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The Limits of Protectionism: Building Coalitions for Free Trade. By Michael Lusztig. Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 2004. 288p.

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not measure abstract violence; they judge concrete acts. Hence, the better term would have been “just act,” not just violence. Moreover, when the substitution is made, the full impact of many of Keane’s sentences and digressions are realized. For example, by substituting “*an act*” for “violence,” one illuminates the just cause that should motivate any political act: “*An act* can be deemed ‘good’ only when it serves as an effective means of creating or strengthening a peaceful civil society secured by publicly accountable political-legal institutions” (p. 161).

The Limits of Protectionism: Building Coalitions for Free Trade. By Michael Lutzig. Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 2004. 288p. \$27.95.

— John A. C. Conybeare, *University of Iowa*

This is an ambitious and useful book that takes the reader through eight cases of governments that tried, with mixed results, to guide their countries from protectionism to free trade. A successful strategy requires the government to make allies of the industries that can transform themselves and survive in a more competitive environment (“flexible rent-seekers”) and quickly to kill the industries that cannot (“inflexible rent-seekers”). Michael Lutzig adopts from the classic public choice literature the term *rent-seekers*, a group that seeks to effect a zero sum transfer from others to itself, usually resulting in a negative sum game for society, by the amount of the transaction costs necessary to effect the transfer.

The process starts with a government perceiving one or more of three types of opportunities that Lutzig calls economic crisis (e.g., the Mexican debt crisis of 1994), mandated change (e.g., Canada complying with the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations), and strategic calculation (e.g., Prime Minister Robert Peel hoping to repeal the Corn Laws). Governments then pick one or more of four plans for implementation: the big bang (self-explanatory), divide and conquer (picking off the protectionist industries one by one in order to lessen the overall magnitude of political opposition), incrementalism (slow but broad-based reductions in protection), and path of least resistance (liberalize the sectors where resistance is low, buy off the stronger opposition with subsidies, and put off the tough cases). With this framework in place, Lutzig has a 4 × 7 table with 28 boxes in it. The eight cases (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Britain, Mexico, New Zealand, and the United States) populate only seven of these boxes. Most of the cases are contemporary (late twentieth century), except for Britain (the 1840s) and the United States (the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Amendment of 1934 that moved the United States away from the Smoot-Hawley level of protection).

While the typology set up is both interesting and useful, especially for a public policy strategist, it does not constitute a “model” (pp. 21–25). There is no clear spec-

ification of a hypothesis or of dependent and independent variables. The only global generalization I was able to get out of the book was that sometimes liberalization works and sometimes it does not. The reasons why it does or does work seem to be mostly idiosyncratic and unique to each case. What the author presents as a model in Figure 1.1 is simply the chronological sequence of events that may occur.

This quibble aside, the cases are well presented, sensitive to historical nuances, detailed in their uses of source material (i.e., not superficial), and told in ways that show how the author sees them fitting into the appropriate boxes. Therein lies another problem. Lutzig elaborates on one version of Peel’s decision to attempt repeal of the Corn Laws: It was necessary to prevent revolution. However, as Lutzig is surely aware, there are a number of other explanations for the repeal of the Corn Laws, such as the rise of middle-class urban voters and election buying by the cotton textile producers. He is giving us the version that fits his typology. Similarly, his story of U.S. trade liberalization is slanted: “Roosevelt and Hull used the iteration strategy as a means of implementing free trade through gradual conversion of flexible rent-seekers” (p. 77). There are many other factors one could emphasize in telling the story of U.S. trade policy between the wars, ranging from ideology to optimal tariffs (the effective rate of protection for the U.S. manufacturing industry actually went up during the period in question).

I have much less familiarity with the other cases, though in each case, the story Lutzig tells appears quite plausible. Yet there is often a whiff of tautology in the accounts. When President Carlos Salinas’s big bang strategy works in Mexico, it is evidence of his “acute political skills” (p. 102). When Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam’s big bang fails, it is evidence of “poor policy decisions” (p. 173). To be fair, Lutzig does try to offer some reasons as to when a particular strategy works and when it does not, but they are often just dropped on the reader as asides in the course of recounting a case study. The twin cases of Chile and Brazil are particularly interesting since a comparison of the two would presumably hold a lot of extraneous variables constant, and since Lutzig says liberalization worked in one case and not in the other, fertile ground for some small-n generalizations. Yet again, the cases are discussed separately with little comparison. The Chicago Boys’ big bang worked in Chile because it worked. Brazilian President Henrique Cardoso’s big bang ran into opposition and he retreated into the protected cocoon of Mercosur. Lutzig clearly does not want to attribute the Chilean success to the Pinochet dictatorship, but that is the only obvious reason that jumps out at the reader. The author himself seems puzzled by the different outcomes and notes that “as late as the mid-1980s, the situations in Brazil and Chile were reasonably comparable” (p. 204). Yet the analytic judgments offered are invariably country

unique. In the case of Brazil, for example, he says that “seeking to build a coalition by satisfying protectionist rent-seekers dooms . . . the prospects for successful neo-liberal reform” (p. 204).

Overall, *The Limits of Protectionism* is something of a curate’s egg. The framework and the cases are helpful, but the dissection and analysis is less satisfying. It does remind us to reread the classics: “the new ruler ought to determine all the injuries that he will need to inflict. He should then inflict them once for all, and not have to renew them every day, and in that way he will be able to set men’s minds at rest and win them over to him when he confers benefits” (Machiavelli, *The Prince*). Did Machiavelli invent the big bang strategy of public policy innovation?

Global Prescriptions: Gendering Health and Human Rights. By Rosalind Pollack Petchesky. New York: Zed Books, 2003. 320p. \$75.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

—Betsy Hartmann, *Hampshire College*

In her book, Rosalind Petchesky sets herself the ambitious task of analyzing the development and impact of transnational movements for women’s health in the last two decades of the twentieth century. She examines them not only in relation to the changing concepts of human rights and major United Nations conferences, but within the broader political and economic context of the spread of neoliberalism, religious fundamentalisms, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and militarism. Originally commissioned by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development for a five-year review of the World Summit for Social Development, the book assumes a fair degree of sophistication in regard to transnational politics although the text is punctuated by short boxes that give readers a useful introduction to key policy developments.

The first two chapters of *Global Prescriptions* focus on the rise of transnational women’s health movements and the pros and cons of their participation in UN conferences, especially the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo in 1994. Petchesky has long been active in reproductive rights issues and has participated in feminist organizing around the ICPD. Thus, in a sense she writes as a “participant observer,” though there is little personal narrative in the text. She views the UN conferences on environment (Rio de Janeiro 1992), human rights (Vienna 1993), population (Cairo 1994), social development (Copenhagen 1995), and women (Beijing 1995) as important sites of discursive struggle as a growing coalition of women’s groups, from both the North and South, came together to push for an inclusive agenda of women’s rights and empowerment. The models of organizing they developed, from pre-conference networking to an active Women’s Caucus at the conferences for lobbying governments and international agencies, proved highly successful in terms of increasing

women’s visibility, expanding the concept of human rights, getting new language into policy documents, and in many countries serving as an opportunity for diverse groups to come together to put pressure on the state.

Of all the conferences, the 1994 ICPD in Cairo marked the most notable “paradigm shift” as women’s health groups made an alliance with the population and family planning establishment to fight off fundamentalist opposition to birth control, abortion, and sexuality education. The result was the “Cairo consensus,” in which reproductive health programs and women’s empowerment were put forward as a much better means for addressing population growth than the narrow, top-down, and often coercive population control programs of the past. In feminist circles, the process of producing the consensus was far from consensual, however. The period was marked by intense and sometimes bitter struggle and debate. In particular, many women’s groups were concerned that the Cairo consensus did not challenge the dominant neoliberal model of development with its emphasis on privatization of health and other social services and its negative impact on women’s livelihoods.

Petchesky acknowledges these struggles and notes in retrospect how the Women’s Caucus at Cairo probably should have paid more attention to the structural and macroeconomic conditions necessary for the realization of women’s reproductive and sexual rights. However, she argues that “this shortsightedness reflects not so much a willful political choice or the dominance of Northern women’s NGOs as deeper structural and cultural weaknesses of women’s movements across the globe.” She argues that feminist activists have to some extent “internalized dominant gender norms so that macroeconomic issues (trade, finance and resource allocations), like military and security issues, are perceived as intrinsically masculine and insular terrain” (pp. 50–51).

In actuality, however, many women’s groups involved in the Cairo process did have a strong and well-developed analysis of these “masculine” terrains (e.g., see Jael Silliman and Ynestra King, eds., *Dangerous Intersections*, 1999). And it was precisely this analysis that led them to question the strategic decision of the Women’s Caucus leadership not to bargain more strongly on economic issues when negotiating the Cairo consensus. Although Petchesky is right in saying that this decision was not a simple outcome of the domination of Northern feminists and foundations over Southern activists, I would argue (as someone who also participated in the Cairo process) that no understanding of that process is complete without examining the hierarchies in transnational women’s organizing, the role of strategic philanthropy in gatekeeping and amplifying certain voices over others, and the collaboration between U.S. foundations, such as the Pew Charitable Trusts, and the State Department and national security community around Cairo. The *material* politics of the Cairo process