The Military Revolution, Administrative Development, and Cultural Change in Early Modern Russia

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The subject of state-driven social change is hardly new to Russian historiography. Indeed scholars since Karamzin have claimed that the demands of the state, and particularly its defensive requirements, constituted the fundamental engine of Russian historical development.1 Understandably, the link between military reform and social change continues to be explored by historians. In recent years a number of significant studies have enhanced our understanding of the broad social-structural implications of the military revolution.2 The role of military reform in the evolution of the landed gentry, the enserfment of the peasantry, and the colonization of the southern frontier is now much clearer than ever before. Yet despite the successes of recent research much remains to be learned about the consequences of the military revolution in early modern Russia. One of the most intriguing questions concerning the wider impact of military change in Muscovy is the possible effect of the reforms on the bureaucratization of governmental culture in Russia.3

Among scholars of the military revolution in the West it has long been recognized that the introduction of new model forces brought significant changes to early modern European culture, especially among the ruling elite.4 Under pressure to manage ever larger and more sophisticated armed forces, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century leaders organized complex administrative systems which, in turn, began the process of bureaucratization of state service. Paradoxically, though the impact of the new forms of administration was probably more dramatic in backward Muscovy than in Western Europe,5 the links among military reform, literate administration, and the bureaucratization of governmental culture in early modern Russia have never been the subject of specific investigation.6

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3By “governmental culture” I mean the customs, actions, and consciousness characteristic of those who work in the state. It is my basic premise that governmental culture varies with the form of the state. I understand governmental culture to be distinct from “political” or “religious” culture, though all of these spheres are obviously interrelated.


5I discuss this briefly in my “The Consequences of the Military Revolution in Muscovy in Comparative Perspective,” forthcoming in Comparative Studies in Society and History.

6This is not to say the growth of official documentation and impact of literate administration have not been noted. According to Hellie, “late sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Muscovy was making the transition from an oral to documentary society, one in
The following essay represents a preliminary attempt to fill this gap. In what follows I will begin by setting out the basic chronology of military reforms in Muscovy. In this I will adopt the concept of “military/fiscal formats” — general characterizations of the force-types and fiscal resources of particular eras. The chronology sketched below will appear as a succession of formats beginning with the cavalry horde of Ivan III and ending with the pre-Petrine gunpowder army. Next, I will investigate the ways in which specific military reforms stimulated the development of literate administration in Muscovy. Finally, I will explore the general consequences of the elaboration of a literate administration on what I will call the “governing class”: the court elite — Muscovy’s political notables; chancellery personnel — Muscovy’s administrative elite, and the higher gentry — Muscovy’s officer corps.

Muscovite Military/Fiscal Formats in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries

At the turn of the fifteenth century the Muscovite court elite found itself in possession of forces quite different from and in some ways inferior to contemporary Western armies. At about the time Western courts were building large pike- and shoulder-armed infantry forces supported by artillery, the Muscovites continued to rely on lightly armed horse. This was well noted by the Imperial ambassador Sigismund von Herberstein, who offered the best general picture of the early sixteenth-century Muscovite field army available in foreign or indigenous sources. He describes a small cavalry force, unencumbered by foot soldiers and big guns. Its primary tactical asset was speed: “whatever they do, whether they are attacking, or pursuing, or fleeing from the enemy, they do suddenly and rapidly.” Herberstein explains that because Muscovite tactics are premised on mobility “neither infantry nor artillery can be of any use to them.” To be sure, Herberstein notes that the Russians are familiar with gunpowder arms, and particularly cannon, but he remarks that which the possession of properly and accurately executed documents was crucial for many aspects of life.” See R. Helli, Slavery in Russia, 1450-1725 (Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982), 603 and D. Kaiser, The Growth of the Law in Medieval Russia (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980), 153-63.


Throughout this essay I will use “court elite” rather than the problematic “nobility” or “aristocracy” to denote the class of courtiers who ruled the empire (“maskovskie chiny”). On them, see N. S. Kollmann, Kinship and Politics: the Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1375-1547 (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1987) and R. Crummey, Aristocrats and Servitors. The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613-1689 (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983).

“Chancellery personnel” will be used to denote the officials and scribes who worked in the grand princely scriptorium and later in the chancelleries (“priintsiy ljudi”). The fundamental study is N. F. Demidova, Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII v. i ee rol’ v formirovaniy absoliutizma (Moscow: Nauka, 1987).


As I will point out below, indigenous sources relevant to the military are scarce before 1550. Herberstein visited Russia twice, in 1517 and 1526. His description, Rerum moscovitarum commentarii (Vienna, 1549), was probably written shortly after 1517, however it was amended through 1549 and again in 1557. I cite Moscovia der Hauptstadt . . . [Herberstein’s 1557 German edition], ed. F. Berger (Weimar: Gustav Kiepenheuser Verlag, 1975). The literature on the ambassador and his description is large. See M. Poe, Foreign Descriptions of Muscovy, An Analytic Bibliography of Primary and Secondary Sources (Columbus, OH: Slavica, 1995), 61-65.

Herberstein, Moscovia der Hauptstadt . . ., 80.

Ibid.
“they do not understand the different kinds of artillery or their correct use.”14 Though Herberstein was not aware of it, we know from Muscovite sources that the tactically arrayed cavalry army was arranged in five wings — great, advanced, right, left, guard.15

About the organization of forces above the tactical level, Herberstein says little. Nonetheless, there are several hints in *Rerum moscoviticarum* that he understood the all-Muscovite army to be a combination of regional units based in the former appanage courts. For example, he clearly states that Muscovy is made up of principalities and notes that their erstwhile rulers now serve the grand prince in Moscow.16 This is echoed in indigenous sources that speak of regional courts.17 That the localities contributed forces to Moscow’s army is clear.18 To give but one example, in a description of the Novgorod campaign of 1477/8 we find Muscovite courtiers leading twenty-four contingents of provincial warriors (*mezdatsy, in’ertsy, koluzhany*, etc.).19 Further, Herberstein remarks that the grand princely court registered central and provincial warriors every two to three years.20 The fact of registration is supported if not confirmed by scattered indications in indigenous texts where we read of courtiers receiving what may be muster lists upon the acceptance of command assignments.21 To conclude, the cavalry army of the early sixteenth century was a small, mobile force comprised of central and regional militias, perhaps garrisoned in fortified cities, and mustered on the occasion of great campaigns. There was no centralized, permanent force outside the grand prince’s court.22

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14Ibid.


16Ibid., 93: “What follows is a description of the country (*Landbeschreibung*), of the principalities and lordships (*Herrschaften*) of the grand prince . . .”

17On the continued existence of regional courts in Muscovy after 1500, see A. A. Zimin, “O sostave dvortsovykh uchrezhdenii Rosskogo gosudarstva kontsa XV i pervoi polovine XVI v.,” in *Istoriia i genealogiia vtoroi poloviny XV i pervoi polovine XVI v.*, 215-234.


19RK 1475-1605, 20-21. Also see RK 1475-1605, 104 (1507/8).

20Herberstein, *Moscovia*, 79: “Every two or three years the grand prince counts and registers the *deti biareskie* in each province so that he may know their number and how many horses and servants each has.” This is corroborated by other, though less trustworthy foreign sources. See Paolo Giovio, Pauli Iovii Nuvoviensis libellus de legatione Basiliy magni principis Muscovian . . . (Rome, 1525). I used the edition in *Biblioteka inostrannykh pisatelei o Rossii*, otd. 1 (St. Peters burg, 1836). See page 55. Also see Albertus Campensis, *Lettera d’Alberto Campese che scrivo al beatissimo Padre Clemente VII . . .* (Venice,1543) (drafted approx. 1523-24). I used the edition in *Biblioteka inostrannykh pisatelei o Rossii*, otd. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1836). See page 23. Neither Giovio or Campensis were ever in Muscovy, however they based their observations on interviews with Muscovite officials. On Giovio and Campensis, see Poe, *Foreign Descriptions of Muscovy*, 65 and 66.


Let us now turn to the fiscal system that supported the cavalry army *circa* 1600. Here again Herberstein is our best source, because (tellingly) almost no administrative paper related to funding the army survives prior to the second half of the sixteenth century.\(^{23}\) Regarding remuneration for service, he writes:

> And whomever he calls to court, or sends to war, or dispatches on an embassy, must pay their own way, except for the *detti boiarskie*, that is the impoverished nobles. They are so poor that he [the grand prince] takes their sons annually [to Moscow] and maintains them on meager stipends. Thus if he assigns a stipend of six guldens to one of them for three years, he [the servitor] pays this stipend himself in the third year. However those who receive twelve guldens annually as a stipend must be ready with their horses at all times for any purpose, and indeed at their own cost. The elites, those who are sent on embassies and other great affairs, do not receive much money, but instead [receive] offices, villages, or other definite and notable incomes, usually for a period of eighteen months. And if a special favor or pretext is rendered, then this period can be extended several months, but in such a way as not to lessen the tribute and ordinary incomes of the prince. The fines and duties which are extracted from the poor may be kept by them. Those whose tenure is over have no hope of receiving similar favor for six years, but must in the meantime fulfill all services and commands at their own expense.\(^{24}\)

The fiscal system Herberstein describes was composed of two tiers. Wealthy warriors served without remuneration. If they were charged with special duties, they received prebends. Provincial servitors received small, irregular stipends. It is clear that the court was not involved in financing the bulk of the army: the boyars (*boiar*), and provincial gentry (*dvoriane* and *detti boiarskie*) covered the cost of campaigning by extracting goods and funds from their estates. This is perhaps why the military audits described by Herberstein took account of the number of bondsmen a servitor had — this would have been a good indicator of his resources.

The military-fiscal format we find outlined in Herberstein was well-suited to the needs of Ivan III’s time. The Muscovites fought Tatars, Cossacks, Lithuanians, and Livonians — all of whom were wedded to the cavalry arm. The Russians followed suit, relying almost entirely on horsemen for their defensive needs. However in the second half of the sixteenth century the Russians encountered Western-style forces with increasing frequency, particularly in the costly Livonian War. In response the court elite began to alter the composition of its forces in the 1550s. Though the surviving sources do not permit a detailed reconstruction of the course of the reform, its outline is reasonably clear.\(^{25}\) First, the court re-figured the army itself. The regime attempted to enhance its control over command positions by placing limits on the precedence disputes (*mestnichestvo*) that sometimes interfered with military activity.\(^{26}\) Further, steps were taken to

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unite cavalry units in Moscow. In 1551 Ivan IV’s regime formulated a plan to grant estates to approximately 1000 of the “best” provincial servitors (deti boiarskie) in the immediate environs of Moscow. In the third quarter of the century the court founded the Military Service Chancellery (razriadnyi prikaz), the clearing house for all military affairs and what would become the most important bureau in Muscovy. And around mid-century the government introduced the first Russian gunpowder infantry units (strel’tsy). More significantly, the regime began to restructure the system of remuneration for all personnel. The government made efforts to centralize its income under a plan to commute provender rents (kormlenie) into cash.

These funds were collected by agents, deposited in central institutions, and then used to pay servitors’ salaries (okлады) according to fixed compensation scales. The traditional system of knighthood from estates was also revamped. Prior to the 1550s martial aid from non-prebendal estates (posest’ia) was in theory voluntary and the amount of service one had to render from prebendal estates was unregulated (at least in writing). The reforms of the 1550s stipulated that all landholders had to offer military aid to the grand prince. The court issued schedules relating landholdings to service obligations.

In short, the government of Ivan IV made the first significant attempt to modernize the Russian army and the fiscal administration that supported it. Traces of the new system are documented in indigenous sources, though it is never synoptically described. Fortunately, the English ambassador Giles Fletcher provided an excellent general description of

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27 It is unclear whether all the estates were granted. See A. A. Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniia 1550 g. i dvorovia tetrad 50-kh godov XVI reka (Moscow and Leningrad: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1950), 1-3 and Zimin, “K istorii voennykh reform,” 348.


30 The elimination of kormlenie was mandated in the “edict on provender rents and service” (prigoov o kormleniiakh i sluzhbe) of 1555/1556. The edict is found in the Nikonovskii zav vsekh vrat reprinted in Polnoe sobranie Russkikh letoipis’ (31 vols. (St. Petersburg-Moscow, 1846-)) (hereafter “PSRL”), 13: 267-69. For discussions of it, see: A. A. Zimin, “Prigoov na 1555-1556 i likvidatsiia sistemy kormleniia v Russkom gosudarstve,” Issctva SSSR (1958), no. 1: 178-82; S. O. Shmidt, “K istorii zemskoi reformy (Sobor 1555-1556 g.),” in Goroda feodal’noi Russii. Sbornik statei pamiati N. B. Ustievna (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), 125-34; and Nosov, Stanovlenie, 367-86.

31 The moneys apparently went to the treasury (kazna), tax-collection bureaus (chet’), and chancelleries (prikazy), all of which served as bursars for personnel. On the rise and function of the fiscal chancellies, see Verner, O vremeni i prichinakh, 109ff. On the specific connection between kormlenie and the rise of the chet’, see Verner, O vremeni i prichinakh, 125.

32 This is clear from the so-called Boyar Book of 1556 which assigns monetary entitlements (oklady) for servants. It is published: “Boiar’kaia kniia 1556g. (soobshchena kniazem M.A. Obolenskim),” in Arkhiiv istoriko-iridiceskikh svedenii, otnoashchikhsia do Rossii, izdatel’emyi N. Kalashovym (St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1861), kn. 3, otd. 2, 25-88. For an analysis, see Nosov, Stanovlenie, 386-420.

33 Universal service according to schedules is prescribed in the “edict on provender rents and service.” See PSRL: 13, 269. On this aspect of it, see Helle, Enserfment, 36ff. The effect of the reform can perhaps be seen in the appearance (Kashira, 1556) of regional mastervs which list servitors according to rank and land entitlements. See M. G. Krotov, “K istorii sostavleniia desiaten (vtoraia chet’),” in Issctva po istoriko-izucheniia Rossii v dozektrievskago perioda. Sbornik statei, ed. V. I. Buganov (Moscow: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1984), 56-72.
the late sixteenth-century Russian military in his *Of the Russe Commonwealth*. The army he portrays is tactically similar to that outlined by Herberstein seventy years earlier. It is a cavalry force mustered in local contingents for garrison service and occasionally united in great hordes. Fletcher writes:

> When warres are towards (which they faile not of lightly every yeere with the Tatar, and manie times with the Polonian and Sweden) the foure Lordes of the Cheffirds sende foureth their summones in the Emperours name, to all the Dukes and Dyacks of the Provinces, to bee proclaimed in the head Townes of every Shire that all Sinaboiarskey, or sons of gentlemen make their repair to such a border where the service is to be done, at such a place, and by such a day, and there present them selues to such, and such Captaines.

Yet the force Fletcher describes is obviously more complex than that seen by Herberstein. The English envoy tells us that the Muscovite army comprises three parts. “First, he [the grand prince] hath of his Dworaney, that is, Pensioners, or Gard of his person.” These Fletcher divides into three ranks according to status, each receiving a salary in cash and land according to his station. Second, he describes a small cohort of 110 chiefs who are obliged to muster large contingents of cavalry. For this service they receive cash allotments to be disbursed to the warriors. Fletcher clearly has in mind something analogous to the Western system by which kings hired mercenary captains, who in turn distributed funds to the troops. But the analogy is not quite exact: “They [the Russian chiefs] are rather as paymasters, than Captaines to their companies, themselves not going forth ordinarily to the warres, save when some of them are appointed by speciall order from the Emperour himself.” The final contingent is composed of musketeers, the *strel'tsy*.

Of footmen that are in continuall pay, he hath to the number of 12000. all Gunners, called *Strelzy*. Whereof 5000. are to attend about the Citie of Mosko, or any other place where the Emperour shall abide, and 2000. (which are called *Stremaney Stresley*, or Gunners at the stirrop) about his owne person at the verie Court or house where he himselfe lodgeth. The rest are placed in his garrison Townes, till there be occasion to have them in the fielde, and receive for their salarie or stipend every man seven rubbels a yeere, besides twelve measures a piece of Rye, and Oates.

In sum, Fletcher well describes the three basic changes brought on by the military reforms of the middle decades of the sixteenth century — the unification of the cavalry army, the creation of the first Muscovite gunpowder forces, and the centralization of the fisc.

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34 For literature on Fletcher, see Poe, *Foreign Descriptions of Muscovy*, 124-25.
36 Ibid., 233.
37 Ibid., 235.
38 Ibid.
The hybrid military-fiscal format — cavalry/strel’tsy — remained largely unchanged until the 1630s. At that time, in preparation for the Smolensk War of 1632-34, the government embarked on a program to raise forces of the Western variety — the “new formation regiments” (polki novogo stroiia), consisting of infantry (soldaty), side-armed cavalry (draguny), and other gunpowder forces. The court elite recruited Western captains and mercenary units well-versed in modern techniques to train and fight with Muscovite servitors. The government issued all personnel weapons, supplies, and cash. After the war the expensive hirelings were dismissed and indigenous units of the new type were for the most part disbanded. A second effort at creating new-model forces was undertaken in connection with the Thirteen Years War (1654-67). Again the government recruited Western captains, instructed them to train Russians, and placed them in command positions. But on this occasion the elite took steps that permanently altered the hybrid military-fiscal format. First, the practice of enticing cavalymen into the new units with cash was gradually abandoned. To fill the ranks of the gunpowder army, the government began to draft soldiers out of peasant and tax-paying communities. Recruitment quotas were enacted for villages. Second, the government began to force cavalymen into the new units. Those without sufficient means to serve in the old army were placed in the new units, as were the sons of all cavalymen. Finally, the strel’tsy were removed from field duty and made into a sort of constabulary/garrison force.\(^{39}\)

Naturally, the creation of this new army was accompanied by changes in taxation and administration. Direct imposts became more burdensome, at least in part due to the cost of the new forces.\(^{40}\) In the 1680s the government began to impose household taxes in place of the old land unit tax (sokha). Indirect taxes also rose, and the government made some effort to rationalize their collection. In 1680 the entire tax system was centralized in the hands of the treasury.\(^{41}\) Moreover, the court elite formed a variety of new bureaus to support the new-model forces: the Foreign Mercenary Chancellery (inozemskii prikaz), 1623; the Recruit Mobilization Chancellery (prikaz sbora datochnykh liudei), 1631; the Military Personnel Mobilization Chancellery (prikaz sbora ratnykh liudei), 1637; the Dragoon Chancellery (prikaz dragunskogo stroia), 1649; the New Formation Cavalry Chancellery (reitarskii prikaz), 1649; the New Formation Infantry Chancellery (prikaz sbora soldatskogo stroia), 1658; and others.\(^{42}\)

In conclusion, we see a succession of three military-fiscal formats in Muscovy from the time of Ivan III to Peter I. The following table makes this clear.

### Table 1: Military-Fiscal Formats in Muscovy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Arm</th>
<th>Weapons</th>
<th>Recruitment</th>
<th>Compensation</th>
<th>Disbursement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c. 1500</td>
<td>cavalry</td>
<td>cold</td>
<td>elite</td>
<td>land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1600</td>
<td>hybrid</td>
<td>cold/hot</td>
<td>elite/open</td>
<td>land/cash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1700</td>
<td>infantry</td>
<td>hot</td>
<td>open</td>
<td>cash</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{40}\) See the data provided in Hellie, *Enserfment*, 125-26.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 222.

\(^{42}\) On all these, see Brown, “Muscovite Government Bureaus,” 269-330.
In the era of Ivan III, the army was a small cavalry force, uncompensated outside prebends, status, and booty. The reign of Ivan IV brought significant reforms and a new format. Gunpowder units were created and the government began to centralize control of tax incomes and service land stocks. In the second half of the seventeenth century, a third format was introduced. The older units — cold-armed cavalry and streltsy — were gradually supplanted by new-model infantry. The bulk of these units was drafted from the tax-bearing population and outfitted by the state.

The Progress of Literate Administration

The Muscovite cavalry host required almost nothing in the way of military administration or documentation prior to 1475. Given its small size and ad hoc character, the army’s administrative requirements could be and probably were accomplished orally. Though the surviving sources are in many ways incomplete, what we do not find is nonetheless telling. The record contains no evidence of a centralized administration charged with the maintenance of the army. There was a court scriptorium, but it was small and almost completely undifferentiated.43 In light of the fact that there was no army administration, it is not surprising that we find no military documentation. The record contains no hint of personnel records, correspondences with field commanders, or pay registers.44

This situation changed somewhat in the last quarter of the fifteenth century. The grand prince’s scriptorium expanded from approximately a dozen to two dozen state scribes (d’iaki).45 However there was little specialization among scribes and no formal separation of departments within the scriptorium.46 At this time several sorts of documents related in varying degrees to military administration appeared — diplomatic protocols (stateinnye spiski), land registers (piatnye knigi), prebendal documents (zhalovannye gramoty), retrospective service books (razriadnye knigi and rodoslovnye knigi), and, for the first time, muster lists (ropisi po polkom).47 It is reasonably easy to explain why these types of paper evolved. By international convention, diplomacy was conducted in writing. The Muscovites followed suit, though somewhat later than their competitors.48 Land registers first appear in connection with the annexation of Novgorod. The surviving land books — as well as later references to cadastres which do not survive — make clear that the grand


45Alef provides the following figures on the number of state secretaries at court: 1470s, fourteen d’iaki; 1480s, ten d’iaki; 1490s, seventeen d’iaki; and 1500-1505, twenty d’iaki. See “The Origins of Muscovite Autocracy,” 273. Alef’s data is drawn from A. A. Zimin, “D’iakeskii apparat v Rossi vtoroi poloviny XV — pervoi treti XVI v.,” Istoriicheskii zhurnal 87 (1971): 219-86.

46The evidence is reviewed in Alef, “The Origins of Muscovite Autocracy,” 278ff.

47The scriptorium issued other types of documents as well, for example, chronicles and judgment charters. These documents do not relate to the army, but rather indicate that non-military contexts may have been important for the growth of government documentation. The literature on chronicles is sufficiently well-known, and the chronicles themselves are published in PSRL. On the judgment charters, see A. Kleimola, Justice in Medieval Russia: Muscovite Judgment Charters (Pravye Gramoty) of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 65, pt. 6 (1975)). Published examples of judgment charters are found in Akty sutiis’ no-ekonomicheskoi istorii severo-vestchnogo kontsa XIV-nachala XV I v., 3 vols. (Moscow: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1952-64).

48The earliest diplomatic records are from the last quarter of the fifteenth century, but they may well have been kept earlier. See Alef, “The Origins of Muscovite Autocracy,” 267-69, and R. M. Croskey, Muscovite Diplomatic Practice in the Reign of Ivan III (New York: Garland Pub., 1987). They are in part published in Sobranie imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva, vols. 35, 41, 53, 59, 71, 95,
prince supported the army in part through the distribution of prebendal estates and direct taxation.\(^{49}\) Judging by the surviving documentary record neither measure was thorough-going.\(^{50}\) Most cavalrymen continued to serve from their allodial estates, outside the sphere of central control and documentation. Some servitors received prebends of various sorts and we find texts associated with their distribution. These documents regulated the collection of provender rents and attest to the decentralized nature of the fiscal system.\(^{51}\) The service books were a response to the need to regulate conflict among court clans. As servitors entered the Muscovite court from appanage and extra-Rurikid lands, competition for status grew more intense. For this reason, the regime of Ivan III began to record both service histories (in the deployment books \(\text{\textit{razriadnye knigi}}\)) and lineage (in the genealogical books \(\text{\textit{rodoslovnye knigi}}\)). The government used these texts to calculate relative status, make service assignments, and resolve precedence disputes \(\text{\textit{mestnichestvo}}\).\(^{52}\) Finally, behind the deployment books lie a set of administrative documents — especially muster lists — that do not come down to us.\(^{53}\) These personnel records probably represent a first response to the increasing administrative burden brought on by the enlargement of the empire and its army.\(^{54}\)

The tentative movement toward literate administration we see in the last quarter of the fifteenth century was accelerated by the military reforms of the 1550s. Two provisions of the military re-figuration were particularly significant. The first was the commutation and redirection of provender rents. The government stipulated that in-kind payments to local officials be converted into cash and transferred directly to Moscow. The result was the partial centralization of finance. Each chancellery was assigned territories from which it was to pay for operations\(^{55}\) and all began to keep

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51 All of these documents regulate the collection of income, either by prescribing what should be collected and by whom (\textit{ustary}, \textit{kornelenye gramoty}, \textit{gabnye}, and \textit{zeneskie gramoty}) or proscribing the collections of certain duties (\textit{zhalovanye gramoty}). The best general treatment is S. B. Veselovskii, \textit{Feodal'noe zemlevладение в severo-vostochnoi Rusi} (Moscow: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1947). Many of these documents are published. For a selection with critical commentary, see \textit{Pamiatniki Russkogo prava}, 8 vols. (Moscow: Gosiurizdat, 1952-61), vols. 3 and 4.


55 Brown, “Muscovite Government Bureaus,” 281. Fletcher clearly states that both the Military Service Chancellery and the Musketeers’ Chancellery had lands assigned to them out of which they were to pay cavalrymen and \textit{strel'tsy} respectively. See Fletcher, \textit{Of the Russe Commonwealth}, 216.
accounts. Special financial bureaus were created, for example the Tax Collection Chancelleries (cheti), which funded the cavalry army, and the Chancellery of the Grand Revenue (prikaz bolsogo prikoda), which supplied the strel'tzy. In short, after the reform the court became paymaster for the army and books were kept accordingly. Yet recording what was distributed in land and cash was only half of the equation. The government had to see that it received what it paid for in terms of military service. This meant regular verification that servitors were fulfilling their obligations and that they were being properly compensated. Consequently the court instituted a system of military reviews and began to keep regular personnel registers. Fletcher renders a thumbnail sketch of these practices: “When they come to the [muster] place assigned them in the summons or proclamation, their names are taken by certaine Officers that have Commission for that pourpose from the Roserade, or high Constable, as Clarkes of the Bandes.” Actually much more was done: officials verified land and peasant stocks, apportioned entitlements, checked horses and armaments. All of this was recorded in neatly arranged lists and archived in Moscow.

The second reform causing an increase in government record-keeping was the imposition of a universal requirement on all landholders for service or payment according to wealth. With this the regime was compelled to track the assets of its potential servitors, something not required when service was (in principle) not mandatory. To manage the registration of landholding the court elite founded the massive Service Land Chancellery (pomestnyi prikaz) in the second quarter of the century. Fletcher describes the registration of service lands after the reforms of the 1550s. “When they [cavalrymen] are of yeeres able to beare armes, they come to the office of the Roserade, or great Constable, and there present themselves: who entreth their names, and allotteth them certaine lands to maintien their charges.” An order for disbursement was then issued to the Service Land Chancellery, which, according to Fletcher, “keepeth a Register of all lands given by the Emperour for service to his Noblemen, Gentlemen, and others, giveth out and taketh in all assurances for them.” Interestingly, we also see new rigor brought to an old form of documentation — the service books. The government moved both the genealogical and deployment books into the Military Service Chancellery and

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57 On these institutions, see Brown, “Muscovite Government Bureaus,” 297, 298, 300, 302, 308, and 328.

58 These were generally called “reviews” (smotry) and the documents that devolved from them muster lists (motreennyye spiski) and the town military musters (desiatni). On the origins of these local personnel lists, see Krotov, “K istorii sostavleniia desiaten.” More generally, see Poe, “Elite Service Registry in Muscovy.”

59 Fletcher, Of the Russe Commonwealth, 238.

60 This is apparent not only from the presence of military records, but also from the appearance of archival inventories. See S. O. Shmidt, Rossiskoe gosudarstvo v seredine XVII stoletiia. Tsarski archiv i istoriya letoipis vremeni Ivana Grozynogo (Moscow: Nauka, 1984) and A. A. Zamin, ed., Gosudarstvennyi archiv Rossii XVII stoletiia: opyat rekonstruktii, 3 vols., (Moscow: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1978).

61 The history of this key institution remains to be written. On the expansion of its staff, see Demidova, Sluzhilaia biurokratiia.

62 Fletcher, Of the Russe Commonwealth, 233.

63 Ibid., 205.
produced official redactions. More importantly, the court began to keep centralized lists of servitors showing rank, seniority, land and cash entitlements, and place of service. The purpose behind these new lists seems to have been to avoid status conflicts and rationalize record-keeping. Administrators no longer needed to guess the status or entitlement of a particular member of the governing class — this and more could simply be read off lists.

Though the coming of the new-model army and its eventual triumph over the cavalry/strel'tsy format brought changes to the central administration, they cannot compare to those which transpired between 1500 and 1600. The reason is not far to seek. The centralization of military-fiscal administration was the basic force behind bureaucratization and paperization. This fact was not altered by the introduction of any particular mix of forces, so long as they were controlled and paid from Moscow. Thus the new-model army — maintained from the center as had been its predecessor — did not transform the need for administrative resources. It did nevertheless intensify administrative growth and record-keeping. The infantry armies were larger than the combined cavalry/musketeer hosts and this probably increased the administrative burden on the center. Not only did more troops have to be registered, they also had to be supplied with cash and arms. This too represented an increase in the burden on the chancellery system. After the distribution of service lands, the old cavalry was in principle self-supporting: it lived and fought from its estates. This meant the administrative burden of supply was shouldered by landholders. Soldiers, on the other hand, had to be trained and outfitted by Moscow. Tax-payers were catalogued, taxes were collected, central bureaus purchased weapons, supplies and cash were distributed to captains, and the captains in turn gave the arms and cash to soldiers. At each stage in this process administrators intervened and documented activities.

The burden associated with managing the new forces can be seen in several arenas. The number of literate administrators and bureaus increased after the Time of Troubles, in part in connection with the creation of new-model forces. In 1626, there were 623 chancellery servitors (prikaznye liudi) working in Moscow; by 1698 there were 2739. In the 1640s, 774 state scribes (d'iaki) and undersecretaries (pod'iachie) were employed in the provincial offices; in the 1690s there were over 1900. In 1550 there were no central chancelleries; in 1626 there were forty-four; and in 1698 there were fifty-five, each with a more or less distinct territorial or functional sphere of activity. Attention to literate regulation of affairs likewise expanded, as we can see by comparing successive law codes. The Sudebnik of 1497 contains sixty-eight articles; that of 1550, 100 articles; that of 1589, 231 articles (extended redaction); finally, the Sobornoe Ulozhenie

64 Here I have in mind the Sovereign's deployment book (gosudarev razriad) and the Sovereign's genealogical book (gosudarev redolovets), both products of the 1550s. See Buganov, Razriadnye knigi, 131ff. and Bychkova, Redolovnye knigi, 32ff. Also see Poe, “Elite Service Registry in Muscovy.”

65 The progenitors of this species of documentation were the tysiachnaia kniga of 1550, the dvorovaia tetrad’ of 1551-52, and the so-called boiarskaia kniga of 1556. All are published: Zimin, Tysiachnaia kniga 1550 g. and “Boiarskaia kniga 1556 g. (soobshchena kniazem M.A. Obolenskim),” in Arkhiv istoriko-iuridicheskikh svedenii, otnosiashchikhsia do Rossii, izdavaemyi N. Kalachovym (St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1861), kn. 3, otd. 2, 25-88. These later developed into the boyar books and boyar lists of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On them, see Poe, “Elite Service Registry in Muscovy,” 273-79.

66 See the figures in Hellie, Enserfment, 267ff.: “The Military Forces of the Muscovite State.”

67 Demidova, Sluzhliia biurokratiia, 23.

68 Ibid., 37.

69 Ibid., 23. There functions are characterized in Brown, “Muscovite Government Bureaus,” passim.
contains almost 1000 articles divided into twenty-five thematic chapters. As the law grows, so does the complex of paperwork that must be used to administer it. The government conducted land surveys with renewed vigor, particularly now that it had to raise and support the army itself. We find major land/asset registry campaigns in the 1620s, 1640s, 1670s, and 1710s.

The military/fiscal formats I have described each entailed a different level of administrative and documentary demand. Quantitatively, each format required more administrators and more paper than the complex that preceded it. The key variable would seem to be the degree to which the army was dependent on central supply, compensation, and control. Table 2 summarizes this hypothesis.

Table 2: Military-Fiscal Formats and Administrative Burden

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Arm</th>
<th>Supply</th>
<th>Compensation</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Administrative Burden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c. 1500</td>
<td>cavalry</td>
<td>local</td>
<td>local/central</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1600</td>
<td>hybrid</td>
<td>local/central</td>
<td>local/central</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1700</td>
<td>infantry</td>
<td>central</td>
<td>central</td>
<td>very high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Muscovite cavalry army of 1500 was a quasi-local affair. Servitors raised their own military supplies, they were not centrally compensated in cash, and they relied on Moscow only occasionally for military coordination. Since the administrative burden of service was largely shouldered by individual landholders, affairs could be conducted for the most part without officials or writing. The central scriptorium was small and the amount of documentation it produced limited. The building of a hybrid army after 1550 changed this. Moscow took control of coordination and compensation of the military. Administrative loads were reduced by the fact that most payments were in land and by the fact that servitors were to support themselves in large measure from their allotments. Nonetheless, the need to document the collection, distribution, and use of assets moved the government to found the central chancelleries and to introduce a wide-ranging system of official paper. Finally, with the triumph of the new-model forces the government took almost complete control of supply, compensation, and coordination of the army. The central chancelleries grew (particularly the Military Service and the Service Land Chancelleries) as did the documentary complex they employed.

The Coming of Literate Administration and the Governmental Culture in Muscovy

What impact did the introduction of literate administration have on the culture of government in Muscovy? In offering an answer to this query we first must recognize that the force of bureaucratization was not uniform. The scribal cohort was obviously most affected by the advent of offices and complex documentation because it worked in the chancelleries and processed the paperwork. The lives of the court elite and higher gentry were doubtless altered by the beginnings of literate administration, but we should not exaggerate its impact: the basic duties of boyars and high-ranking provincials remained the same under Aleksei Mikhailovich as they had under Ivan III — to govern, to lead, to

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fight. Certainly seventeenth-century courtiers worked more frequently with scribes and documents than their fifteenth century counterparts, but their daily affairs were hardly dominated by offices and written instrument as were those of the chancellery officials. Despite these differences in degree we can identify certain general changes brought to all three groups by the coming of literate administration. If we judge the early Muscovite state according to this criterion, it was obviously not a terribly effective organization. The duel structure of the army circa 1500 suggests this. As we saw, the cavalry host of Ivan III was essentially a mustering of the court in the immediate confines of Moscow. Courtiers could be easily mobilized because they were directly at hand. However for major campaigns, such as the attack on Novgorod in 1478, the courtier army momentarily expanded to include the military cohorts from regional towns and courts. Large mobilizations of the governing class were logistically difficult because the court had little knowledge of or control over distant servitors. In sum, under Ivan III the “state” — the mobilized force of the governing class — did not extend very far outside the walls of the Kremlin.

The advent of literate administration helped the court overcome the tyranny of distance and thereby expand the court’s effective control over the governing class. In the first half of the sixteenth century the court elite created Russia’s first postal service linking the various areas of the expanding empire. In the second half of the century, the regime of Ivan IV began to produce regular written audits of courtiers and regional forces. With the aid of these two instruments, the empire and its army were knitted more completely than ever before. The extent of the court’s knowledge of the governing class can be seen in the volume of personnel records that survive. Let us take as examples three species of service registers — one central, one chancellery, and one provincial. The boyar lists (boiar’skie spiski) recorded the rank, service assignment, and physical condition of thousands of courtiers who served “on the Moscow list” (po moskovskomu spisku). Beginning in the later sixteenth century they were drafted annually by the Moscow Desk


73 For an introduction to the social scientific literature concerning the impact of literate administration on society, see J. Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society (New York: Cambridge UP, 1986), 87-126.


75 This is the thesis of several neglected works by the late Harold Innis. See his Empire and Communication (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1972) and The Bias of Communications (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1991).


77 For a general description of these lists, see Poe, “Elite Service Registry in Muscovy,” 262-88.

patrimonial organization to proto-
and Society
see P. I. Ivanov,
"Stolbtsy Moskovskogo stola": no. 103 (1626
74 (1675
Stanislavskii, "Boiarskie spiski," 126.
The scrolls of the Moscow desk. This brings the total to ninety
rospis' russkogo voiska 1604 g
otdel rukopisei
scrolls
(RGADA) in Moscow. Stanislavskii, "Boiarskie spiski," 125
1667
narodnogo prosveshcheniia
narodnogo prosveshcheniia
prikaza
The town military musters (deiatni) were all-purpose fiscal-military accounts that catalogued information regarding provincial servitors' monetary and land allotments, militarily viable dependents, horses, and weapons. The information in the musters was collected at annual reviews of local servitors and dispatched to the Moscow Desk of the Military Service Chancellery. Twenty-one town military musters from the sixteenth century have survived, the oldest being one from Kashira in 1556. In addition, there are references to over ninety sixteenth-century town military musters that have perished. Three hundred and eighty town military musters come down to us from the seventeenth century, the latest from 1676. These personnel registers, all created in connection with the military reforms and maintained by the Military Service Chancellery, were vehicles for and a representation of the extension of central control over the entire governing class. What had been a small collection of courtiers, scribes, and dependents in and around Moscow in the late fifteenth century had become a much larger group spreading over the entire empire by the mid-seventeenth.

Literate administration facilitated social stratification and differentiation among the court elite, chancellery personnel, and higher gentry. In addition to efficient mobilization of servitors, the power of early modern states depended on their ability to take exploit of the advantages of status and functional divisions. To be sure, the Muscovite governing class

was differentiated prior to the coming of chancellery administration, but all evidence indicates that the system of distinctions was little developed. The court elite (boiare) stood above the gentry (dvoriane and deti boiarskie), however neither group was vertically or horizontally divided in any thorough-going way.\(^8\) The tiny grand princely scriptorium showed no sign of functional differentiation before the second half of the sixteenth century.\(^8\) One reason for this relative simplicity was that innovation was not required: prior to the first encounter with Western-style forces in the third quarter of the sixteenth century the customary ways of organization were sufficient. Another reason had to do with the difficulty of elaborating a complex system of statuses and offices in the absence of sophisticated literate administration. Certainly elaborate systems of social classification may exist without officers and documents to manage them, as may be seen in the case of kinship classifications. Nonetheless state-imposed systems of classification operate in a way that is greatly facilitated by external management and documentation. The rights and duties of a “mother” do not need to be systematically set out and the progression from “mother” to “grandmother” does not need to be authorized by anything other than a biological fact. The same is not true of state-imposed classifications. The character of new classes must be explained, membership in them recorded, and progression between them decided by stable procedures. Some of this can be accomplished without writing, but not on a very great scale.

The introduction of administrators and documentation, while it was not the cause of hierarchicalization and differentiation, provided some of the tools necessary to build a more sophisticated set of divisions. This is apparent from the development of personnel registry. The first service documents show few social divisions. The genealogical books classify servitors by clan-membership, while the deployment books reflect distinctions based on a few court stations (boiare, okol’nichie, d’iski, etc.), military ranks (voevody in various regiments — right, left, etc.), and occasionally regions. In stark contrast the service registers of the 1550s evidence a much more detailed system of vertical classes. Let us take the Thousands’ Book (tysiachnaia kniga), a register constructed in 1550 in connection with the reform of the cavalry, as an example. On the highest level, this list is divided into three groups: duma ranks (dumnye chiny), gentry (deti boiarskie) serving in Moscow, and gentry serving in or from the provinces.\(^8\) On the next level each of these groups is divided into ranks with headers: the duma ranks are separated into boiare, okol’nichie, oruzhnichie and kaznichei; the gentry are divided into three articles (stat’i) according to the amount of land they are to be granted; provincial servitors are divided into two such articles. These classes, in turn, are subdivided by a peculiar mix of clan membership and geographical origin. All sub-lists are sorted by seniority in a given rank.\(^8\) Seventeenth-century service registers such as the boyar lists, undersecretary lists, and the town military musters are similarly arranged in fine status and functional subdivisions.\(^9\) In sum, as the state expanded with the collection of information in Moscow, it deepened with the elaboration of new forms of social division. The limited complexity of Ivan III’s court was replaced, under the pressure of military change and

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89See the synoptic table of ranks listed in Zimin, ed., Tysiachnaia kniga 1550 g., 10.

90Ibid., 372-73.

91For an overview, see Poe, “Elite Service Registry,” passim.
with the aid of literate administration, into the sophisticated web of social classifications we see in the Ulozhenie of 1649.

As the governing class was enlarged and differentiated by literate administration, so too were its components integrated in a new way by the chancelleries. Durkheim’s distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity is heuristically valuable in describing the changes in the style of integration that came with literate administration. Members of the early Muscovite governing class were, aside from a very few status and functional distinctions, of a piece. The court elite and higher gentry shared a common identity (elite), task (rule) and purpose (service), such that there was little need for any central coordination of activities by the scriptorium, which was commensurably small and unsophisticated. The grand prince and his retinue of boyars — the political as well as military elite of the realm — both directed and executed matters of collective importance (war, diplomacy, justice) collectively. The solidarity of such homogeneous groups, Durkheim suggested, was mechanical — the very communality of life producing a fellow feeling that knit the group.

However advancing social complexity, produced in large measure by military reforms and facilitated by literate administration, brought increasing status and functional differentiation to the governing class. The once common culture of the tiny Moscow court was slowly divided and subdivided by fine distinctions of station and role. Though it would be a mistake to exaggerate the rapidity or extent of movement in this direction, even the limited differentiation we see in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made a new form of central coordination of roles and activities necessary. According to Durkheim the solidarity of groups undergoing differentiation becomes increasingly less mechanical and more organic — the interaction of functionally complementary social units producing social cohesion. The agent of coordination within the governing class was obviously the chancellery system itself and the massive regulations it produced. As the government took on new tasks, new prikazy were created to manage them, and new legislation was promulgated to regulate and coordinate their activities. In order to undertake even routine tasks the various chancelleries had to cooperate. Regular procedures to integrate administrative activities were created, as we see in the example of granting new salary entitlements (oklady). The procedure was initiated by the servitor, who submitted a petition to a chancellery describing his service history and requesting a salary increase “as one’s peers” (protiv moей брати’), suggesting the existence of acknowledged norms. The undersecretaries who processed the petitions checked the claims

93The collegial nature of rule in early Muscovy was suggested by E. Keenan in “Muscovite Political Folkways,” Russian Review 45 (1986), 115-81. Keenan’s argument has been taken up by and affirmed in Kollmann’s Kinship and Politics.
96The protiv formula was used in a variety of contexts. We find protiv svoego chelov (“according to my station”); protiv moey brati’ (“as my brother”) and protiv otca moego (“as my father”) in petitions. In orders to figure new salary levels we find protiv ynykh takikh (“as others such as this”). See RGADA, fond 210 (razriadnyi prikazy), opis’ 9 (moskovskii sto), stolbets 622, fols. 120, 118, 307 and 70 verso.
of the supplicant against official service registers and then listed precedents (primery) of the entitlements of servitors with profiles approximating that of the petitioner. If any of the necessary information was unavailable, a memo (pamiat') requesting the necessary data was issued to the relevant chancellery. Finally, the entire matter was submitted for decision, an edict was handed down, and the results were transmitted to the chancelleries charged with disbursement, for example the Service Land Chancellery or the Fiscal Chancellery. What is abundantly clear from this example is that members of the governing class no longer interacted as members of a small, homogeneous retinue, but as functionaries with distinct, inter-dependent roles to play in an increasingly complex military-administrative enterprise.

The three changes we have surveyed combined to produce what may have been the most fundamental effect of the coming of literate administration — the beginning of the reorganization of social identity within the governing class. Before the mid-sixteenth century, the identities of those in the governing class were formed in an environment characterized by locality, simplicity, and organic connection. The circle of social intercourse was closely confined to court, clan, village, and parish. Few (though there are notable exceptions) had any significant regular contact with the world outside these spheres. Moreover, identities were simple in terms of the number of roles they comprised. Within the clan one might be father, brother, or son; within the court one might be a boyar, chief, or scribe. Finally, the self and social images servitors constructed out of these dense local relationships were shifting, many-sided, and embedded in the richness of daily life.

The coming of literate administration in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries altered the traditional matrix of identity-construction in the governing class. In short, locality, simplicity and personal connection was slowly encroached upon by centrality, complexity, and impersonality. As the governing class became better integrated by the operation of the chancellery system, the social horizons of its members expanded. The lives of servitors throughout empire were linked by the broad classifications of the central chancelleries. Through the activities of the Moscow Desk the descendants of svozdal’ty, iur’evtsi, and koluzhany who served with the court in the Novgorod campaign of 1478 came to see themselves as members of imperial classes — gentry serving on the “provincial” (gordovoy) or, if they were fortunate, on the “Moscow register” (moskovskii spisok). In official communications servitors began to refer to — and presumably conceive of — themselves as members of these broad strata. The Tula serviceman L. A. Begichev, petitioning for inscription on the “Moscow resident list” (zhiletskii spisok), clearly thought in terms of court and country. He must be

respectively. Other examples are reprinted in AMG. On the use of this expression in administrative contexts generally, see Demidova, Sluzhil’naia biurokratiia, 118.

97 In the salary cases processed by the Moscow desk we frequently read: poslat’ pamiat’ v chet (“send a memo to the fiscal bureau”); otpisat’ v pomestnyi prikaz (“write to the Service Land Chancellery”); otpisat’ v moskovskii stol k bolarskomu spisku (“write to the boyar list [division] at the Moscow Desk [of the Military Service Chancellery]”). See RGADA, fond 210 (razriadnyi prikaz), opis’ 9 (moskovskii stol), stolbets 622, fols. 29 vero, 520, 73, respectively. Many responses to such queries are found in the archive of the Moscow desk: from the prikaz kazenskogo dvorta (“The Kazan Court Chancellery”); from the inozemnyi prikaz (“Foreigner’s Prikaz,” dealing with mercenaries); from the streletskii prikaz (“Musketry Chancellery”); and from the Service Land Chancellery. See RGADA, fond 210 (razriadnyi prikaz), opis’ 9 (moskovskii stol), stolbets 622, fols. 17-18, 19-22, 70-70a, 425, respectively. Many other such requests are found in the documents reprinted in AMG.

98 This type of identity is best described as “multiplex.” See M. Gluckman, The Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1955), 18-21.


included among the residents because, as he put it, his family had always served “on the Moscow list” (po moskovskomu spisku) and never “in provincial service” (po gomde). Further, the facets of identity multiplied as the state became more and more complex. Differentiation on the chancellery level was recapitulated on the level of the individual servitor by the division of roles and aspects of service. The relatively homogeneous deti boiarskie of the later fifteenth century were replaced in the mid seventeenth by a warriors with various military roles (dragun, reitar, etc.), ranks (vybornyi, dvornyi, gomdonyi, etc.), land allotments (zemel’ni oklad), and monetary allotments (denezhnyi oklad). Each of these characteristics informed the identity of the servitor, as may be seen in the complex self-identifications they used when addressing central authority. For example, in a petition of 1664 the serviceman Alesha Fedorov syn Pisarev identifies himself as captain (“rotmistr”) of the new model cavalry (“reitarskii stroi”) serving from the residents list (“zhiletskii spisok”).

Finally, though the facets of identity were many, they were stereotyped by the use of rigid, centrally imposed categories. What had been flexible to intimate associates became fixed in the gaze of Moscow bureaucrats. To his family and friends Pisarev was a member of their intimate community — son, father, neighbor. But his official self was a stereotype insofar as each of the characteristics he used to identify himself were general administrative categories. To the Moscow Desk, Pisarev was one of many captains of the new formation cavalry registered as a resident — a subject of imperial policy, not a concrete personality.

**Conclusion**

In the era of Ivan III the Muscovite dvor was a moderately-sized gathering of unlettered warriors who, together with a small group of scribes, managed a considerable principality in northeastern Rus’. A bit more than a century later the court was a much more complex entity comprising a well-stratified political elite, a system of functionally differentiated chancelleries, and a large network of gunpowder military forces. I have argued that behind this transformation were successive waves of military reform, waves which brought with them well-elaborated literate administration. I suggested that the coming of literate administration to the governing class — the court elite, chancellery personnel, and higher gentry — had four effects: integration on an imperial level; increased status and functional differentiation; a slow movement from mechanical to organic solidarity; and, finally, the transformation of patterns of social identity.

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102 AMG 3: 560-61.