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The Unveiled power of NGOs: how NGOs influence states' foreign policy behaviors

Youngwan Kim
University of Iowa

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THE UNVEILED POWER OF NGOS:
HOW NGOS INFLUENCE STATES' FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIORS

by

Youngwan Kim

An Abstract

Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Political Science
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

July 2011

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Sara McLaughlin Mitchell

ABSTRACT

This research project is designed to understand the relationship between states and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), especially how they influence one another. In this study, I argue that the theoretical relationship between states' foreign policy behaviors and the behavior of NGO is dynamic and conditional, with the influence of NGOs on states' behaviors depending on the host states' regime type and the age of the influencing NGOs. I also argue that NGOs influence states' foreign policy behaviors toward other states both directly and indirectly, functioning as information providers, lobbying groups, agenda setters, and norm generators.

By applying these theoretical arguments to the field of international development, the influence of NGOs on states' decisions about foreign aid is analyzed with the case of the United States. A new time-series cross-sectional dataset of the activities of US-based NGOs in developing countries is constructed by utilizing annual reports of NGOs, websites, and through personal communication with NGO officers. In addition, another new dataset is constructed about the number of *New York Time* articles. With constructed datasets, the quantitative studies are conducted. The quantitative studies show that as number of US-based NGO field operations in developing countries increase, that country is significantly more likely to receive higher amounts of aid from the United States. NGOs that have longer operations in developing countries are also more effective at lobbying the United States to provide more foreign aid. Furthermore, empirical analyses show that as number of US-based NGO activities increase in a country, the media coverage of that country increases. The qualitative analyses of NGOs' influence on states' foreign policy behaviors are also conducted. Interviews with NGO workers, governmental officials, and a reporter from the *New York Times* provide insight about

how NGOs interact with the US government. In addition, these interviews show that NGOs function as information providers, lobbying groups, agenda setters, and norm generators.

The theoretical understand of NGO-state relationships will contribute to the study of NGOs and NGOs' interaction with states. In addition, empirical analyses with newly constructed dataset and interviews with people in the field will become an important asset to social scientists in this field. The study also has a great potential to be expanded by including more NGO data, issue areas, and other countries' NGOs.

Abstract Approved: _____

Thesis Supervisor

Title and Department

Date

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CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

PH.D. THESIS

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Dedicated to Eunjung, Hyungho, Oksook, Sara, and Denise

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) have become very influential actors in world politics over the last three decades (Reimann 2006). According to the Union of International Associations,¹ over 25,000 NGOs are currently operating internationally. NGOs have influenced state foreign policy behaviors significantly. For example, in 1995, three NGOs based in the US, the Development GAP, Oxfam America, and Friends of the Earth, suggested a detailed proposal for reforming and restructuring the US foreign aid plan. Recently, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, one of the largest NGOs based in the US, strongly urged the US government to provide more foreign aid to promote economic growth in the world's poorest nations in spite of the economic crisis of the US. Amnesty International has worked as the symbolic protector of human rights, and it has changed the shared perception of human rights in many countries. InterAction, which is the largest coalition of US-based international NGOs, has maintained a strong relationship with the US government, providing a substantial recommendation and consultation for US foreign assistance. These real-world examples clearly show how NGOs have tried to influence governments' policies, especially when the decisions of governments are related to their special field of work. Although the interaction between NGOs and governments' decisions about foreign policies can be easily observed in the real world, the systematic nature of this relationship is not well understood.

The main purpose of this research project is to understand the relationship between states and NGOs, especially how they influence one another. While we have observed that NGOs attempt to influence states in our daily life, we do not know the mechanisms by which NGOs influence states' foreign policies. In this study, I argue that the theoretical relationship between states' foreign policy behavior and the behavior of

¹ Union of International Association (<http://www.uia.be/>)

NGOs is dynamic and conditional, with the influence of NGOs on states' behavior depending on the host states' regime type and the age of the influencing NGOs. I argue that NGOs influence states' foreign policy behavior toward other states both directly and indirectly.

Scholars in the NGO literature have typically focused on either top-down or bottom-up relationships between states and NGOs. In top-down relationship, states tend to influence NGOs by providing resources and controlling available funding. In contrast, bottom-up relationships view NGO decision-making processes as independent from host governments. Moreover, NGOs attempt to influence governments' policies in order to achieve the mission and goals of NGOs in the field. Both approaches seem to explain the relationship between NGOs and states, but these one-way state-NGO relationships often do not consider important factors that decide state-NGO interactions. The regime type of states and the maturity of NGOs can provide an explanation of this dynamic relationship between states and NGOs. Depending on regime type, NGOs have different access to the public and different influence over governments' decisions. Moreover, NGOs in many democratic countries have existed long enough to be independent from the direct control of governments. Therefore, NGOs tend to influence governments more strongly in democratic countries. In contrast, NGOs in many non-democratic countries are not mature and are still strongly influenced by governments (e.g. many NGOs in China).

In order to answer the research question of how NGOs influence states' behaviors, this study suggests that NGOs function as a connecting bridge between developed and developing countries by influencing the foreign policy decisions of developed countries. As *direct* influences, NGOs provide information for governments of developed countries and directly lobby governmental officials on their foreign policy decisions. *Indirectly*, NGOs mobilize domestic support in developed countries on behalf of and for the benefit of developing countries by setting an agenda and generating new norms among the public. These indirect mechanisms often occur through public awareness of issues articulated

through the free press, something that is easier for NGOs to achieve in more open, democratic societies. With respect to US foreign aid, my theory predicts that the US provides greater amounts of aid to developing countries if more US-based NGOs are operating in that country and if the length of NGO operations in the potential aid-recipient country increases. More indirectly, an increase in the frequency and duration of NGO activities in a potential recipient country should also increase the media coverage of that country in US media outlets.

By studying NGOs in the field of international development and states' foreign aid policies, I want to test and develop these theoretical arguments. For these empirical studies, I generated a new time-series cross-sectional dataset of US-based NGO activities in 155 countries. As there is currently no time-series cross-national dataset, constructing this dataset was a great challenge. After considering the 115 largest NGOs in the US, the data of 40 NGO activities were coded covering the 1960-2008 time period. For each NGO in my dataset, I have recorded each developing country that has NGO operations in it and the years of those operations. I have also compiled information about the characteristics of each NGO, such as the overall operating budget, religious affiliation, and the age of the organization. While it was a very time-consuming job, I believe that this dataset provides enormous potential for future projects. In addition, the development of this dataset will greatly assist other scholars in conducting similar kinds of projects. To evaluate the indirect effect of NGOs on US foreign aid, I have also collected a dataset of *New York Times'* coverage of developing countries related to relief and development.

My empirical chapters provide strong support for my theoretical arguments. First, I find that as the number of US-based development NGO field operations increases in a developing country, that state is significantly more likely to receive a higher amount of foreign aid from the US government. The substantive effect is quite large; for each additional US-based NGO operating in a country, the amount of annual foreign aid increases by over 15 million dollars. Second, I show that NGO field operation time is

important as well, as older, more established NGOs are more effective at securing higher amounts of US foreign aid for the countries in which they operate. For each additional NGO-year of field operations in a developing country, that state can expect to receive an extra \$250,000 in US foreign aid. These findings demonstrate that NGOs are effective at directly lobbying their home states and influence foreign policy decisions. I also test the indirect effect of NGOs by examining attention to the countries in which they operate in US media outlets, such as the *New York Times*. A one unit increase of NGOs' projects leads to an increase of 0.17 articles about that developing country in the *New York Times*. Since the mean of the number of articles related to development issues is 2.33, the influence of NGO activities seems to have a statistically significant and substantial impact on coverage by the *New York Times*. Thus US-based NGOs influence the US government's foreign aid decisions both directly and indirectly.

I also evaluate potential endogeneity in the relationship between NGOs activities and US foreign aid by considering whether NGOs are reactive to where the US sends foreign aid. Many early NGOs in the United States were in fact closely aligned with the US government, much like the government organized NGOs (GONGOs) currently operating in China. I find that there is a positive and statistically significant effect of US foreign aid on NGO field operations, yet the substantive effect is very small. It would take an additional one billion dollars of US foreign aid for one new NGO to locate in the aid-receiving developing country. In addition to the test of reverse causality, an instrumental approach is adopted. This approach also shows that NGOs influence the amount of foreign aid, not the other way around. With each country, the Granger causality test is conducted. Most countries' time series support the causal mechanism from NGOs to states. While the relationship between NGOs and states' foreign policy behavior may be endogenous, at least with respect to US foreign aid policy, my study shows that most of the relationship runs from NGOs to foreign aid.

To more clearly test the endogeneity issue, I conduct qualitative studies which include interviews with NGO workers, USAID officials, and a reporter from the *New York Times*. This qualitative research is used to explain the causal mechanism more clearly. Workers from World Vision International, CARE, Samaritan's Purse, Mercy Corps, Women for Women, and other small NGOs are interviewed with specific questions about how and whether NGOs influence the US government's decisions about foreign aid. In addition, the substantial relationship between these NGOs and the US government is also examined through interviews. Along with interviews with NGO workers, interviews with USAID officials show how the US government interacts with US-based NGOs from the perspectives of the US government. A reporter from the *New York Times* provides an insight of how NGOs try to publicize their work through the media.

This study makes two specific contributions to the study of NGOs. First, this study can provide a theoretical explanation of state-NGO relationships. Different theoretical explanations of the state-NGO relationship in democratic and non-democratic systems can be easily applied to explain state-NGO relationships in other countries. The second specific contribution is the quantitative analysis of NGO activities. While some NGO datasets exist in specific issue areas, such as human rights and the environment, there are currently no large-N datasets that cover the activities of all NGOs in the world. The construction of a new dataset on US-based NGO activities will provide an important new public good to social science scholars interested in this topic. This will include NGOs across multiple focus areas, which will allow for more innovative empirical tests, and set the stage for constructing a more advanced dataset of NGOs in the world. More broadly, my study will show that NGOs are one of the important main actors in international politics, influencing government decisions in the foreign policy arena.

Motivation and Research Objectives of Study

Foreign aid and NGOs have many common aspects. First, both are designed to improve socio-economic conditions of people in developing countries. No matter what the real purposes of these two are, it is true that they are designed with the purpose of helping people in need. Second, both are transferred from developed countries to developing countries. The activities of international NGOs mainly target developing countries with the funding raised from people, foundation, or governments in developed countries. Foreign aid is directly or sometimes indirectly transferred from the governments of developed countries to the ones of developing countries. Third, both are very recent phenomena in world politics. We have only observed foreign aid and NGOs for the last several decades. Only after 1945, transfer of aid was developed between independent countries (McKinlay and Little 1977). The number of NGOs dramatically increased after World War II (Ahmed and Potter 2006). Compared to the long history of state existence, foreign aid policy and the existence of NGOs are very recent phenomena. Fourth, foreign aid and NGOs are very important aspects of world politics. Foreign aid has been in the center of debates in the field of international development. Apart from the effectiveness of foreign aid, it is clear that foreign aid is an important factor that influences economic development of developing countries. No one can ignore the importance of NGOs any more in terms of their impact, resources, expertise, and knowledge. With enormous resources, NGOs are implementing their projects, which can change people's lives in developing countries as well as in developed countries.

In spite of these common aspects of foreign aid and NGOs, the relationship between these two is not well studied. I personally witnessed the state-NGO relationship in the field. When I worked as a long-term election observer in Bangladesh, I observed that many US-based NGOs are working for the fair and clean elections in Bangladesh. More interesting is that these NGOs seem to cooperate with the US government. Some part of their funding for the project in the field comes from the grant provided by the US

government. NGOs share information with the US government. NGO interaction with the US government definitely influences the decisions of the US government. As NGOs work in the field of international development, their activities and opinions about the regions can make an impact on foreign aid decisions. We often observe that NGOs announce the suggestions of US foreign aid reform. Although they are ‘nongovernmental’ organizations, it is interesting to see NGOs working with the government, influencing its foreign policies, and taking the influence from the government.

The puzzle starts here. Why do NGOs have close relationships with the government? Why do they try to influence foreign policies of the government? With common aspects of NGOs and states’ behaviors, specifically foreign aid policies, I hope to understand the relationship between these two. Through this dissertation, I hope to provide a theoretical explanation of the state-NGO relationship. With existing studies and analyses, I try to develop theories that explain the interaction between the activities of NGOs and states’ behaviors toward other states. I also want to provide empirical approaches of state-NGO relations. I believe that empirical approaches with data on NGO activities will enhance our understanding of NGO influence on world politics. The activities of NGOs are sometimes underestimated or overestimated according to the research methods and scholars. With better measurement of NGO activities, the impact of NGOs can be examined.

Organization of Dissertation

Chapter 2 covers the existing literature in the field of NGO studies and foreign aid. I first review how scholars define NGOs, and then describe the different types of NGOs. In accordance with the purpose of this study, NGOs are narrowly defined. The studies of the general interaction between states and NGOs are reviewed. The literature about NGOs’ influence on states’ behaviors is also reviewed, focusing on how NGOs attempt to influence states’ specific policies. The foreign aid literature is also reviewed and analyzed.

As studying the foreign aid literature, I connect the study of foreign aid with the study of NGOs. The existing literature that deals with NGO influence on states' foreign aid is closely reviewed.

After reviewing the literature, I focus on trying to develop a theoretical understanding of state-NGO relationship in Chapter 3. The existing approaches of one-way state-NGO relations are first reviewed. Based on this relationship, I develop a dynamic theory of state-NGO relationship with focus on states' regime type and the maturity of NGOs. The main theoretical understanding of the function of NGOs is also developed. I argue that NGOs try to influence states' foreign policy behavior by functioning as information providers, lobbying groups, agenda setters and norm generators. NGOs have direct influence over states' foreign policy behaviors by providing information and putting pressure on their decisions. NGOs also try to achieve their main goal by raising the public awareness in order to change or maintain states' foreign policy behaviors.

Chapter 4 develops working hypotheses based on the theoretical understanding of state-NGO relations. It also shows research design, methods, and data collection processes. I collect new time-series cross-sectional data of NGO activities in developing countries. The main independent variables, which are the number, time, and weighted number of NGO activities, are newly collected. In addition, the variable that reflects the number of *New York Times* articles that cover developing countries is collected. The process of data collection is explained in detail. The amount of US foreign aid, the main dependent variable can be found in the OECD database. The other several control variables are added from various sources.

Based on research design, I conduct empirical studies and show the results in Chapter 5. Empirical studies in this chapter strongly support the working hypotheses. The more and longer US-based NGOs have field operations in developing countries, the more potential recipient countries receive foreign aid from the United States. In addition, the

more and longer US-based NGOs have field operations in developing countries, the more the media are likely to cover these countries since NGOs endeavor to influence the public through their projects and various activities. The positive relationship between media coverage and foreign aid is also shown in the results of empirical studies. The potential endogeneity problem is extensively tested. By adopting three different methodological approaches such as test of reverse causality, an instrumental approach, the Granger causality test, the causal mechanism between NGO activities and the amount of foreign aid is studied.

Chapter 6 shows the qualitative study of state-NGO relationships. This is also designed to test the potential endogeneity problem between states and NGOs. Interviews with people in the field are conducted. Questions about whether NGOs influence states or the other way around are mainly posed. Interviews with NGO staff, USAID officials, a reporter from the *New York Times* provide insight about the relationship between states and NGOs. Most of them agree that NGOs influence states' foreign policy behaviors, not the other way around. At the same time, they explained that the US government and US-based NGOs are working together as good partners in some areas. Interviews also confirm the theoretical understanding of NGOs' function as information providers, lobbying groups, agenda setters, and norm generators. Interviewees argue that NGOs attempt to influence the decisions of the US government directly and indirectly.

Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation. It first summarizes the main theoretical arguments and findings from empirical studies. The limitations of the study are also described. Based on the discussion of the dissertation, this chapter provides the future expansion of the study. With similar theoretical understanding and research design, this study can be applied to other fields of interests such as environmental problems and human rights issues. By including more countries such as China, European countries, South Korea, and Japan, the study can also be expanded. Studying NGOs in China and

their relationship with the Chinese government will contribute to the understanding of how different regime types can influence the state-NGO relationship.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This chapter first defines NGOs as actors in international politics. NGOs are defined according to several criteria in order to avoid any confusion with other international organizations. While the theoretical understanding of NGOs might be applied to other kinds of international NGOs, I primarily focus on international humanitarian NGOs in the field of international development in this study. After clearly defining NGOs, the existing studies of state-NGO relations are reviewed. The structure of this chapter follows the focus of the studies. First, I review the literature on the general interaction between states and NGOs. Second, the influence of NGOs on states' behaviors is examined. Third, before studying how NGOs influence states' foreign aid policies, I review the literature of foreign aid. Fourth, I review how scholars understand the influence of NGOs on states' foreign aid behaviors.

Through this chapter, I hope to understand the general and specific interaction between states and NGOs. While NGOs and states' foreign aid policies have similar goals, the relationship between two has not been sufficiently studied.

NGOs as Actors

The concept of NGOs can widely vary depending on how we define NGOs. The term, NGOs, can include myriad different kinds of organizations. Some people might think that private schools and hospitals are NGOs since they are non-governmental. Others consider terrorist groups as NGOs as they work independently. Even the same kinds of NGOs can also vary in terms of their size, purpose, organizational structure, and resources. For example, the Widernet project, which is a small local NGO located in Iowa, provides a digital library to developing countries, especially in Africa. With a small number of staff and volunteers, it strives to eradicate the digital gap between developed

and developing countries. World Vision International is widely known to the public. Functioning like multi-national corporations, its projects reach out to more than 100 countries in the world. Because of the variation among non-governmental organizations, it is important to understand and define NGOs before we set out to analyze NGOs.

Definition of NGOs from Literature

The World Bank (1992) defines NGOs as “many groups and institutions that are entirely or largely independent of government and that have primarily humanitarian or cooperative rather than commercial objectives”. Clarke (1998) defines NGOs as “private, non-profit, professional organizations, with a distinctive legal character, concerned with public welfare goals” (36). Willetts (2001) says that no generally accepted definition of NGOs exists, but there are three other generally accepted characteristics that exclude some organizations from being considered as NGOs. First, NGOs should not be political parties or governmental agencies. They should not be any institutions directly affiliated with any organizations of a government. In addition, they should not aim to achieve any political power through their activities. Second, they should not generate profit. Profit-making companies are not NGOs. Third, all criminal groups should be excluded from the definition of NGOs, although they do not belong to governments or private companies. NGOs should have a benevolent purpose. Ahmed and Potter (2006) also narrow the definition of NGOs by excluding government agencies, corporations, religious groups, political parties, private hospitals, schools, sports organizations, fraternal organizations, and terrorist groups.

Types of NGOs

There are different types of NGOs. The types of NGOs are classified by the level of organization, geographical location, and main purpose. Willetts (2001) categorizes NGOs as local, provincial, national, regional, and global NGOs, depending on their areas of project coverage. Local NGOs include organizations which have community-based programs and focus on smaller regions. National NGOs usually cover one nation.

Regional and global NGOs' projects cover more than one country. These international NGOs are often called INGOs. Until the early 1990s, there were not many NGOs operating internationally, so most of NGOs were national NGOs. However, in the 1990s, many international NGOs emerged and some of them cover more than 100 countries in the world. Depending on the level of organization, the activities of NGOs and their relations with the governments can vary. International NGOs usually have a greater range of projects, so they have more resources than local and provincial NGOs. They also tend to work with governments from multiple countries.

Figure 2.1 shows the trend of increased number of NGOs after the 1950s.² The Union of International Associations records that there are 26,789 international NGOs excluding inactive organizations. The number of NGOs has increased over the last decades. Before 1950, there were only a few international NGOs. However, the number of international NGOs has dramatically increased for the last several decades.

² The graph has been modified from the original table (Figure 1.2.1. (b) Trends in number of active international organizations) in the Yearbook of International Organizations, 2008-2009. The line shows polynomial curve.




Figure 1.1 Growth in the Number of NGOs

Geographical location is another criterion. Maslyukivska (1999) points out that people perceive NGOs differently depending on where they live. People in developed countries consider NGOs as any non-profit organizations to which they tend to donate money. However, people in developing countries understand that they can receive some benefits from NGOs. For example, in the United States, NGOs can be private voluntary organizations, and Americans are willing to donate money to help people in developing countries. However, in most African countries, NGOs refer to voluntary development organizations working to improve socio-economic conditions. Internationally, there is a gap between Northern and Southern NGOs. Northern NGOs usually indicate international NGOs that have international operations in the South, which are developing countries. Southern NGOs mostly indicate organizations that have local operations in developing countries. These Northern and Southern NGOs sometimes cooperate in terms

of their work and resources, but also sometimes have different points of view of changing people's lives. Hudock (1995) provides an example of different situations that Northern and Southern NGOs might face in the field. With case studies of Gambia and Sierra Leone, she explains that Southern NGOs in these two countries are very dependent on Northern NGOs in terms of resources and funding. The problem is that this dependency creates uncertainty for Southern NGOs. Southern NGOs can never predict whether Northern NGOs continue providing external funding for them since they have witnessed that some Northern NGOs cease to work because of sudden changes such as civil war, lack of infrastructure, currency devaluation, corruption, and poor relations with government. While Southern and local NGOs in these two countries need to deal with these sudden changes, Northern NGOs can avoid the difficulty caused by unstable situations by stopping field projects in these two countries. The way Northern and Southern NGOs deal with changing environments can be different even though they face the same situations.

Different types of NGOs can be decided by their main purpose. The World Bank divides NGOs into two categories: operational or advocacy NGOs. The main purpose of operational NGOs is the design and implementation of development-related projects. For example, Save the Children is an operational NGO. Save the Children, which is one of the largest and oldest NGOs, has many development-related projects in more than 120 countries. The main purpose of their projects is to improve socio-economic conditions in developing countries. NGOs in this category deliver services to people. For example, NGOs are operating healthcare services, delivering education programs, and providing micro-credit for the communities (Lewis 2007). Another category is advocacy NGOs. Their main purpose is to defend or promote a specific cause or policy. In general, NGOs which solely focus on advocacy work do not run any field operations. Rather, they attempt to change countries' specific policies such as human rights and environmental

issues. Amnesty International is an example of a NGO in this category. It has tried to change the paradigm of human rights in many countries over the last decades.

NGOs' Goals and Motives

In addition to the category of the main purpose of the NGOs, their main goals and motives may include relief, social and economic development, and political roles (Ahmed and Potter 2006). The working goals and motives of NGOs cover almost every area. The activities of NGOs are easily observable in emergency conditions. One of the recent examples is the earthquake in Haiti. When the earthquake occurred in January 2010, NGOs were among the first international actors who offered to help affected people. They provided tons of food and clothing for desperate people who had lost everything in the earthquake. The government of Haiti did not function to improve the situation, and the efforts of other nations were limited in comparison to the work performed by international NGOs. They acted expeditiously to provide emergency relief. The function of NGOs in disaster recovery was also evident when the deadly Indian Ocean Tsunami hit countries in Asia in 2004. Many relief experts were sent to India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. They provided first-aid, food, and shelters for victims. The involvement of NGOs in affected areas was evaluated as one of the most effective ways to deliver humanitarian relief (Cerny and Durham 2005).

In addition to the one-time relief, NGOs provide long-term humanitarian and development projects. The NGOs' goal of social and economic development is more related to long-term projects in developing countries. In order to improve and change developing countries' social and economic conditions, NGOs have many substantial projects related to economic development, education, public health, community-development, water sanitation, etc (Ahmed and Potter 2006). Catholic Relief Services, one of the largest US-based NGOs, provides mainly the services of public policy, agriculture, education, emergency response, food security, health, HIV and AIDS,

microfinance, peace-building, a social safety net, and water sanitation. Their long-term projects sometimes last for more than 20 years.

Many NGOs are also functioning to influence governments or other actors politically. These NGOs are mostly advocacy and lobbying groups as described previously. Their main goals are to change the policies of governments. Early human rights advocacy groups faced substantial resistance from many countries. The standards for human rights were not clearly articulated at that time (See Clark, Freidman, and Hochstetler 1998). However, many countries have come to work with human rights NGOs and respect their works. Human rights NGOs have worked in the four major areas of human rights activities: education, standard-setting, monitoring compliance with international standards, and enforcement (Smith, Pagnucco, and Lopez 1998). Environmental issues have a similar pattern to that of human rights. Environmental NGOs argue that governments should increase the regulations of corporations to improve environmental conditions. Some NGOs' goals are to monitor other actors such as states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). NGOs have closely worked with the World Bank. When the World Bank implements projects, NGOs not only cooperate but also monitor for proper implementation. The Narmada dam is an interesting example of NGOs' monitoring work on the World Bank's projects (Fisher 1995). When the Indian government received funding from the World Bank to construct the Narmada dam, local NGOs allied with international NGOs protested the project vociferously because of its impact on the environment and local people's lives. The World Bank withdrew from the project because of the large protests organized by NGOs and local people.

NGOs' Organizational Structure and Budget

While NGOs do not aim to generate any profits, they do act very similarly to for-profit corporations in terms of their organization and structure. The main difference between NGOs and for-profit organizations is the sources of income. NGOs' primary income mostly comes from their members, governments, private corporations,

foundations, and foreign sources. In order to raise funds for NGO activities, NGO leaders need to maintain the organizational structure for fundraising, marketing, strategy management, monitoring and evaluation systems, and accounting. The organizational structures of NGOs are very similar to those of for-profit organizations except the fact that they do not produce any tangible products. As the number of NGOs has increased over the last several decades, NGOs are now facing competitive pressures. Lindenberg (2003) describes that donors demand greater financial accountability and more concrete evidence of program impact. He also explain that it becomes difficult for small NGOs to keep pace with more efficient and larger NGOs which take advantage of economies of scale in marketing, operations, and services.

NGOs try to spend generated funding for their project, but they also need to spend for their own management. The contributors do not want NGOs to waste their money for NGOs' own sake. However, NGOs cannot avoid spending some funds for maintenance costs. These may include salaries for their personnel, office overhead, and marketing costs. As NGOs become bigger, they are more likely to raise more funds and spend less for maintenance. Smaller NGOs sometimes cannot raise adequate funds to pay their own bills. Catholic Relief Services seems to be one of the most efficient NGOs in the US. According to their annual report for 2009, they only spent 4.78% of their budget for support service.³ About 95% of the funding they raised in 2009 went directly to the poor in developing countries through various projects in the field. This efficiency is possible because of the amount of funding raised in each fiscal year and the proper management of its funding. Its total operating revenue was \$780,594 in 2009.

Defined NGOs

The main research question in this study is how NGOs influence states' foreign policy behaviors toward other countries, as stated in the previous chapter. More

³ CRS Annual Report is available at the website. (<http://www.crs.org>)

specifically, my analysis of states' behaviors focuses on how states provide foreign aid toward other states. Therefore, I need to focus on specific kinds of NGOs which might have an influence over states' foreign aid policies. In doing so, I can also exclude some organizations which are irrelevant to the purpose of this study.

Table 2.1 shows different categories of NGOs from existing literatures as explained previously. Out of these several criteria, I need to select specific categories of NGOs. First, I adopt all general characteristics of NGOs which are non-profit, independent, and benevolent. As I adopt these general criteria, I exclude multi-national corporations, any government-affiliated organizations, and terrorist or criminal organizations. Second, in terms of level of organization, I focus on international NGOs. As my research questions deal with states' foreign policy behaviors, I need to focus on NGOs which intend to influence states' foreign policy and act internationally. Local NGOs which focus on the improvement of homeless people in the city have little motivation to try to influence states' foreign policies. Rather, they are more interested in the change of domestic economic policies. Third, my analysis focuses on Northern NGOs, especially US-based NGOs. I hope to understand how US-based NGOs try to influence the US government, so I need to focus on the analysis of US-based NGOs. Fourth, in terms of main purpose and specific goals, I focus on humanitarian NGOs in the field of international relief and development. These NGOs are mostly operational NGOs, but they do have some advocacy works. As I only include NGOs in the field of international relief and development, I exclude other kinds of NGOs focusing on other issues, such as human rights and environments.

In this study, I focus on primarily on international humanitarian US-based NGOs. However, the theoretical understanding of this study can be applied to other kinds of international NGOs.

Table 2.1 Defined NGOs

Criteria	Categories	Defined NGOs
General Criteria	Non-profit, Independent, Benevolent	All Included
Level of Organization	Local, Provincial, National, Regional, Global	International (Global)
Geographical Location	North, South	United States (North)
Main Purpose	Operational, Advocacy	Operational, Advocacy
Specific Goals	Relief, Social and economic development, Political roles	Humanitarian (Relief and Development)

General Interaction between States and NGOs

In the study of International Relations, states have been typically identified as the central actors. Many theories assume that a state is a unitary actor and focus on the study of states. Besides states, international organizations, such as IGOs, have been widely studied as well. Mearsheimer (1994-95, 8) defines these international institutions as “sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other.” In the study of IGOs, states are still the main decision makers, so scholars still pay much more attention to the behaviors of states in the frame of international institutions. With the state-centric view of international politics, non-state actors have been somewhat neglected. As non-state actors such as NGOs, transnational networks and coalitions,

experts and epistemic communities, foundations, multinational corporations, multi-stakeholders, and social movements have gained more power over the last several decades, scholars began to study how these non-state actors influence world politics (Kans and Mingst 2010).

We might trace back to the modern study of non-state actors to the work of Deutsch et al (1957). They argue that the increase of transaction and communication among states can lead to a sense of community and collective identification among people. In spite of this study, scholars say that even in the post-World War II era NGOs were not the subject of systematic inquiry (Risse 2002). An analytic work on non-state actors arose during the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that time, the study of transnational relations focusing on non-state actors was developed. Nye and Keohane (1971, 332) define transnational relations as “the movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an intergovernmental organization.” They argue that non-state actors play a significant role in international affairs and they can be one of the main forces which can change state behaviors. They summarize the main effects of transnational actors into five categories: “attitude change, international pluralism, increases in constraints on states through dependence and interdependence, increases in the ability of certain governments to influence others, and the emergence of autonomous actors with private foreign policies that may deliberately oppose or impinge on state policies” (Nye and Keohane 1971, 337). Through transnational communication, the change of behavior in one country can affect attitude change of other countries. In addition, coordination among non-state actors can occur as they share common interests and values. They also argue that transnational organizations can become an instrument of powerful states as they depend on home government. Even though their definition of transnational actors includes a broad range of non-state actors, they point out that the conflict between transnational organization and their home government can emerge. Nye and Keohane (1974) narrow down their

definition of transnational relations by focusing on international activities of nongovernmental organizations and excluding sub-units of governments and international organizations. Huntington (1973) also emphasizes the importance of transnationalism. He explains that the global extension of the United States during the two decades after World War II was one of the principal sources of transnational organizational revolution. Due to social, economic, and technological modernization in western states, especially the United States, transnational organizations expanded rapidly. Nonetheless, during the early 1970s, Huntington (1973) did not anticipate the rapid increase of the influence of NGOs on world politics.

More interestingly, scholars have paid more attention to state-NGO relationships and how states and NGOs influence each other. There are no NGOs which can be absolutely free from the authority of the state since they reside and operate based on states. After the end of the Cold War, the number of NGOs increased significantly. Scholars then started to seriously consider systematic analysis of NGOs and state-NGO relationships. They believe that states can influence the existence and characteristics of NGOs. Risse-Kappen (1995) argues that three components of domestic structures, the state structure, the societal structure, and policy networks, can determine the variation in the policy impact of transnational actors such as NGOs. In addition, domestic structures can even have an impact on the characteristics of NGOs. By focusing on domestic structures, he insists that transnational actors face two obstacles when they want to influence national policies and national governments. First, they must obtain access to the political systems of national governments. Second, they should gain more support from the public. According to his arguments, domestic structure determines how difficult it is for transnational actors to influence governments. The more open or plural a society is, the easier it is for transnational actors to influence governmental policies. In the United States, which is one of the most open and plural societies, NGOs could easily access the political system and also more effectively persuade the public to support their activities.

In contrast, under authoritarian regimes such as that of China, NGOs are less likely to influence governments' decisions. Krasner (1995) also argues that the sovereign states are the most important component of the institutional environment within which NGOs function. Therefore, the domestic structure of states can influence NGOs and sometimes determine the nature of NGOs themselves.

Heins (2005) analyzes state-NGO relationships by using game-theoretical concepts. He says that there is a variation of state-NGO relationship depending on different times and countries. By treating states and NGOs as rational actors, he argues that NGOs have a mixed-motive game with the government. The value of NGOs and the government is partly harmonious and partly in conflict. For example, while the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has preference for non-war over war, it prefers coordination with war-making states to non-coordination. That is why the ICRC was willing to coordinate with war-making countries. He also describes that state-NGO relationships in the United States have changed depending on the different contexts. In their early development, US-based NGOs tended to implement projects by following orders from the US government. However, current major US-based NGOs have worked on maintaining a certain distance from the US government. In doing so, their activities in the field are not compromised by US foreign policies, and at the same time they can work with the US government in certain areas. Young (2000) attempts to conceptualize state-NGO relationships more comprehensively by defining them as either supplementary, complementary, or adversarial with comparative studies of different countries. He argues that in supplementary relations, NGOs can operate independently as a supplement to governments. In this case, NGOs are not influenced by governments. Rather, NGOs supplement the governments' activities in a certain area. For instance, when two countries do not build an official diplomatic relationship, NGOs from one country are willing to implement projects in the other country. In complementary relations, NGOs are good partners to governments. NGOs may work as complements to governments in a

particular relationship. For example, Young shows that Jewish international NGOs have been working closely with the Israeli government by raising funds and even functioning as diplomatic agents of Israel. In addition, many governments have been outsourcing more of their development aid delivery to NGOs (Werker and Ahmed 2007). The view of adversarial relations argues that NGOs can monitor governments and sometimes criticize their accountability to the public. Even in this adversarial relationship, NGOs can influence governments by criticizing their performance regarding certain issues. For instance, Japanese peace and human rights groups had an adversarial relationship with the Japanese government in the 1950s and 1960s (Young 2000).

Barnett (2005) reflects two defining features of state-NGO relationships in recent years. He states that “the purpose of humanitarianism is becoming politicized, and the organization of humanitarianism is becoming institutionalized.” (Barnett 2005, 723) Since the late 1980s when NGOs expanded their scale, scope, and significance of their activities, the purpose of NGOs has been politicized. NGOs are willing to cooperate with states which sometimes compromise NGOs’ founding principles. He also argues that NGOs do not aspire to maintain their basic principles such as neutrality, independence, and impartiality any more. Rather, they interact with states and politicize their agendas. In doing so, they seek to achieve their purpose much more effectively. He also emphasizes how humanitarian NGOs have institutionalized. With more resources from various international donors, they can expand their activities into more areas. However, the problem is that NGOs now consider their projects as a business. NGOs need to obtain more funding with secured sources. In addition, the system of accountability through monitoring and evaluation programs becomes important since donors want to know where the money goes. He implies that this transformation might be more effective for NGOs to achieve their goals, but this kind of interaction with states might compromise the principles and activities of NGOs.

NGOs' Influence on States' Behaviors

It seems evident that NGOs are somewhat constrained by states since NGOs are subject to the rule of states. NGOs do not possess any legal autonomy independent from the control of states. Nonetheless, NGOs have influenced states' behaviors in many different ways. Sociological institutionalists (Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez, and Boli 1987, Boli and Thomas 1999) and constructivists (Katzenstein 1996, Price 1997, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) share the belief that norms and world culture strongly influence state behaviors. Therefore, scholars in these fields focus on the study of how norms generated and distributed by transnational actors such as NGOs influence state behaviors.

Boli and Thomas (1999) understand NGOs as enactors and carriers of world culture. By identifying five global cultural principles embodied by NGOs, universalism, individualism, rational voluntaristic authority, rationalizing progress, and world citizenship, they argue that NGOs have played a key role in spreading cultural principles. According to their study, as a legitimate actor with cultural and symbolic influence over states, NGOs have been active in spreading world culture and in modifying state behaviors. Similar to sociological institutionalists, constructivists are also interested in how norms can change state behaviors and how NGOs function in the process of generating and disseminating norms.

The influence of NGOs on states' behaviors can be observed in many different areas. Without the activities of NGOs, states' behaviors might never be changed since the issues are sensitive to the interests of the governments. In the case of land mines, Price (1998) analyzes how NGOs promote the distribution of norms in order to change state behaviors. Norms of banning land mines, initially generated by a few international NGOs, accrued power in the international community, and states began to adopt the policy of banning land mines. Once this norm becomes internalized, its influence gains momentum. In the area of human rights, norms have strongly functioned as a main force in changing state behaviors. Hawkins (2002, 49) evaluates Chile's human rights movements as the

ones where “strong norms and strong networks together produce the most significant changes in targeted states”. Without strongly stabilized norms of human rights, substantial change in human rights conditions in Chile was not likely to occur. The women’s rights movement is another issue in which norms function as a strong force in changing state behaviors. According to Thompson (2002), women’s rights were virtually unknown in the 1970s in Chile. Norms of women’s rights such as women’s suffrage, equal opportunity of education, and marital rights were clearly different from human rights issues. NGOs and other international actors worked to institutionalize norms of women’s rights. In spite of their efforts, norms of women’s rights are not well internalized in some countries, especially non-western countries. Princen (2003) describes how the activities of NGOs change states’ behaviors in the ivory trade ban. Before the late 1980s, the ivory trade ban was beneficial business. The population of the elephant dropped from an estimated 1.3 million in 1979 to 625,000 in 1989. At that time, African elephants faced a significant threat to their existence. States were reluctant to put a ban on the ivory because of its popular demand and beneficial supply. Environmental NGOs played a key role in changing states’ behaviors and accomplished a global ban on the ivory trade. Princen (2003) analyzes that NGOs promote international actions by utilizing local resources and spreading advocacy works about the ban.

States’ Foreign Aid

Before we begin to analyze how NGOs can influence states’ foreign policies such as foreign aid policy, we need to understand how states provide foreign aid to other countries. In addition, we need to understand what other factors may influence decisions of foreign aid. The study of foreign aid has been extensively conducted by political scientists, but there is an on-going debate about foreign aid. Scholars seek to explain what causes donor states to provide more or less foreign aid. While some argue that donors’

interests determine foreign aid, others assert that recipients' needs are a more important factor.

Scholars, who consider donors' interests as one of the determinants of foreign aid, argue that foreign aid is only a tool that countries use to expand their influence over others (McKinlay and Little 1977, Hook 1995). McKinlay and Little (1977, 1979) argue that humanitarian factors do not significantly influence whether and how much foreign aid is provided by donor states. Rather, the foreign policy interests of the donor are an important factor that causes the donors to provide foreign aid. With US foreign aid, they test several interests of the donors such as development interests, overseas economic interests, security interests, power-political interests, and interest in political stability and democracy. They find out that hypotheses of security interests and power-political interests are strongly supported. It implies that US foreign aid is provided depending on the interest of the US.

Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor (1998) conduct a comparative empirical analysis of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish foreign aid policies toward African countries. They focus on these countries in order to understand the different characteristics of foreign aid given by these developed countries. They point out that the foreign aid of these countries has different purposes based on the backgrounds of the countries. For example, France has colonial ties with African countries and the US tries to hold a strategic hegemony. While each country's rationales and reasons of providing foreign aid are different, the study clearly denies that foreign aid is as an altruistic tool of foreign policy. Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor (1998) argue that, in general, the need of the recipients is not an important factor that determines the amount of foreign aid given by these countries.

The Two-good model also focuses on the interests of the donor. The donors want to achieve two goods through foreign aid. The first good is 'change', defined as the ability to change the status quo in desirable ways, and the second one is 'maintenance',

which is the ability to prevent changes in favored aspects of the status quo (Palmer, Wohlander and Morgan 2002). This model specifies that foreign aid is another tool for donors or developed countries to acquire more influence on recipients, mostly developing countries. This approach argues that foreign aid matches a donor country's foreign policy and reveals its policy preferences. Based on this approach, foreign aid is mostly decided by the donors' national interests and benefits.

Another approach of analyzing foreign aid asserts that humanitarian or idealistic factors, such as human rights, are more important in driving foreign aid than material factors. This approach is widely tested by using the case of US foreign aid (Lai 2003, Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998). This literature emphasizes the 'good' purpose of foreign aid to improve recipient countries' political and economic situations. According to this argument, the main factors in deciding the amount of foreign aid are the needs of recipient countries. Therefore, poor economic situations or bad societal conditions mainly determine how much foreign aid should be provided to recipient countries. Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) test these idealistic factors of foreign aid determinants with a cross-sectional time series dataset of US foreign aid allocation from 1977 through 1994. They focus on finding the difference of US foreign aid allocation between, during, and after the Cold War. They find out that security driven factors such as military alliances have become less critical after the Cold War when the US provides foreign aid. Rather, humanitarian factors such as recipients' need became much more important after the Cold War. For example, they show that the neediest states are receiving an increasing portion of US foreign aid after the Cold War.

Alesina and Dollar (2000) show mixed results of foreign aid determinants with the case of foreign aid provided by the US, Japan, France, and Germany. They argue that the patterns of foreign aid are decided by political and strategic consideration. At the same time, poor countries have received more foreign aid if these countries are former colonies of donor states. They also find significant differences in donor states' behavior

indicating that foreign aid provided by the US is strongly influenced by the interests in the Middle East. France tends to provide much more foreign aid if the recipients countries are former colonies and its political allies.

State-NGO Interaction in Foreign Aid

Scholars have also studied the more specific relationship between NGOs and governments in the field of foreign policy. NGOs have tried to put some pressure on certain foreign policies in order to achieve their goals and purposes. They know that states have much more resources and can implement the large scale of projects in developing countries. At the same time, governments have utilized NGOs to provide foreign development funds. With the criticism of foreign aid effectiveness, governments want to distribute foreign aid channeled through NGOs. Governments also want to use the expertise of NGOs in the field. Both NGOs and governments understand that they can achieve their goals more effectively through the cooperation.

Several studies show how states provide foreign aid through the activities of NGOs. Lewis (2007) shows that about five percent of all official aid was being channeled through NGOs by the second half of the 1990s. This trend has increased over the last several decades in many countries. While the United Kingdom provided only 1.4 percent of its official foreign aid through NGOs, it provided 3.6 percent in 1993. He also studies NGOs' role in the field of international aid as implementers, catalysts, and partners. As implementers, NGOs have mobilized resources to provide goods and services, either as a part of their own project or a contractor of governments. NGOs' role as implanter can be criticized since this NGO role can be abused by governments' interests in certain countries or regions. The role of catalyst focuses on NGOs' relationship with other actors. As NGOs are implementing projects, they can facilitate other developmental change among other actors. Empowerment projects done by NGOs can be a good example of how NGO activities can facilitate other changes in the communities. NGOs can also

function as a partner with governments and donors. Lewis (2007) also argues that NGOs can choose whether they want to actively involve with the project or not. It implies that partnership with government does not necessarily mean that NGOs are dependent on governments' resources and decisions. Through the partnership with governments, NGOs can effectively achieve their intended goals in developing countries.

There are also scholars who criticize NGOs working as an agent of international foreign aid donors. According to Edwards and Hulme (1996), there is no empirical evidence that foreign aid channeled through international and local NGOs is more effective in terms of performance, legitimacy, and accountability. Rather, NGOs' performances can be compromised as NGOs depend more on international foreign aid. Edwards (1999) also argues that northern NGOs have functioned as agents of international foreign aid. As an agent of foreign aid, NGOs have limitations on making a significant impact on socio-economic situations of developing countries. He suggests that NGOs need to function more actively as a vehicle of international cooperation by bridging developed and developing countries.

In order to understand the relationship between states and NGOs in the field of foreign aid, it might be helpful to consider the studies about the domestic politics of foreign aid. These studies show that domestic politics of donor countries are among the main determinants of foreign aid (Lancaster 2007). Different kinds of domestic groups such as interest groups or business groups have incentives to influence foreign aid policy in order to change other countries' economic or political situations. For example, multinational corporations may try to influence donor countries' foreign aid policy to open up the market of developing countries. If we treat NGOs as one of multiple domestic groups seeking to influence governments' foreign aid policy, NGOs can be treated as one of the domestic determinants of foreign aid.

Many developed countries have provided foreign aid for developing countries with the purpose of international development. NGOs which seek to promote

international development have a great incentive to mobilize foreign aid for developing countries. There are not enough studies about the relationship between NGOs and foreign aid, even though both are designed to help improve socio-economic situations in developing countries. It is necessary to understand how NGOs and governments interact with each other in order to achieve their goals more effectively. The relationship between NGOs and governments will be discussed more in depth, and theories about these two actors will be developed in the following chapters.

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, I first try to focus on the definition of NGOs. After defining the general characteristics of NGOs such as non-profit, independent, and benevolent organizations, I decide to focus on international humanitarian US-based NGOs for the study. Scholars have studied the state-NGO relationship from different perspectives. Because of state-centric views, some scholars are not concerned about NGOs. Others are interested in how NGOs generate norms and how norms influence states' behaviors. These theoretical approaches have tried to study NGOs' roles in the world and their relationship with states and other institutions.

In addition to the literature of NGO studies, I review the study of foreign aid. The field of foreign aid is widely studied by many political scientists. Scholars in this field have a debate about the role of foreign aid. Some argue that foreign aid is just a tool of donors while others insist that humanitarian factors mainly drive the amount of foreign aid given by donors. One of the main questions in this study is how NGOs can influence states' foreign policy behavior toward other states, especially the decision of foreign aid. While scholars have paid some attention to the state-NGO relationship, more theoretical and empirical understanding of the relations between these two is needed. The next chapter will develop more sophisticated theories about the relationship between NGOs and states.

CHAPTER III

THEORY AND MODELS

Introduction

Through this chapter, the theory and conceptual models are developed. The theoretical understanding of state-NGO relations in this chapter can contribute to the existing studies. First, I show the existing approaches of one-way state-NGO relations and develop a dynamic theory of state-NGO relations by considering states' regime type and NGOs' maturity. Depending on the NGOs' maturity and the state's regime type, NGOs can influence the states or the other way around. Second, I discuss how NGOs influence states directly and indirectly. Directly, NGOs function as lobbying groups and information providers to influence governments' decisions. Indirectly, they work as agenda setters and norm generators to influence the public. These theoretical arguments focus on the practical relations of NGOs with the government. Third, by dealing with foreign policies, the theory describes how NGOs can influence the relations among states. By analyzing the state-NGO relationships, we can also understand influence of NGOs over state's behavior toward other states. In addition to the theoretical understanding, these theories are conceptualized by graphic models. This chapter also states the general hypotheses for the study.

Problem of Endogeneity: One-way State-NGO Relations

When we study state-NGO relations, the issue of endogeneity should be considered. The existing studies about the influential direction of the state-NGO relations provide two different explanations. Scholars have typically focused on either top-down or bottom-up relationships between states and NGOs. First, the top-down approach argues that states influence NGOs by providing resources and controlling available funding. Tembo (2003) argues that NGOs function as a new imperialistic method of disseminating

powerful countries' values to developing countries. He posits that NGOs based in developed countries implement their projects in developing countries without respect or consideration for the local culture and needs. Their projects do not help local people improve their lives. Rather, they destroy traditional and cultural values in the villages and implant western values through their projects. This theory argues that NGOs merely reflect the interests of developed countries, showing that governments of developed countries fund many international NGOs. They also argue that the presence of NGOs can deepen the dependency of developing countries on outsiders, naming NGOs as new colonialists (Cohen, Kupcu and Khanna 2008). Therefore, from this perspective, NGOs are not sincerely concerned about developing countries' political and economic conditions. Rather, they sometimes make a negative impact on developing countries' political and economic development. US-based NGOs for promoting democracy such as National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, or International Foundation for Electoral Systems might have this kind of relationship with the US government. Many specific projects of these NGOs are designed to promote and stabilize democracy internationally, and they are primarily funded by USAID. While these NGOs' missions and intentions are benevolent with goals of promoting clean and transparent elections, the US government has an interest in promoting democracy in certain countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq to achieve its foreign policy goals.

In the bottom-up relationship, NGOs' decision-making processes are primarily independent from governments' decisions. In addition, NGOs attempt to influence governments in order to achieve their mission and goals in the field. NGOs are basically working for the altruistic purpose of improving human lives (Clarke 1998, Duffield 1997). The foundation of most NGOs is driven by the entrepreneur's ideals of changing the world. Therefore, their activities and projects are fundamentally designed to help people in need. There is little evidence that international NGOs are controlled by any governments or political entities. Most NGOs employ an independent decision-making

process and there is little or no chance that other political entities can intervene in their activities in a systematic way. Greenpeace is a good example of an independent NGO. It came into existence from the adventurous activity in which a small team of activists tried to protect a small island in Alaska from US underground nuclear testing. Greenpeace activities were often actually against the US government's policies and actions. It still does not solicit funds from private corporations or any governments in order to maintain its independence. According to its annual reports, its annual revenue was about \$25 million in 2008 and most of its revenue comes from contributions and donations from 2.8 million members worldwide.⁴

Dynamic State-NGO Relations:

NGOs' Maturity and States' Regime Type

Based on existing studies, it seems that states can strongly influence NGOs and vice versa. Therefore, it is very confusing to comprehend the direction of influence between states and NGOs. It is not easy to grasp the essence of the relationship between states and NGOs because state-NGO relations can vary depending on states' regime type and NGOs' maturity. These two factors substantially determine the dynamic state-NGO relationships.

First, from the existing studies of domestic structures' influence over the relationship between states and NGOs, it seems critical that we need to consider the regime type within which NGOs operate in order to understand state-NGO interactions. As described above, Risse-Kappen (1995) strongly argues that states' regime types influence the state-NGO relationship. In democratic systems, NGOs can influence governments' decisions more easily than in non-democratic systems.

Along with states' regime types, the maturity of NGOs in a country needs to be considered. Depending on the country, the maturity of NGOs as a group can be different.

⁴ Greenpeace Website (www.greenpeace.org)

The longer NGOs exist, the more independent they become from governmental control and the more influence they can achieve over governments' policies. In many democratic countries, NGOs' initial emergence was promoted by governments. Reimann (2006) shows that the early explosive development of NGOs after the Second World War was basically caused by developed countries' support for NGOs. Western governments have greatly supported nongovernmental activities in the early stage of NGO development. Without governments' direct and indirect support, it might be difficult or nearly impossible to see the emergence of international NGOs in developed countries. Huntington (1973) also explains that the US government was one of the main forces that drove the development of US-based international NGOs after the Second World War. Therefore, in the early stage of NGO emergence, NGOs cannot be independent from the influence of governments with respect to their funding, projects, and activities. In addition, due to governments' influence, they have a very limited impact on governments' policies. However, the longer NGOs exist, the more independent they become from governments by securing their own funding and increasing organizational power. CARE can serve as a good example of this trend. CARE, which is now one of the world's largest humanitarian NGOs based in the United States, was founded in 1945 in order to provide the US government's food packages for France. CARE was supported by the US government at that time, but has now become one of the most powerful and independent NGOs which attempt to influence the US governments' decisions concerning international development. For example, CARE has urged the US government to pass the Global Food Security Act and the FY2010 State and Foreign Operation bill.⁵ In doing so, it provides the web link by which the public can directly send emails to their Senators. CARE has in fact emerged because of the direct and indirect funding from the

⁵ CARE website (<http://www.care.org>)

US government. However, it continued their mission and expanded their projects after their initial missions were accomplished.

Many NGOs in non-democratic countries emerged because of governments' intentional support as well. Scholars (Naim 2007, Lu 2009) refer to these kinds of NGOs as 'Government Organized NGOs' (GONGOs). GONGOs exist in nearly every country regardless of regime type including the United States and France (Naim 2007). However, it is also true that most NGOs in non-democratic countries are basically GONGOs. GONGOs include the Myanmar Women's Affairs Federation, a Russian Youth Group, the Sudanese Human Rights Organizations, Saudi Arabia's International Islamic Relief Organizations, and the China Youth Development Foundation. There are several reasons why governments organize 'Nongovernment' organizations instead of government agencies. First, governments want to access private information and resources domestically or in the international community directly through GONGOs (DeMars 2005). As governments organize puppet organizations, they can act like NGOs and easily manipulate international NGOs' connections and resources. Second, governments hope to control the agenda through GONGOs and suppress any unexpected civil movements. Government-organized human rights groups in Sudan are a good example. As these GONGOs in Sudan try to mostly represent the human rights groups in Sudanese society, the Sudanese government can control or conceal real human rights abuses. Third, through GONGOs, governments want to advance their interests in their society or abroad (Naim 2007). When governments are not willing to overtly conduct any projects domestically or internationally or they are not qualified to do so, GONGOs can work to fulfill governmental missions instead of government agencies.

While GONGOs are dependent on governments in terms of funding and resources, they also have a great deal of autonomy as well. Lu (2009) develops the idea of 'dependent autonomy', stating that GONGOs in China have some level of autonomy despite their dependency on the Chinese government. According to her studies of NGOs

in China, Lu (2009, 43) asserts that GONGOs in China discover ways of increasing their level of autonomy “by using personal relations, by achieving financial independence, by finding powerful patrons and offering their supervisory agencies various benefits in exchange for more freedom”. According to Lu’s studies, GONGOs are clearly different from government agencies, so we need to understand the influence of NGOs in non-democratic systems separately. Moreover, while GONGOs in China have some level of autonomy, it does not necessarily mean that they can influence the Chinese government’s decisions. Because of their authoritarian regime, NGOs in China have limited influence over the Chinese government.

The dynamic state-NGO relationship can be represented as Figure 3.1. As Figure 3.1 illustrates, NGOs in both democratic and non-democratic systems do not significantly influence states at the early stage of development. Over time, NGOs’ influence over governments’ decisions and policies in democratic systems increases, but NGOs’ influence over non-democratic governments does not increase as much.




Figure 3.1 NGOs' Maturity and Influence over Governments

Direct NGOs' Influence on States
in Democratic and Non-democratic Systems

There are two kinds of interactions between NGOs and governments' foreign policies. The first avenue is direct interaction. NGOs have a direct relationship with governments. Their direct influence over states can be summarized by two conceptual roles: *Information Providers* and *Lobbying Groups*. Whether NGOs operate under democratic or non-democratic systems, NGOs can provide rich information for governments. For example, during the wars of the former Yugoslavia, the main source of information for international communities and other governments including the US government was relief or human rights workers from international NGOs (DeMars 2005). Western governments had very limited access to information about what was actually occurring in the former Yugoslavia. NGO workers were able to provide critical

information about the situation. Moreover, international human rights NGOs mainly provided information about Chilean human rights abuses in the 1970s (Hawkins 2002). Without the NGOs' information, the US government would not have had any information regarding serious human rights violations in Chile.

As Price (1998) focuses on normative change, he shows that NGOs can operate as information providers. First, he argues that NGOs generate issues by disseminating information. In the case of land mines, he shows that NGOs can even affect state behaviors regarding high politics, such as security policy. As transnational networks of civil society reveal information about the cruel reality of the victims of land mines, governments become more aware of the issues. In addition, NGOs try to establish networks with political and governmental officials. Through these networks, NGOs try to effectively influence governments' decision-making processes.

Moreover, under democratic systems, NGOs have a direct relationship with government officials and apply some pressure on governments' decisions. Within this direct relationship, NGOs can function as lobbying groups. Scholars believe that NGOs are similar to interest groups, defining them as one of many pressure groups (Willett 1982). It is true that NGOs sometimes operate like pressure groups, especially when they deal with the problems of the environment or human rights, applying pressure on national governments. The Boomerang pattern developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998) is one of the most representative models that show how NGOs function as lobbying groups. In this pattern, if the activities of NGOs to change government's policies in Country A are blocked by Country A's government, NGOs in Country A seek assistance from international NGOs. If NGOs in Country B are willing to assist NGOs in Country A, they attempt to apply substantial pressure on Country B's government. Because of the pressure from Country B's NGOs, the government of Country B ends up applying pressure on Country A to change its policies. In this model, Country A is usually a less democratized and developing country and Country B is a democratic and developed

country. Keck and Sikkink (1998) provide several empirical examples of this Boomerang pattern in the field of human rights, environmental problems, and violence against women. One of the examples is human rights violation in Argentina. The activities of human rights NGOs in Argentina built up the relationship with various international Human Rights NGOs. Amnesty International and groups staffed by Argentine political exiles provided detailed reports of human right violations and put some pressure on the government of the US. In 1977, the US government decided to reduce its military aid for Argentina based on the information provided by these international NGOs' network. After several incidents of diplomatic pressure from the US government, the human rights situation in Argentina improved significantly by 1978.

While NGOs can function as lobbying groups under both democratic and non-democratic systems, NGOs in non-democratic systems cannot truly function as lobbying groups. Rather, NGOs in non-democratic systems are strongly influenced by government decisions. The direction of the influence for NGOs in non-democratic systems is mostly from states to NGOs, not from NGOs to states. However, as the study of Chinese NGOs conducted by Lu (2009) shows, there is a possibility that GONGOs can influence government decisions in unexpected ways.

Indirect NGOs' Influence on States in Democratic and Non-democratic Systems

In both democratic and non-democratic systems, NGOs can influence governments indirectly through the public, functioning as *Agenda Setters* and *Norm Generators*. Based on the host state's regime type, NGOs' indirect influence over governments can vary. First, one of the main differences of NGOs' effect on governments in democratic and non-democratic systems is the public's influence over governments' foreign policies. Under a democratic system, governments are responsive to the public since decision-makers want to be reelected through the popular vote. There might be variation of the public's influence over governments' foreign policies within

non-democratic systems depending on different autocratic institutions (See Lai and Slater 2006). Nonetheless, we can say that non-democratic governments have less incentive to heed public opinion than democratic governments do. Second, NGOs in non-democratic countries have more limited access to the media in comparison to NGOs in democratic countries. The media is one of the best tools NGOs can utilize to advertise their missions and influence the public. The media in non-democratic countries are not as free as those in democratic countries. Rather, information from government-controlled media tends to be reported as propaganda (Van Belle 1997). Therefore, NGOs in non-democratic countries have a limited influence over the public. In non-democratic countries, the role of NGOs as agenda setters and norm generators can be limited. Although NGOs can influence the public through available sources by setting important agendas and generating norms, the public cannot successfully influence governments.

In the international community, NGOs have recently become one of the most persuasive agenda setters. It is true that NGOs clearly have a legitimacy problem. We are not sure whether and how these NGOs can represent public opinion. According to Bouget and Prouteau (2002), NGOs play a preeminent role in linking the public with the political process, and they are key actors in building the relationship between citizens and national governments. We have seen numerous cases in which NGOs try to persuade the public to support humanitarian needs. For example, they use prime time advertisements to send messages to the public. The Save Darfur Coalition, a network consisting of NGOs working for raising public awareness and mobilizing a response to the atrocities in Darfur, launched various advertisements in television, newspapers, and magazines. By showing the horrible reality of the Sudanese people and sending strong messages to help them, the Save Darfur Coalition successfully attracted the public attention in the United States. These kinds of activities by NGOs sometimes can change people's foreign policy preferences, which can influence the decisions of governments.

NGOs also function as norm generators. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) explain the norm life cycle. They assert that there are three stages of norm development: norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalization. In the norm emergence stage, norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states to accept new norms. In the second stage, the norm cascade, the norm leaders socialize other states and make them norm followers. In the last stage of internalization, norms acquire a “taken-for-granted quality” and everyone comes to accept the norm (895). Throughout these three stages, the role of NGOs has been emphasized. NGOs can be a norm entrepreneur to first raise an important issue. They can also persuade the public to accept a new norm. Once the public internalizes a new norm, governments must recognize that a new norm exists among their citizens.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) use the example of women’s suffrage. After the norm of women’s right for suffrage emerged in some western countries, it spread into other countries. Many other countries decided to adopt women’s suffrage because of international pressure. Once women’s suffrage norms had become internalized, few people now imagine that women do not possess the right to vote. Throughout the process of norm internalization, NGOs such as the American Woman Suffrage Association and the International Women’s Suffrage Association played a key role. Risse (1999) develops a similar model for the incorporation of international norms into domestic practices. His spiral model explains that international human rights norms can become domestic norms through five steps: repression, denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status, and rule-consistent behavior. In his model, states first strongly repress any kinds of activities related to human rights movements domestically and then deny any human rights violations. However, they gradually accept international norms because of pressure from transnational networks or other states. Finally, international norms become domestic norms. Risse (1999) also recognizes the important role of transnational networks of

NGOs, especially the international network of human rights NGOs. They eventually convince governments to accept the prevailing international norms.

Real-world Examples of

Direct and Indirect NGOs' Influence on States

Under democratic systems, it is common to observe NGOs functioning as information providers, lobbying groups, agenda setters, and norm generators. InterAction, which is one of the most representative networks of US-based NGOs and has 192 members, has maintained a strong relationship with the US government over the last two decades. After gathering information from their members, InterAction has provided a substantial recommendation and consultation for the reform of US foreign aid policies. According to InterAction, it has been annually invited to foreign aid committee meetings, providing detailed suggestions for foreign aid. It also has helped the US government deliver foreign aid in the field more effectively. Moreover, when a disaster strikes in other countries, InterAction provides first-hand information and works with the US government in order to distribute supplies donated by USAID or the public. Indirectly, through numerous publications, it has raised important agendas in the world. The members of InterAction also have used the public advertisements through the media to spread their messages about their activities and projects. By sending more messages through advertisements or any kinds of media, InterAction can affect the public opinion toward some important issues more easily. For example, whenever countries have a catastrophic disaster, InterAction has attempted to raise public awareness of the situation. When the Indian Ocean Tsunami hit the South-East Asian countries, InterAction provided information and publicized the situation about these countries. Through InterAction's activities, the public was able to understand the situation more clearly and was motivated to help victims of disasters.⁶

⁶ The detailed information about InterAction's activities can be found at its website: (<http://www.interaction.org>).

NGOs in non-democratic systems function mostly as information providers since they need to report their activities to the governmental officials. China Charity Federation (CCF) is one of a few officially approved NGOs in China. With strong support from the Chinese government, CCF has conducted many national and international humanitarian projects including the Indian Ocean Tsunami. When they conduct their projects, their detailed activities need to be reported to the Chinese government. As a GONGO in China, CCF has functioned as an information provider. In this case, CCF is strongly influenced by the Chinese government. Therefore, we can call the Chinese government a lobbying group in terms of its influence over Chinese NGOs. At first glance, it seems that NGOs in non-democratic systems possess a limited capacity to influence the public. However, they can influence non-democratic governments indirectly. According to Lu (2006), the China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF) initiated its trademark program, called Project Hope. This project became so popular among the Chinese public and mobilized tremendous public donations. When CYDF goes to the press and media, it shows and emphasizes the miserable lives of students who cannot go to school because of poverty. The messages through Project Hope, therefore, are mostly contradictory to statistics from the Department of Education, which usually shows high rates of attendance and literacy. CYDF eventually sets its own agenda and provides new paradigm of norms for the Chinese public. From this case, we can see that even under non-democratic systems, NGOs can function as agenda setters and norm generators.

The activities of Amnesty International have changed the norms and standards of human rights in both democratic and non-democratic systems. Amnesty International was founded in 1961 by a British lawyer who tried to protect two students held in Portuguese jails. Currently, it is one of the most influential and well-known NGOs in the world. People trust its human rights reports and believe that human rights standards need to be set up in more countries. Its reports for some countries sometimes change states' foreign aid policies and even diplomatic relationships (Clark 2001). When Amnesty International

strongly criticizes human rights issues in the US and China, the governments of these two states cannot just ignore its impact on diplomatic relationship with other countries and on the domestic public, since other countries and people pay attention to what Amnesty International says. It has truly functioned as a norm generator.

Models and General Hypotheses

Conceptual Models

Table 3.1 summarizes NGOs' influence over governments in democratic and non-democratic systems. As previously explained, NGOs can function as information providers, lobbying groups, agenda setters and norm generators. However, their functions can vary according to regime type. Under non-democratic systems, governments mainly influence NGOs. In addition, NGOs possess limited power as agenda setters and norm generators.

Table 3.1 NGOs' Role in Democratic and Non-democratic Systems

	NGOs' Role	Democratic System	Non-democratic System
Direct	Information Providers	Very Strong	Strong
	Lobbying Groups	NGOs to States	States to NGOs
Indirect	Agenda Setters	Very Strong	Moderate
	Norm Generators	Very Strong	Limited

Based on these direct and indirect ways for NGOs to influence governments, I develop a theory to explain the relationship between state behaviors and NGOs in democratic and non-democratic systems. Through these models, I hope to understand how international NGOs affect governments' behaviors toward other states. As shown in Figure 3.2 and 3.3, we can see how international NGOs work as the bridge linking two countries.




Figure 3.2 A Model of State-NGO relations in Non-democratic Systems




Figure 3.3 A Model of State-NGO Relations in Democratic Systems

These models generally explain how NGOs influence state behaviors toward other states directly and indirectly in democratic and non-democratic systems. While a similar model is used, NGOs' function in non-democratic systems is different from that of the NGOs in democratic systems. Figure 3.2 shows the state-NGO relationship in non-democratic systems. Governments create and support NGOs. With specific missions given by authoritarian governments, NGOs enter other countries and implement their projects in these countries. While they implement their projects, governments also have similar interactions with these countries where NGOs are operating. While NGOs work in these countries, they may develop their own agendas or different opinions about these countries from the opinions held by their governments, so they may try to influence the public or government. In contrast to the influence of the government over NGOs, there is a weak influence from NGOs on the governments of non-democratic systems. That is why the direct and indirect influence from NGOs on the government is represented by a dotted line. The public in non-democratic systems have also a weak influence over the government's decisions.

Figure 3.3 explains how NGOs in democratic systems influence governments. In step 1, internationally-operating NGOs have interaction with developing countries. They may have field offices or be initiating projects in developing countries. Through various activities, NGOs become aware of the situations of developing countries. Through this interaction with developing countries, NGOs endeavor to influence host governments' foreign policy decisions in the field of their specialties in order to more effectively achieve their missions and goals in developing countries. In addition, NGOs may attempt to influence public opinion to promote their projects since they understand that public opinion can influence government policy under a democratic regime. This is what happens in step 2. In step 3, host governments change their foreign policy behaviors toward other states because of NGOs' information, lobbying, and pressure from the public caused by NGOs.

Number and Time Periods of NGO Activities

When we consider this relationship between NGOs and governments' foreign policy, we need to pay significant attention to the number of NGOs and the longevity of NGO activities in developing countries. The level of direct and indirect influence of NGOs can be moderated by these two factors. It means that these two factors are essential to determine the level of NGOs' function as information providers, lobbying groups, agenda setters, and norm generators.

The number of NGOs might represent the level of NGOs' capability as a group in developing countries and host countries. As information providers, more NGOs working in a developing country can gather more information about that country. It means that the larger number of NGOs in developing countries can provide more information to the governments of host countries. More NGOs can also cover larger areas and provide service for larger populations in a country. In addition, they may have various kinds of projects in the field of development covering education, poverty relief, and community development. While these NGOs are conducting their projects, they are able to gather a larger amount of information.

Cooperation among NGOs is another reason why the number of NGOs is an important factor to gauge the level of NGOs' strength. There might be a conflict among NGOs if there is a large number of NGOs in developing countries. However, NGOs tend to cooperate with each other in the field and in host countries since cooperation among them helps achieve their missions. Cooperation among NGOs can be easily observed in the field. For example, there are many NGO forums in developing countries. Through these forums, NGOs share their projects' results and exchange information about the field. One of these forums is the NGO Forum on Cambodia. It is a membership organization among local and international NGOs in Cambodia with the purpose of sharing information, facilitating cooperation, and generating debate and advocacy on development issues. The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) is

another example of cooperation of NGOs in the field. It was created in response to the demand from many national and international humanitarian organizations which want to provide humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. As international NGOs share information about their projects in Afghanistan, they can effectively fulfill their projects. This network for NGOs also interacts with governmental agencies as well as with international organizations.

The reason why NGOs tend to cooperate in the field is that this kind of networking among NGOs can make them achieve their mission and goals much more effectively. As lobbying groups, the larger number of NGOs can influence the host governments' foreign policy behaviors more easily. Networking and cooperation among NGOs in the host countries can occur because more NGOs can have more power in influencing the foreign policy behaviors of governments. The number of NGOs in the field is also important when we deal with the indirect influence of NGOs. The more NGOs exist in a country, the easier it is for NGOs to influence the public about that country. Through large numbers of activities in developing countries, NGOs can make the public realize the critical socio-economic issues that developing countries are facing.

In addition to the number of NGO activities in the field, the longevity of NGO activities can also strengthen NGOs' function as information providers since they can provide more information with more experience in a country. As NGOs operate longer in developing countries, they come to understand the local situation and have more incentive to extend more effort to improve the current situation. With information and incentive, NGOs have a strong tendency to work as lobbying groups. As NGOs stay longer in a country, they tend to develop various agendas regarding the country's development and socio-economic conditions. This tendency can strengthen NGOs' function as agenda setters and norm generators.

Moreover, the longevity of NGO activities is related to the organizational strength of NGOs and the level of resources that NGOs can mobilize. As NGOs' projects exist for

an extended time, the project can be more stabilized with more available resources. NGOs' personnel can work more efficiently with stabilized field operations and also utilize existing networks with local people and governmental officers in developing countries. Even though the activities of interest groups and NGOs are distinct, their attempt to influence governments' policy can be similar. The literature of interest groups also emphasizes the importance of organizational structure stabilized over time. The level of an interest group's power is mainly determined by its membership size, financial resources, leadership, and cohesiveness (Schmidt, Shelley, and Bardes 2009). These factors can become stronger as interest groups have existed longer. This theoretical understanding of interest groups can be applied to NGO field operations. For example, CARE established its office in Uganda in 1969. While CARE was forced to suspend its activities during the reign of Idi Amin for about seven years, it has had field operations for more than 40 years. It has established its offices, available resources, and networks with local people over the last 40 years. It also has much more experience with local people and culture. We can easily imagine that CARE has much more effective project management than the other newly established NGO projects in Uganda.

Based on the theoretical understanding of state-NGO relations and models developed earlier, I have these six general hypotheses as follows.

Number of NGO Activities:

General Hypothesis 1: The more NGOs from developed countries that are operating in developing countries, the more efficiently they alter the host governments' foreign policy toward these developing countries.

General Hypothesis 2: The more NGOs from developed countries that are operating in developing countries, the more NGOs try to influence public opinion in their host country.

Time of NGO Activities:

General Hypothesis 3: The longer NGOs operate in developing countries, the larger their effect on host governments' foreign policy behaviors.

General Hypothesis 4: The longer NGOs operate in developing countries, the more NGOs try to influence public awareness about developing countries in their host country.

NGOs' Maturity:

General Hypothesis 5: The longer NGOs exist, the more they can be independent from governmental control and the more influence they can achieve over governments' policies.

Regime Type:

General Hypothesis 6: NGOs in democratic systems can influence governments' foreign policy decisions more easily than in non-democratic systems.

Case Selection and Contribution of Study

In order to understand the relationship between NGOs and states' foreign policies, it might be ideal to conduct empirical research with a large number of countries' foreign policies and NGOs based on many countries. However, studying many countries' foreign policies and NGOs might be too time-consuming to conduct. It is also true that data availability may definitely constrain the range and scope of projects. Therefore, I decide to study foreign aid policies of the United States and US-based NGOs for this project.

There are several reasons why I choose the US as my main case. First, the US has been one of the biggest donors among developed countries in terms of the absolute amount of foreign aid. According to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the US has provided the largest amount of Official Development

Assistance (ODA) followed by Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Spain. For foreign aid in 2008, the US provided \$ 24,422 million. The total amount of foreign aid provided by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries in 2008 was \$ 98,523 million. This shows that the US alone provided about 24% of total amount of ODA provided by DAC countries. If we consider the size of the economy, the US might not provide as much as some European countries such as the Netherlands. However, in terms of impact made by foreign aid, US foreign aid has made a significant effect on developing countries' economies. Second, the impact of US-based NGOs might be one of the largest among NGOs based on other developed countries. In terms of number of NGOs based on the US, there are more than 8,000 registered NGOs in the field of international development and relief according to the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS).⁷ These NGOs have annual revenue of \$ 17,629 million in 2008. There is no other single country that has more international NGOs than the US. Third, I can access the data of US foreign policies and US-based NGOs much more easily compared to other countries such as China or Japan. The amount of ODA provided by the US can be easily accessed. It might take a significant amount of time to analyze the activities of US-based NGOs, but it is feasible to conduct if we only study US-based NGOs, not other countries' NGOs. Studying multiple countries' foreign aid and NGO activities might be a future project with more time and resources. While we limit the scope of study, understanding the US foreign policy and US-based NGOs will be a great asset, considering their impact on the world's politics and economy.

In this chapter, I develop theoretical explanations of the relationship between NGOs and states depending on states' regime type with hypothesis 6. While hypothesis 6 is developed based on the theoretical understanding of the relationship between states and NGOs, it might not easy to test these hypotheses with valid empirical methods. In order

⁷ Detailed information about NCCS and the number of registered NGOs will be provided in Chapter 4.

to test this hypothesis, I need significant variations among cases. As I explained already, it is very time-consuming to test this hypothesis with multiple cases. The main difficulty is to collect data about NGOs based on non-democratic systems. In addition, non-democratic countries such China do not officially open up data of their foreign aid. In addition, there are limitations on the analysis of the activities of NGOs based on these non-democratic countries because the information about these NGOs cannot be easily accessed. With these limitations, I will focus on testing other general hypotheses except hypotheses 6.

The theoretical understanding of this study can greatly contribute to the study of state-NGO relations. First, this study tries to understand the dynamic relationship between states and NGOs. We have to consider the different relationship between NGOs and states depending on their situation. Regime type and the maturity of NGOs seem to be important factors that determine the state-NGO relations. Even though I cannot really test how regime type influences the state-NGO relations, the influence of NGO maturity can be studied. Second, the theory tries to understand the state's behavior toward other states. Many NGO studies deal with domestic influence of NGOs over the governmental policies. The theory developed in this chapter pays more attention to the function of NGOs as the bridge between developed countries and developing countries. Third, the theory pays more attention to the practical aspect of NGOs' interaction with the government. Until now, we do not really understand how NGOs interact with the home country's government. By explaining the function of NGOs as four different categories, we can understand the practical interaction between NGOs and the government.

Conclusion

While reviewing the existing literature, I develop general theories to understand the relationship between NGOs and states. I seek to understand what factors influence state-NGO relationship. States' regime type and NGOs' maturity seem to be two main

factors in deciding their relationship. Under a democratic system, NGOs tend to be more independent and to influence states' foreign policy. In contrast, NGOs based in non-democratic countries seem to be more controlled by states. Maturity of NGOs as an organization is also an important factor. As NGOs exist longer, they can secure their financial resources and stabilize organizational structures.

In addition to these two factors, I focus on NGOs' direct and indirect influence over state's foreign policy decisions. Directly, NGOs try to influence states' foreign policy functioning as information providers and lobbying groups. NGOs' function as information providers and lobbying groups can be supported by many existing studies and real world examples. By providing information for the government, NGOs have a substantive impact on the government's decisions. With information from the field, NGOs also put some pressure on states' decisions functioning as if they were lobbying groups or sometimes interest groups. Indirectly, NGOs have functioned as agenda setters and norm generators. As NGOs have projects all over the world, they have set new agendas and generated new norms. NGOs have gained a significant trust among the public. The indirect influence through the public can change the host government's foreign policy toward other countries. NGOs function as information providers, lobbying groups, agenda setters, and norm generators are well supported by NGO activities in the field of international development.

In order to test the direct and indirect influence of NGOs over state's foreign policy decisions, the number and time periods of NGOs' field operations are also important factors. As more NGOs have operations in the field, they can influence home countries' foreign policy more effectively. In addition, as NGOs stay longer in developing countries, they tend to have more stabilized field operations with strong networks of local people and governmental officers. Therefore, hypotheses, which test the number and time periods of NGOs' field operations, are developed.

The general hypotheses developed in this chapter will be empirically tested in the next two chapters. The general theories developed in this chapter can be applied to other countries with different regime type and different history of NGOs' existence. In order to conduct empirical studies with many cases, it is required to have more time and resources as well as data. With limited data availability, I will only focus on the case of the United States. In the next chapter, I will explain how I collect data and conduct empirical studies.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH DESIGN – HYPOTHESES, METHODS, AND DATA

Introduction

This chapter describes research design, methods, and data collection. It first starts with a discussion of how my theoretical models can be applied to the field of international development and foreign aid. With a more narrow definition of NGOs, working hypotheses about the direct and indirect influence of NGOs over governments' foreign aid policies are stated. Methodological approaches such as fixed-effects, random-effects, and random-effects Tobit models used in the empirical studies are explained. I also provide detailed sources of all variables used in my empirical analyses. In addition, the process of data collection for the number of US-based NGO activities in developing countries is explained as well. My approach goes beyond traditional NGO studies by considering the linkage between where NGOs conduct field operations and their host governments' foreign policy. This helps us see more carefully how NGOs influence states' foreign policy decisions.

Narrowly Defined NGOs

As discussed in detail previously, I define NGOs narrowly for this study. It is necessary to review what definition of NGOs I use for the empirical studies since a different definition can cause confusion and include many different kinds of non-profit organizations. These different kinds of non-profit organizations do not share the same characteristics as other organizations. In addition, their purposes and activities are very distinct. Therefore, I only include specific kind of NGOs for empirical studies applied to the field of international development. NGOs which satisfy the following three criteria are used for my empirical studies. The first criterion is from the definition that the World Bank uses. This criterion excludes any organizations affiliated directly with any

governmental agencies and for-profit organizations which are non-governmental organizations. The second one is about NGOs' main purpose and specific goals which are related to international development. As I try to apply my theoretical arguments to the field of international development, I need to exclude NGOs that focus on different issue areas such as human rights and environment. This narrows down the range of NGOs that my empirical studies deal with. The third one is the range of NGO activities. I only include NGOs based in the United States since my case focuses on the case of the United States. Even though there are many European NGOs making a great impact on international development, I exclude them for my empirical studies. Fourth, I only deal with the largest NGOs. More specific criteria of selecting largest NGOs will be provided later when I explain the process of data collection. I only include NGOs that have more than \$10 million in assets. The reason why I only deal with the largest NGOs is that studying all US-based humanitarian NGOs is practically impossible. In addition, large NGOs usually have more resources and power to have significant interactions with the government. They also provide enough information about their activities to the public to make data collection feasible.

Criteria:

- 1) NGOs are non-profit organizations that are largely or entirely independent of government.
- 2) The main purpose of their activities is humanitarian or international development.
- 3) They are based in the US and their activities are internationally operated.
- 4) I include only NGOs that have more than \$10 million in assets.

Working Hypotheses

According to the conceptual models developed earlier, there are three steps to explain how activities of international humanitarian NGOs influence donor states' foreign aid decisions. Now, I hope to apply this conceptual model to the field of international development and foreign aid. Figure 4.1 describes how conceptual model can be applied to the case of foreign aid.




Figure 4.1 Application of Model of State-NGO Relations in Democratic Systems

In Step 1, international NGOs gather information about recipient countries through their projects in the field. As they deploy field workers in developing countries, they are more likely to understand the current situations regarding development in those countries. The longer NGOs have projects in developing countries, the more they gather information and clearly understand the situation. Developing countries are also willing to help workers from NGOs in order to obtain more international assistance. In Step 2, NGOs interact with donor governments. As described above, NGOs have two ways of interacting with the governments of donor states. They might have a substantial

relationship with governments or they can mobilize the public. As information providers, NGOs can use their direct relationship with states to provide more, precise information about recipient countries. In addition, NGOs as lobbying groups can apply some pressure on donor countries to assist recipient countries. Indirectly, NGOs as agenda setters can raise critical issues that developing countries face, so they mobilize the public to apply substantial pressure on donor countries' decisions about foreign aid. NGOs may generate some normative issues among people in developed countries which can funnel more foreign aid toward certain countries. Finally, in Step 3, donor countries provide foreign aid to recipient countries in response to direct and indirect influence of NGOs.

According to the conceptual models developed earlier, the activities of NGOs in developing countries funnel more foreign aid from the United States because of direct and indirect influence of NGOs. Direct influence of NGOs toward the US government can be modeled with the number and time period of NGO activities and the amount of US foreign aid. As explained with the general hypotheses about the direct influence of NGOs on the US government, the higher number of US-based NGO activities in developing countries are more likely to increase the amount of US foreign aid given to these countries. In addition, the longer NGO field operations exist in developing countries, the more US foreign is given to these countries. I also have a working hypothesis regarding the maturity of NGOs. As NGOs exist longer in the United States, they can influence the foreign aid policies of the US government more. Different NGO may have different impact on the US government's foreign aid policies depending on their organizational strength. For example, while CARE was founded in 1945, Food for the Poor was established in 1982. Even though these NGOs start their program in a country at the same year, their impact of projects and influence over the US government can be very different. With more resources and established structure, CARE might have more influence over the US government.

For the indirect influence of NGOs on the US government, it is not easy to conceptualize and measure the influence of NGOs on the public as the general hypotheses state. Even though I can argue that NGOs try to influence the public theoretically, it is difficult to measure the impact of NGOs on the public. There are many factors that decide public awareness about social issues. Media coverage is one of the most important factors that decide and change public awareness. McCombs (2004) emphasizes the important role of the news media as an agenda-setter and argue that the news media can set the agenda for public thought and discussion. He also summarizes the empirical evidence that shows the strong relationship between the new media and public awareness. He explained that there are more than 300 published studies worldwide which documented the media's influence on the public, from the US presidential elections to a local election in Japan. Many empirical works such as public opinion in Louisville have been conducted to test the relationship between politics in the US and the American public. Based on this empirical evidence, I have decided to gauge the impact of NGOs on the public by measuring the media coverage. This means that NGOs try to publicize their works through the media in order to influence public awareness. By influencing the public, NGOs can indirectly influence the foreign policies of the US government. Using the media coverage as the measure of the public awareness can be controversial, but I might consider it as one of the best available options.

It is also necessary to empirically show that the media coverage and public awareness can influence the foreign policy of the US. Van Belle (2003) conducts extensive studies about how media coverage influences the allocation of US foreign aid. He compares the influence of the *New York Times* and network television coverage on foreign aid allocation. With empirical studies, he shows that bureaucracies tend to respond to media coverage, so news media is one of the main determinants of US foreign aid allocation. This argument needs to be tested in order to show the indirect influence of NGOs on governments' foreign aid decisions.

By applying US-based NGOs in the field of international development to the conceptual models, we have these hypotheses as follows.

Working Hypothesis 1 (Direct Influence): As the number of US-based NGO field operations in a potential recipient country increases, the amount of foreign aid sent from the US government to the recipient country increases.

Working Hypothesis 2 (Direct Influence): The longer US-based NGO field operations in a potential recipient country exist, the more the US government provides foreign aid for the recipient country.

Working Hypothesis 3 (Direct Influence): The longer NGOs exist in the United States, the more influence they can achieve over the foreign aid policies of the US government.

Working Hypothesis 4 (Indirect Influence): As the number of US-based NGO field operations in a potential recipient country increases, the media coverage of this country increases because of NGOs' attempt to influence the public.

Working Hypothesis 5 (Indirect Influence): The longer US-based NGO field operations in a potential recipient country exist, the more the media covers the country because of NGOs' attempt to influence the public.

Working Hypothesis 6 (Indirect Influence): The more the media covers the country, the more the US government provides foreign aid for the recipient country.

Methods

Quantitative study

In order to test the direct influence of NGOs for the US case, a large N quantitative study is used with US foreign aid as the dependent variable. I have collected time-series cross-sectional data with US foreign aid as the dependent variable and the activities of US-based NGOs in developing countries as a main independent variable.

This dataset covers 155 countries over the 1960-2008 time periods. The unit of analysis is the country year. There are two important characteristics of the dataset. First, it is a time-series cross-sectional dataset. It has 155 cross sections with countries, and the number of time periods is 49. Second, it has the amount of US foreign aid as the dependent variable. In principle, the amount of US foreign aid cannot be negative, so we have a limited range of the dependent variable.⁸

When scholars conduct empirical studies with time-series cross-sectional data with foreign aid as a dependent variable, they have not agreed on any common methods, instead adopting various methods (Van Belle 2003). The cross-sectional information is reflected in the differences between units, and the time-series information is reflected in the changes within units over time (Greene 1993). The observations in the time-series cross-sectional dataset are not independent, and we need to have more accurate parameter estimates because of the repetition. When the observations are not independent, ordinary least square (OLS) estimates can produce biased estimates. In addition, testing models of US foreign aid with 155 countries and 49 time periods can increase the probability of serial dependence in the residuals. There is also a possibility that there is greater or lesser variance in the error terms for some countries than others (McGillivray 2003). Considering the methodological problems, the employment of classic OLS cannot deal with the dataset that I use.

In order to consider this characteristic of time-series cross-sectional data with US foreign aid as a main dependent variable, the two most widely used models, fixed-effects and random-effects models, are considered. According to Greene (1993), fixed-effects models or random-effects models can account for repetition which generally occurs from time-series cross-national data. Greene (1993) explains fixed-effects and random-effects as follows. He first shows the equation representing fixed-effects models.

⁸ There will be more explanation about the negative amount of foreign aid used in this study in the data section.

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta' \mathbf{x}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

(Eq. 4.1)⁹

In Equation 4.1, y_{it} and \mathbf{x}_{it} represents a dependent variable and independent variables. α_i represents the individual effects which are taken to be constant over time and specific to the individual cross-sectional unit. In addition, ε_{it} represents the error term. Different from a fixed-effects model, a random-effects model can be represented as follows:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta' \mathbf{x}_{it} + v_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

(Eq. 4.2)¹⁰

In this equation, v_i represents the random disturbance characterizing the i th observation and is constant through time. As shown in Equation 4.1 and 4.2, fixed-effects models treat unit or individual effects as fixed while random-effect models treat them as random. Fixed-effects models are conditionally analyzed on the effects present in the observed sample. The random-effects models have a strong assumption that the individual effects are uncorrelated with other regressors.

It seems to make more sense to use fixed-effect models with the dataset that I use for empirical analyses since countries in the dataset are not samples drawn from a large population. Greene (1993) also argues that the fixed-effect model is a reasonable approach when we deal with inter-country comparison which includes the full set of countries. However, the fixed-effects models also have several disadvantages such as lost degrees of freedom. Based on advantages and disadvantages of these two models, I use

⁹ The equation is directly adopted from the equation of 16-32 from Greene (1993, 465).

¹⁰ The equation is directly adopted from the equation of 16-44 from Greene (1993, 469).

these two models together and compare the results from these two models. The Generalized Least Squares (GLS) random-effects and fixed-effects within regressions are employed and compared with each other.

Dealing with a positive amount of US foreign aid, I also adopt the random effects Tobit models. Many scholars agree that any empirical analysis that has foreign aid as a dependent variable should address the fact that not only do countries receive different amounts of aid, but also some countries do not receive any aid at all from the US (Neumayer 2003). The Tobit model refers to censored or truncated regression models in which the range of the dependent variable is constrained in some way. We have many observations where US foreign aid is zero. Since this feature destroys the linearity assumption, the ordinary least squares methods cannot properly deal with this dependent variable (Amemiya 1984). Tobin (1958) developed a statistical method to address this issue and named it the Tobit model. The Tobit model describes a two-stage decision making process in the context of aid allocation. In the first stage, the US government decides who will receive foreign aid, and then in the second stage, it decides how much foreign aid will be allocated to each country (McGillivray 2003). As two stages exist in foreign aid, the Tobit model can deal with this issue. The random-effects Tobit model is useful in considering the characteristics of US foreign aid data, and it has been widely used by scholars who study foreign aid as a dependent variable (Alesina and Weder 2002, McGillivray 2003, Dollar and Levin 2006).

To test the indirect influence of NGOs for the US case, these three models, the generalized least squares analysis of random-effects and fixed effects models, and Tobit Models, are also employed because this dataset is also time-series cross-sectional. The process of determining media coverage can be similar to the one of foreign aid decision since some countries may not receive any media attention at all. Here, the media make a similar decision as the US government's decision regarding foreign aid allocation. They first judge whether they should cover some countries. Once the media decide to pay

attention to these countries, they may cover them more in a given year. The number of articles that cover these countries can increase after their initial media coverage. While the mechanism of media coverage can be interpreted as discussed, scholars tend to use the GLS analysis of a random-effects model when they test media coverage (Van Belle 2003). Therefore, the GLS model is also employed to test the indirect influence of NGO. Since the random-effects model has the disadvantage of having strong assumptions, the fixed-effects model is adopted as well. The results of these three methods can be compared.

Data – Test of Direct Influence

Main Independent Variable (Number of US-based NGO Activities): I collected time-series cross-national data of US-based NGO activities in developing countries. This dataset covers 155 countries covering the period 1960-2008. As there is currently no time-series cross-national dataset, constructing this dataset was a great challenge. While it was a very time-consuming job, I believe that this dataset provides enormous potential for future projects. In addition, developing this dataset will greatly assist other scholars in conducting similar kinds of projects. I have considered several potential sources which lead to the construction of time-series dataset about the activities of US-based NGOs in developing countries.

First, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provides a dataset of NGO activities.¹¹ The USAID database shows the most current activities of registered private voluntary organizations in foreign countries. It now shows 586 registered private voluntary organizations and provides a dataset about the number of US-based NGO activities in developing countries. Even though this does not cover all NGOs in the US, it represents the largest and most important international NGOs in the US.

¹¹ USAID Website (<http://intranet.dimen-intl.com/usaid/index.html>)

However, after contacting USAID, it turns out that their database started only several years ago, so it does not cover the last several decades. Second, InterAction provides information about where their members have activities.¹² Although it only covers 192 NGOs, their members are very influential NGOs in the United States. Therefore, this information can represent the activities of US-based NGOs. Unfortunately, it does not have all of their members' activities because it receives self-reported data from its members. In addition, it does not have a time-series cross-national dataset. Third, the Yearbook of International Organizations provides the member country of almost all NGOs in the world. It has a comprehensive list of NGOs in the world, and I am able to count only the number of country members of US-based NGOs. However, it does not have specific information about where US-based NGOs have had foreign projects over the past decades. When I contacted the publisher, they replied that the information about NGOs' specific projects is the one that the Yearbook does not have, even though many people have inquired about it.

After considering several potential sources and facing some failure, I decided to take the largest NGOs in the US and trace back how many projects they have had in developing countries for the last several decades. Most large NGOs publish their annual reports and provide the information about their activities in the world. Through their annual reports, I can construct the dataset about how many activities the largest NGOs have in developing countries. In addition, most NGOs are willing to publicize their work in foreign countries and have informative websites about their foreign projects.

Before starting to collect the data, I needed to construct a list of the largest NGOs in the US. The National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) provides a comprehensive list of US-based NGOs registered to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). NGOs need to register with the IRS in order to receive tax exemption, so almost all US-

¹² InterAction Website (<http://www.interaction.org/member-directory>)

based NGOs are registered with the IRS. The NCCS uses the database of the IRS and provides the information of US-based NGOs. Most information of the NCCS can be accessed at its website.¹³ According to Lampkin and Boris (2002), the NCCS provides outstanding data related to NGOs. First, it works with the IRS and state officials to standardize data. Second, it has developed a standard classification system. With its classification systems, millions of NGOs in the US can be easily classified. This classification system is called the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE). With the NTEE, non-profit organizations in the US can be categorized. Main categories include education, environment, medical research, human services, and youth development. In accordance with the definition of NGOs that I developed in chapter 2, I consider only NGOs that have categorization number of Q30 and Q33, that are international development and international relief respectively. These are NGOs that implement various projects in the field of international development. This means that I include only US-based international NGOs which deal with international relief and development.

Table 4.1 shows the number of registered non-profit organizations in the field of international development and relief. From the database of NCCS, there are 3,339 and 5,018 non-profit organizations under the category of Q30 and Q33.

¹³ NCCS Website (<http://nccs.urban.org/>)

Table 4.1 Number of Registered NGOs (Q30 and Q33)

Type of Organization	Number of Registered Organizations		Number of Organizations Filing Fm. 990		Total Revenue (In millions)		Assets (In millions)	
Q30								
Other Nonprofit	107	3%	73	3%	90	1%	39	1%
Private Foundation	127	4%	64	3%	20	0%	65	1%
Public Charity	3,105	93%	2,229	94%	7,301	99%	5,475	98%
Total	3,339	100%	2,366	100%	7,411	100%	5,579	100%
Q33								
Other Nonprofit	72	1%	50	2%	5	0%	10	0%
Private Foundation	208	4%	75	2%	3	0%	59	2%
Public Charity	4,738	94%	2,949	96%	10,207	100%	4,021	98%
Total	5,018	100%	3,074	100%	10,215	100%	4,094	100%
Sum	8,357		5,440		17,626		9,673	

The list of registered NGOs is sorted by the NGOs' total assets. Under the category of Q30, there are 58 NGOs that have more than \$20 million in assets. Under the category of Q33, 56 NGOs with more than \$10 million in assets exist. The average assets of NGOs in the category of Q30 are much higher than the assets of NGOs in the category of Q33. With \$20 million in assets from Q30 and \$10 million from Q33, I am able to study similar number of NGOs from each category. I include NGOs which were originally hosted in foreign countries such as the United Kingdom if they have an independent organization in the US and are registered with the IRS. Even though I consider only the 114 largest NGOs out of 8,357 under the category of Q30 and Q33, these largest NGOs' total assets are about 94% of all NGOs' total assets under the category of Q30 and Q33. As Table 4.1 shows, the total sum of assets of all registered NGOs is about \$ 9,673 million. The total sum of assets of the 114 largest NGOs is \$ 9,135 million, which covers most of all NGOs' assets. Considering the size of their assets, these largest NGOs may have active foreign activities with significant impact on people's lives in developing countries, and they also try to influence the US government's foreign aid decisions.

With the list of 114 largest NGOs, I have checked their websites and annual reports. Information about the foreign projects of NGOs is obtained mainly from their websites and annual reports. At their websites, many NGOs provide the profile of countries where they have current or previous projects. The country profiles describe when the NGOs started their projects in developing countries and how they have implemented various kinds of projects. Some NGOs report that they started their projects and stopped the operations. I have recorded the information as they report. Annual reports of NGOs are also other alternative sources. In addition to checking information on the web, I sent emails to each NGO when information about its foreign projects was not included on their website or in annual reports. When I received no reply from NGOs, I directly called the NGOs and attempted to reach the person in charge of foreign projects.

After contacting them, I asked when these NGOs started their foreign projects. While I contacted many NGOs, I did not receive enough information from many NGOs because they simply do not keep their historical records for various reasons such as lack of human resources and consistent efforts to track their projects in different countries.

Table 4.2 and Appendix A shows the list of the largest NGOs in the United States under the categories of international development (Q30) and international relief (Q33) sorted by their assets. Table 4.2 includes only the 20 largest NGOs according to their revenues which are used for collecting data, while Appendix A includes all 114 NGOs considered for the study. With the coding methods of websites, annual reports, email contact, and phone contact, I was able to obtain when and where 40 NGOs out of 114 largest NGOs have foreign projects or offices. In Appendix A, 'web data' means that I collected data from NGOs' websites mostly from country profiles or annual reports. 'Email data' means that I received emails from the contact of NGOs. This also includes some data received by email after a phone conversation. 'Phone data' indicates the data were received from a phone conversation. I code only long-term and consistent humanitarian projects and exclude any short-term projects such as medical equipment shipment or one-time disaster relief such as the Sichuan earthquake in 2008. I indicate this with 'No long-term'. For various reasons, I have been unable to procure information about the other 74 NGOs' foreign projects. Some NGOs do not maintain their information about foreign projects and do not reply to emails and phone calls. 'No reply' and 'No info' indicate these cases. Other NGOs are excluded if they only deal with a single country such as the United Armenian Fund or the American Nicaraguan Foundation. As these NGOs only focus on single country, they do not choose where to initiate their projects. Their way of selecting target countries is much different from other international NGOs. That is why they are excluded. This is indicated as 'One Country'. When NGOs do not fit into the definition that I mentioned previously, I also exclude them and indicate as 'Other NGOs'. This case includes religious groups or non-

humanitarian NGOs. The International Committee of the Red Cross is also excluded because of its contentious characteristics of having a close relationship with governments and acting like IGOs. When NGOs have already appeared on the list, I indicate 'Duplicate'. I also collect NGOs' founding date and religious affiliation. In addition to one Jewish and one Muslim NGO, there are also nine Christian NGOs. The remaining NGOs are secular NGOs. I made a judgment about their religious affiliation by reading their mission statements. When NGOs clearly have the intention of spreading religious belief in their mission statements, I coded them as a religious NGO.

Table 4.2 List of Largest NGOs (Q30 and Q33)

Category	Use	Method	Name	State	Start	Religious	Rule Date	Revenue (Million)	Assets (Million)
Q33	Y	Web Data	Food for the Poor Inc	FL	1982	Christian	1982	1,514	32
Q33	Y	Web Data	World Vision International	CA	1950	Christian	1982	1,508	407
Q33	Y	Web Data	Americares Inc	CT	1975	Secular	1979	1,014	190
Q30	Y	Web Data	CARE	GA	1945	Secular	1993	714	739
Q33	Y	Web Data	Plan International	RI	1937	Secular	1975	515	191
Q33	Y	Web Data	Save the Children	CT	1932	Secular	1964	470	282
Q30	Y	Web Data	Chf International	MD	1952	Secular	1968	377	125
Q33	Y	Web Data	Compassion International	CO	1952	Secular	1959	370	142
Q30	Y	Web Data	International Relief and Development	MD	1998	Secular	1999	297	29
Q33	Y	Web Data	American Jewish Joint Distribution	NY	1914	Jewish	1933	272	475
Q33	Y	Web Data	Christian Childrens Fund	VA	1938	Christian	1951	231	70
Q33	Y	Web Data	Mercy Corps	OR	1979	Secular	1981	218	119
Q30	Y	Web Data	Asia Foundation	CA	1950	Secular	1952	144	55
Q33	Y	Phone Data	Children International	MO	1936	Secular	1971	143	44
Q30	Y	Web Data	Management Sciences for Health Inc	MA	1971	Secular	1973	135	30
Q33	Y	Email Data	Food for the Hungry Inc	AZ	1971	Christian	1971	130	16
Q30	Y	Web Data	Pact Inc	DC	1971	Secular	1971	115	163
Q30	Y	Web Data	International Aids Vaccine	NY	1996	Secular	1996	98	143
Q30	Y	Email Data	International Medical Corps	CA	1985	Secular	1984	95	27
Q30	Y	Web Data	Aga Khan Foundation	DC	1957	Islam	1981	93	188

I collect the data of US-based NGO activities starting from 1960 to 2008. After checking 40 NGOs from which I can obtain information about their foreign projects, I combine the number of projects from 40 NGOs into one variable. This variable represents how many NGOs out of 40 NGOs have projects in developing countries. Figure 4.2 shows the total number of NGO activities as well as the total amount of US foreign aid in millions in a given year. As shown in Figure 4.2, we can observe that the number of NGO activities in developing countries has significantly increased over the last several decades. In 1960, there were only 66 NGO activities in foreign countries, increasing to 813 NGO activities in 2008. This trend shows the increased number of NGO activities in developing countries. It also shows the increased amount of US foreign aid over the last decades.




Figure 4.2 Number of NGO Activities and US Foreign Aid

Main Independent Variable (Time of US-based NGO Activities): In order to test hypotheses regarding the time of US-based NGO activities, I construct another variable which can reflect how long US-based NGOs have had operations in developing countries. Since different NGOs have different starting times, I must be very careful in constructing this variable. The number of NGOs should be counted in order to clearly reflect the influence of US NGOs' field operations. I count how long each operation has been active in a country and add up the number of operations according to the year. For example, if only one NGO started its operation in 1998, it has 10 years of operation in 2008. When another NGO started its activities in 2005, it has 4 years of operation in 2008. In this case, the time of US NGO activities is 14 in 2008. I construct this variable to consider all 155 countries over the period 1960-2008.

Table 4.3 shows how I construct the variable of number and time of US-based NGO activities. For example, if NGO 1 started its field operations in 2001 in Country A and NGO 2 started in 2003, there are two NGO activities in 2003. For the time of US NGO activities, the variable is four in 2003 since NGO 1 spent three years, and NGO 2 spent one year. If NGO 3 started in 2005, the number of NGOs is 3 and the time of the NGO activities is 9 since NGO 1 spent 5 years and NGO 2 spent 3 years.

Table 4.3 Collecting Number and Time of NGO Activities

Country A	NGO 1	NGO 2	NGO 3	NGO Number	NGO Time
2001	1			1	1
2002	1			1	2
2003	1	1		2	4
2004	1	1		2	6
2005	1	1	1	3	9

Main Independent Variable (Weighted Number of US-based NGO Activities): In addition to these two main independent variables, I construct the weighted number of US-based NGO activities depending on the age of each NGO. For all NGOs used for empirical studies, I record their foundation year. According to the age of each NGO, the number of NGO activities in foreign countries is weighted. The first year of NGO activities in the field is recorded as the value of years after the foundation year. For example, when NGO 1 which has existed for 10 years has a field operation in Country A in 2001, the weighted number of NGO activities is 10 instead of 1. For the next year, it has 11 instead of 1. After combining other NGOs' values, I construct one variable that reflects the weighted number of NGO activities based on the maturity of each NGO. Table 4.4 shows how I construct this variable. While the variable of Time of US-based NGO Activities measures how long NGOs have operations in the field, this variable measures the different effect of each NGO depending on its age as explained in the previous chapter.

Table 4.4 Collecting Weighted Number of NGO Activities

Country A	NGO 1 (Founded in 1991)	NGO 2 (Founded in 2001)	NGO 3 (Founded in 2001)	Weighted NGO Number
2001	10			10
2002	11			11
2003	12	2		14
2004	13	3		16
2005	14	4	4	22

Dependent Variable (US Foreign Aid): For US foreign aid, I use data from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) database.¹⁴ It contains data about how much Official Development Assistance (ODA) the US provides to various recipients. The measure of total US foreign aid is net disbursement of ODA. Net disbursement of ODA is widely used as the measure of foreign aid in the literature since this measure can capture the actual annual amount of foreign aid given by donors (Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu 1998, Easterly 2003, McGillivray 2003). In practice, it is possible to observe a negative aid amount because of recipient countries' repayment of the previous period's loans, not because of a donor's reversal of any foreign aid. This negative amount of foreign aid does not arise because of a donor's conscious intention (McGillivray 2003). Using Tobit models directly deals with the problem of negative amounts of US foreign aid since anything less than zero will be truncated. However, including a negative amount of US foreign aid will distort the results of fixed-effects and random-effects models. Since a negative amount of US foreign aid does not mean that the US government asks recipient countries to pay back the loans in most cases, I have decided to make negative amount of US foreign aid zero.

¹⁴ OECD Database (<http://webnet.oecd.org/wbos/index.aspx>)

Net disbursement of ODA is basically foreign aid from developed countries to developing countries to promote development, and it does not include any private contributions or investments. It is only included as a measure of foreign aid, since other kinds of foreign aid such as military aid should be excluded to properly test the hypotheses. Since I deal with NGOs that have humanitarian objectives, these NGOs are mostly interested in making the US government provide more ODA, not military aid, in order to improve the socio-economic conditions of developing countries. For example, there is no reason to believe that CARE asks the US government to provide more military aid to Uganda. If military aid is included, the result of empirical studies might be distorted because of the inclusion of irrelevant foreign aid in studying the relationship between NGO's humanitarian activities and foreign aid. The amount of US foreign aid for countries except OECD members is used. I also exclude some territories.¹⁵ After excluding these territories, I have 155 countries.

Polity Score: In order to test the direct influence of NGOs, several control variables, which reflect standard explanations for foreign aid allocation in the literature, are added. The first control variable is the level of democracy of recipient countries. The Polity IV (democracy-autocracy) score is used to measure the level of democracy.¹⁶ It varies from -10 (most authoritarian) to 10 (most democratic). It has been widely used by many international relations scholars to measure the regime types of states.

The reason why the level of democracy is included is that regime type of recipient countries is one of important reasons why donors provide foreign aid. Knack (2004) argues that causal direction between foreign aid and democratization can go either way.

¹⁵ I excluded territories as follows: Anguilla, Aruba, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Falkland Islands, French Polynesia, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Macao, Mayotte, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Niue, Northern Marianas, St. Helena, Tokelau, Turks and Caicos Islands, Virgin Islands, Serbia, and Palestinian Administration Area.

¹⁶ Polity IV score has been developed by Ted Robert Gurr, Monty Marshall and Keith Jagers. The data can be accessed on their website (<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>).

Foreign aid donor countries are likely to provide more foreign aid to countries that have a regime type similar to their own. On the other hand, democratic donor countries may provide foreign aid to promote democracy in recipient countries which have a lower polity score. In either case, it is important that the polity score should be included reflecting different political situations in recipient countries.

GDP per capita: The second control variable is logged GDP per capita of aid recipient countries. This can be accessed on the UNDP webpage as one of their development indices.¹⁷ This variable reflects humanitarian need of developing countries since GDP per capita directly reflects the wealth of a country and its people's economic conditions. The poorer the countries are, the more they need to receive foreign aid from developed countries. Scholars treat this humanitarian need as one of the most important factors driving foreign aid from donor countries (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Including the GDP per capita also helps to consider the different impact on the recipients' economies driven by foreign aid.

Population: The third control variable is the logged population of aid recipients. This variable is logged in order to avoid extreme variation. It is added since the impact of foreign aid in different sized population can be different. For example, the impact of 10 million dollars of foreign aid can be different in countries with a population of 10 million than in countries with a population of 100 million. The bigger population, the more foreign aid might be needed. The data are from the World Bank Development Index.¹⁸

Infant Mortality Rate: The infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births from World Bank Development Index (WDI) is also added. This variable reflects the social-economic conditions of recipient countries. According to Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998), recipient countries' need is one of important factors that determine the amount of foreign

¹⁷ UNDP website (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>)

¹⁸ World Bank Website (<http://www.worldbank.org/>)

aid. Countries that have higher infant mortality rate might receive more foreign aid from the US. WDI has data only for every five year period, so I fill the projected rate of linear decrease or increase between every five year period's data. For example, the infant mortality rate for Cuba was 33 in 1970 and 26.4 in 1975. For years of the 1971, 1972, 1973, and 1974, rates for these years are filled with the calculation of the linear decrease between 33 and 26.4.

US Alliance: The variable that represents the alliance of the US is included. This variable reflects the donor-interest model of US foreign aid (McKinlay and Little 1979). It is also related to the security-driven goal of US foreign aid (Poe 1992). This argument insists that the allies of the US are more likely to receive a higher amount of US foreign aid. The Correlates of War Formal Alliance dataset provides the formal alliance among countries. I generated a variable to show the level of alliance commitment by using the dataset. If a country is not allied with the US in a given year, the variable is coded as 0. As there is more commitment, the variable has a higher value. For example, entente is 1 and neutrality pact is 2, defense pact is 3.

Human Rights Index: The human rights score is included as one of the control variables in the empirical analyses. The level of human rights in aid recipient countries determines the amount of US foreign aid. The human rights' influence over the amount of foreign aid has been controversial. Cigranelli and Pasquarello (1985) point that the US government distributed significantly less foreign aid to recipient countries that violated the human rights. At the same time, other scholars have criticized their studies, pointing out several methodological issues (See Carleton and Stohl 1987, McComick and Mictchell 1988). Poe (1992) developed Cigranelli and Pasquarello's argument with more years and samples of studies. He showed that the human rights issues seem to influence the amount of US foreign aid.

For these data, I use the Cigranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset. From the Cigranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset, I use the physical integrity rights index.

This is an additive index constructed from torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment and disappearance indicators.¹⁹ It varies from 0 to 8, and higher values mean that the government respects these four rights (Cingranelli and Richard 1999). Unfortunately, these data are available only after 1981. Therefore, separate empirical analysis is added with the human rights index covering from 1981 to 2008.

Regional Dummies: Regional dummy variables are also included according to the Correlates of War project. Countries are divided into six categories: Americas, Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Oceania. Five regional dummy variables are included with Oceania as an omitted category. This variable also captures the tendency that the US has paid much attention to Middle East over the last several decades. Especially after the September 11 attacks, the Middle East became a very important region for the US. The United States started its war against terrorism after 9/11 and tried to provide more assistance to promote democracy in the Middle East.

All independent variables are lagged by one year compared to dependent variables in order to deal with the endogeneity issues. For example, the amount of foreign aid in 2008 is tested with other independent variables in 2007.

Table 4.5 provides the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the test of direct influence. The mean of US foreign aid is 34.47 million US dollars with the maximum of 11,227 million US dollars. The US provided the largest amount of foreign aid in 2005 for Iraq. The mean of NGO activities is 1.98 and varies from zero to 25. Kenya in 2008 has the largest NGO activities as 25. The variable that counts the time of NGO activities shows the mean of 30.22 with the maximum of 619, which is the case of India in 2008. Polity score varies from -10 and 10 with the mean of -1.44. Human rights index varies from 0 to 8 with the mean of 3.43. As GDP per capita and population are

¹⁹ The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project (<http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp>)

logged, the variations of these variables are not very big. The maximum infant mortality rate per thousand is 245.

Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics (Direct Influence)

Variable	Observation	Mean	Stdv	Min	Max
US Foreign Aid (Aid)	7,440	33.65	197.50	0.00	11,227.79
Number of NGO Activities (NGOs)	7,595	1.98	3.25	0.00	25.00
Time of NGO Activities (NGOtime)	7,595	30.22	59.94	0.00	619.00
Weighted Number of NGO Activities (WNGOs)	7,595	79.20	131.01	0.00	1,059.00
Polity Score (Polity)	5,549	-1.44	6.79	-10.00	10.00
Logged GDP per capita (LnGDP)	5,817	6.72	1.37	3.57	11.04
Logged Population (LnPop)	7,405	15.04	2.06	9.40	21.00
Infant Mortality Rate (Mortality)	7,556	70.97	47.69	0.00	245.00
Human Rights Index (HRI)	4,340	3.43	2.69	0.00	8.00
Formal Alliance (Ally)	7,595	0.58	1.17	0.00	3.00
America (America)	7,595	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
Europe (Europe)	7,595	0.09	0.29	0.00	1.00
Africa (Africa)	7,595	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Middle East (Middle)	7,595	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00
Asia (Asia)	7,595	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00

Parentheses indicate variables' names in empirical studies.

Table 4.6 shows the correlation among the variables in my study covering the period 1960-2008. One of the highest correlations among variables is between the number of US-based NGO activities and the weighted number of US-based NGO activities. As explained previously, the weighted number of US-based NGO activities is calculated based on the number of US-based NGO activities. That is why there is a high correlation between these two variables. In addition, the time of US-based NGO activities has a high correlation with the number of US-based NGO activities because of the same reason. Therefore, I do not include these three variables in the same empirical models. Another high correlation among variables exists between infant mortality rate and GDP per capita. These two variables are highly and negatively related. It implies that countries that have a high GDP per capita have a lower infant mortality rate. Except these two variables, there are no highly correlated variables, which sometimes generate multicollinearity in the empirical models.

I also add another correlation table for data covering the years 1981-2008 as shown in Table 4.7. As explained, the human rights index is available only after 1981. The variable of the human rights index is included. For several reasons, I will conduct separate empirical studies with data covering the years 1981-2008. In the next chapter, I will explain why I need to conduct separate empirical studies. The correlations with data covering the years 1981-2008 show a pattern similar to the correlations with data covering the years 1960-2008. There are high correlations among three main independent variables because of the characteristics of these variables.

Table 4.6 Correlation Table (Direct Influence, 1960-2008)

	Aid	NGOs	NGOtime	WNGOs	Polity	LnGDP	LnPop	Morin	Ally	America	Europe	Africa	Middle	Asia
Aid	1.00													
NGOs	0.18	1.00												
NGOtime	0.12	0.92	1.00											
WNGOs	0.14	0.97	0.94	1.00										
Polity	0.06	0.28	0.30	0.29	1.00									
LnGDP	0.00	-0.09	0.00	-0.05	0.18	1.00								
LnPop	0.13	0.49	0.46	0.47	0.04	-0.12	1.00							
Morin	-0.03	-0.06	-0.14	-0.11	-0.34	-0.76	-0.01	1.00						
Ally	0.01	0.16	0.18	0.18	0.36	0.19	0.09	-0.22	1.00					
America	-0.03	0.12	0.14	0.14	0.34	0.20	-0.01	-0.23	0.91	1.00				
Europe	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.16	0.16	-0.09	-0.26	-0.12	-0.12	1.00			
Africa	-0.08	-0.06	-0.11	-0.09	-0.17	-0.43	-0.22	0.56	-0.42	-0.41	-0.17	1.00		
Middle	0.14	-0.21	-0.18	-0.20	-0.27	0.35	0.01	-0.18	-0.17	-0.24	-0.10	-0.35	1.00	
Asia	0.01	0.19	0.20	0.18	-0.03	-0.12	0.39	-0.10	-0.16	-0.24	-0.10	-0.35	-0.20	1.00

Table 4.7 Correlation Table (Direct Influence, 1981-2008)

	Aid	NGOs	NGOtime	WNGOs	Polity	LnGDP	LnPop	Morin	HRI	Ally	America	Europe	Africa	Middle	Asia
Aid	1.00														
NGOs	0.16	1.00													
NGOtime	0.10	0.92	1.00												
WNGOs	0.13	0.98	0.94	1.00											
Polity	0.04	0.28	0.30	0.29	1.00										
LnGDP	-0.03	-0.30	-0.18	-0.26	0.13	1.00									
LnPop	0.11	0.53	0.51	0.52	0.04	-0.17	1.00								
Morin	-0.01	0.13	0.02	0.06	-0.29	-0.75	0.02	1.00							
HRI	-0.09	-0.22	-0.20	-0.19	0.18	0.17	-0.34	-0.13	1.00						
Ally	0.02	0.20	0.26	0.24	0.46	0.23	0.09	-0.28	0.04	1.00					
America	-0.02	0.17	0.22	0.20	0.43	0.23	0.02	-0.28	0.09	0.93	1.00				
Europe	-0.03	-0.08	-0.08	-0.04	0.17	0.13	-0.12	-0.27	0.11	-0.14	-0.13	1.00			
Africa	-0.08	-0.02	-0.11	-0.08	-0.17	-0.49	-0.17	0.69	0.04	-0.39	-0.37	-0.21	1.00		
Middle	0.16	-0.24	-0.22	-0.23	-0.32	0.40	0.02	-0.28	-0.10	-0.17	-0.22	-0.12	-0.34	1.00	
Asia	-0.01	0.18	0.21	0.19	-0.07	-0.11	0.35	-0.09	-0.13	-0.17	-0.23	-0.13	-0.35	-0.21	1.00

Table 4.8 shows the mean of NGO activities, NGOs' time, and US foreign aid in all 155 countries over the period 1960-2008. It also shows the list of countries included in the empirical studies. In fact, this table shows interesting characteristics of US foreign aid and NGO activities. The top three receivers of US foreign aid are Egypt, Iraq, and Israel. Afghanistan and Pakistan are the 5th and 6th largest aid recipients as well. This definitely implies that a significant amount of US foreign aid is given according to US interests, especially the security of Middle East. However, except these top receivers, we can observe some relationship between the number of NGOs and the amount of foreign aid. The more NGO activities a country has, the more foreign aid it has received. For some countries that have never had NGO activities, a very small amount of US foreign aid has been given. For example, countries with no NGO activities such as Brunei, Qatar, and Bahrain have received a very small amount of US foreign aid over the last decades even though Qatar and Bahrain are located in Middle East. Countries with the highest level of NGO activities are India, Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia. These countries have lower GDP per capita. The activities of NGOs in these countries show that NGOs tend to go to the places where their service is needed. It is also interesting that these countries have received a significant amount of foreign aid from the US.

Table 4.8 Average NGO Activities, Time, and Foreign Aid in Countries

Country	NGOs	NGOTime	Aid	Country	NGOs	NGOTime	Aid
Afghanistan	5.47	74.73	179.7	Liberia	1.92	20.43	33.5
Albania	0.65	4.00	10.4	Libya	0.00	0.00	3.0
Algeria	0.00	0.00	3.8	Macedonia, FYR	1.00	25.00	9.0
Angola	2.39	31.67	18.5	Madagascar	1.22	9.90	17.8
Antigua and Barbuda	0.00	0.00	0.1	Malawi	3.10	28.67	21.0
Argentina	1.31	27.45	3.9	Malaysia	1.18	25.37	1.8
Armenia	2.63	24.63	23.5	Maldives	0.00	0.00	0.1
Azerbaijan	1.45	11.98	9.2	Mali	5.06	74.31	22.9
Bahamas	0.00	0.00	0.0	Malta	0.00	0.00	1.5
Bahrain	0.00	0.00	0.0	Marshall Islands	0.00	0.00	14.5
Bangladesh	6.65	127.27	87.0	Mauritania	0.55	6.69	7.4
Barbados	0.00	0.00	0.3	Mauritius	0.00	0.00	0.8
Belarus	1.14	20.51	0.5	Mexico	5.43	91.78	26.7
Belize	0.04	0.06	2.6	Micronesia	0.00	0.00	28.0
Benin	0.63	5.22	8.7	Moldova	0.49	4.84	7.5
Bhutan	0.55	7.71	0.0	Mongolia	1.22	7.24	4.7
Bolivia	7.96	142.14	70.5	Montenegro	0.55	2.90	0.9
Bosnia- Herzegovina	3.14	48.02	29.0	Morocco	1.00	25.00	28.5
Botswana	0.88	6.22	13.7	Mozambique	3.65	37.18	44.2
Brazil	5.00	86.10	21.1	Myanmar	1.35	12.59	5.0
Brunei	0.00	0.00	0.0	Namibia	0.39	2.90	8.2
Burkina Faso	2.73	33.41	13.7	Nauru	0.00	0.00	0.0
Burundi	2.02	29.82	9.5	Nepal	3.63	44.80	19.2
Cambodia	3.57	53.43	27.5	Nicaragua	5.80	78.04	41.9
Cameroon	0.90	5.98	10.8	Niger	3.86	60.43	16.5
Cape Verde	0.43	4.71	4.3	Nigeria	3.29	42.27	47.2
Central African Rep.	0.69	7.02	3.4	Oman	0.00	0.00	3.6
Chad	1.84	23.49	11.9	Pakistan	4.73	64.76	172.0
Chile	2.90	49.49	8.5	Palau	0.00	0.00	13.4
China	3.49	50.04	5.2	Panama	0.84	9.12	18.6
Chinese Taipei	0.00	0.00	8.0	Papua New Guinea	1.08	15.43	0.6
Colombia	5.20	89.47	102.7	Paraguay	0.67	4.71	5.7
Comoros	0.00	0.00	0.2	Peru	5.12	71.71	67.9

Table 4.8 Continued

Congo, Dem. Rep.	2.35	32.29	78.7	Philippines	7.57	146.02	88.1
Congo, Rep.	0.31	2.45	2.4	Qatar	0.00	0.00	0.0
Costa Rica	0.63	6.69	24.8	Rwanda	3.65	40.14	23.5
Cote d'Ivoire	0.82	6.67	11.4	Samoa	0.00	0.00	0.6
				Sao Tome & Principe	0.00	0.00	0.2
Croatia	1.02	25.02	6.3	Saudi Arabia	0.00	0.00	0.0
Cuba	0.37	3.49	1.6	Senegal	3.02	48.76	25.3
Cyprus	0.00	0.00	6.7	Seychelles	0.00	0.00	0.8
Djibouti	0.00	0.00	2.2	Sierra Leone	3.88	67.84	11.2
Dominica	0.84	21.00	0.0				
Dominican Republic	3.92	59.63	24.9	Singapore	0.59	16.22	0.3
Ecuador	5.43	104.33	23.5	Slovenia	1.00	25.00	0.1
				Solomon Islands	0.57	8.29	0.3
Egypt	3.57	60.27	607.5	Somalia	3.16	43.14	50.7
El Salvador	4.94	88.41	88.7				
Equatorial Guinea	0.00	0.00	0.3	South Africa	4.20	43.06	39.5
Eritrea	0.33	2.47	10.8	Sri Lanka	3.71	67.92	27.7
Ethiopia	8.51	129.10	100.6	St. Kitts-Nevis	0.00	0.00	0.1
Fiji	0.12	0.43	0.9	St. Lucia	0.00	0.00	0.0
				St. Vincent & Grenadines	0.43	16.71	0.2
Gabon	0.00	0.00	1.1	Sudan	4.94	61.27	115.3
Gambia	1.12	28.86	4.0	Suriname	0.94	22.06	0.4
Georgia	2.51	20.37	29.6	Swaziland	0.69	4.24	4.5
Ghana	3.00	26.69	29.5	Syria	0.53	1.94	6.3
Grenada	0.00	0.00	1.4	Tajikistan	1.76	16.18	11.6
Guatemala	6.51	117.41	42.2	Tanzania	5.02	60.43	32.5
Guinea	1.76	17.33	15.2	Thailand	5.20	98.73	22.8
Guinea-Bissau	1.04	9.76	2.5	Timor-Leste	1.18	20.47	3.7
Guyana	0.37	3.49	7.3	Togo	1.35	27.08	4.2
Haiti	6.69	107.82	69.7	Tonga	0.00	0.00	0.4
Honduras	7.33	139.10	60.4	Trinidad and Tobago	0.02	0.02	1.1
India	12.63	237.74	193.4	Tunisia	1.00	25.00	13.0
Indonesia	7.53	142.16	86.8	Turkey	0.53	4.04	49.3
Iran	0.12	0.43	1.1	Turkmenistan	0.43	4.71	2.8
Iraq	1.39	8.06	566.8	Tuvalu	0.00	0.00	0.0
Israel	0.00	0.00	533.8	Uganda	8.69	141.18	46.3
Jamaica	0.02	0.02	25.5				

Table 4.8 Continued

Jordan	1.65	12.53	112.2	Ukraine	1.16	25.59	8.6
				United Arab			
Kazakhstan	0.61	5.63	17.7	Emirates	0.00	0.00	0.0
Kenya	9.41	147.49	56.2	Uruguay	1.31	27.45	2.6
Kiribati	0.00	0.00	0.2	Uzbekistan	0.78	6.61	9.1
Korea	0.00	0.00	51.9	Vanuatu	0.57	8.29	0.8
Korea, Dem. Rep.	0.51	3.45	11.7	Venezuela	1.27	26.86	4.2
Kuwait	0.00	0.00	0.0	Viet Nam	3.53	45.69	121.0
Kyrgyz Republic	1.16	9.39	11.8	Yemen	1.43	25.55	16.7
Laos	1.96	41.61	15.8	Zambia	3.41	45.59	36.0
Lebanon	3.47	52.43	20.1	Zimbabwe	3.73	44.10	24.8
Lesotho	1.02	13.37	7.8				

Data – Test of Indirect Influence

Dependent Variable (New York Times Coverage): The media coverage of developing countries is measured by the *New York Times* Archive.²⁰ As one of the national print media sources, the *New York Times* has been widely recognized as one of the most representative media and its articles have been widely analyzed in order to measure media coverage. The *New York Times* Archive provides the number of articles the *New York Times* has in a given year starting from 1851. If key words such as “humanitarian need” and a country’s name are entered in the *New York Times* Archive, the number of relevant articles can be found. Therefore, we can count the number of articles related to the issue of developing countries’ humanitarian need and international development in each year. The key words that I use are the country name, relief, and development. The number of articles that include all three key words is shown at the *New*

²⁰ The New York Times Archive (<http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/nytarchive.html>)

York Times Archive. After getting the number of articles, it is coded into a country year format. As the temporal domain of the study includes the years 1960-2008, there are 7,595 cases for the analysis with 155 countries. The mean of articles covering a country in a given year is about 2.34. The maximum number of articles is 81, covering Iraq in 2003 due to the war in Iraq.

Main Independent Variable (Activities of US NGOs): The same variable for testing direct influence is used.

Main Independent Variable (Time of US NGO Activities): The same variable for testing direct influence is used.

For the empirical analysis of indirect influence, six control variables are included. According to Golan and Wanta (2003), geographic, cultural, and economic proximities are important factors that decide international media coverage. The US media believe that news from countries with close proximities can attract more US news consumers. It seems that geographic proximities are not supported by empirical studies, but they are still considered as an important factor. I adopt the measurement of geographic, cultural, and economic proximities that Golan and Wanta (2003) used.

English Usage: Chang, Shoemaker, and Brendlinger (1987) argue that language affinity is considered as an indicator of cultural proximity. Therefore, a dummy variable that indicates whether countries use English as an official language is included. This dataset can be easily accessed by the World Factbook developed by the CIA.²¹

Trade Relationship: Trade relationship is used to measure economic proximity. Countries that have a higher volume of trade might be covered by the *New York Times*. Economic ties are measured with the Correlates of War Project's Trade Data.²² The data set covers the period 1870-2006 with dyadic trade statistics. From dyadic trade data set, I

²¹ World Factbook (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>)

²² Correlates of War Dataset (<http://www.correlatesofwar.org>)

use the variable of imports of country A from country B in current US millions of dollars. This variable is logged. I use only the data that the US is country A and other countries are country B. This data set covers only up to 2006, so I use the number of 2006 for 2007 and 2008.

Regional Dummies: Geographical proximity is measured as a dummy variable determined by regions as Golan and Wanta (2003) included. This variable for regional difference is included in order to control the media's biased reports about some regions such as the Middle East. Countries are divided into six groups such as Africa, Middle East, Europe, Americas, Asia, and Oceania. The same variable for testing direct influence is used.

Diplomatic Relationship: In addition to these proximities, data of diplomatic relationship are also included. Diplomatic relationship can reflect the relationship between the US and other countries. The *New York Times* might not or cannot cover countries with which the US does not have diplomatic relationship. The Correlates of War Diplomatic Exchange Data set shows diplomatic relationship between two countries. Diplomatic relationship only with the US is included. Originally, this variable varies with 0, 1, 2, 3, and 9. If countries do not have any diplomatic exchange, it has the value of 0. When countries have a chargé d'affaires, it has the value of 1. The value of 2 and 3 means the country has a minister and ambassador in the other country respectively. We may treat this variable as an ordinal variable starting from non-diplomatic relationship to good relationship. It contains 9, which means other relationship, and I drop this category in order to avoid any statistical distortion or exaggeration since 9 can mean any kind of relationship. Since a diplomatic relationship covers a 5 year period, the starting year of the relationship is used to represent the 5 year interval.

Population: The size of countries is another important factor that determines the media's international coverage. The bigger countries are, the more issues may emerge (Golan and Wanta 2003, Ish 1996). The size of countries can be measured by their

populations, so logged population is added. The source of data is the World Bank Development Index as explained previously.

As I do in the test of the direct influence, I also lag all independent variables by one year. Table 4.9 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the test of indirect influence. The mean of *New York Times* coverage is 2.34 with the maximum of 81 and the minimum of zero. The logged amount of trade varies ranging from zero to 12.66. Table 4.10 shows the correlation among these variables. There are no highly correlated variables among them. The largest correlation is between *New York Time* coverage and the variable of population. These two variables are positively correlated with 0.44 correlations. This simply implies that the *New York Times* tend to cover the populous countries more. Table 4.11 summarizes the sources of all variables as explained previously.

Table 4.9 Descriptive Statistics (Indirect Influence)

Variable	Observation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
New York Times Coverage (NYT)	7,440	2.34	4.66	0	81
NGO Activities (NGOs)	7,595	1.98	3.25	0	25
English (English)	7,595	0.33	0.47	0	1
Diplomatic Relations (Diplomatic)	7,546	2.46	1.29	0	4
Logged Amount of Trade (Trade)	5,990	4.14	2.78	0	12.66
Logged Population (LnPop)	7,405	15.04	2.06	9.40	21
America (America)	7,595	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
Europe (Europe)	7,595	0.09	0.29	0.00	1.00
Africa (Africa)	7,595	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Middle East (Middle)	7,595	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00
Asia (Asia)	7,595	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00

Note: Parentheses indicate variables' names in empirical studies.

Table 4.10 Correlation Table (Indirect Influence, 1960-2008)

	NYT	NGOs	English	Diplomatic	Trade	LnPop	America	Europe	Africa	Middle	Asia
NYT	1.00										
NGOs	0.28	1.00									
English	-0.09	0.01	1.00								
Diplomatic	0.00	0.13	-0.08	1.00							
Trade	0.27	0.31	-0.03	0.27	1.00						
LnPop	0.44	0.50	-0.23	0.26	0.46	1.00					
America	-0.02	0.05	-0.01	0.09	0.25	-0.15	1.00				
Europe	-0.09	-0.04	-0.08	-0.03	-0.07	-0.10	-0.13	1.00			
Africa	-0.15	0.01	0.22	0.00	-0.30	-0.06	-0.41	-0.17	1.00		
Middle	0.16	-0.17	-0.23	0.06	0.09	0.07	-0.24	-0.10	-0.31	1.00	
Asia	0.15	0.16	-0.12	-0.06	0.10	0.34	-0.26	-0.11	-0.34	-0.20	1.00

Table 4.11 Data Sources for Empirical Studies

<i>Direct Influence</i>		
Variables	Data	Sources
Dependent Variable	US Foreign Aid	OECD
Main Independent Variable	Number of NGO Activities	40 Largest NGOs' Reports
	Time of NGO Activities	40 Largest NGOs' Reports
Control Variables	Level of Democracy	Polity IV
	GDP per capita	UNDP
	Human Rights Score	Cingranelli-Richards Human Right Dataset
	US Alliance	Correlates of War Formal Alliance
	Infant Mortality Rate	World Bank Development Index
	Region	Correlates of War Country Code
	GDP per capita of Recipient Countries	World Bank Development Index
	Populations of Recipient Countries	World Bank Development Index
<i>Indirect Influence</i>		
	Data	Sources
Dependent Variable	Media Coverage Regarding Humanitarian Need	New York Times
Main Independent Variable	Number of NGO Activities	40 Largest NGOs' Reports
	Time of NGO Activities	40 Largest NGOs' Reports
Control Variables	Language - English	World Factbook
	Trade	Correlates of War Trade Data
	Diplomatic Relationship	Correlates of War Diplomatic Exchange Data
	Region	Correlates of War Country Code
	Populations of Recipient Countries	World Bank Development Index

Conclusion

With a narrowly defined concept of NGOs, working hypotheses in the field of international development are developed in this chapter. Several different methodological approaches are adopted in order to test working hypotheses. As I construct the time-series cross-sectional dataset, fixed-effects and random-effects models are adopted. With non-zero dependent variables, the random-effect Tobit model is also adopted. These models hope to clearly explain the relationship between the amount of foreign aid and the number and time of NGO activities. The main dependent variable is the amount of foreign aid provided by the US to 155 countries from 1960 to 2008. The main independent variables are the number and time periods of NGOs' foreign activities. With these main independent variables, other control variables are added, based on the existing empirical studies of foreign aid and NGOs studies.

I have to collect the data of NGOs' foreign activities with major NGOs based on the US in the field of international development and relief since the data about NGO activities are very limited, and I am unable to locate an existing dataset to show foreign activities of US-based NGOs. The process of collecting data requires a significant effort with different methods such as analysis of web sites, email exchange, and phone contacts. It is almost impossible to collect all US-based NGOs' foreign activities, so I focus on the biggest US-based NGOs. In addition to NGOs' data, I collect data of the media coverage on developing countries. I use the *New York Time* archive to collect these data. With significant effort to collect data, I can conduct the empirical studies. The next chapter will show the results of empirical studies.

CHAPTER V

QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH RESULTS

Introduction

This chapter shows the results of empirical studies for the direct and indirect influence of NGOs on foreign aid, focusing on the case of the United States. Through detailed analyses of quantitative studies, the working hypotheses are tested and they find significant support. The more activities of NGOs and the longer US-based NGOs have field operations in developing countries, the more potential recipient countries receive foreign aid from the United States. In addition, the media are likely to cover these countries' development needs since NGOs try to influence the public through their projects and various activities.

In spite of these results of empirical studies, there is a possibility that the causal mechanism between US foreign aid and the number and time of NGO activities can be reversed. In other words, the amount of US foreign aid might influence the activities of NGOs in developing countries. The issue of the endogeneity problem is also extensively tested with several methods such as a test of reverse causality, Granger causality test, and an instrumental variables approach. All of these methods show that the activities of NGOs influence the activities of NGOs, not vice versa.

Results of Empirical Studies of Direct Influences

The unit of analysis in this study is the country year for the years 1960-2008, excluding members of the OECD. I exclude OECD members since they do not need to receive any development aid, and they are usually foreign aid donors. There is a time difference between the time of a foreign aid decision and implementation. The amount of foreign aid provided for developing countries in a given year is mostly decided in the previous year. For example, the final amount of US foreign aid to be provided in 2000 is

usually decided in 1999. The foreign aid committee in the US sometimes makes decisions for a long-term project, but these decisions can be changed depending on the situation at the time when the final decision is made. In addition, most literature in the field of foreign aid uses a one-year lagged term. I also use one-year lagged variables to predict the amount of US foreign aid per country in a given year. Therefore, the equation 5.1 is tested as the main model. This equation shows that US foreign aid in a given year is decided by several variables such as the number of NGO activities, polity score, GDP per capita, population, infant mortality rate, the US alliance, and regional categories. The terms, v_i and ε_{it} , represent the error components in the random-effects model.

$$\text{Aid}_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{NGOs}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \text{Polity}_{it-1} + \beta_3 \text{LnGDP}_{it-1} + \beta_4 \text{LnPop}_{it-1} + \beta_5 \text{Mortality}_{it-1} + \beta_6 \text{Ally}_{it-1} + \beta_7 \text{America}_{it-1} + \beta_8 \text{Europe}_{it-1} + \beta_9 \text{Africa}_{it-1} + \beta_{10} \text{Middle}_{it-1} + \beta_{11} \text{Asia}_{it-1} + v_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

(Eq. 5.1)

Table 5.1 shows the results of the empirical analysis for the direct influence of US-based NGO activities on the amount of US foreign aid. For this empirical study, the fixed-effects model (models 1 and 2), the random-effects GLS regression (models 3 and 4), and the random-effects Tobit (models 5 and 6) are adopted. Through these empirical analyses, working hypothesis 1 is tested.

Working Hypothesis 1 (Direct Influence): As the number of US-based NGO field operations in a potential recipient country increases, the amount of foreign aid sent from the US government to the recipient country increases.

First, I run the bivariate model between US foreign aid and NGO activities with fixed-effects and random effects models. Without any control variables, we can see a strong relationship between these two variables (models 1 and 3). The number of US NGO activities in foreign aid recipient countries positively influences the amount of foreign aid that countries receive. In other words, countries that have more US NGO

projects are more likely to receive a higher amount of foreign aid from the US government. As shown in model 1, a one unit change in US NGO projects leads to a 16.51 million dollar increase in the predicted level of US foreign aid. It is statistically significant at the 0.001 level as well. As I include other control variables such as polity score, logged GDP per capita, and logged population, the influence of NGO activities remains statistically significant. Logged GDP per capita has a negative relationship with the amount of foreign aid received by developing countries. Richer countries receive a lower amount of foreign aid as predicted.

Models 5 and 6 are tested with the Tobit random-effects models. These models are tested in order to reflect the two-stage process of foreign aid. The first stage is whether a country is received a foreign aid, and the second stage is how much foreign aid is provided. As models 5 and 6 show, a one unit increase in the number of NGO foreign projects in developing countries leads to a 25.18 and 25.20 million dollar increase in the predicted level of US foreign aid, respectively. Since the mean of US foreign aid is 33.65 million dollars, we can see the substantively significant increase caused by a one unit increase of NGO activities. With all control variables included, the substantial influence of US NGO activities is greater than the bivariate relationship between US foreign aid and NGO activities. Along with this influence, GDP per capita has a statistically significant influence on US foreign aid. Poor countries are more likely to receive more foreign aid from the US. Other variables such as polity score, infant mortality rate, and some regional dummies such as Europe, Africa, and Asia do not show a statistically significant relationship with US foreign aid. It seems that regime type is not a main factor which increases the amount of US foreign aid. It seems that allies of the US have received more foreign aid. The higher the level of commitment is, the more US foreign aid has been provided. Models 3 and 4 are tested with random-effects GLS regression. It shows almost identical results with random-effects Tobit models. The results with different statistical methods are very similar to each other. In fixed-effects regression

models, logged population has a positive significant impact on US foreign aid. It means that larger countries receive more US foreign aid. Other than this, the results are very similar to the random-effects models.

Table 5.1 US Foreign Aid from 1960 to 2008 (With Number of NGOs)

	Fixed		Random		Tobit	
	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model6
NGOs	16.51*** (0.960)	18.88*** (1.883)	15.87*** (0.909)	17.64*** (1.569)	25.18*** (2.018)	25.20*** (2.041)
Polity		-0.923 (0.824)		0.294 (0.754)	0.216 (0.955)	0.294 (0.960)
LnGDP		-39.56*** (6.652)		-23.98*** (5.670)	-33.55*** (7.492)	-36.15*** (7.566)
LnPop		77.08*** (19.150)		-0.884 (5.449)	10.74 (8.529)	12.62 (8.976)
Mortality		0.195 (0.267)		-0.331 (0.188)	0.0386 (0.244)	-0.0153 (0.252)
Ally		98.32*** (12.550)		60.74*** (10.450)	27.44** (9.554)	64.44*** (13.770)
America				-175.7** (60.090)		-245.9** (94.150)
Europe				7.966 (55.850)		-47.79 (90.140)
Africa				-9.681 (52.030)		-57.84 (84.230)
Middle				122.5* (53.930)		-28.29 (88.120)
Asia				-18.45 (54.490)		-117.5 (88.520)
Constant	2.897 (2.750)	1041.7*** (305.200)	4.12 (6.773)	178.3 (101.400)	-57.59 (148.300)	9.565 (158.600)
sigma_u					133.9*** (10.670)	128.9*** (10.180)
sigma_e					253.4*** (3.057)	252.7*** (3.047)
N	7440	4714	7440	4714	4714	4714

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 0.001

While the constructed dataset for US-based NGO activities covers data from 1960 to 2008, the empirical studies are conducted with the years 1981-2008. There are several reasons why I conduct the separate empirical studies with a smaller time period. First, the emergence of NGOs is a very recent occurrence in light of the history of world politics. As I mentioned previously, many NGOs were founded in the early 1980s. Second, many countries became independent around the early 1990s. In the dataset from 1960-2008, there are many missing variables for countries which became independent after 1980. Third, the human rights index is available only after 1981. The human rights index might have a significant impact on US foreign aid as some existing literature explains (Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998).

Table 5.2 shows the empirical test with the data covering the years 1981-2008. This empirical model shows almost the same results as the empirical models covering the years 1960 – 2008. At the same time, the substantive effect of NGOs on the amount of US foreign aid is larger. The human rights index shows the mixed results depending on different models. It shows a statistically significant relationship with US foreign aid when the Tobit model is tested (model 6). As model 6 in Table 5.2 shows, the human rights index shows a significant impact on US foreign aid. With other statistical models in model 2 and 4, the human rights index is not statistically significant. This might imply that the impact of human rights on the amount of US foreign aid received is probably not as high as other scholars expect when it is tested with US NGO activities. The number of US NGO activities still shows a positive and statistically significant impact on the amount of US foreign aid. The interesting feature from this empirical study compared to the previous one is the level of influence of US NGO activities. One unit increase of NGO activities leads to an increase of 36.29 million and 26.68 million dollars with fixed-effects and random effects models, respectively. Compared to the substantial impact of 18.88 and 17.64 from the results with fixed-effects and random-effects models using the data of the period 1960-2008, there is about 92 and 51 percent increase, respectively.

This implies that NGO activities after 1981 have a greater impact on the US government's foreign aid decisions. It also implies that more NGOs after 1981 have tried to mobilize US foreign aid in order to achieve international development in developing countries.

All empirical models using data from 1960-2008 and 1981-2008 show that hypothesis 1 is strongly supported. With little variation depending on the models, hypothesis 1 is empirically supported by these models.

Table 5.2 US Foreign Aid from 1981 to 2008 (With Number of NGOs)

	Fixed		Random		Tobit	
	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model6
NGOs	26.24*** (1.854)	36.29*** (3.160)	21.62*** (1.591)	26.68*** (2.510)	35.92*** (3.234)	37.40*** (3.216)
Polity		-1.055 (1.374)		0.457 (1.270)	0.503 (1.557)	0.884 (1.561)
LnGDP		-87.07*** (11.810)		-53.13*** (10.200)	-73.42*** (13.110)	-77.22*** (12.990)
LnPop		77.060 (39.940)		-26.68** (10.210)	-23.97 (13.630)	-29.07* (13.810)
Mortality		2.696*** (0.583)		0.520 (0.388)	0.539 (0.463)	0.811 (0.494)
HRI		4.148 (2.802)		3.325 (2.721)	7.094* (3.444)	7.759* (3.402)
Ally		187.9*** (23.980)		128.9*** (19.990)	40.22* (16.240)	122.0*** (24.910)
America				-356.1** (111.300)		-419.8** (146.700)
Europe				52.090 (99.560)		-13.79 (133.500)
Africa				-71.93 (94.310)		-112.4 (126.400)
Middle				243.2* (97.790)		109.100 (131.500)
Asia				-9.689 (98.020)		-93.53 (131.500)
Constant	-26.87*** (6.228)	-983.4 (650.300)	-13.81 (11.170)	686.1*** (191.300)	659.3** (248.000)	813.7** (254.100)
sigma_u					210.8*** (16.900)	195.5*** (15.080)
sigma_e					286.4*** (4.332)	284.5*** (4.287)
N	4185	3053	4185	3053	3053	3053

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 0.001

Hypothesis 2 is tested on another empirical study with the same control variables. As I explained previously, the variable of *NGOtime* reflects how many and how long NGOs have operated in developing countries. Since this variable already reflects the number of US NGO activities, it is highly correlated with the number of US NGO activities. Therefore, I only use this variable to test hypothesis 2 excluding the number of US NGO activities. Hypothesis 2 predicts as follows:

Working Hypothesis 2 (Direct Influence): The longer US-based NGO field operations in a potential recipient country exist, the more the US government provides foreign aid for the recipient country.

Table 5.3 shows the results of empirical studies with fixed effects models (models 1 and 2), random-effect GLS models (models 3 and 4), and the random-effects Tobit models (models 5 and 6). All models support hypothesis 2 statistically. It shows that the periods of US NGO activities are statistically significant and have a positive impact on US foreign aid. It implies that the longer US NGOs have operations in recipient countries, the more foreign aid they can receive from the US. For example, a NGO working in the same developing countries for an extended time has a stronger incentive to influence the US government's foreign aid decisions in comparison to NGOs which have only recently started their projects. In this empirical model, other control variables such as logged GDP per capita, logged population, and the infant mortality rate have a statistically significant impact. The polity score is also statistically significant as models 4, 5, and 6 show. This implies that more democratic countries are likely to receive more US foreign aid. The alliance of the US also shows positive and significant results. The significant impact of logged population implies that larger countries receive more US foreign aid as expected. As Table 5.3 shows, hypothesis 2 is statistically supported.

Table 5.3 US Foreign Aid from 1960 to 2008 (With Time of NGO)

	Fixed		Random		Tobit	
	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model6
NGOtime	0.489*** (0.050)	0.192* (0.090)	0.495*** (0.048)	0.305*** (0.079)	0.362*** (0.102)	0.346*** (0.103)
Polity		0.855 (0.824)		1.777* (0.757)	2.667** (0.959)	2.567** (0.964)
LnGDP		-43.84*** (6.708)		-25.68*** (5.732)	-36.14*** (7.653)	-38.38*** (7.742)
LnPop		130.9*** (18.660)		17.04** (5.352)	46.23*** (9.489)	49.70*** (9.954)
Mortality		-0.0694 (0.275)		-0.617** (0.191)	-0.43 (0.252)	-0.565* (0.260)
Ally		101.0*** (12.680)		60.74*** (10.560)	27.93** (10.090)	66.33*** (14.130)
America				-168.9** (60.560)		-254.9* (100.800)
Europe				3.261 (56.250)		-68.57 (96.980)
Africa				15.570 (52.380)		-24.05 (90.590)
Middle				111.7* (54.290)		-68.51 (95.100)
Asia				-16.52 (54.870)		-136.7 (95.520)
Constant	20.38*** (2.519)	1799.0*** (299.500)	20.20** (6.726)	-42.44 (101.500)	-507.3** (163.500)	-460.8** (173.200)
sigma_u					143.6*** (12.370)	139.7*** (11.570)
sigma_e					256.8*** (3.105)	256.2*** (3.095)
N	7440	4714	7440	4714	4714	4714

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 0.001

The direct influence of the number and time of NGO activities is shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.²³ These graphs are created from the fixed-effects models with control variables (model 2 from Table 5.1 and 5.2). They show the predicted value of US foreign aid depending on the number and time of NGO activities. Figure 5.1 shows the substantive relationship between the number of NGO activities and US foreign aid. The relationship between the time of NGO activities and US foreign aid is shown in Figure 5.2. In each figure, histograms of the number and time of NGO activities are added. Histograms show a right-skewed distribution. There are many zero variables for the number and time of NGO activities. While the maximum of the time of NGO activities is 619, only one percent of the variable of the time of NGOs occur above 290. This shows a highly right-skewed distribution.

These graphs show the substantive effect of NGOs' presence in terms of numbers and time. In order to more clearly understand the substantive effects of NGO activities from the empirical studies with time-series cross-sectional data, I calculate estimated errors for each country. Estimated errors for each country are calculated, and the means of estimated errors for each country are compared. Countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Madagascar, Laos, Somalia, Chad, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Cote d'Ivoire show the lowest means of estimated errors. It seems that countries with lower GDP per capita fit the models. In contrast, countries which have received excessive foreign aid because of specific regional concern of the US do not fit into the models. These countries include Egypt, Israel, and Iraq. With the variable of NGO time, the estimated errors for each country show similar results. Models are fitted better with countries such as Belarus,

²³ The dotted lines show 95% confidence interval. The confidence interval in Figure 5.2 looks much larger than the one in Figure 5.1, but it is mainly because of different scale of Y axes in two figures. The confidence interval in Figure 5.2 becomes bigger as the time of NGO activities increases. This shows that we have a relatively high degree of uncertainty over the predicted value.

Angola, Somalia, Burundi, Tajikistan, Cameroon, Mali, Rwanda, Malawi, and Burkina Faso. Egypt, Israel, and Iraq are the countries that have the highest estimated errors.

As these graphs show, the more NGOs exist in developing countries and the longer they have had missions in developing countries, the more US foreign aid the recipient countries have received. A good example is the case of Kenya. From 1960 to 2001, the average amount of annual US foreign aid for Kenya is approximately \$ 28 million. The maximum US foreign aid is less than \$ 100 million. As NGOs started to have field operations in Kenya during the 1990s, Kenya began to receive more foreign aid. In 2002, the number of NGO activities increased up to 20, and Kenya received \$ 102 million and \$ 111 million US foreign aid in 2002 and 2003, respectively. This example can be also understood with the variable of NGO time. From 1960 to 2001, the time of NGO activities had significantly increased. In 2001, the value of NGO time is 305. This implies that a longer period of NGO activities is likely to increase the amount of US foreign aid. These trends show how the activities of US-based NGOs can influence the amount of US foreign aid.




Figure 5.1 Substantive Effects of Direct Influence (Number of NGOs)




Figure 5.2 Substantive Effects of Direct Influence (Time of NGOs)

Figure 5.3 is also created to show the relationship between the amount of US foreign aid and the number of NGO activities. This graph shows the relationship between the mean of US foreign aid and number of NGO activities for each country. This scatter plot shows the positive relationship between these two means. Even though it shows a simple trend, we can observe that Egypt, Iraq, and Israel seem to be outliers. These countries have received excessive foreign aid from the US because of strategic concern of the US. In contrast, countries such as Peru, Liberia, Philippines, Bangladesh, and Ethiopia lie on the simple linear regression line. With lower GDP per capita, these countries need to receive more foreign aid and have NGO activities.




Figure 5.3 Scatter Plot of US Foreign Aid and Number of NGO Activities

In order to test the effect of NGO maturity, the empirical study is conducted with the variable of the weighted number of US-based NGO activities. Through this empirical test, hypothesis 3 is tested. Hypothesis 3 predicts as follows:

Working Hypothesis 3 (Direct Influence): The longer NGOs exist in the United States, the more influence they can achieve over the foreign aid policies of the US government.

As I explained previously, the variable of WNGOs is the weighted number of NGO activities and reflects the maturity of each NGO. Table 5.4 shows the results of empirical studies with fixed effects models (models 1 and 2), random-effects GLS models (models 3 and 4), and the random-effects Tobit models (models 5 and 6) as I did in the previous empirical studies. These models significantly support hypothesis 3. It shows that the weighted number of US-based NGOs is significantly related to the higher amount of US foreign aid. This implies that NGOs with a long history have more resources to influence the US government than newly established NGOs. For example, when NGOs with a long history such as CARE or World Vision International have field operations in a country, these NGOs can influence the policies of the US government more effectively than newly established NGOs. Other control variables show the similar effects on the amount of US foreign aid.

Table 5.4 US Foreign Aid from 1960 to 2008 (With Weighted Number of NGOs)

	Fixed		Random		Tobit	
	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model6
WNGO	0.316*** (0.023)	0.284*** (0.046)	0.310*** (0.022)	0.295*** (0.038)	0.414*** (0.049)	0.411*** (0.050)
Polity		-0.102 (0.829)		1.006 (0.757)	1.355 (0.961)	1.348 (0.965)
LnGDP		-41.66*** (6.691)		-24.10*** (5.708)	-33.84*** (7.560)	-36.49*** (7.642)
LnPop		108.3*** (18.890)		8.233 (5.418)	27.21** (8.800)	29.82** (9.290)
Mortality		0.168 (0.273)		-0.421* (0.191)	-0.0844 (0.249)	-0.188 (0.257)
Ally		100.9*** (12.630)		61.23*** (10.520)	27.21** (9.708)	65.93*** (13.940)
America				-178.5** (60.450)		-257.4** (95.830)
Europe				-3.901 (56.140)		-69.37 (91.670)
Africa				-0.59 (52.330)		-46.19 (85.700)
Middle				113.6* (54.210)		-49.95 (89.780)
Asia				-22.33 (54.790)		-132.3 (90.190)
Constant	10.43*** (2.700)	1499.2*** (301.700)	10.86 (6.796)	58.94 (101.400)	-281.1 (152.200)	-216.1 (162.800)
sigma_u					135.4*** (11.160)	131.2*** (10.590)
sigma_e					255.7*** (3.088)	255.0*** (3.078)
N	7440	4714	7440	4714	4714	4714

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 0.001

Results of Empirical Studies of Indirect Influences

Similar empirical studies are implemented to test the hypotheses regarding the indirect influence of US-based NGOs on government's decisions. The indirect influence of US-based NGO activities on the government is analyzed by studying the influence of NGO activities on media coverage. NGOs attempt to influence public awareness, and the change of public awareness about the issue can influence governments' decisions. These hypotheses predicts as follows:

Working Hypothesis 4 (Indirect Influence): As the number of US-based NGO field operations in a potential recipient country increases, the media coverage of this country increases because of NGOs' attempt to influence the public.

Working Hypothesis 5 (Indirect Influence): The longer US-based NGO field operations in a potential recipient country exist, the more the media covers the country because of NGOs' attempt to influence the public.

As The unit of analysis is the country year for the years 1960-2008, except for members of the OECD. The equation 5.3 is tested as the main model in the following empirical studies.

$$\text{NYT}_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{NGO}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \text{English}_{it-1} + \beta_3 \text{Diplomatic}_{it-1} + \beta_4 \text{Trade}_{it-1} + \beta_5 \text{Pop}_{it-1} + \beta_6 \text{Mortality}_{it-1} + \beta_7 \text{America}_{it-1} + \beta_8 \text{Europe}_{it-1} + \beta_9 \text{Africa}_{it-1} + \beta_{10} \text{Middle}_{it-1} + \beta_{11} \text{Asia}_{it-1} + u_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

(Eq. 5.3)

Table 5.5 shows the results of empirical studies of indirect influence. With fixed-effects models, model 1 shows the bivariate relationship between the number of *New York Times* articles and US NGOs' projects with the fixed-effects model. The activities of NGOs have a significant and positive impact on the number of *New York Times* articles which cover the countries where NGOs have activities. Model 2 shows an empirical

study with other control variables such as English usage, diplomatic relationship, trade relationship, logged population, and region using the same fixed-effects model. This also shows that NGO activities have a positive impact on the coverage of the *New York Times*. Substantively, a one unit increase of NGO projects leads to an increase of 0.25 articles in the *New York Times*. Since the mean of the number of articles is 2.33, the influence of NGO activities seems to have a statistically significant and substantial impact on the coverage by the *New York Times*. Diplomatic relations seem to have a statistically significant influence on the coverage of *New York Times* as well. It implies that higher diplomatic ties lead to a higher coverage on foreign countries. It might be true that a closer relationship between two countries encourages their media to cover more about each other. Trade relationship and logged population also show a significant relationship with *New York Times* coverage. Higher trade volume seems to lead to more coverage by the *New York Times*. The larger countries seem to receive more attention from the media. As shown in models 3 and 4, the random-effects GLS model produces almost identical results with the fixed-effects models. The random-effects Tobit models show the similar results as models 5 and 6 show. The only difference is that regional dummies except Europe show statistically significant results in model 6. It seems that English usage does not really matter when the *New York Times* decides which countries they need to cover since none of the models show any significant impact of English usage. The variable, English, does not show any statistically significant impact.

With empirical studies shown in Table 5.5, hypothesis 4 is strongly supported with different kinds of models. This implies that NGO activities in developing countries promote the coverage of the media as NGOs attempt to publicize their activities and socio-economic conditions in developing countries.

Table 5.5 New York Time Coverage from 1960 to 2008 (With Number of NGOs)

	Fixed		Random		Tobit	
	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model6
NGOs	0.270***	0.253***	0.281***	0.207***	0.400***	0.229***
	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.031)
English		0.605		0.392		0.5
		(3.639)		(0.438)		(0.581)
Diplomatic		-0.312***		-0.320***		-0.328***
		(0.053)		(0.051)		(0.074)
Trade		0.143***		0.0938**		0.0654
		(0.039)		(0.034)		(0.048)
LnPop		0.0418		0.719***		1.427***
		(0.220)		(0.105)		(0.146)
America				1.006		5.407***
				(0.970)		(1.453)
Europe				-0.565		3.088
				(1.125)		(1.637)
Africa				0.114		3.906**
				(0.947)		(1.423)
Middle				2.713*		7.427***
				(1.073)		(1.568)
Asia				0.995		4.297**
				(1.049)		(1.542)
Constant	1.823***	1.626	1.802***	-9.334***	-1.133**	-25.94***
	(0.053)	(3.480)	(0.233)	(1.679)	(0.396)	(2.420)
sigma_u					4.777***	2.688***
					(0.289)	(0.181)
sigma_e					4.855***	4.689***
					(0.056)	(0.056)
N	7440	5769	7440	5769	7440	5769

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 0.001

Table 5.6 shows the results of empirical models testing hypothesis 5. Fixed-effects models (models 1 and 2), random-effects models (model 3 and 4), and Tobit random-effect models (model 5 and 6) are adopted as shown in Table 5.6. As these models show, the time of US NGO activities has a significant and positive impact on coverage by news media. This implies that US NGOs try to mobilize the public through the news media as they stay in developing countries for a longer time period. As NGOs stay longer in developing countries, they can raise more important issues and spread the norms in home countries. That is why the longevity of NGO activities in the field can lead to fortifying NGOs' function as agenda setters and norm generators. Other variables such as diplomatic relationship, trade relationship, and logged population also have a statistically significant impact on US foreign aid as the previous empirical studies with the number of US NGO activities. English usage seems not to be a significant factor in increasing the coverage of news media. It might be because of the capability of the *New York Times* and the interconnectivity of modern world. There are many reporters who can deliver information in foreign language in the *New York Times*. Moreover, the language is not a strong barrier any more since people share information throughout the world regardless of their languages. With this empirical study, hypothesis 5 is strongly supported.

Table 5.6 New York Time Coverage from 1960 to 2008 (With Time of NGOs)

	Fixed		Random		Tobit	
	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model6
NGOtime	0.0101*** (0.001)	0.00473*** (0.001)	0.0106*** (0.001)	0.00442*** (0.001)	0.0149*** (0.001)	0.00417** (0.002)
English		0.634 (3.663)		0.535 (0.438)		0.668 (0.577)
Diplomatic		-0.297*** (0.053)		-0.324*** (0.052)		-0.337*** (0.075)
Trade		0.146*** (0.039)		0.126*** (0.035)		0.110* (0.048)
LnPop		0.792*** (0.213)		0.944*** (0.103)		1.706*** (0.140)
America				0.823 (0.971)		5.248*** (1.450)
Europe				-0.739 (1.126)		2.951 (1.633)
Africa				-0.105 (0.948)		3.711** (1.420)
Middle				2.165* (1.073)		6.831*** (1.563)
Asia				0.553 (1.049)		3.807* (1.537)
Constant	2.049*** (0.048)	-9.568** (3.386)	2.033*** (0.236)	-12.32*** (1.657)	-0.815* (0.409)	-29.74*** (2.361)
sigma_u					4.957*** (0.299)	2.666*** (0.177)
sigma_e					4.897*** (0.057)	4.717*** (0.057)
N	7440	5769	7440	5769	7440	5769

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 0.001

Similar to the direct influence of the number and time of NGO activities, the substantive effects of indirect NGOs' influence are shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. As these two graphs show, hypotheses 4 and 5 are substantively supported. While Figure 5.4 shows the relationship between media coverage and the number of NGOs, Figure 5.5 shows the influence of time of NGO activities over media coverage. They show that the higher number of NGO activities and a longer time period of NGOs' existence have a substantive relationship with a higher number of *New York Times* articles covering the countries where NGOs have operations.

The substantive impact of the number and time of NGO activities can be described with several examples of countries. For example, South Africa had not been covered by the media in the field of international development and relief before 2000. US-based NGOs started to have more field operations in South Africa starting from 1995, and there were 10 NGO activities in 1998. The number of *New York Times* articles covering the field of international development and relief in South Africa were 10 in 1999. After 1999, more than 10 articles for each year could be observed. Considering the mean of the number of articles, which is 2.34, the impact of NGO activities seems to be significant. Pakistan shows similar trends. As the number of NGO activities increased during the 1990s, the number of *New York Times* articles significantly increased. I can easily find examples of other countries. This time-series example with a couple of countries seems to be too simple, and the impact of NGO activities seems to be exaggerated. Nonetheless, with the results of empirical studies with time-series cross-sectional data, this example implies that NGOs attempt to publicize their activities and their attempt leads to higher coverage of countries in the field that NGOs are working on.




Figure 5.4 Substantive Effects of Indirect Influence (Number of NGOs)




Figure 5.5 Substantive Effects of Indirect Influence (Time of NGOs)

Foreign Aid and Media

Media coverage has been one of the important factors to influence foreign policy behaviors. In chapter 4, I developed working hypothesis 6 about the influence of media coverage on the amount of US foreign aid as follows:

Working Hypothesis 6 (Indirect Influence): The more the media covers the country, the more the US government provides foreign aid for the recipient country.

In the following empirical analysis, Hypothesis 6 is empirically tested. As I explained previously, this hypothesis is already tested in other studies with different datasets (See Van Belle 2003). However, it is important to confirm that media coverage influences the amount of US foreign aid with the dataset which I construct for other empirical analyses. Yet I have already shown that NGO activities influence media coverage of developing countries, I also need to show that more media coverage leads to the increase of US foreign aid. In this way, I can truly understand the indirect influence of NGO activities. This relationship is explained in conceptual models that I developed in chapter III.

Table 5.7 shows the results of empirical studies with media coverage as a main independent variable and US foreign aid as a dependent variable. It shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between the *New York Times* coverage and the amount of US foreign aid. Substantively, the impact of media coverage seems to be significant. As the *New York Times* covers one more article about recipient countries, they receive about 20 million dollars more. Considering the fact that the average amount of US foreign aid is 33.65 million dollars, the impact of one unit increase of the *New York Times* coverage seems to be substantial. This empirical study strongly support hypothesis 6. In time-series data of many countries, we can easily find the positive relationship between the *New York Time* coverage and the amount of US foreign aid. One of examples is Mexico. US foreign aid received by Mexico and the media coverage have a very positive relations. During 1970s, Mexico was not covered in the field of

international development and relief and at the same time was not received a significant amount of US foreign aid. As the media coverage increased from 1997, the amount of US foreign aid became bigger. Mexico received \$153 million US foreign aid in 2006 with 23 articles of the *New York Times*. Other control variables show the similar results with previous empirical studies. The variables which reflect the socio-economic development of recipient countries show significantly positive relationship with the amount of US foreign aid. The alliance of the US seems to receive more foreign aid from the US. From this empirical study, we now know that NGOs' influence over the media coverage eventually has an impact on US foreign aid.

Table 5.7 US Foreign Aid from 1960 to 2008 (With Media Coverage)

	Fixed		Random		Tobit	
	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model6
NYT	16.68*** (0.586)	19.11*** (0.834)	16.55*** (0.557)	19.22*** (0.805)	22.73*** (0.998)	22.67*** (0.998)
Polity		0.887 (0.762)		1.907** (0.694)	2.964*** (0.887)	2.685** (0.890)
LnGDP		-42.73*** (6.357)		-26.75*** (5.375)	-35.79*** (7.274)	-36.60*** (7.350)
LnPop		95.21*** (17.490)		-3.295 (4.689)	23.67** (8.979)	26.70** (9.323)
Mortality		-0.351 (0.253)		-0.795*** (0.174)	-0.706** (0.233)	-0.813*** (0.238)
Ally		81.60*** (12.040)		49.91*** (9.854)	20.35* (9.737)	49.78*** (13.340)
America				-138.8* (55.230)		-210.9* (100.600)
Europe				22.31 (51.060)		-49.02 (97.720)
Africa				32.39 (47.410)		-3.087 (91.320)
Middle				77.47 (49.280)		-115.2 (95.770)
Asia				-5.909 (49.770)		-125.6 (96.250)
Constant	-4.17 (2.401)	1257.9*** (282.000)	-3.871 (5.761)	252.2** (91.530)	-177.7 (157.400)	-143.5 (165.900)
sigma_u					148.2*** (12.530)	142.1*** (11.530)
sigma_e					240.5*** (2.899)	240.2*** (2.894)
N	7440	4714	7440	4714	4714	4714

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 0.001

Tests of Endogeneity Problem

Theoretically, I show that NGOs with a long history of operation in democratic states are more likely to be independent from the control of governments of the host countries. However, it is important to deal with the problem of endogeneity methodologically. In all empirical studies, I already lag the independent variables by one year against the dependent variable. In addition, I adopt three ways of dealing with the endogeneity problem. First, I conduct another empirical study with NGO activities as a dependent variable. Second, the Granger Causality test is implemented. Third, instrumental variable approaches are adopted. Even though these three methodological approaches of dealing with endogeneity problem can be limited, I hope to utilize these three methods to at least ease the suspicion of a reverse causal mechanism in previous empirical studies.

Test of Reverse Causality

We may imagine that US NGOs tend to have more projects in the countries to which the US government sends more Official Development Assistance. This is theoretically feasible since many NGOs' projects are funded by governments. Therefore, we may have doubts about the causal direction of the relationship, as discussed earlier. The amount of US foreign aid might decide the number of projects conducted by US NGOs. Based on this suspicion, I set up another model to learn the causal direction between states and NGOs.

In this empirical analysis, the NGO activities are the dependent variable, and US foreign aid is the main independent variable with the same control variables. Equation 5.2 shows the statistical model for this empirical study.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{NGOs}_{it} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Aid}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \text{Polity}_{it-1} + \beta_3 \text{LnGDP}_{it-1} + \beta_4 \text{LnPop}_{it-1} + \beta_5 \text{Mortality}_{it-1} \\ & + \beta_6 \text{Ally}_{it-1} + \beta_7 \text{America}_{it-1} + \beta_8 \text{Europe}_{it-1} + \beta_9 \text{Africa}_{it-1} + \beta_{10} \text{Middle}_{it-1} + \beta_{11} \text{Asia}_{it-1} + \nu_i + \\ & \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$$

(Eq. 5.2)

For this empirical study, the fixed-effects model (models 1 and 2), the random-effects GLS regression (models 3 and 4), and the random-effects Tobit (models 5 and 6) are adopted. As Table 5.8 confirms, the result of this empirical models shows that the amount of foreign aid does have a statistically significant impact on the number of US NGO activities. However, the substantive impact of US foreign aid seems to be very small. A one unit increase of US foreign aid leads to a 0.001 increase of the number of US NGO activities. In other words, the US should provide one billion dollars to the recipient country in order to increase one unit of US NGO activities. Therefore, the amount of US foreign aid cannot substantially increase US-based NGO activities. While this empirical study is designed to find out the causal mechanism between states and NGOs, it shows interesting characteristics of where NGOs decide to have foreign projects. The variables such as the polity score, infant mortality rate, and logged population show a significant relationship. The polity score implies that NGOs tend to go to democratic countries more than non-democratic countries. This may also imply that many autocratic countries do not allow NGOs to have projects in their regimes. As infant mortality rates shows, countries with poor socio-economic situations have more US NGO projects. This shows that NGOs decide their foreign projects considering developing countries' socio-economic conditions. The more populous countries have a higher number of US NGO projects as well.

Table 5.8 US NGO Activities from 1960 to 2008

	Fixed		Random		Tobit	
	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model6
Aid	0.002*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.0009*** (0.000)	0.0008*** (0.000)
Polity		0.116*** (0.006)		0.121*** (0.006)	0.113*** (0.007)	0.108*** (0.007)
LnGDP		-0.211*** (0.053)		-0.0916 (0.052)	0.176** (0.065)	0.107 (0.067)
LnPop		3.416*** (0.146)		2.306*** (0.099)	6.061*** (0.069)	6.667*** (0.176)
		-		-	-	-
Mortality		0.0201*** (0.002)		0.0288*** (0.002)	0.0129*** (0.002)	0.00862*** (0.003)
Ally		0.0125 (0.101)		-0.0621 (0.101)	0.946*** (0.133)	0.934*** (0.163)
America				-0.696 (1.418)		-12.34* (4.858)
Europe				-1.8 (1.449)		-8.253 (4.935)
Africa				1.102 (1.352)		-8.354 (4.661)
Middle				-2.488 (1.398)		-19.97*** (4.817)
Asia				-2.021 (1.406)		-16.76*** (4.701)
Constant	1.941*** (0.026)	-48.07*** (2.354)	1.940*** (0.187)	-29.79*** (1.904)	-97.40*** (1.465)	-92.98*** (5.152)
sigma_u					8.441*** (0.582)	7.822*** (0.572)
sigma_e					1.729*** (0.022)	1.725*** (0.022)
N	7440	4714	7440	4714	4714	4714

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 0.001

In order to show the substantive impact of US foreign aid on the number of US NGO activities, two graphs are presented. Figure 5.6 shows the predicted values of model 6 from Table 5.1 and Table 5.8. While the same models are used, the substantive impact of independent variable on the dependent variable seems to be very different. For the left graph, this model's dependent variable is the amount of US foreign aid, and the independent variable is US NGO activities as explained. This graph shows that the predicted values of US foreign aid substantially increases as the amount of US foreign aid increases. In contrast, the right graph shows the impact of US foreign aid on the number of NGO activities. It shows that the predicted values of US NGO activities are almost the same when the amount of US foreign aid increases from 0 to 100 million dollars. This shows graphically that the US government needs to spend about one billion dollars in order to increase one unit of NGO activities. Through these empirical studies and graphs, we can see that the amount of foreign aid does not substantially influence the number of NGOs. Rather, it seems that the bulk of the causal relationship runs from NGOs to US foreign aid as the number of NGOs influences the amount of US foreign aid.




Figure 5.6 Predicted Values of Model 6 in Table 5.1 and Table 5.8

Granger Causality Test

Granger (1969) introduced a notion of causality in a time-series analysis. In a simple expression, a variable X granger-causes a variable Y, if “Y can be better predicted from the past of X and Y together than the past of Y alone” (Pierce 1977, 11). This method has been widely adopted by economists and political scientists (Freeman 1983). Especially, when researchers have potential endogenous regressors, the Granger causality tests are used. Even though the Granger causality test does not perfectly prove that a variable X causes a variable Y, it is useful to uncover the character of causal relationship. With time-series cross-sectional analysis, the Granger causality test is also adopted. Hood, Kidd, and Morris (2008) apply the Granger causality test to time-series cross-sectional analysis with the example of the causal relationship between black mobilization and Republican growth. They also provide methodological ways to test for Granger causality with time-series cross-sectional data by using the constrained regression technique in statistical packages such as STATA or E-Views. While the method that they use works with their dataset, this method does not really work with the dataset that I have because of too many zero values in my dataset. As many countries do not receive any foreign aid for multiple years, there are many zero variables in the dataset that I use for empirical studies. This fact hinders capability of using this Granger causality test with time-series cross-sectional dataset.

Therefore, I decide to run the Granger causality test for each country separately. In this way, we can understand whether a main independent variable, a number of foreign activities of US-based NGOs, granger-causes a dependent variable, the amount of US foreign aid, for each country.

Table 5.9 and 5.10 shows p-value of the Granger causality tests. This p-value implies whether the variable of NGOs’ foreign activities granger-causes the amount of US foreign aid. There are four possible cases of this causal relationship. First, X granger-causes Y. Second, Y granger-causes X. Third, X and Y are granger-caused by each other.

Fourth, there is no granger-caused relation between X and Y. In this test, there is a fifth case in which variable X is dropped because of collinearity. In this empirical test, X is the number of NGOs' foreign activities, and Y is the amount of US foreign aid.

I only include cases that show some granger-causal relationships. Table 5.9 shows the first case. Out of 155 countries, 53 countries show that the activities of NGO granger-cause US foreign aid. It implies that about one third of total country cases show Granger causality from NGO activities to US foreign aid. These countries seem to be the ones that have many NGO activities and a relatively large amount of US foreign aid. In addition, these countries' GDP per capita seem to be relatively lower. Table 5.10 shows country cases that show granger-causality from US foreign aid to NGO activities and in both directions. There are only eight country cases that show granger-causality from US foreign aid to NGO activities. These countries are only 5 percent of the total number of countries. 15 countries show both directions between NGO activities and US foreign aid. Tables exclude cases which do not have any statistically significant relationships. 35 countries do not show any Granger causality.²⁴ 44 countries are dropped because of collinearity. These countries include Morocco, Seychelles, Comoros, St. Lucia, etc. Most dropped countries seem to be small countries and have few or zero NGO activities. It seems that these countries are dropped since the variable of the number of NGO activities includes too many zero variables.

This Granger causality test does have some limitations. Even though many countries show a significant granger-causality, it is still dubious whether NGO activities granger-cause the amount of US foreign aid when we consider all cases. Despite this

²⁴ These countries are as follows: Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Cape Verde, Venezuela, Bhutan, Singapore, Guatemala, Egypt, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Gambia, Pakistan, Vanuatu, Yemen, Cameroon, Panama, Somalia, Argentina, India, Dominica, Philippines, Burkina Faso, Syria, Indonesia, Fiji, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Brazil, Swaziland, Thailand, El Salvador, and Suriname.

limitation, granger-causality tests at least show that potentially endogenous variable, NGO activities, can granger-cause the dependent variable.

Table 5.9 Granger Causality Test (NGOs to Aid)

NGOs granger-cause Aid					
Country	NGOs -> Aid	Aid -> NGOs	Country	NGOs -> Aid	Aid -> NGOs
Mexico	0.000	0.550	Cuba	0.001	1.000
Guyana	0.000	0.190	Colombia	0.001	0.763
Peru	0.000	0.095	Liberia	0.001	0.150
Bolivia	0.000	0.330	Botswana	0.001	0.702
Paraguay	0.000	0.465	Malaysia	0.001	0.768
Montenegro	0.000	0.357	Tanzania	0.002	0.463
Ukraine	0.000	1.000	East Timor	0.002	0.801
Armenia	0.000	0.497	Solomon Islands	0.002	0.889
Azerbaijan	0.000	0.000	Moldova	0.006	0.397
Mali	0.000	0.122	Niger	0.007	0.885
Benin	0.000	0.002	Laos	0.008	0.929
Guinea	0.000	0.337	Kazakhstan	0.009	0.038
Sierra Leone	0.000	0.317	Lebanon	0.012	0.421
Ghana	0.000	0.503	Burundi	0.013	0.000
Nigeria	0.000	0.968	Myanmar	0.014	0.159
D.R.Congo	0.000	0.167	Iraq	0.017	0.469
Kenya	0.000	0.366	Uzbekistan	0.017	0.094
Eritrea	0.000	0.677	Nepal	0.018	0.186
Angola	0.000	0.160	Jordan	0.019	0.000
Mozambique	0.000	0.081	Papua New Guinea	0.019	0.781
Zambia	0.000	0.812	Senegal	0.031	0.668
Malawi	0.000	0.292	Uganda	0.031	0.932
Sudan	0.000	0.141	Georgia	0.037	0.190
Afghanistan	0.000	0.562	Ecuador	0.041	0.121
Turkmenistan	0.000	1.000	Turkey	0.048	0.727
Tajikistan	0.000	0.652	Iran	0.049	0.753
North Korea	0.000	0.732			

Table 5.10 Granger Causality Test (Aid to NGOs and Both)

Aid granger-causes NGOs			Both Directions		
Country	NGOs -> Aid	Aid -> NGOs	Country	NGOs -> Aid	Aid -> NGOs
Costa Rica	0.058	0.024	Haiti	0.000	0.043
Central African Republic	0.097	0.000	Ivory Coast	0.000	0.000
Congo	0.097	0.012	Chad	0.000	0.001
Honduras	0.123	0.029	Rwanda	0.000	0.000
Namibia	0.188	0.000	Ethiopia	0.000	0.000
Guinea-Bissau	0.204	0.031	Zimbabwe	0.000	0.000
Mauritania	0.380	0.003	Kyrgyzstan	0.000	0.000
Chile	0.682	0.019	Mongolia	0.000	0.000
			Nicaragua	0.003	0.007
			Madagascar	0.004	0.012
			South Africa	0.015	0.000
			Togo	0.017	0.003
			Albania	0.031	0.008
			China	0.000	0.041
			Lesotho	0.020	0.031

Instrumental Variables Approach

In addition to the methods of test of reserve causality and Granger causality, I adopt an instrumental variables approach. Instrumental variables methods are one of the widely used solutions to endogeneity problem (Baum 2006). In order to conduct instrumental variables approach, it is important to find a good instrument. The instrument must be a variable that affects the potentially endogenous independent regressors, but should not directly have an impact on the dependent variable. To find a good candidate for an instrument is a very difficult task since most variables that might affect endogenous variables usually have a direct effect on the dependent variable. After considering several potential candidates for an instrument, I find one of the best available instruments among candidate variables. I decide to use the logged number of people affected by natural disasters in a country as an instrument with theoretical and methodological reasons.

Theoretically, the logged number of people affected by natural disasters can be a good instrument. We may imagine that this variable may affect both the amount of foreign aid and the number of NGOs' foreign activities. It is possible for countries affected by natural disasters to receive more foreign aid by the US. However, this is not always the case once we consider the time frame of foreign aid decisions and implementation. It takes a significant amount of time for the US to send more foreign aid to countries affected by natural disasters. In contrast, as often observed in the incidence of natural disasters, it is NGOs that go first to areas affected by natural disasters. For example, when the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 and the Haiti earthquake in 2010 occurred, international NGOs started their projects immediately after these natural disasters and have continued their projects since then. The number of NGO activities is much more directly affected by the incidents of natural disasters in developing countries than the amount of foreign aid. In addition, it is not easy for the US government to increase the amount of foreign aid as natural disasters occur.

Methodologically, an instrument needs to have a higher correlation with potentially endogenous regressors and a lower correlation with the dependent variable. As Table 5.11 shows, the correlation between the logged number of people affected by natural disaster and the amount of US foreign aid is 0.0904. Compared to this low correlation, the correlation between the logged number of people affected by natural disaster and the number of NGOs' foreign activities is 0.5062. We can easily notice that this variable has a higher impact on the number of NGOs' foreign activities while it has a minimal effect on US foreign aid.

Table 5.11 Correlations among Aid, NGOs, and an Instrument

	Aid	NGOs	Disaster
Aid	1		
NGOs	0.2101	1	
Disaster	0.0904	0.5062	1

It is not easy to find a good instrument for instrumental variables approaches, but it seems that I at least attempt to find the best available option. The variable of the logged number of people affected by natural disasters is from the EM-DAT database.²⁵ The EM-DAT database provides comprehensive lists of various disasters covering almost all countries starting from 1900 to the current year. This database is widely used by scholars from various disciplines. The reason I log this variable is to avoid any statistical distortion caused by the wide range of the variable.

²⁵ EM-DAT Database (<http://www.emdat.be/database>)

Table 5.12 shows the result of instrumental variables approach. Generalized two-stage least squares random-effects instrumental variable regression is conducted in model 1, 2, and 3 with different control variables. When I only include the variable of NGOs, it shows statistically significant relations with the dependent variable. With other control variables, NGOs' foreign activities have an impact on the amount of US foreign aid from 1960 to 2008. In this empirical study, the variable of NGOs is instrumented by mainly the logged number of people affected by natural disaster. Even with instrumental variables approach, NGO activities show a statistically significant impact on US foreign aid. It implies that the variable of NGO activities might not be endogenous, and NGO activities influence US foreign aid.

Table 5.12 US Foreign Aid from 1960 to 2008 (Instrumental Variables Approach)

	Model1	Model2	Model3
NGOs	13.33*** (2.305)	15.86* (8.035)	17.17* (8.158)
Polity		-0.332 (1.284)	0.0605 (1.242)
LnGDP		-23.61*** (5.939)	-26.62*** (5.916)
LnPop		6.851 (14.470)	2.792 (14.090)
Mortality		-0.41 (0.285)	-0.401 (0.307)
Ally		31.42*** (7.728)	71.84*** (11.120)
America			-212.4** (74.270)
Europe			2.891 (71.160)
Africa			-14.64 (68.500)
Middle			112.4 (69.030)
Asia			-31.38 (69.350)
Constant	8.974 (7.895)	62.71 (198.500)	150.4 (198.200)
N	7440	4714	4714

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 0.001

Conclusion

In this chapter, several quantitative empirical studies are conducted. These empirical studies are designed to test working hypotheses. Through these studies, I find strong empirical support for my hypotheses. With different methodological approaches such as fixed-effects, random-effects, and Tobit models, all working hypotheses are strongly supported. Empirical studies first support the direct influence of NGOs over US foreign aid. About the number of NGO activities in developing countries, countries that have more NGO projects have received more foreign aid from the US. Concerning the time period of NGO activities, recipient countries have received more US foreign aid as NGOs have existed in these countries longer. The weighted number of NGO activities is also significantly related to the amount of US foreign aid. After testing these direct influences of NGOs, the indirect influence of NGOs is tested. Hypotheses about indirect influences are also empirically supported. The more NGOs have activities in developing countries, the more media covers these countries. In addition, if NGOs exist in developing countries for a longer time period, media tend to cover more about these countries. The relationship between media coverage and US foreign aid is also studied. Media coverage has a significant and positive impact on the amount of US foreign aid received.

After conducting the main empirical studies, I study the potential problem of endogeneity. It is not clear whether NGO activities cause the increase of US foreign aid or the other way around. There is a doubt that US foreign aid attracts more NGO activities in developing countries since this phenomenon has been observed in the field of international development and existing literature shows the governments' influence over

NGO activities. Therefore, three methods such as test of reverse causality, Granger causality, and instrumental variables approach are used. All three of these methods support the results of previous empirical studies. They show that NGO activities influence the amount of US foreign aid, not the other way around. In the next chapter, a qualitative analysis of foreign activities of NGOs will be conducted to see if the causal mechanisms described in the theory are applied to real world cases.

CHAPTER VI

QUALITATIVE STUDIES

Introduction

This chapter provides a qualitative study of the causal mechanisms linking US foreign aid and NGO activities. It includes the background information of interviewees and detailed analyses of interviews according to the theories. In-depth interviews with NGOs workers, USAID officials, and a reporter from the *New York Times* are conducted. Through these interviews, I can understand the causal mechanism relating NGO activities and states' foreign policy behaviors. In addition, the NGOs' relationship with the media is studied. Even though NGOs admit that they sometimes have a partnership with the US government depending on the project, they argue that the US government has a very limited influence on international NGO activities and that they have independent decision-making processes.

While the main purpose of these interviews is to confirm the causal mechanism between states and NGOs, the interviews support the theories described in the early chapters. NGOs influence the US government directly and indirectly. Through personal interaction with USAID officials, NGOs function as information providers. With systematic advocacy efforts, they function as lobbying groups. NGOs also try to publicize their international activities in order to influence the US government indirectly by raising the public awareness of international issues.

Methods of Qualitative Studies

In chapter V, large N quantitative studies were conducted with time-series cross-sectional data. With the results of quantitative studies, we may argue that NGO activities influence the amount of US foreign aid. Even though several methodological approaches are adopted to solve the problem of endogeneity, the causal direction between states and NGOs needs more comprehensive analysis. In order to address this issue, I decide to adopt qualitative studies with the methods of interviews. With this qualitative study, we can now confirm that NGOs may influence governments' decisions.

Quantitative and qualitative studies have their own advantages and disadvantages. Through qualitative case study, researchers can conduct an in-depth study and understand a single case more in detail (Lijphart 1975). However, it may have a fundamental problem of causal inference, since a single case can generate the problem of alternative explanations, measurement error, and random error (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Meanwhile, a large N quantitative analysis is well suited to test alternative hypotheses by controlling for other potential explanations (Jackman 1985). The problem of the large N study is the lack of available data and the time consuming process of collecting data (Collier 1993). Selection bias often caused by the lack of data can be another problem with quantitative analysis (Signorino 2002). The more important issue that I have in the previous chapters is determining whether the independent variable is endogenous or not. Theoretically, I have a suspicion that the variable of NGO activities can be endogenous to the US government's decisions to provide foreign aid to developing countries. Therefore, I adopt several methodological solutions such as test of reverse causality, Granger causality test, and an instrumental variable approach in the last chapter. Along with these quantitative methods, qualitative studies can explain the relationship between NGOs and states much more in detail.

The method of in-depth interviews is primarily used to study the relationship between NGOs and states. In order to test the main theoretical arguments, I consider three

main groups of interviewees: US governmental officers, NGOs workers, and reporters from the media. For US governmental officers, I contacted staff members from USAID, since USAID is one of the main governmental bodies that deals with international development and has extensive relations with NGOs. For reporters, I contacted reporters from the *New York Times*. I have already utilized the articles of the *New York Times*, and it is one of the main media outlet in the US. The interviews with reporters from the *New York Times* give a good insight of how media and NGOs interact with each other. For NGO workers, it is not easy to identify the sample of US-based NGO workers because of the large number of US-based NGOs. Therefore, in the field of international development and relief, I try to have a mixture of large and small NGOs. The detailed selection process of NGO workers will be explained later.

Three interview methods are used to conduct interviews with these three main groups of interviewees: face-to-face, phone, and email interview. For a face-to-face interview, I need to develop networks with interviewees. I was able to have a face-to-face interview with NGO workers with the help of one of my acquaintances who used to work as a program officer at World Vision International. Another main method of conducting interviews is through email and phone. I sent emails to several target NGOs requesting phone interviews. After exchanging several emails, I was able to have interviews with several interviewees. Because of the development of technology, face-to-face interviews are no longer necessary. It takes enormous time and resources to meet NGO workers since NGOs are located in different places. Using a phone saves enormous time to conduct the interviews. Using email questionnaires is also a good method considering NGO workers' workloads and schedules. Even though I may not ask more detailed questions, I can still identify the causal relationship between the US government and NGO activities.

Through interviews with these key groups, the main causal direction between the US government and US-based NGOs is tested. Three sets of interview questionnaires are

prepared for three different key groups. For NGO workers, interviews include the questions about the relationship between the US government and US-based NGOs. There are four main parts in the interview questionnaires: 1) the influence of NGOs on the US government, 2) whether the US government tries to influence NGO activities, 3) decisions about NGOs' international activities, and 4) NGOs' relationship with the media. For USAID officials, similar questions are prepared. I try to see the different perspectives of USAID's relationship with US-based NGOs. For reporters, questions focus on whether and how they obtain information from NGO workers in the field. The interview questionnaires can be found in Appendix B.

Interview Selections and Interviewees

In order to select interviewees for NGO workers, I focus on NGOs in the field of international development and relief. Therefore, NGOs listed in Appendix A are considered. Out of the 114 largest NGOs in the field of international development and relief, the largest NGOs according to their annual revenue are first considered. After contacting these NGOs, I was able to conduct face-to-face interviews with a staff member from World Vision. Phone interviews were conducted with staff members from CARE, Samaritan's Purse, and Mercy Corps. I also received detailed answers from questionnaires from Women for Women. I conducted a brief interview with Children International, Feed My Starving Children, and Compassion International through email and phone.

World Vision is one of the largest international NGOs based in the US. It is a "Christian humanitarian organization dedicated to working with children, families, and their communities worldwide to reach their full potential by tackling the causes of poverty and injustice".²⁶ It has international projects in about 100 countries in the world.

²⁶ World Visions Website (www.worldvision.org)

Its total revenue in 2010 was \$1,041 million and total net assets are \$170 million. CARE is another one of the largest NGOs in the US. It was founded in 1945 to provide relief to survivors of World War II. Its main mission is “to serve individuals and families in the poorest communities in the world”.²⁷ It has activities in about 72 countries. In 2009, its revenue and support was \$700 million. Samaritan’s Purse and Mercy Corps are also two of the largest NGOs in the field of international development and relief. Samaritan’s Purse is “a nondenominational evangelical Christian organization providing spiritual and physical aid to hurting people around the world.”²⁸ Founded in 1970, it has provided humanitarian aid to developing countries. Its annual revenue was \$ 313 million in 2008. Mercy Corps has worked to “provide communities with the tools and support they need to transform their lives”.²⁹ Its annual support and revenue in 2009 was \$ 235 million. Compassion International and Children International are also among the 50 largest NGOs. Compared to these NGOs, Women for Women is a mid-sized NGO with annual revenue of \$29 million in 2009. It focuses more on women’s rights and economic situations. Table 6.1 shows the list of organizations with which I conducted interviews.

²⁷ Care Website (<http://www.care.org>)

²⁸ Samaritan’s Purse Website (<http://www.samaritanspurse.org>)

²⁹ Mercy Corps Website (<http://www.mercycorps.org>)

Table 6.1 List of Interviewees

List of Organizations	Interview Method
World Vision	Face-to-face
CARE	Phone
Samaritan's Purse	Phone
Mercy Corp	Phone
Women for Women	Email
Children International	Phone
Feed My Starving Children	Email
Compassion International	Email
USAID	Face-to-face, Email
New York Time	Phone

A face-to-face interview with Randall Spadoni from World Vision was conducted. I visited his office in Washington DC and conducted an in-depth face-to-face interview for about an hour. He is currently working as a country program manager covering the countries of China, Mongolia, Myanmar, and North Korea. I also had a phone interview with a director of Policy Communications director from CARE for about 30 minutes. She is in charge of communicating with the media and publicizing CARE's activities and does not want to reveal her name. A phone interview with Chris Johnston from Samaritan's Purse was conducted for about 20 minutes. He works in donor ministries. I also had a phone interview with Emily Wei from Mercy Corps. She is a Policy Analyst in Mercy Corps, specializing in food security. Alex Craig from Women for Women sent emails answering all questions in detail.

For the interview with a reporter from the *New York Times*, I first needed to determine whom to contact. I searched articles about international development and relief. It seems that a reporter, Celia Dugger, has written many articles about international development in Africa. I tried to contact her by email and set up a time for the phone interview. Through the internet international phone, I was able to conduct an interview with Celia Dugger who is a Co-bureau Chief, at the *New York Times*, currently based in Johannesburg, South Africa. She is in charge of covering stories in the Southern African region. Two anonymous officials from USAID were willing to have an interview with me, but they preferred not to reveal their names and detailed information. I conducted a face-to-face interview with one official from USAID in Washington DC. I was able to also receive detailed answers to questions by email from another USAID official.

Contents of Interviews

State-NGO Interaction

I asked extensive questions about state-NGO relationships to each person. Staff from World Vision, CARE, Samaritan's Purse, Mercy Corp, and Women for Women said that all of these organizations have interactions with the US government. Mr. Spadoni said that World Vision's interactions occur mainly with USAID. Officials from USAID often meet workers from various NGOs and ask opinions about some region's political and economic situations. Workers from World Vision are sometimes asked to make presentations for governmental officers with information gathered by its field workers. Mr. Johnston from Samaritan's Purse also mentioned that the vice president of Samaritan's Purse plays a key role of interacting with the US government. The vice president meets governmental officials from various departments, especially from USAID and attends several meetings with USAID officials along with other NGO members. Ms. Wei from Mercy Corps said that the US government is one of the main donors for Mercy Corps. Mercy Corps needs to interact with the US government since

the US government wants to know where grants provided by the US government are spent.

While these NGOs seem to have an extensive interaction with the US government in terms of funding and project evaluations, some NGOs do not have any interaction with the US government. Through conversations on the phone, an anonymous staff member from Children International said that Children International does not have any relationship with the US government and does not pursue any government-related funding. Abby Theobald, Food Relief Coordinator, from Feed My Starving Children mentioned that “FMSC does not work directly with the US government, due to various reasons.” From the email exchange with Compassion International, staff member from the department of sponsor-donor relations answered that they “do not accept government funding, and are not associated with any government whatsoever”.

US Government’s Influence over NGOs

One of the main questions raised from the previous chapters is whether NGOs influence the US government’s decisions or the other way around. When questions regarding this issue are asked, staff from NGOs that have any interaction with the US government answered that NGOs and the US government work together. They emphasized that the US government functioned as a donor. Any major donors including the US government want to know where the money goes and how it is spent. While NGOs are implementing projects, they often report their activities and programs’ achievements to donors. Before NGOs accept government funding or pursue USAID grants, they are well aware that they have obligations to report their activities in the field. NGO officials are willing to accept donor’s demands as long as they follow the purpose of program in the field.

Mr. Johnston described this relationship as a good partnership. As the US government provides funding for the program which can improve socio-economic conditions for people Samaritan’s Purse is serving, Samaritan’s Purse is willing to

cooperate with the US government. Ms. Wei also emphasized the importance of partnership with the US government. As the US government is one of its major donors, partnership with the US government is essential. Even though Mercy Corps does not have any regular meetings with government officials, they do have meetings with the US government if there are issues related to projects mainly funded by the US government. Governmental officials from USAID also describe how they cooperate with US-based NGOs. Even though USAID has funding available for people in developing countries, it is better for NGO workers to implement projects with their expertise. Officials from USAID mentioned that NGOs have many more resources and much more expertise in terms of field operations. That is why USAID provides funding for NGOs. It seemed that officials from USAID believed that funding somewhat influences where NGOs have international activities. They also agreed that NGOs and the US government are good partners when they implement or develop projects in the field.

Independent NGOs

Despite extensive interaction with the US government, staff from NGOs clearly stated that their organizations are independent organizations. They can work with the US government if it is better for NGOs to implement projects in the field. At the same time, they can choose not to work with the US government. More important is that the US government does not or cannot influence the decisions about NGOs' international activities. Mr. Spadoni described World Vision's federated models. World Vision has separate teams for implementation and support. Teams for implementation focus only on the field operations. They design, plan, and conduct field operations without any interference from outside. These implementation teams are very independent in terms of decision-making processes. The supporting teams are the main actors who have interaction with the US government. They pursue the government funding and provide it to implementing teams. Because of these federated models, the US government has a much smaller opportunity to influence World Vision's decisions about field operations.

Even if World Vision pursues grants provided by the US government, it often tries to have a cooperative agreement with the US government. It means that the US government has less control over what World Vision is doing in the field.

Staff from CARE also emphasized the independent characteristics of CARE. Even though CARE started as an implementer of the US government's foreign policies, it is now big enough to decide and implement their projects independently. It does not need to depend on funding from the US government. She also added that CARE often turns down grants provided by the US government if workers from CARE think that the grants might damage CARE's reputation in the field. For example, CARE has not pursued some grants focused in Afghanistan since these grants can be harmful to its reputation in the field and they can put CARE workers in danger.

Mr. Johnston also explained whether the government influences NGOs' international activities. He described that Samaritan's Purse decides where it has field operations depending on the situation, not available funding. For example, when a cyclone hit Myanmar in 2008, Samaritan's Purse immediately sent a team to help affected people in the area. After providing immediate help, they make a decision about whether it needs a field operation. Once it decides to have a long-term project in a country, it starts to search for available funding. Its presidency makes a final decision about where Samaritan's Purse has field operations. Therefore, he said that decisions about where it opens field offices or starts field operations are very independent. He mentioned that sometime USAID money influences where it opens a new office, but the influence is very limited. Mr. Craig from Women for Women said that his organization has certain criteria that must be met before it begins to assess if it wants to establish programmatic operations in a country. For example, a country must have conflict or post-conflict status. Women are disproportionately affected by the conflict and experience high levels of social and economic exclusion. Regarding his organization's decisions about the initiation of foreign activities, he answered as follows.

“Prior to entering a new country, WfWI will form a country assessment team comprised of country experts, senior WfWI specialists, external consultants, and frequently a member of the Board of Directors to conduct in-country analysis to determine if a specific country should become our next location of operation.”

He also answered the questions emphasizing independent decision making systems of his organization as follows.

“I am not aware of the US government ever applying their influence or leverage to alter how WfWI implements its programmatic activities. Prior to submitting proposals for government grants, WfWI carefully examines and vets the parameters and requirements of the grant and ensures that our programmatic offering aligns with the grant objectives and goals.”

More important is that NGOs that do not have any interaction with the US government are not influenced by the US government. Staff from Children International said that the US government does not and cannot influence the decisions of Children International’s foreign activities. It can remain solely as an independent decision maker as it does not receive any funding from the US government. For most NGOs, especially small NGOs, it is true that they are not influenced by the US government.

NGOs’ Influence over the US government

Interviewees described that NGOs influence the US government through the interaction with government officials and through systematic advocacy efforts. These two ways of influencing the US government are very similar to the theoretical understanding of direct influence of NGOs which is developed and empirically tested in the previous chapters. Through direct interaction with government officials, NGOs function as

information providers. Systematic advocacy efforts are close to the function of NGOs as lobbying groups.

As described earlier, NGO workers have interactions with government officials. A staff person from CARE explained that she often makes presentations for government officials. These presentations include the activities of CARE, political situations of countries, regional information, and economic development. She has provided detailed information gathered by CARE workers in the field. With information that they are given by NGO workers, government officials often make important foreign policy decisions. For example, she mentioned that CARE workers try to educate members of the US foreign aid committee by providing more precise information about the situations and countries. In addition, she explained one of CARE's projects, the Leaning Tour. In 2010, the Leaning Tour sent a delegation to Ethiopia which included two congressmen, people from the media, and potential donors. What CARE did was to give them an opportunity to experience the reality of the Ethiopian economic and political situation. Through this kind of project, CARE tries to educate people, especially people in power of delivering more resources to developing countries. She added that educating key decision makers, such as members of Congress, is one of CARE's main interactions with governmental officials.

NGO workers sometimes directly suggest their opinions to governmental officials. For example, Mr. Spadoni said that World Vision has provided detailed information about developing countries for the US government. When USAID sent an assessment team about child focus issues in Myanmar, officials from USAID met workers from World Vision and other international NGOs, and they gathered information about children's rights and economic conditions through NGO workers. In the Philippines, workers from World Vision were also invited to meetings with officials from the US government. They provided extensive advice for child labor programs in the Philippines. Moreover, Ms. Wei explained how Mercy Corps' effort about food security is seriously

considered by the US government. She mentioned that the traditional way of distributing food for the poor by the US government is to provide food purchased from outside of recipient countries. Mercy Corps suggested that it should be much easier if the US government provided locally purchased food for the poor. After considering this suggestion, the US government started to provide locally purchased food for the poor in developing countries.

Through interviews, I can confirm that NGOs function as lobbying groups. Many large NGOs have their own advocacy teams. These advocacy teams try to systematically influence decisions of the US government. Mr. Spadoni answered that World Vision sometimes tries to influence the initiation of new legislation, if it is necessary. Through the public campaign or lobbying efforts toward the legislature, World Vision tries to influence the US government's policies, especially foreign policies which affect people's lives in developing countries. For example, it tries to influence the US government's foreign policies regarding child-trafficking in Malaysia. With its efforts, the US government put more resources to prevent child-trafficking in the region. Some NGOs do not have any explicit advocacy activities. Nonetheless, they are willing to put forth advocacy efforts. Mr. Johnston said that Samaritan's Purse does not focus on advocacy, but sometimes suggests foreign policies if it is necessary. For example, even though it is a rare case, the president of Samaritan's Purse suggested to the Obama administration that the US should take immediate action for the Haiti earthquake. Mr. Craig explained his organization's advocacy activities. Women for Women does not lobby or participate in political activities. However, it does support any legislation or international policy that is directed to eradicating human rights violations, violence against women, and eliminating social and economic exclusion.

In addition to their own advocacy teams, NGOs form networks among themselves in order to effectively influence the US government's policies. Ms. Wei mentioned the role of InterAction, the alliance of US-based international NGOs. World Vision, CARE,

and Mercy Corps are the members of InterAction. She said that InterAction is functioning as a main actor to influence foreign policy decisions of the US government. She added that it is much more effective to act with other NGOs because more NGOs can put more resources to change or initiate US government's policies. InterAction has a regular meeting with government officials from various departments including USAID. It tries to influence the US government at the macro policy level.

NGO Activities in the Field

Through the interviews, it turns out that NGOs cooperate in the field as they do in home countries for advocacy. There is a simple reason why these NGOs in the field are willing to coordinate. Through the coordination, they can implement their projects much more effectively. Even though different NGOs have distinct projects in the field, NGOs in the field of international development and relief share common values and goals, which aim to help people in need. Staff from CARE explained that CARE as one of the largest NGOs sometime plays a key role of coordinating with other NGOs. It often opens forum for NGOs in the same region or country. She said that there is a synergy effect as more NGOs work together if these NGOs share the same goals and values. Mr. Jonhston mentioned the avoidance of duplicate efforts as follows.

“We coordinate with other NGOs a lot. We often have meetings for coordination with other NGOs. We don't want to duplicate our efforts. It's always better to know what other NGOs are doing in the field since coordination in the field happens a lot. For example, if we want to do community development, we first need to understand whether we need to go. If other NGOs have worked in that community already, it is better to target other communities.”

There are mixed reactions about the coordination and the number of NGOs in the field. Staff from CARE said that the large number of NGOs in the field promotes more coordination among NGOs. There is some competition among NGOs when they pursue grants provided by the same donor. However, once they work in the field, they are willing to work with other NGOs in order to achieve better results. She believed that coordination among many NGOs in the field is essential for each NGO to implement their project effectively. The more NGOs exist, the better they can improve people's lives. Ms. Wei explained that it might depend on the situation. She received several reports about conflict among NGOs in the field. She said that conflicts among NGOs can occur as the number of NGOs increased. If the target area is too small, there must be similar international NGOs. If NGOs do not respect other NGOs' work, there is a possibility that conflict can emerge. However, she added that the high number of NGOs is not directly related to the conflict. More important is what NGOs are working on and what the situation is.

Relationship with the Media and the Public

Through interviews from NGO workers, it seems natural for NGOs to use the media to publicize their activities in order to influence the public. Interviews about NGOs' relationship with the media and the public show how NGOs function as agenda setters and norm generators. Many large NGOs have separate teams for communications. These communication teams sometimes publicize their activities through the media and answer media's interview requests. In addition, they focus on publicizing their activities for the public in order to set up the new agenda and raise the public awareness about the situation. Staff from CARE said that the relationship with the media and the public is very essential for their work. She added that CARE utilizes the media in order to change public awareness and to gather funding more effectively. Using the media is a very effective tool to change people's awareness about some regions and countries. She mentioned that the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation even provides funding for the media

to cover stories of NGO activities in the field. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation tries to educate the American public about the situation in developing countries. Once the media starts to cover stories about some regions, people become aware of the situation. People's awareness of the situation definitely helps NGOs raise more money for their targeted projects. It can also attract governments' help or international actors' support.

Mr. Spadoni took an example of child-trafficking in Southeast Asia about how NGOs' interaction with the media and the public can set the new agenda and generate a new norm. NGOs alone could not effectively handle the issues of child-trafficking which was usually perpetrated by organizational criminals. Local governments did not have resources to prevent child-trafficking. Comprehensive media coverage about child-trafficking in Southeast Asia brought a lot of attention locally and internationally. As people start pay attention to that issue, NGOs can raise more money from the public and other international actors for implementing projects which aim to prevent child-trafficking and treat child-trafficking victims. The extensive coverage of the media make people pay more attention to the child-trafficking issues and set the new agenda. Furthermore, as the media covers more about the child-trafficking stories, people begin to realize that they have to protect the basic human rights for children. Through this kind of process, prevention of child-trafficking becomes a new norm in some regions and can be spread to other countries.

Ms. Wei also emphasized Mercy Corp's relationship with the media. Mercy Corps often uses the media to publicize their activities. As it has several projects after Haiti's earthquake, Mercy Corps provides information for the media. The media also provides essential information for NGO workers. Mid-size NGOs such as Women for Women use the media very frequently to expose their activities. Mr. Craig said that his organization wants to publicize their activities. He summarizes his organization's relationship with the media as follows.

“WfWI uses the media frequently to provide exposure to our activities. These have included interviews and appearances by WfWI staff members, domestic and field staff, on major television and radio shows, print publications and Internet websites dedicated to international development and women’s issues. Moreover, WfWI produces reports and other publications that document the organization’s activities and disseminate these publications through various outlets. The organization’s website is also a primary source for information dissemination and encouraging the support of WfWI’s mission and vision.”

Ms. Dugger from the *New York Times* explained that reporters need to contact NGO workers in the field. She said that NGO workers are the people who actually live in the field. She also added that talking with NGO workers is one of the most effective ways to understand the local situations. That is why she talks to NGO workers very often. From her point of view, NGOs have their own reasons for contacting the media. Ms. Dugger believed that NGOs want to contact the media for two main reasons. First, NGOs want to raise the public awareness about the situation that they are dealing with. This is closely related to NGOs’ function as agenda setters. Without people’s attention, NGOs cannot effectively raise enough funding to implement their field projects with contributions from any donors. As more people realize the urgent problems in developing countries, the public want to donate their money to NGOs. In addition, other international actors such as states, foundations, and IGOs are more likely to provide resources for NGOs. Second, NGOs want to generate and distribute a new norm. After raising public awareness, NGOs want to stabilize their projects in the field. If people truly understand the necessity of NGOs’ work in the field and accept it as a norm, NGOs are more likely to implement their projects much more effectively. A staff member from CARE explains that it is not easy to set up a new agenda and make it a new norm. She mentioned that CARE has spent enormous efforts to educate the public that helping people in the Middle

East is much cheaper than military actions in the region. As people change their minds about how to build the peace between countries, key decision-makers tend to listen to their voices more carefully. While it takes time and resources, a new norm can simply change the world in the long term.

Reactions to Interviews

The interviews are designed to understand the relationship between the US government and US-based NGOs. In addition, the interviews focus on the causal mechanism between NGOs and the US government. As predicted, it seems that large NGOs have extensive interaction with the government. The interesting and unexpected reaction from the interviews from NGOs that have interaction with the government is that all of interviewees emphasize the importance of partnership with the US government. They do not deny that the US government can somewhat influence NGOs' projects and NGOs sometimes need to work with the US government. Mr. Spadoni from World Vision said that it is almost always better to keep a good relation with the US government than to have a bad one. The US government should not be considered as the one whom international humanitarian NGOs need to confront. Rather, it is better to attempt to change the perception and behaviors of the US government in the field of international development. He said that it might be very silly to anger a potentially good partner or donor. It is an interesting finding that NGOs maintain and even prefer having an interdependent relationship with the government.

More interesting is that NGO workers strongly believe the independence of NGOs' decisions while they admit the interdependent relationship with the government. They think that grants or contracts provided by the US government somewhat influence the initiation or continuation of field operations. However, the influence by the US government over the field operations is not a major factor that causes NGOs to have field operations.

Through the interviews, I can confirm that NGOs function as information providers, lobbying groups, agenda setters, and norm generators. NGOs put forth efforts to influence the US government's policies. Through the interaction with government officials and systematic lobbying efforts, NGOs want to influence the US government. Along with this direct influence, NGOs try to utilize the media in order to raise the public awareness about the situation as indirect influence. Through setting new agendas and generating norms, NGOs can indirectly influence the government. In addition, NGOs can easily raise more funds if their activities are publicized through the media.

Conclusion

The interviews with people in the field of international development and relief provide me some insight into how they try to make an impact in the world. Despite their busy schedules, NGO workers, USAID officials, a reporter from the *New York Times* were willing to help me conduct this research. I sincerely appreciate their help and endeavor to describe their projects and relationship with other organizations.

My general impression from the interviews is that we have many people who try to improve other countries' socio-economic conditions. Different actors might have different strategies, but they share the common values and goals. NGOs are working hard to change and improve the situation that people in developing countries are facing. NGO activities might cause some unexpected results such as the destruction of the culture, dependency on foreign aid, and the corruption. However, in general the true intention of NGO activities try to bring a better life for people, and most NGO activities make a positive impact on developing countries. When I asked the effectiveness of NGO activities, all interviewees firmly believed that NGOs are making a positive impact in the field.

While the interview does not cover many NGOs, it reveals how NGOs interact with the US government. The causal mechanism between states and NGOs is closely

studied through these interviews. Interviews confirm that NGOs influence states through interaction with governmental officials and systematic lobbying. In terms of funding, project implementation, and evaluations, interviewees admit that NGOs have a partnership with the US government.

CHAPTER VII

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

General Findings and Contribution

Our understanding of NGOs is still limited, although their importance in the international world has been growing. The dissertation is designed to shed light on the study of NGO activities and interactions with governments. Depending on the regime type of states and the maturity of NGOs, the relationship between states and NGOs can vary. With theoretical mechanisms of how NGOs influence governments' foreign policy behaviors toward other states, we can understand the relationship between states and NGOs. NGOs influence states directly and indirectly by functioning as information providers, lobbying groups, agenda setters, and norm generators. With the case of international development and foreign aid, theoretical arguments are tested. NGOs are private sector organizations to provide humanitarian aid for developing countries, and foreign aid is used by states to help other countries. Therefore, NGOs and foreign aid might be closely related and the empirical studies in this project envision their relationship. The designed quantitative and qualitative analyses show the causal relationship between the activities of NGOs and state foreign aid behaviors. The findings from empirical studies show that NGOs have substantive influence over the US government's foreign aid decisions.

With time-series cross-sectional data covering the period of 1960-2008 with 155 countries, empirical studies show that the number of NGO activities in foreign countries are positively related to the amount of foreign aid provided to these countries. Substantively, one unit increase of NGO activities leads to the increase of US foreign aid by at least \$ 16.51 million. With the data of the period of 1981-2008, substantive impact of increased NGO activities is at least \$ 21.62 million. The causal mechanism of time of NGO activities is also supported. The longer NGO exist in developing countries, the

more foreign aid is provided in these countries. Along with the activities of NGOs in foreign countries, the impact of NGO maturity is tested. Since NGOs with long histories tend to secure more funding and resources with stabilized organization, their impact on foreign aid policies seems to be larger than that of newly established NGOs. Empirical analyses with the weighted number of NGO activities are conducted and show that NGOs with long histories influence the amount of foreign aid.

The indirect influence of NGO activities is supported by empirical tests. Media coverage is adopted as the measurement of the public awareness of developing countries. Based on the existing studies about the relationship between the public awareness and media coverage, I assume that higher coverage might lead to the change of the public awareness. The empirical studies support that the activities of NGOs influence media coverage. The more NGOs have activities in developing countries, the higher the level of media coverage in these countries. One unit increase of NGO activities leads to the higher coverage of media by at least 0.22. The relationship between media coverage and foreign aid is also tested. As confirming the results of existing analyses, the higher media coverage leads to the increase of US foreign aid. The problem of potential endogeneity issue is also extensively tested with three different methods. All methods show that the causal direction is from NGOs to states, not the other way around.

The results of qualitative research show interesting findings. All US-based NGO workers emphasize the importance of cooperation with the US government. By cooperating with the US government, NGOs can achieve their goal much more easily and effectively since the US government has enormous resources including grants, funding, and personnel. NGOs are willing to work with the US government as long as projects with the US government do not jeopardize their principles and missions. NGO workers also emphasize that decision-making in their organization is very independent. The influence of the US government is limited when NGOs decide where and whether they want to initiate projects. The interviews reveal that NGOs are willing to publicize their

international works through the media in order to change and raise public awareness about the issue or some regions.

The empirical findings in this study can greatly contribute to the study of foreign aid, NGOs, and world politics. First, scholars have studied the determinants of foreign aid by focusing on states' foreign policy behaviors. As non-governmental entities, NGOs have not been seriously considered as one of the main determinants of foreign aid. Even though we can easily find the common aspects of foreign aid and NGOs in the field of international development, the relationship between these two has not been thoroughly explored. This study suggests that NGOs can be one of the main determinants of US foreign aid. In other countries, NGOs might be influential in their foreign aid policies.

Second, this study shows the critical role of NGOs with large N dataset. As the number of international NGOs increases, NGOs have become more important. In spite of many scholars' efforts, there are not many empirical analyses of NGO activities. Moreover, there exist only a few large N datasets. In contrast to other areas of studies, lack of data hinders empirical analyses of NGOs. I collected very specific data about NGO activities in the field of international development and relief. Even though it takes a large amount of time to collect time-series cross-sectional data of US-based NGO activities, these newly collected datasets have a great potential for the future analyses in the field of NGO studies. I believe that more large N data need to be collected in various fields of NGOs in order to understand the role of NGOs more clearly.

Third, scholars in the field of international relations now need to pay more attention to the importance of NGOs since NGOs can be one of the main actors in world politics. This study shows that NGOs can change states' foreign policy behaviors toward other countries. Cooperation between states can be promoted by the activities of NGOs. As international NGOs expand further, the influence of NGOs will be larger in the future. It is necessary to understand how NGOs interact with other actors such as states, IGOs, and multi-national corporations.

Limitations of Study and Discussion

I cannot deny that this study has some limitations in terms of theory, research design, and empirical studies. More important is that I can improve or expand this study by knowing the limitations of the study. I can find several limitations.

First, the study focuses on only one country, the US. Out of many developed countries which provide foreign aid, I choose the US as the main target of study. There are several reasons why I choose the US, and I already explained it in detail in the previous chapter. By focusing on the case of the US, I am able to conduct my research within the given time and with available resources. However, if were able to include more countries, the research might support my theoretical understanding much more in depth. Some people might argue that this analysis might only apply to the case of the US, if they only focus on the research design. It might be a reasonable criticism.

Second, I might include more NGOs in the US. I focus on the largest NGOs in the field of international development and relief. I consider only NGOs which have more than \$10 million assets. I dare say that no one can include all NGOs, even in the field of international development and relief. The reason is that there are too many NGOs in the US. I focus on the largest NGOs since I know that these NGOs have power to influence the US government. Nonetheless, I might include more large NGOs.

Third, I only focus on states' specific foreign policy behaviors, foreign aid. As I focus on NGOs in the field of international development and relief, I decide to analyze foreign aid policies. As explained before, these two have many common aspects. As I focus on states' specific behaviors toward other states, I tend to lose other important behaviors of states. Instead of providing foreign aid, states can take aggressive actions against other states. These aggressive actions might include war, trade conflicts, and diplomatic assaults. I try to understand how developed countries try to provide aid for developing countries. This might reflect only certain aspects of developed countries' behaviors.

Future Expansion

This dissertation with the newly collected data of US-based NGO activities might have some limitations as I explained earlier. However, at the same time it has a great potential for expansion. With these limitations in mind, I hope to expand this research in the future.

First, it is possible to include different kinds of US-based NGOs. Environmental and human rights NGOs will be the first targets. With the experience of collecting humanitarian NGOs, I can collect the data of how environmental NGOs work in developing countries and analyze how they influence governments' environmental policies. Human Rights NGOs can also be another interesting field of analysis. The change of human rights policy in countries might be influenced by the number of human rights NGOs working in these countries. Historically, NGOs in the field of environments and human rights sometimes strongly act against states' policies. The governments have been among the main violators in the field of environments and human rights. Because of the characteristics of environmental and human rights NGOs, the expansion to these fields will provide an interesting aspect of the interaction between states and NGOs. We might find that NGOs are more willing to work with the government in order to change states' behaviors. It might be the case that NGOs do not want cooperate with the government because of their projects which target the main activities of the governments.

Second, with similar theoretical explanations and arguments, this study can be applied to the case of China. The reason why I am interested in China is that expansion to the case of China can reveal how NGOs influence the government in non-democratic systems. Moreover, China has provided a large amount of foreign aid for developing countries, especially African countries (Lum, Fisher, Gomez-Granger, and Leland 2009). Even though theoretical understanding of NGO influence on the government in non-democratic systems is developed, I could not test it because of lack of data and resources. If I adopt the qualitative study with the case of China, I am able to conduct the tests

regarding the influence of regime type on the interaction between states and NGOs. NGOs in non-democratic regimes are more likely to follow their host governments. They cannot survive without support from non-democratic governments, so they tend to follow the instructions from governments.

Third, I want to include more NGOs in democratic countries, especially European countries, Japan, and South Korea. The same frame used in this dissertation can be applied to these cases. European NGOs might have a similar interaction with their host governments as US-based NGOs do. The analysis of NGOs and foreign aid provided by Japan and South Korea will also provide an interesting aspect of these countries' behaviors. Japan has mainly provided foreign aid for countries in Southeast Asia where Japan once invaded. As Japanese companies expand their business in this region, Japanese foreign aid has played a pivotal role in expanding the Japanese foreign market. It might be interesting to see how Japanese NGOs interact with the governments of host and home countries. An analysis of South Korea might provide insight into how a former aid-recipient country provides foreign aid and services through international NGOs. Along with the provision of foreign aid, the South Korean government now promotes NGO activities which aim to promote international services in developing countries. The state-NGO relationship in South Korea can be analyzed with a frame work similar to the one in this dissertation. These expansions will confirm that the theoretical understanding of this study can be applied to multiple cases.

Fourth, I hope to understand the relationship between IGOs and NGOs. By using a similar framework, I can analyze how NGOs try to influence IGOs through lobbying, monitoring, and working with them. Cooperation between intergovernmental organizations and NGOs can be often observed in the field. IGOs sometime provide more funding for developing countries in order to promote development. For NGOs, working with IGOs can expand their projects and impact on the field. The relationship between

NGOs and IGOs can be empirically tested if I can collect more specific data about their relationship.

APPENDIX A
LIST OF LARGEST NGOS (Q30 AND Q33)

Category	Use	Method	Name	State	Founded	Religious	Rule Date	Revenue (Million)	Assets (Million)
Q33	Y	Web Data	Food for the Poor Inc	FL	1982	Christian	1982	1,514	32
Q33	Y	Web Data	World Vision International	CA	1950	Christian	1982	1,508	407
Q33	Y	Web Data	Americares Inc	CT	1975	Secular	1979	1,014	190
Q30	Y	Web Data	CARE	GA	1945	Secular	1993	714	739
Q33	Y	Web Data	Plan International Inc	RI	1937	Secular	1975	515	191
Q33	Y	Web Data	Save the Children Federation Inc	CT	1932	Secular	1964	470	282
Q30	Y	Web Data	Chf International	MD	1952	Secular	1968	377	125
Q33	Y	Web Data	Compassion International Incorporated	CO	1952	Secular	1959	370	142
Q30	Y	Web Data	International Relief and Development Inc	MD	1998	Secular	1999	297	29
Q33	Y	Web Data	American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee	NY	1914	Jewish	1933	272	475
Q33	Y	Web Data	Christian Childrens Fund Inc	VA	1938	Christian	1951	231	70

APPENDIX A CONTINUED

Q33	Y	Web Data	Mercy Corps	OR	1979	Secular	1981	218	119
Q30	Y	Web Data	Asia Foundation	CA	1950	Secular	1952	144	55
Q33	Y	Phone Data	Children International	MO	1936	Secular	1971	143	44
Q30	Y	Web Data	Management Sciences for Health Inc	MA	1971	Secular	1973	135	30
Q33	Y	Email Data	Food for the Hungry Inc	AZ	1971	Christian	1971	130	16
Q30	Y	Web Data	Pact Inc	DC	1971	Secular	1971	115	163
Q30	Y	Web Data	International Aids Vaccine Initiative	NY	1996	Secular	1996	98	143
Q30	Y	Email Data	International Medical Corps	CA	1985	Secular	1984	95	27
Q30	Y	Web Data	Aga Khan Foundation USA	DC	1957	Islam	1981	93	188
Q30	Y	Web Data	Pathfinder International	MA	1957	Secular	1959	92	46
Q33	Y	Email Data	World Relief	MD	1944	Christian	1964	61	46
Q30	Y	Web Data	Project Orbis International Inc Dba Orbis	NY	1973	Secular	1973	57	23
Q30	Y	Web Data	Africare	DC	1970	Secular	1971	42	27
Q30	Y	Web Data	Ashoka	VA	1980	Secular	1981	37	79

APPENDIX A CONTINUED

Q30	Y	Web Data	Ipas	NC	1974	Secular	1974	34	22
Q33	Y	Web Data	International Orthodox Christian Charities	MD	1992	Christian	1992	34	14
Q33	Y	Web Data	Lutheran World Relief Inc	MD	1945	Christian	1946	33	44
Q30	Y	Web Data	Hope Worldwide Ltd	PA	1991	Christian	1995	32	6
Q30	Y	Web Data	Project Concern International Our Childrens Health	CA	1961	Secular	1963	31	9
Q33	Y	Web Data	Planet Aid Inc	MA	1997	Secular	1997	30	13
Q30	Y	Web Data	Action Against Hunger USA	NY	1980	Secular	1985	30	16
Q33	Y	Web Data	International Relief Teams	CA	1988	Secular	1994	27	2
Q30	Y	Web Data	Citihope International Inc	NY	1985	Christian	1979	24	4
Q30	Y	Web Data	Millenium Promise Alliance Inc	NY	2005	Secular	2006	23	48
Q30	Y	Email Data	Women for Women International	DC	1993	Secular	1994	22	12
Q30	Y	Web Data	Room To Read	CA	1998	Secular	1999	22	14
Q33	Y	Web Data	Childcare Worldwide	WA	1981	Secular	1983	19	1
Q33	Y	Web Data	Life for Relief and Development	MI	1992	Secular	1993	18	2

APPENDIX A CONTINUED

Q33	Y	Email Data	Reach the Children Foundation	FL	1998	Secular	1991	14	8
Q33	N	No Reply	Feed the Children Inc	OK			1967	1,183	593
Q33	N	Duplicate	World Vision International World Vision Inc	WA			1982	1,126	358
Q33	N	Other NGOs	International Committee of the Red Cross	FO			1942	901	697
Q30	N	No Reply	Brothers Brother Foundation Bbf	PA			1965	331	20
Q33	N	No Reply	Samaritans Purse	NC			1981	279	192
Q33	N	No Reply	Operational Blessing International Relief and Development Corp	VA			1987	279	17
Q30	N	No Info	Fundacion DE LA Universidad Del Valle DE Guatemala	FO			1966	243	264
Q33	N	Other NGOs	United States Fund for Unicef	NY			1949	229	131
Q33	N	Other NGOs	United States Fund for Unicef in Kind Assistance Corporation	NY			2005	225	119
Q30	N	No Info	Path	WA			1982	210	526
Q33	N	No long- term	Christian Aid Ministries	OH			1982	184	97

APPENDIX A CONTINUED

Q30	N	No Reply	Cross International Catholic Outreach Inc	FL	1946	148	5
Q30	N	No Reply	Adventist Development and Relief Agency International	MD	2000	144	44
Q30	N	Other NGOs	American Hospital of Paris	FO	1938	139	120
Q30	N	One Country	American Nicaraguan Foundation Inc A Mission for Children	FL	1993	137	22
Q30	N	No Info	Heifer Project International	AR	1999	131	151
Q33	N	No Reply	Heart To Heart International Inc	KS	1993	119	19
Q33	N	No Reply	Childrens Network International	CA	1998	101	4
Q33	N	One Country	Childrens Hunger Fund	CA	1996	95	5
Q33	N	One Country	Joint Israel	NY	2002	91	106
Q33	N	No Reply	Cross International Aid	FL	2001	84	1
Q30	N	One Country	American Near East Refugee Aid Inc	DC	1968	78	12
Q30	N	No long- term	International Aid Inc	MI	1981	78	4
Q30	N	No Reply	Oxfam America Inc	MA	1988	73	99

APPENDIX A CONTINUED

Q33	N	No Reply	Church World Service	IN	2000	72	26
Q30	N	Other NGOs	Nsf International	MI	1968	65	166
Q30	N	No Info	World Emergency Relief	CA	1986	61	1
Q33	N	No Info	Gleensing for the World	VA	1999	56	4
Q30	N	No Reply	Christian Blind Mission International Inc	SC	1978	54	2
Q30	N	Other NGOs	American College of Greece	FO	1964	50	286
Q30	N	No Reply	Pan American Development Foundation Inc	DC	1964	49	14
Q33	N	Duplicate	Plan International USA Inc	RI	1940	48	22
Q30	N	Other NGOs	Magee Womens Research Institute and Foundation	PA	1986	47	87
Q30	N	One Country	Jewish National Fund Keren Kayemeth Leisrael Inc	NY	1953	45	95
Q30	N	Other NGOs	American Institute in Taiwan	VA	1979	44	119
Q30	N	Other NGOs	Aeras Global Tb Vaccine Foundation	MD	1999	43	42
Q33	N	No Info	Benevolent Healthcare Foundation	CO	2001	41	50

APPENDIX A CONTINUED

Q30	N	Other NGOs	Taipei American School Foundation	CA	1981	40	97
Q33	N	One Country	United Armenian Fund	CA	1990	39	1
Q30	N	Other NGOs	International Schools Services Inc	NJ	1959	38	26
Q30	N	Other NGOs	Jerusalem Foundation	FO	1997	37	119
Q30	N	No Reply	Salvation Army World Service Office Sawso	VA	1978	36	32
Q30	N	No long- term	Gain International	TX	1996	36	8
Q33	N	No Info	Taiwan Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation	CA	2006	35	53
Q33	N	No long- term	Convy of Hope	MO	1985	34	21
Q33	N	No long- term	Mission without Borders International	CA	1986	33	13
Q33	N	No long- term	Global Operation and Development Giving Children Hope	CA	1982	33	18
Q30	N	Other NGOs	Global Alliance for Tb Drug Development Inc	NY	2000	31	54
Q30	N	No Reply	American Jewish World Service Inc	NY	1994	31	25
Q33	N	One Country	Salvadoran American Humanitarian Foundation	FL	1984	30	1

APPENDIX A CONTINUED

Q33	N	No Reply	Christian Relief Services Charities	VA	1985	30	2
Q30	N	Other NGOs	Olpc Foundation 2b1 Worldwide OR 2b1	MA	2006	29	31
Q30	N	No long- term	Cure International Inc	PA	1996	26	35
Q30	N	Other NGOs	Trustees of Robert College of Istanbul	NY	1947	26	19
Q30	N	No long- term	Blessings International	OK	1981	26	8
Q30	N	Other NGOs	United States Soybean Export Council	MO	2006	25	3
Q30	N	No long- term	International Youth Foundation	MD	1990	24	29
Q33	N	No Reply	Relief International	CA	1995	23	14
Q30	N	Other NGOs	English Language Institute in China	CA	1981	23	11
Q30	N	No long- term	Surgical Eye Expeditions International Inc	CA	2000	23	5
Q33	N	No Reply	Operation USA	CA	1980	22	7
Q30	N	No long- term	Books for Africa Inc	MN	1993	22	10
Q33	N	One Country	Love A Child Inc	FL	1986	22	4
Q30	N	Other NGOs	Friends of the World Food Program Inc	DC	1995	21	13

APPENDIX A CONTINUED

Q33	N	One Country	Soldiers Angels	CA	2004	17	2
Q33	N	No long- term	Assistant International	CA	1995	17	6
Q33	N	Other NGOs	Bethesda Ministries	CO	1989	16	6
Q33	N	Other NGOs	Global Health and Education Foundation	CA	2000	15	13
Q33	N	Other NGOs	Maranatha Volunteer International	CA	1971	15	12
Q33	N	One Country	Feed My People Childrens Charities Inc	AZ	1988	13	2
Q33	N	Other NGOs	Halo Trust USA	NJ	1999	13	5
Q33	N	Other NGOs	International Teams	IL	1963	12	8
Q33	N	Other NGOs	World Blessing Foundation	CA	1999	11	0.009
Q33	N	No Info	Hungry Children Project	CA	1976	11	0.118

APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES

Interview Questionnaire for NGOs

1. Can you briefly explain about your organization's international activities? Please briefly introduce yourself and your work.
How long have you worked? Job Title?
2. Does your organization have any interaction with the US government?
Regular meeting? Any reports? Network with other NGOs?
3. Does the US government put some pressure on activities of your organization? If so, how?
Direct or indirect influence?
4. Does your organization try to put some pressure on US foreign policy? If so, how?
5. Does your organization try to influence the US government's decision about US foreign aid?
Specific countries? Or programs?
6. Do you believe that NGOs try to influence the US government? If so, how?
NGOs as a whole.
7. When your organization decides where and how they have a field operation, how is the decision made? Who plays a key role in deciding the initiation and continuation of field operations?
Decision maker? Funding-driven? Value-driven? Experience-driven?
Information-driven?
8. How much does funding provided by USAID influence your organization's decisions about field operation?
9. Do you cooperate with other NGOs in the field? If so, how?
10. Does your organization use the media to publicize your organizations' foreign activities?
Try to mobilize the public? Media as a good method?

Interview Questionnaire for USAID

1. Can you briefly explain about USAID's work? Please briefly introduce yourself and your work.
How long have you worked? Title?
2. Does USAID have any interaction with US-based NGOs?
Regular meeting with NGOs?
3. Does the US government put some pressure on activities of US-based NGOs? If so, how?
Direct or indirect influence?
4. Do NGOs as a whole try to put some pressure on US foreign policy? If so, how?
5. Do you believe that NGOs try to influence the US government's decision about US foreign aid?
6. How much do you think that funding from USAID influences NGOs' international activities?
7. When USAID decides the recipients of USAID funding, what is the most important factor?

Interview Questionnaire for Reporters

1. Please briefly introduce yourself and your work.
How long have you worked? Title? What do you do there?
2. Do you have any interaction with NGOs in the field? If so, how often do you talk with NGOs?
Regular meeting? Any reports?
3. Do you contact NGOs in the field? Do you obtain some information about their activities?
4. Do NGOs contact you to publicize their activities in the field?
5. Do you believe that NGO activities in the field attract more media attention?
Examples?

6. The more activities NGOs have in the countries, the more media covers. Do you believe this?
7. When you decide where or which countries to deal with in your article, how do you decide? Do you believe that NGO activities influence this decision?
8. Can you let me know any recent articles to cover NGO activities? Why did you cover NGO activities?

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