Understanding Political Change in Post-Soviet Societies: a Further Commentary On Finifter and Mickiewicz

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Understanding Political Change in Post-Soviet Societies: A Further Commentary on Finifter and Mickiewicz
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Modernization theory suggests that in the post-World War II period increased education promoted public support for democratic principles and an individual opportunities society in the former Soviet Union. Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), however, based on a 1989 survey in the Soviet Union, found that the less well educated were more supportive of individual locus of control than were the better educated. Examining survey data collected in the former USSR during 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1995, we find consistent reconfirmation of the modernization theory, despite a major decline in support for an opportunities society that occurs between 1992 and 1995. This recent increase in preference for socialism is explained by rising nationalism, growing nostalgia for communists, and disillusionment with certain aspects of the market economy, particularly the perceived growth of social inequality.

At the end of the 1980s scholars were challenged to explain the dramatic political changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The rapid disintegration of the USSR raised a host of questions about why the collapse occurred and what political and economic arrangements would eventually replace the old order.

Among the theoretical arguments offered in explanation for the rapid changes prior to the availability of data was a theory of modernization effects.1 This theory suggested that while the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s implied sudden and rapid social and political change, the underlying explanations for the change were more long term and gradual. For example, as the years passed and Soviets became better educated and more aware of other cultures, they began to demand more rights, more individual opportunities, and greater self-determination for both the individual and the various ethnic populations of the USSR.2

While there are no reliable, longitudinal public-opinion data available for testing these hypothesized dynamics—although the earlier Soviet Interview Project data appear to support the modernization argument (Millar 1987)—the theory suggested that certain relationships should be evident in the data that various Soviet and Western scholars were starting to collect at the end of 1980s and at the outset of the 1990s. In particular, if the theory is an accurate description of the change taking place in the former Soviet Union, we should expect these data to reveal that younger, better-educated, and urban Soviets were relatively more opposed to socialism and more favorable toward an “opportunities” society at the beginning of the reform era.3 By comparison, older, less well educated and rural residents were expected to be relatively more supportive of socialism and state control of the means of production (hence the guarantor of work) and broader well-being. Moreover, we would expect the former group to be less supportive of the Communists (as the rulers of the socialist state) and more pro-reform (at that time “pro-reform” implied less support of authoritarian government and positive support for a market economy). Again, the opposite would be predicted for the older, less well educated and rural groups.

Given the substantive importance of these hypothesized relationships for understanding the collapse of the

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1 Some versions of the modernization theory emphasize macroeconomic modernization (see Janos 1992) while others stress change in education and social values (see Lapidus 1989; Hahn 1991; Duch 1993; Evans and Whitefield 1993). Our use is much closer to that of the latter authors.

2 Movement toward reform in the former Soviet Union no doubt occurred as an interaction between the policy actions initiated by elites and the dissent expressed by the public, once the elites allowed the public to express its dissatisfaction on core issues. Reformist elites came to realize that they could no longer achieve their own (personal and state) goals such as economic growth via policies designed for a rural, uneducated society given that the Soviet society of the 1980s was no longer predominantly rural or uneducated. Under these circumstances, economic efficiency and growth could not come about without a reduction of central control. The public played a role in this change, not by lobbying or pressuring the leaders, but simply by not functioning well. The reformist elites’ decision to provide more freedom matched the desire of the better-educated segment of society for increased opportunities for personal advancement.

3 We have adapted the terminology used by McIntosh and MacIver (1992) to define the relationship between the citizen and the state. During the transition from authoritarian socialism to democracy the preferred role of the state is extremely important. There is a good deal of tension between those who want the security and stability presumably offered by reliance on the state even at the expense of individual freedom and opportunity, and those who want individual freedom and opportunities even though it entails some uncertainty and risk. The conceptual continuum thus ranges from those who prefer a “state guaranteed” society at one end to those who favor an “individual opportunities” society at the other end. Our measurement instrument captures this continuum as closely to the conceptual distinction as possible, although we use a reference to “the government” as guarantor of well-being rather than the state because our past research experience suggests that the “state” is an amorphous term that confuses some people.
Soviet Union, as well as the implications for the future politics of the newly emerging independent states, we were quite surprised by the reported results of the 1989 study conducted by Ada Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz (1992). Their results clearly contradicted the modernization theory and the hypotheses stated above. The most striking of these contradictions included their finding that the better educated had a much stronger commitment to socialism than relatively less well educated Soviet citizens and that those most favorable toward socialism were also relatively more supportive of reform. In addition, they found that rural citizens, particularly those least educated, were far less supportive of socialism than were urban dwellers and relatively less inclined toward reform. These results imply that at the end of the 1980s, support for socialism was most evident among middle- to upper-class Soviet citizens who were less favorably disposed toward a society incorporating individual opportunities than were lower-class Soviets. Nevertheless, the upper classes, despite their loyalty to socialism, were more inclined to favor reform.

Because many of the Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) results did not fit with data that we were collecting only shortly after the period when Finifter and Mickiewicz were in the field (see Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1993), nor with evidence reported by other scholars (Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992; McIntosh and MacIver 1992; Mason 1995), we responded by reassessing mass support for political and economic change in the former USSR based on data we had collected in 1991 and 1992 (see Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994).

In objection to our reassessment, Finifter (1996) has more recently presented a number of methodological arguments that she believes account for the discrepancies between our two previously published articles. Briefly stated, her arguments focus on differences between the two studies in the following areas: the timing of the surveys, the structure of samples, and the survey measures used to create certain indices.

The purpose of our further commentary here is not to address in detail each of these specific counter arguments. Rather, we feel that the broader understanding of Soviet and post-Soviet politics, as well as the enhancement of comparative politics more generally, can better be served by focusing on substantive and theoretical issues. We proceed by first reexamining the hypothesized relationship between education and commitment to socialism by using a broader set of indicators of support for socialism from our 1990 study, thus allowing us to address the issue of timing for the Finifter and Mickiewicz study versus our studies. Next, we introduce data from 1995 and consider whether the education relationship has remained consistent even in the face of the tremendous change occurring in the past five years. The final topic in this section involves an alternative interpretation to that offered by Finifter for the relationship between education level and support for an individual opportunities society as revealed by the 1990–91 World Values Survey.

The second major section of the paper considers the relationship between locus of responsibility and attitudes toward political change. Clearly, what political change meant while the Soviet Union still existed is different from what political change means in the post-Soviet period. The focus of this section, therefore, is rising nationalism, the reemergence of support for communists, and growing disillusionment with democratization.

The third section then turns to the impact of changing economic conditions and circumstances on preferred locus of responsibility. Reform, as it has been and is still occurring in the newly independent states, involves economic as well as political change. Indeed, our understanding of public attitudes toward state responsibility for individual well-being would be limited without exploring the impact of economic perceptions, including beliefs about free markets and social justice, on preferred locus of responsibility. A brief conclusion drawing out the broader implications of our findings brings the paper to a close.

UNIVERSALITY AND REPLICATION

Before moving on, however, two points raised by Finifter must be addressed directly as they misrepresent both the letter and intent of our previous reassessment. The first point deals with the universality of relationships and the second with replication.

As indicated above, there are sharp discrepancies between certain correlations reported by Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) and our reassessment (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994). In her recent critique, Finifter recasts our previous article as claiming "universal status for the positive relationship" between education and preferred locus of responsibility (emphasis Finifter 1996, 138; see also pages 139–41). A revisit to our earlier article will reveal that we did not cast the relationship between education and locus of responsibility as a universal.

On the contrary, our work was based on the assumption that we were testing hypotheses that described the political reality and social relations existing within the former Soviet Union at a certain time. The reported distributions and relationships were assumed to be influenced by certain socioeconomic factors which were expected to vary over time (such as perceptions of the economic situation). We also pursued the surprising fact that the examined correlations in data from the Soviet Union were quite similar to the correlations among similar measures in the United States, despite major differences in political systems. In short, our analyses explicitly entertained the impact of context on the distribution of public attitudes as well as the associations among attitudes.

While part of any scientific endeavor is to seek generalizable findings and relationships that remain stable across time and across cultures, social scientists generally assume that social relations are dynamic. Clearly, comparative research strives to uncover general relationships, but an equally salient purpose of comparative research is to determine under which social conditions identified relationships do hold true, and what factors lead to shifts in distributions and associations. In accordance with this idea, our previous work did not rule
out the possibility that education and locus of responsibility might be negatively correlated under some circumstances, for some societies, or at some point in time even though none of our data pointed to that conclusion.

Second, Finifter argues that our earlier piece was not a direct replication of the Finifter and Mickiewicz research and is therefore not directly comparable (see Finifter 1996, 139, 141–44). Our purpose was to examine the correlates and explanations of support for the old Soviet system versus desire for reform, marketization, and an individual opportunities society. We did not set out to replicate the Finifter and Mickiewicz study.4 We were extremely candid about not using exactly the same measures with exactly the same wording, or even the same sampling frame. Our focus was testing alternative theories and thus, use of the same measure of a concept or exactly the same sample was not necessary. In order to accurately test existing theories one needs equivalent, valid measures of concepts and unbiased samples of areas where the theory should apply, not identical survey data. Our earlier work was not, and was not meant to be, a replication. It was a reassessment of a body of work we found questionable in light of our own research and theoretical orientation. While these issues are important, they are not key motivations for our paper. Thus, let us turn to a fuller examination of the evidence necessary to resolve the discrepancies that generated the original controversy.

EDUCATION AND SUPPORT FOR STATE VERSUS INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR WELL-BEING

One of the most obvious discrepancies between the Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) results and those we reported in our reassessment (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994) involves the correlation between education and locus of responsibility. Finifter (1996, 148–49) argues that the correlation between these two variables reversed between the end of 1989 (when Finifter and Mickiewicz found a significant negative correlation indicating that the better educated were relatively more supportive of socialism than were the less well educated) and June of 1991 (when our survey revealed a significant positive correlation indicating that better-educated Soviets preferred an individual opportunities society more than those who were less well educated). We are dubious that such a radical change could have occurred within a two-year time span. Historically, there may have been a period in Soviet society when a negative correlation existed, but we believe that this correlation began to reverse long before the fall of the USSR. It seems likely to us that this change in correlation began in the post–World War II period as overall education increased, causing a positive correlation to evolve over a number of years. This was a gradual change, not a sudden one occurring in the period between 1989 and mid-1991.

We contend that data from our 1990 study (conducted only six months after the Finifter and Mickiewicz study), in conjunction with subsequent surveys, support the continuity of correlation argument far better than the sudden change argument. Although the critical locus of responsibility measure was not included in our earliest study,5 a number of indirect measures reflecting support and opposition to socialism were included and can be used for comparison. Moreover, some of these items were carried forward to our subsequent surveys as well. By examining the correlations between education and these items in all of our surveys, as well as the correlation between these items and the locus of responsibility measure (in those years when it is available), we can begin to determine a pattern of relationships. From this pattern we are able to make well-founded inferences about what the correlations most likely would have been in 1990 if locus of responsibility items had been available.

A factor analysis of eleven survey items from the 1990 study that measured attitudes toward socialism revealed three distinct dimensions. The first was similar to the reform dimension discussed in our 1994 reassessment.6 The four items loading most heavily on this dimension included discomfort with the speed of reform (whether too fast or too slow), the desire for an orderly society versus more individual freedom, respect for Stalin, and discomfort with a competitive party system (remember the Communist Party was still the only allowable party in the USSR at this point in time). A second dimension captured approval or disapproval of the political and economic changes occurring in Eastern Europe. The third dimension reflected attitudes toward three different institutions: the Communist Party, and the national and local Supreme Soviets (the legislative bodies of the

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4 Replication has a number of different meanings. Sniderman (1995) offers a definition involving the use of a different data set and comparable measures to validate earlier results and interpretations that he labels cross-validation. While the work presented here (and in our earlier reassessment) reflects this, we feel that even this form of replication was not what we intended. Our results and those reported by Finifter and Mickiewicz convey very different theories about the social processes involved in the demise of the Soviet Union. Each team is presenting and testing alternative empirical theories. Reducing these differences to a simple matter of replication, or even a cross-validation, would diminish the theoretical significance of this controversy.

5 The 1990 study was funded equally by this research team and our Soviet collaborators; thus the number of survey questions we were able to contribute to the questionnaire was more limited in that year than in subsequent years when the funding was provided predominantly by the U.S. National Science Foundation.

6 These four items are not exactly the same as the four questions used in our 1994 Index of Reform, which was based on factor analyses of the broader set of questions available in 1991 and 1992. In the mix of eleven variables available for the 1990 surveys, a competitive parties question clearly loads with the speed of reform, orderly society, and Stalin questions. The Communist Party rating loads with an institutional factor, rather than with the reform items.

The net result of starting with the 1990 survey is that three of the four reform indicators, rather than two, are very similar to the items used by Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) to measure support for political change. Our orderly society question is very similar to their question Q22d. Our speed of reform question is like their Q18 and our competitive parties question is similar to their competitive elections (Q29) question. Again, the reader should realize that we are not attempting to replicate the Finifter and Mickiewicz measure here. Nevertheless, the four-item reform measure used in our Table 1 here does more closely resemble the Finifter and Mickiewicz measure of change, and thus can be seen as conforming with the suggestion made by Finifter (1996, 144).
One final item, an affective rating of private enterprises (recall that the state controlled the means of production in the USSR, thus rating private enterprises positively implies support for a more individualistic society) was also available but the loadings for this item were spread equally across the three dimensions (see the appendix for the exact wording of the questionnaire items).

All these survey items were positively and significantly intercorrelated for Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, as were the three indices formed from the measures that loaded together on each dimension. In short, the data show that those individuals opposed to reform were also negatively oriented toward the democratization and marketization occurring in Eastern Europe, and toward private enterprises. Thus, they were also relatively more positively oriented toward the major institutions of the Soviet government. In 1990 this antireform, pro-socialism sentiment was expressed by a substantial segment of the Soviet citizenry in Russia and Ukraine. For example, 41% of Russians and 33% of Ukrainians interpreted the changes in Eastern Europe as a threat to the interests of the USSR. Similarly, 44% of Russians and 43% of Ukrainians thought political reform was occurring too rapidly in the Soviet Union. Lithuanians, on the contrary, were largely in favor of reform and very negative toward the political institutions of the USSR—66% of this group, as compared with 31% of Russians and 29% of Ukrainians, rated the Communist Party “very negative.” Most important to the relevance of the argument presented here, the better-educated survey respondents in all three former republics were significantly more pro-reform, favorable toward the change taking place in Eastern Europe, negative toward communist institutions, and more supportive of private enterprise than were less well educated Soviet citizens. In other words, as of mid-1990, education was positively correlated with a variety of measures indicating support or opposition to socialism (Pearson correlations ranging from .10 to .50).

On their own, the 1990 correlations do not definitively refute Finifter’s change of correlation hypothesis because the critical locus of responsibility item is not included in the measurement. As of 1991, however, the locus of responsibility item was added to our surveys and some of the other items included in the 1990 study continued to be included as well. The four items in the index that we labeled reform, as well as the rating of private enterprises, were included in all our subsequent studies. If the items that were positively correlated with education in 1990 were also positively correlated with education and locus of responsibility in subsequent surveys, it would convincingly disconfirm Finifter’s “change in correlation” hypothesis.

Table 1 presents the relevant set of correlation matrices for all three former republics across the period 1990–95. All of these correlations are positive and all but three are significant. Moreover, education is posi-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1. Correlations among Education, Attitude toward Reform, Affect toward Private Enterprises, and Locus of Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russia</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year of Study</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The University of Iowa Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys (PSCS). See note 8 for the sample description.

*The wording of the survey question used to measure locus of responsibility here and in all subsequent tables is: “Some people say the central government of the Russian Federation/Ukraine/Lithuania should guarantee everyone work and a high standard of living while others argue that every person should look after himself.” The survey question scale initially ranged from 1 = government responsibility to 5 = individual responsibility for economic well-being. Here we have collapsed the scale as follows: 1,2 = state, 3 = pro/con, 4,5 = individual. The 1995 data employed a seven-point scale, so the collapsing was 1–3 = state, 4 = pro/con, 5–7 = individual.

**Education was coded as a 9-category variable that ranged from 1 = primary education and 9 = highest graduate degree.**

*The reform index was comprised of four items: speed of reform, orderly society versus individual freedom, respect for Stalin and support for competitive parties.*

*This is item Q62 noted in the Appendix.*

*Not significant; all other correlations significant at p < .01.*
tively correlated with all the items in all the years (1991, 1992, and 1995) including the locus of responsibility question. The fact that the pattern of correlations is similar across the three former republics is also very telling. One part of Finifter’s critique (pp. 10–13, 15) is devoted to her argument that the differential weighting of the three republics in the combined sample used for our reassessment could help account for the discrepancy between our respective results. Yet the positive correlations in Table 1 for each former republic taken separately, a permissible mode of analysis because the sample from each former republic has always been self-representing,8 demonstrate that the results are not simply an artifact of the sample weight. In short, if one were to predict backwards to 1989 from this pattern of correlations, one certainly would not predict a negative correlation between education and locus of responsibility. Given that the magnitude and direction of all the correlations remain surprisingly stable in the face of dramatic social, political, and economic change, it would be very surprising to have found a single correlation—that between education and locus of responsibility—to have made a dramatic shift from clearly negative to clearly positive between 1989 and 1990.9

The argument for a dramatic change in the direction of the correlation between education and locus of responsibility would appear more plausible if there had been a major shift in the distribution of attitudes toward the locus of responsibility between 1989 and 1991. We find very little empirical support for this contention, however. When we previously compared our 1991 distribution of locus of responsibility attitudes with those reported by Finifter and Mickiewicz, we found almost no difference: 54 and 51% (when the distributions are dichotomized) in the respective surveys supported state responsibility for well-being (see Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994, 400). According to Finifter’s change in correlation hypothesis, the only way this high degree of similarity in the overall distribution for the two studies could have been attained is if virtually the same number of better and less well educated Soviets shifted, in opposite directions, from one side of the dichotomy to the other between 1989 and 1991. While this is not entirely impossible, it seems highly improbable.

In addition, a comparison of our 1991 and 1992 studies (see Table 2) suggests a good deal of stability in these same attitudes at a time when Finifter argues that massive changes in public opinion were taking place due to the dramatic events associated with the collapse of the USSR. Despite the very real drama associated with many of the events leading up to the Soviet demise, only minor differences occurred in the distributions for locus of responsibility between 1991 and 1992.10 This continuity of public attitudes in the face of a major political upheaval suggests that many citizens’ preferences had been formed long before 1989.

It is important at this point to clarify that the 1990–92 stability of opinion does not mean that the distributions were fixed across all time periods. In fact, among Russians and Ukrainians massive changes occur in locus of responsibility attitudes between mid-1992 and the beginning of 1995 (see Table 2). During this period, Russian and Ukrainian preferences shifted sharply in a pro-socialist (state responsible for well-being) direction. Lithuanians, for their part, exhibit relatively little attitudinal change throughout the entire time frame (see Table 2). Roughly one-third of the Lithuanians surveyed preferred state responsibility for well-being during the entire period, which is approximately half the level of support for socialism found in Russia and Ukraine at the outset of 1995.

Level of education did influence this pattern of stability and change in attitudes, but the strength of effect required to substantiate Finifter’s change in the sign of the correlation argument is not apparent. As Table 2 reveals, the same overall trend in changing support for state responsibility was evident in both the better and less well educated segments of the three populations, although the dramatic shift in attitudes that occurs correlations thus include only those involving their locus of responsibility measure, not their measures of reform. 10 Stability in overall distributions does not necessarily mean individual level stability. See Gibson (1995) for panel data that reveal significant individual level change in dealing with related economic and political issues.
between 1992 and 1995 is more pronounced among the less well educated. Even in Lithuania, while there is no discernible change among the better educated, a shift of ten percentage points in a socialist direction is evident for those with a secondary education only. This pattern of differential shift in attitudes is not surprising as previous studies have repeatedly demonstrated that better-educated people have more consistent and stable attitudes because their opinions are more firmly anchored in a stronger foundation of information (Converse and Pierce 1986; Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1995). The fact that better-educated individuals have more firmly anchored attitudes is, however, one more reason why a directional change in correlation between education and locus of responsibility is rather implausible.11

Finding a consistent correlation between education and support/opposition to socialism (with the better educated showing the least support) for the entire period of 1990–95 does not rule out the possibility of a negative correlation in 1989, but certainly makes it less probable. Given that any science centers around probabilities and the likelihood of relationships occurring under varying circumstances, we agree with Finifter that examining the World Values Study data could shed additional light on the relationship that might be expected to exist in a variety of places between education and locus of responsibility. However, our interpretation of the World Values Study data differs from that reached by Finifter. Our theory was that a positive relationship should hold between education and locus of responsibility (the better educated prefer an individual opportunities society more so than the less well educated). Finifter argues, on the basis of history, that a negative correlation would, in theory, be a more accurate representation of the underlying relationship between education and locus of responsibility. Yet, following Finifter's logic, we agree that data from the World Values Study do not present a direct comparison with the Finifter and Mickiewicz study because they were collected in 1990–91. Nevertheless, we can utilize the data for theory development by asking which of the two alternative theories would more likely be suggested by these data collected from some 40 separate countries.

Finifter’s (1996) Table 1 presenting the World Values data contains 54 correlations involving education and locus of responsibility; 3 registering at zero, and 9 negative (only one of which is significant). The table also contains 42 positive correlations (78% of all correlations), 19 of which are significant. This large number of consistently positive correlations is astounding, given the wide array of different languages, multiple translation difficulties, diverse sampling approaches, and the broad variation in the quality of field work that, practically speaking, had to be involved in a study of 40 countries. In short, using the World Values Study to build a theory of the real world relationship between education and locus of responsibility would almost never produce a theory reflecting a negative correlation (only one out of 54 correlations was significantly negative). Rather, the most likely theory based upon the World Values Study is a positive relationship which would be significant about half the time. In summary, a reexamination of our 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1995 surveys, as well as the World Values data, reveals no support for the Finifter and Mickiewicz argument that better-educated people in the former Soviet Union preferred a socialist system more than the less well educated citizens or that less well educated citizens were more likely to prefer an individual opportunities society.12

### POLITICAL CHANGE AND LOCUS OF RESPONSIBILITY

A second major discrepancy between the two studies involves the relationship between locus of responsibility and attitudes toward political change. Much of the discussion of this relationship in the earlier articles

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11 It is interesting to note that a change in the direction of the correlation with locus of responsibility would have had to entail a major shift in attitudes toward socialism. Furthermore, this shift would have had to be systematic and differ for better and less well educated Soviets. The overall population could not simply shift in an antiasocialism direction between 1989 and 1991. Rather, the better educated had to become rapidly more negative toward socialism while the less well educated became more positive at the same rate.

12 One problem with this comparison lies in the fact that the Finifter and Mickiewicz measure was a single forced choice dichotomous item. In a situation where respondents may not be accustomed to or comfortable with voicing their opinions openly to strangers, it may be methodologically inappropriate to use forced choice questions. This is due to the fact that the respondent with less well formulated opinions is not allowed to register an opinion somewhere between the extremes of state versus individual responsibility for well-being as the items in our surveys do.

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**TABLE 2. State or Individual Should Be Responsible for Work and Standard of Living**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who Should Be Responsible?</th>
<th>Education Group</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro/con</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(1384)</td>
<td>(1243)</td>
<td>(1270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The University of Iowa Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys (PSCS). See note 8 for the sample description.

*Education is trichotimized here, those with secondary education or less versus those with at least some higher education are included in the table; those in the middle category (technical training) are excluded for parsimony of presentation.

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involves the issue of whether a negative or positive correlation more accurately reflects the association between locus of responsibility preferences and attitudes toward political and economic reform.

With regard to citizens' orientations toward these key reform issues, we hypothesized that the higher the level of support for policy changes designed to create a market economy in a relative short period—even at the cost of inflation, unemployment, and resulting social disruption—the more likely that person is to favor an open and competitive political system with democratic institutions. It is important to note that we do not claim that support for economic reform and support for democratic political institutions will be unidimensional, nor have we found this to be the case (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1995). However, we do expect that these two sets of preferences will be positively correlated. Both economic and political reform can be expected to benefit citizens with certain similar skills, backgrounds, or esteemed positions in society (and to hurt or be of little value to those without those skills, backgrounds, and positions). Those who placed themselves and their families among the ranks of the intelligent, well-connected, persuasive, politically efficacious and/or marketable are, we argue, those most likely to expect advantages from both political and economic reforms. Those who believe themselves to lack marketable job skills and formal education and who are poorly connected are more likely to oppose these reforms on the basis that the present system is more responsive to their personal needs than a system oriented toward individual responsibility and a free market economy.

Following this line of reasoning, it may be true, as Finitter suggests, that “the economic hardships faced by ordinary Soviet citizens might lead many to think that political reform should be accompanied by continuation of state responsibility” (1996, 7). However, our theory leads us to expect that those most supportive of an open and competitive polity will also be more likely to support the risky, but potentially profitable, conversion to capitalism with its greater emphasis on an individual opportunities society.

What political change meant in the 1985–92 period, however, was very different than what political change has meant since 1992. In the earlier period, change focused on the introduction of basic and broad reforms such as providing more individual freedom, reducing state control over information and social communication, eliminating a single-party system, and introducing competitive elections. Since 1992 political change has become more multifaceted and complex. Constitutional reforms have been introduced, new legislative institutions have been created, new elections have been held, and many political parties have appeared; some of which have already disappeared and others, such as the new version of the Communist Party, have reemerged. As a result of all this change it is conceptually meaningless at this point in time to speak of the relationship between “democratic reform” and “market reform” in such global terms. Political and economic change as it is occurring in post-Soviet societies, as well as public reaction to that change, is more complex than is suggested by broad terms like democratic reform, market reform, or marketization.

Given the highly mutable nature of what political change means in the newly independent states, we focus our discussion on an exploration of the most recent period of change rather than revisiting our earlier analysis of attitudes toward reform during the 1990–92 period. Three recent political trends in particular are potentially important for explaining and interpreting the shift in locus of responsibility between 1992 and 1995: rising nationalism, the reemergence of communists, and growing disillusionment with democratic reformers.

**Nationalism**

With the decline of Marxism-Leninism as the defining ideology of the Soviet system, alternative ideologies and political currents have found room for expression in the former republics. Nationalism is one of the ideologies that is capable of mobilizing people to engage in various forms of political participation. Recent elections demonstrate the appeal associated with a promulgation of nationalist symbols. For example, in the Russian presidential elections of mid-1991, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a rabid nationalist at the head of the Liberal Democratic Party, drew nearly 8% of the vote—third highest in the election. In the Russian parliamentary elections of late 1993, Zhirinovsky’s party won a large number of seats in the State Duma on the basis of proportional representation on party lists. Similar nationalist movements occurred in Ukraine and Lithuania during this period as well.

Empirically, nationalism has been operationalized in terms of two dimensions: exclusionary and aggressive nationalism (McIntosh, MacIver and Abele 1993; Furtado 1994; D’Anieri and Malanchuk 1995). Exclusive nationalism is aimed at keeping the nation homogeneous and excluding members of different racial or ethnic groups. Key attributes include having an official language, restricting franchisement, deporting outsiders, and perceiving that the country’s nationals living abroad are discriminated against. Aggressive nationalism involves beliefs in national superiority, isolation from outside influence, and controlling the nation’s destiny through force and possible domination of other countries. These two dimensions are related, yet separate as shown by correlations of .10, .21 and .32 in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, respectively, in 1995.

The three countries vary in their relative ranking on

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13 For more on reform, the reader should refer to the correlations between reform and locus of responsibility in Table 1, all of which are positive. When these correlations are recomputed for the four categories of education by urban/rural location used in Finitter's Table 4, most of these correlations are positive and significant. Of the 36 correlations (three countries times three years times four education by urban/rural categories) 32 are significant and positive, and two are insignificant and positive. Only two negative correlations are obtained, only one of which is statistically significant. In short, a reanalysis of our earlier data and the 1995 data reveal positive correlations between a pro-reform orientation and support for individual responsibility for well-being. Reform, however, is a separate dimension, different from, but related to, nationalism, attitudes toward communists, or democratic principles.
each of the two dimensions. Russians displayed the highest level of aggressive nationalism (mean of 21.5 on a six-item index, see appendix for definitions), while Lithuanians ranked lowest on this dimension (a mean of 17.9 as compared with 19.6 for Ukraine). Lithuanians, however, exhibited the highest level of exclusive nationalism (a mean of 10.4 on a five-item index; see the appendix for the items), with Russians next (9.1) and Ukrainians showing the least exclusivity (7.7). These nationalist sentiments are correlated with preferences for greater state responsibility for economic well-being, as well as relatively less positive attitudes toward the West and Western ideas. Contrary to what is often conveyed by the popular press, post-Soviet citizens are relatively accepting of the West. For example, in 1995 only 8–9% of Ukrainians and Lithuanians and roughly 15% of Russians rated the United States and Germany negatively. Nevertheless, this was an increase in negativity when compared with 1992 (about 5% for Ukraine and Lithuania and 9 percent for Russia), which helps to confirm a rise in nationalism and potentially helps to explain the 1992–95 shift toward increased demand for state responsibility of well-being.

Reemergence of Communists

The failure of the August 1991 coup in Moscow quickly led to the end of the overarching dominance of the Soviet state by the Communist Party. In some of the Soviet successor states, the Communist Party quickly lost all significant public support as did the terms communist and communism, forcing former reform communists to establish social democratic parties for survival. In other states, the political machines that had been constructed within republic Party organizations survived the downfall of the Soviet Union and continued to control most state bodies under the guise of a new name.

Although support for the Communist Party remained substantial, it was disbanded in Russia by order of President Yeltsin. However, following a November 1992 ruling by the Russian Constitutional Court declaring that Yeltsin could not ban local communist parties, more than a dozen communist parties began to organize. The largest of these new parties is the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). Headed by Gennadii Ziuganov, this party brought together a number of former local party organizations and it began to pursue far-reaching goals. The CPRF made substantial progress toward one of their goals—winning power through electoral means on a platform of strong Russian state power and an active governmental role in the economy—in the December 1993 parliamentary elections by winning 15% of the seats. The popularity of the CPRF may be due to its ability to adapt to the reform environment without straying too radically from original Communist beliefs. Even though the CPRF promotes state supervision of the economy, they do not advocate a Leninist revolutionary policy nor a return to full central planning of the economy. In this sense, the CPRF is quite similar to the emerging social democratic parties such as the party that governs Lithuania, but is also quite different in that a strong sense of Russian nationalism forms a prominent part of its foundation.

By the time of our 1995 surveys, the “reformed image” of the new communist parties may be what accounts for the public’s more positive attitude toward “communists” in general. As the upper part of Table 3 reveals, the perception that communists have “too much influence” in society and politics shifted significantly between 1992 and 1995. Russians in particular were much less likely to view communists negatively in 1995, a trend that held across education levels (see Table 3). Ukrainians also expressed a more favorable view of communists in 1995, whereas the trend was in the opposite direction for Lithuanians, despite the presence of a reformed communist party governing Lithuania.

These cross-cultural differences in evaluations of communists may reflect an emerging nostalgia for the communists of old. Only a small minority of Lithuanians (11%) think of themselves as “Soviets in 1995” whereas a clear majority of Ukrainians (although only one-quarter of the better educated) still label themselves as Soviets (see Table 3). This self-identification with Soviets is strongly correlated with other indicators of communist evaluations in all three countries, including assessments of the various reformed communist parties. In addition, those who are relatively more positive toward communists are also more favorable toward state responsibility for social well-being. Again, this correlation, coupled with the apparent trend in reemerging support for communists, could help explain the change in locus of responsibility.

Disillusionment with Democratization

While support for communists rose between 1992 and 1995 in Russia and Ukraine, the opposite trend appears to be more prevalent for attitudes toward democratic reformers and democratization. A sizable proportion of Russians and Ukrainians in 1995 felt that democratic reformers have “too much influence” in society and politics (see Table 3). Also, 42%, 38%, and 25% of Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians, respectively, said they had “nothing” in common with democratic reformers.

Given that the difficult economic circumstances associated with shifting to a market economy have become identified as directly resulting from the policies of democratic reformers, it is not surprising to find growing disillusionment with the movement toward democratization. An even more fundamental concern, however, arises from the finding that this disillusionment is not simply directed at current democratic leaders, but also appears to have eroded support for democratic principles (see the bottom of Table 3). Between 1992 and 1995 support for democratic values such as a competitive party system, popular participation in politics, the right to organize opposition to government policies, and the protection of minority rights receded in all three of these newly independent states. Despite this decline in enthusiasm for democratic values, a clear majority of these post-Soviet citizens remain committed to democracy. Dichotomizing the index of democratic values at the
TABLE 3. Change in Political and Economic Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Communist Influence (% too much)(^a)</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>49.6</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Education</td>
<td>High Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Low Education</td>
<td>High Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Low Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify Self as Soviet(^b)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>11.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>High Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Low Education</td>
<td>High Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Reformers Influence (% too much)(^c)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>10.9</td>
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<td>High Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Low Education</td>
<td>High Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Values(^d)</td>
<td>13.7</td>
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<td>13.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>Low Education</td>
<td>High Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Financial Retrospective (% worse)(^e)</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>High Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Low Education</td>
<td>High Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Enterprises (% negative)(^f)</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Justice Attitudes: Support Income Regulation(^g)</td>
<td>34.2</td>
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<td>52.7</td>
<td>56.1</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>Low Education</td>
<td>High Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Increased Economic Inequality(^h)</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Low Education</td>
<td>High Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Low Education</td>
<td>High Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The University of Iowa Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys (PSCS). See note 8 for the sample description.

\(^a\) Do Communists have too much, too little, or the right amount of influence in politics?

\(^b\) To what extent would you say you think of yourself as a Soviet?

\(^c\) Do Democratic Reformers have too much, too little, or the right amount of influence in politics?

\(^d\) See Appendix for definition of this index. Higher index values are pro-democratic.

\(^e\) What is the current financial situation of you and your family compared to one year ago?

\(^f\) How favorable are your feelings towards private enterprise?

\(^g\) Should income be regulated so no one earns more than others?

\(^h\) Is there a danger of growing economic inequality among citizens?

midpoint of the scale reveals that in 1992 roughly seven out of every ten survey respondents registered pro-democratic sentiments (that is, above the midpoint of the index). Three years later, 61% of Russians, 59% of Ukrainians, and 67% of Lithuanian respondents were pro-democratic. Hence, it seems likely that post-Soviet citizens are not ready to give up their newly acquired political freedoms and return to a more authoritarian political system. Nonetheless, those who support democratic principles more strongly are also relatively more favorable toward an individual opportunities society, thus the decline in support for democracy provides a potential explanation for the recent change in locus of responsibility.

Economic Change and Locus of Responsibility

**Personal Finances.** Our earlier reassessment argued that locus of responsibility preferences should be a function of economic as well as political factors. Indeed, we found that the personal financial situation experienced by the survey respondent was one of the strongest predictors for locus of responsibility attitudes. Those respondents who had suffered a deterioration in their financial situation during the past year were much more likely to support a society in which the state was responsible for well-being. We expect that this relationship should also hold true for the more recent survey period, as the
hardships connected with a transition to a market economy take their toll on the quality of everyday life. Such is indeed the case when the bivariate relationship between personal financial conditions and locus of responsibility is examined for Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania in 1995. However, the trend in economic outlook does not correspond to shifts in locus of responsibility. As Table 3 reveals, economic outlook actually improved slightly between 1992 and 1995 for Russians (especially among the better educated), remained relatively stable for Ukrainians (although it deteriorated among the better educated), and became more negative for Lithuanians (particularly for the less well educated). In short, change in personal economic conditions cannot explain change in locus of responsibility for Russia or Ukraine but may do so for Lithuania.

Privatization. Just as with political change, we believe that the meaning of economic reform shifted between the end of the 1980s and the past few years. At the end of the 1980s the possibilities for individual entrepreneurship were still only possibilities for the future (Slider, Magun, and Gimpelson 1991). Between 1992 and 1995 privatization and entrepreneurship mushroomed (although in some cases this involved “nomenklatura privatization” whereby former plant managers under the Soviet regime expropriated their factory, or turned to black-market entrepreneurship (see Motyl 1993, 142-44). Nevertheless, the survey evidence demonstrates that some decrease in the earlier negative attitudes toward private enterprise occurred between 1992 and 1995 (see the percentage rating private enterprises negatively in Table 3). Given that those who are more positive toward private enterprises also favor an opportunities society, the trend displayed in Table 3 cannot explain the shifts over time in locus of responsibility, but the fact that Lithuanians are more positive toward private enterprise than are respondents from Russia and Ukraine may help explain why Lithuanians in general are more supportive of an opportunities society.

Attitudes toward privatization, however, are broader and more complex than what can be suggested by merely examining evaluations of private enterprise. For example, on the one hand, 58% of Lithuanians prefer that the government owns the heavy industries in the country (the comparable numbers for Russia and Ukraine are 67% and 59%, respectively). On the other hand, only 6% of Lithuanians (but 26% of Russians and Ukrainians) want the government to own “local businesses like shops and restaurants.” In addition, Lithuanians have been more willing than Russians or Ukrainians to adopt certain capitalist business norms such as allowing companies to earn large profits (60% in Lithuania as compared with 50% in Russia and 52% in Ukraine), or fire inefficient workers (46% approve in Lithuania, 32% in Russia and Ukraine). Despite the growing complexity in these various attitudes, the basic correlation tends to hold—those positive toward privatization and capitalist norms are more supportive of an opportunities society.

Social Justice. The Western press regularly carries a number of articles regarding the economic hardships that have accompanied the move toward a market economy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. High inflation, growing unemployment, periods when factories cannot pay the workers, and increasing poverty are the topics most often reported. Rarely do the media cover the growing inequality between those who are amassing huge fortunes and those who lack the skills to succeed in a capitalistic economy.

In the former communist system, the distribution of rewards was based as much on need as on merit. Despite a meritocratic incentive system, communist ideology gave strong emphasis to egalitarianism, which ensured that incomes were less highly differentiated in the former communist countries as compared to Western capitalist countries (Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995). Furthermore, the differences in wealth that did exist were kept as inconspicuous as possible. In the current period of change, differences in wealth have become very visible, thereby increasing public support for regulations to control income differences (especially among the less well educated; see Table 3). Interestingly, this desire for income regulation had previously been higher in Lithuania than in the other two countries. All three countries (Russia in particular) have also witnessed a sharp increase in the percentage of individuals who view the growing inequality as a serious threat to social stability. These growing concerns about inequality may help explain disillusionment with democratic reformers, as reformers have become associated with the “rich” (or what the public perceives as the unjustified accumulation of wealth). When asked how to explain the increasing wealth of some people, roughly 40% of the survey respondents attributed the gain to illegal activities and another 20% said the newly rich were simply the old nomenklatura acquiring state property for themselves. Furthermore, those respondents who perceived the growth in wealth as the result of illegal activities were also most strongly in favor of government responsibility for general well-being, whereas those who attributed the increase in wealth to hard work or creativity (roughly 25%) were relatively more supportive of an opportunities society.

A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF LOcus OF RESPONSIBILITY

Clearly, a number of political and economic factors are correlated with current preferences regarding the locus of responsibility in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Moreover, these correlations are all in the direction that supports our hypothesized relationship between locus of responsibility and measures of support for economic and political change, more so than the negative correlation hypothesized by Finifter and Mickiewicz. Namely, support for an opportunities society is relatively higher among those who are more inclusionary in their nationalist orientation, more positive toward democratic reformers and democratic principles, less nostalgic about their Soviet past, less supportive of communists (even reformed communists), and more positive toward privatization and capitalistic norms. Yet, because these plausible explanatory variables are also intercorrelated
among themselves, each bivariate relationship may simply be a spurious reflection of some other factor. In order to safeguard against this possibility and to determine the relative power of each hypothesized explanation, we computed a multivariate regression, the results of which are presented in Table 4.

Before proceeding to a discussion of this table, it should be noted again that our analysis is not intended to duplicate either the regression that was presented in our earlier reassessment or the Finifter and Mickiewicz regression. The analysis reported here uses the single locus of responsibility item as the dependent variable, rather than an index (thus the lower R-squared), so as to be more compatible with the earlier Finifter and Mickiewicz analysis. We do not, however, attempt to follow what Finifter and Mickiewicz did by way of independent variables, as they had only one nondemographic independent variable—life satisfaction. Our purpose is to explain preferences for a society in which the state rather than the individual is responsible for individual well-being; therefore, theory, rather than previous analysis, should dictate the hypotheses that are examined.

Overall, the results of the regressions demonstrate that both political and economic factors have a significant direct effect on locus of responsibility preferences. Among the political variables, exclusive nationalism is the only variable that is significant for each country. Aggressive nationalism, however, is significant only for Ukraine. The effect here is the reverse of that found for exclusive nationalism—aggressive nationals tend to support individual responsibility but exclusive nationals want more state responsibility for well-being. Apparently, controlling one’s own destiny is in part a reflection rather than an index of the political environment (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1995).

### TABLE 4. Regression Testing Hypothesized Political and Economic Predictors of Locus of Responsibility for 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
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<th>Lithuania</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>b</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aggressive nationalism</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exclusionary nationalism</td>
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<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose communists</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.08*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support democrats</td>
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<td>.04</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
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<td>(.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
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<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.08*</td>
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<td>Personal finances: past</td>
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<td>Personal finances: future</td>
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<td>Education (low to high)</td>
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Source: The University of Iowa Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys (PSCS). See note 8 for the sample description.

*p < .05; **p < .001.

See the Appendix for definitions of the independent variables. Age, gender, income, ethnicity, and national economic evaluations were included in the regression but are not presented in the table for reasons of parsimony.

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14 A second analysis employing exactly the same independent variables from our earlier reassessment (see Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994, 409, Table 6) with our 1995 data reveals that political reform continues to be strongly and positively related with locus of responsibility. Between 1992 and 1995, however, the effect of reform on the single locus of responsibility measure dropped for Russia and Ukraine (the beta coefficients are .22, .16, .18, .09 in these two countries for 1992 and 1995, respectively), but remained constant for Lithuania (beta of .13 and .15 in 1992 and 1995, respectively). Support or opposition is not exactly the same as support or opposition to a number of more specific types of political changes or issues currently relevant to these post-Soviet societies. However, reform is more abstract and primarily represents support for rapid (rather than slow) change and does not reflect support for any particular type of change (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1995).
of a broader self-efficacy which leads to a greater sense of individualism.

Among Russians and Lithuanians, opposition to communists continues to be related to support for an individual opportunities society, whereas support for communists promotes support for greater state responsibility. Given that Russians have recently become more positive toward communists while Lithuanians became more negative helps explain the difference in the level of support for state responsibility observed for these two countries. This is especially important because support for communists is the single strongest predictor in the Russian regression. Support for democratic reformers or democratic values, on the other hand, failed to reach significance except for Lithuania. The zero-order correlations between these variables and locus of responsibility ranged from .15 to .21, but this association is primarily indirect, acting through some of the other variables in the equation (although it should be noted that the signs of the coefficients are positive, as we hypothesized). In short, the connection between support for democratic values and support for an opportunities society is very weak at best, but other political attitudes (evaluations of communists and exclusive nationalism) are significant predictors of locus of responsibility.

Among the predictors listed under the economic variables, the strong impact of concern about one’s personal financial situation confirms a similar finding from our earlier reassessment. Again, contrary to what is often found in Western nations, evaluations of the national economy had no significant effect on locus of responsibility attitudes. Also, the exceptionally strong impact of personal finances in Lithuania helps explain why there was relatively little change in locus of responsibility between 1992 and 1995 (the increased negative assessment here, which promotes state responsibility, offsets the change in ratings of communists which promote individual responsibility).

Even more telling is the strong effect of attitudes toward privatization and social justice especially for Russia and Ukraine. These variables are far more important than the measure of personal economic situation confirms a similar finding from our earlier reassessment. Again, contrary to what is often found in Western nations, evaluations of the national economy had no significant effect on locus of responsibility attitudes. Also, the exceptionally strong impact of personal finances in Lithuania helps explain why there was relatively little change in locus of responsibility between 1992 and 1995 (the increased negative assessment here, which promotes state responsibility, offsets the change in ratings of communists which promote individual responsibility).

Our data consistently and strongly support these expectations. These findings do not preclude the possibility that at the end of the 1980s there were some specific Soviet republics where the elite may have favored socialism more so than did the lower classed citizens. For example, this may have been the case in the less well developed, Asian parts of the Soviet Union where the elite segments of the population may have personally benefited more from socialism than did the working class. However, lacking any Asian republics, our data do not provide a direct test of this hypothesis.

The evidence does demonstrate, however, that political and economic views among post-Soviet citizens are consistently, but not strongly, related. Those expressing stronger preferences for democratic principles and relatively more positive assessments of democratic reformers are also relatively more supportive of capitalistic norms and an opportunities society. The fact that a stronger relationship is not present is perhaps better for the future consolidation of democracy. Setting aside questions of causality, democracy could have suffered a major setback in these countries during recent years if this correlation were stronger. After all, the 1992 and 1995 comparisons reveal a substantial deterioration in support for an opportunities society while support for democratic principles remains relatively high.

While support for a state guarantees versus an opportunities society was more strongly related to economic than political factors, the impact of economics was not simply a matter of pocketbook concerns. More ideological and normatively based attitudes regarding state ownership of property, and equality in the distribution of
wealth and power across social categories, were also very important predictors of locus of responsibility preferences, even after controlling for personal economic conditions and material self-interest.

Beyond these conclusions we would hope that this exchange has increased the saliency of various broader issues that are relevant to the comparative study of politics. Finifter has clearly called attention to concerns regarding what constitutes comparability in empirical studies across cultures or across time. To what extent must the study design, the samples, and the measurement instruments be exactly the same for any comparison of cross-cultural findings to be valid? These important and relevant questions must be adequately addressed by every comparative research project if the study of comparative politics is to advance as a field. Furthermore, we have pointed out the potential power of comparative studies for theory building. Testing hypotheses across cultures and across time may not provide the definitive answer to every specific research question, but it should help in developing more generalizable and dynamic theories of social and political relations.

APPENDIX

The questions used in the analysis are grouped below by index. Each index was computed as a simple additive measure after assuring that all items were coded in the same substantive direction.

AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM

Q56 How favorable or unfavorable are your feelings toward the army? (1 = Very Negative, 7 = Very Positive)
Q117 Our society is made up of many different kinds of people. I would like to find out how much you have in common (share their ideas, interests, their outlook on different events) with Russian Nationalists. (1 = Great Deal, 4 = Nothing)
Q133 Please tell me if Russian Nationalists have too much, too little or the right amount of influence on society and politics. (1 = Too Much, 3 = Right Amount)
Q138 Some people say that spending money on Russia's army should be significantly cut back. Others believe that defense spending needs to be greatly increased. (1 = Spending Sharply Decreased, 7 = Spending Sharply Increased)
Q147 Russia has always given other countries more than it got in return. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)
Q150 The Russian government should use force, if necessary, to preserve the unity and integrity of the Russian state. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)

EXCLUSIONARY NATIONALISM

Q91 Some people say that Ukrainians and Russians have a completely different history, culture and language. And yet others argue that Ukrainians and Russians have the same basic history, culture and language. (1 = Completely Different, 2 = Something in Common but Not Much, 3 = Basically the Same)
Q92 Do you think that only those who speak Russian should have the right to work in official (state) establishments of the Russian Federation? (1 = Yes, 2 = No)
Q98 Do you think that refugees from other countries who are now living in Russia should go home or is it all right with you if they stay indefinitely? (1 = Should Go Home, 2 = Can Stay Indefinitely)
Q101 Who should have the right to vote? (1 = Only People of Russian Nationality, 2 = Only People Born in Russia, 3 = Only People Who Lived in Russia at the Time the Soviet Union Fell in 1991, 4 = Anyone Currently Residing in Russia)

Q102 How often are Russian people living in Non-Russian republics of the former USSR discriminated against? (1 = Very Often, 2 = Sometimes, 3 = Rarely, 4 = Never)

OPPOSE COMMUNISTS

Q54 How favorable or unfavorable are your feelings toward the Communist Party of the Russian Federation? (1 = Very Negative, 7 = Very Positive)
Q114 How much do you have in common (share their ideas, interests, their outlook on different events) with Communists? (1 = Great Deal, 4 = Nothing)
Q130 Please tell me if Communists have too much, too little or the right amount of influence on society and politics. (1 = Too Much, 3 = Right Amount)
Q135 To what extent would you say you think of yourself as a Soviet? (1 = A Great Deal, 2 = Somewhat, 3 = Very Little, 4 = Not At All)

SUPPORT DEMOCRATS

Q63 How favorable or unfavorable are your feelings for democratic reformers? (1 = Very Negative, 7 = Very Positive)
Q85 Is democratization dangerous for our society? (1 = No Danger, 7 = Highest Danger)
Q116 How much do you have in common (share their ideas, interests, their outlook on different events) with democratic reformers? (1 = A Great Deal, 4 = Nothing)
Q132 Please tell me if democratic reformers have too much, too little or the right amount of influence on society and politics. (1 = Too Much, 3 = Right Amount)

DEMOCRATIC VALUES

Q157 Compromise with one's political opponents is dangerous, since it usually leads to changing one's own position. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)
Q46 Participation of the people is not necessary if decision-making is left in the hands of a few trusted, competent leaders. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)
Q50 Any individual or organization has the right to organize opposition or resistance to any governmental initiative. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)
Q51 Competition among many political parties will make the political system stronger. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)
Q52 The government has the responsibility to see that the rights of all minorities are protected. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)

PERSONAL FINANCES: PAST

Q5 Would you say that you and your family (living here) are much better off, somewhat better off, about the same, somewhat worse off or much worse off economically compared to one year ago? (1 = Much Better Off, 2 = Somewhat Better Off, 3 = About the Same, 4 = Somewhat Worse Off, 5 = Much Worse Off)

PERSONAL FINANCES: FUTURE

Q7 Do you think that a year from now you and your family will be much better off economically, somewhat better off, about the same, somewhat worse off or much worse off? (1 = Much Better Off, 2 = Somewhat Better Off, 3 = About the Same, 4 = Somewhat Worse Off, 5 = Much Worse Off)

PRIVATIZATION

Q13 Please tell me whether in your opinion, the government, the employees or private individuals should own former kolchoz & sovkhoz property (farms and farmland)? (1 = Government, 2 = Employees, 3 = Private Individuals)
Q14 Please tell me whether in your opinion, the government, the employees or private individuals should own large industry. (1 = Government, 2 = Employees, 3 = Private Individuals)

Q15 Please tell me whether in your opinion, the government, the employees or private individuals should own local businesses like restaurants. (1 = Government, 2 = Employees, 3 = Private Individuals)

Q62 How favorable or unfavorable are your feelings for private enterprises? (1 = Very Negative, 7 = Very Positive)

SOCIAL JUSTICE

Q45 There should be a mechanism regulating income such that no one earns very much more than others. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)

Q81 Is the growth of economic inequality among citizens dangerous for society, that is, does it lead toward destabilization in our country? (1 = No Danger, 7 = Highest Danger)

Q126 Please tell me if businessmen have too much, too little or the right amount of influence on society and politics. (1 = Too Much, 2 = Too Little, 3 = Right Amount)

Q131 Please tell me if rich people have too much, too little or the right amount of influence on society and politics. (1 = Too Much, 2 = Too Little, 3 = Right Amount)

Q163 Do you think rich people receive too much, too little or the right amount of government support? (1 = Too Little, 2 = About the Right Amount, 3 = Too Little)

Q168 Do you think businessmen receive too much, too little or the right amount, or too little government support? (1 = Too Little, 2 = About the Right Amount, 3 = Too Little)

REFERENCES


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