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Conceptions of Democracy Among Mass and Elite in Post-Soviet Societies

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What do citizens and political leaders have in mind when they think about democracy? This article deals with the relationship between different conceptions of democracy and the level of support for democracy among both ordinary citizens and political elites in two post-Soviet countries, Russia and Ukraine.

Data collected through personal interviews in 1992 and 1995 reveal that the mass and elite in these post-socialist countries hold different conceptions of democracy. The elite tend to emphasize law and order and the rule of law, whereas the citizens stress freedoms in their understanding of democracy. Involvement in politics, especially in a political party, has a significant influence on the meaning of democracy as well as on the consistency among attitudes reflecting support for democratic principles. Different conceptions of democracy are also found to affect the perceived extent to which the current regime fits with the individual's idea of what a democracy should be like.

A burgeoning literature is charting the level of popular support for democratic principles in the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.¹ The theoretical justification for monitoring popular support for democratic values rests on the assumption that this support is a crucial factor

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¹ See for example, Russell Dalton, 'Communists and Democrats: Democratic Attitudes in the Two Germanies', *British Journal of Political Science*, 24 (1994), 469–93; Jeffrey Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture', *British Journal of Political Science*, 21 (1991), 393–421; Ada Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, 'Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change', *American Political Science Review*, 86 (1992), 857–74; James Gibson, Raymond Duch and Kent Tedin, 'Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union', *Journal of Politics*, 54 (1992), 329–71; David Mason, 'Attitudes Towards the Market and the State in Post-Communist Europe' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Phoenix, Arizona, 1992); James Gibson and Raymond Duch, 'Emerging Democratic Values in Soviet Political Culture', in Arthur H. Miller, William M. Reisinger and Vicki L. Hesli, eds, *Public Opinion and Regime Change: The New Politics of Post-Soviet Societies* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993); Mary E. McIntosh, Martha Abele MacIver, Daniel G. Abele and Dina Smeltz, 'Publics Meet Market Democracy in Central and East Europe, 1991–1993', *Slavic Review*, 53 (1994), 483–512; William M. Reisinger, Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli and Kristen Maher, 'Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and Implications for Democracy', *British Journal of Political Science*, 24 (1994), 183–223.

that will foster (or its absence will impede) the development of democracies in these countries.² More broadly speaking, this political culture approach to democratization argues that certain mass orientations, such as interpersonal trust as well as support for democratic values and institutions must be present in society before democracy can take root or become consolidated.³

The purpose of this article is not to dispute the basic assumptions of the political culture approach to democratization. Rather, it is to address two inter-related aspects of democratization that have been given less attention in the emerging literature on popular support for democracy in post-socialist societies. The first deals with the extent to which support for democracy is similar among ordinary citizens and political elites. Almost all of the previous studies of support for democracy in post-Soviet societies have focused on the mass citizenry only.⁴ While citizen support for democracy may be one of the critical factors needed for the successful development of a democratic system, it may be even more important to know if that support is similar for both ordinary citizens and political elites. In fledgling democracies, especially those emerging from seventy years of communist rule where representation and accountability were not mainstays of government, the ordinary citizens and the elite may think very differently about what democracy means, and what type of democracy would be best for their societies. A comparison of mass and elite beliefs about democracy would shed light on whether or not the leaders and ordinary citizens share a common political culture. Are their beliefs similar, and are the beliefs and preferences expressed by the mass and elite correlated with the same political and socio-demographic factors? According to some, the process of democratization would be smoother in societies where political leaders and ordinary citizens share a common understanding of what democracy means than in societies where the mass and elite hold different conceptions of democracy.⁵ This is crucial to understanding the development of democracy and a representational system. If the political changes occurring in these emerging democracies are initiated and institutionalized by the political leaders, it becomes important to know if the leaders are taking the new regimes in a direction supported by the citizenry, or if they are reforming the system despite what the citizens prefer.

The second aspect of democratization studies addressed in this article entails an examination of certain methods that have been used to gauge popular support

² Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972); Russell Dalton, *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1988).

³ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); Ronald Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', *American Political Science Review*, 82 (1988), 1203–30.

⁴ Some exceptions to this are starting to emerge. See, for example: Betty M. Jacob, Krzysztof Ostrowski and Henry Teune, *Democracy and Local Governance* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993); Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger, 'Comparing Citizen and Elite Belief Systems in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 59 (1995), 1–40.

⁵ Jacob *et al.*, *Democracy and Local Governance*.

for democratic values. Virtually all of the empirical investigation of popular support for democracy follows the same research methodology. This methodology involves devising a set of survey questions that reflect certain democratic principles – such as competitive elections, a competitive party system or freedom to criticize government – and then asking the survey respondents to indicate a positive to negative evaluation of each principle.⁶ The extent of support for these various principles thus reveals the overall level of support for democracy.

On the surface, this research approach appears reasonable and it certainly fits with measurement models applied generally in the social sciences. Nevertheless, there exist some potential problems that should be addressed. First, the approach implies that there is widespread agreement on the principles or characteristics that define a democracy. Those characteristics or values that the researcher selects for the survey questions are presumed to be the ones that citizens in the emerging democracies also see as relevant and important. Clearly, if the citizens in the emerging democracies have a different conception of democracy than does the researcher, then the measures of democratic principles may prove to be an invalid measure of support for democracy.⁷ Predicting the success or failure of democratization in these countries from the measures of democratic support would thus be subject to considerable error.

Secondly, the approach that is used when measuring support for democratic principles often involves selecting the survey indicators with factor analysis. Using factor analysis to select the items produces a set of measures that are similar in substantive content and distinct from other concepts. What factor analysis does not do, however, is demonstrate the extent to which the attitudes

⁶ Richard Rose and William Mishler, 'Reacting to Regime Change in Eastern Europe: Polarization or Leaders and Laggards?' (Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, No. 210, 1993), have objected to this approach by suggesting that it is more realistic to measure support for the current regime as compared to the former communist system, rather than measuring support for ideal democratic principles. Their argument suggests that some of the ideal principles may not apply to an evaluation of the current democratic regime. In part, this is similar to the argument made in this article. However, the argument here stresses the need for using principles and values that are relevant to the conceptions of democracy expressed by the people of the societies where democratization is being examined.

⁷ An example of how an invalid and unreliable measure of support for democracy could arise is as follows. Suppose that the citizens think about democracy as a form of government that will promote individual prosperity while controlling corruption and crime, but the researcher asks survey questions about support for competitive political parties, free elections and protecting minority rights. The respondent may answer the researchers' survey questions, but those answers may have very little to do with other modes of support for or opposition to democracy such as voting for an anti-democratic candidate or participating in an anti-democratic demonstration. However, if the researcher had measured support for democracy in terms of promoting economic opportunity or rule of law and protection of individual rights, they would have had a more valid and reliable measure because that is how the public understands democracy, and those terms would have been more relevant to (capable of predicting) their political behaviour. Because democracy is a complex, potentially multi-dimensional concept it is important that the researcher measure the most salient and relevant aspects of this concept.

are crystallized or consistently held from item to item.⁸ In other words, a majority of the citizens in the aggregate may support the various democratic principles, but these various norms and beliefs may not form a coherent democratic ideology.

Finally, scholars question whether citizens in countries dominated for decades by authoritarian rule have formed a coherent belief system that informs their political attitudes.⁹ Sceptics contend that the authoritarian systems did not provide sufficient political information or levels of mass and elite discourse for average citizens to form stable and meaningful opinions on political issues. These critics raise questions concerning the appropriateness of surveys with ordinary citizens as a method for studying the newly emerging democracies in the former Soviet bloc. While respondents may answer survey questions, these sceptics claim that they really do not understand abstract concepts such as democracy and that there is little coherence to their various political beliefs. Given this absence of informed political opinion, the citizenry cannot provide a stable foundation for the development of democracy. Others have argued that the situation in post-socialist societies since 1989 is one of territorial, ideological and political confusion and uncertainty.¹⁰ If this is accurate, we should find little shared understanding of abstract political concepts such as democracy or a market economy among the public in general, and at the individual level we should find little coherence or consistency in beliefs regarding democracy and a market system.

Each of the problems mentioned above poses a potentially serious limitation to the study of popular support for democracy and the broader study of democratization in terms of political culture. This article proceeds by examining each potential problem in turn. The meaning of democracy as articulated by political elites and ordinary citizens in Russia and Ukraine is examined first.

⁸ Factor analysis tends to emphasize differences between the magnitudes of the correlations among various sets of items rather than the coherence among the measures, especially when orthogonal rotation is utilized. That is, two sets of items could produce a two-factor solution because the correlations within each set are larger than the correlations across the sets. Yet, at the same time, the correlations within each set could be relatively low in absolute terms (for more on this, see J. Scott Long, *Confirmatory Factor Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983); Edward G. Carmines and Richard A. Zeller, *Reliability and Validity Assessment* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979). Therefore, when it comes to examining the coherence or consistency of attitudes on some particular topic, such as support for democratic principles, it is advisable to examine some measure of inter-item association in addition to the factor analysis.

⁹ For a discussion of these concerns, see Boris Grushin, Interview by L. Kononova, 'Problems of a Telephone Poll During the Day', *Kultura*, 11, 4 April 1992; Mary E. McIntosh and Daniel G. Abele, 'Conceptions of Democracy in a Changing Central and East Europe: The Political Reasoning of Attentive and Mass Publics' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Philadelphia, 1994); Miller *et al.* 'Comparing Citizen and Elite Belief Systems in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine'.

¹⁰ Including Ken Jowitt, 'The New World Disorder', in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds, *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 248.

Then we determine if these conceptions of democracy reflect ideals that are widely held in common by all segments of post-Soviet societies or if they reflect variation in background as well as current attitudinal and behavioural orientations. If similar ideas about the meaning of democracy, or support for democratic principles, are uniformly distributed across the mass and elite, we could conclude that these two sets of actors share a common political culture.¹¹ By contrast, variation across categories defined by demographics, policy preferences, level of political participation or involvement in a political party would contradict the shared political culture thesis while at the same time revealing those factors that shape or influence beliefs about democracy. Next we turn to an investigation of the connection between the saliency of democracy and the extent to which support for various democratic principles are internally consistent and form a democratic ideology. Finally, we draw out some implications of what the findings indicate about the current level of popular support for democracy in Russia and Ukraine, as well as for the future study of democratization.

The empirical evidence presented below derives from surveys conducted in the summer of 1992 and 1995 with both ordinary citizens and elites. The surveys of ordinary citizens involved face-to-face interviews with a cross-section of 1,300 Russian and 900 Ukrainian adults in 1992 and 1,700 Russians and 1,000 Ukrainians in 1995. The elite samples included two different sets of respondents: legislators from the national parliaments and administrators from the major governmental ministries. The 1992 Russian elite sample included eighty-seven legislators and twenty-five administrators for a total of 112 respondents, whereas the Ukrainian sample was comprised of fifty legislators and fifteen administrators for a total sample of sixty-five. The 1995 Russian elite sample included 125 members of the Russian parliament (ninety-five from the State Duma and thirty from the Federation Council), and seventy-five administrators. The Ukrainian elite sample for 1995 was made up of a hundred members of the Ukrainian Supreme Council (the parliament) and fifty high-level administrators. The legislators included in the study comprise a proportionate random sample drawn from all legislators who came from the districts which matched the places where the citizen samples had been selected. The administrators comprised a sample of all deputy ministers of the largest and most important government ministries. A more complete description of these surveys and samples is available from the authors.¹²

¹¹ See William M. Reisinger, Arthur H. Miller and Vicki L. Hesli, 'Political Norms in Rural Russia: Evidence from Public Attitudes', *Europe Asia Studies*, 47 (1995), 1025–42, for more on this argument.

¹² The mass samples, in each case, used a multi-stage probability approach. In the first stage, geographically based primary sampling units were selected across each country reflecting both urban and rural areas. In Russia, the PSUs were drawn only from the area west of the Urals. Later stages in the sample design were based on further subdivisions of the PSUs. Final selection of the respondent was made by selecting addresses from residence lists and then applying the Kish method for within household selection. No substitution was allowed. Some of the Russian parliament members

Before moving on, it may be helpful to remind the reader briefly of the historical circumstances existing in Russia and Ukraine at the time the surveys were conducted. Roughly six months prior to the 1992 surveys the Soviet Union collapsed, and the former Soviet Republics became independent countries. The speed and direction of reform was still a matter of political debate only six months after the collapse of communist rule. Among the Russian and Ukrainian citizenry, roughly six out of ten believed that reform was moving too quickly and slightly more than half negatively evaluated the political change that had occurred during the past year.

Yet for the parliamentary members who had been elected in the semi-democratic elections of 1990, the summer of 1992 was a period of relative calm. The short-lived, armed stand-off that occurred when Russian democrats defended the White House during the attempted coup of August 1991 was quickly eclipsed, as a topic of concern and conversation, by more pressing issues of relevance to both Russia and Ukraine, such as the speed of economic reform and who would control the nuclear weapons or the Black Sea fleet. Moreover, while the tensions between the Russian parliament and the presidency began to loom on the horizon towards the end of 1992, this opposition did not turn to armed conflict until the September–October crisis of 1993, well after the 1992 surveys were conducted. Towards the end of 1992 the Russian government decided to move rapidly towards a market economy and privatization. Ukraine, on the contrary, took a much slower approach to economic reform during the immediate post-Soviet period.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Russia and Ukraine experienced political reform that included institutional change in their parliamentary structures and the holding of new elections. The post-Soviet Russian parliament (the Federal Assembly) is composed of two chambers. The lower chamber is called the State Duma (450 seats), while the upper chamber is the 178 member Federation Council. In both the December 1993 and December 1995 Russian elections the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party embarrassed the democratic reformers by capturing more parliamentary seats than did the combined efforts of the parties led by the reformers.¹³

The communists made a similar showing in the 1994 Ukrainian elections held in March and April. These were the first general elections held after Ukraine became independent in 1991. The majority of the 5,833 candidates for the 450 positions of deputy to the newly revised parliament (the Supreme Council) ran

(Footnote continued)

interviewed in 1995 had been elected 'at large', thus they could not be sampled on the basis of a voting district that matched the location of the mass sample. Instead they were matched on the geographical location of their residence.

¹³ For more information on the outcome of these elections, see Darrell Slider, Vladimir Gimpel'son and Segei Chugrov, 'Political Tendencies in Russia's Regions: Evidence from the 1993 Parliamentary Elections', *Slavic Review*, 53 (1994), 711–32.

as independents (all legislators were elected from single-member constituencies). The election outcome gave the largest bloc of seats to the independents (40.2 per cent), but the leftist parties captured 36.3 per cent of the seats (the Communist Party alone gained 25.4 per cent of the seats). The pro-democratic centrist parties (most notably the Interregional Bloc for Reforms) and nationalist parties (especially Rukh, the organization that had led the movement for independence from the Soviet Union), received 8 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. Overall, the election results appeared to produce a parliament with a somewhat leftist orientation and a preference for moving slowly towards economic reform.¹⁴

THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY IN THEORY

Presumably people accept democracy because it is an effective mechanism for reaching an agreement and discovering the common good.¹⁵ Yet defining democracy remains an elusive task, as different scholars provide different meanings of the concept according to their ideological and professional backgrounds.¹⁶ Some of these definitions emphasize institutional and procedural aspects.¹⁷ Dahl's¹⁸ list of seven institutions – elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative information and the right to form independent groupings – is widely employed to categorize states into democratic and authoritarian regimes.¹⁹ Other definitions tend to give more emphasis to majority rule and the democratic values. For example, one definition that has survived the ages is that 'democracy is a form of government in which the people rule'.²⁰

In short, democracy can have different meanings with numerous implications for a variety of social values and institutional arrangements. The important

¹⁴ For more on the Ukrainian election, see Marko Bojunc, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March–April 1994', *Europe Asia Studies*, 47 (1995), 229–49.

¹⁵ J. J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourse* (New York: E. F. Hutton and Company (1762) 1950); James Madison, *The Federalist Papers* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

¹⁶ For more on how these definitions differ, see Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, 5 (1994), 55–69.

¹⁷ See, for example, Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971) and *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989); G. Bingham Powell, 'Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy', in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Ronald Inglehart, *Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

¹⁸ Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, p. 221.

¹⁹ Kenneth Bollen, 'Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 25 (1990), 7–24; Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang Reinicke, 'Measuring Polyarchy', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 25 (1990), 7–24.

²⁰ David Held, 'Democracy', in Joel Krieger, editor in chief, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 220.

question here is: to what extent are these democratic theorists' meanings of democracy reflected, if at all, in the notions of democracy held by citizens living in the societies experiencing transitions from authoritarian rule? Moreover, if democracy is to be 'rule by the people', then we would want to know if the political leaders – those who are actually formulating the institutions and procedures for these newly emerging democracies – have a conception of democracy that is similar to that expressed by the ordinary citizens. If there are major discrepancies between the meaning of democracy expressed by the mass and elite in post-Soviet societies we need to be concerned about the extent to which representation is actually occurring in these countries.

The evidence for comparing the meaning of democracy that is held by ordinary citizens and elites in Russia and Ukraine comes from responses to an open-ended question asked in the 1992 surveys (while this question was not repeated in the 1995 surveys, questions regarding democratic principles were asked in both years). This survey question was: 'There is considerable argument concerning the meaning of democracy. What does democracy personally mean to you?' The exact same question was asked of both ordinary citizens and elite respondents.

We know of no other similar survey data from the former Soviet Union asking both average citizens and national elites about the meaning of democracy. Two studies, however, have reported on the conceptions of democracy held by local political leaders in Belarus and Ukraine.²¹ While these local elite studies provide a starting point for some basic empirical expectations, they are, unfortunately, far too brief to offer much insight into the beliefs about democracy expressed generally by people in post-Soviet societies.

THE SALIENCE OF DEMOCRACY

Before turning to the types and distribution of answers given in response to the question about the meaning of democracy, it is instructive to examine the average number of responses as an indicator of how salient the topic of democracy was in 1992. By salience we mean the individual's awareness of the concept of democracy. We assume that an individual who has more to say about the meaning of democracy has a richer understanding, or more fully developed cognitions of democracy than an individual who has relatively little or nothing to say about the meaning of democracy.²²

Given the absence of any previous data on this topic from the former Soviet Union, we had no particular expectations about the average number of answers that the mass survey respondents would give to the question about the meaning

²¹ See Jane Grischenko, 'Belarus'; and Oleksandr Boukhalov and Serguei Ivannikov, 'Ukraine', both in Betty M. Jacob, Krzysztof Ostrowski and H. Teune, eds, *Democracy and Local Governance* (Honolulu, Hawaii: Matsunaga Institute for Peace, 1993), pp. 51–72 and 225–42 respectively.

²² For more on salience and political cognitions, see Richard Lau and David O. Sears, eds, *Political Cognitions* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1986).

of democracy. Nevertheless, previous studies comparing mass and elites do suggest that we should expect, on average, more responses from the elite than from ordinary citizens because of differences in levels of education and political involvement.²³ Moreover, contrary to what is suggested by those sceptics who argue that citizens of the former Soviet Union should have no understanding of 'democracy,' there are historical reasons why 'democracy' is not an unknown concept to the people of the former Soviet Union. For example, a particular concept of democracy was, in fact, part of communist philosophy. The Soviet Marxist perspective generally held that democracy is not present so long as one class dominates the others within a society. Thus, achieving true democracy requires, and is tantamount to, ending class domination and conflict, hence achieving communism. Soviet scholars and politicians claimed that their system of soviets, or councils, represented a higher 'democratic' status than could be found in Western bourgeois democracies.²⁴ They tended to criticize any formal checks on the power of the soviets (countervailing institutions, judicial review, etc.) as being anti-majoritarian. Also, starting in the early 1960s the Soviet government provided some limited opportunities for democratic participation among the citizenry.²⁵ In addition, as part of his *glasnost*' programme, Gorbachev called for more 'democratization' of the Soviet Union including multi-candidate elections, a permanent legislature and the creation of independent associations.²⁶ Given this past history we should expect, contrary to what the sceptics argue, that the mass public in Russia and Ukraine will exhibit at least some basic understanding of democracy.

As expected, the average number of responses to the question on the meaning of democracy was greater among the elite than among the ordinary citizens (see Table 1). Despite the differences in education or involvement, the Ukrainian elite gave a significantly higher number of responses than the Russian elite (60 per cent of Ukrainians as compared with 47 per cent of Russians gave two or more responses). This difference may reflect the relative degree of power and influence that Russia and Ukraine had in the Soviet Union, as well as which set of elites may have felt more repressed by the Soviet system.²⁷ A similar

²³ Philip E. Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics', in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press, 1964); Donald Granberg and Soren Holmberg, *The Political System Matters* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988).

²⁴ Roy A. Medvedev, *On Socialist Democracy* (New York: Norton, 1975); Alfred G. Meyer, *Communism*, 4th edn (New York: Random House, 1984), chap. 8.

²⁵ Jerry F. Hough, 'Political Participation in the Soviet Union', *Soviet Studies*, 28 (1976), 3–20); Raymond M. Duch, 'Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union', *American Political Science Review*, 87 (1993), 590–608.

²⁶ David Mason, *Revolution in East-Central Europe* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 44–8.

²⁷ The previous studies on local elites (see Grischenko, 'Belarus'; Boukhalov and Ivannikov, 'Ukraine') also found that Ukrainian local leaders were more likely than Belarus leaders to give responses to the question about the meaning of democracy. In Ukraine 16 per cent, as compared with 28 per cent of local leaders in Belarus, gave no responses to the question.

TABLE 1 *Number of Responses Given to the Meaning of Democracy among Mass and Elite*

Number of responses	Russia		Ukraine	
	Elite	Mass	Elite	Mass
0	3	25	8	29
1	50	42	32	49
2 or more	47	33	60	22
Total %	100	100	100	100
(n)	(112)	(1,303)	(65)	(901)
Mean number of responses	1.58*	1.20*	1.72*	0.98*

*Mass and Elite differences significant at $p < 0.01$.

Source: The University of Iowa 1992 Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys (PSCS).

difference does not appear, however, among the ordinary citizens. In fact, a smaller percentage of Ukrainians than Russians gave two or more responses, a point we return to shortly. Nevertheless, while the ordinary citizens gave significantly fewer responses than the elite, roughly three out of every four citizens gave at least one answer to the question. We could reasonably conclude, therefore, that democracy was a familiar and salient concept for a significant proportion of the post-Soviet citizenry, especially that quarter to one-third of the population that gave two or more responses to the question.

The concept of democracy was not equally salient, however, to all segments of the Russian and Ukrainian populations. But, the variation in saliency across subsets of these populations was not totally unexpected, although some surprises did emerge. Among the elite of both countries, administrators, those from urban environments, and the middle-aged gave slightly more comments than did the elite on average (see Table 2). None of these differences, however, were statistically significant.

Another factor that might have been expected to influence the salience and coherence of political beliefs, even among the elite, is attachment to and participation in a political party.²⁸ In addition to other functions, political parties act to clarify and articulate alternative positions on political issues, as well as providing a forum for the exchange of political views. Given this informational function of political parties, we would expect that those who are active in a party should hold more fully developed political ideologies.

As expected, Table 2 demonstrates that political leaders active in a political party (labelled high involvement) gave significantly more substantive com-

²⁸ Adam Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society* (New York: Free Press, 1992); Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participating Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

TABLE 2 *Average Number of Responses to Open-Ended Question on Meaning of Democracy*

	Russia		Ukraine	
	Elite	Mass	Elite	Mass
Total	1.58	1.20	1.72	0.98
Legislator	1.53	—	1.68	—
Administrator	1.76	—	1.87	—
Residence				
Urban	1.61	1.25	1.76	1.04
Rural	1.53	1.09	1.64	0.90
Age				
Under 30	—	1.16	—	0.98
30–50	1.60	1.25	1.79	1.12
50 +	1.52	1.15	1.66	0.83
Gender				
Male	1.58	1.28	1.72	1.05
Female	—	1.12	—	0.92
Education				
Less than secondary	—	0.83	—	0.72
Secondary	—	1.05	—	0.94
Some advanced	—	1.23	—	1.05
Higher degree	1.58	1.51	1.72	1.47
Political Involvement*				
Lowest quartile	1.50	1.11	1.65	0.87
Highest quartile	1.69	1.55	2.09	1.44

*For the elite we used membership in a party organization here, because all the elite are highly involved by any other measure. Low involvement for the elite represents those who were not members of any political party; high involvement indicates that the elite respondent was active in a party. *Source*: 1992 PSCS.

ments regarding the meaning of democracy than did those who were not party members (labelled low involvement). However, in 1992 the party systems in Russia and Ukraine were still in a nascent stage of development.²⁹ Only 39 per cent of the Russian elite, and 16 per cent of the Ukrainian, indicated that they were active in a political party. That level of activity, even among a set of individuals who are already highly involved in politics, was clearly correlated

²⁹ For a more elaborate description of the early party system, see William M. Reisinger and Alexander Nikitin, 'Public Opinion and the Emergence of a Multi-Party System', in Arthur H. Miller, William M. Reisinger and Vicki L. Hesli, eds, *Public Opinion and Regime Change: The New Politics of Post-Soviet Societies* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 168–96.

with an increased articulation of democratic tenets (see Table 2). Of course, this correlation does not demonstrate causality, but it certainly does support the theory that institutions such as political parties do promote greater issue articulation and ideological thinking. Nevertheless, except for partisan involvement there was little systematic variation in the saliency of democracy across various subsets of the elite sample. Moreover, the elite simply did not vary on those demographic factors, such as gender or education, that proved important when examining the number of responses given by the ordinary citizens.

A multivariate analysis of the number of responses given by the mass respondents, by contrast, revealed that gender, education and political involvement all contributed independently (statistically significant at $p < 0.01$) as explanations for the variation in the saliency of democracy among ordinary citizens.³⁰ Males, the better educated and the most politically involved, all gave above average numbers of responses (see Table 2). Given the impact of education on saliency and the fact that Russians are better educated than Ukrainians,³¹ it is understandable that Russians, on average, gave a slightly higher number of responses than did Ukrainians.

In general, the pattern of differences in the saliency of democracy across the various demographic categories presented in Table 2 is not unexpected. What is surprising is the level of saliency attained among the better educated and most involved segments of the mass public.³² The saliency of democracy among those ordinary citizens with a higher educational degree or a high level of political involvement is almost the same as that found for the political elite. Indeed, in Russia there is no significant difference between the saliency of democracy among these subpopulations in the mass public and the elite taken as a whole (see Table 2). This is very unexpected given previous work comparing mass and elites in Western democracies showing that elites have more fully developed political cognitions than even the highly educated or highly involved segments of the mass public.³³ The similarity in the level of saliency among the most involved citizens and the elite is particularly surprising given that this subgroup represents that 25 per cent of the public most engaged in politics and not just some small segment of the public. The relatively high level of saliency of

³⁰ The regression equations predicting the number of responses for Russia and Ukraine are very similar. Education and involvement are equally powerful predictors (significance of $t = 0.001$) while gender is much weaker but yet significant ($t = 0.02$). Age and urban or rural identities on the contrary are not significant. The adjusted R^2 for the equations are 0.10 for Russia and 0.13 for Ukraine.

³¹ The mean level of education for the Ukrainian respondents is 3.6 as compared with 4.5 for the Russians, where having only a primary education was scored 1 while earning a graduate degree was scored 9. By comparison virtually all of the elite respondents had a higher education diploma and about a quarter had a postgraduate degree.

³² The Grischenko 'Belarus' study of local leaders in Ukraine found an emphasis on freedom versus rule of law that is similar to what we find for ordinary citizens. Apparently the views of local leaders lie somewhere between those of national leaders and ordinary citizens.

³³ See Philip E. Converse and Roy Pierce, *Political Representation in France* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).

concerns about democracy among this group clearly reveals the powerful impact that participation in politics can have on an individual's ability to articulate abstract political concepts.³⁴

THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY: THE CITIZENS' PERSPECTIVE

While there may be considerable variation in the saliency of democracy across demographic and political categories of post-Soviet publics, this does not imply that there will also be considerable variation in the meaning of democracy. Indeed, if democracy is an 'ideal' type of government or political system with particular features that are widely recognized, we should expect little variation in the meaning of democracy across subpopulations. Likewise, we should expect little discrepancy in the conception of democracy articulated by the mass and elite in a given society where those two sets of political actors share a common political culture.

Contrary to these expectations, the empirical evidence reveals major differences between the meaning of democracy as espoused by the mass and elite (see Table 3; for the more extensive coding categories see Appendix I). The elite, relative to ordinary citizens, gave far more emphasis to democracy as the rule of law, whereas the masses emphasized freedom (especially freedom of speech, individual choice and freedom of beliefs). The elite also placed relatively more emphasis on responsibility for one's own actions and respect for the rights of others (see Table 3). Perhaps this emphasis on rule of law and responsibility articulated by the elite is understandable given that they are directly involved in creating the laws and institutions that provide the rule of law and that protect the rights and freedoms of citizens. A more cynical

³⁴ Unlike the elite questionnaire, the mass respondents were not asked to what extent they were active in a political party, thus this could not be correlated with saliency of democracy. The ordinary citizens were, however, asked if there was any particular political party that best represented their interests. This question is more similar to a party identification measure than a measure of party involvement. Nevertheless, those who indicated that some party reflected their interests also gave significantly more responses to the meaning of democracy question than did those who had no partisan tie. In Russia, those with a favoured party gave, on average, 1.51 responses as compared with 1.12 among those with no party attachment. The comparable numbers in Ukraine are 1.27 and 0.94. However, only 16 per cent of Russians and 15 per cent of Ukrainians felt that some particular party best represented their interests. Also, controlling on a level of political involvement almost completely explains the difference in saliency for partisan and non-partisan respondents.

There is one case, however, where the differences are not accounted for by level of involvement. Those respondents who indicated that the democratically orientated parties of Russia (Democratic Russia) and Ukraine (Rukh) best reflected their interests, gave even more responses to the democracy question than did the average partisan identifier. Democratic Russia and Rukh identifiers gave an average of 1.66 and 1.56 responses respectively. Apparently those citizens who identified with the political organization that had spearheaded the democratic mass movements in Russia and Ukraine had given more thought to what democracy was all about than had even the average highly involved citizen. These partisan identifiers, however, were a very small percentage of the population in 1992, as only 4.3 per cent of the Russian sample identified with Democratic Russia and 4.7 per cent of the Ukrainians identified with Rukh.

TABLE 3 *Conceptions of Democracy Among Elite and Mass in Russia and Ukraine, 1992*

Meaning of democracy†	Russia		Ukraine	
	Elite	Mass	Elite	Mass
Freedom	26*	38	26*	42
Rule of law	35*	16	39*	10
Responsibility	10*	4	16*	4
Majority rule	16	15	12	15
Improve society	2	2	3	3
Equal opportunity	4	6	4	5
Relations to economics	2	5	0*	7
Negative comments	5*	14	0*	14
Total % (n)	100 (162)	100 (1,412)	100 (99)	100 (830)

†See Appendix 1 for coding scheme that indicates fuller meaning of responses. Also, note that the distributions are based on a combination of the first two responses to the open-ended question of what democracy means, therefore the number of cases is greater than the sample size *per se*.

*Difference between mass and elite statistically significant at $p < 0.01$.

Source: 1992 PSCS.

interpretation of the results would be that the political leaders were merely reflecting the authoritarian orientation of the leadership cadres socialized under the former communist regime, thus their emphasis on social control. The public, by contrast, in emphasizing freedom appears to be giving more weight to that aspect of democracy that they were most lacking under the totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union.

The mass and elite were also quite different in the percentages making negative comments about democracy (see Table 3). The Russian and Ukrainian citizens have identical percentages expressing negative views of democracy (14 per cent) while none of the Ukrainian elite and only 5 per cent of the Russian leaders made negative remarks about democracy. Apparently the negative comments made by the Russian elite were an early indicator of the turmoil that eventually erupted in the parliament.

The relatively low frequency of certain types of responses in Table 3 is equally as noteworthy as those that are emphasized. Given the importance of equality as part of the communist ideology, it is very surprising that conceptions of democracy as a means for promoting equality or equal opportunity are not more prevalent in Table 3. Likewise, given that the post-Soviet societies are reforming their economic systems at the same time that they reform their political system, it is surprising to find relatively few individuals thinking of democracy as a means for promoting economic opportunities or the private ownership of property. The low incidence of comments of an economic nature raises questions about the extent to which the post-Soviet public perceives a

connection between economic and democratic reform. Some scholars argue that democratization and economic change go hand-in-hand while others suggest that there is no necessary association between the two.³⁵ While there may be a correspondence between market economics and democratic systems at the macro level, the responses to the question on the meaning of democracy suggest that at the individual level, for both average citizens and elites, there is little salient connection between beliefs about democracy and economic principles, an implication we return to again later.

In sum, when the most prominent meanings of democracy as expressed by the mass and elite are compared, there appears to be considerable similarity in their overall conception of democracy. Both the mass public and elites think of democracy as promoting freedom of expression, rule of law and majority rule (power of the people). Nevertheless, the differences in emphasis of meaning are large enough to suggest that the popular conception of democracy does not reflect a set of norms and beliefs that are enduring and widely shared by most post-Soviet citizens and political leaders. Moreover, the mass and elite differences suggest, presumably because they indirectly reflect differences in levels of education and political involvement, that beliefs about democracy vary across demographic and political categories rather than reflecting a shared common culture. If such variation is found, it would in turn imply that these conceptions of democracy may be relatively ephemeral and subject to change as a consequence of shifts in environmental circumstances, political conditions, issue preferences or participatory involvement.

To address this possibility we must look for variation in the meaning of democracy across subgroups of the mass and elite populations. Such an examination of the empirical evidence reveals that there is indeed systematic variation in the meaning of democracy across different subsets of both the elite and mass respondents. For example, Table 4 reveals that the elite from the urban areas of Russia and Ukraine were more likely to think of democracy in terms of rule of law, whereas those from rural areas gave relatively more emphasis to freedom. A similar difference is found between legislators and administrators. Legislators emphasize the rule of law while administrators give more weight to freedom. Systematic differences also emerge when the elite are divided by their orientation between who should be responsible for providing a job and a good standard of living for people: the government or individuals themselves. Those preferring more responsibility for the individual gave greater emphasis to freedom while those preferring government guarantees for economic well-being emphasized the rule of law (see Table 4).

³⁵ For a review of this debate see, for example, Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Raymond M. Duch, 'Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union', *American Political Science Review*, 87 (1993), 590–608.; McIntosh *et al.*, 'Publics Meet Market Democracy in Central and East Europe, 1991–1993'.

TABLE 4 *Conceptions of Democracy by Demographic and Attitudinal Measures: Elite Respondents*

Meaning of democracy†	Residence		Position			Responsible for jobs	
	Urban	Rural	Legislator	Admin.	Gov't	Indiv.	
<i>Russia</i>							
Freedom	22**	29	21*	40	21*	34	
Rule of law	40*	28	39*	27	41*	25	
Responsibility	12	8	10	7	13**	7	
Majority rule	15	18	18*	10	9*	22	
Improve society	4	1	2	5	2	3	
Equal opportunity	4	4	3**	8	3	6	
Relation to economics	2	3	2	3	2	3	
Negative comments	1*	9	5**	0	9*	0	
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(n)	(90)	(32)	(122)	(40)	(73)	(88)	
<i>Ukraine</i>							
Freedom	18*	33	22*	39	22*	36	
Rule of law	49*	36	45*	17	50*	21	
Responsibility	14	11	14*	22	12*	23	
Majority rule	12	14	13	11	13	10	
Improve society	4	1	3	4	1	4	
Equal opportunity	3	5	3	5	2	6	
Relation to economics	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Negative comments	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	
(n)	(21)	(51)	(73)	(26)	(40)	(59)	

†See Appendix 1 for coding scheme of specific responses.

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$.

Source: 1992 PSCS.

Given that trust in people is often seen as important for the development of democracy, we also examined the relationship between trust and the meaning of democracy (results are not included in Table 4). A significant difference was found only among the Russian elite (no systematic differences were found among either the Ukrainian elite or the mass publics in either country). On the one hand, the roughly 30 per cent of the Russian elite who were less trusting of others gave significantly more emphasis to rule of law meanings than did those who trusted others (41 per cent and 28 per cent respectively). The trusting, on the other hand, gave somewhat more emphasis to majority rule (18 per cent among the trusting, 11 per cent for the distrusting). Possibly, although this is rather speculative, those who were less trusting of others saw democracy as providing rules that would protect them from those that they did not trust. Overall, however, these data suggest that trust in others plays a less important role in the establishment of a democratic political culture than previously suggested.³⁶

We could speculate further on what lies behind the other differences in emphasis as well. For example, the emphasis that urban elites give to the rule of law may reflect a concern about rising crime and disorder, thus they are more likely to see the rule of law aspect of democracy as a mechanism for dealing with these problems. Likewise, those who want the government to be responsible for economic well-being may emphasize the rule of law when discussing democracy because they also see the establishment of laws and procedures as the best way of attaining what they want from a democracy. But, what is more important is that the conceptions elites have of democracy are not universal; they vary systematically across demographic and attitudinal categories.

Even more telling is the finding that similar variation in the meaning of democracy occurs among the Russian and Ukrainian mass publics. In both countries, those respondents who lived in rural areas, who felt that their economic condition would improve in the coming year, who thought that individuals should be responsible for their own economic well-being, who were relatively more involved in politics, as well as the better-educated (not included in Table 5), all gave relatively greater emphasis to freedom when discussing the meaning of democracy (see Table 5). By comparison, those from urban areas, those who were pessimistic about their future economic situation, those looking to the government to provide a good standard of living, those less likely to participate and the less well-educated all gave relatively more emphasis to the rule of law. In addition, these latter subgroups, with the exception of those from urban areas, were all more likely to make relatively more negative comments about democracy (see Table 5). A separate analysis for Ukraine (not reported in Table 5), also revealed significant differences between respondents from East

³⁶ Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*; Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture'.

TABLE 5 *Conceptions of Democracy by Demographic Attitudinal and Behavioural Measures: Mass Respondents*

Meaning of democracy†	Residence		Future economy		Responsible for jobs		Political involvement	
	Urban	Rural	Better	Worse	Gov't	Indiv.	Low	High
<i>Russia</i>								
Freedom	35*	43	49*	34	32*	42	36*	47
Rule of law	18*	8	10*	19	17*	12	18*	11
Responsibility	4	3	3	3	4	4	3	4
Majority rule	14	15	15	14	18	14	18*	12
Improve society	3	1	1	3	2	2	1	4
Equal opportunity	6	8	8*	3	3	9	2	9
Relation to economics	5	4	9*	4	5	4	7	3
Negative comments	15	18	5*	20	19*	13	15*	10
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
(n)	(1,008)	(284)	(261)	(569)	(457)	(460)	(551)	(612)
<i>Ukraine</i>								
Freedom	39*	49	54*	37	38*	47	37*	50
Rule of law	12*	6	4*	11	14*	7	14*	8
Responsibility	5	4	1**	6	3	5	3	6
Majority rule	19	6	15	15	15	14	20*	13
Improve society	3	3	2	3	3	4	1	4
Equal opportunity	4	4	7**	2	2*	8	1*	7
Relation to economics	6	9	13*	6	9**	4	7	4
Negative comments	12*	19	+4*	20	16**	11	17*	8
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
(n)	(518)	(255)	(97)	(413)	(304)	(311)	(343)	(357)

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$.

†See Appendix 1 for coding scheme that indicates fuller meaning of responses.

Source: 1992 PSCS.

and West Ukraine. Those in West Ukraine gave relatively more emphasis to freedom (50 per cent as compared with 35 per cent in the East) while East Ukrainians emphasized rule of law, responsibility, majority rule and negative comments (17 per cent in the East as compared with 10 per cent in West Ukraine gave negative comments).

Identification with a political party, while not significant for elites, had some impact on the particular beliefs about democracy emphasized by ordinary citizens. Those citizens who felt that their interests were represented best by some particular party gave greater emphasis to freedom and majority rule, and significantly less emphasis to negative comments about democracy than did non-partisans in both Russia and Ukraine (the differences were about 10 percentage points in each country). Party identification was thus not only associated with increased saliency of democracy, but also a more positive view of what democracy meant. Of course, it must be recalled that in 1992 the most prevalent parties, and those positively assessed by the public, were pro-democratic (the communists were rated negatively by six out of ten Russians and Ukrainians). The correlation between party identification and democratic beliefs, therefore, may reflect self-selection rather than the impact of participation in a party organization.

In summary, the empirical evidence reveals significant variation in the conceptions of democracy that are expressed by mass and elites in post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine. The meaning of democracy as promoting freedom is more prevalent among citizens than is the notion of democracy as providing the rule of law, or equality or majority rule. On the one hand, the freedom to express oneself without the fear of government repression is clearly the modal feature in the ordinary citizen's understanding of democracy. The elite, on the other hand, take democracy to mean order, restraint and legal institutions (rule of law and responsibility). Although the emphasis given by the elite is akin to the institutional characteristics stressed by Dahl's definition of democracy, it also tends towards the promotion of mechanisms for social control.

The difference in conceptions of democracy expressed by the mass and elite is not necessarily a 'problem' for the development of democracy. After all, freedom of expression as well as rule of law are both integral parts of a broader conception of democracy. The potential for a problem to develop, however, arises from the absence of a commonly shared understanding of democracy. If the current democratically orientated government leaders pursue policies that maximize one conception of democracy, but this is not the form of democracy preferred by a significant portion of the citizenry, negative public attitudes towards 'democracy' may result. Given that future governments are now formulated through the ballot box, anti-democratic political leaders could potentially exploit this negative public sentiment and gain legitimate control of the government. Indeed, these are exactly the fears that have been raised by the gains that the communists and ultra nationalists made in the 1993 and 1995 Russian parliamentary elections.

While the observed differences between mass and elite conceptions of

democracy are interesting in their own right, they are even more interesting because they show systematic variation across subgroups defined by demographic, attitudinal and behavioural categories. The implication of this variation is that people do not have a widely shared prototype of democracy in mind when they are evaluating the emerging political regimes in their countries. This also implies that public beliefs about democracy, during the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, may not have formed a tightly interwoven belief system or ideology.

A DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY?

It is not possible to determine to what extent Russians and Ukrainians held consistent (that is, highly intercorrelated or structured) attitudes towards democracy from the responses to the open-ended question about the meaning of democracy. However, this can be ascertained from a set of closed-ended questions regarding democratic principles that were asked of the elite and mass survey respondents in both 1992 and 1995. The exact wording for the questions can be found in Appendix 2. The five questions all form a single factor in a factor analysis that included these items and another set of five questions measuring attitudes towards economic reform which also formed a separate factor (see Appendix 2 for question wording). The items dealing with attitudes towards economic reform are included for purposes of comparing the level of constraint found with the democracy questions to some other set of survey items. In addition, the economic reform measures can be used to test for the hypothesized correlation between support for democracy and market reform. The magnitude of this correlation would also indicate the extent to which mass and elite preferences reflect a broader reform ideology that connects democratic and market orientations.

The specific survey questions used here to measure support for democratic principles were selected so as to reflect the major themes indicated by the responses to the open-ended questions about the meaning of democracy. Although none of the five questions regarding democratic principles referred to freedom of expression,³⁷ the items do deal with other aspects of democracy mentioned in response to the open-ended question. The five items refer to the need for leaders to compromise, the need for popular participation in politics even if the leaders are trustworthy, the right to organize opposition to government policies, the importance of competitive parties and the responsibility of the government to protect minority rights.

A clear majority of both elite and mass respondents preferred a pro-democracy position on all but one of the items regarding democratic principles

³⁷ The mass survey included a couple of questions dealing with freedom of speech and freedom of association but they were not included in the elite survey. Given that a mass–elite comparison is important for gauging the relative level of attitude constraint, these items were not utilized in the analysis presented here.

TABLE 6 *Support for Democratic Principles*

Democratic principles	Russia		Ukraine	
	Elite (%)	Mass (%)	Elite (%)	Mass (%)
<i>Political leader needs to compromise (Q42)</i>				
Strongly Agree	25	17	37	17
Agree	70	63	57	50
Pro/Con	1	10	1	23
Disagree	4	10	5	10
<i>Participation of people not necessary (Q44)</i>				
Strongly agree	5	12	3	16
Agree	24	44	28	37
Pro/Con	7	10	10	21
Disagree	64	34	59	26
<i>Individual right to organize opposition (Q49)</i>				
Strongly agree	13	12	23	13
Agree	59	47	61	46
Pro/Con	8	13	3	24
Disagree	20	28	13	17
<i>Party competition makes system strong (Q50)</i>				
Strongly Agree	22	14	35	16
Agree	61	39	53	40
Pro/Con	4	18	3	23
Disagree	13	29	9	21
<i>Government protects minority rights (Q51)</i>				
Strongly agree	26	42	32	41
Agree	56	50	60	45
Pro/Con	3	2	3	9
Disagree	15	6	5	5

Note: Response categories on disagree side have been collapsed for ease of presentation. For question wording, see Appendix 2. Also, all elite/mass differences are significant at $p < 0.01$.

Source: 1992 PSCS.

in 1992. When presented with the statement that ‘participation of people is not necessary if you have a few trusted competent leaders’ (Q44), slightly more than half of the mass respondents agreed, whereas a majority of the elite disagreed (see Table 6). This item appears to be tapping an authoritarian orientation that may be a residue of communist domination.³⁸ While a large majority of the 1992

³⁸ Reisinger *et al.*, ‘Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and Implications for Democracy’.

elite disagree with this item, approximately a quarter of the elite preferred that the public allow them to run the government with little input from the citizenry. The remaining items in the democratic principles subset reveal more congruence between the elite and mass than does the question about popular participation. Yet, even when a majority of both groups indicated the same preference, there were differences in the strength of those preferences. For example, 22 per cent and 35 per cent of the Russian and Ukrainian elite strongly agreed that party competition makes the system stronger, but only 14 per cent and 16 per cent of the mass respondents in those respective countries felt strongly about this belief. In general, however, democratic values were endorsed by a majority of both sets of respondents, thus confirming what had been previously found for at least ordinary citizens.³⁹ Furthermore, when these items are combined into a single index (with a range of 1 as low support for democratic principles to 20 as high support for democracy), making it much easier to assess change over time, it is evident that both the mass and elites express strong support for democratic principles. The elite express significantly more support for democratic principles than do the masses, but the differences are not huge. The index means for the Russian and Ukrainian ordinary citizens in 1992 were exactly the same (13.8), while the mean for the Russian elite was 15.1 and the Ukrainian elite was slightly higher at 16.6. Support for democracy among both average citizens and elites declined between 1992 and 1995. By 1995 the means on the democratic principles index were 12.9 and 13.1 for the Russian and Ukrainian masses respectively, whereas the comparable figures for the elite were 14.7 and 15.3. Apparently the recent resurgence of the Communists, especially in Russia, does correspond with a weakening of support for democracy and democratic principles. Nevertheless, the extent to which support for democratic principles has declined should not be overstated. Dichotomizing the index of democratic values at the midpoint of the scale reveals that as of mid-1995 slightly more than six out of every ten mass survey respondents, and an even larger percentage of the elites, in Russia and Ukraine expressed a pro-democratic preference (that is, above the midpoint of the index). Hence, it seems unlikely that post-Soviet citizens are ready to give up their newly acquired political freedoms and return to a more authoritarian political system.

At this point we could stop and conclude, on the basis of Table 6 and the 1992 and 1995 comparison, that support for democracy, despite recent declines, is alive and well in Russia and Ukraine, thereby confirming a number of previous studies. We suggest, however, that this would be an unwarranted conclusion if these attitudes on support for democracy are not only declining, but are also relatively inconsistent. To speak of relative inconsistency, however, requires a standard. Previous work has suggested two such standards: one is to compare mass and elite levels of consistency; the other is to compare the levels of constraint with different sets of measures. Previous studies of attitude

³⁹ Gibson and Duch, 'Emerging Democratic Values in Soviet Political Culture'.

consistency⁴⁰ reveal higher levels of attitude constraint among elites than among ordinary citizens.⁴¹ We also find this difference when comparing measures of attitude consistency for the five questions on democratic principles (see Table 7). The average inter-item correlation among the five items for the Russian and Ukrainian elite was 0.26 and 0.31 respectively in 1992, which is virtually the same as it was more recently in 1995 (0.25 and 0.29). The comparable correlations for the ordinary citizens in Russia and Ukraine were 0.18 and 0.21 respectively in 1992, and 0.14 and 0.17 in 1995. However, these correlations are significantly lower than those obtained with the five economic reform items. The 1992 average inter-item correlation using the economic attitude measures for the elite was 0.43 (there was no difference between Russians and Ukrainians), whereas for the mass publics it was 0.35 in Russia and 0.30 for Ukraine. The comparable 1995 correlations were about 0.39 for the elites and 0.28 for the average citizens. This higher level of consistency for the economic items is somewhat surprising given that, unlike the concept of democracy, there was no history of tolerance for or discussion of free markets and capitalism under communism. Thus, as Duch⁴² argues, we should have expected more consistency of attitudes regarding democratic principles than market reform.

Perhaps the greater degree of attitude crystallization (i.e., consistency) found with the economic items reflects the fact that people are experiencing the economic changes directly, whereas the political reforms are more abstract. Support for this interpretation comes from the finding that consistency among the five democratic principles items is much higher for those citizens most active in politics (about 0.26; 'about' indicating virtually no difference for Russia and Ukraine in either 1992 or 1995) than for uninvolved citizens (about 0.11). Moreover, among the most highly involved citizens there was yet an additional impact of partisan involvement. The constraint level among highly involved partisans was about 0.34 (actually 0.34 and 0.31 for Russia and Ukraine respectively in 1992, and 0.36 and 0.33 in 1995), while among the involved non-partisans the comparable measure of constraint equalled roughly 0.22 (little difference by country or year). This higher level of constraint among the very involved partisans was not a reflection of education either, as there was no difference in the education level of the highly involved partisans and non-partisans. This impact of partisan attachment was not found, by contrast, among the less involved citizens. But, a similar partisan effect was found for the elite. These results strongly suggest that parties, as an institution, do play

⁴⁰ For example, Converse. 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics'; Converse and Pierce, 'Political Representation in France'.

⁴¹ We report only inter-item correlations here as indicators of attitude consistency, however, we also computed Cronbach's Alpha for all of the comparisons. Alpha, unlike the Pearson correlation coefficient, is not affected by differences in item variance as it is a measure of consistent ordering of responses rather than covariance. The Alpha coefficients are not reported, however, because they gave virtually the same results as the correlation coefficients.

⁴² Duch, 'Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union.'

TABLE 7 *Support for Market Reform*

Economic issues	Russia		Ukraine	
	Elite (%)	Mass (%)	Elite (%)	Mass (%)
<i>Should state guarantee work? (Q72)</i>				
Government guarantee	11	36	3	39
Neutral	30	30	34	26
Individual responsible	59	34	63	35
<i>Pursue economic reform despite hardship (Q45)</i>				
Agree	74	56	78	45
Neutral	4	11	6	22
Disagree	22	33	16	31
<i>Evaluation of private enterprises (Q30)</i>				
Negative	15	46	11	47
Neutral	34	26	29	31
Positive	51	28	60	22
<i>Regulate equality of income (Q43)</i>				
Agree	23	34	11	33
Pro/Con	5	7	3	17
Disagree	72	59	86	50
<i>Influence of businessmen (Q66)</i>				
Too much	21	48	29	52
About right	30	28	59	25
Too little	49	24	12	23

Note: For question wording, see Appendix 2. All elite/mass differences significant at $p < 0.01$.

Source: 1992 PSCS.

an important role in promoting the development of consistent policy views among those who are most involved in politics,⁴³ but a partisan orientation alone is not sufficient to promote attitude consistency.

Having a more fully developed understanding of democracy also influences the consistency level, even among the elite. The constraint level for Russian political leaders who gave none or only one answer to the 1992 question on the meaning of democracy is 0.20, whereas it reaches 0.38 among those who gave

⁴³ While these correlations do not demonstrate causality, the evidence strongly suggests that the organizational activity associated with party membership among these already highly involved individuals is indeed the explanation for this higher level of constraint. Of course, the opposite causal ordering would suggest that self-selection into party membership by the most highly consistent explains the difference.

TABLE 8 *Inter-Item Correlations*

	Russia		Ukraine	
	Elite	Mass	Elite	Mass
<i>Correlations among democracy items</i>				
Total sample	0.26	0.18	0.31	0.21
<i>Meaning of democracy</i>				
0–1 response	0.20	0.13	0.27	0.11
2 + responses	0.38	0.29	0.42	0.30
<i>Involvement</i>				
Low	—	0.11	—	0.10
High	0.26	0.26	0.31	0.27
<i>Party attachment</i>				
Non-partisan	0.22	0.15	0.24	0.17
Partisan	0.36	0.30	0.39	0.33
<i>Correlation between democracy and economic orientation</i>				
Total sample	– 0.32	0.23	– 0.03	0.14
<i>Meaning of democracy</i>				
0–1 response	– 0.31	0.15	– 0.43	0.07
2 + responses	0.18	0.30	0.12	0.18
<i>Party attachment</i>				
Non-partisan	– 0.11	0.17	– 0.08	0.19
Partisan	0.09	0.41	0.10	0.28

Source: 1992 PSCS.

two or more responses (see Table 8). The comparable consistency levels for the Ukrainian elite were 0.27 and 0.42. Similar differences were found among ordinary citizens as well. Those who gave more than one response to the meaning of democracy question exhibited significantly higher levels of constraint than did those giving only one or no response. This difference persists even after controlling for education. However, it must be recalled that only about a quarter of the mass respondents gave more than one response. Clearly, the consistency among attitudes in support of democratic values depends heavily on the extent to which the individual has thought about the concept of democracy.

The extent of thinking about democracy also has an impact on the degree to which support for democratic principles and support for a free market economy are associated at the individual level. But, this impact, at least among the 1992 elite, was less than straightforward. While a majority of the 1992 elite favoured

a market economy (means of 12.5 and 13.5 for Russia and Ukraine respectively on a scale that ranged from 1 as low support and 20 as high support for a market economy), the mass respondents were evenly divided in their support or opposition to a free market (comparable means of 10.1 and 9.9). By 1995, however, support for market reform had declined sharply among both the masses and the elite. The 1995 elite means on the market reform index are 10.6 and 10.7 for Russia and Ukraine respectively. The comparable means for ordinary citizens are 8.6 and 8.8. In the aggregate, therefore, public attitudes towards the market had shifted considerably more between 1992 and 1995 than attitudes towards democratic principles shifted. Given that both sets of attitudes had changed in the same direction, however, does suggest a positive correlation between orientations towards democracy and marketization.

Among the 1992 political elite, however, there was virtually no correlation between support for democracy and support for economic reform (the correlation was -0.02 for the Russian elite and -0.03 for the Ukrainian elite, see Table 8). In short, the most pro-democratic elite in 1992 were no more or no less likely to prefer a market economy than were the least pro-democratic leaders. But remember, almost all of the elite (85 per cent) were pro-democratic.

Nevertheless, the correlation between support for a market economy and democracy was greatly affected by the extent to which the elite had thought about the meaning of democracy. Among those who had a more developed understanding of democracy (indicated by giving two or more responses to the open-ended question on the meaning of democracy) the correlation is a positive 0.18 in Russia and 0.12 in Ukraine (see Table 8). Among those leaders with a lesser developed understanding of democracy, by contrast, the comparable correlations are -0.31 and -0.43 . The positive correlations found for the better informed are expected and readily interpretable.

Yet the negative correlations in 1992 are somewhat of a puzzle, as they indicate that strong support for democratic principles was significantly associated with preferences for a controlled economy. The negative correlations are made more understandable, however, by investigating what these particular members of the elite meant by democracy. Most of these elite members gave heavy emphasis to the rule of law and responsibility for personal actions when defining democracy. In brief, they saw democracy as involving more control of the masses, a belief that would correspond to support for a controlled economy as well. Hence, these elite respondents could support the broad principles of democracy reflected in the structured questions, but their responses to the open-ended question revealed that cognitively they understood democracy to be much more orientated towards social control than did those who had a more fully developed understanding of democracy.

The 1993 Ukrainian and 1994 Russian parliamentary elections, however, brought into office a whole new set of leaders. This turnover in leadership produced a set of leaders that was more like the citizenry in outlook on both democratic principles and economic reform. It is not surprising, therefore, that the correlations between elite support for democracy and a market economy

found in 1995, relative to 1992, are more similar to those found for the population in general (0.23 and 0.22 for the Russian and Ukrainian elite respectively).

The correlations between support for democratic and market principles are simply much more straightforward among the ordinary citizens than among the elite. First and foremost, the data confirm what others had previously found,⁴⁴ namely, a statistically significant but very modest correlation between attitudes towards democracy and support for a market economy (a correlation of 0.23 and 0.14 for Russia and Ukraine respectively in 1992 and a comparable 0.14 and 0.20 in 1995). The strength of this correlation, however, was not consistently influenced by such factors as level of involvement or education. In fact, for both Russia and Ukraine the size of the correlation was slightly (although not significantly) lower among the better educated. The only factors that did have a consistent impact on the magnitude of the correlation between democratic and market orientation are the richness of cognitions regarding democracy (i.e., the number of responses given to the open-ended question) and partisanship. Among those citizens who were better informed about democracy in 1992 (gave two or more responses to the question on the meaning of democracy) economic and democratic orientation were correlated at 0.30 and 0.18 in Russia and Ukraine respectively (see Table 8), whereas the comparable correlations among those with a less well-developed understanding of democracy (0 or 1 response on the meaning of democracy) are 0.15 and 0.07. In short, a reform ideology that combines support for both democracy and a market economy is somewhat more likely to develop among those citizens who have a richer understanding of what democracy means.

The impact of a partisan attachment on the formation of a reform ideology, however, is even greater than that found with the richness of cognitions about democracy. In both Russia and Ukraine, those who identified with a party were consistently more in favour of both democracy and a market economy or consistently more opposed to both (correlations of 0.41 and 0.28 in Russia and Ukraine respectively in 1992; 0.29 and 0.27 in 1995) than were those who did not identify with a party (correlations of 0.17 and 0.19 in Russia and Ukraine in 1992; 0.08 and 0.12 in 1995). Moreover, these differences held regardless of level of education or involvement. The implication of this result is that among ordinary citizens partisanship promotes a consistent reform ideology, even if in many cases that ideology may not have a pro-market orientation (recall that in 1992 half of the citizens were opposed to a market economy, a figure that approaches two-thirds by 1995). The correlation does suggest, however, that maintaining or increasing support for democracy will likewise result (albeit rather weakly) in maintaining or increasing support for a market economy. Of

⁴⁴ Gibson and Duch, 'Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union'; Duch, 'Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union'.

TABLE 9 *The Perceived Extent to Which the Current Regime Fits With the Individual's Idea of a Democracy*

Meaning of democracy	Russia		Ukraine	
	Fits a great deal or somewhat	Very little or not at all	Fits a great deal or somewhat	Very little or not at all
Freedom (%)	59	41	48	52
Rule of law (%)	38	62	28	72
Responsibility (%)	56	44	42	58
Majority rule (%)	41	59	47	53
Improve society (%)	25	75	45	55
Equal opportunity (%)	41	59	34	66
Relation to economics	29	71	31	69
Negative comments	24	76	26	74
Total sample (%) (n)	48 (430)	52 (494)	41 (249)	59 (364)

Source: 1992 PSCS.

living up to those principles? Because democracy rests on the consent of the governed, it depends on popular legitimacy much more than other forms of course, this correlation also implies that a drop in support for a market economy will be associated with a corresponding slight drop in support for democracy. Apparently this is exactly what occurred between 1992 and 1995.⁴⁵

LINKING THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY WITH PERCEIVED DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE

At this point we can return to an argument made by Rose and Mishler,⁴⁶ among others.⁴⁷ These scholars of democratization ask what is more important to the success or failure of democratic transitions and consolidation: that the citizenry support the principles of democracy or that they perceive the current regime as

⁴⁵ A separate analysis also suggests that the shifting economic attitudes, particularly those regarding growing economic inequality, are a major factor in the resurgence of the Communists. For more on this, see Arthur H. Miller, William M. Reisinger and Vicki L. Hesli, 'Understanding Political Change in Post-Soviet Societies: A Further Commentary on Finifter and Mickiewicz', *American Political Science Review*, 90 (1996), 153–66. Also, in 1995 ratings of the Communists were much more strongly correlated with attitudes towards the market (0.44 and 0.24 in Russia and Ukraine) than attitudes towards democracy (0.05 and 0.07).

⁴⁶ Rose and Mishler, 'Reacting to Regime Change in Eastern Europe: Polarization or Leaders and Laggards?'

⁴⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Larry Diamond, 'Three Paradoxes of Democracy', in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds, *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 95–107; Seymour Martin Lipset, 'The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited', *American Sociological Review*, 59 (1994), 1–22; Stephen Whitefield, 'Social Responses to Reform in Russia', in D. Lane, ed., *Russia in Transition* (London: Longman, 1995), pp. 124–45.

government. That legitimacy, according to Lipset,⁴⁸ is best gained through prolonged effective government performance and the extent to which it satisfies the basic needs of the population and key power groups.

In short, while 60 per cent of the citizenry may support the principles of democracy, if they believe that the present regime is not fulfilling their expectations of that ideal democracy, then they will be less supportive of the current attempts at democratization. To what extent did the citizens of Russia and Ukraine perceive their current government as fitting with their notions of what a democracy should be like? In Russia, fewer than half (48 per cent) of the citizens thought that the central government in 1992 fitted with their understanding of a democracy 'a great deal' or 'somewhat' while 52 per cent said 'very little' or 'not at all' (see Table 9). By 1995 only 36 per cent of Russians felt that the central government fitted their image of a democracy. In Ukraine an even lower percentage of citizens in 1992 (41 per cent) and a comparable 37 per cent in 1995 felt that the government fitted their understanding of democracy a 'great deal' or 'somewhat'.

This perception of how well the government fitted with personal notions of democracy varied, however, by the particular meaning of democracy that each individual had in mind. For example, those who made negative comments about the meaning of democracy, not surprisingly, were also overwhelmingly negative in their assessments of the current regime's performance in both Russia and Ukraine. On the other hand, Table 9 also reveals that those Russian and Ukrainian citizens who thought about democracy in terms of various freedoms were more likely than the average citizen to see the government as fulfilling their expectations of a democracy. However, citizens of both countries who thought of democracy in terms of the rule of law – the meaning of democracy emphasized by the elite – were largely negative in their evaluations of the extent to which the current regime fitted their notion of a democracy. Similarly negative were those who focused on democracy as a system that would increase economic prosperity.

The analysis presented in Table 9 demonstrates that the individual's understanding of democracy is relevant to assessments of how well the government is perceived as fulfilling the expected norms of a democracy. This combination of information appears to be a more relevant and valid indicator of public support for democracy than asking only about support for democratic principles.⁴⁹ Clearly, if public support is an important ingredient for continued democratic reform in Russia and Ukraine, then it is fortunate, as Table 9 suggests, that so few citizens in these countries think of democracy in economic

⁴⁸ Lipset, 'The Social Requisite of Democracy Revisited', p. 8.

⁴⁹ The greater validity of a measure that combines the responses to the open-ended meaning of democracy and the assessment of how well the current regime fits with one's conception of a democracy can be determined from correlations with other criterion variables. For example, the 1992 mass survey contained ratings of Ruslan Khasbulatov, the Speaker of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies (RCPD) who was one of the leaders of the violent stand-off that occurred at the White House (the building where the RCPD met in Moscow) in September/October of 1993. The

terms. At the same time, Table 9 also suggests those aspects of democracy – freedom, responsibility and majority rule – where the current regimes are doing a better job of fulfilling the citizens’ expectations of a democracy. Given the evidence of Table 9, the leaders of these countries would be well advised to keep public attention focused on these three aspects of democracy while they try to improve their performance with respect to other popular conceptions of democracy, particularly the rule of law (which includes the notion of law and order) or the belief that democracy is a mechanism for promoting economic prosperity.

CONCLUSION

Popular support for democratic institutions and principles may be an important factor in the equation explaining the eventual maintenance and consolidation or failure of fledgling democracies. Yet, if support for democracy is not validly measured we may never be able to detect how important this support is to the process of democratization. Various types of democracies exist. Some may share characteristics in common while others vary. People also have different conceptions of democracy and the type of democracy that may be best for their society.

When measuring support for democratic institutions or democratic values it is important to determine if these particular institutions or values are relevant to the concept that the respondent has about democracy or what democracy may mean in the context of their society. The individual may give a positive response to the abstract value because it sounds like an appealing goal rather than because it is an integral part of an enduring, firmly held set of fundamental beliefs. Moreover, even if citizens firmly support liberal democratic norms, they may believe that the actions of the current regime do not fulfil those norms. Knowledge about both types of information are critical to predicting overall public support for democratization.

A more reliable and valid measure of support for democracy that could be

(Footnote continued)

study also included ratings of the ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Since both of these leaders are perceived as anti-democratic we should expect a measure of popular support for democracy to be negatively correlated with support for these leaders. As expected, we do find negative correlations between these ratings and three different measures of support for democracy: (1) the index of support for democratic principles, (2) the question concerning how well the current regime fits with the individual’s understanding of democracy, and (3) the multiple correlation for a series of dichotomous variables that reflect the rows in Table 9. For this last measure respondents were divided by the type of response given to the open-ended question and then assigned a code of ‘1’ if they both mentioned that particular meaning of democracy *and* said that the current government fitted with their understanding of a democracy ‘a great deal’ or ‘somewhat’. The resulting correlations are as follows: Democratic principles index, Khasbulatov – 0.08*, Zhirinovskiy – 0.04; Regime fits democracy, Khasbulatov – 0.23**, Zhirinovskiy – 0.15**; Meaning plus fits democracy, Khasbulatov – 0.29**, Zhirinovskiy – 0.19** (* $p = 0.05$, ** $p = 0.001$). While this is a rather limited test of validity, it does suggest that the second and third measures are more valid as indicators of public support for democracy than as a measure based only on democratic principles.

constructed for future studies, therefore, would start with an indicator of salience and the extent of understanding that the individual has of democracy. Next, it would have the individual evaluate how effectively the current regime fits with their conception of a democracy utilizing those aspects of democracy that they find meaningful. Finally, using the very same criteria, they could be asked to evaluate how effectively the last regime (or how some potential future regime or alternative set of leaders) fit these criteria. Admittedly, this approach to measuring support for democracy would be less efficient than the rating scales currently in use. Nevertheless, the approach would provide a far richer understanding of how the people in different societies conceive of democracy, and it may prove far more powerful in explaining the process of democratization.

The above analyses also hold substantive implications relevant to the process of democratization. The level of information and coherence of thoughts about democracy and democratic principles evident among the Ukrainian citizenry certainly disproves the sceptics who argue that seventy years of authoritarian rule left the average citizen incapable of forming meaningful opinions on political issues. Relative to the elite, the ordinary citizens of Russia and Ukraine exhibit more coherence of beliefs than is usually found in Western democracies.⁵⁰ However, they exhibit less constraint among attitudes regarding democratic principles than attitudes towards a market economy. This relative lack of a coherent democratic ideology suggests that beliefs about democracy do not yet form part of their basic value structure or deeply rooted political culture.

While a substantial majority of both mass and elite prefer democratic to authoritarian political values, these preferences are not firmly crystallized. Given this relative lack of structure among democratic beliefs, these preferences could shift dramatically in the face of continuing social and economic difficulties. Nevertheless, a commitment to democracy is more firmly fixed among those who have given more thought to the meaning of democracy and among those who are more highly involved in politics. Although they are a small segment of the population, these are the very people who would be most actively engaged in promoting and defending the emerging democratic political system.

The empirical evidence also reveals less connection between economic and democratic beliefs, especially among the elite, than has been suggested by earlier work. Only among those elite who had given a good deal of thought to the meaning of democracy was there a positive, albeit weak correlation between strength of support for a market economy and support for democratic principles. Among ordinary citizens, by contrast, a modest and positive correlation exists between support for democratic and market principles, thereby suggesting that democratically oriented political leaders could use pro-democracy symbols and messages to mobilize support for

⁵⁰ See Miller *et al.*, 'Comparing Citizen and Elite Belief Systems in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine', for more on this comparison.

economic reform. Given that more than half of the citizens in these post-Soviet countries are currently opposed to a market economy this mobilization effort is certainly necessary. In order to mobilize the citizenry by using democratic symbols the leadership must be able to communicate in a way that the citizens will find meaningful. The effectiveness of this communication, however, will be limited by the fact that the citizens and leaders have somewhat different conceptions of democracy. Moreover, the correlation between preferences on economic and democratic principles implies that if support for economic reform declines further, the public may also become less favourable towards a democratic regime.

While the analysis does not support the hypothesized impact of trust in people on democratization, it does suggest that the development of political institutions, such as political parties and civic organizations, could weigh heavily on the direction that support for democracy and a market economy take in the future. The end of authoritarian rule in the former Soviet Union was achieved without the involvement of mass parties, trade unions or other civic organizations that, many years earlier, played such a major role in coercing political democracy out of reluctant elites in Western Europe.⁵¹ These types of democratic mass institutions are only starting to develop in post-Soviet societies. Yet the above analysis strongly suggests that involvement with a political party was associated with greater coherence of political beliefs.

In particular, those citizens who identified with a democratically oriented party held more coherent views on democracy, were more positive towards democracy and democratic principles, and also were more supportive of a market economy. The directive for emerging democracies is clear – promote democratically oriented parties and citizen participation in these parties. While the prescription is clear, accomplishing this task will be a major challenge for the proponents of democracy, especially given the resurgence of the communists, the rise of ultranationalist parties and the proliferation of many small parties in most of the former republics of the Soviet Union.

APPENDIX 1

Question #8: There is considerable argument concerning the meaning of democracy. What does democracy mean to you?

- 01 FREEDOM (general category)
- 02 Freedom of speech/Expression/Press (opinions or views – outwardly directed)
- 03 Freedom of participation/Freedom to be involved
- 04 Freedom of individual choice (free actions, free will, liberty)
- 05 Freedom to evaluate events openly (any general event)
- 06 Freedom of culture/Cultural expression

⁵¹ See Richard Gunther, 'A Model of the Modern Elite Settlement', in Richard Gunther and John Higley, eds, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Robert Fishman, *Working Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).

- 07 Freedom from government repression (freedom to criticize govt./any govt. action), organize opposition
- 08 Freedom of beliefs/Ideas/Opinions (self-directed category)
- 96 *Glasnost* (more freedom, openness)

- 20 RULE OF LAW (general management of people and state – order, following the law; legality)
- 21 Not anarchy/Not disorder/Not boundless freedom
- 22 Protection of individual rights
- 23 Protection of international human rights (protection of Russians in other countries)
- 24 Action within the limits of law (change or actions in a specifically legal framework)
- 25 Equity before the law/Justice (elite not the exception)
- 26 Division of powers/Checks and balances
- 27 Sovereignty (local autonomy, local vs. national)

- 30 RESPONSIBILITY (honesty/decency)
- 31 Collective responsibility
- 32 Respect for other's rights/willing to co-operate, compromise
- 33 Respect for minority rights
- 34 Citizen duty
- 35 Responsibility for one's own actions/decisions

- 40 MAJORITY RULE (general election privileges/elections as important institution)
- 41 Individual less important than collective or nation
- 42 Power of the people
- 43 Active impact on the various processes of development (ability for ordinary people to influence/change govt.)
- 44 Multi-party system/party competition
- 45 No political parties
- 46 Strong political parties
- 47 Development of elite

- 60 TO IMPROVE SOCIETY/WELL BEING
- 61 Democracy as a process toward a specific goal (a set of procedures and policies, actions; not just empty words)
- 62 Solving problems
- 63 Trust
- 64 Newness (change, new vs. old)

- 70 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY/EQUALITY (ability to realize your ideas)
- 71 Equal right to property

- 72 VARIATION IN HARMONY
- 73 Peace/Brotherhood

- 80 RELATION TO ECONOMIC SYSTEM
- 81 Private property ownership (land reform, small business, home business)
- 82 Promotes entrepreneurship
- 83 Opposed to central planning (privatization of big business and industry)
- 84 Wealthy state (having products to buy, good roads, social safety net, social security)
- 85 Personal economic opportunities (right to earn a living, high standard of living, high wages)

- 90 NEGATIVE (general negative comments)
- 91 Anarchy/Total freedom and chaos
- 92 Does not exist (not what we have here)
- 93 We could never have democracy here (will never work here)
- 94 Legal nihilism (useless, senseless, superficial, legal terrorism)
- 95 Nothing (just empty words, it's a sham, does not concern/include me)
- 97 No substance in answer
- 98 Don't know/Can't tell
- 99 No answer/Refusal/Blank

APPENDIX 2

Index of Pro-Democracy Orientation

- Q42 I am now going to read you a number of statements. For each statement, would you please indicate whether you agree with each fully or partially or disagree partially or fully. 'A successful political leader will often need to compromise with his political opponents.'
- Q44 (same as above) 'Participation of the people is not necessary if decision-making is left in the hands of a few trusted, competent leaders.'
- Q49 (same) 'Any person or organization has the right to organize opposition or resistance to any governmental initiative.'
- Q50 'Competition among many political parties will make the political system stronger.'
- Q51 'The government has the responsibility to see that the rights of all minorities are protected.'

Index of Pro-Market Orientation

- Q72 Some people say the central government of Russia [Ukraine] should guarantee everyone work and a high standard of living, others argue that every person should look after himself. On this card is a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 signifies that the government guarantees everyone work and 7 that every person should look after himself. 'Which position corresponds to your views?'
- Q30 Now we would like to get your feelings towards certain groups using a five-point scale, where 5 indicates a very positive view and 1 a very negative view. You may use any number between 1 and 5 to tell me how favourable or unfavourable your feelings are for each group. 'Businessmen.'
- Q43 For each statement, would you please indicate whether you agree with each fully or partially or disagree partially or fully. 'There should be a mechanism regulating income such that no one earns very much more than others.'
- Q66 Some people think that certain groups in society have too much influence on life and politics in Russia and that other groups don't have as much as they deserve. For each group that I will now mention, please tell me if they have too much, too little or the right amount of influence. 'Businessmen.'
- Q45 (same as 43) 'Economic reform must be pursued, even if it means significant hardship for the people.'