Document Type

Dissertation

Date of Degree

Summer 2010

Degree Name

PhD (Doctor of Philosophy)

Degree In

Philosophy

First Advisor

Evan Fales

Abstract

The intent of this thesis is to provide an account of the phenomenology of movement that collapses the distinction between mental and physical without the elimination of the mental. There are two main ways in which mental and physical converge in this account. First of all, the type of knowledge involved in learning movement skills is a type of nonpropositional knowledge that is literally embodied in the neuromuscular system of the body. Thus the mental phenomena of knowing-how and thinking how to do movement skills are body-wide phenomena. Furthermore, this type of knowledge is genuinely self-referential, since the knower and known are identical. Second, the phenomenology of self-actuated movement reveals that the self is experienced as a psychophysical unity through the experience of the coherence of action and the proprioception of that action. This is due to the sense of effort provided by sensorimotor integration of the peripheral nervous system. This sense of effort is the direct awareness of physical properties of muscle lengths, tensions, and speeds of contraction, and is thus a genuine psychophysical phenomenon. It is also argued that we enjoy a high degree of epistemic security regarding experiences of this type.

Keywords

action, movement, nonpropositional knowledge, phenomenology, proprioception

Pages

1, iii, 147 pages

Bibliography

Includes bibliographical references (pages 145-147).

Copyright

Copyright 2010 Wendy S Scholz

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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