How Democracies Keep the Peace: Contextual Factors That Influence Conflict Management Strategies

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Comments
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Contextual Factors That Influence Conflict Management Strategies

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Abstract: Some studies find that democratic states are more amenable to third party forms of conflict management, while other studies indicate that democracies are able to resolve contentious issues on their own through bilateral negotiations. Using data from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project, the authors investigate peaceful and militarized conflict management strategies that democratic states employ to resolve contentious issues. Theoretically, the authors focus on how militarized conflict history, relative capabilities, and issue salience influence the tools of conflict management that democratic states employ. Empirical analyses suggest that democratic dyads employ bilateral negotiations more often to resolve contentious issues when the issue has been militarized previously, when the issue is more salient, and when they are facing an equal adversary. Democratic dyads seek out non-binding third party settlement more frequently in situations of power preponderance than non-democratic dyads, although binding forms of third party settlement occur most often in relatively equal democratic dyads. Pairs of democracies are more likely to employ militarized conflict management strategies when they have resorted to force over the issue previously, when the issue is highly salient, and when they are evenly matched.

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Over the last decade, the phenomenon known as the democratic peace has received a considerable amount of attention in the International Relations literature. The main tenet of this theory is well known: democracies seldom, if ever, go to war with each other (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993), although democratic states may be equally likely to participate in wars as non-democracies (Chan 1997; Ray 1995, 2000).1 These empirical observations, supported in a wide variety of studies, have spurred a rather rich quest to ascertain why the dyadic democratic peace exists. A number of possibilities have been posited, including shared norms of compromise and cooperation (Dixon 1993, 1994; Maoz and Russett 1993; Mitchell 2002), institutional constraints (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Bueno de Mesquita et al 1999, 2003; Morgan and Schwebach 1992), capitalistic market prosperity (Mousseau 2000; Hegre 2000), economic interdependence (e.g. Russett and Oneal 2001), and joint involvement in international organizations (Russett and Oneal 2001).

The fact that democratic states don’t fight wars against each other is not to say they don’t have their share of disagreements. There has been no shortage of them, and sometimes they involve military forces. Examples include a series of clashes between Canada and the United Kingdom over the ownership of Labrador during the 1920s, the “Cod War” between Great Britain and Iceland, and the 1997 “Salmon War” between the U.S. and the Canadian province of British Columbia. Mitchell and Prins (1999) document close to 200 militarized democratic disputes between 1946 and 1992. The difference between clashes by joint democratic dyads and other dyads is that the former do a much better job of preventing escalation to the most serious confrontation level, interstate war.2 Militarized disputes between democracies are more likely to end in compromise (Mousseau 1998) and with negotiated settlements (Dixon and Senese 2002). Furthermore, there have been only a handful of militarized disputes between two democracies that have resulted in any fatalities (Mitchell and Prins 1999; Wayman 2002).

1 Some studies present empirical evidence for a monadic democratic peace as well. See for example Benoit (1996), Huth and Allee (2002), Keller (2005), Leeds and Davis (1999), and Rummel (1983).
2 Ironically, while good at preventing escalation, democracies do not do such a good job of terminating lower-level disputes among themselves (Mitchell and Prins 1999). Senese (1997) finds that once in a militarized dispute, jointly democratic dyads are just as likely to escalate the dispute to uses of force short of war.
We know that democracies are more likely to adopt compromise solutions to problems as a matter of course (Maoz and Russett 1993). But do these compromise solutions come about because of efficient bilateral contracting, because democracies are more willing to involve neutral third parties in the conflict resolution process, or some combination of both? Dixon (1993, 1994) finds that democratic dyads are more likely than other pairs of states to use third party assistance to resolve their disputes. Raymond (1994) and Allee and Huth (2006a) find that democratic dyads have a preference for binding forms of third party settlement, arbitration or adjudication.³ Allee and Huth (2006a, 2006b) show that states with significant domestic audience costs and political opposition are more likely to seek out international legal (binding) rulings to resolve ongoing territorial claims. An implication of these empirical findings is that third party participation in the conflict resolution process may be a key reason that democracies have fewer wars. More recent studies of conflict management by Hensel (2001) and Mitchell (2002), on the other hand, find consistent evidence that jointly democratic dyads are significantly more likely to employ bilateral negotiations to resolve disputes, and much less likely to turn to third party conflict management.

These seemingly opposite empirical results present an interesting puzzle about how democracies negotiate solutions to their interstate conflicts. One possibility for explaining these disparate findings is that there is a selection effect at work in this process. All things equal, states would prefer to negotiate on their own because this allows them to retain greater control over the negotiation outcomes (Hensel 2001). Furthermore, if democracies’ institutional constraints and/or norms of peaceful conflict management operate effectively, they may be able to avoid third party involvement, militarized disputes, and escalation of disputes to war precisely because they are able to resolve things through bilateral negotiations.

A second possibility is that democratic dyads utilize bilateral negotiations to resolve contentious issues until such efforts fail and one or both disputants resort to militarized force to resolve the issue. Empirical studies may produce disparate findings about how democracies manage conflicts because they

³ Raymond finds that binding tools are more likely to be selected by democracies, but these conflict management efforts are not particularly effective.
analyze data at different stages in the process of escalation. Dixon’s (1993, 1994) data include conflicts that reach the crisis stage or higher, whereas the data employed by Hensel (2001), Mitchell (2002), and Allee and Huth (2006a, 2006b) focus on verbal contention over territory; only some claims escalate to the level of militarized conflict. Raymond’s (1994) data focuses only on third party attempts to settle interstate disputes, leaving out the comparison categories of bilateral negotiations and military force.

A third potential explanation for the puzzling findings relates to the interrelationship between power and regime type. Bilateral negotiations may be prevalent in asymmetric democratic dyads because democracies are more willing to employ coercive tactics against weak adversaries. Yet when facing evenly matched disputants, democracies may find third party solutions more attractive, especially if they reach an impasse in bilateral negotiations. Another possibility is that the variance in issue salience influences how democracies manage interstate conflicts. Democracies might employ more coercive conflict management strategies when seeking resolution on a highly salient issue, such as contention over a valuable piece of territory, in comparison to a low salient issue, like a minor fishing dispute.

All of these possibilities suggest that there are several important contextual factors that must be analyzed in order to get a better handle on the process by which democratic dyads resolve interstate conflicts differently than non-democratic dyads. Our theory focuses on three factors that interact with dyadic regime type to explain conflict management strategies: militarized conflict history, relative capabilities, and issue salience. We show that these three contextual factors have a strong influence on the use of bilateral, third party, and militarized conflict management tools. We find that democratic states employ bilateral negotiations more often to resolve contentious issues when the issue has been militarized previously, when the issue is more salient, and when they are facing an equal adversary. Democracies seek out non-binding third party settlement more frequently in situations of power preponderance than non-democracies, although binding forms of third party settlement occur most often in relatively equal democratic dyads. Democracies are more likely to employ militarized conflict management strategies when they have resorted to force over the issue previously, when the issue is highly salient, and when
they are evenly matched. Our theory and empirical results point to the need for more nuanced research
design strategies when studying interstate conflict management.

Our paper is organized as follows. We begin with a literature review of research connecting
states’ regime characteristics to conflict management strategies, with an emphasis on bilateral versus third
party settlement. Next, we develop our theoretical argument about how militarized history, relative
capabilities, and issue salience intervene in the relationship between regime type and conflict
management strategies. This is followed by a discussion of our research design and empirical tests.
Our paper adds new insight to the conflict management literature by analyzing a dataset from the Issue
Correlates of War (ICOW) Project that expands the types of contentious issues examined (territorial,
maritime, and cross-border river claims) and allows for significant variance in negotiations contexts.

Conflict Management Strategies
When disputes arise, what strategies do states employ to resolve them, either peacefully or through
militarized means? Recent research on conflict management emphasizes the enhanced ability of
democratic states to resolve things peacefully, especially when their opponents are also democratic. But
even when choosing peaceful conflict management strategies, states must make choices about whether
they will negotiate things on their own, through bilateral talks with their opponent, or whether they will
turn to third parties (individuals, states, IGOs, or NGOs) for assistance. Even when third parties are
consulted, states must still choose between non-binding forms of conflict management (good offices,
inquiry, conciliation, mediation, multilateral talks, etc.) and binding forms (adjudication and arbitration).
In this section, we review past research on the question of when democratic states turn to bilateral
negotiation versus when they seek out third party assistance (and in what form).

Going It Alone: Bilateral Negotiations

States have numerous diplomatic tools at their disposal for settling international disputes. Direct
bilateral negotiation is the most frequent method employed for the peaceful settlement of disputes (Levi
1991), but states often involve third parties when they are unable to reach a bilateral settlement. Third
party involvement takes many forms, ranging from very minimal commitment to resolving the dispute (such as bringing the parties together for negotiation), to a high level of involvement (such as arbitration or adjudication of the dispute). One example of a lower level commitment by a third party is the use of “good offices,” where a third party brings the disputants together for direct negotiations or agrees to carry messages back and forth between the disputants. Third parties can also serve as mediators, where they try to reconcile opposing views of the disputants, and offer possible solutions to the conflict. Another way that third parties can become involved in the resolution of disputes is through inquiry, which is a fact-finding mission that attempts to "produce an impartial finding of disputed facts, and thus to prepare the way for a negotiated settlement” (Akehurst 1997, 277). Legal scholars refer to conciliation as a combination of inquiry and mediation, but whereas mediators can make multiple proposals to resolve a conflict, a conciliator usually offers one proposal in the form of a single report (Akehurst 1997). Good offices, inquiry, mediation, and conciliation are non-binding forms of conflict resolution in the sense that the dispute participants are not committed to accept any settlement proposals offered by third parties.

Third parties can play a more direct role in the resolution of international disputes in the form of adjudication and arbitration. Adjudication is a legal procedure, where the dispute is brought before a tribunal with a fixed number of judges, and the judges rely on international law to resolve the issues at stake (Akehurst 1997; Levi 1991). In arbitration, on the other hand, the disputants select an arbitrator (which is an individual or a panel of a few individuals), and its decision should be based in law, but the parties involved can agree to apply rules other than those of ordinary law (Akehurst 1997, 293). Finally, the outcomes of both adjudication and arbitration are binding upon the parties, i.e., they are expected to follow through with the terms of the final decision. The International Court of Justice, one of the six primary organs of the United Nations, is the most prominent adjudicator in international disputes.

As noted above, bilateral negotiation is the most frequent conflict management tool employed by all states, occurring in over 70% of all peaceful attempts to resolve contentious interstate issues (Hensel 4 Levi (1991, 282) points out that conciliation is rare in the history of international relations, being used only by the League of Nations and the United Nations for peacekeeping.
Why might democratic countries prefer to resolve interstate conflicts through direct, bilateral negotiations? One obvious answer relates to the ability of two democracies to strike reliable bargains. As Lipson (2003) argues, four basic traits of democratic regimes allow them to reach peaceful international agreements more readily: transparency, regime continuity, audience costs, and constitutionalism. Constitutional procedures make commitments more credible and transparent, serving to both constrain and inform states in international bargaining (Lipson 2003, 77). Regime continuity for established democracies strengthens commitments to international agreements by raising the reputation costs for reneging, in essence tying future leaders’ hands to bargains struck today. All of these features of constitutional democracies lead to the conclusion that democracies will be able to strike bilateral bargains efficiently and that any agreements reached will be strong and durable.

Trust is enhanced in these situations because participants can usually monitor at least some of the internal processes at work in the competing state due to the transparent nature of democratic governments and the frequent need for those governments to garner public support. Both sides also have an incentive to reach an agreement that is jointly satisfactory so the issue does not arise again, especially while the current domestic regime is still in power. As a result of the nature of democratic openness and expected commitment to peaceful outcomes, democracies may not generally feel a need for third parties to mediate agreements or guarantee outcomes. At the very least, until they have tried to solve an issue themselves, or unless the situation appears to be leading to military escalation, they may see no value in inviting outsiders to become involved in their affairs, and potential third parties may see no requirement for offering their services.

On the other hand, non-democratic regimes, according to Maoz and Russett (1993), are more likely to see disagreements as zero-sum games with regards to winning and losing. Autocrats may be more amenable to a winner-take-all approach or more likely to try to conduct and resolve differences through coercion and violence. The lack of transparency in non-democratic governments increases uncertainty and impedes the development of trust. This can lead to an environment of suspicion and fear, making it more difficult to work through serious issues. In these instances, third party involvement can
help level the playing field by encouraging conditions favorable to both sides, by decreasing the costs of
attaining information, and by raising the costs of defection. Consequently, non-democratic dyads may see
third party assistance as desirable when both sides really want a settlement. In these environments, third
parties may be acceptable to disputants, especially if they can effectively provide guarantees that the
terms of the agreements will be carried out (Walter 1997).

Institutionalists generally insist that domestic political accountability in democratic states should
induce risk-aversion on the part of popularly elected leaders (Fearon 1994, Bueno de Mesquita and
Lalman 1992). Since the use of military force is likely to be costly, leaders that must face voters and
defend their policy decisions are likely to seek negotiated outcomes to foreign policy crises. While
foreign policy failures can result in a democratic leader’s removal from office, more likely is that such
setbacks will diminish a leader’s ability to move other parts of their domestic and foreign policy agendas
( Brace and Hinckley 1992, Huth and Allee 2002). Furthermore, an inability to solve crucial policy issues
will motivate opposition parties to challenge a democratic leader’s competence and their ability to govern
effectively (Schultz 1998).

Domestic political accountability not only pushes democratic leaders away from risky foreign
policy ventures, it also serves as a signal to foreign elites about the constraints confronted in addressing
salient policy problems. In an international environment where political leaders have both the ability and
the incentive to bluff about preferences, resolve, and capabilities, opposition parties that can impose
audience costs improve a government’s ability to signal truthfully (Fearon 1994, Schultz 1998). “When
there is weak political support for war,” Schultz (1998, 830) writes, “the opposition can reveal this fact by
deciding to oppose the government’s threat.” The potential response by opposition parties makes it costly
for liberal leaders to bluff. In a similar vein, Huth and Allee (2002) focus on the effect of domestic
accountability on conflict management strategies to settle territorial disputes. They argue that greater
domestic audience costs reduce the chances for revisions to the territorial status quo, the use of militarized
force to pursue territorial related goals, and that democratic states are more likely to make concessions in
peaceful negotiations. Huth and Allee’s empirical analyses demonstrate that democracies are
significantly more likely to engage in peaceful talks, less likely to employ militarized force over territorial disputes, and more willing to make greater concessions in peaceful negotiation rounds.

Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith (1999, 2003) agree that the political costs democratic elites confront for policy failure adds to efficient signaling of preferences and thus makes foreign policy demands in bilateral negotiations more credible. Since backing down in the face of a challenge is assumed to be costly for democratic leaders, insincere or deceitful demands issued by these same elites to foreign governments for foreign policy change should arise infrequently. Thus, it seems that democratic leaders avoid violent conflict in part because they hardly ever bluff about their preferences. Indeed, Huntley (1996) maintains that “the most important quality that a republican government brings to [the] table is not a 'peaceful disposition,' but rather a capability to be trusted” (quoted in Chan 1997, 81).

From this discussion we see that democracies may opt for direct, bilateral negotiations to settle disagreements, partly based on their ability to build trust due to the transparent nature of their governments. Non-democratic dyads have more difficulty with trust and uncertainty due to the non-transparency of their regimes and are thus less likely to be trusted to carry out agreements reached in bilateral negotiations.

A Little Help from My Friends: Third Party Settlement Attempts

While transparency and openness may improve the chances for bilateral negotiations, these same institutional characteristics increase democracies’ willingness to join and work with international institutions. After all, look at the most successful and enduring of institutions designed to facilitate international cooperation and avoid or remedy disagreements. Among them are the G-8 for international financial issues, the European Union (EU) and Organization of American States (OAS) for regional problems, and NATO for defense matters. All of these institutions are composed primarily of democratic states. Even the United Nations, the body in which nearly every nation on earth holds membership, emerged from coordination of the mostly democratic victors of World War II (Cassell 1994; Ikenberry 2001). Empirical evidence illustrates democratic states’ commitment to international institutions.
“Shared democracy is associated with a 7 percent higher density of IGO memberships (Russett and Oneal 2001, 217).” Furthermore, international organizations populated with mostly democratic members have democratic decision-making procedures (Risse-Kappen 1996), while membership in regional organizations promotes democratization among non-democratic members (Pevehouse 2002).

Many international organizations call for peaceful dispute resolution in their charters, thus it is not surprising that democracies are more likely to accept their involvement and that even non-democratic members of these organizations are socialized into such conflict management practices (Mitchell 2002). Pevehouse and Russett (2006) assert that international organizations with a higher density of democratic states are better able to manage conflicts involving member states because they can mitigate commitment problems more effectively, they are more likely to have multiple mechanisms embedded in their charters to encourage peaceful dispute resolution, and because democracies are able to socialize other states inside an international organization to adopt peaceful dispute resolution techniques. Their empirical results suggest that dyads belonging to a higher number of democratic IGOs are significantly less likely to experience militarized disputes with fatalities than other pairs of states.

Democratic states’ internal institutions and norms may also enhance their willingness to involve third parties in the dispute settlement process. Dixon (1993, 1994) focuses on how norms of bounded competition make democratic states more inclined to turn to third party dispute resolution. “All modern democracies are openly competitive systems of governance where conflicting material interests and basic political values routinely clash over the proper course of public action...Just as competition is a constant of democratic governance, so too is the presence of rules, procedures, or guidelines for setting its boundaries” (Dixon, 1994, 15). Democratic actors are willing to forego the use of force to achieve a victory on a contested issue: “contingent consent implies that within democratic societies political actors will prefer to follow nonviolent regulatory procedures and will expect competing actors to do likewise” (Dixon 1994, 16).

Dixon asserts that this democratic norm of bounded competition extends to world politics. When a dispute arises between two democratic states, they are more amenable to peaceful dispute settlement
because they realize that their opponent is operating under a similar norm of compromise and nonviolence. Such conciliatory democratic norms should increase the chances of democracies adopting or agreeing to conflict management efforts, especially active participation by third parties (Dixon 1993). Dixon's (1993) analysis of post-World War II SHERFACS data strongly supports this hypothesis. He finds that third party management in a given crisis phase is about 50% more likely if both dispute participants are highly democratic.

Raymond (1994) also contends that democracies are more likely to turn to third parties to help resolve their disagreements. However, he believes that democracies will not view all types of third party settlement equally. Rather two democracies will be more inclined to involve third parties in the resolution of disputes in binding ways, such as arbitration or adjudication, rather than non-binding (good offices, mediation, inquiry, conciliation) ways because democratic institutions create a norm of trust in legal procedures. “Lacking shared democratic norms and the trust in law such norms encourage, autocratic leaders would be predisposed to restrict any third party to functioning as a go-between rather than as an umpire…Limiting the power of a third-party intermediary eliminates the dilemma of being obliged to adhere to a verdict that might injure perceived national interests” (Raymond 1994, 27). Raymond’s empirical analysis of 206 dyadic disputes from 1820-1965 reveals that coherent democratic dyads are three times more likely to use binding third party arbitration in comparison to non-democratic dyads.5

Allee and Huth (2006a, 2006b) make a similar theoretical argument about democracies’ willingness to submit to legal dispute settlement procedures more frequently than non-democratic countries. They argue that third party settlement provides a form of political cover for democratic leaders who are electorally vulnerable with respect to foreign policy failure. Their empirical analyses of all

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5 Not only do democracies engage in binding settlement attempts more frequently, they also more likely to submit themselves to the authority of international courts. Powell and Mitchell (2007) examine states’ willingness to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court. They find that democratic states are five times more likely to accept the Court’s jurisdiction than non-democratic states.
territorial claims from 1919-1995 supports the theory, demonstrating that legal dispute settlement is much more likely if the claimants face strong domestic opposition and if the dyad is democratic.⁶

**Context Matters**

While existing theoretical arguments focus on the tendency for democracies to choose bilateral or third party conflict management tools, we know that states employ both strategies when managing conflicts. We are interested in understanding more carefully which strategy is most likely to be employed in a given negotiation situation. We think the key to unpacking the existing empirical puzzle relating regime type to negotiation strategies lies in a better grasp of negotiation context. In some situations, leaders will prefer bilateral negotiations, while in other situations, they will seek out third party assistance. Unlike previous studies that simply control for contextual factors, we argue that these variables intervene in the relationship between regime type and conflict management strategies. As noted above, our theory focuses on three contextual factors: militarized conflict history, relative capabilities, and issue salience. Below, we describe how these three factors modify the way that democracies manage interstate conflicts.

**The Influence of Militarized Conflict History on Democratic States’ Conflict Management Strategies**

Generally speaking, democratic dyads should be more apt to settle contentious disputes peacefully as opposed to through armed conflict, which means that they will be more likely to use bilateral or third party peaceful settlement than non-democratic dyads. In other words, all types of peaceful settlement will be more common among democratic dyads in comparison with non-democratic dyads. The process of negotiation usually begins with bilateral attempts to settle a dispute. Third party solutions to a conflict become more attractive if bilateral negotiations fail and if one or both parties to a conflict resort to the threat, display, or use of militarized force. As conflicts intensify and the number of militarized incidents increases, they become more visible to potential third party conflict managers. The

⁶ In the research design section, we talk about militarized strategies for conflict management as well. Empirically, we compare peaceful conflict management (bilateral negotiations, non-binding third party settlement attempt, binding third party settlement attempt) to the onset of militarized disputes (with and without fatalities) over the issue in question.
disputants themselves will also view external efforts to manage their differences with greater necessity as things heat up, especially considering the costs incurred in militarized conflicts.

The conflict management literature often refers to such situations as “ripe” for resolution. Highly militarized relationships in world politics, such as enduring rivalries, attract a great deal of attention from third party mediators. For example, enduring rivalries attracted close to half of all mediation efforts in the Cold War era (Bercovitch and Diehl, 1997). Similarly, Hensel (2001) finds that non-binding third party settlement attempts become significantly more likely in the resolution of territorial claims in the Western Hemisphere as the number of previous militarized conflicts between the claimants rises. With respect to the dynamics of third party conflict management, Greig (2001) examines mediation efforts across the span of enduring rivalry relationships, finding a curvilinear pattern. Mediation efforts are more successful either early on when the rivalry emerges, or much later when the rivalry is fully entrenched.

Most of these conflict management studies, however, do not distinguish carefully between conflicts involving two democracies, and those between mixed or autocratic dyads. The greater transparency and credibility of democratic regimes should intensify the effect of militarized conflict history on peaceful conflict management practices. This could push in one of two directions. First, if democracies face greater audience costs for backing down in crisis situations (Fearon 1994), then a history of militarized conflict over a given interstate issue may lead to higher levels of resolve in future bargaining situations and lowered propensities to negotiate the issue peacefully. These tendencies towards hawkish foreign policy behaviors may be exacerbated if leaders’ electoral fortunes are on the line (Ostrom and Job 1986). However, when democracies face other democratic adversaries, they should fear the chances for escalation of militarized conflicts if both sides have signaled their resolve clearly. Thus, while democracies might be willing to threaten or use militarized force, especially as a history of conflictual relations accrues over time, we would not expect these disputes to escalate to severe levels (e.g. fatalities) when their adversary is also democratic.
On the other hand, militarization of an issue claim in a jointly democratic dyad might encourage more serious peaceful efforts to resolve the issue. This could ramp up bilateral efforts to resolve contentious issues, especially given bilateral contracting advantages that democratic dyads enjoy (Lipson 2003). Democracies might also recognize the need for a legal third party solution as confrontations over contentious issues heat up. As we described earlier, however, democracies are more likely to exhibit a preference for binding third party conflict management strategies over non-binding ones (Raymond 1994; Allee and Huth). Because conflict management studies (e.g. Dixon 1993, 1994) often focus their attention on the most conflictual set of cases, ones where bilateral negotiation has often failed, it explains why democratic dyads would seem to exhibit a greater affinity for third party conflict resolution empirically. Analyses that broaden the scope of contentious issues to include cases that do not become militarized should exhibit a greater tendency for bilateral settlement among democracies. But if things heat up militarily, democracies may view legal third party conflict resolution as a useful option. The democratic peace proposition, however, indicates that very few democratic dyads will accrue a history of militarized disputes. Thus while democratic conflict management strategies may depend on militarized dispute history, their empirical effects may be limited to a relatively small range of prior MIDs.

The Influence of Relative Capabilities on Democratic States’ Conflict Management Strategies

If democracies are reluctant to involve third parties in the dispute resolution process, this may be a function of power politics. In the last century, the major powers have tended more often than not to be democracies, and their security interests are broader and farther ranging than minor powers. Whereas minor powers tend to have conflicting issues with their neighbors, major powers experience them around the world. Consequently, the expectation is that major powers will be involved in disputes more often than their weaker counterparts. Prior to the creation of organizations like the EU and OAS, major powers had little incentive to surrender their advantages of strength, even if they did not intend to go to war with their democratic competitors. If powerful Great Britain had an issue with newly independent Canada in the latter 19th century, what did she (Great Britain) have to gain by letting someone else try to affect the outcome? Powerful democracies might employ different conflict management strategies when facing
other powerful democracies than when they are dealing with weaker democratic adversaries. Two distinct theoretical possibilities present themselves in the IR literature.

One classical take on relative power and conflict, as articulated clearly by power transition theorists (Organski and Kugler 1981), predicts that militarized conflict is most likely when two adversaries have similar capabilities and when at least one side is dissatisfied with the global, regional, or issue status quo. A plethora of empirical studies support the claim that power parity is more dangerous than power preponderance (see Kugler and Lemke (1996) and DiCicco and Levy (1999) for reviews of this literature). Relative power distinctions are significant for explaining peaceful conflict management practices as well, with third party and IGO conflict management occurring more frequently in situations of power parity (Wall and Lynn 1993; Hensel 2001; Hansen, Mitchell, and Nemeth 2008). We expect all forms of conflict management to be more prevalent in dyads characterized by power parity in comparison to dyads where one state has an asymmetric power advantage. Yet, for democracies, parity should be less dangerous overall, given that these states are more likely to be satisfied with the status quo (Lemke and Reed 1996). If democracies have a preference for legal settlement, we should see a stronger propensity for evenly matched democratic adversaries to turn to binding forms of third party conflict management.

A more recent theoretical perspective, developed by Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003), paints a different picture about how regime type and relative capabilities might interact to influence interstate conflict management. The democratic peace might be strongest in situations of parity because powerful democracies may be willing to employ coercive tactics against weak democracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003:242). Further, weaker democracies are more likely to capitulate against stronger adversaries, which imply that militarized conflicts should be more frequent in asymmetric democratic dyads, and that peaceful negotiations should be less likely to occur in general. When asymmetric democratic dyads do negotiate, this theoretical perspective would predict that it would take the form of bilateral negotiations, since the stronger side can coerce the weaker side into making concessions. In other words, militarized conflict and bilateral negotiations should be more frequent in asymmetric democratic dyads in comparison to symmetric democratic dyads.
The Influence of Issue Salience on Democratic States’ Conflict Management Strategies

Hensel (2001) and Hensel et al (2008) demonstrate the importance of issue salience for understanding how states resolve contentious interstate issues. All forms of peaceful and militarized settlement are more likely over more salient issues in general, such as territorial claims, and over more salient issues of a particular type (e.g. a territory with great strategic and resource importance or a maritime area with vast fishing and oil resources). Militarized conflict over an issue is five times more likely if the issue at stake is extremely salient to both sides, while peaceful settlement attempts are more than twice as likely over highly salient issues (Hensel et al 2008). While issue salience increases nearly all forms of conflict management, different regimes may respond to important claims in distinct ways. Since democracies make more credible commitments, only highly salient claims that face serious obstacles for successful issue resolution may lead democratic leaders to seek out third party assistance. While Allee and Huth (2006a, 2006n) find a general propensity for democracies to employ legally binding conflict management tools as a form of domestic political cover, this proclivity might be modified by issue salience, with democratic leaders seeking political cover only for highly visible and salient issues. Autocratic leaders, on the other hand, may seek out third party conflict management regardless of issue salience since they are less able to commit credibly to bilateral settlements.

Furthermore, the democratic peace may face its limitations at high levels of issue salience. Democracies may be willing to employ militarized force to pursue their highly salient issue related goals in order to increase the chances for success in peaceful negotiation rounds. A highly salient issue may ignite domestic opposition to accommodative policies and thus push democratic leaders into shows and uses of force. Colaresi (2004) observes democratic publics rewarding leaders for more hawkish policies. Electoral punishment for real or perceived foreign policy failures may compel certain democratic leaders to risk armed conflict if such actions demonstrate resolve and leadership skill. Yet, democratic publics are fickle. They do not tolerate high degrees of casualties (Gartner and Segura 1998), which implies that democracies will avoid escalation of MIDs against other democratic adversaries, especially given the fighting advantage democracies have in interstate wars (Reiter and Stam 2002).
Research Design

To test our theory, we employ a dataset on contentious issues collected by the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project. The ICOW project identifies contentious issue claims based on explicit evidence of contention involving official representatives of two or more nation-states over the issue type in question. For example, the ICOW territorial claims data are based on evidence that officials from at least one state make explicit statements claiming sovereignty over a specific piece of territory that is claimed or administered by another state. Beyond territorial claims, the ICOW project has collected data on two additional distinct types of contentious issues: maritime claims, which involve explicit contention between two or more states over the ownership, access to, or usage of a maritime area; and river claims, which involve explicit contention over the usage of an international river. The spatial-temporal domain of the data used in this paper is the set of all qualifying claims to territory from 1816 to 2001, maritime zones from 1900 to 2001, and cross-border rivers from 1900 to 2001 in the Western Hemisphere (North America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean), Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. In these regions, the project has identified 191 dyadic territorial claims, 143 dyadic maritime claims, and 82 dyadic river claims.

At this point, we offer an administrative note for clarification. The term ‘dispute’ is widely recognized in the conflict literature. It is usually synonymous with militarized conflict and closely associated with the Correlates of War (COW) MID data set. But not all international disagreements over contentious issues become militarized. On the contrary, as will be shown subsequently, a great many do not. In this study, we adopt the terminology from the ICOW project (Hensel 2001, Mitchell 2002) where the term ‘claim’ refers to verbal international disagreements over contentious issues, independent of whether or not there is a display, threat, or use of military force. A claim occurs when an official of one state makes an unambiguous assertion of ownership or control over a territory, area, or resource presently controlled, administered, or claimed by another state. Throughout the remainder of this paper, ‘claims’

7 We employ version 1.0 of the data, available at <http://www.paulhensel.org/icow.html>.
refer to all contentious issue disagreements, while ‘disputes’ refer solely to those disagreements that have reached the status of a militarized interstate dispute (MID).

The unit of observation in this analysis is the claim dyad-year. The ICOW dyad-year claim dataset includes a case for each year of every dyadic claim. For example, the Belize territorial claim involves two dyads: Guatemala-United Kingdom (1868-1981) and Guatemala-Belize (1981- present). Thus there are 114 dyad claim years for the Guatemala-UK dyad and 21 dyad claim years for the Guatemala-Belize dyad (through 2001). We also incorporate information from the ICOW settlement attempt dataset, which codes information on each peaceful attempt to resolve the contentious issue claim. For example, in the Belize territorial claim, ICOW codes 16 settlement attempts between Guatemala and Great Britain and 12 attempts between Guatemala and Belize.

Dependent Variable

Our analysis sheds light on the conflict resolution mechanisms states use to resolve contentious issues. Three pacific strategies and two violent ones are evaluated below. On the pacific side, we model bilateral negotiation, non-binding third party conflict resolution, and binding third party settlement. While extant research suggests democracies frequently use third party conflict management to resolve salient issues, we know little about whether such strategies are conditional on other crucial covariates. That is, to what extent are the tendencies of democratic leaders to resolve contentious issues through peaceful means affected by past violent conflict, issue salience, and relative power? All things equal, democratic leaders gravitate towards accommodation and non-violent dispute settlement. But even democratic leaders may find escalatory foreign policy actions useful in conveying resolve and achieving political victory. As such, we also model leader decisions to use military force to resolve issue claims.

With five separate settlement options, a multinomial model designed for categorical data seems appropriate. However, such an estimator requires mutually exclusive categories and the ICOW Project actually records multiple settlement efforts in any given year. Not only can bilateral negotiations or militarized conflict be used more than once in a year to resolve an issue claim, both can be used in the same year as well. Hensel (2001), thus, maintains that aggregated analyses using ordered logit models are
inappropriate since multiple types of settlement attempts may be used by states in any given year. Hensel further argues that separate analyses on each settlement attempt type are required rather than generating a selection rule that defines mutual exclusivity. Following Hensel (2001), then, we run separate probit models on five separate settlement attempt types: bilateral negotiations, non-binding third party settlement, binding third party attempts, militarized conflict, and militarized conflict with fatalities. If Lipson’s arguments about bilateral contract efficiency are accurate, we would expect democratic leaders to resolve contentious issues via bilateral negotiations. But as commitment problems arise, even democratic leaders look for assurances that promises will be kept. Third parties provide one mechanism by which leaders can tie their own hands and thus more credibly commit to peaceful conflict resolution.

Independent Variables

Democracy: Democracy scores for claimants are taken from Marshall and Jaggers’ Polity IV data (2002). Scores are assessed for governments ranging from 0 to 10 on both autocracy and democracy scales, with 0 being the least democratic/autocratic and 10 the most democratic/autocratic. A weak link measure is used for the -10 to +10 democracy-autocracy score. We can think of democratic dyads as those dyads characterized by a weakest link score of at least six or higher.

Militarized History: We argued that a history of militarized conflict alters states’ behavior, making them more amenable to third party assistance. However, we anticipated that the influence of militarized conflict history would be stronger in democratic dyads than mixed or autocratic dyads. Our measure of militarized history codes the number of previous militarized interstate disputes over territory, river, or maritime issues in the past 5 years (Jones et al. 1996; Ghosn and Palmer 2003). This variable ranges from zero to 6 in our data. The expectation is that there will be a greater likelihood of third party settlement attempts for all dyads experiencing previous MIDs. The concern about a renewal of military disputes is expected to cause the two sides to be more willing to accept outside assistance, and that same

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8 In an earlier version of this paper, we did create such a decision rule to allow for the use of a multinominal estimator. However, reviewers have been uniformly concerned about the arbitrariness of the coding rules created to establish mutual exclusivity. Most appear to agree with Hensel (2001) that separate analyses of each settlement attempt type remain more methodologically defensible.
concern is further expected to elicit offers of help from third parties (e.g. Dixon 1993). At the same time, past violent conflict should increase the probability of future conflict and given electoral considerations, perhaps even more so for democratic states.

Our theory suggests that joint democracy and MID history both influence bargaining strategies employed by competing states. However, we argued that militarized history should have a stronger effect in democratic dyads, thus we create an interaction term multiplying the weak link regime measure by the measure of past militarized conflict over the past 5 years. Democracies are better able to avoid militarized disputes, as the democratic peace literature suggests, thus it is not surprising that the range of militarized history is smaller, having a maximum value of 3.0 (compared to 6 for non-democratic dyads). Where both prior MIDs and joint democracy are present, we anticipate more frequent peaceful settlement attempts (bilateral and third party).

**Salience.** Issue salience is the importance attributed to a particular claim by the claimants (Hensel 2001; Hensel et al 2008). ICOW’s salience index scores the importance of each claim on a 0-12 scale. For territory, it takes into consideration whether homeland territory is involved, whether or not it is part of the mainland, whether the territory contains known or potential resources, the existence and size of a population in the disputed area, and ethnic or religious bases for the claim. For rivers, salient indicators capture the volume of water discharged and the need for that particular source of water for a variety of reasons, including drinking, fishing, irrigation, resource extraction, and other economic requirements. Maritime salience is based on fishing and oil resources, strategic military significance (such as naval choke points), and whether the maritime boundary is related to a disputed land border. The three issue types employ different indicators for capturing salience, but all are aggregated into a single twelve-point scale for ease of comparison. Hensel et al (2008) argue that more highly salient issues will heighten the likelihood of peaceful and militarized settlement attempts. In addition to entering issue salience in our

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9 Regimes with democracy-autocracy scores of 6-8 have a maximum of 3 past MIDs. Regimes with democracy-autocracy scores of 9 or 10 have only a maximum of 2 past MIDs. So, democratic states are more successful at avoiding even low level violent conflict, which frequently leads to retaliation, the development of rivalry, and war.
models, we also create an interaction term multiple issue salience times democracy to capture the contingent effect of issue salience on democracies’ conflict management strategies.

*Relative Capabilities:* Powerful states typically have stronger bargaining power. We measure the stronger side’s relative capabilities (% of dyad), which ranges from .50 (complete equality in power) to 1.0 (complete preponderance by one side in the dyad). Our capabilities measure comes from the Correlates of War Project and captures each country’s global share of demographic (total & urban population), military (spending & personnel), and economic capabilities (iron & steel production, energy consumption). We also calculate an interaction term by multiplying the relative capabilities score in the dyad times the weakest link democracy score.

*Issue Management:* The ICOW project collects information on successful and unsuccessful peaceful attempts to resolve contentious issues. Similar to past militarized conflict activity, a weighted count of past unsuccessful peaceful settlement attempts over the last ten years is included in the models presented below to explain settlement and conflict actions. According to Hensel (2001, 97), unsuccessful attempts include both bilateral and third party efforts that did not produce lasting agreements.

*Empirical Analysis:* The empirical analysis centers on different strategies of conflict resolution. Our theoretical concern remains the behavior of democratic states and whether such states adjust their conflict management strategies depending on important other considerations, such as past violent conflict, issue salience, and relative power. We use a probit estimator with robust clustered errors (on the claim dyad) to evaluate the relationship between regime type and conflict management. As noted above, we run separate analyses for each of the five separate peaceful and militarized strategies used to resolve issue claims. We enter the interaction terms in separate models in order to facilitate an easier interpretation of our findings and to help avoid the high levels of multicollinearity that would arise from entering all three interaction terms simultaneously.
Empirical Analyses

Table 1 presents probit analyses for the impact of regime type on *peaceful* settlement attempts for states with issue claims, while Table 2 runs the same models for *militarized* settlement attempts. Since the primary concern of the analyses involves interactive relationships, the results are more easily interpretable using Figures 1 and 2 where the conditional effects are graphically displayed. With five separate dependent variables, a discussion of empirical results can be lengthy and confusing. To offer both specifics about each model and synthesize the results to offer an overall summary of the empirical results, the discussion is divided into two parts. First, the impact of regime type is evaluated for each conflict management strategy conditional on past violent conflict, issue salience, and relative power. Second, the conditional effects will be compared across separate conflict management strategies to assess better how democratic states resolve contentious issues.

**Bilateral Negotiation**

Model 1 shows democratic states to have a higher probability than autocratic states of using bilateral negotiations to resolve issue claims, but only when little or no past violent conflict characterizes the dyadic relationship. In fact, with no previous militarized conflict, the model predicts a 50% increase in the use of bilateral negotiations when going from a weak link score of -10 to +10. However, when previous bouts of militarized conflict define the relationship, regime type appears to have less influence on the use of negotiations to settle issue claims. With 3 past MIDs, there is a much smaller 13% increase in the use of bilateral negotiations. At 6 past MIDs, though, democratic states actually have a lower probability than autocratic states of relying on bilateral negotiations to resolve contentious issues. This could conceivably indicate that democratic states are turning to third parties to help settle these claims as the number of past militarized incidents increases. Both normative and institutional arms of democratic peace theory presumably anticipate democratic leaders actively seeking non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms even when violent conflict characterizes the relationship. While there is little evidence from our analyses that democratic states are turning to third party assistance, it is also true that our model cannot reliably predict democratic behavior at 6 past militarized conflicts since no weak link score above
A regime effect also obtains for bilateral negotiations conditional on issue salience (Model 2). When issue claims remain relatively unimportant, democratic and autocratic states behave similarly. As claim salience increases, however, democratic leaders increasingly turn to diplomatic channels to resolve the contentious issue. For high salience issues, democratic states are more than twice as likely as non-democratic states to negotiate important claims. This suggests democratic leaders recognize the salience of certain claims and seek to avoid escalation through active diplomacy.

Model 3 offers some support for Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) contention that powerful democracies may initiate militarized conflict at higher rates than weaker democracies and thus pose an exception to the liberal peace. Our evidence indicates that relatively strong democracies are less likely to yield to negotiations than their weaker counterparts. Indeed, the likelihood of a democratic leader resolving a contentious issue via bilateral negotiations is twice as high at parity than at preponderance. Further, non-democratic leaders show no greater propensity at either parity or preponderance to initiate diplomacy and compared to democracies, the rate of bilateral negotiation tends to be lower. So democratic states in general resolve contentious issues through diplomacy at higher rates than non-democracies and much higher when dyadic power is relatively equal.

**Non-Binding Third Party Settlement**

In general, the results are weak. Regime differences are not observed for either the past conflict interaction or the issue salience interaction. A strong effect is however uncovered for regime type conditional on relative power. Nondemocratic states at parity are substantially more likely to utilize non-binding forms of third party settlement than democratic states at parity; more than 50% in fact. Powerful

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10 We have 415 instances of third-party settlement attempts in the data; 63 are binding and 351 are non-binding.

11 Admittedly, there is some difference in regime type behavior when past violent conflict is at its maximum (6 MIDs in last 5 years). However, since there are no cases of democratic states having more than 3 militarized disputes, this prediction of the model remains unreliable.
democratic states, in contrast, are twice as likely as powerful non-democracies to seek out such mediation
efforts to help resolve salient issues.

**Binding Third Party Settlement**

Extant research tends to show democratic states submitting to binding forms of third party
settlement at higher rates than non-democracies. Our evidence supports such a conclusion, with two
exceptions. First, at low issue salience, non-democratic leaders show a greater propensity to settle claims
via binding third party efforts. Second, with moderate to high levels of past militarized conflict, non-
democratic states submit to binding third party settlement attempts at much higher rates than democratic
states. This may indicate efforts by inter-governmental institutions and developed democracies to help
resolve entrenched conflicts among authoritarian states to prevent escalation. Potential arbitrators
presumably go to the hotspots and issue claims among non-democracies tend to be ‘hotter’ than those
between more liberal states.

Democratic states show higher probabilities for binding third party settlement when issue claims
are extremely important and when violent conflict does not characterize the past relationship. These
relationships present a puzzle. Why does issue importance push democratic leaders to binding forms of
settlement, but violent conflict does not? We suggest that militarized conflict may introduce electoral
considerations that demand a more hawkish foreign policy response. For democracies, armed conflict
may simply have a very strong conditioning effect on any type of contentious issue, pushing leaders away
from more accommodative policies.

**Militarized Conflict**

The models in Table 2 show sizable regime type differences, but sometimes in unexpected ways.
Perhaps the most striking relationship involves the likelihood of armed conflict given past conflict. For
countries with little or no past violent conflict, the probability of MID onset is less than 3% and less than
1% for fatal MID onset. For democracies, the probabilities are even smaller at about 1.5% for MID onset
and 1/10\(^{th}\) of 1% for fatal MID onset. However, violent conflict only pushes states toward more violent
conflict. For non-democracies, the probability of MID onset jumps 800% and over 300% for fatal MID
onset. What is interesting is that these probabilities are even higher for democratic states. In fact, with three past militarized disputes, the likelihood of an additional MID onset for democratic states is above 0.30. So violent conflict pushes both democratic and non-democratic states towards continued violence to settle contentious issues, but the rate increase is considerably larger for democratic leaders.

In general, democracies are less likely than non-democracies to resort to force regardless of the salience of the issue claim with one exception. High salience claims lead democracies into militarized conflict at higher rates than non-democracies, nearly 40% higher in fact. For moderate and low issue salience, democratic leaders are considerably less likely than non-democratic leaders to use military force. For all categories of issue salience, democratic states have a smaller probability of fatal MID involvement than non-democratic states. For high salience claims, the likelihood is less than half that of non-democracies. This supports previous arguments that democracies may experience more frequent MIDs at lower levels of escalation (Senese 1997). Democracies may utilize militarized threats to demonstrate resolve, especially over highly salient issues, but they tend to back down when facing other highly resolved democratic opponents.

Table 2 also shows little support for Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) expectation for powerful democracies being more conflict prone. Not only are the probabilities of MID and fatal MID involvement smaller for democracies than non-democracies for all levels of relative power, but very powerful democracies actually have the lowest probability of militarized and fatal militarized conflict. Democratic leaders do not appear to take advantage of their preponderant power and target weak adversaries with military challenges.

Conclusion

Our paper seeks to understand how democracies manage interstate conflicts and under what conditions democratic states utilize different forms of peaceful and militarized conflict management strategies. Many existing studies identify tendencies for democracies to prefer bilateral negotiation or legalistic third party settlement, yet it is not clear when democratic leaders will select these conflict management
strategies, especially in light of the fact that democracies employ all forms of peaceful and militarized conflict management tools at different points in time. We argue that the answer lies in a better understanding of the context within which interstate negotiations take place. The conflict management strategies that democracies will employ depend upon the history of militarized conflict to date, the salience of the issue at stake, and the relative capabilities of their adversaries.

The evidence we find strongly indicates that dyads with histories of armed conflict increasingly resort to force to settle contentious claims. However, all forms of conflict resolution increase with past violent conflict. The probabilities of bilateral negotiation and both non-binding and binding third party settlement are considerably higher as the number of past MIDs increases. This confirms the intuition of the conflict management literature that third party mediators go to the hot spots, and that these efforts intensify as militarized histories accrue. However, the trends displayed in Figure 1 further suggest that dyads with entrenched histories of past militarized conflict, such as enduring rivals, at some point eschew peaceful negotiation and opt for force to resolve the contentious issue. Since democratic dyads rarely reach such high levels of past militarized conflict, this trend toward greater militarization rarely appears. For autocratic dyads with very high levels of past militarized conflict, the probability of resorting again to militarized violence reaches 60% and over 10% for fatal militarized violence. These findings confirm results offered by Hensel (2001): past militarized conflict increases both peaceful negotiation and militarized attempts to resolve contentious issue claims.

For most reasonable values of past conflict, democratic dyads have a substantially higher probability of binding third-party conflict management compared to non-democratic dyads. However, while past conflict increases the probability of binding third-party settlement for all dyads, it substantially increases it for non-democracies. Because autocrats do not enjoy the same degree of transparency, reliability, and audience costs as democracies, they find it more difficult to make credible commitments. In these situations, third party guarantors may facilitate agreements and help parties carry out the terms of the agreement. This may help to explain why a strong democratic community seems to produce more
frequent third party conflict management in non-democratic dyads, even though the willingness to accept third party assistance is a democratic norm (Mitchell 2002).

We should again point out that a willingness to employ legalized third party forms of conflict management could make bilateral settlement more likely and more successful. For example, democratic states are significantly more likely to recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, which may create more efficient out of court bargaining for democratic dyads (Powell and Mitchell 2007). Thus looking only at the frequency of actual binding third party efforts may be misleading if democracies are strategic actors that anticipate the possibility of these binding judgments, and hence prefer to negotiate more efficiently on their own. Independent analyses not reported herein reveal that democracies are significantly more likely to reach agreements that entail roughly even concessions, compared to agreements reached in non-democratic dyads that involve asymmetric outcomes (either favoring the challenger or target). Hence democratic dyads are able to not only employ bilateral negotiations more frequently; they are also better able to reach fair agreements that are carried out by both sides.

Two last points. First, salient claims also increase all forms of conflict management. However, in general, democratic dyads are less likely than non-democratic dyads to resort to serious armed conflict and much more likely to use binding third party settlement mechanisms and bilateral diplomacy to resolve contentious issues. Second, the empirical evidence does not offer much support for Bueno de Mesquita et. al.’s (1999, 2003) conjecture regarding powerful democracies. If audience costs induce risk-aversion in democratic political elites, as many institutionalists argue, then the costless campaigns powerful democracies likely face when confronting much weaker opponents cannot explain the relationships we observe. Indeed, powerful democracies eschew the use of force and opt for procedures more in line with their domestic conflict resolution norms.


### Table 1: Probit Models of Peaceful Conflict Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Bilateral Negotiation</strong></th>
<th><strong>Non-Binding Third Party Conflict Management</strong></th>
<th><strong>Binding Third Party Conflict Management</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regime Type (Weak Link Dem-Aut)</td>
<td>.012***</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.054**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recent MID Activity (Past 5 Years)</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.051</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regime Type*Recent MID Activity</td>
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<td>(-.0077)</td>
<td>(-.0051)</td>
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<td>ICOW Salience Index</td>
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<td>.032***</td>
<td>.031***</td>
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<td>Regime Type*Salience</td>
<td>(-.002*</td>
<td>(.0016)</td>
<td>(-.001)</td>
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<td>Relative Capabilities</td>
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<td>-.498***</td>
<td>-.505***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regime Type*Capabilities</td>
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<td>(-.0305)</td>
<td>(.070**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unsuccessful Attempts</td>
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<td>.252***</td>
<td>.250***</td>
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<td>9939</td>
<td>9939</td>
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<td>Pseudo R²</td>
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<td>0.0610</td>
<td>0.0617</td>
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Note: One-tailed significance tests. ***<.01; **<.05; *<.10. Robust standard errors clustered on claim dyad.
Table 2: Probit Models of Militarized Conflict Management

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<tr>
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<th>Militarized Dispute</th>
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<th>Fatal Militarized Dispute</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regime Type (Weak Link Dem-Aut)</td>
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<td>Regime Type*Recent MID Activity</td>
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<td><strong>.009</strong> (0.0047)</td>
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<td><strong>.003</strong></td>
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<td>(.0040)</td>
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<td>(.0234)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
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Note: One-tailed significance tests. ***<.01; **<.05; *<.10. Robust standard errors clustered on claim dyad.
Figure 1: Substantive Effects for Peaceful Conflict Management
Figure 2: Substantive Effects for Militarized Conflict Management