

Grant's Secret Service: the Intelligence War From Belmont to Appomattox

ISSN 0003-4827

Copyright © 2003 State Historical Society of Iowa. This article is posted here for personal use, not for redistribution.

This work has been identified with a <http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/>>Rights Statement In Copyright.

Recommended Citation

"Grant's Secret Service: the Intelligence War From Belmont to Appomattox." *The Annals of Iowa* 62 (2003), 478-479.

Available at: <https://doi.org/10.17077/0003-4827.10743>

Hosted by Iowa Research Online

now standard school. His approach is not without controversy. Some may object to taking seriously Know Nothing politicians' pretensions to social and labor reform. Purists may likewise regret his rather anachronistic portrayal of the Know Nothing political style as "populist." Presentism may also be evident in the extended Ventura analogy. Nonetheless, Voss-Hubbard's meticulous attention to the Know Nothings' local roots and antiparty spirit offers intriguing insights on pre-Civil War political developments.

Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox, by William B. Feis. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002. xiv, 330 pp. Maps, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. \$39.95 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

Reviewer Douglas M. Paul is a Ph.D. candidate at Ohio State University.

Civil War historians have often recognized the importance of intelligence, yet they have rarely explored it beyond narrow studies of particular battles and campaigns or sensational accounts of behind-the-lines espionage. With the notable exception of Edwin Fishel (to whom this book is co-dedicated), few scholars have systematically examined the impact of intelligence on any facet of the war. William B. Feis changes that with *Grant's Secret Service*, an in-depth examination and evaluation of Ulysses S. Grant's collection and use of intelligence. Feis contends that determining "what a commander knew, when he knew it, and how he used what he knew offers a valuable—and perhaps more evenhanded—perspective from which to view the nature of command in the Civil War" (3). He applies that perspective to Grant with a chapter on each major battle or campaign, from Belmont in 1861 to Appomattox in 1865.

What emerges is a picture of a discriminating, confident, often daring mind committed to offensive operations and not overly concerned with the enemy's own plans—a recipe for military success. Grant possessed *coup d'oeil*, the ability to make sound decisions in the midst of chaos and to make sense out of uncertainty. Unlike some of his counterparts, who disdained the "secret service," Grant actively pursued intelligence and supported its gatherers faithfully. During the Vicksburg campaign, he used Grenville Dodge's network of scouts and spies to discover Confederate whereabouts and intentions. (Housed at the State Historical Society of Iowa, Dodge's papers provide ample opportunity for historians wishing to follow Feis's lead.) Facing Lee in the East, a more difficult task, Grant looked to the Army of the Potomac's Bureau of Military Information (BMI), created in

1863. The first official intelligence apparatus in the U.S. Army, the BMI provided key information—gleaned from Richmond spy rings, newspapers, and scouts—which Grant used to defeat Lee.

A lack of information could make a command inert and vulnerable, as in George McClellan's case. Grant realized early on that all generals, including the enemy, face this dilemma, but instead of endlessly waiting for perfect intelligence, he boldly took the initiative. He made mistakes. At Shiloh, according to Feis, it was Grant's belief that the Confederates were unable and unwilling to attack that led to the disastrous first day, not an intelligence failure. More important was Grant and the BMI's failure to discover and prevent Jubal Early's Shenandoah Valley raid in the summer of 1864. Feis argues that such miscues were often the result of general human failings such as the misperception and wishful thinking that afflict all judgments. More than mere exculpation, Feis illustrates the difficulties of generalship while demonstrating how Grant the man both persevered and excelled.

Feis's pioneering approach sheds light on Grant but precludes much contextual analysis. In other words, Grant is somewhat in a vacuum here. One hopes that Feis will undertake a scrutiny of the intelligence used by other Civil War generals—especially Robert E. Lee—for comparison. But with this portrait Feis challenges the view of Grant as the butcher of Cold Harbor winning only with superior numbers. The lens of intelligence shows Grant as a complex figure calculating with intellect and instinct. Despite Sherman's statement to the contrary, Grant really did "Care a Damn for What the Enemy Does Out of His Sight," to devastating effect (267).

Struggle for the Heartland: The Civil War along the Mississippi Corridor, by Joseph W. Foulke. Pittsburgh: Dorrance Publishing Co., Inc., 2001. 310 pp. Maps, notes, illustrations, appendixes, bibliography, index. \$23.00 paper.

Reviewer Terry L. Beckenbaugh is assistant professor of history at McNeese State University in Lake Charles, Louisiana. His research and writing have focused on Civil War general Samuel Ryan Curtis.

In *Struggle for the Heartland*, Joseph W. Foulke tackles a broad subject: the Civil War in the Mississippi River valley. Foulke argues that eventual Union victory resulted from events in the West, specifically the Federal conquest of the Mississippi River valley. He highlights Iowans' valuable contributions to the war effort, especially in the West.

Copyright of Annals of Iowa is the property of State of Iowa, by & through the State Historical Society of Iowa and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.