Discussants

Emilia Justyna Powell, Georgia Southern University and Steve Rothman, University of Oregon

Start Date

10-13-2006 1:30 PM

End Date

10-13-2006 2:30 PM

Abstract

A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, March 22-25, 2006. I would like to thank Ashley Leeds, Cliff Morgan, and Randy Stevenson for their helpful comments on this project.

Abstract

States often experience disagreements such as competing territorial claims and sometimes they attempt to address these differences by negotiating explicit, written settlements. Can these agreements help ensure a durable peace? I examine the effect of agreements that attempt to address differences after significant conflict has occurred, such as peace agreements, as well as agreements designed to manage competing claims before they reach the level of violence. I refer to these two sets of agreements together as ‘conciliatory agreements’. Using the theoretical framework of the bargaining model of war, I argue that the provisions specified in conciliatory agreements make the existing peaceful equilibrium more robust against the potentially disruptive effect of environmental shocks, such as changes in relative capabilities or regime type. Furthermore, I argue that conciliatory agreements not only increase the likelihood that peace is maintained but also impact the kind of peace maintained. Specifically, competing states that experience disruptive changes may remain at peace either because they continue to accept the status quo or because they peacefully renegotiate a new settlement. I argue that varying agreement provisions can account for why, when conditions change, some states resort to force, while others peacefully renegotiate. I test my propositions concerning the effect of shocks and agreement provisions on the durability of peace and the likelihood of renegotiation using cases of territorial claims between 1919-1995, as identified by Huth and Allee (2002). I have collected conciliatory agreements for three regions (Middle East, the Americas and Europe) and present preliminary findings based on these regions.

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Copyright © Michaela Mattes, 2006.

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Oct 13th, 1:30 PM Oct 13th, 2:30 PM

Conciliatory Agreements and the Durability of Peace

A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, March 22-25, 2006. I would like to thank Ashley Leeds, Cliff Morgan, and Randy Stevenson for their helpful comments on this project.

Abstract

States often experience disagreements such as competing territorial claims and sometimes they attempt to address these differences by negotiating explicit, written settlements. Can these agreements help ensure a durable peace? I examine the effect of agreements that attempt to address differences after significant conflict has occurred, such as peace agreements, as well as agreements designed to manage competing claims before they reach the level of violence. I refer to these two sets of agreements together as ‘conciliatory agreements’. Using the theoretical framework of the bargaining model of war, I argue that the provisions specified in conciliatory agreements make the existing peaceful equilibrium more robust against the potentially disruptive effect of environmental shocks, such as changes in relative capabilities or regime type. Furthermore, I argue that conciliatory agreements not only increase the likelihood that peace is maintained but also impact the kind of peace maintained. Specifically, competing states that experience disruptive changes may remain at peace either because they continue to accept the status quo or because they peacefully renegotiate a new settlement. I argue that varying agreement provisions can account for why, when conditions change, some states resort to force, while others peacefully renegotiate. I test my propositions concerning the effect of shocks and agreement provisions on the durability of peace and the likelihood of renegotiation using cases of territorial claims between 1919-1995, as identified by Huth and Allee (2002). I have collected conciliatory agreements for three regions (Middle East, the Americas and Europe) and present preliminary findings based on these regions.