Let us clear from the ground the metaphysical or general principles upon which, from time to time, _laissez-faire_ has been founded.... Nor is it true that self-interest generally is enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these. Experience does _not_ show that individuals, when they make up a social unit, are always less clear-sighted than when they act separately.... The time...has come when each country needs a considered national policy about what size of Population, whether larger or smaller than at present or the same, is most expedient. And having settled this policy, we must take steps to carry it into operation.¹

If the aggregate supply of new labor is the vector of billions of self-regarding micro-social-psychological decisions—if, that is, when “a woman conceives and bears a child, it is safe to assume that the State is not overmuch in her mind”—what guarantees that the result promotes macroeconomic optimality let alone the accumulation of capital? Because the supply of labor at any given moment appears fixed, “not by anything then happening, but by the habits and actions of millions of disconnected households a generation back,” whereas the demand for labor is the aggregate of current individual demands by hundreds of thousands of competing employers, “[d]iscrepancy between two things so distinct in immediate origin is obviously possible.”²

That a sharp conflict can also erupt between micro- and macroeconomic rationality became a prominent theme, for example, in the French power-holders’ attempts to combat what they viewed as that country’s fatally uncompetitive underpopulation. In the explanation accompanying the filing of a bill to award premiums or annuities to mothers of four or more children, Adolphe Messimy, a former Minister of War, stated in 1912 that:
Why, today, does one say it is disastrous to raise children? Because in the modern family and especially in the bourgeois family, when the father has paid for the education of the child for twenty years, the latter goes off and produces nothing for the family, which has raised him.

But from the point of view of the country, it is far from being so. The child once grown up will produce and will constitute for the money expended in his education a magnificent investment.

Messimy then explained that even in a working-class family, it cost 4,000-5,000 francs to raise a child to the age of 13, at which point he became a demi-ouvrier; later the child as worker would receive wages of 1,500 to 2,000 francs annually for 40 to 50 years and obviously produce much more—otherwise no one would employ him—thus generating a return of 40 percent. The problem was that economic self-interest was not calculated to promote this social or national dividend because the investors, the parents, bore the cost of producing the worker without any return. Such a divergence represents the canonical welfare-economics case for "interference with normal economic processes...to increase the dividend." But has capital, disguised under the name of "society," in fact intervened into procreational decisions to this end? And if spontaneous demographic outcomes are not favorable, why has capital not intervened into this laissez-faire regime?

This chapter first explores whether it makes sense to speak of an optimum population in a capitalist society. It then introduces and ultimately disposes of the objection that patriarchal state interference with women's sexual autonomy and reproductive freedom (in the form of statutory bans on contraception and abortion) is inconsistent with the claim that capitalist population policy is laissez faire. Finally, it analyzes whether capital can articulate and implement a population policy designed to promote that optimum. The failure of capital and of the central state apparatus in the United States during the post-World War II period to agree on the definition of such an optimum let alone the need for establishing any population policy provides the illustrative material for the discussion.

IS THERE AN OPTIMUM POPULATION?

From the *histoires raisonnées* of Ricardo...it would be quite justifiable to infer that, once the world was populated at all, any increase in population was a disadvantage.... Even from an economic point of view, the advent of Eve was a misfortune!

What is the optimum population from capital's perspective? Many demographers and economists have, for the past century, expressed considerable skepticism as to whether the notion of an optimal population size has any practical value at all. For William Beveridge, optimum density as the golden mean balancing precariously between over- and underpopulation "suffers from the two
defects of being unknowable and never the same for two moments together.” Gunnar Myrdal characterized the theory of optimum population as “a speculative figment of the mind without much connection with this world; it does not give any guiding rule for the practical and political judgment of reality.”

The complexity of economic consequences of alternative possibilities has meant that economists have failed to reach a consensus on the optimum rate of population change in the United States. At the peak of the Pax Americana in the mid-1950s, Kingsley Davis, a Parsonian functionalist, knew that the optimum would strike a balance between the “very large numbers for...sheer military and industrial strength” and “fewer numbers for...maintaining a high level of living,” but he was unable to sketch any criteria for framing such a determination. Daniel Moynihan, even as the federal government for the first time expressed concern about overpopulation in the United States, asked: “Is there an optimum population for the country? Who can say?” Even Julian Simon, an extreme market-knows-best pronatalist, concedes that “even in the very simplest case,” the macroeconomic welfare impact of an additional child is not only “thoroughly messy and generally indeterminate” but is incapable of a strictly scientific evaluation. Conceding that the short-run impact must be negative because children consume without producing, all Simon can offer is the speculation that the long-term effect “may be positive” because the connection between population growth and productive and infrastructural scale economies is “tenuous.” Finally, the 18 U.S. congressmen who introduced a joint resolution in 1970 placing the federal government’s imprimatur on zero population growth conceded that although “stabilizing population may be a terribly urgent priority...we do not know what constitutes an optimum population for this country.”

Although he was neither explicit nor clear on the point, Malthus must have presumed that Britain (and other countries) had already achieved an optimum level of population such that every additional person (or worker) would trigger diminishing returns. The notion of optimum population in the sense of the highest possible per capita national income does in fact hinge on the hypothetical counterbalancing of two forces in tension with each other: the “law” of diminishing returns, which imagines that per capita output rises as population declines; and that of external economies, which posits that in a complex social division of labor, larger populations generate benefits that cannot be captured by the smaller populations favored by diminishing returns because a smaller than optimum labor force cannot make maximum use of the indivisibilities of some factors of production. In an early formulation, for example, James Mill observed that: “There is a certain density of population which is convenient, both for social intercourse, and for that combination of powers by which theproduce of labour is increased. When these advantages, however, are attained, there seems little reason to wish that population should proceed any further. If it does proceed further,...it lessens [the net revenue].”

Some economists, rejecting a Malthusian interpretation of the maximum demographic carrying capacity, agree that the phenomenon of optimality would
have to relate to that population (at any given time) above and below which per capita income decreases. Keynes implied this view in his debate with Beveridge in the 1920s on overpopulation (rather than optimum population) when he asked rhetorically: "Is not a country overpopulated when its standards are lower than they would be if its numbers were less? [T]he question of what numbers are desirable arises long before starvation sets in, and even before the level of life begins to fall." As a macroeconomic analogy to the "law" of diminishing (and increasing) returns—which even as a microeconomic doctrine presupposes an unreal constancy of certain factors and variability of the remaining factor of production—the theory of optimum population as applied to a dynamic historical societal process is doomed to irrelevance.

Because of the lack of any easy conversion between the individual and collective consequences of population change, the relationship between demography and economics is much less straightforward than is commonly recognized. The observation that, ceteris paribus, smaller families are economically less pressured than larger ones does not necessarily mean that the macro-societal analog is similarly structured. Under certain circumstances, reproductive free riders benefit only so long as most others continue to procreate sufficiently. Thus a person whose income derives from a business that depends on increases in population may individually benefit from sharply curtailing her own fertility but only so long as the rest of society continues to produce more children. Under certain circumstances, a total fertility strike would not only not reduce unemployment in the short run, but, by producing a smaller labor force and diminished demand, might even generate underpopulation-induced unemployment.

Unsurprisingly, few if any analysts believe that anyone has discovered a method for determining what the optimum population is—especially since any per capita welfare optimum would also have to take into account the personal and class distribution of income and the level and distribution of the subjective costs of production including the disruptiveness of cyclical depressions and booms. Indeterminacy of so many intertwined factors prompted one of the chief economic reporters to the U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future to confess agnosticism "regarding an 'economically desirable' family size." Moreover, in a period of intense internationalization, production for and trade with the world market make it possible to escape at least from the limitations of putative national under- or overpopulation. As Beveridge remarked in his debate with Keynes: "The first principle of population to-day is that, under conditions of economic specialisation and international trade, the population problem in any particular country cannot profitably be considered without reference to other countries. The problem in every country is a problem of the distribution of population of the world as a whole." And, finally, the notion of an optimum is made even more complicated by the fact, recognized by orthodox economics as early as Marshall, that "deduction must be made for the growing difficulty of finding solitude and quiet and even fresh air...."

From the narrower vantage point of capital, the notion of an optimum
population would have to incorporate elements promoting the development of the forces of production such as the division of labor, cooperation, science, and the proliferation of numerous dense population centers of exchange and thus of optimal scale economies and consumer market size.\textsuperscript{25} Indeed, it was on this linkage of increasing population with intensified markets and a deepening division of labor on the one hand and increasing returns on the other that the Ricardian socialist Thomas Hodgskin grounded his refutation of Malthus.\textsuperscript{26} For capital in general, an optimum population would therefore have to be conceptualized differently. It would entail a population large enough to forge a labor force that during all phases of the industrial cycle suffices for capital’s self-valorization demands without being so redundant that the income required to aliment the reserve armies becomes a drag on capital accumulation: “A demographic Laffer curve, discovered, let us imagine, sketched on a tablecloth in the Hoover Institution canteen, tells us that six-child families are bad for business and zero children bad for business, but somewhere in between is a fertility regime under which the economy can optimally thrive.”\textsuperscript{27}

When the capital-friendly U.S. domestic population control and zero population growth agenda began to take hold of public opinion in the late 1960s, it was, for reasons of political legitimation, tactically clever to emphasize that whereas the bulk of population growth was accounted for by the contracepting nonpoor, above-average fertility among the poor was not so much a population as a poverty problem.\textsuperscript{28} Not all economic demographers, however, were discreet. Joseph Spengler, for example, in a commissioned report to the federal government’s Commission on Population Growth and the American Future in 1972, revealed that “[f]ar more important at present than how many people is what kind of people.” The segment of the population that stood most in need of demographic exorcising was the “born losers, dependent on the welfare system.” This group’s disappearance could be expedited by “drying up its sources....”\textsuperscript{29} These mere objects of pity are functionally equivalent to Malthus’s “unhappy persons,” the children of large families which arrived too late for the mythical “original division of land,” and who therefore “in the great lottery of life, have drawn a blank.”\textsuperscript{30}

This Malthusian reinvention of seventeenth-century English poor-law policy and anticipation of mid-1990s’ right-wing welfare reform was embedded in a broad attack on labor-protective legislation.\textsuperscript{31} Unlike their counterparts in the golden era, before the New Deal, today’s “losers” find their access to employment “limited by the requirement that employers pay them, not in keeping with their productivity, but somewhat in line with the wages paid quite productive workers and the living standards shared by the latter.”\textsuperscript{32}

To the extent that capital can shift the cost of the maintenance of the reserve army on to others,\textsuperscript{33} the sustainable optimum population may be enlarged. By the end of the Napoleonic wars, for example, the diminished demand for soldiers and sailors and the increased taxation absorbed by poor law relief meant that “it was by no means so obvious that the increasing numbers of the ‘lower orders’ was advantageous to the ruling classes.”\textsuperscript{34} Or as Malthus himself realized,
restating the issue of optimum population within the framework of the wage-fund doctrine: "It is not easy to determine what is the price of labour most favourable to the progress of wealth." Likewise, the Depression of the 1930s in the United States revealed the fiscal limits of the reserve army. After mentioning several unemployed people who continued to have children (including triplets), *Time* commented that the "urge to procreate...today provides relief administrators...with one of their toughest and most ticklish problems." Faced with 22 million people on the dole costing the states and federal government $180 million monthly and "producing a quarter of a million children a year...[r]elief administrators want to use scientific birth control to constrain that impoverished sixth of the population" that was accounting for one-third of the next generation. Concerted implementation of such state demographic policy was, however, stymied by "fear of the Roman Catholic Church."36

**IS DEMOGRAPHIC LAISSEZ FAIRE COMPATIBLE WITH PATRIARCHAL STATE CONTROL OF WOMEN’S SEXUAL AUTONOMY AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM?**

For more than three decades, population scientists have pursued, without much success, that Questing Beast, the psychological determinants of fertility. But like the mythical King Pellinore, we seem to find only the beasts’ fewmets.37

Before discussing whether capital has a population policy, it is necessary to explore a logically prior question: Is the characterization of capitalism as a laissez-faire reproductive regime merely a time-bound artifact of the period, encompassing the final third of the twentieth century, since the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutionalization of the right to reproductive freedom? Is, then, the characterization of capitalist population policy as laissez faire inconsistent with the legal prohibitions on contraception and abortion in effect for 100 years or more beginning in the mid-nineteenth century? Such a claim hinges on the hidden empirical assumptions that such laws not only were designed as macroeconomic measures to control population, but that they actually significantly interfered with procreation. Finally, it would be necessary to prove that such laws conflicted with the purposes of capitalist population policy by dysfunctional affecting the supply of wage labor; proponents of the claim would have to show that such laws exerted a negative impact on proletarian reproduction. It would be irrelevant to show merely that restrictions on birth control had an impact on nonworking-class population growth since specifically capitalist population policy is not primarily concerned with the reproduction of the bourgeoisie.

As U.S. fertility and birth rates, which at the outset of the nineteenth century far exceeded any ever registered in Europe, fell after midcentury below those of a number of European countries, some groups voiced concern that this
Capitalist Population Policy

decline was a result of "'prudence' on the part of the community, not as a State, which encourages population, but as individuals." Indeed, even some legislative bodies commented on this trend in connection with penalizing the propagation of contraception and abortion. Such generalizations, however, are not pertinent in this context. For these complaints focused on the decline in fertility among "the native American" population and in particular on the fact that "the more wealthy and intelligent class of married persons limit the number of their children to one or two [through] induced abortions." Contemporary opinion generally believed that middle- and upper-class Protestants were the chief users of abortion in the mid-nineteenth century. Consequently, when, toward the end of that century, abortion again became associated with the poor rather than the higher-income "native" population, it ceased to be "as demographically significant or as socially threatening to men in the policymaking positions...."

The alleged pivotal piece of national anti-birth control legislation, the so-called Comstock Law of 1873 ("An Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, obscene Literature and Articles of immoral Use"), was not driven by any perceived need to interdict the working class's successful efforts to limit their numbers. The congressmen who explained the bill focused their attention on the popular "disgust" for and the need for suppressing the "abomination" of pornographic materials. Representative Merriam, who collaborated with Anthony Comstock in the latter's war on "this pestilential literature," was primarily concerned both that the "purity and beauty of womanhood has been no protection from the insults of this trade" and that nine-year-old children's minds were being polluted. Significantly, when, a half-century later, the birth-control movement agitated on behalf of repeal, one of its principal legislative history points was that not even Comstock himself had intended to penalize the dissemination of "normal birth control information"; rather, his goal had merely been "to free the young people...from contamination by those...trafficking extensively in smutty literature and inducements to sex perversion."

Nor can the Comstock Law and similar state laws be meaningfully interpreted as throwbacks to seventeenth-century mercantilism's "almost fanatic zeal for an increase in population...." Comstockery was not the product of a policy of state self-aggrandizement in a struggle for international competitive supremacy. Hobbes may have argued that the sovereign's duty with regard to "multitude," an aspect of a people's temporal good, was "to increase the people...by ordinances concerning copulation..." but Anthony Comstock did not. Antiabortion laws had more to do with regulating and protecting the public from a medical profession that appeared to be a menace to health than with shaping untoward demographic developments. Similarly, the criminalization of abortion in Britain at the beginning of the nineteenth century was a product, on the one hand, of a humanitarian movement to abolish the law on infanticide, and, on the other, of doctors' professionalization campaign to eliminate rival practitioners. And even if the legislation can also be interpreted as the "ruling classes...asserting their rights to police the reproductive actions of the lower orders" which led to a
"decline in women’s rights to limit their pregnancies," there is no evidence that it was designed as a specifically capitalist instrument of population control.45

It makes no more sense to cast the misogyny inherent in the World War I-era judicial decision (under a state criminal statute banning the dissemination of information about contraception) denying women “the right to copulate with a feeling of security that there will be no resulting conception” as repopulationist than the recent religiously driven “pro-life” movement in the United States.46 This insight underlies the observation made by Crystal Eastman, a feminist and socialist, during World War I, that although “capitalism thrives on an over-supplied labor market...with our usual enormous immigration to be counted on as soon as the war is over, it is not likely that an organized economic opposition to birth control will develop.”47 Finally, even if Comstockery’s intent had been repopulationist, it would have been an outright failure; for “despite Comstock, large families were becoming scarce among native-born Americans even before 1910...”48

That a laissez-faire regime of reproduction can coexist with antiabortion and anticontraception laws was made abundantly clear by the position adopted by Margaret Sanger, the leader of the birth control movement in the United States. Despite having been repeatedly prosecuted herself under such statutes, she nevertheless protested what she expressly called the country’s laissez-faire population policy:

We are a nation of business men and women. We believe in efficiency, accuracy, and sound economic policy. [I]t is high time that not only American science but American business as well should begin to analyze the cost to the community of the haphazard, traditional, happy-go-lucky methods in producing the Americans of tomorrow—the laissez-faire policy approved by those who forget that the Biblical injunction “be fruitful and multiply” was given to Noah immediately after the Flood, when...the entire population of the globe was eight.49

Feminist theoreticians have explored the complexity and contradictoriness of state “populationist (political-economic) and the sexist (patriarchal) dimensions of fertility control policies” in class- and race-divided societies, in which “‘pronatalist’ and ‘antinatalist’ policies coincide.” Rosalind Petchesky, for example, recognizes that “the policy of imposing patriarchal controls over women’s fertility and sexuality is difficult to balance with a policy of population control aimed at the poor or racial minorities. The state’s promotion of fertility control measures in the service of populationist ends may unwittingly facilitate their use by the ‘wrong’ women (ruling-class wives and unmarried daughters), in the service of their sexual and reproductive freedom.” State mediation of this conflict between population and sexual control is made even more complicated by the state’s need to maintain its legitimacy by accommodating some non-ruling-class demands. As an example, Petchesky mentions the third quarter of the nineteenth century when the decline in birth rates and rise in abortion prompted
efforts to discourage birth control among middle-class women and apply negative eugenics to the poor and foreign-born. But it is precisely here that even her critical approach becomes insufficient as Petchesky argues that the class and racial interests of compulsory sterilization as a populationist strategy are transparent: "A poor and unskilled mass of unemployed comprises not only a cheap labor reserve economically but also a potential source of social rebellion...."50

This insightful analysis nevertheless fails to explain how the state’s visible demographic hand could ever fulfill this mediating role by calibrating and implementing the production of the optimal size of the reserve army at any given time let alone dynamically for 20 years ahead of time. To make the calculation it would, at a minimum, be necessary to know: (1) individual employers’ fluctuating demand for such labor and the wages that would insure that the requisite amount of labor would be forthcoming; (2) the aggregate private and societal costs in terms of all the components of the social wage (including unemployment insurance and the non-employment-related welfare system); and (3) the quantitative point at which a functional reserve army of the unemployed is transformed into a gang of mutineers. To list these informational desiderata is to reveal the epistemological—not to mention the practical—hopelessness of the undertaking by the state in a capitalist society constrained by the anarchy of competition among millions of employers and self-legitimation needs to satisfy certain popular expectations that would preclude the kind of mass procreational invasiveness that such proletarian population planning would presuppose. After all, even the mid-twentieth-century planned parenthood organizations that urged the formulation of national population planning shrank back from authoritarian models without explaining how the procreative acts of 100 to 200 million people could be democratically coordinated. It is precisely for these reasons that a laissez-faire regime is consistent with state interference with female sexuality, and that, as Linda Gordon has observed: "Despite the apparent dominance of population-control-eugenics advocates for much of the last century, in fact that group has accomplished very little."51 The fact that the secular decline in the birth rate continued through and despite decades of patriarchal sex legislation further undermines the claim that such state intervention is incompatible with laissez-faire reproduction.52

These complexities have attended population policy at least since industrialization created a contradiction between bourgeois sexual prudery and fear of population. Because birth control would have destroyed the link between the relegation of women to motherhood and sex, the goals of population control and sexual control became "somewhat at odds." The response to Malthus’s population theory was doubly divided between radical and liberal attitudes toward social control and between concern for sexual control and population control; consequently, Malthusianism and anti-Malthusianism bore a complicated relationship to each other.53 Such ideological-legitimation reasons help explain why political actors as disparate as Jeremy Bentham and President Dwight Eisenhower have eschewed state intervention into procreational decisions as coercively inexpedient and wholly improper as a state function or responsibility.54
This overlay of demographic policies beholden to conflicting purposes emerged early in the work of James Mill, who is credited with having achieved the merger of political economy and Malthusianism—at least in its neo-Malthusian, that is, pro-birth control form. In his *Elements of Political Economy* Mill was constrained to concede that neither the rewards nor punishment that legislatures had at their disposal

to alter the course of human actions...is very applicable to the purpose of counteracting the tendency in the human species to multiply. Suppose a law were proposed for annexing penalties to the father and mother of a child, the circumstances of whom were inadequate to its maintenance; it would not be easy to find a mode of punishing, which would be equal to the effect, without producing almost as much uneasiness in society as that which it would propose to remedy: neither would it be very possible to ascertain and define the state of circumstances which is, and that which is not, adequate to the maintenance of one, or two or any other number of children. To apply rewards to the case of not having any children, in such a manner as to operate usefully upon the principle of population, would be still more difficult.55

Mill was therefore reduced to propagating the popular sanction of intense approbation and disapprobation “to secure the great body of the people all the happiness which is capable of being derived from the matrimonial union, without the evils which a too rapid increase of their numbers involves.”56

A century and a half later, the same constraints still restricted the demographic policy universe in polities based on mass legitimation—with the significant modification that advances in birth control technology and the widespread availability of cheap contraceptive devices had displaced the focus of debate to the proper demarcation of the private and public spheres separating the freedom to engage in and the prohibition of certain conduct. In societies pervaded by widely if not universally accepted state regulation of many kinds of individual behavior, “in the sphere of reproduction, complete individual initiative is generally favored even by those liberal intellectuals who...most favor economic and social planning. Social reformers who would not hesitate to force all owners of rental property to rent to anyone who can pay, or to force all workers in an industry to join a union, balk at any suggestion that couples be permitted to have only a certain number of offspring.”57

**DOES CAPITAL HAVE A POPULATION POLICY?**

[D]on’t worry, he [the worker] will produce the boy himself, even if not exactly for the entrepreneur’s sake! He does not, like other commodity providers of the market, even need to be stimulated by a “profit” to produce this article! He provides it for the sake of the thing itself, if the
thing will just work.58

How does capital react in the face of perceived over- or underpopulation? The United States has not witnessed underpopulation propaganda since President Theodore Roosevelt59 galvanized “race suicide” plaints, accusing “the man or woman who...has a brain so shallow and selfish as to dislike having children [of being] in effect a criminal against the race....”60 Roosevelt, who later regretted “the profound and lasting damage unwittingly done by Malthus,”61 castigated those who wished to limit fertility so that the children could “‘taste a few of the good things of life’”62 or “preferred automobiles and lap-dogs and put vapid excitement above the performance of the highest duty....”63

These presidential polemics were not, however, prompted by scarcity in the labor market, which was already overflowing with precisely the immigrants whose massive advent, coupled with declining birth rates among the Anglo-Saxon stock, had purportedly brought about the phenomenon that the racialists, eugenicists, antifeminists, and antibirth controllers were lamenting.64 “[U]nregulated immigration,” as labor economist and historian John Commons observed in 1920, was “America’s convenient reserve army of the unemployed,” which made it unnecessary for employers even to think about planning their utilization of labor while restraining wages and augmenting the surplus for capital.65 Nor has worldwide labor sourcing lost its functionality for U.S. capital. President Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers, for example, reconfirmed in 1990 that: “When labor market mobility is insufficient to eliminate area- or industry-specific labor shortages, employers often turn to immigrants. Throughout U.S. history...immigrants traditionally have adapted well to the U.S. labor market and have contributed significantly to long-run U.S. economic growth.” These quasi-exogenous demographic injections have in part, but only in part, been responsible for the fact that the labor market has been “remarkably efficient in adapting to economic change.” Consequently, “[l]abor markets typically do not experience long-run imbalances....” Of special relevance here is that these benefits of “the natural workings of the market”66 flow independently of the “natural workings” of procreation. This reasoning expressly underlay the Immigration Act of 1990, which was designed to meet labor shortages and contribute to the smooth operation of the labor market.67

If the United States has not experienced a labor shortage since the closing of the frontier, in Europe eugenicists complained on the eve of World War I that the proliferation of birth control “had destroyed the pressure which carried an English population as the great colonizing force into every quarter of the globe....” Consequently, the absence of “surplus population” meant that no longer would “a boom in the mining industry...be followed, as that of 1871 was, by a rise in the birthrate, but by an immigration of Polish or other foreign workers.”68 At a time when “the woollen and cotton manufacturing towns of England [we]re not reproducing themselves” because wages were “wholly inadequate to maintain” large working-class families, British eugenicists even found it “absurd...to still
further reduce the economic value of the child by carrying on his or her school days till 16 years.69

European states, in contrast to the United States government, have periodically, in association with undulating industrial cycles and continental military and imperialist rivalries, initiated repopulation campaigns. France, where such campaigns appear to be perpetual, is arguably the best example of the failure of the visible hand of the capitalist state to control reproductive outcomes. From the aftermath of the disastrous Franco-Prussian War of 1871 and the world wars to de Gaulle’s call for a doubling of the French population to 100 million, the French people have been impervious to the state’s efforts to frustrate their voluntary infertility.70

Whereas France and Germany had approximately equal populations on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, by World War I, Germans outnumbered the French by 60 percent. Between these once and future military antagonists: “Numbers appeared at the beginning of the twentieth century as a question of life or death...: these are conclusions quite different from that which Malthus’s disciples claimed to elevate to an economic law.”71 The other major European powers also recorded much higher rates of increase than France. “Thus, as the First World War was declared, France was already on the eve of committing a national ‘suicide’ which she had been gradually preparing for more than a century.”72 Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, a leading French economist, worrying about the “relative sterility” that had already overtaken France but remained merely a distant possibility for France’s rivals, railed against the feminist movement for having brought about a procreationally perilous “masculinization of the woman”; after all, a stationary economy itself would eventually become “effeminate.”73 In an age of mass armies: “Since numbers were the most easily measurable feature of armies, the decision of the French Assembly of 1872 to have an armed force as numerous as Germany’s set going the competition in which each increase of peacetime effectives induced every potential enemy to follow suit, arguing in terms of balance of power politics.” This French “rage for numbers”74 led Messimy, the former War Minister, to introduce a bill in 1912 establishing premiums or an annuity for all mothers with four or more children.75 Leroy-Beaulieu viewed France’s demographic future with such alarm that, despite his reputation as one of the “laissez-faire ultras,” he found Messimy’s proposal insufficient; instead, he proposed reduced military obligations for the fathers and sons of normal (that is, three-child-or-more) families, reservation of state employment for members of such families, and, since the state budget was already overflowing with bounties for horses and hemp, non-means-tested state bounties for “la production des hommes”—third and higher-parity children.76

France’s enactment, following World War I, of a repressive criminal statute strictly prohibiting the propagation of contraception and abortions failed to halt the decline of natality despite the fact that the well-developed neo-Malthusian movement had been crushed. The 400,000 abortions performed annually in addition to the widespread and ineradicable practice of coitus interruptus insured
that by the 1930s France "was so demographically ill-equipped that there would be little hope of serious sustained resistance to any reasonably prepared and determined invader." As World War II began, France's birthrates were the world's lowest.77

At the beginning of the century, Darwinian eugenicists like the Fabian socialist Sidney Webb warned of the British race's "deterioration, if not...suicide" unless the state offered a financial "endowment of motherhood" to avoid "adverse selection."78 During the Great Depression of the 1930s, when immiseration and widespread contraceptive use made population decline possible, "it [w]as sometimes said that...the final condemnation of capitalism is that under it people are induced to keep their families so small that they no longer replace themselves."79 The post-World War II British Royal Commission on Population underscored the theme of underpopulation by observing that not even the atomic bomb had eliminated the military significance of numbers: "The radical change in the relative numbers of the French and German peoples...exerted a profoundly important influence on the European balance of power and on wider international affairs." It suggested that below-replacement level fertility in postwar Britain would not only undermine that country's international economic, military, and imperial roles, but as replicated elsewhere in Europe, became "merged in more fundamental issues of the maintenance and extension of Western values, ideas, and culture."80

As more recent discussion in France, the center of secular complaints of underpopulation, have made clear, however, state intervention to promote growth may be as legitimationally risky as population control programs. The emergence of widespread support for sexual and procreational autonomy even among nonradical women has made traditional state rhetoric and policy obsolete. The Conseil économique et social recognized, for example, that offering parents 15,000 francs for the birth of a third child might be the most efficacious means of achieving a demographic goal, but because it would be resented by many as a lure and demagogic, its political and social costs would exceed its demographic benefits.81 Thus in 1970, French Defense Minister Michel Debré, "a leading Gaullist proponent of a population increase to maintain France as a major power" in the face of the country's continued importation of workers from Algeria and the Soviet Union's encouragement of larger families, was "hooted" when he told a convention of women sponsored by Elle, France's most popular women's magazine, that "they had a duty to increase the birth rate."82

Organized immigration renders underpopulation—that is, a tight labor market that forces employers to increase wages—relatively easy to remedy; indeed, the recruitment of adults whose unproductive youthful consumption years have been financed elsewhere frees up more income for productive investment. As President Nixon's Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, chaired by John D. Rockefeller III, patiently explained to "the business community," with whose opinion the Commission's preference for slower population growth was at variance:
[T]he historical association of population growth with economic expansion...reflects in large part the fact that periods of rapid economic expansion attracted immigrants to our shores and thus quickened population growth.... Additions to population through immigration are far more stimulating to economic growth than are additions by natural increase...because while babies remain dependent for many years before beginning to contribute to output, many immigrants are of working age and thus become immediately productive.83

The primary obstacle to this strategy is political—labor-market oriented working-class opposition and more diffuse nativist-racist counterpropaganda. The silver lining for those concerned about the potential proletarian extinction is, as the neo-Malthusian Paul Ehrlich optimistically observed, that (in case the implementation of his alarmist analysis brought about underpopulation): “Fortunately, people can be produced in vast quantities by unskilled labor who enjoy their work.”84 At the other extreme, overpopulation has historically been amenable to reverse treatment—state-aided emigration. Although the ancient Greek states initiated this practice as far back as the eighth century B.C. and imperialist powers such as Britain continued it, neither the United States nor the advanced European countries are pursuing the possibility.85

By the same token, it is unclear that within wide biological limits population really matters to capital—especially in light of the delegitimizing repercussions it could expect from any efforts to interfere with what the U.S. Supreme Court has elevated to constitutionally protected individualistic rights both to procreate and not to procreate. For more than a half-century, the Court has declared that reproductive freedom is “one of the basic civil rights of man.” And although the Supreme Court initially framed the right as fundamental to “the perpetuation...the very existence and survival of the race,” it later transformed the right into an emanation of privacy: “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual...to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to beget a child.”86 The state may override such a right only by reference to one of its own “compelling” interests. In light of the apparently macroreproductive origins or at least implications of this judicially created right, it is noteworthy that a majority of the Supreme Court has asserted, albeit in dictum, that “a State may have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth. Such concerns are basic to the future of the State and in some circumstances could constitute a substantial reason for departure from a position of neutrality between abortion and childbirth.”87

Moreover, the most liberal justices in recent decades, Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan, together with the author of the opinion vindicating a constitutional right to abortion, Harry Blackmun, agreed in dissent that it was “conceivable that under some circumstances this might be an appropriate factor to be considered as part of a State’s ‘compelling’ interest....”88 Significantly, the most prominent American constitutional law scholar, the left-liberal Laurence Tribe, has
conceded that collective choice might prevail over individual autonomy "in a period of concern with overpopulation. Government policies narrowly and nondiscriminatorily tailored to limit population growth need not be invalidated by" the aforementioned line of cases. Speculative though such constitutional concessions may be, they must be considered seriously in conjunction with seemingly extreme and undemocratic proposals for implementing zero population growth. Although a compelling case for a universal maximum or minimum two-child policy might be theoretically imaginable, recent uproars over a mandatory reproductive ceiling in the People's Republic of China and quasi-compulsory procreation in Romania under the Ceausescus should serve as an object lesson to agents of capital in the advanced industrial societies that it should focus on other more important and less explosive struggles on its agenda.

By the late 1960s, when Mollie Orshansky's family-size-linked poverty thresholds dominated empirical discourse on the poor in the United States, it had become impossible to ignore the number of children altogether. When the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Committee on Government Operations held hearings, entitled Population Crisis, in 1965 on the creation of offices of population problems within the Department of State and of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), "it marked the first time that a committee has dared discuss...the once politically taboo subject of birth control." The tentativeness and fragility of this turning point was symbolized by the fact that ex-President Eisenhower recanted his former opposition to governmental "corrective action in controlling population growth" in order to prevent "human degradation and starvation" and issued a traditionalist poor-law warning about "the repetitive production of children by unwed mothers, apparently lured by the resulting increase in income from welfare funds [which] provid[ed] financial incentive for increased production by the ignorant, feeble-minded or lazy." Eisenhower himself recoiled from the logical consequences of his new position when he acknowledged that legal sterilization as the ultimate effective measure "unquestionably would shock great segments of our citizenry." The timid approach to population control that the Johnson administration implemented was lambasted by Senator Ernest Gruening, the chairman of the subcommittee and the prime congressional mover, who charged that HEW was "afraid" of dealing openly and effectively with population growth.

Even the commission that President Johnson had appointed to study income maintenance programs, which oozed sympathy for the poor, assigned primary causation of poverty to the social-economic structure, and rejected the claim that the poor were to blame for their own circumstances, was constrained to concede that "the costs of supporting a large number of children can result in poverty for workers with even relatively high earnings." Although the suggestion that the economic pressures of procreation burdened even nonpoor families served to detach the stigma of irresponsible overpopulation from a segregated caste of poor, the commission did state that "for many families poverty is a result of having more children—frequently unplanned children—than the parents can adequately
Its advocacy of subsidized birth control for the poor, however, reinforced the Rockefeller population establishment’s notion that as yet the state should not intervene to dampen enthusiasm for wanted children.96

The so-called rediscovery of poverty in the United States during the 1960s did, however, prompt a spate of neo-Malthusian admonitions. Thus President Johnson’s Committee on Population and Family Planning, in suggesting that (without openly stating explaining why) the poor were the best candidates for birth control, warned that: “Excessive fertility can drive a family into poverty as well as reduce its chances of escaping it.”97 During the peak years of intense interest in the war against poverty and population control, demographers careened to the other extreme, virtually identifying poverty with high fertility. Merely because the Social Security Administration integrated family size into its new definition of poverty, Arthur Campbell, the federal government’s chief of natality statistics, drew “attention to the fact that the fertility of the poor will always be high.” He corroborated this claim by noting that the fertility rate among the poor was 50-60 percent higher than among the nonpoor in the first half of the 1960s; as a result, the dependency ratio—that is, the number of children under 18 years old for every 100 adults between the ages of 18 and 64—was twice as high. In 1966, for example, 100 poor adults had to provide for 130 children, whereas their nonpoor counterparts had responsibility for only 62. The disproportionate distribution of children was further underscored by the following data from 1964: of the children ever born to 35- to 44-year-old wives of household heads in the lowest family income class (under $2,000), only 15 percent lived in families with two children while 20 percent lived in families with seven or more children; the corresponding shares in the richest income class (over $10,000) were 29 percent and 2 percent.98

Perhaps the most sustained policy-driven analysis during this period of the relationship between child-rich families and poverty was undertaken by Harold Sheppard, a social scientist at the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and staff consultant to the Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, which turned out more than a score of volumes of testimony and reports in the late 1960s on the War on Poverty. Taking exception to the prevalent view that because large family size was the result of poverty, raising family income was a prerequisite to limiting fertility, Sheppard called attention to the possibility that family size was itself a cause of poverty. Sheppard operated within the contemporary mainstream demographic-sociological conceptualization of urban-bound rural southern blacks as recapitulating “the modernization process” that had ushered in the so-called demographic transition in nineteenth-century Europe and that First World population controllers had begun to urge on the Third World.99 Viewing the poor within the United States as “somewhat equivalent to the population of a poor nation as a whole,” Sheppard argued that birth control was the common policy denominator:

> The increasing gap between most underdeveloped countries and the developed ones—a gap resulting in large part from the
differential rates of population growth—might well serve as a model in our attempts to understand how, within one country, some parts of the population in poverty fail to move out of poverty while the rest of the country continues to improve. The problem of poverty in such circumstances is not exactly a product of the machinations of "the power structure" or the "system," unless one wishes, of course, to believe that it is to the best interests of the wealthy and powerful that the poor continue to remain poor through a pattern of excessively high fertility rates.100

The unexplicated irony to the contrary notwithstanding, the question is not whether some measure of poverty is functional for capitalism, but rather the point at which the political unrest and the tax-financed alimentation of the unemployed become insupportable. Sheppard's program fit comfortably within the Rockefeller demography cartel's agenda, which targeted eliminating unwanted births. A contemporaneous estimate speculated that the "total economic benefit," which consisted of both the incremental annual income which the family would not have to spend to avoid being thrust down into the ranks of the poor by the advent of another child and the additional income that women who avoided pregnancy could earn, exceeded the total costs of the requisite subsidized family planning services by a factor of 26.101 This analysis appeared to envision the costs as incurred by the public and the benefits as privately inuring to birth-controlling families. To the extent, however, that additional procreation triggers entry into the poor-law system, fertility reduction by eligible candidates for public payments constitutes a saving to the nonpoor including capital. More relevant to capital is the intended proletarianization of mothers, which adds to the labor supply now rather than in 18 to 30 years—that is, a time the labor-market needs of which are as yet unpredictable.

President Nixon inaugurated an unprecedented verbal revolution in U.S. state demographic policy in his special message to Congress on population growth on the eve of the lunar landing in 1969. Nixon not only enunciated the first express national fertility-reduction policy for 5 million poor women in the United States—"[u]nwanted or untimely childbearing is one of several forces...driving many families into poverty or keeping them in that condition"—but also raised the issue of the need for social institutions to plan to house, employ, educate, transport, and provide health care to the next 100 million people "in a humane and intelligent way." Realizing that it was not enough that "[p]erceptive businessmen project the demand for their products many years into the future by studying population trends," Nixon sought to identify the "special responsibility" of the federal government as aggregate capitalist "for defining these problems and stimulating thoughtful responses": "Perhaps the most dangerous element in the present situation is the fact that so few people are examining these questions from the viewpoint of the whole society."102

The ambiguities and halfheartedness of the Nixon administration's approach to demographic questions, however, transcended gender. That it
remained incapable of tearing away from laissez faire became clear in its initial rhetorical support for and then withdrawal from state intervention to facilitate the deconcentration of the existing population in the United States in order to avoid both regional depopulation and overpopulation. In ultimately accepting the free-market dogma that the sum of individual entrepreneurial investment-locational decisions produces maximum aggregate efficiency, the national government insured that the United States continued to be the only advanced capitalist society to subordinate the illusion of workers’ freedom of locational choice to the reality of freedom of corporate choice.103

Consistent with the view of political stalemate, the high point of this national family planning movement in the United States was the Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970.104 Taking as its starting point the claim that low-income families produced more than the three children whom most couples in the United States wanted because they lacked access to family planning information and services, Congress failed to go beyond appropriating funds to be made available for voluntary family planning services.105 This approach was congruent with the goal set forth by President Johnson’s Committee on Population and Family Planning, which consisted in “achieving a society in which all parents can have the number of children they want when they want them.”106 Merely bringing fertility in line with procreators’ apparent desires—a guideline that scarcely merits being called a population policy107—did not, however, meet long-term systemic needs as perceived by John D. Rockefeller III and interpreted by the academic demographers’ cartel that his family financed. In 1967 Rockefeller had urged that the real problem was one of “mass motivation. In the long run, it will not be enough to make it possible for women to avoid having unwanted children. Even in a world of wanted children, population may grow too fast. The most effective way to encourage a trend toward smaller families is in...information and education...to build understanding of the problem.”108

The debate over how expeditiously the Rockefeller program could be implemented became contentious. In particular the unorthodox husband-and-wife sociologist-demographers, Kingsley Davis and Judith Blake, were involved in a dispute with the Rockefeller-founded Population Council over family planning, which in their opinion was too timid and conservative an approach to achieve zero population growth. Already in 1952, when John D. Rockefeller III was organizing the birth-control-oriented Population Council, Davis’s effort to conjure up an atmosphere of demographic crisis requiring commensurate action had been crushed.109 In the 1960s, Davis and Blake’s opponents in the demography establishment, whom Davis accused of failing to “break out of the tryanny of what is and think effectively of what can be,” were in turn “horrified” by Davis’s impetuosity, which they intimated would destroy the opportunity to develop the framework of values without which enduring change was ultimately impossible.110 As Rockefeller’s Commission on Population Growth phrased it: innovation discontinuous with “the fundamental values of American life...would be a Pyrrhic victory indeed.”111
Davis had a long history of sowing sociodemographic controversy. During the Depression of the 1930s, when underpopulation seemed to be the greater danger, he had sketched a brave new world scenario as an objection to the introduction of effective reproductive subsidies. Assuming that a macro-demographic replacement rate required some families of five and six children, Davis argued that “tremendous sums” would be needed to elicit the requisite procreativity from people who were no longer motivated by the intrinsic emotional value of child-bearing and child-rearing. The initial consequence of such fiscal largesse would “[u]ndoubtedly, as many people fear,” be the emergence among “families at the bottom of the social scale” of a literal neo-Roman proletariat who “would find this a delightfully easy method of earning a livelihood.” Inexorably, however, this step would set in motion a process leading to state certification and standardization together with professionalization and functional specialization (into bearers and rearers) and ultimately the creation of “a new type of reproductive system compatible with our urban-industrial-mobile social organization.” Thus the “logical end-result” of the family allowance system would be the replacement of the familial mode of reproduction by an “efficient” and “eugenic” system. Davis arrived at this conclusion because such pronatalism both shares ruling-class Malthusian suspicions that in every poor person lurks a greedy procreator and assumes that the sole purpose of family allowances is to secure replacement-rate reproduction. Davis therefore saw the regime as pinned between subsidies that are too small to trigger the right reproductive response and too large to preserve familial socialization patterns.

Davis and Blake’s common point of attack was mainstream population controllers’ superficial focus on “moderniz[ing] demographic behavior...on the basis of greater rationality” by eliminating unwanted births rather than on the more radical step of persuading people to want fewer children. Davis linked his accusation that the orthodox were semantically misleading the public about the reach of their proposals to a rejection of the efficacy of the demographic invisible hand. The political compromise that the pseudo-population planners had made with the ideological status quo traded away effectiveness for immediate acceptability. By labelling as rational whatever number of children parents literally planned to create (and seeking to deal only with the inadvertent excess), the quasi-official population movement “evade[d] the basic question of population policy, which is how to give societies the number of children they need.” Devolving responsibility for national population planning on to individual families, who retained an unquestioned right to reproduce on any scale they deliberately chose, was tantamount to the abandonment of planning because there “is no reason to expect that the millions of decisions about family size made by couples in their own interest will automatically control population for the benefit of society. On the contrary...what is rational in the light of a couple’s situation may be totally irrational from the standpoint of society’s welfare.”

The root weakness, according to Davis, of the Rockefeller approach was its failure to smash the ideological icons of family and privacy and its lack of
candor in encouraging the public to believe that individually rational reproduction sufficed "without the need for painful social changes": "By sanctifying the doctrine that each woman should have the number of children she wants, and by assuming that if she has only that number this will automatically curb population growth to the necessary degree, the leaders of current policies escape the necessity of asking why women desire so many children and how this desire can be influenced." Having decided that one-half of the out-of-control procreators were disproportionately responsible for the inordinate desire for children in the United States, Davis argued that appropriate changes in the social structure and economy would have to precede any enduring transformation of fertility behavior. The "radicalism" that family planners could not imagine proposing did not extend to abolishing the private appropriation of the societal surplus let alone the introduction of a "Communist Utopia," but focused on family structure, sexual mores, and above all the position of women.115

In addition to several straightforward reversals of governmental subsidies for families such as child taxes and high fees for marriage licenses, Davis proposed a "modification of the complementarity of the roles of men and women." In order to put an end to men's quasi-monopoly on a participation in the wider world that was based on women's (self-)assignment to housework and motherhood, "women could be required to work outside the home, or compelled by circumstances to do so." If given equal opportunities and pay, and "if social life were organized around the place of work rather than around the home or neighborhood, many women would develop interests that would compete with family interests."116 For Davis, the increase in female labor force participation rates was purely instrumental: it was designed to reduce fertility. Although this ulterior motive might not necessarily make it less effective, the obligatory proletarianization that Davis presciently mentioned was indirect. By using its command over the economy, the state can use its power to determine economic conditions including "how much individuals can spend."117

Even as Davis was throwing down the gauntlet, the flow of married women and mothers into paid employment was becoming effective in depressing the total fertility rate below the replacement rate, without even requiring direct state intervention: the inability of even small families to secure an adequate standard of living based on only one wage-earner's income has, together with a transformation in women's consciousness, driven female labor participation rates to a record high: "A family lifestyle dependent on two incomes has become the norm in American society."118 As a soon-to-be Secretary of Labor disclosed in the mid-1970s: "How are multiworker family members... 'hooked'? A standard of living clearly beyond the reach of the average wage earner is urged upon them not only by manufacturers and retailers...but also by the government, which publicizes appealing standards of living."119

The mid-1970s marked a watershed: dual-worker married couples surpassed the "traditional" family in which only the husband is in the labor force as the modal family pattern. If in 1940 almost seven families in ten were of the
traditional type and only one-tenth dual-earners, by the end of the 1980s, the latter were twice as common as the former. From 1970 to 1990, the labor force participation rate of wives with children under six years doubled from 30 percent to 59 percent while that of childless wives increased only from 42 percent to 51 percent. During the brief period from 1976 to 1990, the participation rate of mothers who had given birth during the previous 12 months rose from 31 percent to 53 percent. From 1970 to 1992, the proportion of married couples with children under six years of age working year-round full-time more than tripled—from 7 percent to 24 percent. Alone from 1975 to 1988, the proportion of married couples with children under 18 years of age in which only the father was in the labor force fell from 53 percent to 33 percent, while that of dual-earner families rose from 43 percent to 63 percent. By 1992, in 69 percent of married-couple families with children both parents worked; in 30 percent of them both worked full-time year-round.

The differences among income groupings are instructive. From 1970 to 1986, for example, the proportion of (full-time year-round) one-worker married couples with children fell from 66 percent to 57 percent, while that of two-worker families rose continuously from 14 to 26 percent. Whereas the share of two-worker married couples with children within the highest income quintile and the middle three quintiles increased from 29 percent to 44 percent and from 13 percent to 26 percent respectively, in the lowest income quintile the share rose only from 5 percent to 7 percent. This differentiation is underscored from another perspective. From 1970 to 1986, the average number of full-time year-round workers among married couples with children in the lowest income quintile actually declined slightly from 0.63 to 0.61, whereas the corresponding increase in the average for the three middle quintiles and the highest quintile was 0.99 to 1.18 and 1.31 to 1.45 respectively. While earnings failed to keep pace with inflation for many families, the “rise in the number of workers per family appears to be the principal reason why incomes increased.”

Indeed, even this unprecedented entry of wives and mothers into paid employment has proved inadequate to sustain the standard of living, thus inducing millions to work at two or more jobs. Whereas in 1970, almost six times as many men as women were multiple job holders, by 1996 not only were they almost evenly divided, but women’s rate of multiple job-holding marginally exceeded men’s. Mothers this busy making the difference “between welfare and getting by” apparently lack the time for heroic reproductive feats.

Thus the “hunger” that even liberal economists sought to enlist to motivate AFDC mothers to work could also be brought to bear against working-class mothers. This same insight made headway in Britain in the 1970s. When, despite the existence of family allowances for more than three decades, the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Incomes and Wealth rediscovered the concentration of poverty in families with more three or more children, the first policy choice was to increase mothers’ labor force participation. Capital, as Marx observed, has its own mechanisms for making itself relatively independent of
biological increases in population.\textsuperscript{128}

Davis's views soon acquired sufficient notoriety to attract an interview with The New York Times. He reiterated that the chief barrier to reduced fertility was not technological but motivational. In order to effectuate his goal of making large families undesirable or impossible, Davis repeated his proposal of financial incentives such as the elimination of income tax disadvantages for childless taxpayers or the introduction of a child tax. Paul Ehrlich went even further, proposing both child taxes and luxury taxes on cribs and diapers. Emblematic of the hopelessness of such a radical approach was the failure of even Senator Robert Packwood's 1970 bill prospectively to cap the number of income tax exemptions for dependent children at two. Senate Bill 3632, which was designed to place the federal government's imprimatur on smaller families, was a pendant to two other bills to create governmental responsibility for making contraceptive devices available to every man or woman regardless of economic circumstances by initiating "massive family planning" and to insure every woman the back-up opportunity to terminate unwanted pregnancies by removing legal restrictions on abortions nationwide. Although Packwood's target of zero population growth was ostensibly motivated by a desire to "waylay[] our environmental doom" caused by Americans' overconsumption, he stressed that his program would exert its most dramatic impact on poor blacks, whose rate of unwanted of pregnancies was more than twice as high as among nonpoor whites.\textsuperscript{129}

A charge from Rockefeller's Commission on Population Growth to report on the relationship between the family and demographic change furnished Davis with his ultimate opportunity \textit{pour épater le bourgeois}. Harking back to his heterodox views of 1937, Davis gleefully observed that fertility was so much higher than mortality because the family as an atavistic, "primitive" institution was "performing its replacement function too well. Advocacy of the kinds of changes that would dampen the family's reproductive efficiency was, however, "not appreciated." Such lack of gratitude did not deter him from sketching a "complete reform of the human family...the best of two worlds—the insect world and the human world"—in which professional female childbearers and specialized child rearers would liberate the rest of society from reproductive chores. If his suggestion that antinatalism could be effective only by campaigning for changes that would militate against family formation did not succeed in alienating Chairman Rockefeller, Davis's reminder that "[t]he institution of inheritance would not apply" in his radically reformed society presumably did.\textsuperscript{130}

Blake's contribution was also irreconcilable with the Rockefeller program's short-term vision. She, too, started from the proposition that the overpopulation problem was rooted not in the failure to close the gap between actual births and wanted births, but in the family-size goals themselves. To reduce the number of desired births it was necessary to identify and neutralize the underlying institutionalized coercive familial pronatalism. Pronatalism was underwritten by the standardization of gender-specific reproductive and occupational roles, which propelled the vast majority into procreation. Coercion
was manifest, for example, in school indoctrination and the threat of loneliness. The mere fact that people are socialized in families predisposes them to internalize familial norms and to look forward to performing parental roles themselves. Underestimation of the noneconomic utilities attached to childrearing such as the achievement of the quasi-prescribed social statuses of parents and especially of feminine creativity misled policy-makers. Such motivations accounted for the fact that a minuscule proportion of the population desired celibacy or childlessness. Rather than proposing new policies, Blake pleaded simply for lifting penalties on already existing antinatalist tendencies, the most potent of which she presciently identified in feminism. Antinatalism involved not only making children more expensive but also less rewarding. Since she believed that pricing children off the market was impractical in a wealthy society, Blake focused on altering the reward structure—enabling especially women to derive status and self-esteem from nonreproductive activities.¹³¹

Although Blake and Davis seemed to be articulating the same demographic objectives as the Rockefeller population establishment, which placed great emphasis on systematically laying the groundwork for winning the hearts and genitalia of the American people, their insistence on bluntness and precipitate transvaluation of family values and their refusal to abide by the July 4th shibboleths cast them in the role of outcasts. The stylistic gap between Davis and Blake on the one hand and the mainstream neo-Malthusians on the other is captured by the closing sentence of the report submitted by President Johnson’s Committee on Population and Family Planning that Rockefeller co-chaired: “In working to avoid a population crisis, this nation will...help strengthen the voluntary exercise of a basic human right, the right of parents to have the number of children they want, when they want them.” By the same token, the Nixon-Rockefeller Commission, in an admittedly confused and confusing exposition of the common denominator sheltering the views of all its members, did state that its overall perspective was consistent with the position that aimed at a national debate “to achieve the best collective decision about population issues....”¹³²

Rufus Miles, Jr., the chairman of the board of trustees of the Population Reference Bureau, while echoing some of the same themes as Davis and Blake, came closer to capturing the essence of the Rockefeller approach. Recognizing that the free market and freedom of choice were not conferring demographic benefits on the United States, Miles concluded that either free choice would have to be abandoned or the minds of the reproductive free choosers would have to be reoriented. Since coercive regulation of family size was clearly counterproductive in a representative democracy whose overwhelming majority would oppose it, Miles was forced to opt for “the long, uphill route of encouraging the American people to modify their basic attitudes and behavior....” The chief motivational impediment to zero population growth was that “[u]nfortunately, couples do not seek their self-interest in economic terms alone”; because people in search of psychic rewards were willing to pay dearly to buy children, the chief task was “to persuade couples to act more in their own economic self-interest....” Arguably the
most promising prospect for deconstructing those once socializationally indis­
pensable but now intractable psychic rewards and converting them into economic
rewards more easily accessible to macroeconomic management was to focus on
those “[m]any parents—primarily mothers—[who] seek large families as a psychic
defense against lack of interesting employment, lack of a sense of belonging to a
satisfying social group, or lack of other forms of self-realization.” Even more
explicitly than Blake, Miles therefore made the enlargement of better paid
employment opportunities for women the centerpiece of the initiative to reduce
family size.133

One of the reasons that the state in the United States did not make explicit
its implicitly pronatalist population policy, even after the demise of the quarter-
century post-World War II Keynesian boom, is that capital itself was unable to
articulate its own unified or at least dominant policy. This fractioning was due in
large part to the fact that the demand for the output of individual firms and
industries would be affected in spectacularly different ways by population growth,
stagnation, or decline. And although it appears plausible that capital would be less
disunited with regard to proposals to limit the *faux frais* that are financed by state
confiscation of accumulatable surplus, the groups of high-profile capitalists and
managers that began in the 1960s to mobilize public opinion in favor of birth
control in order to curtail population growth and reduce taxes have yet to achieve
the material success they sought.134 Thus it may be ideologically satisfying to
imagine the Rockefeller population control initiative as effecting a change in the
state’s role in accordance with “the shifting interests and strategies of the dominant
groups in society.... Members of the capitalist class, acting mainly through
philanthropic organizations, articulate a strategy of population planning consistent
with the needs of capitalist society.” But the problem, both for individual capitals
and even more so for social capital in general, as represented by the ideal aggregate
capitalist, the state, is identifying those needs not only or so much in the present,
but 20 years later when the results of the new population policy will make
themselves felt in the labor market. Undocumented and unsupported allegations
concerning “the current mode of capital accumulation [for which] there is no
longer a necessity to reproduce a growing labor force” do not advance
analysis—especially when they are immediately contradicted (“[c]onsistencies are
not ironclad”) by the concession that “growth in retail and service sectors is fueled
by a large pool of unorganized women....”135

The Nixon-Rockefeller Commission on Population Growth appeared to
believe that it had devised a way to avoid legitimational entanglements. Because
it wanted to moderate population growth, it could advertise that its “immediate
goal” was merely “to modernize demographic behavior...: to encourage the
American people to make population choices, both in the individual family and
society at large, on the basis of greater rationality rather than tradition or custom,
ignorance or chance.” One “outmoded tradition” that the Commission designated
“no longer appropriate” was “formal and informal pronatalist pressures.” But
especially when such traditional behavioral constraints were denounced as
"coercive," the Commission's approach was bound to conflict with a newly refurbished ideology of family values that cut across the party-political spectrum. More particularly, the rise of a politically potent antiabortion movement may have made the Commission's strategy moot; it may also explain why ultimately Nixon himself rejected the Rockefeller Commission's acceptance of abortion as an instrument of population control. If, as economist Victor Fuchs believes, optimum population size is only one of many population policy concerns and "one of the least important for the United States," then the Commission's game may not be worth the candle: "Many people are likely to regard the question of the method used to influence population size as far more important than that of size itself." Given the perceived heavy-handedness of state intervention into a solidly protected sphere of privacy that would be required to achieve collective control over fertility, proponents have acted strategically in seeking to conjure up the atmosphere of demographic crisis that alone would justify action:

If the means to influence fertility must fall within the range of policies exemplified by (1) mutually agreed upon coercive programs, (2) massive propaganda campaigns that convince parents that having more than two children somehow constitutes a nonpatriotic or at least socially irresponsible act, or (3) social reforms expressly designed to weaken the institution of the family, then, to be taken seriously, impending disaster must be invoked.

The failure to make the prospect of such a disaster plausible to the masses both solidifies the claim as to the closure of the realpolitical demographic universe and rehabilitates Marx's view that given the spontaneous, immanent mechanisms that capital has at its disposal to deal with its labor requirements, capitalism can rely on the working class's proclivity to procreate for the constant reproduction of the working class as a constant condition for the reproduction of capital. More interesting than a vindication of Marx, however, is the possibility that the capitalist class and the labor movement have come to agree with his assessment of the relative irrelevance of fertility. In the United States, capital has for many decades accommodated its changing labor requirements largely by means of uncontrolled, controlled, and even special occupationally tailored immigration. Not under-population or, more accurately, a wage-tested general scarcity of labor, has driven population policy. Instead, debate has focused on the other chief variable, limiting the faux frais of accumulation in the form of modern poor law subsidies of the surplus surplus-value producers—that is to say, a nonfunctionally and increasingly dysfunctionally large reserve army of the unemployed. This perspective emerged clearly in 1965 when Planned Parenthood's Commerce & Industry Committee, "a blue-chip group of 41 top businessmen" led by Sidney Swensrud, the former chairman of Gulf Oil Corporation, issued a report, made public by Lammot du Pont Copeland, the president of Du Pont, demonstrating large capital's intensifying interest in domestic birth control. As Swensrud told Business Week:
"[B]usinessmen are all too aware of the mounting costs of relief and welfare programs; they are major sources of the taxes needed to sustain these programs. Birth control is the key to reducing these costs through reducing the number of unwanted children born to the poor and poorly educated; this group...represents our most critical population problem."

Two years later, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Family Planning and Population in the Johnson administration was able to report to Congress that this new unit within HEW was “encouraged that declines in birth rate are registered in areas of the lowest educational attainment—the highest incidence of poverty...the largest number of children per family.”

The same period witnessed concerted efforts by other representatives of capital, including the Rockefeller interests, to press the same domestic agenda. In Europe, in contrast, capital has periodically feared absolute scarcities of labor caused by low domestic fertility. But to the extent that labor and racial politics have induced European employers to supplement the importation of cheaper labor from the East and South with family allowance systems, there is little evidence that such subsidies have ever materially promoted domestic procreation.

Labor unions, too, displayed demographic agnosticism. At the height of the clamor for population control under the Nixon administration, the United Automobile Workers, pressing for an Economic Bill of Rights providing for a useful job and a guaranteed annual income for all, told the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future that neither unlimited population growth nor stabilization had ever eliminated deprivation or unemployment: “The problem has always been...that we have never really properly planned for people in this country, either as job holders or as residents, regardless of what size the population was, is, or will be.” And the AFL-CIO itself approached the neutral or agnostic position by rejecting both population growth and reduction as well as any policy that deviated from voluntarism.

As fears of overpopulation careen toward demands for remedies of underpopulation in sync with the intersection of phases of the industrial cycle and more secular changes, it becomes plausible that capital may be in no better position to articulate demographically rational projections for its own interests than are individual procreators. As Marshall, with a century’s hindsight understood, neither individual capitals nor the aggregate capitalist may know what is demographically optimal for them or it in the present let alone the future. In Malthus’s time, according to Marshall, “while the recruiting sergeants and employer of labour were calling for measures tending to increase the growth of population, more far-seeing men began to inquire whether the race could escape degradation if the numbers continued long to increase as they were then doing.” Demographic agnosticism is even more impressively displayed by demographers’ inability at the end of the twentieth century to decide whether the United States would be better off if population growth had ceased at the beginning of the century.

Radical swings in demographic opinion have been common. Before
World War I, increases in population were widely held to promote prosperity, whereas the post-World War I period, even in the absence of "a fundamental change in the economic system," witnessed a widespread official perception that growing numbers were a burden. During the 1930s, eugenicists warned that not only were the United States and other "civilized countries" failing to replace those dying, but that the "feeble-minded" were out-reproducing "educated people." In 1955, near the zenith of the post-World War II baby boom (which was merely a resumption of birth rates antedating the historical low point reached during the Great Depression of the 1930s), *Time* declared that: "Only a few years ago a rate of population increase as high as the present one would have brought howls of impending calamity." Although the magazine conceded that the relationship between population and economic growth was little understood, "enough is known to discredit Malthus.... The lingering worry is whether [society] will have enough people to consume the goods." So little agreement obtained concerning the economic consequences of population change that at the same time Joseph Spengler, the leading demographic historian in the United States, cautioned that continued population growth would intensify economic problems, which in turn would trigger state intervention. During the height of the cold war he warned that "the stork would have managed to do what the followers of Marx had found themselves unable to do for all they tried—fasten fetters on mankind." Even more poignantly, the ruling West German Social Democratic Party, under attack in 1980 by the Christian Democrats for having failed to stem the decline in population, retorted that the net reproduction rate could not be influenced by state measures. Moreover:

We Social-Democrats do not want a population policy, we also do not need a population policy. We don't want to raise children in order to secure the defense capability of the Federal Republic. We also don't want to raise children in order to guarantee the contract between the generations in pensions insurance.... We also don't need a population policy in order to furnish the labor market with workers or to have sufficient consumers of produced mass goods.... Why actually should it be disadvantageous for the labor market if rationalization by means of micro processors no longer has to lead to intensified unemployment? This hands-off approach is congruent with another view prevalent in Germany and elsewhere according to which no population policy, no matter how indirect, can ever be justified in a democratic republic. The basis for such a rejection is rooted in the conviction that if the majority through its behavior demonstrates, for example, that it does not share the state's goal of maintaining demographic stability, it would be impossible democratically to legitimize the enforcement of the underlying set of values which the citizenry no longer regards as binding. Nor, it is argued, can the general welfare or common good serve as a justification because it, too, would have to derive from the same deeply rooted
values. A potential flaw in this reasoning is its tacit assumption that the individuals whose billion-fold exercise of the right to procreational self-determination aggregates to a condition that the state characterizes as underpopulation or overpopulation are fully aware and approve of the consequences. If in fact they did understand and accept the manifold collective ramifications of their individualistic behavior, it seems implausible that they would have elected a government that radically disagrees with them on such a life-and-death question; but if such a situation actually came to pass, it might easily be granted that the state’s dictatorial imposition of a four-child or a one-child policy cannot be justified. As Myrdal put it: “In a democracy a population policy is a contradictio in adjecto if, when a true understanding of the population trend is disseminated...the broad masses...do not react...in a positive way.”

This need to build deep-rooted popular support for a policy that invades the sacred precincts of sexuality and family pervaded the Rockefeller domestic U.S. population program and in part explains that group’s disagreement with what it perceived as Blake’s and Davis’s hopelessly premature and radically discontinuous proposals. It is, for example, no longer politically possible to argue quasi-fascistically, as a noted statistician did in the 1920s, that in the demographic “conflict between the immediate interests of the individual and the more permanent interests of the State...[w]e may express our freedom as individuals only within the limitations that the continued existence of the State is assured.”

Where, however, one generation of individualists does not comprehend the dire societal implications for itself or those to follow, then state efforts to educate (and debate) the citizenry and to implement ancillary policies to encourage or discourage childbearing and -raising would assume a different political-moral quality. Such state intervention vis-à-vis individualists exercising their self-vindicated freedom to bestow any number of children on the world and to expect society to “accommodate the macrodemographic results of microdemographic decisions” would nevertheless presuppose what no one has yet demonstrated—that any advanced capitalist country either is under- or overpopulated or faces any aggregate demographic crisis that requires urgent, immediate, collectivistic measures that cannot be comfortably assimilated to received notions of individualistic freedom.

As Rockefeller himself later noted of his Commission’s recommendations: “[W]e saw no threat to the business or to the welfare of the people...by the population continuing to decline, if it was done in an orderly fashion over a period of years.” The failure of the Rockefeller program to convince the masses of any impending grave generalized population crisis in the United States, and the partial collapse of the population control movement into right-wing, racist-tinged antitax, antiwelfare groups may—together with a fertility rate that plunged below replacement level—explain why the movement has receded into oblivion. Indeed, the simultaneous emergence of the antiabortion movement is profoundly ironic since not only does it lack a basis in population policy, but implementation of its program would presumably bring about an increase in population of precisely
those racial-ethnic and class groupings that protested in the 1960s and 1970s that they were the targets of genocidal demographic conspiracies.

NOTES


31. See below ch. 4 and 10.

32. Spengler, “Declining Population Growth” at 119-20. Just as Spengler expects the disappearance, if not of the “losers” themselves, then at least of their unemployment as soon as employers are liberated from the shackles of productivity-suppressing state intervention, Simon asserts that minimum wage laws are migrant farm workers’ worst enemy. Julian Simon, “New Cure for the Jobs Shortage, “ in *idem, Population Matters: People, Resources, Environment, and Immigration* 256-60 (1990 [1988]). For a critique of such views, see Marc Linder, *Migrant Workers and Minimum Wages: Regulating the*

33. Marx, *Ökonomische Manuskripte 1857/58* at 497-98. Denying that the costs of the reserve army of the unemployed are a "class issue, in which the interest of the capitalist economic elite differs from that of the lower, or working, classes" proves too much because it transforms any specifically capitalist question into a supra-class issue whenever the tax system permits capital to impose part of the costs onto other classes. Irwin Garfinkel & Sara McLanahan, *Single Mothers and Their Children: A New American Dilemma* 88 n.1 (1986).


42. 2 Eli Heckscher, *Merkantilismen: Ett led i den ekonomiska politikens historia* 140 (1931).


44. Mohr, *Abortion in America* at 31-32. For a different but less well-researched and persuasive approach, see John Harper, "Be Fruitful and Multiply: Origins of Legal Restrictions on Planned Parenthood in Nineteenth-Century America," in *Women of America: A History* 245-69 (Carol Berkin & Mary Norton eds., 1979). A depopulationist abortion activist in the 1960s claimed, based on only two abortion decisions, that: "Obviously, the courts considered an expanding popoulation a primary objective of these statutes. [T]he United States needed factory workers to fill the volcanic demands after the Civil War, and agricultural hands to sow and reap the vast new frontiers in the West." Lawrence Lader, *Abortion* 88-89 (1966). Lader overlooks the fact that one decision antedated the Civil War by 15 years and the other was handed down six decades later. Moreover, both opinions are so heavily laden with religio-moral rhetoric that interpreting them in instrumental-industrial
rather than biblical terms is acontextual.


50. Rosalind Petchesky, *Abortion and Woman’s Choice: The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom* 69, 16, 69, 71, 78, 88 (rev. ed. 1990 [1984]). See also Ruth Dixon-Mueller, *Population Policy and Women’s Rights: Transforming Reproductive Choice* 33 (1993): “The women’s movement...has been caught in a double bind on the birth control question, largely because the feminist concept of fertility control as an individual, autonomous act of empowerment has been eclipsed by the political concept of population control as a public policy imposed by governmental authorities or other ruling elites.”


58. Ferdinand Lassalle, *Herr Bastiat-Schulze von Delitzsch: Der ökonomische Julian oder Kapital und Arbeit*, in *idem, Gesammelte Reden und Schriften* 5:268 (Eduard Bernstein ed., 1919 [1864]). Lassalle was making a pun. Starting from the assumption that labor, like everything else sold in the market, is subject to one standard—the relationship of supply and demand as determined by the costs of production/procreation (Erzeugungskosten)—he asked how much it cost to produce/beget a worker and answered that the worker had to be paid enough to cover the usual necessaries.


69. Ethel Elderton et al., *On the Correlation of Fertility with Social Value: A Cooperative Study* 45 (Francis Galton Laboratory for National Eugenics, Eugenics Laboratory Memoirs 18, 1913).


78. Sidney Webb, _The Decline in the Birth Rate_ 17, 19 (Fabian Tract No. 131, 1907). See also Elderton, _Report on the English Birthrate_ at 238.
88. _Ibid._ at 489 n.*.
91. See below ch. 8.
96. _Ibid._ at 28, 75 (quotation at 75).

98. Arthur Campbell, “Family Planning and the Reduction of Poverty in the United States,” in Population Crisis: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 181-95 at 182-83 (1967); U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Fertility of the Population: June 1964 and March 1962,” tab. 6 at 18 (CPR, Ser. P-20, No. 147, 1966). Three decades later, as fertility fell below replacement level, the gap was somewhat compressed. In 1992, the number of children ever born to married women in the labor force in families with the highest incomes (over $75,000) was 1.7 compared to 2.2 and 2.4 children respectively in the lowest-income groups (less than $10,000 and from $10,000 to $20,000). U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Fertility of American Women: June 1992,” tab. 3 at 11 (CPR, P20-470, 1993) (written by Amara Bachu).


100. Sheppard, “Effects of Family Planning on Poverty in the United States” at 723.


106. President’s Committee on Population and Family Planning, Population and Family Planning at 15.

107. Dienes, Law, Politics, and Birth Control at 293.


116. *Ibid.* at 738. Davis’s reference to an involuntary incorporation of women into the labor force conjures up Rosa Luxemburg’s harangues against the wives of the bourgeoisie as “mere parasites of the surplus value that their husbands extract from the proletariat,” who functioned solely as “instruments of natural procreation for the ruling classes.” Rosa Luxemburg, “Frauenwahlrecht und Klassenkampf,” in *idem, Gesammelte Werke* 3:159-65 at 162-63 (1973 [1912]). Davis’s approach, however, was not only class-neutral, but presumably did not echo Luxemburg’s claim that the modern proletarian woman was the first to become a human being by participating in struggle, cultural work, and history: “For the properied bourgeois woman her house is the world. *For the proletarian woman the whole world is her house...*” Rosa Luxemburg, “Die Proletarierin,” in *ibid.*, 3:410-13 at 411 (1914). Startlingly, the leading radical critics of the U.S. poor-law system advocate economic reforms that would “restor[e] lower-class occupational, familial, and communal patterns. Since men...would no longer find themselves unemployed or employed at wages insufficient to support women and children, they would be able to resume breadwinner roles.” Frances Piven & Richard Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare* 345 (1972 [1971]).

117. Davis, “Population Policy” at 738. Later, Davis found another urgent demand for married women on the labor market—replacing healthy retirees, who were, in his view, too busy, if not being born, then playing golf, to be dying promptly enough to cease burdening the economy. In an intriguing temporal extension or inversion of Malthusianism, Davis argued that once old-age pensions are impersonally financed by the commons rather than by named children, “there is no moral constraint on their [retirees’] economic demands.” Despairing, however, of the political feasibility of putting an end to this tragic raid on the commons by lowering retirement payments, Davis proposed restocking the commons by inducing those over 65 not to stop working. Kingsley Davis, “Our Idle Retirees Drag Down the Economy,” *N.Y. Times*, Oct. 18, 1988, at A31, col. 2. This strategy of increasing the supply of labor not biologically but by squeezing the reserves of the nonemployed has for some decades been a formal goal of state family policy in several European countries, which use their family benefits programs in part to induce mothers to enter the labor market. *Family Policy, Government and Families in Fourteen Countries*, 12-13, 32-34, 477-78 (Sheila Kamerman & Alfred Kahn eds., 1978).


In contrast, John Noonan, Jr. & Cynthia Dunlap, “Unintended Consequences: Laws Indirectly Affecting Population Growth in the United States,” in The Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Research Reports: Aspects of Population Growth Policy* 111, 143-44 (Robert Parke, Jr. & Charles Westoff eds., 1972), argued that economic deprivations suffered by large poor families already constituted an antinatalist policy and merely lacked the powerful symbolism of an accompanying governmental message that they were designed to reduce population growth. Blake would presumably have interpreted this point as a vindication: precisely because economics alone cannot deter procreation, the spouse- and parent-centered psychological reward structure must be revamped.

132. President’s Committee on Population and Family Planning, *Population and Family Planning: The Transition from Concern to Action* 43 (U.S. H.E.W., 1968); Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Population and the American Future* at 13. To be sure, this same position viewed the population problem “more as the sum of such individual problems than as a societal problem transcending the interests of


155. An extreme example of such a scenario was the proposal of a German doctor, who, finding mere Malthusian moral restraint insufficient, suggested threading and soldering boys’ penises until they married. C. Weinhold, *Von der überwiegenden Reproduktion des Menschenkapitals gegen das Betriebskapital* 73-74 (1828).
157. Louis Dublin, “The Fallacious Propaganda for Birth Control,” *Atlantic Monthly* 137:186-94 at 191 (Feb.1926). Such an authoritarian-statist approach loses all feasibility when its racist-eugenicist roots are self-exposed: “There is always grave danger...of weakening the social organization by increasing the proportion of defective and dependent stock. For it is always the least desirable parents who are the last to curtail their fecundity.” Louis Dublin, “Has America Too Many Children?” *Collier’s*, Apr. 25, 1925, at 23.
158. Paul Demeny, “Pronatalist Policies in Low-Fertility Countries: Patterns, Performance, and Prospects,” in *Below-Replacement Fertility in Industrial Societies: Causes, Consequences, Policies* 335-58 at 338 (Kingsley Davis et al. eds., 1986). See also Colin Clark, “New Light on Population,” *Listener* 49 (1256):503-504 at 504 (Mar. 26, 1953): “No political leader..., no economist...has the slightest right to interfere with the birth of children.... It is parents who have the right to demand of Prime Ministers and economists that they should so organise the world that children should have enough to eat.”
159. "There is nothing intrinsically worrisome about declining population growth or even declining population; West Germany...did rather well in the 1970's and 80's." Nicholas Eberstadt, "Marx and Mortality: A Mystery," *N.Y. Times*, Apr. 6, 1994, at A21, col. 1 (nat. ed.).