah under British rule), resource windfalls will result in no or modest rent seizing. Other potential variables that might further condition the relationship between windfalls and rent seizing are unfortunately omitted. Ross ends the chapter with his strongest case, without expanding upon the significance of such variables for his original hypotheses.

More troubling for Ross's central thesis is the fact that the windfall in Sabah resulted primarily from increased volumes logged, rather than from international price increases, and these increased volumes in turn resulted from policy initiatives on the part of the Sabah government that greatly expanded two categories of logging licenses—annual and special licenses (p. 107). Thus, it appears that the windfall resulted from *endogenous* rather than exogenous factors. Since rent seizing also is endogenous, this suggests the possibility that the hypothesized windfall/rent-seizing relationship in Sabah is in fact spurious, both developments having resulted from other variables not specified among Ross's initial hypotheses.

The cases of Sarawak and Indonesia also pose dilemmas for Ross's schema. Specifically, while his third hypothesis links rent-seizing activity by state officials with the weakening of institutions that restrict windfall use, in both Sarawak and Indonesia such state institutions were weak or nonexistent from the outset (pp. 137, 157). While Ross argues that *adat*, or customary law, acted as a constraint on windfall use in Indonesia, and it was this "institution" that deteriorated in the face of rent seizing during the period of Suharto's rule, it is difficult to evaluate this claim. How does one measure the effect of *adat* as a constraint on windfall use in any particular area? Moreover, Ross's schema is clearly based on the experiences of the Philippines and Sabah, where the institutions in question are indeed state institutions. Unfortunately, this means that those seeking to understand the causes and consequences of the current rapid deforestation of Indonesia may be disappointed by the present volume. As Ross admits, Indonesia fits less well his thesis about rent seizing and its corrosive institutional effects than is the case for the other states covered here (p. 187).

As with all systematic attempts to assess the validity of propositions across a variety of state settings, Ross's study finds the validity to be greater in some settings than in others. The author deserves considerable credit for developing hypotheses that are clear and then seeking to apply them across a broad swath of empirical data covering half a century and four states. To be sure, there are omissions—e.g., the counter hypotheses ("get rich quick," rent-seeking pressures) are not seriously addressed after the first case—and the time frame ends around 1996 (there is little data later than this). And the poor quality of the copyediting in the volume (see, for example, fig. 6.I; "effect" on p. 35 and p. 36, fn 14) will no doubt prove an irritant to author and reader alike. Nevertheless, this book will be found valuable by scholars, practitioners, and graduate students with interests in the effects of globalization on national-level behavior and institutions.

The Search for Good Government: Understanding the Paradox of Italian Democracy. By Filippo Sabetti. Montreal: McGill–Queens University Press, 2000. 288p. \$34.95.

Franklin Hugh Adler, *Macalester College*

Filippo Sabetti has written an important book, not just for specialists in Italian politics, but also for those more generally interested in comparative politics. Poor government performance has often been associated with the Italian state, so much so that foreign scholars often used Italy as an ideal locale to probe the seminal causes of political pathology. Edward Banfield's (1958) *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, for example, attributed poor political performance to the particular beliefs and attitudes of Italians, to an inadequate moral basis he identified as "amoral familism." The village Banfield studied, Chiaromonte (which he called Montegrano), soon became a model for "backward societies" in the comparative literature and later was woven into game

theoretic concerns, such as the tragedy of the commons and the prisoner's dilemma. Banfield's "culturalist" approach was later refined in Robert Putnam's (1993) *Making Democracy Work*. Rather than condemning all Italy to pathological status, as Banfield's Montegrano writ large, Putnam compared the "unsuccessful" South with the civic-minded North, where a density of associations and an abundance of "social capital" not only made "democracy work," but also contributed to economic prosperity. Putnam later extended this analysis of associability and social capital to the United States, most famously in his work on "bowling alone."

Sabetti vigorously argues that the "culturalist" analyses of Banfield and Putnam not only are flawed with respect to Italy, but represent myopic general approaches to the study of politics. More than 30 years ago, formative voices in comparative politics, such as Roy Macridis and Giovanni Sartori, lamented a growing tendency to treat politics as a dependent variable, "explained" by economic, social, or cultural factors. From an institutionalist stance, Sabetti similarly argues against the implied neutrality or even benevolence of governmental forms; these, he argues, not only frame the context within which social intercourse takes place, but are formative in their own right—they serve to capacitate or incapacitate self-government. As the mantra goes, "Institutions count"; they are more than simple backdrops for the political activity of citizens. Some institutional arrangements promote trust and self-government; some do not.

Sabetti forcefully argues that the creation and development of a *federalist* Italian state, rather than the centralized, unitary one that emerged from the Risorgimento, would have provided precisely that institutional architecture that might have encouraged good government, locally and nationally. Instead, liberal leaders such as Camillo Cavour chose, among hotly debated alternatives, to emulate the monocentric French state model. In the aftermath of the Parisian "June days," which he personally witnessed, Cavour was more interested in unitary, effective social control than local self-government, particularly given the centrifugal potential represented by diverse communes and regions. As Raymond Grew once quipped, types like Cavour sounded like Gladstone but acted like Guizot. Sabetti's hero is Carlo Cattaneo, Cavour's contemporary, who passionately argued for a federalist constitution, a United States of Italy, which would be based upon and draw sustenance from Italy's long-standing, heterogeneous communal traditions. Francesco Ferrara, another advocate for the American model, warned that the preemptory annexation of Sicily, subjecting it to unmediated rule from Rome, would create "the Ireland of Italy" and noted, "It is a common error to attribute more cohesion to a state whose central government takes on tasks that subaltern bodies or individuals can do better" (p. 46).

After reconstructing the constitutional debates that preceded the creation of the Italian state, Sabetti develops and updates Cattaneo's analysis to critique the performance of the contemporary state with respect to the delivery of public services, central planning, and the war on crime. As all fundamental decisions were made in Rome, with little knowledge or sensitivity to local interests, policy tended to be bureaucratic, arbitrary, arrogant, and inefficient. Why? *Not* because political agents were necessarily incompetent or ill intentioned, but because Italy's institutional arrangements were structurally defective, *not* because of cultural pathologies or an absence of social capital, but because Italy's institutional architecture inhibited local self-government. Moreover, excessive legislation (often cumbersome, incompatible, and contradictory), emanating from Rome, left individual office holders with tremendous discretion for interpretation and implementation. This discretion, linked to the pres-

ence of a large public sector and the dynamics of intraparty competition and fund-raising, led endemically to the clientelism, kickbacks, and pervasive corruption for which Italy became infamous, especially with the dramatic Tagentopoli scandals of the early 1990s. A strongly federal system, Sabetti notes, has firebreaks, as corruption in one unit has a greater chance of being contained and not spilling over into others. He cites Burnett and Mantovani's comparison between Italy and the United States: "Corruption in the letting of contracts for building the Milan subway went from high to low on both the paying side and the receiving side. On the other hand, President Clinton's problems with campaign donations have not engulfed state and city Democratic parties nor endangered Democratic mayors and governors" (p. 262).

A student of federalism in Italy and Canada, Sabetti is also a specialist on the Italian South. In this regard, he questions not only the culturalist arguments of Banfield and Putnam, but the latter's "path dependency" scheme in which North-South differences are deeply rooted in distinctive patterns beginning in the eleventh century (monarchy in the South, communal republicanism in the North). Sabetti argues that Putnam's historical model is overly deterministic and factually inaccurate, oblivious to Southern patterns of associability that continued under monarchy and expanded during the nineteenth century. The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle, as Sabetti does recognize greater social capital and civic-mindedness in the North but cannot convincingly account for it. Perhaps, had he been less polemically inclined toward Putnam, Sabetti would have recognized at least a partial affinity between Putnam's explanation and his own institutionalism, for Putnam's argument, stripped of its excessive determinism, is that communal republicanism was an *institutional form* that encouraged self-government, whereas monarchy was a form that discouraged it. Be that as it may, Sabetti has written one of the more stimulating books on Italy to have appeared in recent years, and one of the very few in English that reflects the contemporary Italian fascination with federalism that followed from the Tagentopoli crisis.

Religious Minorities in Iran. By Eliz Sanasarian. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 249p. \$59.95.

Haleh Esfandiari, *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*

Eliz Sanasarian's book is a welcome addition to the growing number of books on Iran since the Islamic Republic replaced the monarchy in 1979. She deals with an important yet little-covered subject: how religious minorities fare under an Islamic government. Just as Sanasarian's first book, *The Women's Rights Movement in Iran*, broke new ground and added much to our knowledge about the status of women under the monarchy and the first few years of the Islamic Republic, *Religious Minorities in Iran* also fills a gap in scholarship. Some books and articles have been published since the Islamic revolution on Iranian Jews and Bahais, but little has appeared on Iran's Zoroastrian and Armenian communities, and virtually nothing on Iran's Chaldeans and Assyrians. No one has treated all the religious minorities in one volume. (Sanasarian is, of course, dealing with religious minorities, not ethnic communities such as the Arabs, Kurds, Baluchis, Turks, and others.)

Sanasarian gives us a concise and useful summary of the history of these communities until the 1979 Islamic revolution, before addressing the major subject of the book, the fate of these communities under the Islamic Republic,

particularly in the first decade after the revolution. Sansarian notes the continuities but, more importantly, the contrasts in official attitudes toward the religious minorities before and after the revolution. The constitution during the monarchy specified Shi'ite Islam as the official religion of the state. But under the Pahlavi dynasty (1924–1979), religion was being gradually pushed into the private sphere. Under the Islamic Republic, in contrast, religion became a dominant element of state polity, affecting the life of religious minorities as much as of the Muslim population.

Under the Pahlavis, according to Sansarian, the Shi'ite clerical hierarchy and the government did try to interfere in the affairs of the religious minorities, and harassment was greater in the provinces than in the capital, Tehran. However, she notes, in the Pahlavi period the religious minorities enjoyed improved working and living conditions and a large degree of toleration; they benefited from the Pahlavi emphasis on nation-building, nationalism, and forging Iran's disparate populations into one people. Under the reign of the second Pahlavi monarch, for example, members of the religious minorities were free to practice their religions and cultivate their cultures. Although no member of a religious minority could serve as a cabinet minister or ambassador, in the last years before the revolution there were, for example, a substantial number of Jews teaching in the universities. Members of the minority communities were prominent in business, commerce, and industry. The minorities had their own representatives in parliament (a practice continued under the Islamic Republic). Sansarian devotes an informative chapter to the discussions on the status of the religious minorities during the drafting of the constitution of the Islamic Republic. Zoroastrians, Armenians, Jews, Assyrians, and Chaldeans sent representatives to the Assembly of Experts, or constituent assembly, and participated in these debates. They were urged not to limit their comments to matters related to their communities. (Members of the Bahai faith, which emerged from nineteenth-century sectarian differences in Shi'ite Islam, were not represented, since the Islamic Republic does not recognize Bahaism as a legitimate religion). In practice, these understandably cautious minority representatives played little role in the drafting of the constitution. Article 13 of the constitution granted the religious minorities the same rights they had enjoyed under the previous constitution: the right to political representation and freedom in matters of religion, personal affairs, and religious education. (Reflecting the enormous hostility of the Shi'ite clerical community to the Bahais, they were not even mentioned in the constitution). However, according to Sansarian, upholding Article 13 was not a priority for the new regime.

Sansarian notes that the Islamic government continued to afford the religious minorities a relative degree of freedom in matters of religious practice and allowed the minority communities to follow their own customs in the area of family law, where it touched on marriage, divorce, and inheritance. But it interfered in the social, cultural, and educational life of the religious minorities in a major way. Minority schools were forced to place boys and girls in separate schools, since segregated education became the law of the land. The state appointed a Muslim principal and Muslim teachers to each minority school, and the teaching of religion was supervised by the state, creating tension between the community and the school staff. Protests, especially from the Armenian community, failed to change government policy. All teaching had to be done in Persian, a major source of concern for Armenians, who had long kept Armenian alive in their community by using it as a language of instruction in their schools, although the government later relented and allowed language teaching a couple of hours a week.

Members of the religious minorities enjoyed no immunity from the general tendency of the Islamic state to interfere in the social and private life of Iranians. The Islamic headdress was imposed on all Iranian women irrespective of religious persuasion. A substantial number of Armenian and Jewish employees in the private sector and civil servants were dismissed, demoted, or forced to resign. The religious concept of "pure" and "impure" was revived by the Shi'ite clerical hierarchy and non-Muslims were once again described as impure, at least by some of the clergy. The Islamic penal code (stoning for adultery, amputation for theft, lashings for various violations of the social code) was applied to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Social gatherings of Jews and Armenians were not immune from harassment. The establishment of the Islamic Republic, the imposition of Islamic law, and the focus on religious identity, Sansarian writes, widened the separation between Iran's religious communities and the Muslim majority. Members of the religious minorities tended to stick to their own communities and refrained from mixing with Muslims to avoid controversy. Of course there were individual exceptions.

There were other problems. Sansarian is especially good at explaining the reasons why the minority communities fared differently under the Islamic Republic. The Jews were regarded with suspicion because of the Islamic Republic's hostility to Israel and Zionism. Jews were subject to property confiscations, arrests, and even executions. Over the years a great number of Jews emigrated from Iran. Under Islamic law, conversion from Islam to another religion was punishable by death, and if found out, Christian converts from Islam were treated harshly and in some instances were killed. The Armenians, Assyrians, and Chaldeans fared better but often were not immune from discrimination and interference. Of the religious minorities, the Bahais fared the worst. Agents of the state embarked on a campaign of arrests, kidnappings, and executions of Bahais. Bahai property was confiscated, and Bahais were subject to forced conversion to Islam. Bahai marriage and death certificates were not recognized and had no standing under law.

Sansarian depicts the religious minorities as communities that managed in difficult circumstances. They learned to live with a theocratic system. In the two decades of the Islamic Republic, she writes, the religious minorities "adjusted but also resisted, they bent but stood firm, they educated but realigned themselves with the new circumstances" (p. 155).

The Soldier and the State in South America: Essays in Civil-Military Relations. Edited by Patricio Silva. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 212p. \$59.95.

Cynthia Watson, *The National War College*

This nice, tight volume offers a novel approach to looking at the civil-military issues that have been a major focus of political science and Latin American studies over the past four decades. Using 10 short essays by predominantly Europe-based scholars (Frederick Nunn of the United States, Celso Castro of Brazil, and Francisco Rojas Arevana of Chile are the exceptions), this collection stretches the evaluative process of civilian-military interactions in the region. Not merely accepting the bureaucratic-authoritarian model of Guillermo O'Donnell or others, it uses a much broader measure of the relationships in society to evaluate the health of Latin America today. It is a short collection that would be an excellent challenge for new graduate students in the subfield of civil-military relations or Latin American politics.

A notable strength of the volume is the use of multiple disciplines rather than merely political science or civil-military

relations to study the transformation of Latin America. Europeans tend to value regional studies, which retains a legitimacy that has been largely dismissed in the United States since the advent of behavioralism; this volume goes a step farther in bringing a variety of disciplines into each of the essays, allowing the authors to highlight rarely considered aspects of civil-military issues. Robben's use of Erikson's basic description of the relationship between a parent and a child in the development of trust is an interesting way to discuss the violations that the Argentine forces perpetrated against their own citizens between 1976 and 1983. His conclusions are much different from traditional political scientific or even sociological views of why this was such an insidious period for Argentina; he deserves credit for pushing us to think about the entirety of the societal and political effects of the mass arrests that violated so many people's safety and sense of well-being during this period. Similarly, Kooning's discussions of the corporate nature of the Brazilian military's view of its role in nation-building is a refreshing look at this behavior that requires the reader to think more holistically about the phenomenon.

With great emphasis on the "national security states" of Brazil (1964–85), Uruguay (1972–85), Chile (1973–90), and Argentina (1976–83), the authors have the luxury of teasing out historical, societal, and political reasons why these states have suffered through periods of such severe and enduring upheaval. Much of this volume's story line is concentrated on Chile, probably because General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte's October 1998 arrest and subsequent detention in London seemed impossible to observers in the region only a few years earlier. While Pinochet would likely never have been considered for arrest in Chile, changes in the invulnerability of the armed forces to civilian reproach had taken place.

The brevity of the essays makes them direct in their approach but does not tie them together very well. The reader requires some familiarity with the importance of civil-military issues in the Latin American context to make the most effective use of this volume.

Although this is an interesting volume, bringing history and theory on civil-military relations together in a refreshing manner, there are a couple of nagging irritants. First, the title includes the term "Essays in Civil-Military Relations" and purports to cover the region. In fact, the collection is focused almost exclusively on the southern cone states and is almost an answer to Guillermo O'Donnell's *Bureaucratic-Authoritarian states of the 1960s–80s*. Only Cammack's concluding chapter lives up to the volume's title by looking at the whole of the region. Nunn does address the broad range of issues that Latin American specialists have considered during the five decades of interest in this topic but focuses mostly on the southern cone states.

While one could argue that civil-military relations are most interesting over the decade of the 1990s in Chile and Colombia, the latter is mentioned only incidentally and peripherally. Colombia's pattern is quite different from that of any other states in the region but it would seem that a book on the whole of the Latin American context would mention this important case study more prominently.

Additionally, while Hugo Chavez Frias, erstwhile coup-maker and now President of Venezuela, is mentioned in passing, this instance of a coup that came close to succeeding receives no formal treatment. Chavez is the brunt of much joking in the United States but this misunderstands the tragedy of Venezuela today. In a country with a relatively small population and vast petroleum resources, societal conditions have deteriorated markedly over the past 20 years. This is precisely the type of case that would be

expected to clarify the uniformed-civilian relationship, and why it has not led to a series of coup attempts—but this goes unnoted by the authors.

The topic is, as several contributors note, not completely closed in South America. As Argentina, in particular, faces yet another bout of economic insolvency, few people expect the military even to contemplate returning to power as they did repeatedly between 1930 and 1983. The questions of civilian competency still remain. As Nunn notes, "It may come to pass that civilian institutions prove incapable of coping with Latin America's various dilemmas" (p. 33). Has history been altered so that these militaries will not take the reins of power again to replace inept civilian counterparts? This book is not entirely encouraging that the militaries will stay in the barracks.

Social Movements and Economic Transition: Markets and Distributive Conflict in Mexico. By Heather L. Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 239p. \$54.95.

Judith Adler Hellman, *York University*

Students of social movements have long struggled to explain why insurgencies occur where and when they do. In this excellent study, Heather Williams examines two contemporary Mexican movements—one rural, one urban—as a means to explain why unrest develops, when movements form, and what movement activists are likely to do once they manage to construct an organization and articulate a set of collective demands. Expanding on the work of Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, and other scholars who have wrestled with these questions, Williams is concerned with the way in which Mexico's successive economic crises, and the implementation of neoliberal policies in response to these crises, influence the manner in which the dispossessed organize and press their demands on the state.

While the literature on social movements and contentious politics is already very extensive, Williams advances the discussion in this field with her recognition that the liberalization of the economy and contraction of the state provide a new context in which popular unrest may be expressed, even as they shape the form that association takes among underprivileged social groups. Not only do protest organizations find new ways to negotiate with government over the classic distributive issues of prices, wages, employment, housing, subsidies, and social spending, but Williams finds that "movements have continued to pressure the state in historically recognizable ways, but have adapted to changes by organizing along new lines," building alliances with new forces, and "even changing their identities . . . to maneuver more adeptly" (p. 6). Thus, she argues, not only does market transition stimulate many highly visible changes in the direction of policy and the character of public institutions, but the same process of change may alter the nature, location, and stakes of informal protest politics.

To illustrate these changes, Heather Williams examines the development of two Mexican movements. The first is a labor struggle provoked by the privatization of the Las Truchas Steelworks in Lázaro Cárdenas, Michoacán, a megaproject on the west coast of Mexico that represents the fullest expression of the postwar period of concentrated public investment and large-scale urban planning to achieve full import substitution industrialization. Williams shows that the privatization of this steel mill set off a prolonged battle to save jobs and preserve the contractual benefits won over a period of decades by the steelworkers' union. However, when the mobilizational capacity of labor began to flag after 18 months,

the location of protest shifted from the workplace to the neighborhood, where protest movements led by steelworkers and ex-steelworkers centered on housing, environmental, and urban infrastructural issues.

Far better known outside of Mexico is the second case that Williams details. El Barzón, a debtors' movement that originated among farmers in the north-central state of Zacatecas, began by protesting high interest rates and low commodity prices. The movement captured the imagination of Mexicans across the social spectrum (even as it created great excitement among students of insurgent politics!). Incorporating tens of thousands of Mexicans, ranging from industrialists to small farmers, shopkeepers, mortgage holders, street vendors, taxi drivers, small business owners, and credit card users, El Barzón, like the labor and neighborhood struggles in Lázaro Cárdenas, was a response to neoliberal policies and market-related shocks that had dramatically reduced both the income and the prospects of those who joined the protests.

As Williams notes, in both cases, the implementation of a radical new economic policy not only changed the political and economic environment in which protest movements developed, but altered protestors' sense of what was possible or useful to demand and shifted contentious politics out of the traditional corporatist channels and onto a far less stable and predictable political terrain. The feeling that no one can say what may happen next in Mexican politics—a feeling that has greatly intensified since the election of President Vicente Fox in July 2000—is revealed in William's study to be a feature of the Mexican political landscape that can be traced to the development of movements such as that of Lázaro Cárdenas and El Barzón in the years before the outbreak of the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas in 1994 or the defeat of the governing party in 2000.

Thus, in this insightful study, Williams recognizes and explains the highly fluid situation in which wage-based and consumption-based demands mix, even as political actors inside and outside of the formal economy find ways of connecting their protest organizations. In addition, she underscores the irony of a situation in which the conceptual language used to describe the parameters of protest often obscures the texture of the actual activities involved. While social movement theorists speak of *opportunity* or *opportunity structures*, Williams's fieldwork reveals that "the term is quite distant from what people in movements experience emotionally or physically as they engage in public assemblies or occupations." In fact, Williams finds that "protest, for most people, is at best inconvenient and at worst terrifying" (p. 21).

Indeed, this is one of the many strengths of this excellent book. Not only does Williams recognize the critical importance of political economy in structuring, if not actually determining, the shape that insurgency will take, but she also identifies the range of strategies and tactics most likely to bring positive results. With an extremely sharp eye for the telling detail, Williams manages to capture the character of a social movement on the ground, noting that the key questions are not always the big theoretical ones but, rather, Who paid for what? Who brought the food and water? Who knew a doctor? Who called the lawyer? and Whose contact leaked the crucial documents?

The Perils of Protest: State Repression and Student Activism in China and Taiwan. By Teresa Wright. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2001. 192p. \$48.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Chris Lee, *University of Minnesota at Morris*

Teresa Wright provides a well-researched in-depth comparative analysis of student movements in China and Taiwan.

Although this is not the only work to look at these movements, this book is a useful addition to the literature because it (1) contains information about the political environment in China and Taiwan in the late 1980s, (2) presents thorough accounts of events from the beginning to the end of both movements, (3) provides valuable information about organizational decision making and conflicts within the student protest groups, and (4) puts forth several hypotheses about dissident behavior that can be applied to other cases. China's Democracy Movement of 1989 and Taiwan's Month of March Movement of 1990 are cases that cry out for comparison. Both movements were preceded by conflict regarding a change or shift of power in their governments, and students in both movements exhibited similar behavior. However, the Democracy Movement of 1989 was ended by the state with the use of violent repression, while the Month of March Movement concluded peacefully and successfully. Both of these cases share a variety of similarities with the exception of their outcomes; therefore Wright seizes the opportunity to review the genesis and effect of student behavior in 1989 and 1990.

The book begins with a brief description of the political environment students faced in China and Taiwan in 1989 and 1990. Wright points out similarities in both cases and notes that although the Taiwanese government was less repressive than the Chinese leadership, the illiberal regimes in both counties created atmospheres of fear and distrust, which greatly influenced the behavior of student protestors. The author also discusses internal divisions within the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) that affected the outcomes of both student movements.

The next portion of the book includes very detailed accounts of student group's organization and protest activities. Wright first discusses the Chinese case, documenting student activities from April 15 to June 4 1989. She then describes the actions of student protest groups in Taiwan in March 1990. One of this book's greatest strengths lies in this section; the benefits of the authors's interviews with student leaders are apparent. In both cases the author's meticulous descriptions and analyses illuminate the decision-making calculus of the student leaders and indicate how the political environments created by illiberal regimes influenced the behavior of student groups in understandable ways. Wright argues that the political realities produced by the CCP and KMT influenced student groups to isolate themselves from potential allies, created organizational instability, and fostered protest radicalization.

Wright concludes by offering suggestions that allow the extension of this work's findings on China and Taiwan to other cases. She finds that certain protest traits are exaggerated in more illiberal and repressive environments, therefore Wright suggests that it may be practical to examine political context as a spectrum ranging from the most oppressive and illiberal environments to those that are the most open and pluralist. "As one moves across the spectrum toward more oppressive regimes, intervening variables of fear and distrust become more pronounced, such that crucial collective action resources of organization and mobilization are stymied" (p. 130). Therefore, the more repressive the regime, the more fear and distrust by dissidents increase, which results in the diminishment of dissident organization and mobilization capacity. A large part of this book's value lies in theoretical arguments that seem to be supported in these cases. Both in China and, due to a lesser degree, in Taiwan, the great likelihood of repression and infiltration by the governing parties created an environment that impacted the realities of student organizational behavior and tactics in three ways.

First, in both cases successful organization was possible only when it was founded on personal friendship networks. Wright argues that in political environments like those in China and Taiwan, organizational networks that are not based on prior friendship are less trustworthy and tend to be plagued by internal suspicion, resulting in organizational instability and ineffectiveness.

Second, an environment of great distrust and fear leads to protest radicalization. The author asserts that protest radicalization occurs in such environments because behavior that is more confrontational is perceived as proof of an individual's commitment to the cause, while moderation is seen as suspicious. The radicalization of behavior can lead to organizational instability and can prolong or exacerbate already tense situations.

Third, dangerous political environments limit protest mobilization efforts. Protestors have to protect themselves from the threats of repression and slander by representatives of the state. Therefore protestors in illiberal regimes may find it necessary to keep their groups from forming recognized ties to outside groups whose membership and tactics are uncertain or to groups who have been targets of state repression in the past. Put differently, the political environment created by illiberal repressive states tends to force protestors to avoid forming connections with other groups, which inhibits a movement's ability to mobilize across various social groups. Hence tactics employed by protest groups to protect themselves ironically may actually weaken the movement's potential influence.

Both of the cases the author focuses on in this book support the three arguments above. She successfully contends that the

political environments created by the CCP in China and the KMT in Taiwan greatly influenced the behavior of student protestors in both states. However, she also states that the protest and organizational behavior described above can also be applied to other cases with illiberal repressive regimes. The fact that she derives several generalizable hypotheses from her extensive analysis of student protest activities in China and Taiwan adds to the value of this book's contribution to the literature.

Although this book provides a very comprehensive account of student protest group activity, there could have been more discussion of the impact of the political environment on the overall success or failure of the movements. The author does point out that elements within both the CCP in China and the KMT in Taiwan wished to use the student movements to their benefits. Conservative governing elites in both China and Taiwan wanted to use the student movements to garner support for slowing the pace of reforms, while liberalizing elements wanted to exploit the students' activities to advance their arguments for the expansion of reforms. However, she could have devoted more space to emphasis of the fact that members who favored liberalization in Taiwan's KMT party held more influence within their party and played a major role in the "success" of the student movement in Taiwan, while liberalizing elements were less influential in China's CCP party, greatly contributing to the lack of success of the Chinese student movement. Despite the aforementioned criticism, this book provides several valuable contributions to the examination of student protest behavior in China and Taiwan and to the study of social movements and contentious politics in general.

International Relations

The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980. By David B. Abernethy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001. 536p. \$35.00.

Giovanni Arrighi, *Johns Hopkins University*

In *The Dynamics of Global Dominance* David Abernethy advances four main propositions concerning the rise and demise of European overseas empires over the last half-millennium. The first proposition is that the unprecedented and unparalleled success of European states in building overseas empires in the two long phases of expansion (dated with questionable precision from 1415 to 1773 and from 1824 to 1913) was due primarily to the cumulative, synergistic effects of the extended geographical reach, functional specialization, and ability to work in mutually reinforcing ways of European governmental, business, and religious institutions. In each sphere Europeans faced highly effective non-European competitors. But no such competitor could match the European *combination* of mutually reinforcing advances in all three spheres. This combination was critical in sustaining not just expansion but also colonial consolidation.

The second proposition is that initially non-European resistance to the triple assault of European specialists in power, profit, and proselytization tended to be ineffectual or even counterproductive. This led to collaboration or, more often, accommodation on the part of non-European actors—"an intensely pragmatic response to circumstances considered unlikely to change whatever one did or thought" (p. 302). Collaboration and accommodation facilitated the expansion and consolidation of European dominance. Over time, how-

ever, they gave way to rebellion and a phase of contraction/disintegration of overseas European empires. The book's third main proposition is that eventual contraction was the result not so much of the overextension as of the contradictions of empire. "Consolidation of colonial rule had the unintended effect of magnifying and highlighting problems inherent in systems of overseas governance. These problems made it more difficult for administrators to know what to do and became sources of conflict with colonial residents. Consolidation eventually undercut itself" (p. 327). Problems of overseas governance developed unevenly among different empires. But the multiple political crises triggered by "hegemonic wars"—an exogenous and unexplained variable in Abernethy's scheme of things—had a powerful synchronizing effect across space on the transformation of contradictions into successful independence movements.

The book's fourth main proposition is that each cycle of expansion/contraction left in its wake a very different world from the one existing when the cycle began. The geographical scope of the regional European interstate system expanded, reaching its present global dimensions at the end of the second cycle. Long-distance trade was stimulated enormously, resulting in today's global economy. Populations were reshuffled across the globe, giving rise to communities far more differentiated and stratified racially and culturally than in the past. Last but not least, rapid national economic development became a universal goal, mounting an unprecedented assault on the world's physical environment.

There is much to be commended in Abernethy's story. The systematic comparison of the forces at work in the two phases of expansion and in the two phases of contraction of European overseas empires generates many insightful,

illuminating, and original observations, such as the analogy drawn between the British North American colonies and India as “precedent-setters” of the first and second phase of decolonization, respectively, and the analogy drawn between the Haitian Revolution and the Rhodesian white settlers’ Unilateral Declaration of Independence as “deviant cases” of the phase of decolonization in which they occurred. It is, above all, the details of Abernethy’s comparative analysis that make *The Dynamics of Global Dominance* compulsory reading for anyone interested in the rise and demise of European colonial imperialism.

The weaknesses of the book are, for the most part, the obverse side of its strengths. Abernethy is well aware of the fact that the two cycles of expansion and contraction that he compares present not just similarities but also differences. Indeed, he probably spends as much time highlighting differences as he does highlighting similarities. Nevertheless, the overall emphasis is on similarities. More important, some of the differences between the two cycles that have been most significant in shaping the dynamics and legacy of European dominance do not receive the attention they deserve or are not discussed at all. I limit myself to two omissions that in my view are particularly problematic.

The first concerns the agency of European expansion. In Abernethy’s story this agency is pretty much the same in the two phases of expansion, consisting of the combination of governmental, business, and religious institutions noted above. In the case of religious institutions Abernethy does note the change in agency between the first and the second phase of expansion due to the emergence of Protestant churches as competitors of the Catholic church. But he pays little or no attention to the far more fundamental transformations that occurred in the governmental and business agencies that led expansion in the two phases. Like many others before him, he presumes a system of national states and related business enterprises that expands *quantitatively* but remains basically the same *qualitatively*. In reality, the system could expand quantitatively only *through* recurrent fundamental qualitative transformations that created governmental–business complexes of increasing size and complexity. Neither the dynamics nor the legacy of European overseas expansion can be fully understood except in the light of these qualitative transformations—transformations that, among other things, resulted in the relocation of the primary political, economic, and cultural center of “European” global dominance outside geographical Europe, that is, to North America.

Closely related to the above, Abernethy pays little attention to a fundamental difference between the settler colonialism prevalent in the first cycle of expansion and contraction and the colonialism of occupation prevalent in the second cycle. European settlers were not colonized peoples but the colonizers themselves—in most instances the primary agency of European overseas expansion. The peoples of non-European descent who lived in the colonies of occupation prevalent in the second cycle, in contrast, were colonized and no amount of collaboration and accommodation vis-à-vis European rule made them colonizers. At least implicitly, Abernethy does take this difference into account when he compares the processes that led to the independence of former colonies in the two phases of contraction. But he ignores it completely in assessing the legacy of the two rounds of European overseas expansion. The fact that settler colonialism added three and a half additional continents (Australasia, North and South America, and the half-continent of Siberia) to the possessions of peoples of European descent—who, after independence, continued to speak European languages and to welcome the inflow of European people, capital, and ideas—while occupa-

tion colonialism left behind no such possessions is hardly ever mentioned; nor is the fact that settler colonialism for the most part eventually resulted in the formation of comparatively or absolutely wealthy nations, while occupation colonialism for the most part eventually resulted in the formation of comparatively or absolutely poor nations.

These are serious weaknesses that are reflected in many dubious judgments concerning the dynamics and legacy of European dominance. On balance, however, they are overshadowed by the book’s strengths. There is much one can disagree with in *The Dynamics of Global Dominance* but at least as much to be learned from it.

Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. By Amitav Acharya. New York: Routledge, 2001. 234p. \$90.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

David Arase, *Pomona College*

Amitav Acharya has produced an innovative and stimulating evaluation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at a crucial juncture in that organization’s development. Acharya does not shrink from the challenge of measuring ASEAN’s rhetoric of regional cooperation against its actual accomplishments, and the theoretical and empirical sophistication that Acharya displays makes this book sure to be a key work on the security and political aspects of ASEAN for academics and policymakers.

At its inception in 1967 ASEAN’s commitment to peaceful and cooperative relations among its members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand) inspired some skepticism because there were festering disputes left over from the decolonization period as well as the threat of communist insurgency spreading beyond Indochina. With some encouragement from the West, ASEAN managed to survive its first few years. After the Vietnam War, ASEAN’s members sought to become something more than pawns in Southeast Asian security affairs. Although ASEAN failed to mount effective resistance to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978, it did subsequently help to isolate Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge regime diplomatically. As the Cold War came to a close ASEAN helped to broker a peaceful settlement in Cambodia. It then created the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to discuss security matters, and it produced the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) initiative. Borne by the self-confidence produced by these initiatives as well as by the rising tide of prosperity among its members, ASEAN set out at middecade to become a regional organization with comprehensive membership that presumably would allow it to rank in importance with the United States, China, or Japan in determining regional affairs.

What distinguishes Acharya’s analysis of ASEAN’s development is his use of the constructivist approach to understanding international relations similar to that of Peter Katzenstein in his recent work. In contrast to neorealist and neoliberal approaches (which use models of actors making rational calculations of utility under conditions of objective and external constraint), the constructivist approach gives new life to behavioralism by giving transnational relations an essential importance due to the effect they can have in changing norms, perceptions, and identities. Through this process a state, or relations between states, may be peacefully changed or take on a particular character. In taking this approach Acharya goes back to Karl Deutsch’s transactionalist analysis of regionalism and adapts the concept of pluralistic security community (i.e., a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable

expectations of peaceful change) to the task of understanding ASEAN as a socially constructed security community.

Acharya's constructivist approach is helpful in putting the spotlight on the peculiar nature of ASEAN. It commits member governments to the informal discussion of issues rather than to formal negotiation processes, to decision making by consensus rather than by voting rules, to noninterference in each other's domestic matters rather than adherence to common values and practices, to the nonuse of force between members, and to the avoidance of collective defense measures. Together these and other norms constitute what is called the ASEAN Way, and according to Acharya this has provided the foundation for ASEAN as a security community. Thus, ASEAN is really not a formal rule-making and rule-enforcing organization, yet it has developed common aims such as protecting regional stability against disruption by external actors, as well as norms and a distinctive sense of "we-ness" among its members.

The question, however, is how significant these norms have been. Acharya tackles this issue by comparing the actual individual and collective behavior of ASEAN's members to the rhetoric of the ASEAN Way, and he asks, To what extent has the ASEAN process affected member identities and loyalties over time? The answers are found in chapters in which he discusses how members have dealt with key episodes such as resolving the Cambodian conflict (chapter 3) and agreeing to admit Vietnam, Myanmar (Burma), and Cambodia (chapter 4). Chapter 5 is devoted to intra-ASEAN tensions over disputed boundaries, competitive military modernization (which undercuts the notion of ASEAN as a true security community), divergent economic priorities, and growing differences over human rights. Chapter 6 deals with ASEAN's attempt to manage its security environment through the ARF. Each chapter identifies troubling disparities between ASEAN norms and stubborn facts that have already or may in the future damage ASEAN's prospects. These chapters also contain insightful treatments of the political maneuvering behind the facade of ASEAN unity and are well worth reading on their own.

Acharya concludes that ASEAN has taught its members norms that help to preserve peace between them. In this sense ASEAN-style regionalism has produced a nascent security community. Acharya finds that ASEAN has not been particularly successful, however, in reconfiguring the loyalties and identities of its members, who remain sovereignty-bound actors. And he is not particularly sanguine about ASEAN's future given the internal strains evident since membership expansion and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98, as well as the external pressures generated by Western human rights lobbies and a more assertive and ambitious China. Looking to the future he reckons that "ASEAN... now is in serious need to reinvent itself" (p. 208).

With respect to the theoretical framework of the book there are two minor points one could raise. One is the invocation of Deutsch's concept of a pluralistic security community while discarding his broader theory of transactionalism. That is, Acharya notes that ASEAN preceded, and did not follow as a result of, intensifying transnational interactions and cultural convergence between member societies and that there is little popular support for ASEAN within member countries. On the question of what then created the ASEAN security community absent the conditions Deutsch imagined, the author refers to the learning and socialization to norms that occur within international institutions, which then may lead national elites to redefine their notions of interest and identity. One supposes that here Acharya could have done more with the elite-led, cognitively based neofunctionalism of Ernst Haas.

The other point has to do with evaluating alternative explanations of ASEAN. The constructivist approach does put the focus on norms, but is this approach in the end better at explaining ASEAN as a security community than, say, Michael Liefer's realist characterization of ASEAN as a diplomatic community serving the separate interests of its members in maintaining stability or Donald K. Emmerson's neoliberal characterization of ASEAN as a security regime dedicated to preserving member sovereignty in conditions of peace? It is true that such characterizations tend to rule out the possibility of weakening sovereignty or the formation of a collective identity by individual states engaged in cooperation, but by Acharya's own account the sovereignty-bound national identities of ASEAN's members remain stubbornly intact over 30 years after ASEAN's inception.

Despite these minor quibbles, Acharya has written a vivid and cutting-edge work on ASEAN and the problems of security cooperation in Southeast Asia.

Organized Crime and Democratic Governability: Mexico and the U.S.–Mexican Borderlands. Edited by John Bailey and Roy Godson. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000. 271p. \$50.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

William O. Walker III, *Florida International University*

Organized Crime and Democratic Governability offers an insightful look at one of the most critical and vexing questions of the contemporary era: To what extent is democratic governance possible when it coexists with organized crime? John Bailey and Roy Godson's edited volume analyzes the many dimensions of the deeply entrenched obstacles to democratic stability in modern Mexico, perhaps an ideal case study for such an inquiry. The reach of organized crime there has long tended to undermine the very lifeblood of democracy, namely, its procedures. As a result, throughout the sweep of Mexico's postrevolutionary history, the roots of democracy have not been firmly planted. This chronic condition cannot quickly be remedied. Consequently, the editors conclude, organized crime in its various manifestations will continue to present "a significant challenge to democratic governability in Mexico" (p. 218).

Democracy is not necessarily a lost cause in Mexico, however. Problems with historical origins have knowable and explainable causes and, hence, are not wholly at the mercy of quasi-immutable external forces. Yet as the essays in this volume indicate, the effort to bring effective democracy to Mexico is more difficult than explaining its relative absences. The book's contributors neither engage in model building about the interplay between organized crime and governance nor exactly offer a theory derived from the relationship between the two. Nevertheless, as the editors point out, there exist demonstrable analytical patterns, or images, that might point toward possible corrective action by a Mexican state with the will to address its problems. There are four typologies that help elucidate the crime–governance nexus within Mexico and two that illuminate the nature of conditions near the border with the United States. The former are identified as Contained Corruption, whereby law enforcement at the subnational level is ineffective, even compromised, in the face of criminal activity; Centralized-Systemic (formal), whereby corruption within the central government extends to virtually all levels of law enforcement; Centralized-Systemic (formal plus shadow), whereby a parallel structure exists alongside the central government and abets corruption; and Fragmented-Contested, whereby centralized bureaucratic incapacity tends to compromise local efforts at law enforcement. The other two images or

typologies, which pertain to the borderlands, are identified as Marginal Corruption, whereby a professional law enforcement structure keeps corruption relatively in check; and Decentralized, Targeted Corruption, whereby corruption tends to overwhelm efforts at law enforcement in select border regions.

The Fragmented-Contested image is the one found most often within Mexico and along its northern border. Given the historic prevalence of bureaucratic incapacity and the persistent inability or unwillingness of the nation, particularly during the reign of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), to address that situation, it is not surprising that Mexico is a site of extensive contestation. At the same time, asserting the primacy of contestation without probing more deeply into, for instance, the structure-agency issue, tends to limit the range of analysis to which these case studies can be subjected.

While the typologies provide a useful angle of vision on crime and politics in Mexico, they do not directly raise several critical questions. It is worth asking whether the democratic processes in Mexico can survive apart from the economic underpinning provided by organized crime. In other words, if Mexico, now under the leadership of Vicente Fox, is positioned to move beyond the PRI's inclusive, authoritarian style of governance, what kind of democracy is possible without the nexus between crime and politics? A related concern is whether the set of relationships between the governing classes and crime is too entrenched to displace. Finally, and more specifically, is the demand for drugs—for profit at home through illegal trafficking and consumption abroad, most notably in the United States—the dependent variable that historically allowed organized crime to penetrate the process of governing in the Mexican state?

Luis Astorga, in examining the long-standing relationships between drug-related crime and the political system, finds that such linkages helped to provide the political system at local levels with a kind of stability that it might not otherwise have possessed. Likewise, Leonardo Curzio sees drug trafficking as responsible for “the evolution of organized crime into a national security problem” (p. 84). Without a hint of irony, Curzio fears as well that the gradual opening of the Mexican political system after elections in 1985 in the state of Chihuahua, which began the process of removing politicians with a sense of entitlement to hold office, might further enable organized crime “to cultivate,” (p. 102), that is, destabilize the political system. Indeed, even when non-PRI politicians join the political system at the highest levels, as was the case when the National Action Party's Antonio Lozano Gracia took charge of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic from 1994 to 1996, it proved difficult to challenge “the ruling elite's impunity and abuse of power” (p. 106) argues Sigrid Artz. Artz finds, too, that administrative incapacity blocked Lozano's efforts to put comprehensive reforms into place, which, in effect, highlights the influence of extralegal relationships upon the nation's political processes. Perhaps no recent event shows the negative consequence of such linkages than the revelation in February 1997 that Mexico's chief drug official, General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, was providing protection for the Juárez cartel. Nor has Mexico's military escaped the taint of association with organized crime, a situation that is not likely to diminish as the army becomes increasingly involved in all manner of issues related to domestic security. Maintaining domestic order, a constitutional mission of the military, has led to the professionalization of the military but not its depoliticization. In fact, contends Raúl Benítez Manaut, at the end of the twentieth century the military was so active in security matters that it raised fears of a militarized state; it did not matter how open the political process appeared to be. Moreover, the Mexican–U.S. border

constitutes an attractive environment in which to revitalize relationships between organized crime and local officials of both countries. As Francisco Javier Molina Ruiz shows, there exist “ample opportunities and fertile ground” for the rapid growth of crime along the border because of “the lack of control mechanisms, the dynamics of the border's economy, and the flexibility of the authorities” (p. 199).

While *Organized Crime and Democratic Governability* may not be the seminal guide for analyzing its subject, when used together with other volumes in this genre, such as Peter Andreas's (2000) *Border Games: Policing the U.S.–Mexico Divide*, it goes a long way toward charting the contours of that important enterprise.

From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America. By Alison Brysk. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000. 400p. \$60.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Margaret E. Keck, *Johns Hopkins University*

From Tribal Village to Global Village does an excellent job of showing how indigenous peoples in Latin America have gone from victims to protagonists in struggles to control their own fate. Like Alison Brysk's previous work on human rights activities in Argentina during the “dirty war,” this book investigates political dynamics involving nonstate actors at the interface between international relations and comparative politics. Key to these dynamics is the idea that “above all, globalization involves the growing presence, use, and salience of information both in national and local struggles and as a newly significant arena of international relations” (p. 12).

Following a strategy that Brysk calls “identity plus internationalization,” since the beginning of the 1980s the new Indian Rights Movement has won changes in international regimes and domestic law in such areas as land rights, legal status, political representation, and language issues (especially bilingual education). It has facilitated both market access for indigenous products and greater negotiating clout with mining and oil companies prospecting on Indian lands.

Brysk's fieldwork for the book focused on Ecuador as a “most likely case,” because of its large indigenous population, its strong and internationalized Indian Rights movement, and the presence of a variety of international forces. However, the book also presents case studies from Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Mexico and refers frequently to Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, and Chile.

The book's theoretical framework combines elements of constructivism with critical theory, yielding what Brysk calls a “critical constructivist” approach. This includes a “normative view of political power in which interaction, learning, and persuasion can transform dominant behavior and institutions—including the state” (p. 29). Within this normative view, Brysk focuses on “the power of meaning” and on a dynamic construction of identity that involves both strategic and symbolic aspects” (p. 39). At the same time, from critical theory she draws a focus on the structural conditions of communication and a recognition that “communication is not merely a transparent and transferable vehicle or resource, but a mode of domination” (pp. 50–51).

Domestic actors deployed transnational resources nationally or took their demands for self-determination, land rights, and cultural survival to external arenas for adjudication. They did so because they had no support at home. International actors—foundations, multilateral institutions, professional associations, and foreign government assistance programs, as well as wealthy individuals—were convinced to support indigenous causes for a variety of reasons. Besides indigenous activists and anthropologists, these included mainly

human rights groups and environmentalists. Thus, "modern resources are deployed to defend traditional identities, and traditional identities construct different responses to modernization" (p. 58). At issue is not the desire to remain frozen in time but, rather, who manages "the pace and content of cultural change" (p. 60).

The Indian Rights Movement most often mobilized in the presence of external threats (such as World Bank projects in Brazil). Essential resources included external supporters (the Catholic Church, anthropologists, international aid agencies) and a small cadre of educated Indians, "confident enough to expect equality, frustrated when it was not forthcoming, and skilled enough to lead modern movements in national political systems" (p. 67). The book does a good job of describing the origins and growth of panindigenous organizing and the development of the external network of support.

The problems I found in the book came, oddly enough, both from the book's breadth and from its narrowness. If one of the book's strengths is its broad overview of the phenomenon under study, the fact that it almost never breaks the narrative with a different kind of standpoint is also one of its weaknesses. After a few chapters of thumbnail sketches of particular indigenous groups, institutions, and struggles in relation to the topic in question, the eyes glaze over. I would have liked to zoom in on a few of these examples, closely enough actually to see the nuts and bolts of mounting an international campaign or winning international support. That never happens.

The other problem with the book is its narrow focus on indigenous politics per se, as if that alone could explain how and why indigenous groups were successful in making their claims. I do not know well most of the cases Brysk discusses and cannot comment on them. However, I do know some of the Brazilian cases. I know that the treatment of the Yanomami issue at the level of relations among the Yanomami, the national government, and both national and foreign supporters misses a lot of the story. It misses, for example, the way President Collor attempted to win foreign accolades for dynamiting an illegal miners' airstrip in Yanomami territory before visiting Washington, only to discover when he got there that the airstrip had been rebuilt immediately and that President Bush knew it. It misses the migration dynamics of itinerant placer miners, recently pushed out of other mineral-rich areas by the advent of more mechanized production. It misses the crucial role of state politics in the case, in that the government of Roraima vehemently supported the gold miners, and the federal government did not want to alienate the government of Roraima. It misses the great difficulty that indigenous activists had in explaining to ordinary Brazilians why a group of 9000 Indians should be granted a territory "the size of Scotland" (p. 135), while the landless movement had tried vainly for years to win land reform. The fact that in 1997 a Brazilian court found five miners guilty of genocide probably says much less about changing attitudes toward Indians than it does about changes in the judiciary due to the institution of a meritocratic system for selecting judges. In other words, elements of the broader political context—federalism, political economy, institutional change, and symbolic politics, among others, in the Brazilian case—are simply absent from this narrative. We hear almost nothing about what else was going on in these countries at the time these conflicts were being adjudicated—what the determinants of the national mood were, what other things would intervene in whether national support was available.

Granted, these are the complaints of a comparativist looking at a study of international relations involving the increasing contact between global and local spheres. However, as more studies investigate transnational linkages and sources

of leverage over domestic problems, it seems important to remember that these linkages do not occur in isolation; they are interpenetrated by elements of political life, at levels ranging from local to transnational.

That said, let me return to the fact that for anyone interested in understanding the process by which indigenous peoples have taken a place on the world stage, as well as what they are fighting for, *From Tribal Village to Global Village* is an essential source.

Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms. By Ann Marie Clark. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 183p. \$39.50 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

Peter Willetts, *City University, London*

The claim is often made by political activists that the international human rights system is dependent upon nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Ann Marie Clark documents this claim with respect to Amnesty International's achievements. The core of the book is a set of three case studies: the development of the Convention against Torture; the creation of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, along with the unfinished story of attempts to produce a convention against disappearances; and the creation of the Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions, followed by the drafting of a UN "Manual" on prevention and investigation of extrajudicial executions. These case studies are not simply presented as empirical accounts of the diplomatic history. They are structured by portraying each as a four-stage political process, in which Amnesty International collated information on the nature of human rights abuses, built consensus around the principle that the pattern of behavior was morally unacceptable, constructed international norms to express this principle as standards of behavior, and then sought to have application of the norms monitored at both the domestic and the international level.

It is an extraordinary comment on the state of political science that it has taken 40 years since their foundation for the first academic book on Amnesty International to be written. The reason is that its activities do not fit into the orthodox study of either comparative government or international relations. Merely to claim that a transnational actor is important breaks the boundary between domestic and global politics. Clark goes much further by clearly asserting that a focus on norm creation is a theoretical challenge to the Realist approach. It is not supposed to be possible for moral principles to have any impact upon the pursuit of power. Unfortunately, despite the depth of her empirical analysis, Clark makes her challenge in the weakest possible manner, "The moral aspects of international norms cannot be completely subordinated to state purposes" (p. 23). The full application of an analysis of the mobilization of support for principles and norms would recognize that traditional state interests do not have any objective status. The pursuit of security and economic wealth is just a different choice of normative priorities than support for human rights.

While this is a book about Amnesty International, it does not make the mistake of concentrating solely on Amnesty's activities. The strength of the case studies is that the politics of human rights at the UN is put in the context of changes in world politics, the significance of changes within particular countries, and the nature of the different structures of different UN fora. While Amnesty has a leadership role, so too do other NGOs, UN secretariat officials, UN rapporteurs, and particular governments, notably the Scandinavians. Amnesty is portrayed as having three strengths: its loyalty to the moral principles of human rights, its independent status,

and its expertise. Nevertheless, it is just one actor in a complex system.

Clark should have the courage to recognize that her work is a denial that we live in "a system dominated by states" (p. 30). Governments have taken the final decisions, but the decisions they took would have been utterly different if Amnesty had not been part of the diplomatic system. Because of the work of Amnesty, in collaboration with the other actors who promote human rights, governments are now constrained by a complex web of international standards, including legally binding treaties. (However, Clark is wrong to suggest, on pages 24 and 31, that they are bound by signing, rather than ratifying, treaties.) An odd omission from the book is any mention either of the way in which the Convention against Torture overrides the principle of sovereignty immunity or the introduction, under the Optional Protocol, of the right of appeal of individuals to international bodies. These two changes were a revolution in the very nature of the international system. It ceased in law, as it had long before ceased in politics, to be simply an interstate system.

It should be noted that by "principles" Clark is referring to what others might call values, and her use of "norms" is in the relatively narrow sense of generally accepted specific rules for behavior. For example, we have had general acceptance of the principle that "Everyone has the right to life" since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in December 1948, but there was no international norm for the conduct of autopsies, to investigate extrajudicial killings, until the UN Manual was produced in May 1991. This distinction, between principles and norms, is central to the book and its most valuable contribution to theorizing about the nature of the political processes in international regimes. Although it is derived from Stephen Krasner's standard definition of a regime (Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes*, 1983, p. 2), Clark's use of the distinction goes way beyond that envisaged by Krasner and opens up the possibility of a nonrealist theory of regimes.

Clark has produced a powerful and important work that should be read widely, not just by those interested in human rights. However, if it is to be used for teaching purposes, students should be cautioned that several general statements downplaying the significance of NGOs in the early years of the UN are not valid (pp. 6, 8, 9, 13, 124). Clark falls into a common trap for subject specialists of believing that the role of NGOs in their field is unique and unprecedented. It is precisely because NGOs have been important at the UN since the foundation and because their role has been expanding on all issues that Clark's work has general importance for theorizing about principles and norms in international policymaking. Indeed, if the early NGOs had not succeeded in the first five years of the UN in translating the principle in Article 71 of the Charter, allowing NGO consultations in an interstate forum, into a set of norms for the exercise of participation rights, then Amnesty would never have had any access to the Commission on Human Rights and the standard-setting processes.

The Global Political Economy and Post-1989 Change: The Place of the Central European Transition. By Elizabeth de Boer-Ashworth. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 203p. \$65.00

Peter Gowan, *University of North London*

This book attempts to draw upon some heterodox, mainly Marxist, approaches to Western influence on Central European political economies in the 1990s. It also argues that the European Union's (EU's) role in the Central European

transformation was qualitatively more positive than the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

In her first two chapters Elizabeth de Boer-Ashworth suggests that various Marxist or neo-Gramscian approaches to the influence of the West on peripheral economies offer valuable insights. But this interesting survey of the ideas of such authors (including the present reviewer) is not then followed through with an attempt to employ concepts from this quarter to studies of the changes in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (and the Czech Republic) in the 1990s. These chapters instead offer a descriptive narrative of changes in the three Central European states unguided by any very obvious analytical/theoretical framework.

Instead, as the book progresses, a second main contention acquires increasing salience. This is that while the baleful influence of the international financial institutions, pressing neoliberalism, was dominant in Central Europe from 1989 to 1993, the stronger involvement of the EU since then has tended to ameliorate the conditions within the Central European political economies, shielding them "from the worst pressures of international capital and the prescriptions of the IMF" (p. 27).

This second contention, that with the signing of the Europe Agreements between Central European states and the EU their transition was ameliorated, is not convincingly argued. Boer-Ashworth does not make distinctions between macroeconomic trends and microeconomic changes. She therefore does not distinguish the IMF's macroeconomic prescriptions from the microeconomic and institutional changes put forward by the IMF and World Bank. This failure is then linked to her failure to understand the nature and economic significance of the EU's trade regime for economic outcomes in the transition. The IMF macroeconomic policy involved a deliberate and harsh deflation combined with a currency devaluation. This was a macroeconomic policy mix very much along the same lines as IMF Latin American policies in the 1980s, though its impact was exacerbated by the collapse of Central European trade with the USSR. This combination gave the Central European economies one path toward strong economic recovery: export-led growth to the EU market. But the EU trade regime seriously blocked this recovery path by blocking imports in key existing Central European export sectors. Boer-Ashworth entirely misses this pincer effect.

One source of this failure may derive from her apparent belief that the trade aspects of the Europe Agreements kicked in only in 1994 (instead of 1992) (p. 157). The long-term consequences for the Central European economies from the combination of the deep slump and the EU's trade policies are evident in the chronic trade deficits of most of these economies. The main exception, Slovenia, proves this rule: Its export insertion in the EU market had been built up since the 1960s. Boer-Ashworth is aware of the chronic problem of current account deficits. But she seems unaware of the EU's role in causing them.

Boer-Ashworth's lack of familiarity with key economic issues and with the EU's economic program also vitiates other parts of her analysis. She views domestic financial liberalization and the dismantling of capital controls as an IMF/World Bank policy rather than as a policy equally championed by the EU. And although she stresses the importance of financial crises, she does not clearly identify the causes of the main financial crisis in her study: that in the Czech republic in 1997. On page 124 she makes a connection between the Czech current account deficit and the collapse of the koruna, followed by the banking crisis. But she ignores the crucial mediating mechanism between the deficit and the koruna collapse: the fact that the Czech republic had dismantled its capital

controls faster and more fully than its neighbors. It had done so partly to take the lead in that field in the race to get into the EU but also to attract hot money into its financial system to compensate for its current account deficit. While missing this key mechanism she later does what she criticizes others for doing in her first chapter—blaming crises derived from the new international regime on domestic failures within the country hit by the crisis: She blames the crisis on instability and corruption in the domestic banking system (p. 127). These problems were universal in the East at that time. What was specific to the Czech republic in 1997 was the faster dismantling of capital controls in line with EU (as well as IMF) norms.

But the most egregious example of the book's blindness to the baleful effects of EU policies lies in Boer-Ashworth's chapter on EU enlargement. She specifically singles out the problems of Central European agriculture as the one sector that she studies in detail. Yet she manages to discuss its problems without any reference whatever to the EU's fierce protection against Central European agricultural exports combined with its vigorous dumping of EU agricultural products in Central European markets.

In sum, after spending her first two chapters packing her bags for a journey into a critical theory of the European transformations in the 1990s, Boer-Ashworth actually travels in a quite different direction: toward an attempted advocacy role on behalf of EU policies toward Central Europe. But her advocacy is weak and flawed. The main work defending (critically) the EU's role, Alan Mayhew's (1998) *Recreating Europe* is not cited.

At a deeper level Boer-Ashworth tends to conflate the norms that legitimized the various Western policies toward Central Europe in the 1990s with the policies themselves. This basic flaw is no doubt partly responsible for her preference for EU activities: She prefers its legitimating norms and values to those of the International Financial Institutions. But her aim of evaluating Western impacts on other political economies requires a study of actual policies, not just normative theorizations.

In Search of Greatness: Russia's Communications with Africa and the World. By Festus Eribo. Westport, CT: Ablex, 2001. 256p. \$79.95 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

Laura Roselle, *Elon University*

In this book, Festus Eribo gives a broad historical view of Russian–African relations and the role of newspapers in communicating Russian and Soviet perceptions of Africa and its people. Not surprisingly, Eribo argues that ideology drove the content of coverage as the Soviet Union attempted to shape opinion according to Marxist–Leninist principles. In taking on the very broad topic of communication, Eribo notes the presence of multiple audiences but describes the content of Russian domestic newspapers in much greater detail than the story of how Russia communicated with African people. While the topic is important, because this book is descriptive and not theoretical, it leaves the reader with more questions than answers about the role of the media in communicating images of Africa.

Eribo begins with a sweeping overview of Russo–African relations that covers pre-Soviet Russian history and the Russian revolutionary press. He notes that by the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet leaders were determined to recruit Africans to the socialist cause and that they encouraged African youth to study in the Soviet Union, a tactic that continued into the 1980s. Eribo raises interesting issues but tends not to develop his discussion beyond a narrative description. He mentions

the Sino–Soviet rivalry for political influence in Africa, for example, but devotes only one sentence to it.

Africa was significant to Soviet foreign policy, particularly within the context of the Cold War. In chapter 4, on Cold War political communication and Africa, Eribo argues that Soviet newspapers portrayed Africa “as a tragic, horrible, dangerous black continent” even as the Soviet Union was perceived as an ally of “oppressed nations” of Africa (p. 103). Eribo notes the theme of Russian racism in a number of places, but some readers will undoubtedly want some elaboration on the conflict between Marxist–Leninist rhetoric and racist rhetoric and the relationship of the Soviet press to this. Noting the number of revolutionary democracies in Africa during the Cold War period, Eribo misses the opportunity to analyze more deeply how the media depicted and contributed to the ideological struggle in Africa. For example, Eribo says that while the Voice of America was broadcasting in five languages for a total of 56 hours a week, Radio Moscow was broadcasting in more than 64 languages for 1940 hours a week. But, beyond supplying these numbers, he does not analyze Soviet propaganda in Africa in a more detailed and complex manner.

Similarly, Eribo argues that nonaligned countries did not criticize Soviet information content and policies during the United Nations' New Information and Communication Order debate, focusing attention instead on a critique of Western media. Some readers may want a fuller explanation of how the Soviets were able effectively to gain allies against Western media images of Africa in a way that deflected criticism of their own coverage.

In another chapter, Eribo describes the content of Soviet newspaper coverage through a systematic content analysis of four newspapers from 1979, 1983, and 1987. The data show that *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Trud*, and *Selskaya Zhizn*, at least in the samples taken, covered political news and news from pro-socialist African countries more than other types of news or news from other African countries. These data confirm the ideological nature of the Soviet media, yet this is hardly a surprise. In addition to his discussion of what Soviet newspapers covered, Eribo could have expanded considerably on the differences in coverage among the four newspapers. There is a critical absence of interviews and archival data on how and why Soviet media officials constructed the news as they did. There is also no discussion of the racism he mentions in other parts of the book.

This lack of context is particularly glaring when Eribo considers newspaper coverage during glasnost and following the Soviet Union's collapse. Data from additional content analyses (from 1990 and 1992) show coverage to be less partisan, as one might expect. The 1992 data also show that Africa was covered less frequently than it was previously, a fact that Eribo attributes to issues of ownership and financial constraints but for which he presents no evidence. A decline in news about Africa would be expected after the ideological struggle ceased, especially because Eribo argues that that struggle was the foundation on which coverage was shaped. The author predicts that, in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, Russian nationalism will replace Soviet ideology in shaping media images, but again, he offers no substantive discussion of this issue.

Although the book has significant shortcomings, the issues under discussion are important to political scientists for a number of reasons. First, as Eribo correctly points out, media images are created, in part, according to specific political and economic contexts. The Soviet mass media apparatus was based on an elaborate system of centralization and control, through which Soviet political officials attempted to shape domestic public opinion. The degree to which they were

successful is a matter of dispute and, as students of public opinion know, is a complicated issue. Second, leaders use various means for presenting their views abroad. Understanding the conditions under which public information successfully influences opinion is important to the study of foreign policy and alliance building. Finally, political change in the Soviet Union was fostered by Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, which abrogated the one-party line of the mass media. That said, the old institutional structures of the media did not disappear entirely with the new political context and changes in political norms. One of the more interesting questions for political scientists studying media systems and change is how, exactly, old structures change when confronted with new political ideas. So, while this book may be less than satisfying, it raises important issues for future study.

Cuba's Foreign Relations in a Post-Soviet World. By H. Michael Erismán. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000. 336p. \$49.95.

Cuba, the United States, and the Helms-Burton Doctrine: International Reactions. By Joaquín Roy. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000. 281p. \$55.00.

Joel C. Edelstein, *University of Colorado at Denver*

In *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (2nd edition, 1993), Walter LeFeber analyzes the extraordinary continuity of U.S. policy in Central America. Indeed, from the Rio Bravo all the way to Tierra del Fuego, for more than a century, the United States has refused to tolerate leftist governments when recourse to other options has been available. Thus even in 1959, it didn't take a political scientist to predict that the United States would not accept the Cuban revolution.

These monographs by Joaquín Roy and by Michael Erismán complement each other to provide a comprehensive view of Cuba's international relations. Roy's study, limited to the decade of the 1990s, sets out to analyze and explain the Helms-Burton law (HB), passed in 1996, in relation to U.S. domestic politics, the U.S.-Cuba relationship, and the wider international picture. "The global dimension is my principal focus, deriving from the internationalization of the original feud between Havana and Washington" (xvi).

Roy utilizes an admirably broad range of sources in his analysis of the interaction of the United States with the EU and its NAFTA partners in response to HB. His study is a valuable contribution to our understanding of, in Roy's words, "... how unilateral sanctions applied by one country (that is, the United States) can ripple beyond their main target (Cuba) to generate serious complications in its international relations" (p. xvi).

HB codified the U.S. economic embargo of Cuba, which had been maintained by executive order since 1962. A change in this policy would henceforth require positive Congressional action. HB brought near-universal condemnation from other countries because of a provision of the law allowing U.S. citizens to sue foreign nationals in U.S. courts for dealing with properties that Cuba had allegedly confiscated improperly in the early 1960s. Controversial within United States was a provision of the law that included in the definition of U.S. citizens those, almost exclusively Cuban-Americans, who had become citizens after the expropriation of their property in Cuba.

HB has failed to bring down the Cuban government by discouraging nationals of other countries from investing in Cuba. Its most important provision, Title III, which asserts extraterritoriality, has not been put into effect because of determined resistance from the EU, Canada, and Mexico.

When, in response to HB, the EU threatened to take the United States to the WTO, the Clinton administration agreed not to enforce Title III. This was in contrast to the conflict over Central and American and Caribbean bananas controlled by U.S. growers. Roy explains, "... Cuba is less important for the United States and the European Union than the banana market—they risked confrontation at the WTO over this agricultural marketing disagreement, but they avoided a clash in the same place because of Cuba" (p. 179).

The Cuban economy has certainly been hurt by the embargo and sources in Cuba acknowledge that some foreign investors have been scared off. However, since the passage of HB, foreign investment in Cuba has increased and Cuba's economic recovery has continued. Nonetheless, Roy sees HB as quite significant, asserting that "... the law is more than a policy—it is an amorphous (although historically coherent) tool for updating the Monroe Doctrine. It is the *Helms-Burton Doctrine*" (p. xiv; original italics). He cites Jorge Domínguez: "The Helms-Burton Act is quite faithful to themes of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary ... [It] rediscovers the ideological brio of imperialism. At the end of the 20th century, as in centuries past, the United States is demanding the right to set the framework for the political and economic system it would tolerate inside Cuba" (p. 6).

Roy's analysis considers strategic, institutional, political, and legal aspects of U.S. policy toward Cuba. He notes that the goals of HB reflect the growing influence of Cuban exiles in the United States. Accordingly, he cites Samuel Huntington's statement that "the institutions and capabilities created to serve a grand national purpose in the Cold War are now being subordinated and redirected to serve narrow subnational, transnational, and even nonnational purposes." Huntington warns that American foreign policy is becoming a policy of "particularism increasingly devoted to the promotion abroad of highly specific commercial and ethnic interests" (p. 7). Roy goes on to note that foreign critics suggest that, contrary to Huntington's thesis of an idiosyncratic foreign policy, HB may reflect a U.S. will and strategy to control the future restructuring of global trade and investment.

Cuban foreign policy is not a focus in Roy's work and there is little substance in his comments that do address this subject. Erismán focuses on Cuba's foreign relations over four decades. In the course of his study he offers a valuable analysis of Cuban foreign policy, including Cuba's relations with the Soviet bloc and with nonaligned countries.

Erismán asserts that counterdependency has been the core organizing principle of Cuban foreign policy. He defines this policy agenda as one "... in which the government assigns top priority to cultivating the capacity to *prevent exogenous penetration* of its decision-making processes and thereby *reduce its vulnerability* to external power centers to the point where its sociopolitical and developmental dynamics *are not* basically the product of a subordinate relationship with a stronger industrialized country, but rather are a reflection of a series of formally or informally negotiated relationships on both horizontal (South-South) and vertical (North-South) axes" (p. 42; original italics). Erismán proposes a two-stage model of counterdependency politics in which the initial step is enlarging political/economic space by geographic and geopolitical diversification of trading partners. Diversification establishes a set of preconditions that place a developing country in an optimal position to proceed to "the second and more crucial phase of the counterdependency agenda—the acquisition and especially the assertive use of collective bargaining power" (p. 45).

In the 1960s, Cuba sought protection from a hostile United States by engaging with the Soviet Union and by encouraging

revolutionary movements, especially in Latin America. It was hoped that creating "many Vietnams" would diffuse the focus of U.S. hostility, help Cuba to break out of isolation in the Americas, and reduce dependency within the Soviet bloc by creating more Third World Marxian Socialist governments (p. 74). The effort failed to produce additional revolutionary governments. Moreover, it was a source of stress in Cuba's relationship with the USSR, which opposed actions it regarded as adventurist with respect to the United States.

Cuba was much more successful in harmonizing foreign policy goals in the 1970s and 1980s, through a strategy that Erisman characterizes as "Cold War dual tracking" (p. 79). Cuba gained substantial economic resources as well as large infusions of military aid from the industrialized socialist bloc, enabling an increase in its influence vis-à-vis the Third World. Cuba's leadership of the nonaligned movement, and its international prestige in general, served to make it more valuable to the Soviet Union and thus deserving of additional resources, while protecting Cuba to some degree from the United States. Erisman points out an unusual instance in which the two tracks were not synergistic, when Cuba's support of the Soviet Union's actions in Afghanistan carried great political costs in relations with the nonaligned movement. The crisis of the Soviet bloc reduced and then eliminated what had been a source of valuable resources and ended the two-track policy.

The revolutionary government initially sought to end dependence by plowing under sugar, following a debt-financed import substitution industrialization strategy. When debt mounted too fast, the road to independence seemed to go through an extreme focus on sugar to create a source of foreign exchange to finance industrialization. This strategy failed in 1970, leaving Cuba more dependent on the USSR.

In the early 1980s, based on its successes in medical care, Cuba began to develop a biotechnology industry in the hope that it could lead and finance a new, diversified economy. Progress has been made, but not nearly enough to avoid the disaster brought on by the demise of the socialist bloc. Erisman observes that "... Cuba's economic health, like that of practically any small island society, is heavily dependent on foreign trade By the early 1980s, ... Cuba had become extremely dependent on its CMEA connection Putting practically all one's economic eggs in a single basket is an extremely risky proposition, as would become painfully evident in the late 1980s and early 1990s" (p. 108).

Economic decline brought discontent, and according to Erisman, "Remarkably, despite all this adversity, Cuba continued its tradition of following the road less traveled, stubbornly maintaining its basic commitment to Fidelista socialism and refusing to compromise its nationalistic principals in any way in order to curry favor with the United States. Such defiance would not come cheaply, but as always Havana was willing to pay the price" (p. 107). Certainly, the options available to Cuba in this situation have been quite limited. I would suggest that Erisman has understated the amount of compromise that Cuba has accepted. For example, significantly greater inequality has resulted from an unavoidably dollarized economy, and this constitutes a real threat to the Fidelista vision of socialism.

Erisman's elucidation of the counterdependency strategy is a valuable contribution to our understanding of Cuban foreign policy. The conceptualization might be still more useful if it included the problematic role of the domestic economy. Without Soviet support and facing stronger U.S. efforts to isolate the island in the '90s, Cuba has welcomed foreign investment to survive. This could turn out to undermine the counterdependency strategy, if this new foreign sector outpaces the domestic sector of the economy and, thereby, be-

comes capable of commanding the Cuban state (and party) to favor its interests when conflicts arise between foreign enterprises and the Cuban people.

Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in China. By Rosemary Foot. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 308p. \$65.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations: Defining and Defending National Interests. By Ming Wan. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. 192p. \$39.95.

Samuel S. Kim, *Columbia University*

Human rights as a focus of both theoretical and practical concern came alive in the last decade of the twentieth century. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the "third wave" of democratization, and the globalization-cum-transparency revolution have all played a part in the widening and deepening of global human rights norms. The revitalization of human rights norms has profound implications for the complex interdependence between China and the global community. Indeed, human rights diplomacy is one of the most novel but generally overlooked aspects of international relations in post-Mao China, where it has finally come of age, whatever the motivation.

Sino-global interaction in the domain of human rights remains, however, one of the most perplexing and least studied questions in post-Cold-War global politics. It is a puzzle of both theoretical and practical significance that challenges scholars and policymakers concerned about the shape of postinternational life in the future. China's human rights diplomacy has not received the scholarly attention it deserves; Ann Kent's (1999) *China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance* is the most conspicuous exception. Rosemary Foot's *Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in China* and Ming Wan's *Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations: Defining and Defending National Interests* go a long way toward filling the lacunae in the literature on this important but neglected subject, and they are welcome additions.

While both address China's theory and practice in human rights and the nature and impact of external pressure on China from key international actors, these two books proceed from different levels of analysis. Rosemary Foot—one of the leading British authorities on East Asian international relations—takes up China as a case study of global human rights politics in this latest work. The main focus is on global actions in response to China's practices in human rights rather than on China's reactions to external pressure. In contrast, Ming Wan examines China's human rights diplomacy as a case study of its foreign relations with four select groups of international actors—the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and the United Nations.

The major premise of Foot's book is that the issue of human rights has become an integral part of global politics, particularly so in the case of the global community's relationship with China. Drawing theoretical insights from international law and international relations literature, Foot provides an excellent and generally reliable analysis of the this complex and evolving relationship and considers, in particular, how normative concerns about the conditions of human rights in China have influenced the behavior of key international actors (e.g., selected nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], some national governments, and the human rights institutions of the United Nations) in the period since the Tiananmen carnage of June 1989. She adopts a chronological narrative approach to examine how seemingly powerless

human rights norms—norms not backed by real enforcement mechanisms—have the power in a state like China to change external behavior and, to some extent, even internal behavior. China's reactive behavior, internal and external, to its role as the focus of so much global attention in this area is meticulously delineated and analyzed.

According to Foot, China's human rights behavior presents a kind of double or mutual challenge of legitimation. On the one hand, because of China's economic, strategic, and demographic weight in world politics, its compliance and cooperative participation are important to the credibility, viability, and legitimacy of the global human rights regime as a universal promoter of human rights. On the other hand, adherence to human rights norms has come to be associated with a state's political legitimacy in the post-Cold War era. China's willed national identity as a "responsible great power" is linked—by those acting as gatekeepers for entry into the exclusive great-power club—with compliance with these human rights norms.

Foot's principal argument is that China has been nudged along a meandering path that has led to a slow but steady involvement in the global human rights regime, consequently locking the Chinese government into discursive human rights formulations, not irrevocably but to a degree sufficient to demonstrate that China remains an integral part of the global human rights solution. What accounts for such forward movement in China's norm diffusion and enmeshment? Here Foot offers a rather long list of external and internal factors: U.S. power; the activities of United Nations (UN) human rights institutions; NGO pressure; the new criteria for membership in international society; the new processes of persuasion, argument, and shaming; and Beijing's great-power status drive, its concerns about its international image, and its understanding that the basis of legitimation has changed.

Despite such forward moves, Foot cautions, China's human rights norms have not progressed far enough for domestic internalization or implementation. Even at the level of policy discourse there are wild swings in Chinese human rights rhetoric, ranging from references that emphasize the universality and individuality of all rights to statements that stress cultural and developmental relativism. Foot cites several major sources of instability in policy pronouncements, of ambiguities in revised or new domestic legislation, and, especially, of the failure to follow through to full implementation: the structural statist underpinnings of the international human rights regime, the competing or conflicting interests of participating states within it, China's strategic and economic weight in world politics, and domestic factors associated with the maintenance of party and state control. Foot concludes, however, that the transformation of China's normative discourse, its deepening enmeshment in the global human rights regime, and domestic policy reform in the fields of criminal and other related legislation do indeed represent significant steps toward full acceptance of international human rights norms.

Wan examines the role of human rights in China's relations with the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and the UN human rights regime, focusing on both the nature and the impact of the external pressure on China from these key international actors and on the tactics Beijing has adopted in response to such external pressure. Wan's main argument is simple and strictly realist: Although the issue of human rights is important in Western policy toward China, it has seldom prevailed over traditional economic and security interests, and Beijing, after a decade of external pressure, still treats human rights diplomacy as an integral part of traditional power politics. Further, China's dialogues with international actors on the subject of human rights have brought

about only adaptive learning about how best to obviate Western pressure, rather than cognitive or normative learning about the importance of human rights per se. The different degrees of commitment to human rights and the respective importance of human rights norms relative to economic and strategic interests explain why Japan, Western Europe, and the United States, in that order, have gradually retreated from a confrontation with China on issues of human rights. Washington's high-pressure approach has become increasingly ineffective, with the exception of winning the release of high-profile intellectual dissidents. Beijing has also successfully neutralized Western European criticism, effectively sidelining human rights issues in Sino-European relations. Except for a brief period after Tiananmen (1989–90), the human rights debate has remained a nonissue in Sino-Japanese relations. Given Japan's imperial-era atrocities such as the rape of Nanking and biological-weapons experiments in Northeast China, China holds a trump card of another kind in its relations with Japan.

The most telling argument in Wan's book is that the UN human rights regime has played a useful mitigating role in Sino-Western relations in the domain of human rights. For the West, the UN human rights regime offers a more legitimate and less costly alternative to bilateral clashes. For China, the human rights regime offers a more congenial arena to seek and mobilize support of Third World member states to demonstrate that China is not really isolated in the international community on the issue of human rights. Wan also argues and concludes that "by successfully resisting external rights pressure, powerful target nations like China weaken the importance of human rights in the foreign policy deliberations of the Western countries that initiate pressure" (p. 143). The most interesting and illuminating part of the book is a background brief on Chinese views of human rights (chapter 2). Drawing from public opinion surveys, field interviews, and a wide range of Chinese-language sources, Wan defines the primary parameters for the possible and the permissible in relation to Chinese theory and practice in human rights: (1) That although views among government officials and social groups are becoming increasingly diverse, there is nonetheless a broad consensus on "developmental authoritarianism"; (2) that the party-state is widely considered a necessary evil for the achievement of economic growth and well-being; and (3) that given the considerable public support in China for stability, any interventionist human rights diplomacy is both unwise and counterproductive.

Although these two books make significant contributions to the understanding of the complex and shifting relationship between China and the outside world, through excellent country-specific and issue-specific descriptive analyses, the shortcomings of both volumes stem from the lack of sustained theoretical rigor and some empirical/analytical omissions. Wan makes it clear at the outset that his book "is not designed to test international relations theories" (p. 11), so there is no point in assessing his book in theoretical terms. Foot's book reveals a keen conceptual mind for defining the puzzle of norm diffusion and enmeshment, if not that of norm internalization, an admirable command over international law and international relations literature, and an accessible and elegant prose. But she seems of more than two theoretical minds. As with her previous work—*The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China Since 1949* (1995)—she seeks to supplement, not reject, realism "by paying attention to both the power and the symbolic elements in [her] explanation of behavior and discourse" (p. 6). As earlier noted, however, she catalogues a long list of the seemingly causal independent variables without providing *a priori* an aggregate weighting formula or prioritization.

Both authors overdo statism by omitting any discussion of the NGO-led struggle to extend the rule of law to crimes of state, especially U.S. and Chinese reactions to the Khmer Rouge genocide from 1975 to 1979 and the most important law-making conference since Nuremberg—the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), held in Rome from June 15 to July 17, 1998. In the Khmer Rouge case, the United States and China embraced a realpolitik partnership of the worst kind, giving strong diplomatic and indirect economic and military support to the Khmer Rouge and opposing the Vietnamese invasion that toppled the genocidal regime and ended the genocide in Cambodia (Kampuchea). In the UN Rome Conference, Chinese and American statism-cum-unilateralism intersected once again when China, along with five rouge states including Iran and Libya, opposed the establishment of the ICC. The NGO-led global campaign to establish a permanent ICC eventuated in a treaty signed by 120 states in a vote of 120 to 7, despite the strong objections made by powerhouses like the United States and China. In several respects, the Rome treaty is ready-made for testing the outer possibilities and limitations of Sino-global interaction on human rights issues. Hence, by ignoring Chinese empirical and behavioral referents in the making of the ICC, both authors leave a gaping hole in their books.

Finally, neither volume pays any attention to the impact of globalization on the global human rights regime, on China's norm diffusion, enmeshment, and internalization, or on the "Asian values" debate. This omission stands out as another weakness, since the forces of globalization in the 1990s have transformed both the context and the conditions under which Sino-global interaction can be played out. There are today some 22.5 million Chinese with on-line access, and it is projected that by 2005 some 200 million will be Internet users. China must worry not only about military power but also about the economic power, cultural power, and knowledge power needed to survive and prosper in a world that is becoming increasingly globalized and competitive.

Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. By John W. Garver. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001. 447p. \$50.00.

Mark W. Frazier, *University of Louisville*

India's nuclear tests in May 1998 came as a surprise to many observers and proved all the more puzzling when Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee, in a letter to President Clinton, singled out China as the focal point of Indian security concerns. This statement and others led some, including Beijing's own foreign policy community, to view the tests as an effort to boost India's status internationally and to shore up domestic support for a new coalition government. John Garver's book challenges this domestic-driven interpretation of the tests by chronicling in detail a half-century of contentious relations between the world's two most populous states. Seen in historical perspective, India's nuclear tests were another episode in what Garver terms a "protracted conflict" (p. 3) between Beijing and Delhi. (The milder-sounding "protracted contest" serves as the book's title, but "protracted conflict," a term Garver uses with some frequency, better captures the book's thesis.)

While Garver acknowledges that there have been cooperative dimensions in Sino-Indian relations, he argues that conflict has been the predominant theme. The book's chapters are organized around specific manifestations of this conflict over the status of Tibet, the still unresolved border dispute, the

exercise of leadership among the developing world, the expansion of naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean, and the development of nuclear weapons. Individual chapters also cover various states in which Chinese and Indian interests have diverged considerably: Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, Burma, and, most significantly, Pakistan (to which two chapters are devoted). While overt military conflict between China and India has occurred only once (in 1962), Garver argues that this is a relationship in which both sides have been absorbed by the possibility of one day having to use military force against one another (p. 4). Garver concludes his portrait of this understated yet substantially conflictual relationship with a chapter on how it might change in the future toward more cooperative directions.

Garver's presentation proceeds in a well-structured, straightforward manner that achieves the right balance of detail and thematic focus. He documents his case using ample Chinese and Indian sources, both secondary and primary. Garver also reminds us of the significance of terrain and topography in several chapters, putting proper emphasis on the "geo" in the term "geopolitical conflict" (p. 22). The well-balanced presentation of problem areas in Sino-Indian relations does come at a sacrifice to the sort of hypothesis-testing that some readers are likely to desire, which would help isolate the causes of this longstanding rivalry and its apparent intractability. Is the "protracted contest/conflict" a straightforward case of two neighboring states invariably competing as they seek to expand their capabilities and influence? To what extent is this rivalry the product of broader systemic forces during and after the Cold War? For that matter, why did the end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet Union not ameliorate the Sino-Indian conflict or at least push it toward more cooperative directions (as some have in fact asserted)? Garver states at the outset that one might analyze Sino-Indian relations within the framework of the Soviet-American conflict, and from the perspective of domestic development goals and processes specific to each state. The approach he favors, as he explains it, is to center his analysis on the "geopolitical conflict in the arc of land and waters lying between and alongside China and India" and to address these other factors "only to the extent that they impinge on their geopolitical rivalry" (p. 5).

With that said, readers must draw their own conclusions as to what is driving this pattern of conflict and competition between India and China. Garver does offer, in the introductory chapter, two explicit and rather intriguing "tap-roots" of the conflict. One is the fact that China and India have strong "nationalist narratives," in which their respective civilizations are seen as having extended a political, social, and economic influence well beyond their current borders as contemporary states. A map on page 15 shows the substantial overlap in the historic domains of Chinese and Indian influence (an overlap that includes Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and peninsular Southeast Asia). How such "nationalist narratives" work to shape modern foreign policy and the articulation of national interests is an intriguing question that deserves more sustained treatment than it gets in subsequent chapters. The second source of the Sino-Indian rivalry Garver identifies will likely prove more satisfactory to security specialists. He says that a security dilemma has arisen from India's need to exercise a kind of unstated "Monroe doctrine" in South Asia in which it exerts sole influence over states in the region. China, on the other hand, attaches great importance and derives its security from establishing cooperative links with its neighbors, including those in South Asia. As China seeks to enhance its security by developing such ties, it actually worsens the situation by undermining India's security.

Garver's conclusion that the relationship remains basically conflictual in the post-Cold War era is an important challenge to a prevailing view among specialists that Sino-Indian relations improved substantially after China allegedly acknowledged an Indian sphere of influence in South Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Garver cautions us to distinguish between China's restraint in objecting to India's expanding power in South Asia versus an actual acceptance of Indian hegemony in the region. China has indeed refrained from providing overt support that India's neighbors have sometimes sought during various diplomatic and military confrontations with India, but China would not accept being shut out of the region, especially from its robust ties with Pakistan and Burma, Garver argues. The other dominant trend in the 1990s has been for India and China to attach added importance to fostering a security environment conducive to economic growth, expanded trade, and foreign investment. While such approaches might presage more cooperative relations, Garver suggests in his final chapter that the vast gaps in economic performance to date (with China far outpacing India) make it likely that any future cooperation between the two states will be highly asymmetric—and that, based on current trends, India might one day have little alternative to acknowledging China's preeminence in the South Asian region.

The sustained economic performance of India and China, and their expanding diplomatic and military clout, has prompted some scholars and policymakers to rethink the traditional boundaries that have long demarcated "East Asia" from "South Asia" and their respective communities of specialists. Garver's timely contribution to the understudied relationship between China and India will likely serve as a milestone in such efforts, and specialists on both sides of the Himalayan divide will benefit greatly from this book.

The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 1948–2000: A Political Study. By As'ad Ghanem. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. 238p. \$62.50 cloth, \$20.95 paper.

Alan Dowty, *University of Notre Dame*

This study, a volume in the SUNY Israel Studies series, represents a new stage of maturity in academic research on Israel's Arab minority: a serious and scholarly (if rather severe) overview from within that community. Ghanem, a lecturer at Israel's University of Haifa, has, within a few short years, emerged as a leading academic analyst of Israeli Arab political issues, and the book at hand will cement his reputation. It combines an insider's feel for his subject with a critical, but reasonably restrained and balanced, presentation of a topic that has too often generated apologetics or polemics. Ghanem does not focus on the history or substance of relations between the Jewish majority and Arab citizens of Israel, or on official policies and practices. On these issues he briefly redraws the picture sketched by previous studies, most of them by Israeli Jewish scholars: Israeli Arabs/Palestinians (the latter designation is increasingly preferred) have formal rights of citizenship, but are in fact second-class citizens both in law (given legal expressions of the Jewishness of the state) and, even more, in practice. While they have made great absolute progress by most measures in the half-century of Israeli statehood, a huge gap between the two communities remains. Furthermore, they are doubly marginalized, first, as Israelis and, second, as part of the broader Palestinian Arab community in which their position is also problematic.

The main thrust of Ghanem's book, however, is a systematic analysis of the various political "streams" (camps or movements) among Israeli Palestinians. Ghanem faults Israeli Jewish scholars for classifying these groups by the self-centered criterion of their attitudes toward Israel and, quite reasonably, posits instead a set of more objective criteria. As it turns out, the resulting categories do not actually differ greatly from previous ones. Ghanem identifies an Israeli-Arab stream (those groups working within the system), the Communists (for a long time the major established party giving full expression to Arab demands), the nationalists (divided between the pan-Arabists and those with a Palestinian focus), and the Islamists (more moderate than their counterparts elsewhere).

Ghanem's clear explication of the thinking of these "streams" makes this the book of choice for those interested in the political divisions among Arabs in Israel. His account confirms the widely noted growth of a Palestinian identity in this community and adds many other observations worth noting. Ghanem notes, for example, that the chances of the Islamic Movement attracting new members "are rather slim, given the wave of modernization and secularization among the Arabs in Israel" (p. 125). He calls attention to the resurgence of clan-based politics at the local level, presenting it as an alternative (and decidedly retrograde) political grouping. Another observation of special interest is the remarkable growth of civil society; according to Ghanem's own research, there were 180 public societies among Israeli Arabs in 1990 but another 656 were added in the next nine years.

Could the grievances of the Israeli Arab minority be corrected within the existing system—or would it require a basic redefinition of the Jewish state (that is, "deJudaizing" or "deZionizing" Israel)? This is the defining issue in the political divisions among Palestinians in Israel, but it is also a question that calls for more extensive scholarly comparisons to experiences of minorities in other democratic states. It would be very useful, in particular, to compare the situation of Israeli Palestinian Arabs to that of other embattled minorities in conflict, rather than trying to set standards and expectations in a vacuum. This is not to single out the book at hand for special criticism, as there are lamentably few comparative perspectives generally in studies of Israel, on this issue or on others.

Ghanem does make brief references to the consociational power-sharing models of Belgium and Switzerland in the framework of making a case for the explicit recognition of a group identity for Israeli Arabs. He argues, very persuasively in this reviewer's judgment, that the liberal model with no mediation between individual and state will not work in the ethnically charged environment of the Arab-Israel conflict. On the other hand, group bargaining and power-sharing between Jews and Arabs enjoys the overwhelming support of Israeli Arabs (p. 182).

Ghanem pursues this approach, however, with a twist that gives it an entirely new significance. In a final chapter that is certain to provoke much debate, he urges consociationalism not in the framework of current Israeli borders but in the former Palestine mandate as a whole, that is, including the West Bank and Gaza strip, the occupied territories, which are not a focus in earlier chapters. Thus, rather than consociational accommodation of a minority, he shifts to a *binational* version in which Jews and unified Palestinian Arabs stand in rough numerical, legal, and political parity. This reflects a revival of interest in a binational state solution among Palestinians in the occupied territories, arguing (as Ghanem does) that separation into two states is not workable because of Israeli unwillingness to grant true independence to the West Bank

and Gaza or (Ghanem's focus) true equality to Arabs within Israel.

The separation implied in a two-state solution does indeed face many obstacles, including Jewish settlements in the territories, shared resources such as water, environmental issues, and economic interdependence. But skeptics will point out that the obstacles are not necessarily made easier to overcome by living together. The same problems of sharing water and distributing public goods would remain but would have to be dealt with on a continuing basis rather than in one decisive denouement. A binational state would be vastly more complicated, as Ghanem indicates when he notes that it would require substantial changes "in nature of relations between the two peoples . . . in the two entities, the Palestinian and the Israeli . . . [and] in the nature of the two national movements" (p. 198). Just to take one immediate problem that comes to mind: What would the immigration policy be? Would the binational state continue to welcome all Jews? Would it be open to the 3.8 million registered Palestinian refugees? The potential for a demographic war seems explosive. Perhaps, for all that, a difficult divorce is better than hostile cohabitation.

Tying their fate to that of the Palestinians in the territories is, of course, attractive to Palestinians in Israel because they would no longer be a minority. But this could also be accomplished in a two-state solution to the conflict, by allowing Israeli Arab areas to opt for incorporation into the Palestinian state. This may seem an extremely radical idea in the current context—but perhaps no more so than binationalism, which would require Israelis to give up the basic Zionist vision of a Jewish state. Ghanem has, however, posed exactly the right dilemma for the Jewish majority in Israel. Eventually they will have to choose: Will they give up territory, settlements and hegemony over Palestinians? or Will they give up the idea of a Jewish state? Data presented in the book (pp. 160–163) underline the basic attachment of Israelis to a Jewish state, providing grounds to argue that when the crunch comes, most will choose separation over binationalism. But however it falls, the necessity of choice has seldom been posed so compellingly.

After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars. By G. John Ikenberry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 293p. \$55.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

K. J. Holsti, *University of British Columbia*

Forty years ago Arnold Wolfers lamented that scholars had failed to examine those rare occasions, following great wars, when statesmen gather to refashion the norms and institutions of international politics. He noted in his (1962) *Discord and Collaboration* (pp. 137–38) that creating a new order after the close of war is "one of the trickiest tasks of diplomacy," for how that order is fashioned will have a profound impact on the subsequent pattern of war. Charles Doran's (1971) *The Politics of Assimilation*, Robert Randle's (1973) *The Origins of Peace*, and my (1991) *Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order* provided empirical support for Wolfers' insights, but G. John Ikenberry offers the first study that links peacemaking to specific types of international order.

Since Vienna (1815), the leading victors have pursued increasingly expansive proposals to establish intergovernmental institutions that bind the great powers together and institutionalize their relations after the war. These order-building arrangements derive from a fundamental bargain between the leading postwar power and its allies. The leading state agrees to restrain its use of power. Others states in turn

agree to join the winner's institutional arrangements that are designed to "lock in" its wartime gains.

Ikenberry hypothesizes that the greater the power disparities following major armed conflict, the greater the probability that the leading power will avoid abandonment or domination strategies and instead seek to create a legitimate, institutionalized order. The success of that effort also depends upon the character of the states partaking in the great bargain. Democracies can make commitments to restrain the use of power that can be trusted by others. Ikenberry argues, for example, that the Soviet Union accepted German reunification and the expansion of NATO between 1989 and 1991 because its policymakers had few fears of democracies and appreciated that major post-1945 institutional arrangements such as the UN, NATO, and WTO are essentially benign and nonthreatening. "Institutional logic" thus helps to explain not only how orders get created but why they endure.

Ikenberry's larger purpose is to explore the bases of political order in general. How to transform raw power into legitimate authority is the central theoretical question of the book. It is essentially a question of how to manage winning. He argues, challenging conventional ideas of international theory, that the international realm and domestic politics do not have two fundamentally different structures. International orders can take on "constitutional" characteristics by "limiting the returns to power" (p. 6). Just as elections and other constitutional devices guarantee that winners cannot rule by pure domination within states, international treaties and institutions can limit the power of war victors. Ikenberry suggests that the crucial distinction between domestic and international orders is not anarchy and hierarchy, but among three strategies for power management: domination (hegemony), balance of power, and the great bargain entailing a winner's self-limitation in exchange for general commitments to institutional arrangements.

Ikenberry embeds his analysis in the theoretical debate between realists who insist that order derives from power and those who argue that it is the result of institutions and ideas. He suggests that this is a false dichotomy. Power is an essential source of order, but international institutions inherently limit it. Liberal institutional theories have not explored the ways the leading state uses intergovernmental institutions to restrain itself and thereby dampen the fears of domination and abandonment by secondary states (p. 15).

The historical chapters explore the origins of the great settlements of 1815, 1919, and the more amorphous post-1945 arrangements. The discussion of wartime peace planning in each of the episodes is particularly rich. Ikenberry focuses on the elements of the "great bargain," how power disparities helped or hindered institutional arrangements, and how democracies were able to make commitments acceptable to the lesser states. The cases fit the model quite well. Post-1945 institutions have come closest to resembling a constitutional order. They have endured and expanded despite the collapse of polarity and the end of the Cold War. International institutions, Ikenberry (p. 273) concludes, "can make the exercise of power more restrained and routinized, but they can also make that power more durable, systematic, and legitimate."

The analysis addresses some key issues in realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches to international relations in general and international order specifically. Its innovative erasure of the distinction between anarchical and hierarchical orders merits serious consideration. The model, however, contains limitations. It is basically a power and rational choice device. Ikenberry discusses ideas and the role of leadership, but these are not linked specifically to the model. Ideas, in particular, have no independent influence. Nor does the model

include the handling of the defeated powers after the great wars. Vienna succeeded and endured for almost 40 years in large part because the winners incorporated France into the peacemaking process. Paris in 1919 failed in part because the victors unilaterally imposed a punitive peace on Germany and in effect eliminated two important actors of the system. The fate of defeated powers is a major source of the durability of peace and the elements of international order. The model leaves no space for such normative dimensions of order-building. Justice as a foundation of international order receives no attention.

The focus on power and the logic of choice after major wars also precludes consideration of broader sources of international order. As Hedley Bull (*Anarchical Society*, 1977) and followers of the English school emphasize, international order derives from the interplay of interests, practices, ideas, and norms over long historical periods. Order is less the result of one power's policies than the habitualized practices of many powers. Bull and his followers speak of international order; Ikenberry addresses the question of *the* order.

The erasure of the line between domestic and international orders also raises issues. International orders, in Ikenberry's sense, are created and sustained by negotiated deals between the leading states. This is a realm of power, influence, commitments, and trust. The domestic realm, in contrast, is one of authority—a consensual right to rule and the corollary obligation to obey. Except for WTO decisions and some policies in the European Union, no party in international relations wields authority. Ikenberry duplicates the common error of conflating power and authority. Finally, Ikenberry speaks repeatedly of the “leading state” that formulates the essential bargain. But in 1815 and, to a lesser extent, in 1919, it is not clear that there was a single leading state. Russian troops patrolled Paris streets, while the diplomats bargained in Vienna. Many Europeans were more concerned with Russian than British domination. Ikenberry gives short shrift to the role of Russia and Austria (particularly Metternich) in the formation of the post-Napoleonic order. Similarly, while Wilson played a key role in the formation of post-1919 institutions, the Versailles treaty reflected French and British, more than American, paramountcy. The historical evidence does not always match the model's crude representation of power.

Ikenberry's volume nevertheless presents a persuasive explanation for the formation and endurance of specific international orders and explores some questions not sufficiently addressed by Bull and his successors. It also does much more. It provides interesting historical evidence. It couples the problem of international order to questions of political order in general. It raises issues of contemporary American foreign policy. What will be the consequences of the Bush administration's proclivity to threaten, rescind, abandon, and scorn major order-creating international agreements? Are the looming abrogation of the ABM treaty and the militarization of space consistent with the idea of the self-limiting leading state? And the study offers major challenges to contemporary approaches to international theory. It is an exemplary positivist theoretical effort and rightfully can claim to be one of the major contributions to international relations in the past decade.

African Foreign Policies: Power and Process. Edited by Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 260p. \$55.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Timothy M. Shaw, *University of London*

The analysis and practice of foreign policy are in flux on the African continent as elsewhere at the turn of the century.

The combined forces of the end of bipolarity, then apartheid plus exponential liberalization(s) and globalization(s), have changed the balance of power, not just between states externally but also between states and nonstate actors (e.g., civil societies and private sectors) internally. The eight regional or national case studies in this collection capture the latter dynamic well—foreign policy is no longer, if it ever was, the monopoly of regimes—but the pair of end pieces by the coeditors is, alas, more cautious and realistic. Thus, this original volume, by nine mainly younger scholars, encapsulates the debate about the sources and causes of, actors and interests in, inter- and transnational relations in this distinctive region with relevance for broader discourses about local to global governance. So chapters 1 and 10 could have been written a decade ago, whereas the central eight very much reflect the profound changes in relations and analyses of the 1990s, especially that by William Reno, “External Relations of Weak States and Stateless Regions in Africa,” with resonance for comparable regions such as Central Europe and Central Asia.

Nevertheless, if, like Reno, you are interested not only in weak states but in the real political economy of transitional countries, then you would want mention of a range of current issues affecting human development/security such as AIDS/HIV, biodiversity, blood diamonds, drought/floods, drugs/guns, illegal/informal sectors, mafias/militias, and new technologies. Alas, on such contemporary issues, except for Reno's contribution, this volume is largely silent. Nevertheless, Peter Schraeder does note the growing role of diasporas in Northern host's foreign policies (p. 53).

The dramatic shift in perspective or paradigm from old to new framework is apparent in chapter 2 from a hitherto determined realist, Clement Abide, who now asserts that “the foreign policy context of Anglophone West Africa in the past decade has assaulted the state-centric model of classical international politics” (p. 27), leading to “the proliferation of actors and issues,” which compels a “redefinition of interests and alliance... consistent with the globalizing tendencies of late-twentieth century neoliberalism” (p. 17). Rene Lemarchand offers an equally revisionist account of “a power shift of seismic proportions throughout the central African Great Lakes Region” (p. 87), suggesting that the fleeting new regional alliance reflected certain historical ethnicities—a latter-day “Hima empire”?—though he comes to overlay the Rwanda card, asserting that in the 1990s, it emerged “as something of a regional hegemon” (p. 92). In contrast, from a more metropolitan viewpoint, Peter Schraeder indicates that Parisian policymakers worried that the coming to power of Paul Kagame represented the rise of Anglo-Saxon influence in Central Africa. But the most compelling and challenging (for a variety of assumptions and approaches) of the chapters is the more comparative one by Reno, who turns state-centrism on its head.

In developing his increasingly powerful and popular redefinition of the character and interests of the actors involved in African conflicts, Reno asserts that “regimes that preside over the disintegration of formal state institutions use private actors to conduct interstate diplomacy and to garner external resources to ensure regime survival” (p. 185). He highlights how the “private diplomacy” of mining companies can serve failing regimes so that both weak and strong states may have mutual interests: “Private global actors are indeed central to the survival of Africa's system of states and the regimes that rule these states” (p. 186). In contrast, while dealing with much of the same terrain as Reno, John F. Clark argues that “foreign policy in central Africa is marked more by continuity than change” (p. 67). And both he and Ruth Iyob indicate how, in terms of both actors and relations, the definition of regions on the continent is

fluid, with conflicts in, say, the Great Lakes and Horn, and central and southern Africa, impacting on each other over time (p. 82).

Several contributions also present an interesting set of comments about nonstate actors, primarily NGOs, derived from different regions; regrettably, companies, unions, even media hardly appear here. Khadiagala treats NGOs appropriately: They “have emerged on the margins of Southern African Development Community (SADC) as alternative purveyors of norms and policies that have a regional reach” (p. 150). In contrast, Adibe cautions that “the unregulated operation of diverse NGOs and transnational organizations is worrisome in West African diplomacy and nation-building processes” (p. 35).

Coeditor Gilbert Khadiagala laments that SADC has lost direction postapartheid, indicating that now “the foreign policy choices of southern African states are constrained by weak state structures, economic despair, and social dislocations” (p. 131). He outlines interregime disagreements over treaties about free trade, security, etc., in the region while noting the resilience of nonstate actors such as NGOs, think tanks, and trade unions: “Weak states furnish fragile bases for regionalism . . . SADC is incapable of meeting problems of internal implosion and civil wars, and its role in building values and norms has been equally problematic” (p. 149).

Reinforcing attention to the southern subcontinent, Denis Venter offers the only case study of a single country rather than a region: the regional center of South Africa, which, postapartheid, is “clearly suffering an identity crisis in its external relations” (p. 177). Change for it is compounded by the combination of democratization and globalization along with unrealistic expectations at home and abroad, especially in the region. Venter points to the broad range of state and nonstate actors in its foreign policy nexus, cautioning about the danger of NGO cooptation through consultation, though he favors more open and representative decision making. The Mbeki regime has attempted to balance interests and resources by articulating a range of ambitions around the notion of an “African renaissance” (p. 170).

In short, if you want more critical approaches see Peter Vale, Larry A. Swatuk, and Bertil Oden (eds.) *Theory, Change & Southern Africa's Future* (2001), and if you want more comparative perspectives see Philip Nel and Patrick J. McGown (eds.) *Power, Wealth and Global Order: An International Relations Textbook for Africa* (revised second edition, 1999), even if both of these concentrate on southern Africa. As the coeditors belatedly recognize in their final paragraph, “With the multiplicity of actors, amorphous targets, and uncertain outcomes, African foreign policy has entered uncharted territory” (p. 21).

Migrants and Citizens: Demographic Change in the European State System. By Rey Koslowski. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. 232p. \$39.95.

Patrick Ireland, *Georgia Institute of Technology*

Every scholar likes to think that what he or she studies is of capital importance. For that reason alone, this ambitious book would have to please immigration specialists. “Demography is destiny” is Rey Koslowski’s thesis, boiled down, and in his view it is almost impossible to overrate migration’s impact on international politics. While guilty of overreaching in a few spots and failing to appreciate the role of politics in quite a few more, he makes a compelling case overall. His bold work both brings a stimulating perspective to a multidisciplinary area of study that is still seeking its center of gravity and serves to remind the field of international relations (IR) that migration deserves its full attention.

The author has a two-pronged objective. At the theoretical level he hopes to advance understanding of contemporary global politics. Advanced through the “thought experiments,” secondary data analysis, and historical evidence characteristic of the IR field, his argument poses a challenge to prevailing international relations and democratic theories. Throwing into doubt the notion of nation-state sovereignty, migration belies the assumption current in much of the literature on democracy of a bounded collection of citizens comprising the *demos*. Nor does it fit the dichotomy between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy that underpins realism or always act as a force for international cooperation as neoliberalism holds. Koslowski sees the nation-state as a transitory, atypical social construct, forged within a unique set of demographic circumstances. Since 1945, changes in that context have transformed domestic politics and, in turn, the international system.

Mass migration has most clearly begun to flush out the problems latent in modern national political institutions in Europe, and at a more substantive level the author’s goal is to retell the European migration story. The book takes an expansive historical sweep, which should be eye-opening to social scientists not well versed in migratory movements within and to the continent before the Second World War. In fact, it is easy for anyone caught up in trying to understand contemporary immigration to forget the essentially nomadic nature of human existence (chapter 3) and the historical sources of the distinctions between nationality and citizenship (chapter 4). There are a couple of surprising omissions in the literature reviewed—Lars Olsson’s work on immigration as a cause of World War I, for instance, would only bolster the author’s argument—and few revolutionary insights are offered. Nevertheless, the material is packaged and pointed in a novel way that promises to stir useful discussion among immigration scholars.

The central thesis, certainly, will fuel debate: Long marked by polyethnicity, Europe constructed nation-states in response to unprecedented population growth and emigration in the midnineteenth century. Recent demographic changes have heralded a shift back to polyethnicity and have thus created a “mismatch” between resident populations and political institutions (p. 8). The presence of durable immigrant-origin communities, the emergence of an EU labor mobility regime, the negative effects of unilateral national actions, the (domestically driven) proliferation of individual rights and their acquisition by noncitizens (most notable in the spread of dual nationality)—the challenges to nation-state sovereignty in Europe have been relentless. They have also tended to act at cross-purposes, as migration has stirred up a titanic clash among democracy, citizenship based on bloodline (*jus sanguinis*), and federalism (pp. 133–34). In this light European Citizenship signals a toleration of complexity that might result in new institutional setups. They would mean no less than a reconfiguration of democracy and the international system.

A robust contention, to say the least. In fact, the author’s mission to put forward demography as an all-purpose explanation occasionally takes him too far. Neoliberal institutionalism may well err in relegating migration to the status of a garden-variety regime issue (p. 17); yet surely transportation, communications, capital flows, and the like have played a more considerable role in undermining nation-state sovereignty than this study would allow. Not surprisingly, there are several approving references to Hedley Bull’s “new medievalism” idea. European authorities and loyalties do seem to have been returning to the functional differentiation of the past. Even as patterns of labor market segmentation by ethnic origin and gender emerge, however, capitalism itself has become more globally integrated. With the economists’ push-pull model still at the heart of many immigration