Grenville Mellen Dodge in the Civil War: Union Spymaster, Railroad Builder and Organizer of the Fourth Iowa Volunteer Infantry

Richard F. Kehrberg

ISSN 0003-4827
Copyright © 2017 State Historical Society of Iowa. This article is posted here for personal use, not for redistribution.

Recommended Citation

Hosted by Iowa Research Online
who were the numerical heart of the period’s middling sorts—as Mahoney focuses instead on the very cream of the bench and bar.

Also less than convincing is Mahoney’s contention that his characters thought of themselves as citizens of a “Great West.” Despite his concern for his subjects’ “spatial mapping,” he unfortunately presents little evidence of such a regional consciousness, which is important for a book where that event of ultimate sectionalism—the Civil War—plays such a substantial role. Indeed, more broadly, Mahoney pays little attention to the ideology of his protagonists. We see them get very intensely involved in the Civil War, for instance, but we don’t really know why they cared so passionately about that cause other than that they were fighting for each other and for their home towns. This is an important insight, but it leaves politics stranded. What did the people of Galena think about slavery, or the Dred Scott decision, or the slave power? What did those in Dubuque think about John Brown, or abolitionism, or Abraham Lincoln’s economic policies?

These limitations and issues aside, we should be grateful that Timothy Mahoney has worked so hard to reveal a world that at times seems like our own—but is, in fact, decisively on the other side of a historical divide.

A final note: although Mahoney’s own writing is sure and solid (one is tempted to say classically midwestern), the copyediting done by Cambridge University Press shows signs of the general deterioration in that fine art upon which just a little bit of civilization depends. One would hope that a $120 price tag would inspire more care. Make Copyediting Great Again!

---


Reviewer Richard F. Kehrberg lives in Ames, Iowa. His research and writing have focused on U.S. military history.

Over the course of the American Civil War 66 Iowans became generals in the Union Army. Arguably the most famous of these was Grenville M. Dodge, who rose from colonel of the Fourth Iowa Infantry to major general and became a close associate of U. S. Grant and William T. Sherman. Dodge went on to be a prominent railroad engineer, successful businessman, and respected politician, but it is the Civil War years that form the heart of James Patrick Morgans’s biography of this famous Iowan.
Born in Massachusetts and educated in Vermont, Dodge was working as a railroad surveyor when he arrived in western Iowa in 1853. The ambitious young man was soon involved in the region’s economic life and Republican politics. At the beginning of the Civil War he worked with Governor Samuel J. Kirkwood to secure arms for the new Iowa regiments, and the governor rewarded Dodge’s efforts by commissioning him as colonel of the Fourth Iowa Infantry. The new colonel took his men to Missouri, where he had to simultaneously organize, equip, and train his new regiment and deal with the confused military situation. Dodge was given command of a brigade in January 1862; that unit played an important role in the Battle of Pea Ridge, where Dodge’s quick thinking and his men’s hard fighting helped blunt the Confederate attempt to envelop the Union Army’s right flank.

Following Pea Ridge, the army assigned Dodge the task of rebuilding the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from Columbus, Kentucky, into northern Mississippi. That assignment marked a new phase in Dodge’s military career. He became closely associated with building and maintaining the Union Army’s railway system in the Cis-Mississippi Theater. Defending this large, vulnerable network proved to be especially challenging. Dodge created a body of spies and informants to help thwart the Confederate raiders. Dodge’s men were never able to stop the marauders completely, but their intelligence allowed them to score some significant successes and keep the Union trains moving. The army praised Dodge for his accomplishments and raised him to command of an army corps. Nevertheless, the ambitious officer was frustrated by the failure to promote him to major general despite his growing responsibilities.

In June 1864, Dodge finally received his coveted promotion as his corps took to the field for the Atlanta campaign. Wounded during the siege of Atlanta, Dodge subsequently led the Department of Missouri and the Department of Kansas. Both of those commands required him to fight guerrillas—Southern sympathizers in one and Native Americans in the other—while navigating a complex political environment. Railroad work was never far behind, however. In 1866 Dodge resigned from the army to become chief engineer for the Union Pacific Railroad.

Morgans builds his account on published sources and firmly intertwines his portrait of Grenville M. Dodge with the history of the Fourth Iowa Infantry. This approach works well in the beginning when Dodge has immediate command of the regiment, but it becomes increasingly problematic as Dodge moves on to new responsibilities and the Fourth begins to operate farther and farther away from its old
commander. The author’s penchant for asides on minor characters or ephemeral details amplifies the organizational problems presented by these twin narratives. For example, after noting that Dodge’s chief of scouts in 1863 was from the Seventh Kansas Cavalry, Morgans sets off on a page-long excursion on the Seventh’s history that manages to encompass “Bleeding Kansas,” William “Buffalo Bill” Cody, future Kansas governor Edmund Needham Morrill, and Susan B. Anthony (110–11). Dodge often gets lost in these details. The result is an interesting but at times exasperating study of Iowa’s most famous Civil War general.


Reviewer Mark Barloon is senior lecturer of history at Central College. His Ph.D. dissertation (University of North Texas, 2001) was “Combat Reconsidered: A Statistical Analysis of Small-Unit Actions during the American Civil War.”

The Vicksburg Campaign was the critical moment of the American Civil War. Federal success depended on the intelligence and improvisational skill of the midwesterners who filled the ranks of Major General Ulysses S. Grant’s Army of the Tennessee. Because they had only three professional engineers to guide them, Grant’s soldiers were forced to apply their own creativity and common sense to the problem of besieging the enemy. Consequently, Confederate Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton was forced to surrender his army. He did not surrender because his men had depleted their supplies but rather because their defensive works had been compromised by Grant’s crafty, self-educated, soldiers-turned-engineers. Although the soldiers performed exceptionally, their siege tactics were not exceptional; they resembled the siegework of seventeenth-century French Marshal Vauban more than the modern trench warfare of World War I.

These are the arguments made by historian Justin Solonick, who received his Ph.D. in 2013 under the tutelage of Steven Woodworth at Texas Christian University. In this book, Solonick enters into three separate scholarly debates regarding Vicksburg and the Civil War. First, he reinforces his mentor’s belief that the West was the critical theater of the war and that westerners made better soldiers than easterners. Second, he advances Michael Ballard’s suggestion that the Confederates did not surrender because of a lack of supplies. Instead, it was the Federals’ relentless advancement of their trenches that forced