



Iowa Research Online  
The University of Iowa's Institutional Repository

---

Department of Political Science Publications

---

4-2-2009

# Regional Voting in Russia's Federal Elections and Changing Regional Deference to the Kremlin

William M. Reisinger  
*University of Iowa*

Bryon J. Moraski  
*University of Florida*

---

Copyright © 2009 William M. Reisinger and Bryon J. Moraski

Hosted by [Iowa Research Online](http://Iowa Research Online). For more information please contact: [lib-ir@uiowa.edu](mailto:lib-ir@uiowa.edu).

**REGIONAL VOTING IN RUSSIA'S FEDERAL ELECTIONS AND CHANGING  
REGIONAL DEFERENCE TO THE KREMLIN**

William M. Reisinger  
Department of Political Science  
The University of Iowa  
Iowa City, Iowa 52242  
[william-reisinger@uiowa.edu](mailto:william-reisinger@uiowa.edu)

and

Bryon J. Moraski  
Department of Political Science  
The University of Florida  
Gainesville, FL 32611  
[bmoraski@polisci.ufl.edu](mailto:bmoraski@polisci.ufl.edu)

Prepared for delivery at the 67<sup>th</sup> Annual National Conference of the  
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 2-5, 2009.

## **REGIONAL VOTING IN RUSSIA'S FEDERAL ELECTIONS AND CHANGING REGIONAL DEFERENCE TO THE KREMLIN**

As problems with the competitiveness of Russian elections have grown more widely agreed upon and more extensive, election data have ceased to be a useful tool for illuminating the values and voting behavior of Russian citizens. Even when the published results from a particular precinct, city or region are not entirely fraudulent, they are shaped--to extents that vary by place and are difficult to ascertain with precision but that have been well documented--by various pressures on voters, a controlled information environment and assorted dirty tricks. Scholars cannot reliably determine from voting results what voters in Irkutsk would do differently from voters in Moscow. Electoral data may, however, remain valuable for illuminating other aspects of Russian politics. We explore the regional outcomes of Russian federal elections for clues about elite control over politics within their regions. We focus on each region's a) voting support for the incumbent or incumbent-supported presidential candidate, b) voting support for the so-called "party of power" in legislative races and c) level of voter turnout in presidential and legislative races. Each of these outcomes has been politicized in Russian politics such that they are relevant to understanding regional elite dynamics even when regional elections are undemocratically conducted or the results fraudulent. We first present and discuss the regional distributions of these three electoral results for all ten federal elections from 1991 to 2008. We then present and discuss a measure developed from those election results that indicate regional elites' abilities to control electoral outcomes during each of four different electoral "cycles" (a legislative and presidential race in close time proximity): 1995/-1996, 1999/2000, 2003/2004 and 2007/2008. Increasing numbers of those regional leaderships possessing such control use it to support the federal executive authority, which we refer to as deference to the Kremlin. We end with an analysis of the regions' different "trajectories"--that is, how their scores on our measure change from the first electoral cycle to the last.

While some of our findings confirm well known patterns, our analyses provide more descriptive specificity about differences among the regions at a given time as well as about how each changes over time. They also permit analytic efforts to explain these patterns, and our analyses here do suggest some unexpected points. Russia's "ethnic" regions become deferential earlier and remain so more strongly. We find, though, interesting variation even within this category of region. The percent of the region's population that is ethnically Russian is a more finely tuned predictor than a region's constitutional status per se. It performs more strongly in multivariate equations and retains a powerful impact even in distinguishing among the ethnic regions. In all cases, the lower the proportion of ethnic Russians in the

region, the higher the deference to the Kremlin. Extremely high levels of voting for Kremlin is associated with extremely high levels of voter turnout at the regional level. We show that levels of deference to the Kremlin that are high enough to suggest elite manipulation begin to be evident in 1995. While such levels spread to a much broader share of Russia's regions from 2003 on, it is not a Putin-period phenomenon. High deference levels show only weak geographical clustering or over-time contagion across contiguous regions. In terms of how different regions change from 1995 through 2008, it is not the changes in regional conditions from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s that accounts for this change; rather, it is the initial differences among the regions, primarily the percent of ethnic Russians in the population, that drives explains the most highly deferential. Intriguingly, change since 1995 has different explanations depending on whether a region is ethnic or non-ethnic. For the non-ethnic regions, urbanization and socioeconomic development has a strong influence, with high levels pushing regions away from deference to the Kremlin, as expected. Within the group of ethnic regions, while urbanization has no impact, the percent of Russian has the same strong impact even though the ethnic regions share a relatively lower percentage of Russians compared to the non-ethnic regions. Russia's ethnic and non-ethnic regions are on separate trajectories of relations with the federal center to an extent not yet sufficiently analyzed.

### **Federal Election Results at the Regional Level**

Russia's post-Soviet federal elections have been extensively studied (see, for example, Belin and Orttung 1997; McFaul and Petrov 1997; McFaul 1997; Wyman 1997; Gel'man, Golosov and Meleshkina 2000; Gel'man, Golosov and Meleshkina 2002; Marsh 2002; Clem and Craumer 2004; Marsh, Albert and Warhola 2004; Sakwa 2005; Gel'man et al. 2007), including by linking voting results to individual choices using survey data (e.g., Hough, Davidheiser and Lehmann 1996; White, Rose and McAllister 1996; Colton 2000; Rose and Munro 2002; Colton and McFaul 2003). Although only national-level totals determine the outcome of federal elections, regional breakdowns are reported, and most analyses of Russian federal elections investigate regional voting to one extent or another. Russia is, after all, a territorially huge country with a culturally and socially complex population. Subnational analyses can take advantage of regional differences to paint a more detailed picture. In what follows, we presume the reader is familiar with the settings and major parties or candidates of each of Russia's federal elections. Those who are not can find a review in Appendix 1.

By common usage, the term "region" refers to any of the constitutionally defined subjects of the Russian Federation, whether its status is that of an oblast', krai, republic, autonomous oblast', autonomous okrug or the two "cities of federal status" (Moscow and St. Petersburg). Originally, 89 regions had

constitutional status. Following recent years' efforts by the Putin administration, six small regions located entirely within another region have been merged with that larger region, resulting in 83 members of the Federation at present. (On the politics of the mergers, see Busygina 2007, 63-67). Thirty two of the original 89 regions are designated by the name of a non-Russian ethnic group or nationality comprising a relatively large portion of the region's populace followed by one of three statuses: republic, autonomous oblast' and autonomous okrug. (For brevity, we will refer to these regions as "ethnic" regions.) With the mergers of smaller regions, all of which were autonomous okrugs nested within larger regions, 26 of Russia's 83 regions are ethnic regions.

In 2000, as part of his efforts to restore the federal center's strength vis-à-vis the regions, President Putin established seven federal administrative districts, each comprising from six to 18 contiguously located regions (on these reforms, see Hyde 2001, 725-27; Nelson and Kuzes 2003; Petrov and Slider 2003; Ross 2004). For purposes of discussion and presentation of results below, these districts are valuable as indicators of the geographic location of different regions. The districts are the Northwest, Central, Southern, Volga, Urals, Siberian and Far East. A map showing the location of the districts is available at [http://flagspot.net/flags/ru\(f.html\)](http://flagspot.net/flags/ru(f.html)).


In examining the results of federal legislative races, we concentrate on what Russians have dubbed the "party of power" (see, inter alia, Colton and McFaul 2000; Makarkin 2000; Likhtenshtein 2002; Smyth 2002; Glebova 2004; Myagkov et al. 2005; Oversloot and Verheul 2006). The essence of the term is when one of the parties on the ballot represents (or is perceived to represent) the federal executive. A cumbersome translation that captures this meaning more fully is "the party of the powers-that-be."<sup>1</sup> The extent of executive-branch involvement with the party of power varied over the period. So, too, did whether the party leadership was based in the Kremlin (symbolizing the offices of the presidency) or in the White House (symbolizing the prime minister and the agencies comprising the government). Despite this variation, the appellation party of power has held meaning for both voters and elites during electoral periods. (Appendix 1 discusses the parties that were considered the parties of power in the different elections.) For the presidential elections, we are interested in the voting for either the candidate who already holds the country's executive office (true of both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin) or his designee (true of Dmitrii Medvedev). We will sometimes refer to the "in-power presidential candidate" to mean Yeltsin or Putin or Medvedev.

---

<sup>1</sup>Golosov (2004, 30) considers the term misleading because the parties in question have not served as vehicles for governing in between elections but solely as electoral vehicles. We employ the term in the latter sense even though some consider that the current party of power, United Russia, may now be playing a larger political role outside the electoral arena.

Figure 1 shows the distributions of regional voting for the in-power presidential candidate and for the party of power between 1991 and 2008. Within the figure, a box chart depicts the distribution of regional votes in the given election. The regional vote at the 25<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> percentiles define the box, with

**Figure 1: Regional Voting for the In-Power Presidential Candidate or the “Party of Power,” 1991-2008**



Means and standard deviations for voting distributions:

1991	1993	1995	1996 (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	1999	1999	2000	2003	2004	2007	2008
Yeltsin	RC	NDR	Yeltsin	Unity	OVR	Putin	UR	Putin	UR	Medvedev
52.6	14.6	10.0	53.2	26.8	11.7	54.5	40.1	72.3	66.0	69.9
(12.7)	(6.0)	(7.2)	(12.5)	(9.1)	(13.1)	(9.9)	(11.5)	(9.1)	(11.1)	(8.4)

... for turnout distributions:

1991	1993	1995	1996 (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	1999	1999	2000	2003	2004	2007	2008
76.2	56.1	65.0	68.6	62.7	62.7	69.7	56.9	65.7	65.9	70.4
(6.5)	(7.8)	(4.7)	(4.8)	(5.5)	(5.5)	(5.3)	(8.7)	(11.1)	(11.8)	(10.3)

(RC: Russia’s Choice; NDR: Our Home is Russia; OVR: Fatherland/All-Russia; UR: United Russia)

Sources: See Appendix 2.

the line through the middle indicating the median level. The lines on either side of the box show the “adjacent values,” which are defined as the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile plus 1.5 times the distance between the 75<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> percentiles. The dots indicate cases that lie beyond the adjacent values. The means and standard deviations for each election are noted below the appropriate box chart. In addition, because the level of turnout in each region is a salient outcome of each election, we note those figures also below the appropriate bar chart.

One thing that stands out visually in Figure 1 is the difference, until 2007 and 2008, between the levels of support received by a presidential candidate and by a party in the legislative races. In the 1991 presidential elections, the spread (standard deviation) of pro-Yeltsin voting among the regions is wider than in any subsequent presidential race. Also different from any subsequent presidential race is the size of the lower tail and the three low outliers (the Altai Republic, Aga Buryat AO and Tyva, all of which are ethnic regions). All three subsequent presidential elections are more notable for their *high* outliers. Only in the 2000 race is there even a single low outlier, Kemerovo oblast’, explained by the fact that Kemerovo’s governor, Aman Tuleev, was himself running for president.

In both 1993 and 1995, other parties outperform the party of power or proto-party of power--Russia’s Choice and Our Home is Russia, respectively. What makes the latter parties’ regional distributions interesting is the presence of high outliers, notably the 48% of Chechen residents reported as voting for Our Home in 1995. Two of the three high outliers for Russia’s Choice in 1993 are Moscow (35%) and St. Petersburg (27%), suggesting that the results reflect those populaces’ ideological preferences to a large extent. Both regions (or, more accurately, cities of federal status) are urban with disproportionately high numbers of voters with high education and income levels. In 1995, however, the regions with high voting for Our Home cannot be explained in this way. For one thing, Our Home presented itself as representing pragmatism rather than an ideological position. For another, the regions that gave Our Home the top eight highest percentages are all ethnic regions, which are more rural and less highly educated than non-ethnic regions. Indeed, 16 of the highest 19 regional totals for Our Home come from ethnic regions. In 1993, the situation is more nearly the reverse: only eight of the top 19 regions in voting for Russia’s Choice are ethnic regions, and all nine *lowest* regions are ethnic regions. In 1993, the t-test of the difference in means between republics/autonomous regions and other regions is +1.41 (.162). In 1995, the t-test is -4.15 (.000).

Both the average regional vote for Yeltsin in the 1996 second-round balloting and the standard deviation of the distribution are quite similar to those in 1991. The data indicate, however, that why a region votes strongly or weakly for Yeltsin changes by 1996. Note, first, that while the correlation

between the regions' ranks in 1991 and 1996 is positive (.33 [.00]), it is not as high as one would expect when the same candidate runs in two successive elections. In 1996, 13 regions returned less than 30% of their votes in favor of Yeltsin, yet three-quarters of those regions (10) had given Yeltsin a majority in 1991. Sixteen ethnic regions (half of them) had given Yeltsin less than a majority in 1991, averaging 36%. Among those 16 regions in the 1996 second round, however, Yeltsin averages 57%. Three of these 16 give him more than 65% (Evensk, Koryaksk and Kalmykia). Tyva, which had given Yeltsin the lowest total in 1991, a mere 15%, gives him 63% in 1996.

A notable rise in average voting for the in-power candidates and parties commences with the 1999-2000 electoral cycle. This pertains to Unity's results in 1999, of course, not to those of the rival pretender to the status of party of power, Fatherland/All-Russia (OVR) (on the competition in 1999 between Unity and OVR for the status of "party of power," see Likhtenshtein 2002 and the discussion in Appendix 1). What the regional distribution makes clear, though, is the extent to which OVR's nationwide figure of 13% depended on high returns from a handful of regions, many of which had governors in the OVR leadership. Ten regions give OVR returns over 25%, topping out at Ingushetia's 88% (5.8 standard deviations above the mean!) Seven of these ten are ethnic regions. The median regional vote for OVR is 7.6%, substantially below its nationwide total. The voting for Unity is much higher on average and it has more regions below the mean than above (the median is slightly above the mean). The outlier at the low end is Ingushetia, the strongest pro-OVR region. The one high outlier is Tyva with 70% for Unity, lower than Ingushetia's vote for OVR but an impressive 4.9 standard deviations above the mean.

Although Putin's victory in the 2000 presidential race was relatively easy, he failed to achieve a majority in over one-third of the regions (33/89=37%). Most of those regions (26/33=79%) are non-ethnic. As noted above, the lowest total for Putin comes from Kemerovo, where he received 25% against Kemerovo's governor Tuleev. (The next lowest total for Putin was the Altai Republic's 38%.) The two extreme outliers on the high end are Dagestan (81%) and Ingushetia (85%), both ethnic regions in the Caucasus. Interestingly, Tyva, which had shown that marked increase in its support for Yeltsin between 1991 and 1996 and had made a heroic effort on behalf of Unity four months earlier, gives Putin a rather pedestrian 62%, only 20<sup>th</sup> among the regions. The average pro-Putin total among the ethnic regions is 59% versus 52% for the non-ethnic regions (t-test = -3.27 [.00]).

In the 2003-2004 cycle, the distributions of both the legislative and presidential results show much higher averages than in the previous cycle, with short bottom tails and some notable high-end outliers.



Despite 16 parties being on the 2003 ballot, and the option for voters to select “against all,”<sup>2</sup> United Russia received a bigger share of the votes than any party in any previous Duma election. Notice, however, how low within the box in Figure 1 is the line marking the median. That median line is at 35.5%, lower than the party’s nationwide total of 38, which in turn is lower than the average regional score of 40%. In other words, a handful of high outlying regions provide United Russia with the total votes it needed to secure control of the Duma. Five regions, all ethnic, delivered two-thirds or more of their votes to United Russia: Dagestan, Tyva, Kabardino-Balkaria, Mordova and Chechnya. Of those five, Tyva had been Unity’s best performer in 1999 while Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Mordova had all been among OVR’s best performers. (Chechnya did not vote in 1999.) In other words, whereas in 1999 regional leaderships “delivered” high vote totals to different parties of power, in 2003 United Russia was the only game in town for regions intending to show strong support for the Kremlin. Sixteen regions gave United Russia over half of all the votes cast, of which 14 were ethnic regions. The ethnic regions as a whole average 50% for United Russia as compared to 35% among the non-ethnic regions (t-test = -7.28 [.00]). (For more on the geography of voting and turnout in the 2004 election, including the high levels of both reported by the ethnic regions, see Marsh et al. 2004.)

In the 2004 elections, by contrast with 2000, no region returned less than a majority for Putin. Indeed every single region’s vote for Putin exceeded the average that the winning candidate received in any previous presidential election. Low outliers are gone, and seven regions return more than 90% for Putin. All seven are ethnic regions, indeed the top 19 spots on the list are ethnic regions. The average for all 32 ethnic regions is 80% for Putin. Non-ethnic regions average 68%. (The t-test of the difference in the means = -8.1 [.000].) The regional support levels in 2004 correlate at .56 (.00) with those in 2000. Also interesting is that, to a significant extent, the regions giving Putin the highest totals in 2004 are the ones that gave Yeltsin high totals in the 1996 second round, albeit the meaning of a “high total” in the two elections is quite different. The two are correlated at .52 (.000).

By 2007, the number of parties on the ballot is still moderately high at 11, yet United Russia gains almost two-thirds of all votes cast, with the second-place Communist Party receiving under 12%. What is striking about the regional distribution is how many regions far outstrip UR’s--quite high--overall average, including six that reported more than 90% of their voters having selected United Russia: the ethnic regions of Tyva, Karachaevo-Sirkassia, Mordova, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia and Chechnya. Four of

---

<sup>2</sup>Russian electoral legislation covering the elections from 1991-2004 provided citizens with the option of participating in the voting process yet expressing dissatisfaction with all the candidates or parties by selecting “against all.” On against-all voting, see Akhremenko and Meleshkina 2002; Oversloot, van Holsteyn and van den Berg 2002; Liubarev 2003; Hutcherson 2004; McAllister and White 2008.

these six are in the Caucasus region. As in previous elections, ethnic regions dominate the high end of the distribution, with the top twelve spots (all giving United Russia over 80%) and 20 of the top 25 spots. The mean for the ethnic regions is 76% and 61% for the other regions (t-test = -7.1 [.00]).

For the election of Dmitrii Medvedev in 2008, the voting results and an adequate turnout level were both seen as important. The *Moscow Times*, for example, quoted a governor's view: "What's the best way to show the next president that you love him? In this election, the answer is to guarantee him a good turnout so that Medvedev becomes Russia's legitimate president in everyone's eyes" (Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin 2009, 9). Accordingly, 2008 saw the highest overall turnout level since the 1991 race, over 70%, almost 5 percentage points higher than in 2004. As for the vote totals, Medvedev's 2008 nationwide vote percentage and Putin's in 2004 are hardly distinguishable. The regional distributions are somewhat different, however. In 2008, the regions with low support in 2004 have been brought to higher levels: the minimum of the range goes from 55 to 59. At the other end, the level of the highest regions is lower in 2008: 92% vs. 98% in 2004. As indicated in Figure 1, Putin's regional average is slightly higher than Medvedev's, but the spread of his regional totals (the standard deviation) is bigger, too. The ordering of the regions across the two elections is highly correlated. Twelve of the top 13 regions for Medvedev are ethnic regions. Mordova, Karachaevo-Sirkassia, Ingushetia and Dagestan give him over 90% of the votes. Ethnic regions on average gave Medvedev 77% of their votes, while other regions on average gave him 67% (t-test = -6.3 [.00]).

What are the key patterns in the regional distributions across the 10 federal elections? First, as came up repeatedly in the discussion above, ethnic regions are different. Consistently from 1995 on, and dramatically in the 2000s, these regions have been much more likely to provide the party of power and the in-power presidential candidate with unusually high levels of vote support and of turnout. Since early in the 1990s, observers have noted the greater ability of ethnic regions' leaders to establish organized political dominance in their region and, with that organization, to control electoral outcomes (see, e.g., Badovskii and Shutov 1997, 48; McFaul and Petrov 1997, 517; Afanas'ev 2000, 207-10; Stepan 2000). Using a complicated measure derived from voting results, Oreshkin (2001, 91) came to the same conclusion that we do by examining the raw voting results: "In its electoral culture, the Russian Federation consists of two unequally sized parts: the 'Russian Russia' and the 'Russia of nationalities'."

Second, and related to the pattern of ethnic regions at the high end of the distributions, those regions that back the party of power or the in-power presidential candidate remain considerably consistent from 1995 on. To illustrate this, Table 1 shows the correlations between each pair of legislative and each pair of presidential elections. The regional pattern for Russia's Choice in 1993 is entirely uncorrelated

with that for Our Home in 1995. That pattern grows increasingly negatively correlated with regional voting for parties of power from 1999 on. In other words, while Russia’s Choice might have had a degree of backing from federal authorities at the time, its impact on regional voting was scant. The regional rankings for Yeltsin in 1991 are modestly correlated with those for him in the 1996 second round and entirely uncorrelated with those for subsequent presidential elections. Meanwhile, the 1995 distribution

**Table 1: Correlations among Regional Distributions in Federal Elections, 1991-2008**

	Russia's Choice				Unified Russia
	1993	Our Home 1995	1999 Unity	OVR	2003
<b>Our Home, 1995</b>	.00				
<b>1999 Unity</b>	-.04	-.14		-.53	
<b>OVR</b>	-.15	.55	-.53		
<b>Unified Russia 2003</b>	-.27	.64	.05	.42	
<b>Unified Russia 2007</b>	-.51	.63	-.11	.50	.85
	Yeltsin 1991	Yeltsin 1996, 2nd	Putin 2000	Putin 2004	
<b>Yeltsin, 1996, 2nd</b>	.33				
<b>Putin, 2000</b>	.06	.56			
<b>Putin, 2004</b>	-.02	.52	.68		
<b>Medvedev, 2008</b>	.09	.29	.48	.79	

Sources: See Appendix 2.

for Our Home correlates at over .5 with all three subsequent legislative races, and Yeltsin’s 1996 second-round distribution correlates at over .5 with the distributions of both of Putin’s races, although the correlation with the 2008 results dips to .29. Thus, these trends suggest that a pattern of regional deference toward the federal authorities begins with the 1995 Duma race. That is, it does not begin in the 2000s when United Russia’s control of the electoral landscape became so dominant or even in 1999 after Putin had taken over leadership as Prime Minister, but in the middle of the Yeltsin period.

Table 1’s results for 1999 deserve special attention. The 1999 election was an anomaly in terms of party-of-power voting because Russia’s governors needed to choose between two parties of power. Unity fared substantially better than OVR nationwide and in most regions. In a handful of regions, Unity’s very high support surely reflected efforts of those regions’ governors with an eye to the benefits of being on the Kremlin’s good side. As we noted earlier, OVR’s overall national average was pulled far above its median regional level by its handful of high outliers. Those high outlying regions were led by governors

who backed OVR, either because they hoped that doing so would enhance their personal ambitions or because they believed it could capture the Kremlin in 2000. Even though OVR was a failure in terms of its founders' hopes, the correlations in Table 1 show that its regional distribution resembles how the parties of power fared in 1995, 2003 and 2007 while Unity's distribution does not.

A third general pattern is that regions show only weak geographical clustering in their levels of support for the parties of power or in-power presidential candidates, except insofar as the ethnic regions are clustered. Examining the regions by the federal district in which they are located, for example, shows only the Southern District, which is composed mainly of ethnic regions in the Caucasus, standing out as averaging significantly higher vote totals than regions elsewhere. In 2007 and 2008, the regions in the Southern District average over one standard deviation about the mean of all regions. One other minor pattern concerns the regions in the Urals District, which includes Yeltsin's home region of Sverdlovsk. In 1991 and 1995, those regions average significantly higher totals for Yeltsin (over one standard deviation above the mean) than other districts, which probably reflects Yeltsin's political base in that area. With these two exceptions, a region's geographic location has little impact.

Fourth, starting in 1999 (with OVR, not Unity), regional levels of voter turnout are strongly positively correlated with voting for the party of power or the in-power presidential candidate. Table 2 shows the correlations. Particularly from 2003 on, but beginning with OVR in 1999, regions that provide the in-power presidential candidate or party of power with the highest vote totals also lead in the levels of voter turnout. The regional turnout distributions, presented in Figure 1, grow larger over time, meaning that more regions have turnout levels far above the average. The positive correlations with vote totals show that these regions are the ones providing the Kremlin with high levels of voting support.

---

**Table 2: Correlations between Regional Voting and Turnout, 1991-2008**

	<b>Correlation between Vote Totals and Turnout</b>
<b>Yeltsin, 1991</b>	<b>-0.09</b>
<b>Russia's Choice, 1993</b>	<b>-0.49</b>
<b>Our Home, 1995</b>	<b>-0.21</b>
<b>Yeltsin, 1996, 2nd round</b>	<b>-0.10</b>
<b>Unity, 1999</b>	<b>-0.06</b>
<b>OVR, 1999</b>	<b>0.43</b>
<b>Putin, 2000</b>	<b>0.47</b>
<b>Unified Russia, 2003</b>	<b>0.69</b>
<b>Putin, 2004</b>	<b>0.70</b>
<b>Unified Russia, 2007</b>	<b>0.90</b>
<b>Medvedev, 2008</b>	<b>0.80</b>

Sources: See Appendix 2.

---

### **Regional Deference to the Kremlin**

When competitive elections are relatively fairly conducted and reported, data on regional differences illuminate the political preferences of geographically clustered, groups of Russian citizens, whether it be voting for presidential candidates or for “democratic” parties versus “communist” or “nationalist” parties. As noted above, numerous excellent studies in the 1990s and early 2000s use federal election results broken down by region (or, even further, by electoral district) to examine Russian electoral behavior. Following the 2007/2008 cycle, data from 10 federal elections across two presidencies are available. This ought to have allowed scholars to generate even deeper insights by examining whether Russian voting changes from 1991-2008.

Unfortunately, violations of democratic election procedures and a noncompetitive electoral environment characterize Russia’s recent federal elections to such an extent that the official results have come to say little about Russian voters’ preferences or decisionmaking. A wide array of careful data analysis and reporting has demonstrated the problems beyond doubt. They fall into three broad categories. One involves elite behavior that, while legal or quasi-legal, chokes off political competition in favor of a preferred candidate or party. This includes vast differences in funding and media access available to incumbent or incumbent-favored competitors (Zadorin 2000; Oates 2003; White and Oates 2003; Sharafutdinova 2007; Golosov 2009). It also includes various “dirty tricks” such as the once trendy practice of encouraging an unknown to run who has the same or almost the same name as a viable challenger (Maksimov 1999; Minchenko 2001; Miroshnichenko 2003, 258-65; Stoliarov 2003, 216-222; Wilson 2005, 62; Smirnov 2008). In a second category are the means by which executive officials control who votes and how. The common term for such levers is “administrative resources” (see, e.g., Nikolaev 2000; Minchenko 2001; Stoliarov 2003, 216-22; Vorontsova and Zvonovskii 2003; Mikhailov 2004, 198-99; Zvonovskii 2004; Baker and Glasser 2005, 322; Wilson 2005, ch. 4; Golosov 2008b). These resources range from pressuring employees of a firm dependent on government contracts (Hale 2007, 228-29), to having a court strike a rival candidate or party off the ballot, to using state officials to get out the vote, to thuggery against a rival’s supporters (Kirkow 1998, 116-17). A third category consists of the cases when the results are falsified through any of numerous means (Lowenhardt 1997; Paramonov and Kirichenko 2007; Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin 2009).

These problems vary by region. Indeed, the regional level seems to be the key locus for how campaigns will play out and how the elections will be managed. Beryozkin, Myagkov, & Ordeshook (2003, 170) put it this way:

As the sole focal point of political power within their domain, it is only reasonable to suppose that a governor is uniquely positioned to coordinate political activity there—the endorsements of newspaper editors, the actions of industrial managers, the efforts of directors of collective farms, and so on.

As Figure 1 above illustrated, regional vote totals and turnout levels in recent years are supportive of the Kremlin to a highly improbable extent if they actually reflected voter behavior. Even in earlier elections, however, some regions are notable as violators of democratic rules of electoral conduct while many are not. By the 2003/2004 cycle and 2007/08 cycles, regions still differ but within much narrower bounds and around a much higher mean. While thus not a source of information on the Russian mass public, data from the federal elections may nonetheless be valuable to scholars as a way to track the strength and activities of the regions' governing political organizations.

Our strategy, therefore, is to deploy the regional results of federal elections as indicators of one kind of strength on the part of a region's leadership: the ability to deliver turnout levels and vote totals for a particular party or candidate that exceed what could occur without elites pressuring voters or falsifying results. We take it as likely that such strength is *organizational* strength—that cadres of state employees and other supporters of the leadership have been formed into one or another sort of political “machine” to bring the reported results about. A machine need not be at work, however; authoritarian control can take other forms. The literature on political machines (e.g., Key 1936; Banfield and Wilson 1963; Scott 1972; Cornelius 1977) stresses that they flow from elites' inability to be fully certain of electoral outcomes. If, however, the leadership in a given region is essentially able to write down whatever results it wishes, little personnel power is required. The official results themselves shed no light on how much machine effort went into producing them. Nor do they reveal the presence or extent of other key aspects of machine politics such as elites providing patronage to those who support them.<sup>3</sup>

In the presence of such highly improbable turnout or vote totals, we assume that they reflect not only the regional leadership's *capacity* to produce those results but their *intent* to curry favor with federal executive authorities. When such high totals are absent, we cannot distinguish whether the leadership lacks the capacity or the intention. There is little question, however, that most regional leaders have wanted the Kremlin to see them in a favorable light, *ceteris paribus*. And when the elections in question are for federal offices, the regional leaders lose little if anything by helping the Kremlin meet its goals. As shown above, regions seeking federal approval by producing favorable electoral results begins not

---

<sup>3</sup>Another common feature of political machines is the use of a political party's organization as the framework that unites the machine's leadership, mid-level officials and rank-and-file supporters. United Russia extended its representation throughout the regions in the mid-2000s, and most governors formally joined the party (Gel'man 2008, 919). Empirically, however, we still know little about where and to what extent regional branches of United Russia play this role.

under Putin but at least with the 1995 elections. Based on his fieldwork in Dagestan at the time of the 2003 Duma elections, Ware (2005, 590) notes a logic that can surely be found in many regions:

While the Duma elections in Dagestan's three single-mandate districts were relatively fair and free of irregularities, the results from the party list election are not credible, and appear to have been manipulated in two different ways. First, it appears that there was massive ballot stuffing in most or all districts, and second, that there was widespread tampering with electoral protocols. Together these manipulations appear to have achieved three tactical and three strategic political objectives. From a tactical standpoint, it appears that the irregularity of the party list election (a) artificially inflated Dagestan's total voter turnout; (b) massively skewed the result in favour of United Russia, the party of power; and (c) also somewhat skewed the result in favour of the KPRF. The achievement of these three tactical objectives seems to have secured the following three strategic goals: (1) the election successfully seated all Dagestanis who could possibly have won a place in the Duma; (2) the election evidently provided Kremlin officials with a demonstration of the loyalties and abilities of Dagestani officials; (3) it may have left officials in Moscow indebted to officials in Dagestan, thereby facilitating subsequent federal support, particularly in the form of budgetary subsidies.

As discussed above, the 1999 Duma race complicates the general pattern because two parties of power were available, and many of the regions that most clearly delivered high vote totals did so for OVR, which did not assume executive power as Unity did. Nonetheless, those regional leaderships that delivered exceedingly high votes for OVR, particularly Ingushetia, had their eyes in one way or another on the prize of the federal executive. Since 2005, of course, the Kremlin's favor is a formal requisite since the Russian president now nominates and can remove governors from their office. Gel'man (2008, 21-22) notes the importance of election results in how the Kremlin judges its appointees: "[I]t was precisely the ability to control the local electoral process by various means, and not at all the effectiveness of regional and local administrations, that guaranteed the survival of regional leaders nominated by the center in the course of the 2007-2008 federal elections." In the words of the Russian geographer N.D. Kozlov (2008, 9) "the characteristic sign of the 'manageability' of regional political regimes is the monopolization of votes. The political stakes of regional leaders are directly expressed by election results. This sharply differentiates regions and allows one to distinguish groups with various levels of political loyalty."

With this logic in mind, we use regional voting and turnout levels as a measure of the strength of regional political organizations. We refer to our measure as an indicator of "deference to federal executive authority" or "deference to the Kremlin" because we are capturing how regional organizations use their strength to produce election outcomes that are strongly politically valuable to the Kremlin. Calculated for each election cycle, our measure is a logged, weighted sum of scores above a cutoff point

for each cycle's vote for the party of power, vote for the president and turnout levels for the two races.<sup>4</sup> Regions scoring zero on our measure were below the cutoff point on all four components. That is, their pro-Kremlin voting and turnout did not reach "highly improbable" levels by Russian and comparative experience, and we do not seek to analyze the variation in the actual levels below the thresholds. Higher scores on our measure indicates component scores farther above the cutoff points. Appendix 3 provides detailed information on how we constructed the measure and its distribution in each cycle. To make clearer how the measure is distributed in each cycle, we group the scores into half-point intervals in Table 3. For each half-point range, it indicates how many regions fall into it, what proportion of Russia's population those regions contain and the average of those regions' percent ethnic Russian residents.

In both the 1995/1996 and the 1999/2000 cycles, the majority of the country's regions—representing even bigger shares of the national populace—remain below the thresholds and have scores of zero. This does not mean that elite pressure in favor of the Kremlin was absent from these regions. It suggests, though, that such pressure was partial or ineffective, leaving other factors to operate, including voter preferences and circumstance specific to the region or the election in question. By the 2003/2004 cycle, however, only a fifth of Russians live in regions scoring zero and in 2007/2008, fewer than a tenth of a percent do. Similarly, regions scoring just over zero, up to .5, fall from 12 to none across the four cycles. All of the higher-scored groupings show increases in the number of regions falling into them from the first to the fourth cycle. As indicated by the boxed cells in Table 3, the median region in both 1995/1996 and 1999/2000 had a score of zero, whereas in 2003/2004 the median region scored 1.2 and in 2007/2008, it scored slightly over 1.5.

For convenience, the final two groupings combine all regions scoring above 1 and above 2 as a way to highlight the trend toward increasingly high scores. From the first to the fourth cycle, the proportion of the regions scoring below one falls from 84% to 21%. Only one region reaches the more extreme level of two or above in 1995/1996 but 21 do in 2007/2008. In both the first and second cycles, the average percent Russian in regions scoring more than two is low; all four regions are ethnic. As more non-ethnic regions join the ranks of those with high scores in the third and fourth cycle, the average percent Russian rises but remains below half, indicating the predominance in this grouping of ethnic

---

<sup>4</sup>By employing high turnout levels as one indicator of elite political control in a region, we are in effect reversing the interpretation of higher turnout as a healthy political development, which is how it has been employed in early comparative national studies (e.g., Jackman 1973) or by Marsh (2004) in his study of Russia's regions. As Zvonovskii (2004, 33) argues, "a high level of turnout often bears witness to the active use of administrative resources" (see also Oreshkin 2001; Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin 2009).



**Table 3: Deference to the Kremlin in Half-Point Increments, Four Electoral Cycles**

Score	Characteristics of this Range	1 <sup>st</sup> Cycle	2 <sup>nd</sup> Cycle	3 <sup>rd</sup> Cycle	4 <sup>th</sup> Cycle
		1995-1996	1999-2000	2003-2004	2007-2008
<b>Zero</b>	Number of regions	58	71	17	1
	(as a % of all regions)	65.2%	80.7%	19.1%	1.2%
	% of RF population in these regions	67.4%	84.9%	21.8%	0.0%
	Average % Russian	80.2%	79.1%	89.0%	62.4%
<b>Up to .5</b>	Number of regions	12	5	8	0
	(as a % of all regions)	13.5%	5.7%	9.0%	----
	% of RF population in these regions	9.9%	4.8%	9.4%	----
	Average % Russian	68.4%	81.8%	85.1%	----
<b>Up to 1</b>	Number of regions	5	6	13	12
	(as a % of all regions)	5.6%	6.8%	14.6%	14.5%
	% of RF population in these regions	2.3%	4.4%	19.6%	12.6%
	Average % Russian	69.3%	63.5%	81.6%	89.6%
<b>Up to 1.5</b>	Number of regions	7	2	19	27
	(as a % of all regions)	7.9%	2.3%	21.3%	32.5%
	% of RF population in these regions	6.4%	3.2%	23.4%	32.8%
	Average % Russian	57.5%	50.2%	85.9%	87.0%
<b>Up to 2</b>	Number of regions	6	1	17	22
	(as a % of all regions)	6.7%	1.1%	19.1%	26.5%
	% of RF population in these regions	13.9%	0.2%	14.8%	30.1%
	Average % Russian	76.2%	20.1%	68.4%	80.1%
<b>Up to 2.5</b>	Number of regions	1	2	5	8
	(as a % of all regions)	1.1%	2.3%	5.6%	9.6%
	% of RF population in these regions	2.0%	2.2%	0.7%	12.3%
	Average % Russian	14.3%	14.9%	49.5%	69.3%
<b>Up to 3</b>	Number of regions	0	0	5	4
	(as a % of all regions)	----	----	5.6%	4.8%
	% of RF population in these regions	----	----	6.2%	4.1%
	Average % Russian	----	----	34.2%	52.6
<b>Up to 3.5</b>	Number of regions	0	1	5	9
	(as a % of all regions)	0.0%	1.1%	5.6%	10.8%
	% of RF population in these regions	----	0.2%	4.1%	8.0%
	Average % Russian	----	0.1%	19.1%	28.0
<b>Total &gt; 1</b>	Number of regions	14	6	51	70
	(as a % of all regions)	15.7%	6.7%	57.3%	78.7%
	% of RF population in these regions	22.3%	5.8%	49.2%	83.2%
	Average % Russian	62.4%	22.2%	64.9%	71.4%
<b>Total &gt; 2</b>	Number of regions	1	3	15	21
	(as a % of all regions)	1.1%	3.4%	16.9%	23.6%
	% of RF population in these regions	2.0%	2.4%	11.0%	24.4%
	Average % Russian	14.3%	8.7%	34.3%	48.7%

Note: “Up to” is short-hand for the range from the previously noted number to the next. For instance, “up to .5” means  $0 < X \leq .5$ . “Up to 1” indicates  $.5 < X \leq 1$ --it does not include scores of .5 or lower. Cells with boxes around them show the location of the median score for that cycle.

Sources: See Appendix 3.

regions. The fact that almost a quarter of the regions (and of Russia's population) scores above two in 2007/2008 is remarkable. The region nearest that boundary is Penza, with a score of 2.06, largely due to its giving United Russia 71% of the votes with ten other parties on the ballot in 2007. Its total for Medvedev and its turnout in both elections were near the thresholds. The highest scoring region in any of the cycles is Ingushetia in 2007/2008 with 3.4. It gave United Russia 98.8% of the vote in 2007 with 98.4% turnout and Medvedev 91.7% of the vote with 92.3% turnout. None of these figures is conceivable in the absence of elite guidance. In his study of voting and turnout data, Zvonovskii (2004, 41 [*italics in original*]) wrote: "In essence, what is occurring today in Russia's electoral space can be seen as the formation within the RF of *two distinct countries*. One of them, (about 15-20% of the populace) live under firm administrative influence, which guarantees the mobilization of electoral support in favor of the candidates and parties that have secured the support of local leaders. The population of the other retains relative independence in its electoral choice." By our measure, the percentage of the population living under firm administrative influence in 2008 is even higher, from a quarter to four-fifths depending on where one draws the line.

For cross-national comparison, consider that in their recent legislative elections, France and Romania both had 60% turnout, Lithuania had 53% and the U.K. had 61% (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2009). Turnout for Mexico's 2006 presidential race was 61% (International IDEA 2009). Felipe Calderon received 36% of the vote nationwide in a five-way race, with the ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican\\_general\\_election,\\_2006](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_general_election,_2006)). In the 2008 U.S. presidential race, Barack Obama received 62% of the vote from his home state of Illinois with 63% turnout (<http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/il.htm>; <http://www.nonprofitvote.org/voterturnout2008>). This was considered a dominant performance for Obama, with near-record turnout in Illinois and nationwide. The highest proportion of the popular vote reached nationwide by any U.S. presidential candidate was Lyndon Johnson's 61% in 1964. Johnson received 63% from his home state of Texas and over 75% from only one state and the District of Columbia (<http://www.multied.com/elections/1964state.html>). Formally, turnout is not mandatory in Russia, and the legislative elections do not produce the government. So, when turnout approximates levels found in countries with mandatory voting or with institutions associated with high turnout, some form of elite pressure is surely at work.

A growing number of scholars have employed electoral data from all the regions to measure such things as the presence or absence of democratic properties (Moraski and Reisinger 2003; Marsh 2004;

Petrov 2004),<sup>5</sup> the strength of regional clientelism (Hale 2007) or the regional political “machine”/-strength of administrative resources (Oreshkin 2001; Mikhailov 2004; Zvonovskii 2004; Oreshkin and Oreshkina 2007).<sup>6</sup> Each author’s index combines different components using different methods. That is appropriate given that each has set out to answer a somewhat different question. Despite the multiple steps involved in constructing our measure, it is simpler to construct than most of the others cited, being transformations of a few readily available sets of numbers.

Precisely because it is relatively simple, we seek to validate that our measure captures what we want it to. The only measures readily available for such a comparison were developed by Nikolai Petrov and Aleksei Titkov (2008) of the Carnegie Moscow Center. They compiled a quantitative index of electoral democracy using a variety of electoral data from each region as well as an index of regional democracy based on experts’ ratings of how each region is performing in various areas. One must be cautious in judging regions’ comparative level of political noncompetitiveness from the inverse of scales that quantify democratic progress. A polity can be judged nondemocratic, or non-polyarchic, for several reasons, including the presence of anarchy or instability. Nonetheless, as a practical matter, measures of regional machine strength or electoral noncompetitiveness are likely to correlate with measures of democratization but negatively, with the “worse” regions having higher scores. Table 4 presents bivariate correlations between three of Petrov and Titkov’s measures and regional vote totals, as well as our measure of regional deference to the Kremlin in each cycle. The rating of the quality of elections is a component of the index of regional democracy. We present it separately because of its inherent relevance.

---

<sup>5</sup>“Democracy” as an attribute of a polity is treated by many as being present or absent. Also, many agree with Dahl (1989) that no country fully meets the criteria of a democracy. For these reasons, the term democracy poorly conveys the extent to which a polity meets one or more desiderata. “Democratization” evokes unidirectional movement toward democracy and has come in for criticism over the last decade as teleological. Hence the awkward formulation “the extent to which each region is characterized by democratic properties.” The Russian language has a word that translates literally as “democraticness,” демократичность, and this is the term that Petrov and Titkov (2008) employ.

<sup>6</sup>One study (Wyman et al. 2002) focused, as we do, on pro-Kremlin voting. They explored such voting, however, primarily in terms of voter preferences rather than elite control of the region’s levers of power (albeit noting the likelihood of such control laying behind notable cases).

**Table 4: Correlations of Regional Vote Totals in Federal Elections with Petrov and Titkov's Measures of Regional Democratic-ness, 1991-2008**

Regional Vote Total for:	Experts' Ratings		Quantitative Index of Electoral Democracy
	Quality of Democratic Elections	Index of Regional Democracy	
Yeltsin, 1991	+ .20	<b>+.42</b>	+ .18
Turnout 1991	-.20	-.04	+ .08
Russia's Choice, 1993	<b>+.31</b>	<b>+.51</b>	<b>+.42</b>
Turnout 1993	<b>-.31</b>	.15	-.14
Our Home is Russia, 1995	<b>-.26</b>	<b>-.27</b>	<b>-.47</b>
Turnout 1995	<b>-.36</b>	<b>-.24</b>	<b>-.21</b>
Yeltsin, 1996, 2 <sup>nd</sup> rd.	+ .05	+ .15	<b>-.21</b>
Turnout 1996, 2nd rd.	<b>-.42</b>	<b>-.39</b>	<b>-.36</b>
Unity, 1999	.01	-.09	.07
OVR, 1999	<b>-.29</b>	<b>-.31</b>	<b>-.50</b>
Turnout 1999	<b>-.52</b>	<b>-.45</b>	<b>-.65</b>
Putin, 2000	-.14	-.13	<b>-.40</b>
Turnout 2000	<b>-.48</b>	<b>-.42</b>	<b>-.70</b>
United Russia, 2003	<b>-.54</b>	<b>-.57</b>	<b>-.86</b>
Turnout 2003	<b>-.49</b>	<b>-.47</b>	<b>-.71</b>
Putin, 2004	<b>-.38</b>	<b>-.42</b>	<b>-.71</b>
Turnout 2004	<b>-.63</b>	<b>-.62</b>	<b>-.75</b>
United Russia, 2007	<b>-.59</b>	<b>-.59</b>	<b>-.76</b>
Turnout 2007	<b>-.58</b>	<b>-.54</b>	<b>-.76</b>
Medvedev, 2008	<b>-.48</b>	<b>-.48</b>	<b>-.71</b>
Turnout 2008	<b>-.55</b>	<b>-.56</b>	<b>-.61</b>
<b>Deference to the Kremlin:</b>			
1995/1996	-.20	-.03	<b>-.21</b>
1999/2000	<b>-.38</b>	<b>-.42</b>	<b>-.65</b>
2003/2004	<b>-.32</b>	<b>-.35</b>	<b>-.71</b>
2007/2008	<b>-.53</b>	<b>-.51</b>	<b>-.68</b>

Sources: See Appendices 2 and 3.

Note: Coefficients above .2 (absolute value) are shown in bold. Because the Petrov and Titkov data exclude Chechnya, the number of cases from 1991-2004 is 88. In 2007, because of regional consolidations, the number is 84, and in 2008, it becomes 82.

From 1995 on, high levels of voting for the in-power presidential candidate and for the political party most closely associated with the president are negatively correlated with democratic characteristics. So, too, are turnout levels. The correlations are strikingly high in the 2003/2004 and 2007/2008 cycles. The least democratic regions, as judged by expert observers, give the Kremlin the strongest support in federal elections. This holds true even prior to the Putin period. It does not hold in 1991 and 1993. In those elections, the more democratic regions support Yeltsin and Russia's Choice comparatively strongly. The correlations become negative from 1995 on and grow in strength with succeeding elections. The

1995 Duma elections, then, mark the point when regional returns in federal elections cease to be an indicator of Russian citizens’ electoral behavior and become what Myagkov (2003) refers to as “the elites’ game.”

**How Do Regions Change Over Time in their Deference to the Kremlin and Why?**

The largest factor shaping the rise in scores on our measure over time is the strengthening of federal powers, both formal and informal, from the Yeltsin and Putin eras. A large and strong literature analyzes the changing dynamics between the Russian central authorities and the regional leaderships, mostly treating the two sets as unitary actors (e.g., McAuley 1997, chs. 1-2; Clark 1998; Stepan 2000; Kahn 2002; Ross 2002; Stoliarov 2003; Bahry 2005; Chebankova 2005; Gel'man 2006; Valentei 2006; Busygina 2007; Chebankova 2008). Our measure, however, allows us to ask how each region changes in its deference to the Kremlin from the first election cycle to the most recent.

Table 5 lists in matrix form where each region falls on our measure in half-point intervals. It provides a way to examine visually how deferential the regions are and the ways in which that changes. Within each cell, we label the regions’ federal administrative district. The green squares indicate regions that remained roughly at the same level of deference. The yellow squares indicate regions that became less deferential from 1995/96 to 2007/08. Ethnic regions are indicated in blue.

**Table 5: Regional Deference to the Kremlin, 1995/1996 vs. 2007/2008**

2007/08	1995/1996 Cycle					
	0	Up to .5	Up to 1	Up to 1.5	Up to 2	Up to 2.5
0			<u>Northwest</u> Nenetsk AO			
Up to .5	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Up to 1	<u>Northwest</u> Kaliningrad <u>Central</u> Vladimir Kostroma Smolensk Yaroslavl	<u>Volga</u> Samara <u>Southern</u> Volgograd <u>Siberian</u> Altai Krai <u>Far East</u> Magadan Primorye	<u>Central</u> Ryazan	-----	<u>Northwest</u> Murmansk	-----

2007/08	1995/1996 Cycle						
	0	Up to .5	Up to 1	Up to 1.5	Up to 2	Up to 2.5	
<b>Up to 1.5</b>	<b>Northwest</b> Arkhangelsk Novgorod <b>Central</b> Briansk Lipetsk Ivanovo Kaluga Voronezh <b>Volga</b> Chuvashia Nizhnii Nov. Orenburg <b>Southern</b> Stavropol	<b>Urals</b> Cheliabinsk Kurgan <b>Siberian</b> Novosibirsk Chita/Zab. Tomsk Irkutsk Khakassia Krasnoyarsk <b>Far East</b> Khabarovsk Sakhalin	<b>Northwest</b> Karelia <b>Central</b> Kursk Orlov Tver	-----	<b>Volga</b> Perm	<b>Northwest</b> St. Petersburg	-----
<b>Up to 2</b>	<b>Northwest</b> Komi Leningrad Obl. Vologda <b>Central</b> Tula Tambov Moscow Obl. <b>Southern</b> Adygeya Astrakhan	<b>Volga</b> Ulianovsk Kirov Udmurtia <b>Siberian</b> Omsk Buryatia <b>Far East</b> Amur Kamchatka Sakha/- Yakutia Evrei AOb.	-----	<b>Northwest</b> Pskov <b>Central</b> Belgorod	-----	<b>Central</b> Moscow <b>Urals</b> Sverdlovsk Khanti- Mansiisk	-----
<b>Up to 2.5</b>	<b>Southern</b> Krasnodar N. Ossetia Rostov	<b>Siberian</b> Kemerovo <b>Volga</b> Saratov	<b>Volga</b> Penza	<b>Siberian</b> Altai Repub.	<b>Southern</b> Kalmykia	-----	-----
<b>Up to 3</b>	<b>Volga</b> Mari El	<b>Urals</b> Tiumen	<b>Volga</b> Tatarstan	-----	-----	<b>Far East</b> Chukot AO	-----
<b>Over 3</b>	<b>Southern</b> Karach.- Sirkassia	<b>Siberian</b> Tyva	<b>Volga</b> Mordovia <b>Southern</b> Dagestan	<b>Southern</b> Kab.-Balk.	<b>Southern</b> Chechnya <b>Volga</b> Bashkorto- stan	<b>Urals</b> Yamal- Nenetsk	<b>Southern</b> Ingushetia
<b>Average</b>	1.5	2	1.82	2.2	2.0	3.4	

Note: Republics, autonomous okrugs (AOs) and the autonomous oblast' (AOB) are listed in blue.  
 "Average" indicates the average score on the measure of 2007/08 deference within each of the 1995/96 categories.

Only three regions fall into the yellow squares, all from the Northwest Federal District: St. Petersburg, Murmansk and the Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug. Only four regions stayed roughly at the same level and are located in the green squares. The other 76 regions all grow more deferential over the twelve years. Whereas the average score in 1995/96 is .3, it has become 1.7 by 2007/08. In terms of the Table, the average region moves down three squares. Table 5 has no columns for 1995/96 scores over 2.5, yet twenty-one regions fall into the corresponding rows in 2007/08.

Regions that scored high on deference in the 1995/1996 cycle are more likely to be among the most deferential in the 2007/2008 cycle--shown in Table 5 by the greater number of cases in the bottom right-hand cells than the upper right-hand cells. Among regions that were deferential (scored above zero) in 1995/96, the average score in 2007/08 is 2.1, versus the overall average of 1.7 (t-test = -3.2). On the other hand, knowing that a region was non-deferential in 1995/96 does little to explain where they stand in 2007/2008. Twelve of these regions stay comparatively low in deference, with scores under one. But almost as many jump to scores over two.

The ethnic regions predominate among those with non-zero scores in 1995/96 (19 of 32, or just shy of three-fifths). They average .53 on the measure in that first cycle, which has a mean of .30 overall, versus .16 for the other regions (t-test = -3.2). By 2007/2008, all nine of the regions that exceed a score of three are ethnic, and 21/27, or over three-quarters of the regions exceeding a score of two are ethnic. In this most recent cycle, the ethnic regions average 2.3 versus 1.7 as the overall mean and 1.4 for the other regions (t-test= -6.3).

To begin explaining the different regions' change (mostly growth) in deference to the Kremlin from the mid-1990s to the late 2000s, we regress this change on measures of a few regional characteristics. These characteristics include aspects of the regional setting in 1995--so as to assess the impact of regional starting points on the trajectories--as well measures of social and economic change over the thirteen years covered from the first to the fourth electoral cycle. What we are presently unable to incorporate into this analysis are characteristics of the elites governing each region. Because we believe that our measure of deference to the Kremlin captures a key aspect of the governing politics of the regions, attributes of the regional elite will need to be examined as potential influences. In this paper, however, we begin by testing for the influence of regional location, demography and social and economic changes.

We measure the change from 1995/1996 to 2007/2008 in each region's deference to the Kremlin by calculating a linear estimate of that change--the slope of the line going through all four points (see Appendix 3 for details). Unlike the difference between the first and last cycles' scores or the percent

change from the first to the last cycle, the linear estimates preserve information about where the region scored in the second and third cycles. The resulting measure ranges from -.02 to .30, with a mean of .13 and a standard deviation of .06.

Our independent variables begin with the measure of deference for the 1995/1996 cycle. Because our measure of deference has a mathematically possible upper bound (achieved if a region achieved 100% vote and turnout in both elections in a cycle), those regions that were at the upper end in the first cycle were constrained from increasing their scores in subsequent cycles to the same extent as the other regions. Including this variable controls for this tendency. Removing it does not, though, alter the signs or relative magnitude of the other coefficients in the tables below.

Our model incorporates an index variable meant to capture a region's relative urbanization and the socioeconomic development that accompanies urban life.<sup>7</sup> As Matsuzato (2000, 155) argues, "International experience suggests that the electoral skills of the party of power work better in rural than urban areas." (See also: Clem and Craumer 1995; Badovskii and Shutov 1997, 48; Solnick 1998.) Because we are working with relatively few cases, we must keep the number of independent variables in our model small. In this case and for the measure of economic change described below, creating an index variable from several related types of data is the best solution. The index of urbanization includes the proportion of the region's population living in urban areas, the region's population density, the proportion of the population that has any higher education, the number of museum-goers per 1,000 residents and the number of theater-goers per 1,000 residents (see Appendix 3).

The findings presented earlier make clear that the ethnic regions (republics, autonomous okrugs and the autonomous oblast') are distinctly different from the remaining regions in their levels of deference to the Kremlin. Many multivariate analyses incorporate a dummy variable to capture this important factor, as we have (Moraski and Reisinger 2003; 2007). In these analyses, however, we will instead use the percent of ethnic Russians in each region's populace. This measure correlates strongly with the constitutional status of the regions<sup>8</sup> but is preferable as an interval-level measure.

---

<sup>7</sup>O'Loughlin, Shin & Talbot (1996, 356) provide an excellent summary of the literature on socioeconomic cleavages a la Lipset. Factoring the individual-level features that are pointed to in this literature into our analyses of regions means we are checking whether regions with more of those types of people in them will have regional political outcomes of an expected type. This cannot be assumed a priori (see Agnew 1996, and the critiques and his reply in the same issue; DeBardeleben and Galkin 1997; Clem 2006).

<sup>8</sup>We correlated the percent of Russians in the populace from the 2002 census with the dummy variable that assigns a 1 to the 32 ethnic regions and a 0 to the other regions. The correlation is -.82 (.000). The average proportion of ethnic Russians in the ethnic regions is 46.6% versus 89% in the other regions. The t-test of the difference in these means is 13.5 (.000). This relationship remains after the recent elimination of six autonomous okrugs.



We also incorporate a dummy variable for the federal district whose regions were shown above to have somewhat higher levels of deference on average than regions located elsewhere: the Southern Federal District, which contains the republics in the North Caucasus area. Doing so will help clarify the impact of the percent of Russians in the population independent of the influence of this cluster of geographically contiguous regions.

We incorporate three measures of change from 1995/1996 to 2007/2008. In general, all three are meant to capture different facets of life becoming worse for the populace. One is the change from 1995 to 2004 (the last year for which we have data) in the level of registered crime. The second, the index of economic change, incorporates the price-deflated change in personal income and in gross regional product per capita. Poverty is widely seen as empirically associated with clientelism, which is key to building a political machine. Stokes (2007, 617) argues that “the very definition of clientelism points toward the poverty of the client.” Kitschelt and Wilkerson (2007, 24) put it this way: “Affluent democracies and parties appealing to affluent citizens in a democracy tend to operate more through programmatic accountability, while parties in poor democracies and parties appealing to the poorest electoral segments tend to practice clientelism.” The third is infant mortality, as with the change in deference calculated by taking the linear change from 1995-2006. High infant mortality, in addition to being regrettable on its own, is a marker of poor public health conditions more broadly. Table 6 presents the results. We show

**Table 6: Multivariate Analysis of Change in Deference to the Kremlin, 1995/96 – 2007/08**  
 (Standardized coefficients are shown; those at .2 or above are bolded)

<b>Explanatory Variable</b>	<b>Expected Sign</b>	<b>Standardized Coefficients</b>
<u>Measures of Initial Differences</u>		
Deference to the Kremlin, 1995/96	Negative	<b>-.38</b>
Index of urbanization, 1995	Negative	-.13
Russians as a % of the population, 1989	Negative	<b>-.59</b>
In the Southern Federal District	Positive	.13
<u>Measures of % Change, 1995-2007</u>		
Linear change in registered crime, 1995-2004	Positive	-.15
Index of Economic Change, 1995-2006	Negative	.15
Linear change in infant mortality	Positive	-.16
No. of observations		79
Adjusted r-squared		.50

Sources: See Appendices 2 and 3.

standardized coefficients to indicate the magnitude of each variable’s impact. Because we include the universe of regions, we do not present statistical significance for the coefficients. We put coefficients that are over .2 in bold font for ease of examination.

The control variable of where they were in the first cycle is strongly negative, meaning those who were high outliers then do not go up as much. (As noted, this is mathematically necessary.) Even though the ethnic regions predominate among those highly deferential in 1995 and thus their slope is partly controlled for, nonetheless percent Russian has a strong negative impact on the over-time slope, as it did for the cross-regional analyses. The bivariate correlation between percent Russian and the slope of change in deference is  $=.48$  (.000), and the other variables in the model do not eliminate this connection. As expected, those regions in the Southern and Volga districts have higher slopes on average than other regions. None of the change measures has more than a modest impact. Each of their coefficients, moreover, works in an unexpected direction.

Perhaps, given that the ethnic regions are distinct in their levels of deference, the explanations work differently for them versus non-ethnic regions. In Table 7, we present the results of the same regression analysis on the two subgroups of cases: ethnic and non-ethnic regions. Within non-ethnic

**Table 7: Multivariate Analysis of Change in Deference to the Kremlin, 1995/96 – 2007/08  
Ethnic vs. Non-Ethnic Regions**

(Standardized coefficients are shown; those at .2 or above are bolded)

Explanatory Variable	Expected Sign	Standardized Coefficients	
		Non-Ethnic	Ethnic
<u>Measures of Initial Differences</u>			
Deference to the Kremlin, 1995/96	Negative	<b>-.42</b>	<b>-.38</b>
Index of urbanization, 1995	Negative	<b>-.28</b>	.21
Russians as a % of the population, 1989	Negative	.04	<b>-.43</b>
In the Southern Federal District	Positive	.20	.11
<u>Measures of % Change, 1995-2007</u>			
Linear change in registered crime, 1995-2004	Positive	<b>-.12</b>	<b>-.25</b>
Index of Economic Change, 1995-2006	Negative	<b>.36</b>	-.05
Linear change in infant mortality	Positive	-.18	<b>-.21</b>
No.of observations		57	22
Adjusted r-squared		.39	.11

Sources: See Appendices 2 and 3.

regions, the percent of Russians does not have an impact. (It has little variance: its standard deviation is 6.7 versus 18.5 for ethnic regions and 22.0 for whole set). In contrast, the index of urbanization shows a reasonably strong impact in the expected direction. Those regions most urbanized and educated have been less likely to show extreme loyalty to the Kremlin. (Perhaps this means that their governors have less effective control of those regions on average due to the nature of the population?) Within the ethnic regions, the model's fit is poor. Still, the large size of the coefficient for percent Russian is interesting given that all the regions in this sample have relatively low proportions of Russians in their populations. The bivariate correlation between percent Russian and our over-time measure is  $-.35 (.075)$ .

These findings suggest that the ethnic nature of a region's population matters, even when comparing within the group of regions with the status of republic, autonomous oblast or autonomous okrug. The ethnically Russian share of their populace is a feature of the regions that characterized them at the beginning of the post-Soviet period and has remained largely unchanged since (the correlation between the percentages from the 1989 and 2002 censuses is  $.98$ ). That a good deal of the explanation for how regions moved from the first to the fourth electoral cycle can be accounted for by a difference in their initial condition requires further exploration. It may relate to cultural differences but might well not: largely Russian and largely non-Russian regions differ on a number of economic, social and political dimensions, many of which grew out of the Soviet era. Understanding what about percent Russian gives it so much influence may shed light on what dynamic factors, as opposed to initial conditions, most influence regions' different trajectories. Table 7 further suggests that tracing out these connections may best be done by distinguishing the ethnic from the non-ethnic regions.

### **Conclusion**

Shedding light on citizens' electoral values and behaviors through analysis of aggregate election data is not possible in today's Russia. Too much stands between voter preferences and the published results. Yet our analyses show that electoral results by themselves can be a useful instrument for examining variation across the regions in elite political control, and this has been true since the mid-1990s. We have applied visual inspection and multivariate analysis to the regional voting in Russia's ten federal elections as well as to a measure of deference to the federal executive authority by regional elites, which we constructed from voting and turnout data. Our analyses of all the regions for all ten elections complement the many insightful analyses that either focus on a few of Russia's regions or generalize about "the regions" and "the center" without accounting for the variation in the former.

That Russia's republics, in particular, along with its autonomous okrugs and oblast have been politically distinct from the other regions is not, to be sure, "new news." Nikolai Petrov (2004, 266) has cleverly paraphrased Tolstoy: "While democratic regions are democratic in different ways, undemocratic regions are undemocratic in much the same way," but this is inaccurate at least with respect to the ethnic versus the non-ethnic regions. This dichotomy should not be an endpoint for analysts, however. Many more insights about politics at the regional level as well as about federal relations are likely to emerge if this difference is treated as a starting point. Our analyses suggest some of the additional complexities worth pursuing. For one thing, the sharp difference between the ethnic and non-ethnic regions is not due to the former's special constitutional prerogatives--or not due to them in a simple fashion. Within the group of ethnic regions, there is significant variation in how they respond to changing political dynamics from the 1990s into the 2000s, and the ethnic composition of their populaces is a strong explanatory variable in modelling this variation. Also, given that the ethnic regions were more likely to demonstrate deference to the Kremlin in 1995 and 1996, it need not have been the case that they would be the regions with the highest average "trajectory" from the first to the fourth electoral cycle. Perhaps the experience of post-Soviet Russia's regions is showing that the ability to maintain a political machine or other form of authoritarian control is like wealth: higher initial stockpiles increase the rate of return.

As we noted earlier, some of the intriguing questions raised by our analyses may be answered by incorporating elite characteristics into our model of change over time. In addition, though, our findings suggest that the form of the models used should be carefully explored, since it may be the case not only that the ethnic and non-ethnic regions operate differently but that dissimilar dynamics drive their politics. If relations between the federal authorities in Moscow and Russia's regions differ not just in the extent of the latter's deference but in what factors drive it up or down, then the future holds much more complexity in the governing of Russia than most analyses to date have indicated.

### **Appendix 1: Overview of Elections, Candidates and Key Parties, 1991-2008**

Russia's formally competitive federation-wide elections span 1991 to 2008. The 1991 presidential election occurred while the USSR continued to exist, but it bears inclusion with post-Soviet Russian elections because it was decoupled from Soviet-era election processes, and the result--the election of Boris Yeltsin as president--was maintained when Russia became an independent country at the end of 1991. Subsequently, federal legislative elections were held in 1993, 1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007. Presidential elections occurred in 1996 (two rounds), 2000, 2004 and 2008. Vladimir Putin became acting president at the start of 2000 with Yeltsin's resignation and was elected to four-year terms in 2000 and 2004. Elections in the 1990s, then, can be seen as occurring during the Yeltsin period while those in the 2000s occur in the Putin period.

Before analyzing the regional distributions of results from these elections, we will summarize the context in which each election occurred. Those familiar with Russian federal elections of the 1990s and 2000s may skip down to Table 1 on p. 32, which summarizes the elections, candidates and parties we will discuss thereafter. Yeltsin had been head of the Russian legislature since April 1990. In early 1991, in response to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev creating a presidency for the Soviet Union, Yeltsin convinced the Russian legislators to enact changes to the Russian Republic's constitution creating the post of president, with elections to the post to be held every four years.<sup>9</sup> Election requires a candidate to receive over 50% of the votes, either initially or through a run-off between the top two vote-getters in the first round. The first elections occurred in June of that year (for more on this election, see White, Rose and McAllister 1996, 35-40; Gel'man and Elizarov 1999, 27). Six candidates were on the ballot. Yeltsin's primary challenger was Nikolai Ryzhkov, a former Soviet prime minister. Yeltsin received a majority on the first ballot.

The December 1993 elections took place two months after a bloody showdown between Yeltsin and his opponents in the then-existing legislature.<sup>10</sup> Following his victory, Yeltsin issued a draft constitution that created a bicameral legislature and a presidency with much greater constitutional power than

---

<sup>9</sup>In 2008, the constitution was amended, *inter alia*, to lengthen the presidential term from four years to six years. The changes do not apply to those currently in office. The next presidential election, therefore, is scheduled for 2012, but the subsequent one will occur in 2018.

<sup>10</sup>The 1993 crisis between President Yeltsin and the parliament emerged as the two sides disagreed on the direction of economic reform, the division of powers between the federal executive and legislature as well as different drafts of a new Russian constitution. The confrontation reached its climax in September when Yeltsin disbanded the Russian parliament, stripped all of its deputies of their legal mandates, and set new federal parliamentary elections for December. The resulting standoff ended in early October when violence broke out in Moscow and Yeltsin convinced the military to storm the parliament building and arrest those inside. See, *inter alia*, Kutsylo 1993; Buzgalin and Kolganov 1994; McDonnell 1994; Zheleznova, Panova and Surkov 1994; Shevtsova 1996; Remnick 1997, 37-83.

before. The bicameral legislature's lower house is the State Duma (or, simply the Duma). Duma members were to be chosen in two ways. Half, or 225 seats, were assigned according to single-member-district (SMD) voting and the other half through nationwide party-list proportional representation (PR) voting with a 5% threshold.<sup>11</sup> The upper house, the Federation Council, has two members for each of Russia's constituent regions. Members have been selected in several ways since 1993, which was the only time they were elected (on the changes in how members are selected and the Council's role in Russian politics, see Remington 2003a). Voters in 1993 therefore had four choices: 1) their preferred party (or bloc of parties running together) from a list of those meeting eligibility requirements for the nationwide PR ballot; 2) their preference for their district's representative in the SMD race; 3) their preference for a "senator" to represent their region in the Federation Council; and 4) whether they were for or against the constitution that provided the framework for the Duma to which they were electing members. Subsequent legislative elections presented voters with only choices 1) and 2) above (and the SMD seats were eliminated beginning with 2007). In analyzing this and other legislative elections, we incorporate data only on the PR voting. We exclude the SMD results because of our interest in the regional level and because candidates in SMD races so frequently ran without a party affiliation.

These December 1993 elections were the first multi-party elections in Russia's history. Following the 1991 putsch, Yeltsin had outlawed the Communist Party on the territory of Russia, but in 1992 the Russian Constitutional Court ruled that communist parties could compete in elections (on the ruling, see Henderson 2007). The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) was the strongest among several communist-oriented parties that were created in the following months, and it became the primary anti-establishment political party in the Russian party structure (for more on the CPRF, see Sakwa 1996; Tsipko 1996; Urban and Solovei 1997; March 2002). Although officially unaffiliated with President Yeltsin, the party known as Russia's Choice was headed by several top aides who had led the reforms in 1992 and 1993, and it saw itself as a party representing loyalty to Yeltsin (for more on Russia's Choice, see McFaul 1998; Gel'man and Elizarov 1999, 31-33). Even though some scholars exclude Russia's Choice from their list of the parties of power (e.g., Turovskii 2002, 920), it did enjoy tacit support from the President in the form of more access to state resources than its rivals (Colton and McFaul 2000, 202; Golosov 2004, 30; White 2007, 25). Russia's Choice placed second in the elections with 15.5% of the party-list vote nationwide (with additional seats gained from single-member districts, it achieved a two-seat plurality in the legislature).

---

<sup>11</sup>As a result of the 2005 electoral law, the SMD races were eliminated; all 450 members of the Duma are now selected according to the nationwide PR voting. In addition, the threshold for parties to receive seats in the Duma was raised to 7%. On this law and its impact, see Moraski (2007).

The 1993 law establishing the procedures for elections to the Duma specified that the initial elections in December of that year would be for a two-year term, with elections in December 1995 for what then became the standard four-year terms.<sup>12</sup> With the next presidential election scheduled for June 1996, this created a pattern in which the Duma elections occur in the shadow of an approaching presidential race: six months ahead in 1995/1996 and three months ahead in 1999/2000, 2003/2004 and 2007/2008.<sup>13</sup> These legislative and presidential pairs form four electoral cycles, therefore, and we treat them as such.

Of the 43 total parties appearing on ballot for the December 1995 Duma elections, three of the four that passed the 5% threshold had run in 1993: the CPRF, the Liberal Democratic Party and Yabloko. The fourth, Our Home is Russia, was created earlier that year with the approval of President Yeltsin and headed by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Compared to Russia's Choice, it represented centrist and less economically radical policies. Like Russia's Choice two years earlier, Our Home had an advantage in access to state resources and the media due to Kremlin backing and was considered a party of power (Badovskii and Shutov 1997, 36; White, Wyman and Oates 1997, 771; Gel'man and Elizarov 1999, 34; Colton and McFaul 2000, 202; Easter 2001, 56; Remington 2008, 172-73). The Communist Party received the highest proportion of the votes cast nationwide, over 22%, with an even higher percentage being cast for parties that fell below the threshold, almost 27%. Our Home placed third with 10%. (For more on this election's run-up and results, see White 1997.)

1996 brought tremendous interest in whether Yeltsin would be able to beat off a challenge in the June election from CPRF leader Gennadii Zyuganov given the CPRF's strong showing in the 1995 Duma election combined with Yeltsin's single-digit public-approval ratings at the start of the year (for a narrative account of this election, see Remnick 1997, 317-354). Yeltsin was able, however, to rally support throughout the first half of 1996. Among many factors accounting for Yeltsin's resurgence was his success at framing the race as a referendum on a return to communism.<sup>14</sup> Yeltsin received a plurality of 35%, with Zyuganov second at 32%. Because no candidate exceeded 50% of the votes, a run-off election was held in June. Yeltsin made an alliance with the third-place finisher, General Alexander Lebed, who had received 14.5% in the first round. Yeltsin received 54% of the votes in the second round. Change in

---

<sup>12</sup>The 2008 constitutional amendments lengthened the term of Duma members from four years to five, to apply to those next elected. Thus, upcoming legislative elections will occur in 2011 and 2016. As a result of the different lengths for presidential and legislative terms, legislative and presidential races will no longer form a cycle. The gap between them will vary from four months, as has been the case and will be again in 2011/2012, to over two years.

<sup>13</sup>For an examination of the 1999 Duma elections as pseudo primaries for the 2000 presidential race, see Shvetsova (2003). Sakwa (2000) refers to the 1999/2000 cycle as "Russia's permanent (uninterrupted) elections."

<sup>14</sup>For an argument that the 1996 presidential election ends a period in which "all of the binary votes" from 1990-1996 were driven by attitudes for or against "reform," broadly understood, see McFaul and Petrov (1997, esp. 509-11).

regional totals between the first and second rounds provides evidence of regional machines throwing their support behind Yeltsin more strongly in the second round than in the first. Given our interest in regional deference to federal authority, we therefore present second-round results for 1996 below.

With Yeltsin constitutionally obligated to step down in 2000--and with his health too poor to push the issue--everyone understood that the 1999-2000 electoral cycle would determine his successor (on this cycle, see Colton and McFaul 2003; Hesli and Reisinger 2003). Several regional governors sought to maximize their influence over the federal center in the years ahead--which included presidential ambitions on the part of some--by creating political parties to compete in the 1999 Duma elections. Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov created the Fatherland Movement in December 1998, and despite many regions' distrust of the capital city, gained the support of some 11 governors by the fall of 1999 (Lussier 2002, 59-64). In April 1999, Tatarstan's President Mintimer Shaimiev,<sup>15</sup> St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev and others established a rival pro-regions party, All Russia (Lussier 2002, 64-65). In August 1999, these two parties merged to create an electoral bloc called Fatherland/All-Russia (following the Russian spelling, abbreviated as OVR) to run as a single listing on the PR ballot. The next month, Putin, who had been appointed Prime Minister in August, created a political party, originally called Unity/Medved but mostly referred to as Unity. Unity's role was give Putin organized support within the State Duma, in particular by sapping the strength of OVR in the December balloting. By election day, Putin's popularity had become very high, thanks to his hardline response to terrorist incidents in September, including prosecuting a new war in Chechnya. Unity outperformed expectations in that December's legislative elections (on the creation of Unity and reasons for its unexpected success, see Colton and McFaul 2000). When the legislators elected in 1999 convened in early 2000, Putin maneuvered his party into the most influential position (Remington 2003b). No one any longer doubted that Unity was the party of power with the full backing of the president and his team.

On the last day of December 1999, Yeltsin surprised almost everyone by stepping down six months before the end of his term. This move elevated Putin to the presidency and caused the 2000 presidential election to be held in March, three months earlier than in 1996. Putin was personally popular, had achieved the strongest position in the legislature and was running as the incumbent. Moreover, regional governors were eager to show their support for Putin in hopes of securing or maintaining federal largess. Although 11 candidates were on the ballot, Zyuganov represented Putin's only serious

---

<sup>15</sup>The leaders of regions with the status of republics have the title of president rather than governor, but it is accepted to use the term "governors" to refer to the heads of all the regions regardless of their formal title.



challenger, and he secured only 29% of the votes. Putin received 53% and won in the first round. (For more on this election, see White 2001.)

The December 2003 election to the State Duma saw little competition (Gel'man 2007). In December 2001, Fatherland-All Russia had agreed to merge with Unity, producing a party named United Russia and securely under the control of Putin's team. United Russia received 38% of the party-list vote--a record to that point in Duma elections--along with numerous SMD mandates, securing a two-thirds majority in the State Duma. The CPRF received only 13% of the party-list votes, barely more than half of its 1999 vote total.

For the presidential race in March 2004, Putin had no viable rivals. Even CPRF leader Zyuganov opted to forego the race; Nikolai Kharitonov represented the Communists. Despite the lack of a strong challenger, the Kremlin portrayed the elections as a referendum on Putin's leadership and devoted substantial resources to achieving a strong win with high turnout (on these elections, see Sakwa 2005; Gel'man 2007). Putin received 71% of the votes, with 64% turnout.

Although the nationwide dominance of United Russia was unquestioned prior to the 2007 Duma race, federal and regional officials pushed hard to produce high turnout and high vote totals for this party of power (see White 2009). It proved easy to accomplish. Not only did Putin enjoy continued high popularity among the public, he had unified control of the federal organs and much stronger tools for influencing the regions than he had inherited. In addition, the public recognized and supported his party, United Russia, far more widely than other parties (Remington 2008, 169). United Russia ended up receiving 64% of the votes (in this election, for the first time, all 450 Duma seats were allocated on the basis of PR). Because over 8% of the votes went to seven parties that failed to pass the 7% threshold, United Russia's vote percentage translated into 70% of the seats in the Duma. The CPRF dropped slightly from 2003, receiving only 12% of the votes and 13% of the seats. Turnout nationwide was just under 64%, quite good for a legislative race.

Putin's constitutionally maximum second term as president was scheduled to end in 2008, and speculation was pervasive for several years prior about whether Putin would step down when his term ended--even though he consistently maintained that he would--and, if he did, whom he would anoint as his preferred successor. In late 2005, he had designated two frontrunners to succeed him by making each a first vice-prime minister: Dmitrii Medvedev and Sergei Ivanov (Yablokova 2005). In late 2007, Putin and United Russia announced their support for Medvedev to become the next president (Levy 2007), while Medvedev made clear that he would nominate Putin as the prime minister. Putin thus remains active in running federal politics but from a new position. In early March 2008, with Putin's and United

Russia's backing and therefore without the need to campaign for votes, Medvedev received almost as high a vote total as Putin had in 2003: 70% of the votes nationwide on 70% turnout to win election on the first ballot. Zyuganov, the nearest competitor received under 18%.

Table A3.1 summarizes the salient contenders for each of Russia's federal elections. (Information on political parties noted in the table but not discussed above can be found in Sakwa 2001; Fish 2003; Myagkov et al. 2005; White 2005; Remington 2008, 167-175.)

**Table A3.1: Presidential candidates and key parties in federal elections, 1991-2008**  
[with percent of presidential or party-list votes received indicated]

	<b>Victorious Presidential Candidate</b>	<b>Main Rival(s)</b>	<b>"Party of Power"</b>	<b>Other Key Parties</b>
<b>June 1991</b>	Boris Yeltsin (57%)	Nikolai Ryzhkov [17%]	-----	-----
<b>December 1993</b>	-----	-----	Russia's Choice [16%]	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) [23%] Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) [12%]
<b>December 1995</b>	-----	-----	Our Home is Russia [10%]	CPRF [22%] LDPR [11%]
<b>June 1996, 1<sup>st</sup> round</b>	Yeltsin [35%]	Gennadii Zyuganov (CPRF) [32%] Alexander Lebed [15%]	-----	-----
<b>July 1996, runoff</b>	Yeltsin [54%]	Zyuganov [40%]	-----	-----
<b>December 1999</b>	-----	-----	Unity [23%] Fatherland/All Russia (OVR) [13%]	CPRF [24%] Union of Right Forces [9%]
<b>March 2000</b>	Vladimir Putin [53%]	Zyuganov [29%]	-----	-----
<b>December 2003</b>	-----	-----	United Russia [38%]	CPRF [13%] LDPR [12%] Motherland [9%]
<b>March 2004</b>	Putin [71%]	Nikolai Kharitonov (CPRF) [14%]	-----	-----
<b>December 2007</b>	-----	-----	United Russia [64%]	CPRF [12%] LDPR [8%] A Just Russia [8%]
<b>March 2008</b>	Dmitrii Medvedev [71%]	Zyuganov [18%]	-----	-----

Percentage figures indicate nationwide vote share received.

## Appendix 2: Data Sources

### Election Results

- 1991 Yeltsin totals: McFaul and Petrov 1998, vol. 1, 379-381  
1991 turnout: McFaul and Petrov 1998, vol. 1, 379-381  
1993 Russia's Choice totals: DeBardeleben and Galkin 1997, Tables 3.1 - 3.4, supplemented with data from McFaul and Petrov 1995, *passim*.  
1993 turnout: McFaul and Petrov 1998 vol. 1, 393-396  
1995 Our Home is Russia totals: McFaul and Petrov 1998, vol. 1, 408-411  
1995 turnout: McFaul and Petrov 1998, vol. 1, 408-411  
1996 2<sup>nd</sup> round Yeltsin totals: McFaul and Petrov 1998, vol. 1, 422-425  
1996 2<sup>nd</sup> round turnout: McFaul and Petrov 1998, vol. 1, 425-428  
1999 Unity and Fatherland/All-Russia totals: Orttung 2000, *passim*  
1999 turnout: Russian Federal Electoral Commission website: <http://www.izbircom.ru/1911/xod/-index.shtml>.  
2000 Putin totals: Orttung 2000, *passim*  
2000 turnout: Russian Federal Electoral Commission website  
2003 United Russia totals: Golosov 2008a  
2003 turnout: Russian Federal Electoral Commission website  
2004 Putin totals: Golosov 2008a  
2004 turnout: Russian Federal Electoral Commission website  
2007 United Russia totals: Golosov 2008a  
2007 turnout: Golosov 2008a  
2008 Medvedev totals: Golosov 2008a  
2008 turnout: Golosov 2008a

### Other Variables

- Petrov and Titkov's measures of "democratic-ness": Petrov and Titkov 2008  
Components of the Index of Urbanization  
    Proportion of the regional population that is urban: Russian Federal State Statistics Service various years  
    Population density: Calculated from data on population and territorial size in Russian Federal State Statistics Service various years  
    Proportion of the regional population that has any level of higher education: Russian Federal State Statistics Service 2005  
    Foreign investment in dollars in 1995: Russian Federal State Statistics Service various years  
    Theater-goers: Russian Federal State Statistics Service 2001, 260-261  
    Museum-goers: Russian Federal State Statistics Service 2001, 262-263  
Percentage of each region's population that is ethnically Russian: McFaul, Petrov and Ryabov 1999, and Russian Federal State Statistics Service 2005  
Registered crime: Russian Federal State Statistics Service various years  
Components of the Index of Economic Change  
    Gross regional product per capita: Russian Federal State Statistics Service various years  
    Personal income in rubles: Russian Federal State Statistics Service various years  
Infant Mortality: Russian Federal State Statistics Service various years

### Appendix 3: Construction of Measures

#### Measuring Deference to the Kremlin for Each Electoral Cycle

We treat each of the four electoral cycles as a unit containing four outcomes of interest: regional vote totals for the party of power in that cycle's Duma PR balloting, regional vote totals for the in-power presidential candidate and the regional levels of turnout for the same two races. We incorporate both vote totals and turnout because both have been of concern to the Kremlin. For the 1999 Duma race, we chose to allow regions to show deference through getting out the vote for either of the parties that in 1999 had the characteristics of a party of power: OVR and Unity. We did this by assigning to each region the higher of the two scores either party received. The Cronbach's alpha statistics for the four raw variables are .57 in the 1995/96 cycle, .77 in the 1999/2000 cycle, .91 in the 2003/04 cycle and .95 in the 2007/08 cycle. These scores are high enough to satisfy us that all four component variables measure a single concept.

We establish cut-off points based on results in the Russian experience and from other countries, one for each of the four types of component variable. We consider outcomes below these cutoff points to be equally unenlightening about regional elite control. For voting for the party of power, the cutoff point is 50%; for turnout in the legislative election, 70%; for voting for the in-power presidential candidate, 65%; and for turnout in the presidential race, 75%. Legislative elections consistently have lower turnouts than presidential races, and, in the 1990s, parties receive substantially lower vote totals than do competitive candidates in presidential races. We therefore set a lower threshold in legislative than in presidential races for assigning a non-zero deference value. Levels above any of these cutoff points are extremely rare among electoral democracies worldwide. In Russia prior to the 2003/04 cycle, these cutoffs are surpassed only by a few regions that were remarked on at the time as having had elite control exerted to shape the outcomes. Outcomes above each cutoff point do go towards the magnitude of the measure. Mathematically, we create these cutoff points by subtracting one from the cutoff point (which varies in the ways discussed above). That amount is then subtracted from the percentage of the vote for the case in question with all scores below one converted a score of one.<sup>16</sup> So, for example, in the 2003 Duma race, United Russia's score in St. Petersburg is 30.9. Subtracting 49 from it produces an initial score of -18.1, which is changed to 1. For Tyva in the same election, subtracting 49 from its vote percentage of 69 produces a score of 20, which is left as it is. At this stage of the transformation, then, the

---

<sup>16</sup>This mathematical procedure is necessary to make sure that no region has a raw score of zero at this point in the transformation since it would then be treated as a missing case when it is logged.

component variables range from +1 upward, with the highest score coming in the 2007 Duma elections when Chechnya's 99.5% vote for United Russia gives it a transformed score of +50.5.

We then take these transformed component scores and create a weighted sum for each electoral cycle. The sum is weighted in order to give more influence to the outcome of the voting for the president, since that outcome has had the highest stakes and drawn the most concern from the Kremlin. Creating the weighted sum involved multiplying the component scores for the Duma race, its turnout and the presidential turnout each by .2 and the component score for the presidential vote by .4 and summing the results. A region that is below the cutoff points on all four components in a given cycle will have a weighted sum equal to one. A score such as Bashkortostan's 16.62 in the 2003/2004 cycle represents United Russia receiving 40% in a race with 75.93% turnout and Putin receiving 91.78% in a race with 88.61% turnout. Or, numerically,  $[(1*.2)+(6.93*.2)+(27.78*.4)+(14.61*.2)] = .2+1.386+11.112+2.922 = 16.62$ . Following the weighted summation, the highest regional score is Ingushetia's score of 30.6 in 2007/08.

Finally, we take the natural log of each of these cycle scores. Doing so creates distributions that more closely approximate normality, which makes them more appropriate for the regression analyses we conduct. This transformation preserves the ordering of the regions and those that are the extreme outliers remain so. All the regions whose cycle scores were one now have scores of zero, indicating that they were below the designated cutoff points on all four components of that cycle's measure.

Table A2.1 provides distributional information on the measure of deference to the Kremlin in each cycle. The skewness statistic indicates the degree to which the distributions are strongly right-tailed. The lower limit of zero on the deference measure requires their distributions to be skewed to the right to some extent. A high distribution with high kurtosis has a sharper peak and longer, fatter tails, while a low kurtosis distribution has a more rounded peak and shorter thinner tails.

**Table A3.1: Summary statistics for measure of deference to the Kremlin**

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median	Min.	Max.	Skewness	Kurtosis	N
1995/1996 Cycle.....	.297	.554	0	0	2.15	1.82	5.03	89
1999/2000 Cycle.....	.197	.545	0	0	3.01	3.36	14.51	88
2003/2004 Cycle.....	1.176	.919	1.20	0	3.23	.40	2.36	89
2007/2008 Cycle.....	1.689	.763	1.52	0	3.42	.75	3.00	83

Table A2.2 provides the correlations among the measures for the four election cycles. All four measures are positively and statistically significantly correlated with each other.

**Table A3.2: Correlations among measures of deference to the Kremlin in each election cycle**

	1995/1996	1999/2000	2003/2004
1999/2000	.30 88		
2003/2004	.47 89	.60 88	
2007/2008	.35 83	.58 82	.66 83

Note: The number of cases is shown below the correlation in each cell.

### Measuring Change in Deference to the Kremlin from 1995/1996 to 2007/2008

To capture the extent and direction of each region's change in deference across the four election cycles, we employ the slope of the line through its values for each of the four cycles. This is superior to calculating the percentage change between the first and final cycle because it incorporates information about the middle two electoral cycles. Negative scores indicate that the trend from the first to the fourth cycle was downward; positive scores indicate a trend for higher (more deferential) scores. The distribution of the resulting variable is included in Table 7 above.

**Table A3.3: Linear estimates of change over time in deference to the Kremlin, overall and by federal district**

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median	Min.	Max.	N	T-test	Average Z-Score
Overall .....	.13	.06	.12	-.02	.30	83	—	—
Northwest .....	.10	.06	.10	-.02	.17	11	1.76 (.082)	-.50
Central .....	.10	.03	.10	.00	.16	18	2.35 (.021)	-.49
Volga .....	.15	.07	.15	.06	.30	14	-1.68 (.096)	.39
Southern .....	.18	.07	.19	.07	.30	13	-3.33 (.001)	.79
Urals .....	.12	.07	.12	.03	.24	6	.30 (.769)	-.13
Siberian .....	.13	.06	.11	.07	.26	12	-.10 (.923)	.02
Far East .....	.12	.04	.12	.06	.17	9	.32 (.744)	-.10

Note: The t-test assesses the hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean value for the given federal district and the mean value for all the remaining regions. Z-scores indicate by how many standard deviations each case is above or below the overall mean of .13.

## References

- Afanas'ev, Mikhail N. 2000. *Klientelizm i Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennost' [Clientelism and Russian Statehood]*. Second ed. Moscow: Moskovskii Obshchestvennyi Nauchnyi Fond.
- Agnew, John A. 1996. "Mapping Politics: How Context Counts in Electoral Geography," *Political Geography* 15 (2): 129-46.
- Akhremenko, A.S., and E.Iu. Meleshkina. 2002. "Golosovanie 'Protiv Vsekh' kak Forma Politicheskogo Protesta: Problemy Izucheniia [The 'Against-All' Vote as a Form of Political Protest: Issues in Studying It]," *Politicheskaia Nauka* (1): 21-43.
- Badovskii, D.V., and A.Iu. Shutov. 1997. "Regional Elites in Post-Soviet Russia: Aspects of Political Involvement," *Russian Politics and Law* 35 (1): 30-53.
- Bahry, Donna. 2005. "The New Federalism and the Paradoxes of Regional Sovereignty in Russia," *Comparative Politics* 37 (2): 127-45.
- Baker, Peter, and Susan Glasser. 2005. *Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution*. New York: Scribner.
- Banfield, Edward C., and James Q. Wilson. 1963. *City Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press and the MIT Press.
- Belin, Laura, and Robert W. Orttung. 1997. *The Russian Parliamentary Elections of 1995: The Battle for the Duma*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Beryozkin, Andrei, Mikhail Myagkov, and Peter Ordeshook. 2003. "Location and Political Influence: A Further Elaboration of Their Effects on Voting in Recent Russian Elections," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 44 (3): 169-83.
- Busygina, Irina. 2007. "The Outcomes of a Decade of Federal Reforms in Russia and the Newest Developments," In *Elusive Russia: Current Developments in Russian State Identity and Institutional Reform Under President Putin*, Katlijn Malfliet and Ria Laenen, eds. Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press: 53-72.
- Buzgalin, Aleksandr, and Andrei Kolganov. 1994. *Krovavyyi Oktiabr' v Moskve: Khronika, Svidetel'stva, Analiz Sobitii 21 Sentiabria-4 Oktiabria 1994 goda [Bloody October in Moscow: Chronology, Eyewitness Views, Analysis of the Events of September 21-October 4, 1993]*. Second, expanded ed. Moscow: Erebus, Inc.
- Chebankova, Elena. 2008. "Adaptive Federalism and Federation in Putin's Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 60 (6): 989-1009.
- Chebankova, Elena A. 2005. "The Limitations of Central Authority in the Regions and the Implications for the Evolution of Russia's Federal System," *Europe-Asia Studies* 57 (7): 933-49.
- Clark, William A. 1998 "Presidential Prefects in the Russian Provinces: Yeltsin's Regional Cadres Policy," In *Elites and Leadership in Russian Politics: Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 1995*, Graeme Gill, ed. New York: St. Martin's Press: 24-51.
- Clem, Ralph S. 2006. "Russia's Electoral Geography: A Review," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 47 (4): 381-406.
- Clem, Ralph S., and Peter R. Craumer. 1995. "The Politics of Russia's Regions: A Geographical Analysis of the Russian Election and Constitutional Plebiscite of December 1993," *Post-Soviet Geography* 36 (2): 67-86.
- . 2004. "Redrawing the Political Map of Russia: The Duma Election of December 2003," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 45 (4): 241-61.
- Colton, Timothy J. 2000. *Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Colton, Timothy J., and Michael McFaul. 2000. "Reinventing Russia's Party of Power: 'Unity' and the 1999 Duma Elections," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 16 (3): 201-24.
- . 2003. *Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: the Russian Elections of 1999 and 2000*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Cornelius, Wayne A. 1977 "Leaders, Followers and Official Patrons in Urban Mexico," In *Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism*, Steffen W. Schmidt, Laura Guasti, Carl H. Lande and James C. Scott, eds. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press: 337-53.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- DeBardeleben, Joan, and Aleksander A. Galkin. 1997. "Electoral Behavior and Attitudes in Russia: Do Regions Make a Difference or Do Regions Just Differ?" In *Beyond the Monolith: The Emergence of Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia*, Peter J. Stavrakis, Joan DeBardeleben and Larry Black, eds. Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press: 57-80.
- Easter, Gerald M. 2001 "Networks, Bureaucracies, and the Russian State In *Explaining Post-Soviet Patchworks*, Klaus Segbers Burlington, VT: Ashgate: 39-58
- Fish, M. Stephen. 2003. "The Impact of the 1999-2000 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections On Political Party Development," In *The 1999-2000 Elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy*, Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press: 186-212.
- Gel'man, V. Ia, G. V. Golosov, and E. Yu Meleshkina. 2000. *Pervyi Elektoral'nyi Tsikl v Rossii 1993-1996 gg. [The First Electoral Cycle in Russia, 1993-1996]*. Moscow: Ves' Mir.
- Gel'man, Vladimir. 2008. "Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy," *Europe-Asia Studies* 60 (6): 913-30.
- Gel'man, Vladimir, and Vitalii Elizarov. 1999. "Russia's Transition and Founding Elections," In *Elections in Russia, 1993-1996: Analyses, Documents and Data*, Vladimir Gel'man and Grigorii V Golosov, eds. Berlin: Edition Sigma: 19-46.
- Gel'man, Vladimir Ia. 2006. "Vozrashchenie Levafana? Politika Retsentralizatsiia v Sovremennoi Rossii [The Return of the Leviathan? Political Recentralization in Contemporary Russia]," *POLIS: Politicheskie Issledovaniia* (6): 90-109.
- . 2007 "Evolyutsiia Elektoral'noi Politiki v Rossii: Na Puti k Nedemokraticeskoi Konsolidatsii? [The Evolution of Electoral Politics in Russia: On the Way to Nondemocratic Consolidation?] In *Tretii Elektoral'noi Tsikl v Rossii, 2003-2004 gody: Kollektivnaia Monografiia [The Third Electoral Cycle in Russia, 2003-2004: A Collective Monograph]*, Vladimir Ia Gel'manSt. Petersburg: The European University in St. Petersburg: 17-38
- Gel'man, Vladimir Ia, G.V. Golosov, A.V. Likhtenshtein, E.V. Popova, R.F. Turovskii, Iu.D. Shevchenko, A.N. Shcherbak, and N.B. Yagromskaia. 2007. *Tretii Elektoral'noi Tsikl v Rossii, 2003-2004 gody: Kollektivnaia Monografiia [The Third Electoral Cycle in Russia, 2003-2004: A Collective Monograph]*. St. Petersburg: The European University in St. Petersburg.
- Gel'man, Vladimir Ia. 2008. *Dinamika Subnatsional'nogo Avtoritarizma: Rossiia v Sravnitel'noi Perspektive [Dynamics of Subnational Authoritarianism: Russia in Comparative Perspective]*. St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Evropeiskogo Universiteta v Sankt Peterberge.
- Gel'man, Vladimir Ia., Grigorii V. Golosov, and E.Iu. Meleshkina, eds. 2002. *Vtoroi Elektoral'nyi Tsikl v Rossii (1999-2000 gg.) [The Second Electoral Cycle in Russia (1999-2000)]*. Moscow: Ves' Mir.
- Glebova, I.I. 2004. "Partiya Vlasti [The Party of Power]," *POLIS: Politicheskie Issledovaniia* (2): 85-92.
- Golosov, Grigorii V. 2004. *Political Parties in the Regions of Russia: Democracy Unclaimed*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- . 2008. *Baza Danykh 'Rossiiskaia Elektoral'naiia Statistika'*. Inter-regional Electoral Network of Assistance 2008a [cited 2 June 2008]. Available from <http://db.irena.org.ru>.
- . 2008b. "Elektoral'nyi Avtoritarizm v Rossii [Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia]," *Pro et Contra* 12 (1): 22-35.



- Golosov, Grigorii V. 2009. "Building a New Political Machine," *Russian Analytical Digest* (57): 2-6.
- Hale, Henry E. 2007. "Correlates of Clientelism: Political Economy, Politicized Ethnicity and Post-Communist Transition," In *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press: 227-50.
- Henderson, Jane. 2007. "The Russian Constitutional Court and the Communist Party Case: Watershed or Whitewash?" *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 40 (1): 1-16.
- Hesli, Vicki L., and William M Reisinger, eds. 2003. *The 1999-2000 Elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hough, Jerry F., Evelyn Davidheiser, and Susan Goodman Lehmann. 1996. *The 1996 Russian Presidential Election*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Hutcheson, Derek S. 2004. "Disengaged or disenchanting? the vote 'against all' in post-communist Russia," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 20 (1): 98-121.
- Hyde, Matthew. 2001. "Putin's Federal Reforms and Their Implications for Presidential Power in Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 53 (5): 719-43.
- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2009. *Voter Turnout Website* International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, March 19, 2009 [<http://www.idea.int/vt/>].
- Jackman, Robert W. 1973. "On the Relation of Economic Development to Democratic Performance," *American Journal of Political Science* 17 (3): 611-21.
- Kahn, Jeffrey. 2002. *Federalism, Democratization and the Rule of Law in Russia*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Key, V.O. 1936. *The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States*. Chicago: University of Chicago Libraries.
- Kirkow, Peter. 1998. *Russia's Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation versus Local Autonomy?* New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven I. Wilkinson. 2007. "Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction," In *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press: 1-49.
- Kozlov, Nikolai D. 2008. "Politicheskie Kul'tury Regionov Rossii: Uravnenie so Mnogimi Neizvestnymi [Political Cultures of the Regions of Russia: An Equation with Many Unknowns]," *POLIS: Politicheskie Issledovaniia* (4): 8-26.
- Kutsylo, Veronika. 1993. *Zapiski iz Belogo Doma, 21 Steniabria- 4 Oktiabria 1993 g. [Notes from the White House: September 21 - October 4, 1993]*. Moscow: Kommersant'.
- Levy, Clifford J. 2007. "Putin Backs Deputy Prime Minister as Successor," *New York Times*, December 11.
- Likhtenshtein, A.V. 2002. "'Partii Vlasti': Elektoral'nye Strategii Rossiiskikh Elit [Parties of Power': The Electoral Strategies of the Russian Elite]" In *Vtoroi Elektoral'nyi Tsikl v Rossii (1999-2000 gg.) [The Second Electoral Cycle in Russia (1999-2000)]*, Vladimir Ia. Gel'man, Grigorii V. Golosov and E.Iu. Meleshkina, eds. Moscow: Ves' Mir: 85-106.
- Liubarev, A. E. . 2003. "Golosovanie 'Protiv Vsekh': Motivy I Tendentsii [Voting 'Against All': Motives and Trends]," *POLIS: Politicheskie Issledovaniia* (6): 104-13.
- Lowenhardt, John. 1997. "The 1996 Presidential Elections in Tatarstan," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 13 (1): 132-44.
- Lussier, Danielle N. 2002. "The Role of Russia's Governors in the 1999-2000 Federal Elections," In *Regional Politics in Russia*, Cameron Ross, ed. Manchester: Manchester University Press: 57-76.
- Makarkin, Aleksei 2000 "Partii Vlasti v Izbiratel'noi Kampanii 1999 g. [The Parties of Power in the Electoral Campaign of 1999]," In *Rossii na Dumskikh i Prezidentskikh Vyborakh [Russia in the*

- Duma and Presidential Elections*], Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Riabov, eds. Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: .
- Maksimov, Andrei. 1999. “‘Chistie’ i ‘Griaznie’ Tekhnologii Vyborov (Rossiiskii Opyt) [‘Clean’ and ‘Dirty’ Electoral Technologies (The Russian Experience)].” Moscow: Mordodey & Imagemakers.
- March, Luke. 2002. *The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russia*. New York: Palgrave.
- Marsh, Christopher. 2002. *Russia at the Polls: Voters, Elections, and Democratization*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- . 2004. “Measuring and Explaining Variations in Russian Regional Democratization,” In *Russian Politics Under Putin*, Cameron Ross, ed. New York: Manchester University Press: 176-97.
- Marsh, Christopher, Helen Albert, and James W. Warhola. 2004. “The Political Geography of Russia’s 2004 Presidential Election,” *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 45 (4 ): 262-79.
- Matsuzato, Kimitaka. 2000. “Progressive North, Conservative South? Reading the Regional Elite as a Key to Russian Electoral Puzzles,” In *Regions: A Prism to View the Slavic Eurasian World*, Kimitaka Matsuzato, ed. Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University: 143-76.
- McAllister, Ian, and Stephen White. 2008. “Voting ‘Against All’ in Postcommunist Russia,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 60 (1): 67-87.
- McAuley, Mary. 1997. *Russia’s Politics of Uncertainty*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McDonnell, Lawrence. 1994. *October Revolution*. Staplehurst, U.K.: Spellmount Limited.
- McFaul, Michael. 1998. “Russia’s Choice: The Perils of Revolutionary Democracy In *Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election of 1993*, Timothy J. Colton and Jerry F. Hough Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press: 115-39.
- McFaul, Michael A. 1997. *Russia’s 1996 Presidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
- McFaul, Michael, and Nikolai Petrov, eds. 1995. *Previewing Russia’s 1995 Parliamentary Elections*. Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- , eds. 1998. *Politicheskii Almanakh Rossii, 1989-1997 gg. [Political Almanac of Russia, 1989-1997]*. 2 vols. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- McFaul, Michael, Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov, eds. 1999. *Primer on Russia’s 1999 Duma Elections*. Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- McFaul, Michael, and Nikolai V. Petrov. 1997. “Russian Electoral Politics After Transition: Regional and National Assessments,” *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 38 (9): 507-49.
- Mikhailov, Valentin. 2004. “Regional Elections and Democratization in Russia,” In *Russian Politics Under Putin*, Cameron Ross, ed. New York: Manchester University Press: 198-220.
- Minchenko, Evgenii N. 2001. *Kak Stat’ i Ostat’siia Gubernatorom [How to Become and Remain a Governor]*. Cheliabinsk: Ural LTD.
- Miroshnichenko, A.A. 2003. *Vybory: Ot Zamysli do Pobedy (Predvybornaia Kampaniia v Rossiiskom Regione) [Elections: From Conception to Victory (Campaigning in a Russian Region)]*. Moscow: Tsentr Publishing.
- Moraski, Bryon. 2007. “Electoral System Reform in Democracy’s Grey Zone: Lessons from Putin’s Russia,” *Government and Opposition* 42 (4): 536-63.
- Moraski, Bryon J, and William M Reisinger. 2007. “Eroding Democracy--Federal Intervention in Russia’s Gubernatorial Elections,” *Democratization* 14 (4): 603-21.
- Moraski, Bryon J., and William M. Reisinger. 2003. “Explaining Electoral Competition Across Russia’s Regions,” *Slavic Review* 62 (2): 278-301.
- Myagkov, Mikhail. 2003. “The 1999 Duma Elections in Russia: A Step Toward Democracy or the Elites’ Game?” In *The 1999-2000 Elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy*, Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press: 142-59.

- Myagkov, Mikhail, Andrei Kunov, Alexei Sitnikov, and Dmitrii Shakin. 2005. "Putin's Party of Power and the Declining Power of Parties in Russia," London: Foreign Policy Centre.
- Myagkov, Mikhail, Peter Ordeshook, and Dmitrii Shakin. 2009. *The Forensics of Election Fraud: With Applications to Russia and Ukraine*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Nelson, Lynn D. , and Irina Y. Kuzes. 2003. "Political and Economic Coordination in Russia's Federal District Reform: A Study of Four Regions," *Europe-Asia Studies* 55 (4 ): 507-20.
- Nikolaev, A.N. 2000. "Administrativnyi Resurs v Regional'nykh Izbiratel'nykh Kampaniiakh [Administrative Resources in Regional Electoral Campaigns]," *POLIS: Politicheskie Issledovaniia* (4): 171-74.
- O'Loughlin, John O., Michael Shin, and Michael Talbot. 1996. "Political Geographies and Cleavages in the Russian Parliamentary Elections," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 37 (6): 355-85.
- Oates, Sarah. 2003. "Television, Voters, and the Development of the 'Broadcast Party'," In *The 1999-2000 Elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy*, Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press: 29-50.
- Oreshkin, D.B. 2001. "Geografiia Elektoral'noi Kult'ury i Tsel'nost' Rossii [The Geography of Electoral Culture and the Integrity of Russia]," *POLIS: Politicheskie Issledovaniia* (1): 73-93.
- Oreshkin, Dmitrii, and Darya Oreshkina. 2007. "The Geography of Russia's Electoral Culture," *Social Sciences* 2 (38): 72-88.
- Ortung, Robert W. 2000. *The Republics and Regions of the Russian Federation: A Guide to Politics, Policies and Leaders*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Oversloot, Hans, Joop van Holsteyn, and Ger P van den Berg. 2002. "Against All: Exploring the Vote 'Against All' in the Russian Federation's Electoral System," *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 18 (4): 31-50.
- Oversloot, Hans, and Ruben Verheul. 2006. "Managing Democracy: Political Parties and the State in Russia," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 22 (3): 383-405.
- Paramonov, D.O., and V.V. Kirichenko. 2007. *Metody Fal'sifikatsii Vyborov [Methods of Falsifying Election Results]*. Moscow: Fictionbook.ru.
- Petrov, Nikolai. 2004. "Regional Models of Democratic Development," In *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*, Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, eds. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 239-67.
- Petrov, Nikolai, and Darrell Slider. 2003. "Putin and the Regions," In *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*, Dale R. Herspring, eds. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: 203-24.
- Petrov, Nikolai V. and Aleksei Titkov. 2008. *Ekspertnaia Otsenka (Reiting) Demokratichnosti Regionov za 1991-2004 gg. [Expert Assessment (Rating) of the Democratic-ness of the Regions, 1991-2004]*. Independent Institute for Social Policy 2008 [cited August 27, 2008. Available from [http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index\\_democr.shtml](http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml).]
- Remington, Thomas F. 2003a. "Majorities without Mandates: The Russian Federation Council since 2000," *Europe-Asia Studies* 55 (5): 667-91.
- . 2003b. "Putin, the Duma, and Political Parties," In *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*, Dale R. Herspring, ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: 39-59.
- . 2008. *Politics in Russia*. Fifth ed. New York: Pearson Longman.
- Remnick, David. 1997. *Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia*. New York: Random House.
- Rose, Richard, and Neil Munro. 2002. *Elections without Order: Russia's Challenge to Vladimir Putin*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ross, Cameron. 2002. *Federalism and Democratisation in Russia*. Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press.

- . 2004. "Putin's Federal Reforms," In *Russian Politics Under Putin*, Cameron Ross, ed. New York: Manchester University Press: 155-75.
- Russian Federal State Statistics Service. 2001. *Regiony Rossii 2001: Informatsionno-Statisticheskii Sbornik [The Regions of Russia 2001: An Informational-Statistical Collection]*. 2 vols. Moscow: Gosudarstvennii Komitet Rossiiskoi Federatsii Po Statistike.
- . 2005. *Osnovnye Itogi Vserossiiskii Perepisi Naselenia 2002 g. [Basic Results of the All-Russian Census of 2002]*. Vol. 14. Moscow: Statistika Rossii.
- . various years. *Regiony Rossii: Informatsionno-Statisticheskii Sbornik [The Regions of Russia: An Informational-Statistical Collection]*. 2 vols. Moscow: Gosudarstvennii Komitet Rossiiskoi Federatsii Po Statistike.
- Sakwa, Richard. 1996. "The Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Electoral Process," In *Studies in Public Policy*. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde.
- . 2000. "Russia's 'Permanent' (Uninterrupted) Elections of 1999-2000," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 16 (3): 85-112.
- . 2001. "Parties and Organised Interests," In *Developments in Russian Politics 5*, Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman, eds. Durham, NC: Duke University Press: 84-107.
- . 2005. "The 2003-2004 Russian Elections and Prospects for Democracy," *Europe-Asia Studies* 57 (3): 369-98.
- Scott, James C. 1972. *Comparative Political Corruption*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz. 2007. "Why was democracy lost in Russia's regions? Lessons from Nizhnii Novgorod," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 40 (3): 363-82.
- Shevtsova, Lilia. 1996. "Parliament and the Political Crisis in Russia, 1991-1993," In *Democratization in Russia: The Development of Legislative Institutions*, Jeffrey W. Hahn, ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe: 29-48.
- Shvetsova, Olga. 2003. "Resolving the Problem of Pre-Election Coordination: The Parliamentary Election as an Elite Presidential 'Primary'," In *The 1999-2000 Elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy*, Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press: 213-31.
- Smirnov, Valerii. 2008. *Afery na Vyborakh [Dirty Election Tricks]*. Moscow: Algoritm.
- Smyth, Regina. 2002. "Building State Capacity from the Inside Out: Parties of Power and the Success of the President's Reform Agenda in Russia," *Politics and Society* 30 (4): 555-78.
- Solnick, Steven L. 1998. "Gubernatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-1997," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 14 (1): 48-80.
- Stepan, Alfred. 2000. "Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 16 (2): 133-76.
- Stokes, Susan C. 2007. "Political Clientelism," In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, eds. New York: Oxford University Press: 604-27.
- Stoliarov, Mikhail. 2003. *Federalism and the Dictatorship of Power in Russia*. New York: Routledge.
- Tsipko, Alexander. 1996. "Why Gennady Zyuganov's Communist Party Finished First," *Demokratizatsiya (The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization)* IV (2): 185-222.
- Turovskii, R. 2002. "Regional'nye Aspekty Obshcherossiiskikh Vyrborov [Regional Aspects of All-Russian Elections]," In *Vtoroi Elektoral'nyi Tsikl v Rossii (1999-2000 gg.) [The Second Electoral Cycle in Russia (1999-2000)]*, Vladimir Ia. Gel'man, Grigorii V. Golosov and E.Iu. Meleshkina, eds. Moscow: Ves' Mir: 186-214.
- Urban, Joan Barth, and Valerii D. Solovei. 1997. *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

- Valentei, Sergei. 2006. "Prospects for Russian Federalism," In *New Actors in Northern Federations: Cities, Mergers and Aboriginal Governance in Russia and Canada*, Peter H. Solomon, Jr., ed. Toronto: Center for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, University of Toronto: 35-53.
- Vorontsova, A. B., and V. B. Zvonovskii. 2003. "Administrativnii Resurs Kak Fenomen Rossiiskogo Izbiratel'nogo Protssessa [Administrative Resources As a Phenomenon in the Russian Electoral Process]," *POLIS: Politicheskie Issledovaniia* (6): 114-24.
- Ware, Robert Bruce. 2005. "Recent Russian Federal Elections in Dagestan: Implications for Proposed Electoral Reform," *Europe-Asia Studies* 57 (4): 583-600.
- White, Stephen. 1997. "The 1995 Elections to the Russian State Duma," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 13 (1): 107-14.
- . 2001. "The Russian Presidential Election, March 2000," *Electoral Studies* 20 (3): 484-89.
- . 2005. "The Political Parties," In *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa, eds. Durham, NC: Duke University Press: 80-95.
- . 2007. "Russia's Client Party System," In *Party Politics in New Democracies*, Paul Webb and Stephen White, eds. New York: Oxford University Press: 21-51.
- . 2009. "The Duma Elections in Russia, December 2007," *Electoral Studies* 28 (1): 171-73.
- White, Stephen, and Sarah Oates. 2003. "Politics and the Media in Postcommunist Russia," *Politics* 23 (1): 31-37.
- White, Stephen, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister. 1996. *How Russia Votes*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.
- White, Stephen, Matthew Wyman, and Sarah Oates. 1997. "Parties and Voters in the 1995 Russian Duma Election," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49 (5): 767-98.
- Wilson, Andrew. 2005. *Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Wyman, Matthew. 1997. "The Russian Elections of 1995 and 1996," *Electoral Studies* 16 (1): 79-86.
- Wyman, Matthew, Stephen White, Ian McAllister, and Sarah Oates. 2002. "Regional Voting Patterns in Post-Communist Russia," In *Regional Politics in Russia*, Cameron Ross, ed. Manchester: Manchester University Press: 23-36.
- Yablokova, Oksana. 2005. "Medvedev, Ivanov Promoted in Shake-Up," *Moscow Times*, November 15.
- Zadorin, Igor. 2000. "Sredstva Massovoi Informatsii i Elektoral'noe Povedenie Rossiian [The Media and Electoral Behavior]," In *Rossiiia na Dumskikh i Prezidentskikh Vyborakh [Russia in the Duma and Presidential Elections]*, Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Riabov, eds. Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:
- Zheleznova, N. L., A. G. Panova, and A. P. Surkov. 1994. *Moskva Osen'-93: Khronika Protivostoianiiia [Moscow, Fall 1993: Chronicle of a Confrontation]*. Moscow: Respublika.
- Zvonovskii, Vladimir B. 2004. "'Elektoral'nyi Tranzit': K Dvum Stranam v Granitsakh Odnoi? [Electoral Transition': Toward Two Countries Within One?]," *POLIS: Politicheskie Issledovaniia* (3): 33-43.