Copyright (c) 2013 University of Iowa All rights reserved. http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2 Recent Events in Day 2: Friday, October 13, 2006 en-us Thu, 16 May 2013 16:27:55 PDT 3600 http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/12 http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/12 Fri, 13 Oct 2006 19:00:00 PDT http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/11 http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/11 Fri, 13 Oct 2006 17:00:00 PDT http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/10 http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/10 Fri, 13 Oct 2006 16:00:00 PDT Paper prepared for the Shambaugh Conference, “Building Synergies Institutions and Cooperation in World Politics,” October 12-15, University of Iowa.

Abstract

Treaty-making involves the constitutional struggle for policy control. Both Congress and the presdient are defined as official actors in the making of international commitments, and both closely guard their constitutionally defined roles. Yet extant scholarship generally concludes Congress rarely matters in establishing U.S. formal commitments abroad. Indeed, it is frequently pointed out that only 21 treaties have been voted down by the U.S. Senate in its 230 year existence. While true, such a figure presents an incomplete picture of congressional influence. Presidents may covet greater institutional capacity to direct unilaterally U.S. foreign policy, but opposition in both the House and Senate frequently reins in an uncompromising White House. In this paper we compare the international commitments made by Presidents George W. Bush (2001-2004) and Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909). We find the Senate’s role in influencing and/or altering treaties has been under-estimated in most analyses. While the Senate rarely rejects a treaty negotiated by the president with a recorded floor vote, the Senate can and does attach amendments and reservations to treaties that affect U.S. obligations and responsibilities. More importantly, though, and even less recognized are treaties killed by the Senate through inaction. At least 21 treaties during Roosevelt’s administration were rejected by the Senate, none of them by a formal floor vote. By ignoring Senate influence before an official floor vote risks under-estimating the influence the Senate has on U.S. commitments abroad. This paper also explores the domestic political authority under which presidents negotiate international agreements. Most scholars conclude that international agreements signal unilateral presidential power. Yet, many are negotiated pursuant to congressional statutes or previously ratified treaties. In both cases, Congress maintains influence over the process.

]]> Brandon C. Prins et al. http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/9 http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/9 Fri, 13 Oct 2006 15:30:00 PDT http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/8 http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/8 Fri, 13 Oct 2006 14:30:00 PDT Prepared for presentation at the 2006 Shambaugh Conference, “Building Synergies: Institutions and Cooperation in World Politics,” October 12-14, 2006, University of Iowa.

Abstract

The negotiations of multilateral agreements are often long and laborious endeavors, but international relations scholars know very little about what occurs during the bargaining of such agreements, and systematic empirical work is seriously lacking. Little empirical work on how multilateral agreements are negotiated exists because data on the negotiations of a large number of agreements across multiple issue areas has not been collected. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new database of facts related to the multilateral agreement making process. The dataset includes data on what occurred during the negotiations of 170 multilateral agreements, across several different issue areas. Research design and case selection are discussed, as well as the coding of three variables unique to the dataset: the length of negotiations, the first proposal maker, and the number of negotiating states. Descriptive statistics on these variables are also provided.

]]> Michael Gilligan et al. http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/7 http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/7 Fri, 13 Oct 2006 13:30:00 PDT A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, March 22-25, 2006. I would like to thank Ashley Leeds, Cliff Morgan, and Randy Stevenson for their helpful comments on this project.

Abstract

States often experience disagreements such as competing territorial claims and sometimes they attempt to address these differences by negotiating explicit, written settlements. Can these agreements help ensure a durable peace? I examine the effect of agreements that attempt to address differences after significant conflict has occurred, such as peace agreements, as well as agreements designed to manage competing claims before they reach the level of violence. I refer to these two sets of agreements together as ‘conciliatory agreements’. Using the theoretical framework of the bargaining model of war, I argue that the provisions specified in conciliatory agreements make the existing peaceful equilibrium more robust against the potentially disruptive effect of environmental shocks, such as changes in relative capabilities or regime type. Furthermore, I argue that conciliatory agreements not only increase the likelihood that peace is maintained but also impact the kind of peace maintained. Specifically, competing states that experience disruptive changes may remain at peace either because they continue to accept the status quo or because they peacefully renegotiate a new settlement. I argue that varying agreement provisions can account for why, when conditions change, some states resort to force, while others peacefully renegotiate. I test my propositions concerning the effect of shocks and agreement provisions on the durability of peace and the likelihood of renegotiation using cases of territorial claims between 1919-1995, as identified by Huth and Allee (2002). I have collected conciliatory agreements for three regions (Middle East, the Americas and Europe) and present preliminary findings based on these regions.

]]> Michaela C. Mattes http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/6 http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/6 Fri, 13 Oct 2006 12:00:00 PDT http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/5 http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/5 Fri, 13 Oct 2006 11:00:00 PDT Paper presented at the 2006 Shambaugh Conference "Building Synergies: Institutions and Cooperation in World Politics," University of Iowa, 13 October 2006. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 37th Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), Ann Arbor, November 2003, and the 45th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 2004. The authors wish to thank Ashley Leeds, Bumba Mukherjee, Chris Reenock, and Jeff Staton for their valuable comments and suggestions, while taking full blame for all errors and interpretations herein.

Abstract

A recent article suggests that a norm of territorial integrity spread rapidly across the globe during the twentieth century. While the successful acquisition of territory by force has become much less frequent, though, there have been numerous attempts to acquire territory by force during this time, and there appear to be several different types of obligations in territorial integrity treaties. Drawing from the content of treaties with territorial integrity provisions, we reconceptualize the norm to distinguish between treaties guaranteeing territorial integrity in a general sense and those that only proscribe the acquisition of territory by force, and we examine an important precursor in the nineteenth-century Latin American norm of uti possidetis juris. We find that both norms seem to have been associated with generally increased low-level conflict over territory but (at least for general territorial integrity obligations and for the Latin American states that developed uti possidetis) less of the more intense forms of conflict.

]]> Paul R. Hensel et al. http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/4 http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/4 Fri, 13 Oct 2006 10:00:00 PDT Paper prepared for presentation at the Shambaugh/ITRAG Conference, "Building Synergies: Institutions and Cooperation in World Politics," Iowa City, Iowa, October 12-14, 2006. This project was supported by funding from the National Science Foundation grant (SES-02415754), the Social and Behavioral Sciences Research Institute and the Udall Center for Public Policy at the University of Arizona as well as a PEIR grant from the Department of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University.

]]> John P. Willerton et al. http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/3 http://ir.uiowa.edu/shambaugh/2006/day2/3 Fri, 13 Oct 2006 09:30:00 PDT