The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson
ments with Hoover's suggestions. Consequently, the book reveals much more about the political philosophy of Herbert Hoover than it does about Woodrow Wilson. Nevertheless, a clear picture emerges from the ideological mist which the Great Depression has created: Herbert Hoover was by no means a political reactionary who mirrored the interests of the American business community. On the contrary, Hoover, like Wilson, was a classical progressive concerned with preserving social order, guaranteeing corporate profits, and protecting consumer interests. Both men praised the virtues of voluntarism and limited government, but during the war, they also willingly and even urgently created a powerful federal bureaucracy able to control the production and distribution of American agriculture products. Both men were expediently willing to employ voluntarism, free competition, monopolistic restraint of trade, price-fixing or any other tactic necessary to stimulate agricultural production and restrain inflation. From O'Brien's book, Herbert Hoover emerges as an activist, pragmatic federal bureaucrat totally committed to governmental direction of the economy; he is hardly a candidate for praise from conservative, laissez-faire circles. Consequently, The Hoover-Wilson Correspondence constitutes a valuable contribution to a growing body of literature on Herbert Hoover.

———James S. Olson
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The view that the attempt to remove Andrew Johnson from office was motivated by narrow and selfish political factors has been so persistent that one is surprised that a book like this one hasn’t been published previously. Benedict, assistant professor of history at Ohio State University, argues that Johnson’s reconstruction program and especially his “winter offensive” in late 1867 and early 1868 strained the American political and constitutional system to the extent that, “Because Republicans respected
the presidency, they would if necessary remove the President.”

This volume argues the broad interpretation for what constitutes an impeachable offense. Using both British and United States precedents it is claimed that, despite the mixed evidence supporting both views, there are convincing examples for the use of the impeachment procedures in cases involving abuse of power. Impeachment cases and constitutional authorities from both sides of the Atlantic are cited to point out that impeachment was designed as a part of the check and balance system as well as recourse for criminal activity. The outrages perpetrated by Johnson, including the massive reversal of confiscation of lands in the South, extravagant abuse of political patronage, and the destructive campaign against the Freedmen’s Bureau, “Converted a conquered people . . . into a hostile, aggressive, uncooperative unit. . . . The failure of Reconstruction could be blamed alone on President Johnson’s abuse of his discretionary powers.”

Iowans have a special interest in the trial and verdict since Senator James W. Grimes was one of the seven recusant Republicans who were responsible for sparing the President from removal. They are presented as brave martyrs in Kennedy’s Profiles in Courage, but this view was debunked in Ralph J. Roske’s essay in the January issue, 1959, of the American Historical Review (“The Seven Martyrs?”). Professor Benedict feels that these Senators voted not guilty primarily because of their conservative bent and their fears of the results of removal. The apprehensions of having Ben Wade in the presidency, the desires to curb Chief Justice Chase’s political ambitions, and the assurances from Johnson that he would moderate for the remainder of his term (Grimes in fact had a meeting with the President), seemed to be powerful influences in the voting decisions of the seven. It is thusly suggested that political motivations were influencing the behavior of all Republicans, not just the thirty-five who voted guilty.

Benedict’s book is an important contribution to the historiography of the literature on the attempt to remove Andrew Johnson from office. He laments, however, its failure for, “The end result is that the only effective recourse against a president who ignores the will of Congress or exceeds his powers is democratic removal at the polls.”

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