A World of Hope, a World of Fear: Henry A. Wallace, Reinhold Niebuhr, and American Liberalism

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movement of the 1950s” (110). Indeed, the Morris family saga is instructive for scholarship that is now focusing on the African American experience in Iowa prior to the civil rights years of the 1950s and 1960s.

Although insightful, Morris’s work raises more intriguing questions than it resolves. What did the legacy of tradition and valor mean for Morris family members and African Americans living in Des Moines during the First and Second World Wars? What kinds of lessons did the family legacy provide for James Brad Jr.’s offspring and black Des Moines residents during the Korean and Vietnam War years of the 1950s and 1960s? And how did the political struggles waged by black women family members, such as Morris’s grandmother and great-grandmother, shape the wartime experiences of their loved ones in uniform during the periods in question? These are minor quibbles, however. Future researchers of African American life in Iowa in the first half of the twentieth century will benefit from Tradition and Valor.


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In A World of Hope, A World of Fear, Mark L. Kleinman uses Henry A. Wallace and Reinhold Niebuhr as key figures in offering alternative paths for American foreign policy in the postwar period. He situates their early domestic and foreign policy outlooks in their youthful experience. He shows how Wallace’s rural Iowa background shaped his social thought, and how Niebuhr’s self-doubt about his choice of the ministry and his concern for his German-American roots contributed to his early speculations on society. Kleinman’s focus on their societal roots lays the foundation for one of his basic arguments: Wallace, the original “insider,” winds up by the late forties as the “cultural outsider.” On the other hand, while Niebuhr, the original outsider, continued “to experience himself on the outside looking in,” his “realistic” perspective and political positions integrated him into the “inside” culture of cold war America.

Kleinman’s attention to the early careers of both men is one of the strengths of the book, particularly in rescuing Wallace from one-dimensional portraits. He is able to demonstrate the different dimensions of Wallace: the man who was rooted in the rural traditions of independence and self-help; the scientific, technological, agricultural
geneticist; and the spiritual searcher whose interests led him to explore “Hinduism, Bahaiism, astrology, and Native American religion” (14). According to Kleinman, it was his experimental approach that united these interests. This material on Wallace’s early career should be of particular interest to Iowa readers who are interested in tracing Wallace’s development from an important local and regional figure to a national political leader.

Although Kleinman disclaims attempting to “beatify Wallace” (13), it is clear that his sympathies lie with Wallace. One of his main points is that the attacks on Wallace for being a Soviet apologist stifled foreign policy debates. The conceptually “constrained” consensus that developed among Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, led, he writes, “not all that indirectly” (xii) to McCarthyism, Korea, and Vietnam. The impact on Niebuhr of the appeasement at Munich, the subsequent “Munichizing” of all later international conflicts, and the threats of these to open, self-critical “public discourse” (301) alarm Kleinman.

Having written critically of the cold war consensus myself and having located its origins in the split between Wallace and the Union for Democratic Action, I find it hard to argue with the main outlines of Kleinman’s position. However, as much as I admire his thoughtfulness, I think his particular formulation of the argument leaves out Wallace’s own role in closing the debate. Kleinman is correct that some of the attacks on Wallace as a Soviet apologist were unfair. Wallace was not a fellow traveler, as was then charged. But his genuine desire for a peaceful and cooperative postwar world led him to place Soviet actions in a benign light. Repeatedly using “security” as a justification for Soviet actions in the period between 1946 and 1948, Wallace made statements on the Soviet Union that were, to say the least, morally obtuse. On occasion, Kleinman concedes the simplistic nature of Wallace’s view of the world. But Wallace’s statements on the Czech coup, for example, were more than simplistic; they were wrong and damaging to the democratic values he proclaimed.

Thus, while Kleinman is correct that Niebuhr helped shape a cold war consensus that muffled serious foreign policy debate, he fails to acknowledge Wallace’s role. As long as the option was a liberalism that failed to understand Stalinism, the field was left to the conservatives and cold war liberals who excused all U.S. actions on the grounds of anticommunism. Only a popularly supported “third camp” condemnation of both imperialist powers could have broken the cold war consensus and the Wallace alternative which fed into the hands of that consensus.
Kleinman's analysis is both perceptive and lacking on other issues. His analysis of how the Union for Democratic Action (UDA) sought to play the insider game in politics is correct. However, he is wrong when he accepts the description of it as "a prototypical, 'liberal, anti-Communist organization'" (135). Founded at the time of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, it reflected the strong anticommunism of that period during its first year. But during the war, anticommunism was largely irrelevant. Freda Kirchwey, Bruce Bliven, Max Lerner, and others who were closer to Kleinman's definition of popular front liberalism were leading lights in the UDA. And much of Niebuhr's foreign policy writing in the war years sought to alert liberals to the security needs of the Soviet Union.

There is much to admire in Wallace. His 1943 Detroit speech following the race riots stood out as an eloquent challenge to the country's racism, as did his courageous integrated tour through the South during the 1948 campaign. His idea of combining local decentralization with national centralized actions remains potentially fruitful. But it was never developed because in the last analysis Wallace was, as Dwight Macdonald saw, a fuzzy thinker. He wrote critically of capitalism, yet praised free enterprise and Horatio Alger. He supported a policy of spheres of influence, yet denied that he did. He saw international free trade as a key to peace, yet defended Stalinist policies that opposed free trade. In 1948 he could not find any part of American foreign policy to agree with, yet four years later he embraced the Korean War. His progression from the Progressive Party in 1948 to support for Eisenhower in 1956 and friendly chats with Nixon in 1960 is a jump that requires recognizing the abstractness and fuzziness of much of his thinking. Well-intentioned in motive, restless in his secular and spiritual inquiries, Wallace was a seriously flawed thinker and political leader who, I believe, should not be held up as a useful alternative to Niebuhr's cold war liberalism. Kleinman has made a strong case for how the latter led to a "profound impoverishment of American political culture" (xiv). Insofar as he holds out Wallace and his supporters as a viable alternative, he makes as good a case as one can. That he fails to persuade me does not detract from the importance of the book.