Towards a Rhetoric of Translation for the Postdramatic Text

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Towards a Rhetoric of Translation for the Postdramatic Text

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Performance or Representation?

One way for an outsider to appropriate or deterritorialize the expression of an adoptive or dominant language is to infiltrate it with a foreign symbolism, as did, for example, some literary members of the Prague School. Franz Kafka chose another way, “the way of dryness and sobriety,” which he imposed on the already impoverished German language of Prague (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 34-35). Kafka’s choice, like that of James Joyce in English and Samuel Beckett in French and English, succeeds, according to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in reterritorializing these languages by “oppos[ing] a purely intensive usage of language to any symbolic or even significant or merely signifying usage” (oppos[ant] un usage purement intensif de la langue à tout usage symbolique, ou même significatif, ou simplement signifiant) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 35). The potential relevance of this Deleuzean perspective on the “minor literatures” of early and mid-twentieth-century Europe was later reviewed and extended by scholars to postcolonial literatures, notably from the Arab world and the Caribbean (see, for example, Hallward, 2001; Burns and Kaiser, 2012).

For the literary translator, the question arises as to how she might approach the delicate task of migrating texts that resort

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1 In order to substantiate specific readings of source texts, this and all further translations of Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari (including any texts quoted by them), Mohammed Dib, and Martin Richet are my translations from the French editions, unless otherwise stated. I am grateful for the guidance of earlier translations, where available, and these are listed in the Reference List.
largely to “a purely intensive usage of language,” while acknowledging that such texts share a mode of expression that transcends historical or critical periodization (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 35). From the moment translation became a self-conscious act, discourse on translation has tended to be polarized between notions of source and target. Definitions of fidelity and equivalence have generally focused on the “meaning” of the source text and, by extension, on fidelity to the author’s “intention,” based on the assumption or premise that every act of writing arises from an intention to communicate something. In theories of translation the implicit focus of this communicative act on behalf of the writer has tended to be on its illocutionary force, that is, its intended effect on the hearer (or reader). On this basis, theories of translation have debated the relative importance of the source versus the target audience, while writers and poets through the ages have taken source texts as springboards for their own creative impulses.

A less common focus in translation has been the perlocutionary effect, that is, the un-intended effect of an utterance. And while in John L. Austin and John R. Searle’s speech act theory perlocution can be defined as an indirect speech act, or the effect of the speaker’s illocution (an effect that the speaker may or may not have intended, in the sense that it may or may not be at cross-purposes with what the speaker did intend), I appropriate the term here to posit the notion of the literary text as purely a surface expression, where the author’s putative intention to signify or represent is a subjective inference by the reader on the basis of contextual cues (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1975, 59-82). For Deleuze and Guattari, attributing Valentin Vološinov’s reflections on the multivariate nature of discourse in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language to Mikhail Bakhtin, the “primary determination” (la première détermination) in language is indirect (Vološinov, 1994 [1929], 26-37):

There are many passions within one passion, and all kinds of voices within one voice, a whole rumor, glossolalia: for this reason every speech act is indirect,
and the act of translation intrinsic to language is the indirect speech act.

Il y a beaucoup de passions dans une passion, et toutes sortes de voix dans une voix, toute une rumeur, glossolalie: c’est pourquoi tout discours est indirect, et que la translation [sic] propre au language est celle du discours indirect (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 97).

Deleuze goes on to stress that metaphor and metonymy are merely effects that derive from the indirect speech act. It follows from this that, if one is to focus on fidelity or equivalence to the source text, the aim should not be the production of a text that conveys some underlying meaning or sense in which the signification and representation of, for example, metaphor and metonymy are fixed. Rather, the aim should be the meticulous rendering of the surface expression so that possible effects to be derived—or rather “affects,” as I shall argue after Deleuze and Hans-Thies Lehmann—are freed anew in the target language and culture: “Le langage est une carte non pas un calque” (Language is a map, not a copy) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 97-98). The act of translation then becomes not one of representation or imitation, but rather a creative, generative, or originary act, in the manner that the source text is originary, with the aim of rendering its performative capacity in the target language. Antoine Berman described the role of translation in “refashioning” the “great western languages,” in a sense that echoes Deleuze and Guattari’s discussions in Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure (Kafka, Toward a Minor Literature) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 1986 [1975]), where a “major literature” is destabilized by the “minor” use of language:

The analytic of translation, insofar as the analysis of properly deforming tendencies bears on the translator, does in fact presuppose another figure of translating, which must necessarily be called literal translation. Here ‘literal’ means: attached to the letter (of works). Labor on the letter in translation is more originary than restitution of meaning. It is through this labor that translation, on the one hand, restores the particular signifying process of works (which is more than their meaning) and, on the other hand, transforms the translating language. Translation stimulated the fashioning and refashioning of the great western languages only because it labored on the letter and profoundly modified the translating language. As simple restitution of meaning, translation could never have played this formative role (Berman, 2000 [1985], 297).
For Berman, the “originary” act of translation “restores the particular signifying process of works (which is more than their meaning).” In the same way, Deleuze and Guattari embrace the role of language in literature in its intersubjective communicative function, rather than restrict it to a purely informative role (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 101). Further, the perlocutionary aspect of this performative capacity is concerned with affect rather than effect. This performative, or dramatic, capacity of language in the Deleuzean sense invites a parallel with theatre and more specifically, with postdramatic theatre. First described by Lehmann in 1999 as an avant-garde genre in which the multiplicity of performative possibilities of a script are foregrounded, postdramatic theatre fosters ephemeral affects and interaction with the material environment of the stage and the audience as participants, in contrast to a unidirectional, stable and repeatable interpretation delivered by performers to a largely passive audience. In his seminal treatise, Lehmann underlines the emergence of what “might be” in drama in stark contrast to the centrality of the logos to traditional Western rhetoric, which reached its apotheosis with Hegel and was further imbued with a Marxist dialectical perspective on history as drama:

The complicity of drama and logic, and then drama and dialectic, dominates the European ‘Aristotelian’ tradition—which turns out to be highly alive even in Brecht’s ‘non-Aristotelian drama’ (Lehmann, 2006, 41).

While Lehmann’s focus is on textual material intended for the theatre, the (anti)drama or theatricality of prose is essentially the focus of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical treatment of literature where, as in postdramatic theatre, plot is subordinated to the experiential, fragmented surface tension of the narrative.5

In this essay I propose to explore how Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective of literature can inform a theory of literary translation for the postdramatic text that, instead of being concerned with the causal chain of “intention” (in the speaker) and “effect” (on the hearer), directs its gaze to the literary concepts of “expression” and “affect” described in Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure and elaborated in Mille plateaux (A Thousand Plateaus) and later in Deleuze’s preface to Samuel Beckett’s Quad, “L’Épuisé” (“The Exhausted”) and “Bégaya-t-il” (“He Stuttered”) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 1980; Deleuze, 1992, 1993a). Elements of

5 For an exhaustive and insightful demonstration of Deleuze’s treatment of prose as (post)drama, see Ronald Bogue (Bogue, 2003).
postdramatic expression will be examined with reference, where appropriate, to performative elements in Kafka, Proust, and Beckett, as explored by Deleuze and Guattari, but also in relation to Gertrude Stein and other works by Beckett, where certain formal features invite comparison with postcolonial writers Mohammed Dib and Abdelwahab Meddeb.

Anaphora, Punctuation, and Aporia

Stein, perhaps more than any other modernist poet in the English language, pushed to the limit what can be done with surface expression, as for example in “Winning His Way, A Narrative Poem of Poetry” (1931), first published posthumously in *Stanzas in Meditation*:

Winning His Way

    Or her way.
    It is very often to have it warmer to content her.
    And they went their way.
    They were chosen to be won their way.
    This is the way that it was done.
    One.
    But why will they be away when they are at an advantage. To stay, and be welcome.
    Finding it lonesome.
    They are willing. To be welcome.
    Finding it handsome.
    They are willing to be able.
    To be welcome.
    A fortnight ago. Or so. They went away. Carefully. In intention.
    A man sitting upon a tree and they were singing to me. In welcome.
    He was perfectly aware that he was sitting there. And welcome.

Notable surface features of this long poem, in addition to distinctive lineation and hyphenation, can be found in Stein’s unusual and insistent use of pronouns for which no antecedents are given, other than, perhaps, the pronouns themselves as they are repeated: “his,” “her,” “it,” “they,” “me,” “he.” And apart from the vague and slippery vocable “way,” it is not until the fifteenth line that Stein
uses a noun with specific denotational value (“a man”), albeit with an indefinite article. A further surface feature of Stein’s poem is the insistent use of the full stop, the truncated phrases propelling the narrative ever forward in spite of this, or rather, because their unfinished form and incomplete content demand it. Stein favored this form of punctuation above all others: “Periods have a life of their own a necessity of their own a feeling of their own a time of their own” (Stein, 1988 [1935], 218).

Indeterminacy, repetition, and the full stop also play a defining role in the linear progression of “Worstward Ho,” and it could be argued that Beckett’s deictic fugue (“Him,” “One,” “It”) echoes Stein’s style:


A striking correspondence in form can also be seen in Dib’s use of the full stop, coupled with the indeterminacy of pronouns and adverbs, in his poem “La guerre” (War) from the 1998 collection L’Enfant-jazz (Jazz-Child). By way of illustration, let us review canto 4:

Il se tenait là.
Derrière les vitres.
Immobilie, sans bruit.

Il demeurait là.
Dehors. Quelqu’un.
Derrière la fenêtre.

Quelqu’un regardait.
La lumière éclairait
La guerre immobile. (Dib, 2007 [1998], 368)

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6 “Winning His Way” was not available in French until 2005. However, a French translation of Lectures en Amérique by Claude Grimal (Éditions Christian Bourgois), which did contain Stein’s essays on punctuation and on poetry, was made available in 1978.

7 “Worstward Ho” was not translated into French by Beckett as he considered it to be untranslatable, although it was eventually translated by Edith Fournier and published to critical acclaim as a book entitled Cap au pire in 1991.
He stood there.  
Behind the glass.  
Stock still, quiet.

He remained there.  
Outside. Someone.  
Behind the window.

Someone stared.  
The light revealed  
A war, stock still still.

The anaphoric referent in canto 4 at first appears straightforward, but is soon put in doubt; the third person “il” (he) in the first stanza suggests that someone (the poem’s eponymous Jazz-Child, perhaps) is standing at the window, looking out. On the same, or the other, side of the glass/window pane, the same or another “he,” a threatening presence, perhaps a soldier or guerrilla fighter, is standing “là” (there). The “someone” in the final tercet may or may not be the one (or two) mentioned in the previous tercets. Thus there is no categorical indication as to whether there are one, two, or three entities in this canto.

While full stops signify, they have no culturally specific connotation, at least none that can be evoked purely by their grammatical function. Stein’s controversial sympathies (she translated, but didn’t publish, many of Maréchal Pétain’s speeches) were recently expounded again by Barbara Will (Will, 2011). Her reported wartime “collaboration,” however, has been vigorously contested and a balanced and nuanced account of Stein’s “confusing and contradictory” politics can be found in Charles Bernstein’s “dossier” (Bernstein, 2017, n.p). In Dib’s “La guerre,” the insistent use of full stops may become conflated for some readers, by association with Stein, with the Vichy regime and its legacy of continuing repression in North Africa. A contemporary reading, recalling the opening lines of Stein’s “Winning His Way,” highlights the pernicious nature of war in the poem’s shifting assignations of “the other” or indefinite “they.” The full stop then becomes a point de repère, and in addition to its intimation of finality as a poetic device, traces an implacable, static grid, the invisible iron grip of a Deleuzean war machine.

Dib’s punctuation, coupled with the indeterminacy of the pronouns and the shifting referential nature of the nouns, serves to create a menacing, allegorical prison, through which only words can escape by refusing a role of static or finite representation. Signifier
and signified move laterally and vertically, in a manner reminiscent of critic Martin Richet’s observation when reviewing the French translation of Stein’s *Stanzas in Meditation*: “Ils [les noms et pronoms] forment un paysage verbal en mouvement qui inclut ou incorpore le monde mais ne le représentent pas” (They [the nouns and pronouns] create a changing verbal landscape which includes and incorporates the world but [they] do not represent it) (Richet, 2006, n.p.). Similarly, the shifting referential use of nouns and pronouns in Dib’s long poem “La guerre,” together with the lack of spatio-temporal (and hence, historiographic) referents other than the passage of time, prevents anchorage in specific geopolitical events and raises his poetics to an aesthetic level that, rather like Kafka’s texts, functions like “a pure machine,” which, as Deleuze pointed out, is an “épure” (a scale drawing or blueprint) when stripped of “material socio-political assemblages” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 70).

The comma can also be deployed to trump the reader’s expectation. In Abdelwahab Meddeb’s *Le tombeau d’Ibn Arabi*, the comma does not follow grammatical conventions but adopts a disjunctive function to constitute a key formal feature of his aporetic discourse (Meddeb, 1995). In his afterword to the English translation, Jean-Luc Nancy draws attention to this rhetorical device, which in Meddeb’s prose poem might have played the role of the line ending, noting the counterintuitive placement of “these little wings, these tiny paws or claws that at first you don’t notice, accustomed as you are to their presence in language” (Nancy, 2010, 114). When the comma is used to separate, for example, the prepositional phrase “de...” from the noun it modifies, Meddeb heightens the indeterminacy of this morpheme, which can indicate possession or provenance, but also substance, time, means, or purpose. Meddeb’s translator, Charlotte Mandell, notes how “‘de ses yeux noirs’ could be translated either as ‘of her black eyes’ or ‘from her black eyes’” (Mandell, 2010, in Nancy, 2010, 115). Nancy hints at the multiple values that could be ascribed to this phrase in his closing remarks to the afterword:

Thus: *I enter into the black, of her black eyes.*

Do you read this as “I enter into the black of her black eyes”? Or “Starting from her black eyes I enter into the black”?

You don’t know (...) (Nancy, 2010, 115)

How is the translator, then, to convey this unrealized modifier, when she does not know the author’s “intention,” other than by preserving the comma’s ambiguous role while being forced to
choose just one syntactical equivalent for the multiple values of “de”? It is felicitous that the preposition “of” carries many comparable, if not identical, values in English, and thus succeeds in carrying to some extent the indeterminacy of the surface expression in the target language.

(Dis)organizing the Constituents of Expression

In their discourse on Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari further unpack or unfold constituents from within the literary expression, for example, its intersemiotic dimension in the portrait of the porter with the bent head, or at the next level, the pure sound of the belfry or tower in Kafka’s *The Castle* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 52). More specifically, in the chapter “Les composantes de l’expression” ([Kafka’s] constituents of expression), instead of a simple binary opposition between content and expression, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate a conception of the latter that, far from creating anthropomorphic metaphor, actively unravels content:

We do not find ourselves before a structural correspondence between two kinds of form, forms of content and forms of expression, but rather before an expression machine, capable of disorganizing its own forms, and of disorganizing forms of content, in order to liberate pure contents which will merge with expressions into one and the same intense element.

Nous ne nous trouvons donc pas devant une correspondance structurale entre deux sortes de formes, formes de contenu et formes d’expression, mais devant une machine d’expression, capable de désorganiser ses propres formes, et de désorganiser les formes de contenus, pour libérer de purs contenus qui se confondront avec les expressions dans une même matière intense (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 51).

On the premise of this Deleuzean conception of literature, it is arguably the enabling of this “expression machine” that should constitute the focus of the translator’s task, both in her appraisal of the source and in rendering the target. This entails, when considering the source, starting with the surface expression and not the content or “intended meaning,” and when rendering the target, translating the formal relations that actively unravel content. These constituents as the epistolary letter, the novella, and the novel.

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8 In this chapter, Deleuze and Guattari identify these constituents as the epistolary letter, the novella, and the novel.
relations are expressed through syntactic and semantic cues, but they operate on a separate plane from the source or target language’s grammar and lexicon. Their role in the novella is to furnish the coordinates for a “carte d’intensités” (a map of intensities) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 65):

[The novella] is a creative line of flight that wants to say nothing other than itself. Unlike [Kafka’s epistolary] letters, becoming-animal allows nothing to subsist of the duality between a subject of the utterance and a subject of the uttered, but constitutes one and the same trial, one and the same process, which replaces subjectivity. 9

[La nouvelle] est une ligne de fuite créatrice qui ne veut rien dire d’autre qu’elle-même. À la différence des lettres, le devenir-animal ne laisse rien subsister de la dualité d’un sujet d’énonciation et d’un sujet d’énoncé, mais constitue un seul et même procès, un seul et même processus qui remplace la subjectivité (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 63).

Thus in the novella the expression is the content, is “nothing other than itself,” and replaces subjectivity with a process of becoming that defies the necessarily static, because referential, role of a translation focused on “content” per se: “Car l’expression précède le contenu et l’entraîne (à condition bien sûr de ne pas être signifiante)” (For expression precedes content and entrains it [on condition of course that it does not signify]) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 74). In the act or gesture of translating an expression, the translator becomes the transient and temporal subject of the utterance—and the subject of the uttered, where these have become indistinguishable, as in Deleuze’s description of expression in Kafka’s novellas.

The novel, which is the third component of Kafka’s expression machine, is a more complex assemblage, which allows an exit-path for the novella but can only develop “si les indices machiniques

9 Brian Massumi, who translated Mille plateaux into English, notes that Deleuze and Guattari’s “procès” carries the double sense of “trial”—which brings to mind Kafka’s Le procès (The Trial)—and “process” as a ‘way of proceeding’ (Massumi, 2008 [1987], xvii). “Trial”, however, can also carry the sense of ‘test’ or ‘proof’, as in the title of Antoine Berman’s study of translation in the German Romantics “L’Épreuve de l’étranger,” and I have opted here to interpret this sliding double-entendre from “procès” to “processus” explicitly in English, in a slight shift from Deleuze and Guattari’s more subtle (and hence more open-ended) semantic fugue (Berman, 1984).
s’organisent en un véritable agencement consistant par lui-même”
(if the machinic indices organize themselves into a truly self-grounded assemblage) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 70). And yet, paradoxically, such a text cannot develop without latching onto the material world, and thus, either it reverts to the dead-end of the novella or it becomes “interminable”:

[...] the text that consists of an explicit machine cannot, however, develop unless it can latch on to such material socio-political assemblages (because a pure machine is merely a [blank] schema which shapes neither novella nor novel). —Kafka, therefore, has multiple reasons for abandoning a text, either because it is cut short, or because it is interminable: but Kafka’s criteria are entirely new, and accountable only to himself, with channels from one text genre to another, refashionings, exchanges, etc., so as to constitute a rhizome, a burrow, a map of transformations. Every one of its failures is a masterpiece, a shoot within the rhizome.

[...] un texte qui comporte une machine explicite ne se développe pourtant pas s’il n’arrive à se brancher sur de tels agencements concrets sociaux-politiques (car une pure machine n’est qu’une épure, qui ne forme ni une nouvelle ni un roman). —Kafka a donc de multiples raisons d’abandonner un texte, soit parce qu’il tourne court, soit parce qu’il est interminable : mais les critères de Kafka sont entièrement nouveaux, et ne valent que pour lui, avec des communications d’un genre de texte à l’autre, des réinvestissements, des échanges, etc., de manière à constituer un rhizome, un terrier, une carte de transformations. Chaque échec y est un chef-d’œuvre, une tige dans le rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, 70).

The constituents of expression in Kafka, and by extension any minor literature, accordingly, form a rhizome, a complex of multiple shoots driven by intensities in perpetual flux:

Everywhere one and the same passion for writing; but not the same one. Writing crosses a threshold on each occasion, and there is no superior or inferior threshold. These are thresholds of intensities, intensities that are higher or lower only in the sense of the direction in which one travels them.

Partout une seule et même passion d’écrire ; mais pas la même. Chaque fois l’écriture franchit un seuil, et il n’y a
pas de seuil supérieur ou inférieur. Ce sont des seuils
d'intensités, qui ne sont plus hautes ou plus basses que
suivant le sens où on les parcourt (Deleuze and Guattari,
1975, 74).\textsuperscript{10}

In his essay “Spinoza et les trois ‘éthiques’” (“Spinoza and the Three
’Ethics’”), Deleuze distinguishes “scalar” affects (which he names
“affections” for the sake of distinction) from “vectorial” affects. The
latter, though derived from the former, are not reducible to them:

These are passages, becomings, rises and falls,
continuous variations in potential, which pass from one
state to another; we shall call them \textit{affects}, which is
more appropriate, and no longer affections. They are
signs of waxing and waning, \textit{vectorial} signs (of the kind
joy-sorrow), and no longer scalar, like affections,
sensations, or perceptions.

Ce sont des passages, des devenirs, des montées et des
chutes, des variations continues de puissance\textsuperscript{11}, qui vont
d’un état à un autre : on les appellera \textit{affects}, à
proprément parler, et non plus affections. Ce sont des
signes de croissance et de décroissance, des signes
\textit{vectoriels} (du type joie-tristesse), et non plus scalaires
comme les affections, sensations ou perceptions
(Deleuze, 1993b, 173; Deleuze’s emphasis).

These affects are “signs” that reflect or absorb each other: states,
shadows on the surface, an interplay between two bodies, always on
the edge, aporetic, “effects of light” (\textit{les effets de lumière}) that are
“relative” in space and time (Deleuze, 1993b, 184). Yet, on one
reading of Spinoza, encapsulated by Deleuze for the sake of his
argument:

Signs or affects are inadequate ideas and passions;
common notions or concepts are adequate ideas, from
which derive true actions. […] It is a material, affective

\textsuperscript{10} Inexplicably, the final sentence of this passage, as translated by
Dana Polan, reads: “These are thresholds of intensities that are not higher
or lower than the \textit{sound} that runs through them” (Deleuze, 1986 [1975],
41; my emphasis).

\textsuperscript{11} The term \textit{“puissance”} here is not related to Foucault’s concept of
power for which, according to Massumi, Deleuze uses the term \textit{“pouvoir”}
(Massumi, 2008 [1987], xvii), but rather to the latent energy or intensity
potential which must be inferred from the analogies Deleuze uses here to
describe “affect.”
language rather than a form of expression, and which resembles the cries rather than the discourse of concept.

Les signes ou affects sont des idées inadéquates et des passions ; les notions communes ou concepts sont des idées adéquates d'où découlent de véritables actions. [...] C'est un langage matériel affectif plutôt qu'une forme d'expression, et qui ressemble plutôt aux cris qu’au discours du concept (Deleuze, 1993b, 179).

While Spinoza ostensibly demonstrates that affects detract from understanding the world through concepts, Deleuze argues that Spinoza persistently undermines his own reasoning in the twists, turns, and asides of his scholia, which favor the fundamental role of affects in their specificity (Deleuze, 1993b, 183). It is the surface expression of these affects, or style, that Deleuze’s “great” writers deliver in and through the stuttering minor language of Kafka or Beckett, as discussed by Deleuze in his essay “Bégaya-t-il” (Deleuze, 1993a).

A further analogy with the theatre will perhaps help to challenge the traditional perspective of the translator in this respect, where the act of translation and the act of performance bear comparable responsibilities in relation to the author’s expression. Anthony Uhlmann, in his Deleuzean analysis of dramatic emotion in Beckett, Kafka, and Heinrich Von Kleist, laments the frequently corrupted relationship between expression and affect that may be introduced on stage by the Stanislavski system of method acting (Uhlmann, 2009). Just as in theatre, according to Uhlmann, the actor’s “familiar, easily recognizable emotion” interferes with the affect of the play, so the translator’s canned formulas, the commonplaces (topoi) generated in conformance to a standard rhetorical norm in the target language, constitute an act of representing, or standing for, the source text, which interposes an interpretation of meaning drawn from the translator’s preformed conception of a target culture (Uhlmann, 2009, 61). While introducing a shift toward a putative audience in the target language, the translator is in danger of fixing, in the sense of immobilizing, the text’s generative, creative, or originary capacity inherent in its surface schema, whereby all other possible affects are negated.

Qui?, Combien?, Comment?, Où?, Quand?
To focus on the source text’s generative capacity is to see it as a Deleuzean “map” or generic blueprint that will allow infinite repetition and variation along multiple axes of language and
As Christophe Collard remarked in a comparison with adaptation for the theatre, the focus of translation is on what unites rather than divides the source and the target (Collard, 2011, 20). However, each new instantiation of the source text’s spatio-temporal dynamic can only be effective so long as the relationship between the variables that determine it is preserved; if the text is a diagram, its instantiation will not “work” if the coordinates are flawed in their transposition.

It is useful here to think of the text in terms of its fundamental variables, as in the argument put forward by Deleuze in 1967 to members of the Société française de philosophie, two years before submitting his thesis Différence et Répétition in a paper published under the title “La méthode de dramatization” (“The Method of Dramatisation”):

It is not certain that the question what is [this]? is a good question for the purpose of discovering the essence or the Idea. It is possible that questions like who?, how many?, how?, where?, when? may be better—both to discover the essence and to discover something more important concerning the Idea.

Il n’est pas sûr que la question qu’est ce que ? soit une bonne question pour découvrir l’essence où l’Idée. Il se peut que des questions du type qui ?, combien ?, comment ?, où ?, quand ?, soient meilleures—tant pour découvrir l’essence que pour déterminer quelque chose de plus important concernant l’Idée (Deleuze, 2002 [1967], 131; Deleuze’s emphasis).

For Deleuze, the literary text is a machine for the expression of the “Idea,” and this Idea is both immanent in and distinct from the concepts expressed. It is equally external to its author or reader (performer, actor, or translator), who can merely come into contact with it, as a straight line does with a curve, through a series of singularities, or instantiations mediated through its utterance, whether voiced or silent. This Idea can equally be expressed in translation or performance, the latter being a form of translation, and the affect this creates is what Deleuze terms the “virtual,” after Henri Bergson and Raymond Ruyer. Deleuze draws on Marcel Proust to illustrate his premise:

The virtual is opposed to the actual and, in this capacity, constitutes an entire reality. We have seen that this reality of the virtual is composed of differential relations and the distribution of singularities. In every respect the virtual corresponds to the formula Proust used to define
his experiential states: “real without being actual, ideal without being abstract.”


Deleuze explains that “differential relations” are determined only in relation to each other, by their reciprocal relationship, in the manner of phonemes, or atomic particles, or genes (Deleuze, 2002 [1967], 139). In terms of literature, we may consider differential relations the formal relations that determine the disjunctive syntactic and semantic operations of the postdramatic text. Deleuze describes “singularities” as “événements idéaux” (ideating/ideated events), which correspond with differential relations and are a series of “ordinary points” (points ordinaires) engendered by a “remarkable point” (point remarquable) (Deleuze, 2002 [1967], 139).

Each remarkable point can be conceived as the “utterance” (la parole), which, as we have seen, Deleuze likens to the point of intersection of a straight line with a curve, which engenders a series of ordinary points (in language) to constitute a (textually mediated) event. Deleuze argues that ontological and epistemological “sense” (le sens) arises from the distribution of these points in the “Idea” (Deleuze, 2002 [1967], 139). He insists on the necessity for the complete interdependence of differential relations and singularities as follows:

The Idea emerges, therefore, as a multiplicity, which must be travelled in two ways, in terms of variation in the differential relations, and in terms of the distribution of singularities that corresponds to specific values in these relations. What we previously coined vice-diction merges with this double trajectory or this double determination, reciprocal and complete [in itself].

L’Idée apparaît donc comme une multiplicité qui doit être parcourue en deux sens, du point de vue de la variation des rapports différentiels, et du point de vue de la répartition des singularités qui correspond à certaines valeurs de ces rapports. Ce que nous appelions précédemment procédé de la vice-diction se confond...
This reciprocity between differential relations and singularities in the expression of the Idea provides a model for conceptualizing a dynamic approach to literary translation whereby a unit of translation can be seen as a “singularity that corresponds to specific values in these relations” (Deleuze, 2002 [1967], 139).

The specific values in a text are what determine its tone, style, register, and ultimately, the expression and its affect. By way of illustration, let us consider Deleuze’s “who?, how many?, how?, where?, when? ...” as specific values determined in textual form, and whether/how the singularities to which they give rise can be generated without significantly altering their differential relations in the target language.

The practice of representing language relations through transformation operations is well established, notably through the principles of Noam Chomsky’s generative grammar. Another means to represent language has been through predicate logic; issuing from philosophical principles, the predating function that answers the question “Qu’est-ce que?” is a fundamental building block of deductive reasoning. The reasoning mechanism is linear and bidirectional; the logical sequence “If a then c, a = b, therefore, if b then c,” can be reversed, but only if it follows the same path in the opposite direction. Theories of formal-equivalence translation have tended toward a literal rendering of form, and in particular of

12 “We shall name this process vice-diction, which is entirely different from that of contradiction. It consists in proceeding through the Idea as a multiplicity. The question no longer relates to knowing whether the Idea is one or multiple, or even both at the same time; “multiplicity,” employed as a noun, designates a domain where the Idea, in itself, is much closer to an accident than to an abstracted essence, and may only be determined with the questions who? how? how many? where and when? in what case?—all forms that plot the true spatio-temporal coordinates” (Nous devons appeler vice-diction ce procédé tout à fait différent de celui de la contradiction. Il consiste à parcourir l’Idée comme une multiplicité. La question n’est plus de savoir si l’Idée est une ou multiple, ou même les deux à la fois ; « multiplicité », employé comme substantif, désigne un domaine où l’Idée, par elle-même, est beaucoup plus proche de l’accident que de l’essence abstraite, et ne peut être déterminée qu’avec les question qui ? comment ? combien ? où et quand ? dans quel cas ?—toutes formes qui tracent les véritable coordonnées spatio-temporelles) (Deleuze, 2002 [1967], 133–134).

13 For a retrospective overview, see Chomsky, 1986.
syntax and morphology. Maria Tymoczko, for example, posited one argument in favor of formal equivalence on the grounds that a representation based on formal logical expressions of the type “(∃x) (y,z)”—in other words, there exists an x where the variable x is the subject and y, z are variables that predicate the subject—could be employed to retain “objectivity” in the translator (Tymoczko, 1985).

Limiting the representation of language’s form to the sole function of predication, however, is insufficient to address the entire range of differential relations inherent in an expression. Moreover, generative and transformational grammars, while allowing more functional breadth than formal logic for the syntactic expression of “who, how many, how, where, when, ...” are unidirectional within the scope of a sentence, and become more constraining as the sentence progresses. Such grammars do not cater well to abrupt changes in sense, juxtaposition, or the disjunctive syntax that is a prime characteristic of the “Idea” in Deleuze’s “minor literature” (Deleuze, 1993a, 138-139). Further, by definition these models take no account of the pragmatic dimensions of the speech act; while they have proven adequate for structuralist notions of language, they cannot fully express non-standard or creative uses of language of the kind described in the works of modernist or postcolonial writers such as Stein and Beckett, Dib and Meddeb.

Stuttering the Language
Translation theories that implicitly rely on a generative or logical model of language fall short, for example, when indeterminacy is a focal trope in literary discourse, as in Beckett’s deictic fugue (“Him,” “One,” “It”) in “Worstward Ho” (Beckett, 1989, 109-110). Leaving aside the difficulties of rendering Beckett’s sound sense, a more appropriate model would involve the determination of coordinates in a manner akin to the mathematical concept of the vector, where variables can define both position and direction along

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14 In contrast, dynamic-equivalence theory, as first put forward by Eugene Nida, has been more concerned with faithfulness to content (Nida, 1964).

15 Barbara Godard identifies Deleuze’s “disjunctive synthesis” as a key determiner for the notion of translation as “paradoxical coordination”: “Working by combination and contiguity, the logic of the AND... AND... AND..., of the disjunctive synthesis produces proliferation and dispersal as a non-exclusive conjunction” (Godard, 2000, 62).
multiple axes, thereby encoding the potential expression or unfolding of multiple positions and discontinuities in perspective among the differential relations of expression and affect.

Further, the way in which the language of a (minor) literature (“la langue”), as opposed to speech or utterance in the linguistic sense (for which he uses the term “la parole”) come together is fundamental to an approach to translating surface expression with the aim of enabling affect:

To make the language stutter: is this possible without confusing it with the utterance? [...] If language is confused with utterance, it is only with a very special utterance, a poetic utterance that deploys the full power of bifurcation and variation, of heterogenesis and modulation intrinsic to language. For example, the linguist [Gustave] Guillaume considers each unit of language, not as a constant in relation to others, but as a series of differential positions or vantage points taken from an assignable dynamism: the indefinite article “a” will travel the entire zone of variation comprising a movement toward particularization, and the definite article “the”, the entire zone comprising a movement toward generalization. It is a stutter, where each position of “a” or of “the” constitutes a vibration. The language trembles through all its limbs. Therein lies the basis of a poetic understanding of language itself: it is as if language extended an abstract line, infinitely varied.

Faire bégayer la langue : est-ce possible sans la confondre avec la parole? [...] Si la langue se confond avec la parole, c’est seulement avec une parole très spéciale, parole poétique qui effectue toute la puissance de bifurcation et de variation, d’hétérogenèse et de modulation propre à la langue. Par exemple, le linguiste Guillaume considère chaque terme de la langue, non pas comme une constante en rapport avec d’autres, mais comme une série de positions différentielles ou points de vue pris sur un dynamisme assignable : l’article indéfini « un » parcourra toute la zone de variation comprise dans un mouvement de particularisation, et l’article défini « le », toute la zone comprise dans un mouvement de généralisation. C’est un bégaiement, chaque position de « un » ou de « le » constituant une vibration. La langue tremble de tous ses membres. Il y a là le principe d’une compréhension poétique de la langue elle-même:
c’est comme si la langue tendait une ligne abstraite infiniment variée (Deleuze, 1993a, 136-137).

The sense of language Deleuze derives from Gustave Guillaume in this explication is the sense in which the translator, if she is to be true to the “stutter” in the literary expression, is to approach language. Deleuze stresses that this “stutter” is not a question of bi- or multilingualism. Rather, it is a “minorization” of the major language, a grammar of disequilibrium, a disjunctive syntax acting upon the major language (Deleuze, 1993a, 141).

Claire Colebrook explains the jump from early twentieth-century phenomenologist Husserl’s logic-based universal to Deleuze’s (vectorial) perspective thus:

[But] whereas Husserl saw sense as a predicate—judging the world to be thus—Deleuze sees sense as the verb, releasing from this world of effected relations—this territory, assemblage or mixture—the potential for other relations, other worlds. In addition to the surface of production, or the space that is produced from the encounters of singular powers, there is also the *metaphysical surface*, which is the image of those powers not as they are actualized but as they might be (Colebrook, 2005, 191-192; Colebrook’s emphasis).

It is this focus on what “might be” in language that invites a parallel with the theatre, more specifically with the postdramatic genre, and entrains a rhetoric of translation that reflects the aporia of the source expression in stark contrast to the centrality of the *logos* to traditional Western rhetoric. While ultimately unattainable, an approach to text as map, with a focus on the surface relations, without aesthetic or historicist interpretation of content, would seem an appropriate means for the translator of non-Hegelian postdramatic texts to remain true to the “*intentio* of the original” (Benjamin, 2000 [1923], 21). This Deleuzean perspective offers new insights into how Walter Benjamin’s “*intentio,*” in the sense of the (vectorial) tension of the text, as opposed to the writer or translator’s intention (and attendant distortion or interference by subjective affections), can be enacted in the target language.

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16 Deleuze refers the reader to Gustave Guillaume’s theory of the “psychomechanics” of language in *Langage et science du langage* (Guillaume, 1964).
Translation as *Gestus*

Translation, like writing, arises from a ritual. The translator, the performer, must be exact to the utterance and the uttered, to the “who?, how many?, how?, where?, when?” in order to, as does Beckett, “[s]ay for be said. Missaid. From now say for missaid.” (Deleuze, 2002 [1967], 131; Beckett, 1989, 101). The semiotic craft may vary depending on the mode of expression, but the object is the same: to allow the differential relations, irrespective of mode, to generate a precise *simulacrum*, to perform a “ritornello” in order, as Deleuze describes the language of Beckett’s *Quad*, to “exhaust” (*épuiser*) the possible:

> Just as the image appears as a visual or aural ritornello to the one who makes it, space appears as a motor ritornello—postures, positions, and gaits—to the one who travels through it (Deleuze, 1997 [1993], 160).

> De même que l’image apparaît à celui qui la fait comme une ritournelle visuelle ou sonore, l’espace apparaît à celui qui le parcourt comme une ritournelle motrice, postures, positions et démarches (Deleuze, 1992, 75).

In this sense the translator/performer’s ritual is analogous to that of the writer of the source text (the one “who makes it”), with the exception, perhaps, that the *gestus* of the translator/performer (the one who “travels through it”) would, to quote Laura Cull and Matthew Ghoulish in relation to performance, “not have existed without the work [she is] responding to” (Cull and Ghoulish, 2009, 144). Even this, however, is on a continuum, as the same could be said of a writer. The difference between writing and translation is primarily determined by chronology; both are transient translations of the (a)temporal into space.

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17 I have nothing to add to this simple and effective translation by Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco.

18 According to Cull and Ghoulish, for the experimental Goat Island collaborative performance group, created in 1987, “a creative response does not imitate or represent an ‘original,’ nor does it seek to critique it. Rather, Goat Island advise us to ‘think of a creative response as your own work that would not have existed without the work you are responding to’” (Cull and Ghoulish, 2009, 144).
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