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*Emerging Party Systems in Post-Soviet Societies: Fact or Fiction?**

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The political science literature reflects two viewpoints regarding the formation of party systems in post-Soviet societies. Scholars drawing on traditional theories of party formation usually argue that the formation of institutionalized party systems in post-Communist states will be an extended process. However, newer studies reveal that parties, partisan support, and even party systems may form relatively quickly. To illuminate this debate, we offer analysis of both mass and elite cross-temporal data from Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. These data reveal a rapid rise in partisanship, strong partisan voting in parliamentary elections, a sharp differentiation on issues between members of various party blocs, a high degree of issue cohesion among those who identify with a given party, and a strong correlation between the policy views of elites and ordinary citizens identifying with the same party. In short, the evidence strongly supports the conclusion that party systems are developing in the post-Soviet societies.

Political parties have become a salient feature on the political landscape of most post-Communist countries. However, recent political science literature reflects a divergence of views regarding the formation of these parties and their role in society and politics. At the root of this controversy lies a simple empirical question: Do the characteristics of the parties in these newly democratizing nations indicate the existence of a party system, or do parties remain rudimentary and undifferentiated groups cluttering the political scene? The principal debate is not a question of whether competing parties exist, but the extent to which they are institutionalized rather than inchoate.

Historically, political scientists have argued that the formation of an institutionalized party system will be a long and arduous process (e.g., Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Huntington 1968; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Proponents of this view point out the lack of multi-party socialization during Communist domination as a barrier to party system development (Reddaway 1994; Rutland 1994; Ordeshook 1995; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1997; Shevtsova and Bruckner 1997)

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and argue that civil society is almost non-existent in these nations (Klingemann and Wattenberg 1992; Fleron 1996; Rose 1995, 1997; White, Rose and McAlister 1997). However, some scholars of the post-Soviet states contend that evidence indicative of a truly competitive and democratic party system is already apparent. Research by Wyman et al. (1995) and Clark (1995), for example, reveals a rapid rise in the proportion of post-Soviet citizens who identify with a political party and who vote for the party with which they identify. Other work details the development of party factions within the parliaments of the newly independent states (Fish 1995a, 1995b).

We address these issues with empirical analysis of both mass and elite data from three nations: Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania over a six-year span beginning in 1992. The first of our four sections reveals a sharp upward shift in party identification and strong links between identification and vote choice. The second details the high degree of issue coherence among mass and elite respondents as well as shared ideological and policy preferences between these groups. The third section suggests that party elites provide ideological and issue representation for post-Soviet citizens and outlines the issue bases of party preferences. The fourth analytic section briefly describes how enduring social cleavages such as class, religion, gender, and ethnicity factor into party preferences. We conclude with the implications of our findings for broader theories of party development and democratization.

Before presenting these analyses, however, we highlight the key arguments and define the political characteristics relevant to determining the extent to which a party system has developed. We also include a brief description of the data used in this study.

Theory vs. Reality

The pioneering work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) guides the way political scientists have traditionally thought about developing party systems. According to these authors, party systems take many years to solidify. Although Lipset and Rokkan agree that crucial aspects of party formation occur in the early stages of competitive political system development, the party-building process itself is slow and takes time (p. 34). In fact, in the case studies presented in *Party Systems and Voter Alignment*, nascent parties take several decades to develop the strength and solidarity necessary to produce a stable, working party system. Thus, it is not surprising that contemporary authors who draw on this traditional perspective of party formation reject the idea that post-Communist societies could have developed a sustainable, working, multi-party system in the brief period that has passed since the fall of Communism.

Indeed, many authors assert that post-Soviet political parties are ephemeral, impotent, and undifferentiated (see for example Reddaway 1994; Rutland 1994; Ordeshook 1995). In fact, Reddaway expresses a strong belief that Russia may never attain a truly representative multi-party system. He emphatically argues

that in Russia “[t]he already advanced process of gradual coming-apart-at-the-seams will probably continue, to be followed in due course by determined efforts to reunite the country, most likely led by forces of militant Russian nationalism” (Reddaway 1994, 13).

Others (e.g., Klingemann and Wattenberg 1992; Rose 1995; White, Rose and McAllister 1997) believe that post-Communist citizens lack a civic culture and are generally distrustful of and apathetic toward political parties, factors which make progress toward a multi-party system difficult. In particular, Rose contends that the outcome of free elections in post-Soviet states has not approximated representative government (Rose 1995, 2; see also Rose 1994).

However, while traditionalists like Rose envision a long journey toward party development in post-Soviet societies, others have argued that post-Soviet party systems are already beginning to provide a means of representation and communication between masses and elites. Scholars such as Wyman et al. (1995) find evidence of emerging multi-party systems that consist of a number of established parties—parties that are beginning to undertake some of the critical functions necessary to the development of stable democracy. More specifically, Wyman et al. find that identification with Russian parties rose dramatically in a short time span. As compared to 1992, when one in five Russians felt close to a political party, by 1994 “one in three Russians were willing to say that there was a party which represented the interests and views of people like them” (1995, 604).

Clark (1995) and Fish (1995a) also display empirically backed optimism regarding the formation of stable multi-party systems in post-Soviet states. With regard to Lithuania, Clark reports that “[t]he fall 1992 elections to the Lithuanian Seimas demonstrates [sic] progress in the development of a strong party system in the republic.” Clark argues that even after gaining a substantially larger portion of the popular vote than any other party, the Communist-based Democratic Labor Party (LDDP) did not act as an extremist party; nor did it seek to compromise movement toward a stable party system. Similarly, Fish contends that “Russia does . . . now have a genuine multi-party political system” (1995a, 340). He argues that by 1993 Russia had “crossed an important juncture” and that “Russian parties’ programs cannot be regarded as particularly poorly developed or unclear. In their tenor, length and treatment of major issues, as well as in their mix of platitudes and policy prescription, they are quite typical and unremarkable” (Fish 1995a, 344).

However, certain limitations of this newer research must be addressed before becoming accepted wisdom. Foremost among the limitations of these initial optimistic views concerning party systems is the fact that these studies deal with an extremely small set of post-Soviet societies. Only three nations are investigated and no author studies more than a single case. Second, none of these scholars seriously investigates whether or not party attachment reflects differing policy preferences. Third, none of these studies explores linkages between elites and ordinary citizens. Finally, some authors (like Clark) tend to prematurely equate

voting for a political party with a broader sense of positive identification with the party.¹ Given these limitations, it is difficult to conclude whether or not competitive party systems have truly emerged in post-Soviet societies. However, these questions can be rigorously addressed with cross-national and cross-temporal data that focus on mass and elite attitudes and behavior associated with political parties.

Data

This investigation utilizes survey data from Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania collected by The University of Iowa and its foreign collaborators in 1992, 1995, and 1997. These particular republics provide an opportunity for meaningful commentary on party development as they represent both “most similar” and “most different” case comparisons within the post-Soviet republics. Russia and Ukraine have the largest populations and highest GNP among the 15 republics while Lithuania is one of the smallest nations. Russia and Ukraine are also similar in the fact that they are economically powerful and hold vast natural resources. From a different perspective, although Lithuanians accounted for less than 2% of the Soviet population, this republic is politically important as it was one of the earliest to seek secession from the Soviet Union. Lithuanian citizens were among the most vocal in attacking the legitimacy of the old system in the late 1980s. In this sense it is quite similar to Ukraine, which also vocalized critical attitudes toward the union and the Russian monopoly. Given that, historically, Lithuania was more “Western” oriented, we would expect it to form a party system more quickly than Russia or Ukraine. Likewise, given the historical East-West split in Ukraine, it is reasonable to expect a more regionalized and fractionalized party system in this country.

In this study we compare attitudinal data from face-to-face interviews with a cross-section of citizens (N = 1301, 900, and 500 for Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania respectively in 1992, N = 1320, 1000, and 504 respectively for 1995, and N = 1810, 1000, and 500 in 1997) with interviews of legislative and ministerial elites (N = 112, 65, and 35 for Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania respectively in 1992, N = 200, 150, and 100 respectively in 1995, and 289, 151, and 101 for these nations in 1997). Mass respondents represent a probability sample of both rural and urban residents of European Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania.² Elite

¹This final flaw is especially troublesome in light of evidence presented by Rose (1995) indicating that these are two very different phenomena in post-Soviet societies.

²The selection of mass respondents entailed the use of a four-stage sample design with the Kish procedure incorporated at the final stage. Questions used in the surveys were jointly designed by the U.S. and foreign research teams and then translated. After back- and re-translation, native speakers administered the surveys to respondents. All mass interviews took place in the respondents' homes and the design prohibited respondent substitution. The average mass interview lasted roughly one hour. Response rates were approximately 87% across the board for Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania for 1992. The rates for 1995 were 80%, 83%, and 67% for each country respectively, and in the spring of 1997 surveys the rates were 86%, 71%, and 82%. The 1992 and 1995 data are available through the ICPSR.

respondents include both legislators and executive branch administrators. Legislators were drawn from the ranks of all legislators representing districts of the mass respondents. The executive branch administrators constitute a sample of deputies from the largest and most important departments in their respective countries including the Prime Minister's or President's office, Departments of Defense, Security, and Foreign Affairs, the economic ministries such as Labor and Finance, and various humanitarian agencies. The selection of specific respondents from these ministries was proportional to the size and number of deputy ministers.³

Characteristics of Developed Party Systems

In the literature outlining political structures, parties have been conceptualized and analyzed in terms of party organizations, as the party in government and as a party in the electorate (Eldersveld 1964, 1982; Sorauf and Beck 1988). Because our empirical evidence contains little information on post-Soviet party organizations, we focus on the party in government and in the electorate.

The party in government refers to those who are seeking to or have captured office under a party label, including both the executive and legislative branches of government. While these elected representatives and government officials may not comprise the party "organization," they are the visible spokespersons for the party. Moreover, they are responsible for the creation, passage, and execution of the policies and laws that reflect the party's political orientation.

The party in the electorate includes those segments of the population that provide support for the party. This support could be relatively passive and take the form of a psychological identification with a party, or it could be more active, including such behaviors as voting for the party or engaging in organizational and campaign activities. Clearly, active involvement with a party is a stronger indicator of loyal commitment than is a psychological feeling that the party represents one's interests. However, because a critical stage in the development of support for political parties in the electorate is the shift from non-partisan (identification with no political party) to partisan (the citizen feels a sense of shared interest with a political party) status, we must also investigate these broader indicators of system development.

That said, a party system suggests more than just the existence of political parties and supporters. A party system refers to the interactions between competing political parties as well as to the relations between the party in govern-

³The sampling approach entailed listing all the ministries and sorting them as to whether they dealt with foreign or domestic affairs. Specific ministries were then selected using probabilities proportional to the size of the staff for each ministry. Next, all deputy ministers from those ministries were listed. The final selection of individual deputies was then made from this list according to the proper proportion for each ministry. No substitutions were allowed. Response rates for the members of parliament and administrators were near 90%, and the average length of an interview was 35 minutes.

ment and the party in the electorate (Sartori 1976). Furthermore, following Huntington (1968) and Mainwaring and Scully (1995), institutionalized or developed party systems display a degree of stability. In such systems, parties appear regularly in elections,⁴ and over time certain population subgroups come to identify with the parties that they regularly support.

Institutionalized parties, as part of a working party system, reflect distinct policy orientations rather than the personal appeal of particular political leaders. Thus, political parties play a critical representational and linkage function by providing a connection between the citizens and government (Sartori 1976; Eldersveld 1982) and provide outlets for a variety of viewpoints in stabilized party systems. One way that political parties accomplish this function is by uniting those individuals in society who share common interests and by representing their interests in the policy-making arena. This process of representation and linkage through the party occurs if the elected party elite share the policy preferences of those citizens in the mass public that they presumably represent.

The following four characteristics of developed party systems appear most critical to the controversy regarding the development of political parties in post-Soviet societies and form the basis of the analysis presented in the next four sections: 1) The extent of public support for political parties, especially as indicated by party identification, the vote and involvement in the party. 2) The extent to which the parties give cognitive organization and meaning to the political world by being perceived as taking differing policy positions and then uniting citizens who share those ideological and policy orientations. 3) The degree to which political leaders are perceived to mirror the party divisions and policy preferences expressed by the supporters of the parties in the electorate. And 4) the extent to which party preferences among the masses are associated with relatively enduring social cleavages such as class, religion, gender, or ethnicity. These associations are important because they reflect the social cleavage basis of the emerging party system. According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), for example, party alignments in the public will be more enduring if they are associated with meaningful social cleavages.

The Development of Party Identification

Citizens who psychologically identify with a political party can be conceptualized as partisans. The basis of this conceptualization can be found in reference group theory and reflects the idea that individuals often define certain aspects of the self in terms of secondary groups in society such as political parties (Campbell et al. 1960, ch. 6). Given that partisanship is theoretically assumed to reflect

⁴For a macro-level comparison of how consistently the political parties in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania appear in elections, the degree of support they receive in these elections, and their relative location in an ideological space based on their party platforms, see Meleshevich (1998). Because only two elections have occurred under the new regimes, longitudinal analysis is limited, however.

a psychological attachment to a political party, the concept does not necessarily incorporate an official membership in a political party. Even a potential outcome such as voting for a given party is not a necessary component of party identification although this behavior as well may be correlated with partisanship (Miller and Shanks 1996).

The measurement of party identification originally conceived in the *American Voter* was quite straightforward. Survey respondents were asked, "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" Those who indicated a party preference were then asked, "Would you call yourself a strong Republican (or Democrat) or a not very strong Republican (Democrat)?" When combined, the two questions produced a single measure that ranged from strong Republican to strong Democrat.

While the *American Voter* measure of party identification works well in a two-party system like that of the United States, it is less readily applicable to a multi-party situation such as Russia and Ukraine evolved after the Soviet Union collapsed. Numerous political parties formed quickly to compete in the parliamentary elections that have been held in these countries since 1992. For example, 43 parties and movements took part in the 1995 Russian Duma elections (White et al. 1997, p. 204), and 30 parties officially ran candidates in the 1998 Ukrainian Rada elections. Such a multitude of parties makes it difficult to measure party identification in the same manner used by the *American Voter*.

Various methods have been used to measure party identification in post-Soviet societies, with limited success. For example, White et al. (1997) addressed the measurement issue by asking their Russian survey respondents the direct question "Do you identify with any particular political party or movement?" This question, however, assumes respondents all understand what it means to "identify with" a political party. Clearly, a group identification is an abstract concept that cannot be measured with such a direct question. William Zimmerman and Timothy Colton asked a less direct question in their 1996 Russian national election survey. Their question asked the respondent if he felt any party or political movement to be "moya partiya" (my party) (see Colton 1996, 13–14). The problem with this question is that the phrasing could be confusing for the respondent. For example, the respondent might wonder, does the phrase "my party" refer to the interviewer's party or his own party? It would have been better to say "your party" (vasha partiya). Perhaps this is why Colton finds that only 25% of Russians indicated a party that they considered to be "my party."

Our approach to measuring party identification uses three questions. The first asks if there is a particular party that "expresses your views better than any other party." If the respondent answers "yes," we ask "which party is that?" Then we ask how close she feels to this party. The first question may not reflect a self-definition in terms of a party group as clearly as the question used in the *American Voter*. Nevertheless, it certainly conveys a broader sharing of interests in common rather than a narrow policy orientation or a running tally in the Fiorina

TABLE 1

Percent Identifying a Party as Representing Their Interests

	Mass			Elite		
	1992	1995	1997	1992	1995	1997
Russia	16	52	61	42	52	66
Ukraine	12	28	27	17	36	54
Lithuania	33	61	70	38	66	75

Source: The University of Iowa Post-Soviet Citizen Survey (PSCS) 1992, 1995, 1997.

For sample size, please refer to Data Section.

Party Identification Question: Is there one particular party that expresses your views better than any of the other parties?

If yes: Which one?

How close do you feel to this party, very close, somewhat close, or not very close?

(1981) sense. Moreover, adding the third question, which asks about how close the respondent feels to the party, helps to capture the sense of group attachment conveyed by the *American Voter* notion of party identification.⁵

Skeptics of post-Soviet party development suggest that little, if any, meaningful identification with political parties has emerged in post-Soviet societies, especially among average citizens. Yet, contrary to these critics, survey data collected in 1992, 1995, and 1997 reveal a significant growth in party identification among elites and ordinary citizens. For example, in early summer 1992, only about one-fifth of the Russian mass public indicated that there was a political party that best represented their interests by our measure of party identification. But by the spring of 1995 this percentage had increased to over one-half (see Table 1). These findings confirm those reported by Miller, White, and Heywood (1996) who discovered that 31% of Russians identified with a political party in the immediate post-election period of November–December 1993. A similar increase in identification with a political party also occurred in Ukraine and Lithuania, although the shift for Ukraine was much less dramatic than that observed for the other two post-Soviet countries (see Table 1).

⁵ Respondents were asked 1) if there was a party that represented their interests, 2) if so, which one, and 3) how much they had in common with that party. Throughout we have used the first two items to indicate partisanship. Thus, respondents were not merely asked a yes or no question but had to provide specific information concerning their views. While simple, this measure captures a psychological sense of attachment or closeness to the party as compared to membership in the party or a vote for the party. Furthermore, the validity of this measure is reinforced by the fact that only a small percentage of respondents replied that their chosen party did not represent their interest very well. This information, in conjunction with the evidence that identification translated into votes during elections, also refutes White, Rose and McAllister's (1997) claim that individuals vote *against* instead of *for* specific parties and further adds to the validity of this measure as an indicator of party preference.

The noticeably lower percentage of partisan identifiers in Ukraine may have resulted because the party system is more highly fragmented than in Russia or Lithuania (Clem 1995). More than 30 political parties actively competed in the 1994 Ukrainian parliamentary elections. Given this high level of party diversity, it would have been difficult for even the best intentioned citizen to determine if any single party best represented their interests. Moreover, until 1998 Ukraine had a single-member first-past-the-post system for parliamentary elections whereas half of the members of parliament in Russia and Lithuania were elected on party ballots (the system Ukraine also adopted in 1998). Perhaps this difference in the electoral laws helps explain the lower level of party identification in Ukraine. However, regardless of possible negative forces, it is clear that Ukraine, like Russia and Lithuania, experienced a substantial rise in partisanship between 1992 and 1995.

An equally dramatic rise in party identification occurred among the political elite during these years. Not surprisingly, the 1992 survey of parliamentary and ministerial elite found higher levels of partisanship than were evident in the mass public. Nevertheless, fewer than half of these political leaders were involved with a political party in 1992, and in Ukraine the figure was a mere 17% (see Table 1). By 1995 party involvement among elites had increased substantially. For example, only about one-quarter of those elites identified with a political party in 1992 said that they also took part in the organizational activities of the party, whereas by 1995 slightly more than half of the Russian and Ukrainian elite and two-thirds of the Lithuanian elite said they were highly involved in party organizational activities.⁶ Thus, the rise in elite partisanship between 1992 and 1995 represents an increase in party organizational activity as well as psychological identification. The same cannot be said for the average citizens, however, as less than 1% of Russians, 1.5% of Ukrainians, and 4% of Lithuanians reported involvement in party organizational activities in 1995.

While the origins of political parties have been attributed to the exigencies of electoral competition and elite strategies for pursuing office (e.g., Eldersveld 1964; Sartori 1976), it is less clear what factors give rise to partisan identification in a newly emerging party system. As previously described, the traditional view states that socialization translates into support for parties that

⁶The growth of partisanship among legislators may be due in part to new legislative rules. In response to rule revision, nearly all legislators in the Russian Duma, for example, joined party-based factions within the parliament in 1993 (Remington and Smith 1995). Because parliamentary factions are "actively . . . strengthening electoral organizations in anticipation of the next parliamentary elections" (p. 483), legislators may tie themselves to certain parties in order to boost their chances of election success. On the other hand, administrators, who are also included in this sample, are forbidden to take part in party activities at a professional level. Thus, their level of partisanship is much lower than that of the legislators alone. For example, in 1997, 75% of Russian legislators identified with a political party while only 12% of administrators shared this allegiance. In Ukraine, 62% of legislators revealed a party identification versus 2% of administrators. Lithuanian legislators also outpaced administrators by a wide margin, at 88% and 25% respectively.

reflect the social cleavages representing society's deeper divisions and vested interests (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Yet, it is difficult to reconcile the generally slow process of socialization with the rapid rise in identification revealed here.

One method of testing the socialization process theory is to see if the rise in partisanship simply reflects continued competition between those who prefer a system similar to the old Communist regime and those bent on democratic and market reforms. The socialization hypothesis would posit generational differences in attachment to the Communist party. If partisanship developed out of socialization over a person's life cycle, then we would expect the lowest rates of party identification to occur among the youngest segments of the population while the oldest subgroup should exhibit higher rates of identification, particularly in 1992 (Greenstein 1965; Jennings and Niemi 1974).

Furthermore, younger people should exhibit a relatively sharper increase in identification between 1992 and 1995, as they presumably became identified with one of the Pro-Reform parties emerging during this period. Yet, we would not expect the level of identification among younger people to approach that of older people (because the period between 1992 and 1995 is extremely short). In addition, similar patterns of partisanship should be observed for other variables associated with support for Communists, such as education, income, occupation, urban/rural residence, and national ethnicity (for earlier work on the correlates of support for the Communist regime, see Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1993). If the socialization hypothesis is correct, older, lower-income, less well-educated, rural, blue-collar workers and those who are natives of the country they reside in should exhibit relatively higher levels of partisanship. Also, the greatest increase in partisanship between 1992 and 1995 should occur for the younger, higher-income, better-educated, urban, professional, and less nationalistic groups.

The empirical evidence provides little support for the socialization hypothesis.⁷ For example, while older Ukrainians were slightly more likely than the youngest quartile to identify with a party in 1992, the difference was minor (see Table 2). Moreover, between 1992 and 1995 identification actually rose faster among the oldest quartile of citizens. The Lithuanian data also failed to fit the socialization hypothesis. In 1995 the only significant relationship occurs for education—but it was in the opposite direction from that predicted by the hypothesis.

In Russia, those with higher incomes in 1995 and better education in both years (characteristics of the younger generations in Russia) also exhibited higher levels of partisanship relative to the lower-income and less-well-educated segments of the population. Similarly, Russians in manual or blue-collar occupations, pensioners, and housewives were less likely than those in more professional occupations, or students and intellectuals, to express a sense of partisan attach-

⁷Only mass data are used here as there is little to be learned by examining levels of elite partisanship across demographic categories due to homogeneity.

TABLE 2

Mass Identification with a Political Party by Demographic Category

	Russia		Ukraine		Lithuania	
	1992	1995	1992	1995	1992	1995
Gender						
<i>Male</i>	19	61	16	34	36	69
<i>Female</i>	13	54	8	32	31	66
Age						
<i>Youngest Quartile (<28)</i>	11	57	8	27	34	74
<i>Age 29–40</i>	21	61	15	33	26	52
<i>Age 41–55</i>	18	51	13	33	35	70
<i>Oldest Quartile (>56)</i>	14	60	12	39	38	74
Income						
<i>Lowest Quartile</i>	17	54	13	32	32	66
	22	55	10	34	24	66
	14	66	9	32	43	71
<i>Highest Quartile</i>	12	58	14	39	28	65
Education						
<i>Through Secondary</i>	13	54	12	31	33	61
<i>Tech/Professional/Some College</i>	15	59	14	35	35	67
<i>College Grad/Higher</i>	21	65	11	34	26	78
Population Density						
<i>Urban</i>	17	59	9	32	38	67
<i>Rural</i>	13	54	18	34	22	68
Occupation						
<i>Workers/Pensioners/Housewives</i>	16	54	11	32	33	68
<i>Technical Workers</i>	20	63	9	28	52	73
<i>Office Workers</i>	14	62	11	40	32	59
<i>Students/Intellectuals</i>	15	74	7	36	34	67
<i>Businessmen/Private Farmers</i>	13	63	23	26	25	76
Native Language						
<i>Russian or Ukrainian or Lithuanian</i>	16	57	16	31	41	68
<i>All others</i>	11	57	8	34	16	65
Media Exposure						
<i>Low</i>	11	44	9	19	25	48
<i>Medium</i>	12	57	12	32	29	60
<i>High</i>	21	62	16	38	40	73
Political Knowledge						
<i>Low</i>	11	33	9	14	14	42
<i>Medium</i>	14	54	10	29	31	73
<i>High</i>	23	74	14	43	49	75

Source: The University of Iowa PSCS 1992, 1995.

N = 208 for Russia, 108 for Ukraine and 165 for Lithuania in 1992.

N = 686 for Russia, 280 for Ukraine and 307 for Lithuania in 1995.

Table entries reflect the percent of each category indicating that a particular political party expresses their views.

Dependent Variable: Is there any one particular party that expresses your views better than any of the other parties?

If yes: Which one?

ment by 1995 (see Table 2). Overall, the pattern of recent partisan development appears to have occurred primarily among the young to middle-aged—those least likely to have been influenced by the earlier socialization of the Communist regime. The development of partisan attachment has occurred in both the rural and urban areas of Russia, although the percentage of identifiers is slightly higher in the urban settings. Despite the Western media attention given to concerns about the rise of ethnic nationalism in the post-Soviet period, it is evident that this increase in partisanship has little to do with ethnic differences.

While these data reveal virtually no support for the socialization hypothesis, the significant relationship between partisanship and education that is present for at least Russia and Lithuania suggests an alternative explanation for the recent rise in identification. This alternative hypothesis is based on notions of information-processing and social learning. In short, many post-Soviet citizens, because they have no previous experience with a multiparty system, also have no prior framework for assessing political parties. Given this absence of an evaluative framework, learning about new political parties likely proceeds in a deliberate and piecemeal fashion (Lau and Sears 1986; Fiske and Taylor 1984). If learning occurs in a piecemeal fashion, then those most attentive to the channels of communication, those most capable of processing information (the better-educated), and those most generally knowledgeable about politics are most likely to develop a partisan identification. The less well-informed, on the contrary, should be less likely to find a party that best represents their interests.

The available evidence strongly and consistently supports the information processing hypothesis. Post-Soviet citizens in all three countries who frequently followed the media (newspapers and television)⁸ or were more knowledgeable about politics⁹ were also more likely to identify with a political party, at both time-points (see bottom of Table 2). Moreover, a multivariate analysis incorporating all the variables of Table 2 regressed on partisanship reveals that media attention and political knowledge were the only two variables consistently and significantly related to having a partisan identification in all three countries for both 1992 and 1995. Clearly, in an age of widespread and rapid mass communication, finding a political party to represent one's interests need not depend

⁸The Media Exposure Index is a simple additive measure formed from the following questions: Q209: How many different newspapers do you read each day?

Q210: How often over the past week did you watch a news program on television?

⁹The Knowledge Index is a simple additive measure formed by dichotomizing (0 = no answer given; 1 = answer given) and then adding the following questions together:

On this ideological spectrum, using any number from 1 to 7 how would you place:

Q16: Yourself; Q17: President of your country; Q18: Leading opposition to the president; Q19: A second national political figure; Q20: Your deputy in parliament

On this scale where 1 signifies that the government guarantees everyone work and 7 signifies that every person should look after himself, which number corresponds to the views of:

Q21: Yourself; Q22: President of your country; Q23: Leading opposition to the president; Q24: A second national political figure; Q25: Your deputy in parliament

on the slow process of socialization.¹⁰ Apparently, a growing number of average citizens use the mass media to form a judgment that one of the many available parties represents their interests.

Consistency Between Identification and Voting

While the previous discussion provides insight into the development of partisanship, it reveals nothing about the particular parties with which Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians identify. A large number of parties competed in the first parliamentary elections after independence.¹¹ However, some were more successful than others. In Russia and Ukraine identification with some 13 parties accounts for most of the partisan identifiers, whereas in Lithuania 98% of all identifiers were spread across only nine parties (see column 1 of Table 3). As of early 1995 the major parties in Russia (in order of percent of identifiers) were the Communist party of the Russian Federation, Women of Russia, Yabloko, and Russia's Choice. Although the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) founded by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy did surprisingly well in the December 12, 1993, election, the LDP was ranked fifth in terms of Russian identifiers (see Table 3).

In Ukraine, identification was more fragmented than it was in Russia (Bojuncun 1995). Identification was also more uniformly distributed across the major parties than it was in Russia. Only three Ukrainian parties—the Ukrainian Communist Party, the Democratic Party, and the Socialist Party—attained a level of popular identification above 10% (see Table 3, column 1). These three main parties, however, account for less than half (46%) of the partisan identifiers.

Identification with Lithuanian parties, by comparison, was much more concentrated. Only 11 prominent parties received seats in the October/November 1992 parliamentary elections (Clark 1995; Girnius 1995). The Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDDP), the reformed successor of the Lithuanian Communist Party, received the highest percentage of popular support in early 1995 with more than one-quarter of the partisans identifying with this party (see Table 3, column 1). Only three other parties enjoyed double-digit support—

¹⁰ An examination of partisan identification by level of media attention and political knowledge, after controlling for age, demonstrates that the presumed socialization effects on the elderly did not diminish the rapid rise in partisanship among this age group, a phenomenon that appears to be attributable to political learning. For example, the level of partisan identification among the most politically knowledgeable for the oldest quartile of Russians increased from 19% in 1992 to 71% in 1995. Furthermore, a more rapid rise in identification among those with higher levels of political knowledge even for the most elderly individuals suggests that earlier socialization did not prohibit elderly citizens from taking on a new partisan identification.

¹¹ The parties competing in early elections were more rightly called movements than political parties due to high fragmentation and low identification. It is difficult to compare support for these 1992 movements and political organizations with the more particular parties that emerged between 1992 and 1995 in order to compete for seats in the newly formed post-Soviet parliaments. Therefore, the remainder of the analysis will focus on the parties that existed as of 1995.

TABLE 3

Mass Consistency in Vote and Identification in 1995

	% identifying with party	% of identifiers who voted for the party
Russian Parties		
Agrarian Party of Russia	9.3	59.6
Yabloko	12.8	63.7
Russia's Future	1.7	23.2
Russia's Choice	11.3	90.4
Civic Union	2.2	57.5
Democratic Party of Russia	6.6	76.0
Dignity and Charity	.6	α
Communist party of the Russian Federation	17.8	72.5
Constructive Ecology Movement of Russia KEDR	1.6	50.6
Liberal Democratic Party	9.6	90.2
Russian Unity and Accord	6.2	81.7
Women of Russia	13.8	67.2
Russian Movement for Democratic Reform	3.3	63.4
Other ¹	3.2	α
Total	100%	72%
Ukrainian Parties		
Ukrainian Republican Party	7.7	50.0
Ukrainian Green Party	3.0	25.0
Ukrainian Democratic Party	12.9	50.0
Ukrainian People's Party	3.7	66.7
Ukrainian Liberal Party	1.8	100.0
Ukrainian Socialist Party	12.5	57.1
Ukrainian Peasants' Party	2.6	α
Ukrainian Beer Lovers' Party	2.6	50.0
Ukrainian Peoples' RUKH	7.4	78.6
Ukrainian Justice Party	1.8	50.0
Ukrainian Union Of Communists	4.1	33.3
Ukrainian Communist Party	21.0	86.7
Ukrainian OUN In The Ukraine	3.3	60.0
Other ²	15.6	50.0
Total	100%	61%
Lithuanian Parties		
Center movement	13.3	31.4
Democratic Party	3.2	50.0 ³
Christian Democratic Party	21.4	84.9 ⁴
Conservative Party	13.6	α
Liberal Union	4.2	α
Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party	27.6	97.0
Union of Poles in Lithuania	3.2	28.6
Social Democratic Party	7.5	35.3
Tautininku	4.2	α
Other ⁵	1.5	
Total	100%	71%

Source: The University of Iowa PSCS 1995.

(Footnotes for this table continue on facing page.)

the Christian Democratic Party, the Conservative Party, and the Center Movement. These four major parties incorporated three-quarters of all identifiers, which suggests a greater degree of party consolidation than was evident for either Russia or Ukraine.

Clearly, a significant percentage of the mass public in these post-Soviet societies believed that one particular party represented their interests. Moreover, while the party systems in each country were still quite fragmented as of 1995, some consolidation of popular support for a smaller number of parties was occurring. A more telling indication of party development, however, comes from an examination of the relationship between identification with a political party and voting for that party.

The skeptics of party development argue that there should be relatively little consistency between identification with a party and vote for the party. However, the evidence appears to refute this viewpoint (see Table 3, column 2). Although the percentage of identifiers who voted for the party with which they identified varied across the different parties, in general the percentages are re-

(Footnotes for Table 3 continued from facing page.)

N = 686 for Russia, 280 for Ukraine and 307 for Lithuania in 1995.

Dependent Variable: Is there any one particular party that expresses your views better than any of the other parties?

If yes: which one?

α: Indicates cases in which no one who identified with the particular party reported voting for that party or in which the formation of coalitions among parties prohibited voting for a specific party by itself.

¹Other for Russia includes: Party of Economic Reform, Union "December 12," Party Led by Barkash, Youth Movement, Party of Beer Lovers

²Other for Ukraine includes: Christian Democratic Party of the Ukraine, Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party, Congress of Ukrainian Nationals, Ukrainian Party of Democratic Rebirth, Union "New Ukraine," Ukrainian National Conservative Party, Ukrainian Workers' Front, Ukrainian Nation Wide RUKH, Ukrainian Peasant's Democratic Party, Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party, Ukrainian Party Of Slavic Unity, Ukrainian Party of Solidarity and Social Justice, Labor Party, Congress of National Democratic Forces, Ukrainian Liberal-Democratic Party, Ukrainian Party Of Free Peasants, Party of Ukrainian National Salvation, Ukrainian Party of Communists, Constitutional-Democratic Party, Ukrainian Citizens' Congress, All-Ukrainian Political Union "State Autonomy Of The Ukraine," Ukrainian Labor Congress, Party Of Crimean Economic Rebirth, Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, Ukrainian National Democratic Forces.

³Those who identify with the Democratic party could vote in accordance with this identification for two coalitions: Sajudis or the coalition including the Democratic Party, Christian Democratic Party and Union of Political Prisoners.

⁴Those who identify with the Christian Democrats could vote in accordance with this identification for three coalitions: Sajudis, the coalition of the Christian Democratic Union and National Youth Movement "Young Lithuania" or the Coalition including the Democratic Party, Christian Democratic Party and Union of Political Prisoners.

⁵Other for Lithuania includes: the Women Party, Sajudis, Union of Political Prisoners and Deported People, and the National Progress Party.

markably high given how recently a multiparty system has emerged in post-Soviet societies.¹² For example, among the Russian respondents the strongest relationship between partisanship and the vote occurred for those identified with Russia's Choice and the LDP—90% of those identified with these two parties reported voting for them (see Table 3, column 2). On average, the percentage of identifiers voting for the party with which they identified is 73% for the four major parties in Russia and virtually the same (72%) for all the parties combined.¹³

The relationship between party identification and the vote in Ukraine and Lithuania was also quite strong, although somewhat weaker than in Russia. In Ukraine approximately 65% of those who identified with the three major parties voted for those parties. Likewise, for Lithuania 71% on average voted for the party that they thought reflected their interests (when considering the major parties). In both of these countries, those who identified with the largest party—the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party—were very loyal to that party, with 87% and 97% respectively voting consistent with their identification which is similar to the corresponding statistics in many Western democracies.

In short, partisan identification has not only developed for a significant fraction of the population in these post-Soviet societies, but identification strongly correlates with vote choice. However, while the correlations between party identification and the vote provide some evidence of a developing party system, this evidence only indirectly suggests that political parties are uniting citizens who share a common policy orientation. Moreover, before we can conclude that the elected leaders represent the policy orientation of their mass supporters, we must examine the degree of congruence between the mass and elite identifiers of each party. It is to these questions that we turn next.

Before moving on, however, a caveat is necessary. The need for brevity of presentation dictates that the political parties are treated more efficiently in the subsequent tabular displays than they are in Table 3. Because of the unwieldy number of parties, subsequent tables will be far too large if data are presented for each specific party. Thus, as others have done (e.g., Evans and Whitefield

¹²Furthermore, the official observed vote gained by each party in the previous election, and the percentage vote as reported by the survey respondents are remarkably similar. The fact that the survey results appear to accurately reflect the official election outcomes as reported by Slider et al. (1994, 714), Bojcun (1995, 239), and Clark (1995, 47), lends a considerable degree of validity to the survey data used here.

¹³Of course, it could be argued that the causal sequence is reversed. That is, the survey respondents could have been telling us that they identified with the party they remembered voting for in the previous election. While these two questions were separated in the questionnaire by several pages of other questions, we acknowledge this possibility. Of course, if the vote and party identification were simply one and the same response, we would expect an even higher correlation than observed. Moreover, we would expect an even higher percentage of citizens to have reported a party identification since turnout in the election was higher than the percent reporting partisanship. Finally, a robust correlation between party identification and the vote choice contradicts those who contend that there should be no relationship or at best only an insignificant correlation.

1996), we will collapse the identifiers of the several parties into a smaller number of party blocs. The work of others suggests that these blocs will maintain the integrity of party differences while allowing us to present party-related evidence in a more efficient manner (see Slider, Gimpelson and Chugrov 1994; Fish 1995b; Bojcun 1995; Girnius 1995).

Shared Policy Preferences

In a sustainable system, political parties unite those who share common policy preferences. Moreover, institutionalized parties represent aggregated interests in the decision-making arenas of government. Evidence of such aggregation and representation would provide a much stronger statement about the development of party systems in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania than that conveyed by the relationship between partisan identification and the vote alone. A close examination of the relevant evidence reveals a remarkable degree of issue coherence within party blocs as well as congruence between mass and elite party identifiers from the same political parties. Thus, the data support the hypothesis that a party system is emerging. The data also reveal that party attachment not only reflects shared ideological and policy preferences, but that those who identify with different parties can be distinguished along policy cleavages. In short, we find substantial evidence of two critical phenomena: party aggregation and differentiation.

First, the citizens of Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania show evidence of a high level of interest aggregation manifest in similar attitudes toward key issues. This high level of cohesion across various issue areas within each group reinforces the argument that each party is supported by citizens with relatively similar policy interests. As shown in Table 4, in less than 20% of these cases do identifiers lack cohesion (have standard deviations that are greater than that of the total sample). Thus, *within* each bloc individuals tend to express attitudes that are more similar than does the population in general.¹⁴ This finding was especially true for the market orientation index, the perceived national economy index, the measure of views toward privatization, and the aggressive nationalism index (unfortunately, space limitations did not allow us to present the standard deviation values in Table 4). In short, Russian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian party identifiers show a high degree of interest aggregation and consistent party alignment manifest in shared attitudes within each of the party blocs.

Even more striking than this high level of interest aggregation, however, is the evidence of party differentiation on the issues. The results of this analysis reveal not only party differences, but also a strong correspondence of each group's policy interests to what we might expect for each bloc given their pre-

¹⁴ Although space limitations do not permit us to show results for each party individually, the level of cohesion within specific parties is, in most cases, even greater than with the party blocs presented here.

TABLE 4

Mass and Elite Means for Current Issues by Party Blocs in 1995

		Market Orientation	Perceived National Economy	Privatization	Crime	Aggressive Nationalism	Exclusionary Nationalism	Joining NATO	Feel Soviet
Russia									
Mass	<i>Anti-Reform Communist Bloc (29)^a</i>	6.3	2.8	3.2	3.5	11.4	1.6†	3.3†	1.5
	<i>Anti-Reform Nationalist Bloc (10)</i>	7.4	2.6	3.7	4.2	11.5	2.0†	3.4	2.0†
	<i>Centrist Bloc (24)</i>	9.2	3.1	3.7	4.5†	10.6	1.7	3.3†	2.1
	<i>Pro-Reform Bloc (36)</i>	10.3	3.4†	4.4	4.5	10.6†	1.5	3.1	2.5†
	<i>Pearson's R</i>	.43	.18	.30	.21	-.16	-.07	-.04	.35
Elite	<i>Anti-Reform Communist Bloc (32)</i>	7.2	1.9	4.3	4.5	11.0	1.6	4.2	N/A
	<i>Anti-Reform Nationalist Bloc (18)</i>	9.0	2.5	3.5	4.6	13.5	2.0†	4.4	N/A
	<i>Centrist Bloc (16)</i>	10.3	3.3	4.3	6.3	10.8	1.7†	3.4	N/A
	<i>Pro-Reform Bloc (34)</i>	14.8	4.9	6.1	7.3	8.0	1.6	2.1	N/A
	<i>Pearson's R</i>	.70	.65	.52	.51	-.50	-.04	-.66	N/A
Ukraine									
Mass	<i>Anti-Reform Bloc (39)</i>	7.8	3.0	3.2	4.0	8.9	1.5	3.7†	1.8
	<i>Centrist Bloc (20)</i>	8.4†	4.0	3.2	4.2	8.7	1.3	2.6	1.9
	<i>Nationalist Bloc (41)</i>	10.5	4.5	4.6	5.1†	9.9	1.7†	2.7	3.1
	<i>Pearson's R</i>	.33	.35	.36	.22	.17	.08	-.16	.48
Elite	<i>Anti-Reform Bloc (46)</i>	7.0	2.7	1.9	5.3	6.9	1.1	3.5	N/A
	<i>Centrist Bloc (24)</i>	8.5	2.9†	2.2†	6.0	7.0	1.3	2.7	N/A
	<i>Nationalist Bloc (30)</i>	13.5	3.9	1.8	5.4†	12.1	2.2†	1.8	N/A
	<i>Pearson's R</i>	.60	.35	-.03	.04	.68	.53	-.60	N/A
Lithuania									
Mass	<i>Anti-Reform Bloc (31)</i>	8.3	4.0	4.0	4.1†	6.8	2.8†	2.5†	3.6
	<i>Other (69)</i>	10.3	5.1	5.1	4.0	9.3	3.3	2.1	3.7†
	<i>Pearson's R</i>	.23	.31	.31	-.01	.36	.20	-.11	.03

Elite	<i>Anti-Reform Bloc (62)</i>	10.0	5.3	5.3	5.6	6.8	2.4	2.0	N/A
	<i>Other (38)</i>	11.8†	6.5	6.5	6.3†	11.8	3.0†	1.5	N/A
	<i>Pearson's R</i>	.24	-.68	.46	.14	.71	.31	-.35	N/A

Source: The University of Iowa PSCS 1995.

N (Mass Sample) = 686 for Russia, 280 for Ukraine and 307 for Lithuania in 1995.

N (Elite Sample) = 104 for Russia, 54 for Ukraine and 66 for Lithuania in 1995.

†The numbers in parentheses represent the percent of party identifiers among the mass and elite for each country that comprise the set of identifiers for each bloc of parties aggregated as indicated below.

†The standard deviation for this item exceeds the standard deviation for the total, indicating that identifiers are less cohesive with their bloc on this item. Less than 20% of the cases reported here show this tendency.

N/A This question not posed to elite respondents.

Party Identification is defined as in Table 3, but here parties are aggregated into blocs as follows:

Russia

Anti-Reform Communist party bloc includes the Communists and Agrarians.

Anti-Reform Nationalist party bloc includes the Liberal Democratic Party.

Centrist party bloc includes the Democratic Party, KEDR, and Women of Russia.

Pro-Reform party bloc includes Yabloko, Russia's Choice, Russian Unity, and Russian Movement.

(For a discussion of party blocs in Russia, see Fish 1995a and 1995b and Slider et al. 1994.)

Ukraine

Anti-Reform party bloc includes Ukrainian Peasant's Democratic Party, Ukrainian People's Party, Ukrainian Peasant's party, Ukrainian Workers' Front, Ukrainian Union of Communists, Party of Ukrainian National Salvation, Ukrainian Party of Free Peasants, Ukrainian Communist Party, and Ukrainian Party of Slavic Unity.

Centrist party bloc includes Ukrainian Liberal Party, Ukrainian Socialist Party, Labor Party, Ukrainian Justice Party, Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, Constitutional Democratic Party, Ukrainian Party of Solidarity and Social Justice.

Nationalist party bloc includes Ukrainian Republican Party, Ukrainian Green Party, Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Party, Congress of National Democratic Forces, Christian Democratic Party of the Ukraine, Ukrainian Peoples' RUKH, Ukrainian Nation-wide RUKH, Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party, Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, and Ukrainian OUN in the Ukraine.

(For a discussion of party blocs in Ukraine, see Bojcun 1995.)

Lithuania

Anti-Reform party bloc includes the Lithuania Democratic Labor Party and the Union of Poles.

(For a discussion of party blocs in Lithuania, see Clark 1995.)

Other for Lithuania includes: the Women Party, Sajudis, Union of Political Prisoners and Deported People, and the National Progress Party.

sumed ideologies. Taking Russian elite attitudes toward a market economy, for example, we would expect “Anti-Reform Communists” to reject policies that promote movement toward a free market economy. This expectation is confirmed by the fact that Russian “Anti-Reform Communist” elites evidence relatively low support for market reform (mean 6.3 on 19-point scale, see Table 4).¹⁵

¹⁵The questions used in the analysis are grouped below by index. Each is a simple additive index.

Market Orientation Index

Q47: Do you agree or disagree that economic reform must be pursued, even if it means significant hardship for the people? (1 = Fully Disagree, 5 = Fully Agree)

Q21: On a five-point scale where 1 signifies that the government guarantees work for all and 5 signifies that every person should look after themselves, which number corresponds to your views?

Q62: On a five-point scale where 1 is very negative and 5 is very positive, where do you place Private Enterprises?

Q45: Do you agree or disagree that there should be a mechanism regulating income such that no one earns very much more than others? (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)

Q126: How much influence do businessmen have in society and politics? (1 = Too much, 3 = Too little)

Direction: 1 = Anti-reform 19 = Positive toward free-market

Perceived National Economy Index

Q10: As for the country in general, do you think that the condition of the economy has gotten much better, gotten somewhat better, stayed the same, gotten somewhat worse, or gotten much worse in comparison with the past year?

Q11: What about in the next 12 months: Do you think that the economy will get much better, get somewhat better, stay about the same, get somewhat worse, or get much worse?

Direction: 1 = Gotten Much Worse, 9 = Gotten Much Better

Privatization Index

Of the following organizations, please tell me if the government, the employees, or private individuals should own them:

Q13: Former kolkoz and sovkolz property (farms and farmland)

Q14: Large industry

Q15: Local business like shops and restaurants

Direction: 1 = Government, 7 = Private individuals

Crime Index

Q41: It is very important to stop crime even if it means violating the rights of the accused. (1 = fully agree, 7 = fully disagree)

Q48: It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they become disruptive (1 = fully agree, 7 = fully disagree)

Q144: In the past few years some people have become wealthy. What is the best explanation for this? (1 = illegal means, 2 = legal means)

Q82: On a seven-point scale where 1 represents high danger and 7 low danger to the country, where do you place the growth of crime?

Direction: 1 = Take a hard line against crime, 20 = Crime is not a serious issue

Aggressive Nationalism Index

Q138: On a seven-point scale where 1 is sharply increase and 7 is sharply decrease, which number corresponds to your views about spending on Russia's (Ukraine's) (Lithuania's) army?

Q147: Do you fully agree, partially agree, disagree, or fully disagree that Russia has always (taken) more from our country than they have given us? (1 = fully agree, 5 = fully disagree)

In contrast, the mean preference for the Russian “Pro-Reformists” is substantially higher on this issue, signifying that this group is more supportive of free-market values.

Obviously, we would expect such clear party differentiation for elites based on their high levels of political interest and knowledge. Less expected, however, is the finding that mass policy preferences follow the same pattern of differentiation by party bloc. Furthermore, when the Russian masses are directly compared to the party elites, we find that their attitudes (expressed by identifiers of the corresponding party blocs) on this particular indicator are very similar (see Table 4).

In Ukraine as well, mass identifiers, like elite identifiers, reveal clear policy preferences that differentiate each party bloc. For example, both mass and elite identifiers of the “Centrist” parties should and do fall in the moderate zone of the market orientation scale relative to “Nationalists” and “Anti-Reformists.” Likewise, “Nationalist” identifiers in Ukraine fall closer to the high end of this scale with elites evidencing slightly higher mean levels of pro-market values than the masses from other blocs (see Table 4). Across the board there is less support for market reforms on the part of the “Anti-Reformists,” while the “Pro-Reform” groups are the most supportive of marketization. The fact that ordinary citizens and elites who identify with each particular party hold similar attitudes on this key issue is a strong indication of the ability of parties to provide connections between these two groups. It also shows that parties constitute an institution through which masses and elites can communicate their desires on key issues

Q150: Do you fully agree, partially agree, disagree, or fully disagree that the government should use force, if necessary, to preserve the unity and integrity of the state? (1 = fully agree, 5 = fully disagree)

Direction: 1 = Less aggressive, 15 = Highly aggressive

Exclusionary Nationalism Index

Q92: Do you think that only those who speak Russian (Ukrainian) (Lithuanian) should have the right to work in official (state) establishments of Russia (Ukraine) (Lithuania)? Yes No

Q101: Which of these characterizes your views?

Only people of Russian (Ukrainian) (Lithuanian) nationality should have the right to participate in elections.

Only people who were born in Russia (Ukraine) (Lithuania) should have the right to vote.

Only people who lived in Russia (Ukraine) (Lithuania) at the time the Soviet Union fell in 1991 should have the right to vote.

Anyone currently residing in Ukraine should be able to participate in elections.

Direction: 1 = less exclusionary 5 = highly exclusionary

Additional Items:

Q143: In your opinion, was the decision to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace program (1) very helpful, (2) somewhat helpful, (3) no change, (4) somewhat harmful, or (5) very harmful?

Q135: Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, some people still think of themselves as Soviets, whereas others have stopped thinking of themselves in those terms. To what extent would you say you think of yourself as a Soviet: (1) a great deal, (2) somewhat, (3) very little or (4) not at all?

and work together in the pursuit of common goals. In short, these findings show clear evidence of meaningful policy differentiation among the parties in all three countries.

In general, the alignment of the party blocs with respect to the various issues is similar across the three countries for all issues. The main exceptions are views concerning Aggressive and Exclusionary Nationalism (see Table 4). That is, the “Pro-Reform” identifiers tend to take a similar orientation on an issue in all three countries, and in each case this position is distinct from the policy orientation of the “Anti-Reformists.” Issues relating to nationalism, however, are not consistent across the three countries. Rather, in Russia the “Pro-Reform” identifiers are less inclined toward the use of force and less exclusionary than those identifying with “Anti-Reform” parties, whereas in Ukraine and Lithuania just the opposite occurs. No doubt, the domination by Russians during the Soviet era left the nationalists of Ukraine and Lithuania with the desire to defend their countries against outside encroachment. The net result is that citizens identifying with the “Pro-Reform,” more nationalistic parties in Ukraine and Lithuania take positions that reflect a more aggressive and exclusionary approach to defending the nation. Despite the reversal in the direction of party alignments on these issues across the three countries, the various parties clearly take differential positions with respect to these important issues.

Another aspect of nationalism involves taking on a new national identity while forsaking an earlier identity with the Soviet Union. In 1995 roughly two-thirds of Russians, a slight majority of Ukrainians (54%), but very few Lithuanians (15%) thought of themselves as “Soviets.” Moreover, in Lithuania there was no relationship between thinking of oneself as “Soviet” and choice of party. In Russia and Ukraine, however, those who identified with “Pro-Reform” or “Centrist” parties were less likely than those in the “Communist” party bloc identifiers to think of themselves as “Soviets” (see Table 4). No doubt, differences in historical circumstances largely account for the cross-country variance. After all, Lithuania and Western Ukraine were forcibly annexed into the Soviet Union during World War II. Nevertheless, in Russia and Ukraine it is important to note that it is the “Pro-Reform” parties that have become associated with promoting a new national identity.

Perceived Party Representation

A third way to gauge the policy impact of political parties is to determine if party leaders are perceived as representing the interests of the party rank and file. If representation is actually occurring, we would expect members of a given party to perceive the leaders of that party as closer to their preferred policy positions while members of an opposing party would perceive those leaders as farther away from their preferred position.

Table 5 documents the perceived distance between individuals and the president of their country on two seven-point scales.¹⁶ The first scale represents an abstract ideological continuum that runs from liberal to conservative, while the second involves the locus of responsibility for social well-being. The first scale tests if post-Soviet citizens lack an ideological or issue-based orientation toward politics and political parties. The second scale also taps an issue that has been at the center of a visible controversy in the literature on democratization in the former Soviet Union regarding party formation (see Finifter 1996; Miller et al. 1996).

A comparison of the perceived distance of the “Anti-Reform Communists” from Yeltsin with the perceived distance for the “Pro-Reformists” on both scales provides solid evidence that Yeltsin is perceived as better representing the latter. On the Liberal/Conservative scale, the “Anti-Reform Communists” perceive Yeltsin as being five times further away from their own preference than do supporters of “Pro-Reform” parties (see Table 5). Thus, as should be expected, Yeltsin better represents the “Pro-Reform” groups.

There is also a considerable difference between these two groups concerning the issue of locus of responsibility for securing jobs. Those identifying with parties in the “Pro-Reform” bloc perceive Yeltsin as much closer to themselves than do the “Communist” identifiers. On this issue the elite “Pro-Reformists” and the elite “Anti-Reform Nationalists” are ideologically separated by a wide distance. These general patterns of perceived ideological and issue distances were also evident for Ukraine and Lithuania (see Table 5). These data support the hypothesis of perceived party representation and further confirm that party development is well under way in these post-Soviet societies.

The Issue Basis of Party Preferences

In addition to the significant correlations between party identification and a variety of issue and ideological preferences revealed in the previous section, a multivariate analysis is needed to determine the relative impact of each issue on the development of identification with a party. The independent variables included in this analysis measure attitudes toward marketization, perceived national economy, privatization, crime, aggressive nationalism, exclusionary nationalism, joining NATO, and feelings about the control of the Black Sea Fleet (for Russia and Ukraine) or the military presence in Kaliningrad (for Lithuania), presidential ratings, and categorizing oneself as a “Soviet.”¹⁷

¹⁶Yeltsin, unlike Kuchma and Brazauskas, is less clearly connected with a specific party. However, he should be associated with the “Pro-Reform” parties more than any other as this bloc most closely represents his policy views.

¹⁷The last two variables were not available for the elite model.

TABLE 5

Perceived Issue Distance from President by Party Blocs in 1995 (seven point scales)

	Russia				Ukraine			Lithuania	
	Anti-Reform Communist	Anti-Reform Nationalist	Centrist	Pro-Reform	Anti-Reform	Centrist	Nationalist	Anti-Reform	Other
LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE									
<i>Mass Respondents</i>									
<i>Self Placement</i>	4.52	3.91	4.01	3.75	4.34	4.05	3.45	2.92	4.81
<i>Placement of President</i>	3.52	4.01	3.95	3.56	3.08	2.89	2.92	2.78	2.23
Difference	1.00	.10	.06	.19	1.26	1.16	.53	.14	2.58
<i>Elite Respondents</i>									
<i>Self Placement</i>	4.38	4.40	3.54	3.89	3.48	3.67	3.33	3.33	5.33
<i>Placement of President</i>	3.00	4.53	4.54	4.42	5.09	4.00	3.67	3.65	2.88
Difference	1.38	.13	1.00	.53	1.61	.33	.34	.32	2.45
GOVERNMENT/INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY									
<i>Mass Respondents</i>									
<i>Self Placement</i>	6.00	5.05	4.91	4.62	5.46	5.36	5.11	4.47	3.61
<i>Placement of President</i>	2.41	2.81	3.17	2.89	4.55	4.28	4.67	4.4	3.83
Difference	3.59	2.24	1.74	1.73	.91	1.08	.44	.07	.22
<i>Elite Respondents</i>									
<i>Self Placement</i>	4.77	5.13	4.00	2.82	5.09	4.58	3.33	3.55	3.04
<i>Placement of President</i>	2.05	1.91	2.82	3.00	2.00	2.50	3.46	3.87	3.96
Difference	2.72	3.22	1.18	.18	3.09	2.08	.13	.32	.92

Source: The University of Iowa PSCS 1995

N = 686 for Russia, 280 for Ukraine, and 307 for Lithuania in 1995.

The first item is a seven-point scale anchored by "liberal" = 1 and "conservative" = 7.

The second item is a seven-point scale anchored by "government should guarantee work for citizens" = 1 and "every person should look out for themselves" = 7.

One of the most interesting results of the mass regression analysis presented in Table 6 is finding that public ratings of the President did not achieve statistical significance in either Russia or Ukraine. This indicates that at this time personalistic ties were *not* the most critical factors in party identification or selection, which is somewhat surprising given the later work of Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli (1997).¹⁸ The more important variable for these countries is the effect of categorizing oneself as “Soviet.” A lingering identification as a Soviet citizen had a major impact on partisan alignment in these countries, as evidenced by the relative size of the regression coefficients for this variable (see Table 6). Thus a cleavage between “old” and “new” greatly affected partisanship in the initial years of democracy in these nations.

In Lithuania, however, feeling “Soviet” as opposed to “Lithuanian” was not a significant determinant of party identification. This variable fails to achieve significance because, as noted previously, only a very small percentage of the Lithuanians still thought of themselves as “Soviet” in 1995. Because almost all Lithuanians labeled themselves as Lithuanian, not Soviet, this variable failed to achieve significance. In short, only when virtually all of the citizens of these newly independent states forsake any loyalty to the old regime will the debate over the “old” vs. “new” order cease to be a major factor in the political alignments of these countries.¹⁹ Lithuania had reached this stage by 1995, whereas Ukraine and Russia had not.

Presidential ratings had an important impact on the party that citizens identified with in Lithuania. The underlying reasons for the greater importance of presidential evaluations in Lithuania most likely stem from the relative number of parties in the Lithuanian system. With the degree of party consolidation in this country, it is unlikely that people choose a party solely on the personal appeal of the party leader. However, the fact that certain leading politicians are easily identified with their parties affects the association between these two concepts. Because there were two major parties in Lithuania, as in the United States, it was cognitively easier for citizens to identify the politician leading each party. When there are fewer parties and candidates to evaluate, it becomes relatively

¹⁸ Although the 1995 survey did not include ratings of individual party leaders, the 1997 surveys did incorporate these topics. These expanded data indicate that shared interests with key individuals affect citizens’ relationships to their chosen party. Thus, the new data suggest that the popularity of party leaders is a more important component of party identification than revealed by analysis of the 1995 data. In fact, a regression analysis revealed that one-third of the variance in party identification can be explained by perceptions of leadership traits (Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli, 1997, 7). At the same time, however, issues and ideology remained very strong determinants of party identification as is reported here for 1995.

¹⁹ The variable of “Sovietness” discussed here is not merely a surrogate for socialization. Instead it taps a policy orientation or ideological identification with the now defunct Soviet regime. This conclusion is suggested by regression analysis using this item as a dependent variable. The analysis reveals that although demographic variables that may capture socialization effects (such as age, education, and native language) have some bearing on “feeling Soviet,” their impact is not consistent across countries and does not rival the explanatory power of the key issues included in Table 7.

TABLE 6

Impact of Major National Issues on Mass Partisanship in 1995

	Russia			Ukraine			Lithuania		
	b	se	Beta	b	se	Beta	b	se	Beta
Market Orientation	.109	.021	.330**	.044	.025	.180*	.018	.008	.151**
Perceived National Economy	.035	.040	.036	.092	.046	.196*	-.012	.016	-.047
Privatization	.037	.045	.047	.023	.057	.041	.011	.018	.039
Crime	-.043	.046	-.065	.004	.039	.101	-.013	.011	-.073
Aggressive Nationalism	.084	.032	.140**	-.002	.033	-.005	-.012	.009	-.091
Exclusionary Nationalism	-.02	.056	-.018	.146	.083	.169*	-.029	.024	-.075
Joining NATO	.103	.063	.087	-.07	.075	-.092	-.02	.030	-.040
Control of Military Forces	.029	.082	.018	-.191	.114	-.163*	-.033	.043	-.055
Presidential Rating	.041	.041	.055	-.05	.051	-.093	-.098	.017	-.437**
Categorizing oneself as Soviet	.246	.068	.212**	.313	.081	.427**	-.028	.043	-.039
Adjusted R ²			.26			.25			.35

Source: The University of Iowa PSCS 1995

N = 307 for Russia, 106 for Ukraine, 206 for Lithuania.

The dependent variable is identification with a party aggregated into blocs as defined in Table 4. The “anti-reform” bloc of parties is scored low and the “pro-reform” party bloc high, with the other parties assigned intermediate values. Independent variables are defined in the text.

* Significant at $p < .05$

** Significant at $p < .01$

simple for the public to match parties with candidates. Hence, it is not surprising to find that Lithuanian party identification was more significantly influenced by evaluations of the political leaders.

Equally interesting, the regression results show that for the most part a single issue dimension dominated the alignment of the parties in all three countries.²⁰ The issues associated with market orientation clearly differentiated the partisan alignment of individuals in the mass population across all three nations. Support for the old-style command economy with all its safety-net entitlements was associated with identification with the “Communists,” whereas support for an opportunity-oriented, free-market economy was related with a “Pro-Reform” party identification.

Similarly, perceptions of the national economy were also an important indicator of party identification for elites (see Table 7). Aggressive nationalism also influenced party selection and identification for the elites, particularly in Russia and Lithuania. The aggressive nationalism indicator directly measured attitudes toward preservation of the state and the use of force to pursue that goal. Thus, in addition to perceptions of the national economy, elite party identification is also based on military issues. This measure appears to tap feelings concerning international strength—a fact that has implications for the foreign policy roles that these nations may play in the region and around the globe. Apparently, elites are concerned with international image, and their party identification partially reflects these concerns.

In addition, for Russian and Ukrainian elites, feelings about whether or not to join NATO were a significant predictor of party identification (see Table 7). The expansion of NATO membership to include a number of East European countries has become a major aligning issue for the political parties in Russia and Ukraine, but apparently only for the elite. This again indicates that the elites, more than the masses, are concerned with international affairs and the placement of the post-Soviet states in the balance of world power. The NATO issue was not a good predictor in Lithuania, however, which likely reflects the historically closer ties Lithuania has had with the West.

The Social Bases of Party Support

Now we turn to the final critical question in our investigation: What types of people identify with each party? Evans and Whitefield (1996) contend that the social bases of party attachment are instrumental in determining the speed of party system formation in newly developing democracies. They argue that when parties can attract support based on appeals to specific categories of individuals, they may be able to circumvent some of the problems associated with the

²⁰Reisinger, Miller and Hesli (1998) outline two possible dimensions for the Russian party system. However, these two dimensions result from a hypothesized two-dimensional space rather than an empirically derived space.

TABLE 7

Impact of Major National Issues on Elite Partisanship in 1995

	Russia			Ukraine			Lithuania		
	B	se	Beta	b	se	Beta	b	se	Beta
Market Orientation	.067	.033	.225*	.066	.025	.331**	-.012	.015	-.082
Perceived National Economy	.222	.062	.323**	.007	.060	.031	-.096	.027	-.361**
Privatization	.099	.085	.107	-.035	.067	-.050	.078	.048	.171
Crime	.018	.048	.032	.004	.041	.010	-.0007	.015	-.004
Aggressive Nationalism	.100	.038	.219**	-.052	.036	-.183	-.051	.018	-.341**
Exclusionary Nationalism	.191	.137	.104	-.410	.141	-.339**	-.004	.044	-.008
Joining NATO	-.258	.089	-.278**	-.315	.110	-.436**	-.004	.055	-.007
Control of Military Forces	-.056	.171	-.024	-.147	.200	-.096	-.135	.087	-.191
Adjusted R ²			.62			.59			.60

Source: The University of Iowa PSCS 1995

N = 82 for Russia, 50 for Ukraine and 66 for Lithuania

The dependent variable is identification with a party aggregated into blocs as defined in Table 4. The “anti-reform” bloc of parties is scored low and the “pro-reform” party bloc high, with the other parties assigned intermediate values. Independent variables are defined in the text.

Note: in order to avoid losing a high number of cases in this analysis, cells with missing data were replaced with the mean score on each independent variable.

* Significant at $p < .05$

** Significant at $p < .01$

lack of a strong civil society (p. 12). Most important, any evidence of strong social bases of support would lend further credence to the claim that meaningful communication between citizens and parties is currently developing in a number of post-Soviet states. Earlier work by Evans and Whitefield (1993) on this aspect of party system development suggests that social differences in support for various political parties in Russia and Estonia, and to a lesser extent in Ukraine, were emerging as early as 1993 (p. 9). By 1995, they find that gender, age, region, education, and income critically differentiate among Russians who identify with various party blocs. For Ukraine, the important social cleavage variables are region, religion, education, and age (1996, Table 2).

Our data show that in Russia "Pro-Reform" identifiers are characterized as having a relatively higher education, speaking a native language other than Russian, and being more likely to be employed in the business world. Those identifying with "Anti-Reform Communist" parties, on the other hand, tend to be slightly older, have a lower level of education, and come from rural areas of the country. "Anti-Reformists" also tend to be native Russians (see Table 8). Thus, like Evans and Whitefield, we find that party blocs can be differentiated by gender and residence (urban vs. rural). Unlike these authors, we find there is not much variance in identification by age, especially for those identifying with the "Pro-Reform" parties. Age has some impact on supporting "Anti-Reform Communist" parties, as mentioned previously, but overall, as of 1995, age did not seem to strongly affect party choice. Thus, the Russian evidence suggests that a sociological theory of cleavage development has limited application.

Age did have an important effect on Ukrainian party identification, however. Young, highly educated, rural, technical or office workers who are ethnically Ukrainian and religious tend to identify with the "Nationalist" parties in Ukraine. Those who are older, lower-income, less educated, urban workers, pensioners, or housewives tend to identify with the "Anti-Reform" parties. Language also emerges as a predictor of party identification in Ukraine. This finding supports the idea that Ukrainians are divided along regional lines much more than citizens of Russia or Lithuania (for more on this, see Malanchuk and Clem 1995).

The bases of social support for Lithuanian parties form a distinct pattern that further proves the relatively high level of party development achieved in this country. The linear relationship between income and education for both the "Anti-Reform" parties as well as all other parties bolsters this claim (see far right-hand columns of Table 8). These findings reveal the important degree to which Lithuanian parties have consolidated. Overall, "Anti-Reformists" tend to be less educated and make less money than supporters of other parties. Individuals who identified with these parties were also more likely to be female and from rural areas. Language also had some impact. Lithuanians who identified with "Anti-Reform" parties were more likely to come from families that spoke languages other than Lithuanian. On the other hand, identifiers of parties that do not fit under the "Anti-Reform" label tend to be male, earn a higher income, hold

TABLE 8

Mass Identification with a Party (Aggregated into Blocs) by Demographic Category (Row Percentages) in 1995

	Russia			Ukraine			Lithuania		
	<i>Anti-Reform Communist</i>	<i>Anti-Reform Nationalist</i>	<i>Centrist</i>	<i>Pro-Reform</i>	<i>Anti-Reform</i>	<i>Centrist</i>	<i>Nationalist</i>	<i>Anti-Reform</i>	<i>Other</i>
Gender									
<i>Male</i>	30	15	16	39	36	19	44	26	74
<i>Female</i>	29	6	31	34	40	21	39	36	64
Age									
<i>Youngest Quartile (<28)</i>	20	15	26	39	28	12	60	36	64
<i>Age 29–40</i>	18	14	28	39	30	22	48	25	75
<i>Age 41–55</i>	31	7	23	38	40	19	41	33	67
<i>Oldest Quartile (>56)</i>	51	4	17	28	51	26	23	31	69
Income									
<i>Lowest Quartile</i>	44	11	28	17	46	26	29	44	56
	35	12	18	35	49	9	42	32	68
	24	8	30	38	31	29	40	28	72
<i>Highest Quartile</i>	20	6	21	53	32	23	45	17	83

Education									
<i>Through Secondary</i>	37	10	24	29	48	14	38	37	63
<i>Tech/Professional/Some College</i>	22	13	25	41	35	21	44	30	70
<i>College Grad/Higher</i>	20	7	20	52	17	38	45	24	76
Occupation									
<i>Workers/Pensioners/Housewives</i>	34	12	21	33	46	21	33	34	66
<i>Technical Workers</i>	16	7	28	49	38	0	62	16	84
<i>Office Workers</i>	25	4	31	40	16	19	65	27	73
<i>Students/Intellectuals</i>	18	9	33	40	11	28	61	29	71
<i>Businessmen/Private Farmers</i>	5	11	8	76	33	33	33	27	73
Population Density									
<i>Urban</i>	21	18	25	36	45	22	34	22	78
<i>Rural</i>	35	5	24	37	18	16	66	38	62
Native Language									
<i>Russian or Ukrainian or Lithuanian</i>	30	11	24	35	30	17	53	26	74
<i>All others</i>	24	9	17	50	46	24	30	58	42
Religions									
<i>Orthodox</i>	28	9	28	36	35	22	43	31	69
<i>Other (non-religious excluded)</i>	32	16	20	32	38	22	39	50	50

Source: The University of Iowa PSCS 1995

N = 686 for Russia, 280 for Ukraine, 207 for Lithuania

Party identification based on response to the survey question: Is there any one particular party that expresses your views better than any of the other parties? If so, which one?

a higher level of education, and be more likely to speak Lithuanian as their primary language.

Yet, some results tend to pose serious questions for the argument that social cleavages explain the consolidation of the party system in Lithuania. Lithuanian parties did not tend to be differentiated on the basis of age or occupation (although "Anti-Reform" identifiers were slightly less likely to be employed in technical trades). Religion as well did not seem to play a particularly important role. While various parties in these post-Soviet countries do appeal to different social strata, thereby confirming a growing consolidation of the party systems, the correlations between social strata and party support were not strong enough or consistent enough to suggest social cleavages as the sole or primary foundation for the development of the parties or party systems.²¹ More likely, the emerging relationship between social strata and party support is a byproduct of party development and the underlying dimension of support for the old regime versus support for a new democratic and market-oriented regime.

Conclusions

Key aspects of a competitive party system are emerging in the post-Soviet states of Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. In fact, the data show that Russia and Lithuania are moving toward a party system much faster than the traditional literature on party formation would predict. This conclusion derives from four interrelated areas of analysis. First, partisan identification has skyrocketed in these two countries. Second, this identification translates into votes for these parties with a remarkable degree of consistency. Third, there is a high degree of correspondence between the policy preferences of national elites and their party's supporters. Identification is based on salient issues and ideological choices, not on ephemeral or fleeting justifications. Furthermore, knowledge and information regarding policy orientations, rather than socialization, accounts for the rise of party preferences. A significant number of average citizens were able to use information disseminated by the parties, the mass media, or social communication to form a judgment that one of the available parties represents their interests. Given the large number of competing parties, this is no simple task.

²¹ The addition of key demographic variables to the regression model explaining party identification increased the explained variance of the model to a limited extent in Russia, but lowered it for Ukraine. The Lithuanian results remained mostly unchanged. In general, the relative magnitude of these variables was pale in comparison to the issue-oriented variables. Of course, in a causal sense the socio-demographic variables would fall farther back in the causal chain. Hence, the overall impact of these variables would be enhanced by taking both their indirect as well as direct effects into consideration. In an analysis of the impact of demographic factors alone on party identification, there was consistency across the three countries for age. For Russia, income was also a significant indicator, but this result is likely a byproduct of the importance of market orientation. Language was significant for both Ukraine and Lithuania (but not for Russia). In Ukraine, this finding reinforces the idea that East/West regional differences continue to be salient.

This process reflects a more deliberate party choice than is suggested by a slow process of childhood socialization. This may create a less enduring party anchor. Yet, the correlation between partisanship and information-seeking (as displayed in Table 2) implies that many post-Soviet citizens are beginning to organize their knowledge of the political world through partisanship. This dynamic is not only essential to the continued growth of established parties; it also allows meaningful dialogue between elites and masses to take place through the medium of political parties—a critical indicator of an emerging party system. Finally, not only do masses and elites who identify with the same party share policy preferences, but parties can be differentiated on the basis of social and political issues as well as demographics. In short, the data suggest that citizens differentiate among parties on the basis of the broader policy positions and action orientations they associate with the competing leaders who head specific parties.

However, while party formation in Russia and Lithuania has made unprecedented and unexpected advances in the past few years, Ukraine's party system remained relatively underdeveloped. Ukraine has made important strides toward the development and consolidation of a party system, but in comparison to Russia and Lithuania this nation lags behind in important aspects of party-building. For example, although the rate of identification with a political party has more than doubled since 1992, as of 1997 the total percentage of mass identifiers fell far short of the 60% and 70% found in Russia and Lithuania, respectively. Furthermore, social cleavages in Ukraine tend to reinforce regional divisions and thus deter the development of broadly based national parties.

The sheer number of political parties in Ukraine may explain part of this phenomenon. Even those most knowledgeable about politics and political parties may find it difficult to navigate in the political arena. On the other hand, a different set of forces may be at work. Evans and Whitefield (1996), for example, speculate that Ukraine's lack of a nationwide party system stems from the "inherent problems associated with the merging of historically distinct regional factions into a unified state" (p. 12). Ukraine, more than Russia or Lithuania, still struggles to define its image as a newly independent state.

In conclusion, theories of party development based on evidence from societies that evolved prior to globalization, sophisticated mass media communication, and the creation of a new breed of professional politicians may require revision in light of the post-Soviet experience. Contrary to traditional theories, popular support for parties does not reflect deep-seated social cleavages. This may be because social divisions are changing rapidly as these nations experience the shocks of moving toward a market economy. Or, post-Soviet societies' dearth of intermediate groups and organization may deter linkage between social cleavages and political parties. Rather than reflecting basic social cleavages, the current party alignments reflect the more generic and wholesale rejection of the old system versus a preference for the new regime and a market economy. Popular support for the various parties, therefore, generally arises from the

information and knowledge gained by the average citizen indicating how well the various parties fit with their preferences on these fundamental ideological and issue dimensions.

Parties in the post-Soviet states are not ephemeral, impotent, non-representative, personalistic, or undifferentiated. Post-Soviet party systems are beginning to provide a means of representation and communication between masses and elites. However, the emergence of a party system does not mean that the consolidation of democracy is a foregone conclusion. Strong, ideologically differentiated political parties with mass as well as elite followings are clearly essential to continued democracy, yet other conditions must also be met. Without continued progress the current parties will have a difficult time transforming themselves into organizationally strong and enduring institutions.

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