Lincoln and the Democrats: The Politics of Opposition in the Civil War

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as the voice of the people and cooperated with sensitivity and understanding whenever possible.

In *Lincoln and the Radicals* (1941), T. Harry Williams established the view that Lincoln and the Radical Republicans engaged in an ongoing confrontation. Harris argues persuasively that Lincoln and the radicals cooperated on a complex domestic agenda while enacting supportive legislation for the war effort. However, Harris, possibly to be concise, often drifts into oversimplifying his conclusions. Nonetheless, despite occasional lapses, he contributes to a fuller understanding of the most complex, pragmatic, and idealistic political leader in American history, particularly Lincoln’s amazing ability to work with Congress.


Reviewer Jennifer Weber is associate professor of history at the University of Kansas. She is the author of *Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s Opponents in the North* (2006).

About halfway through *Lincoln and the Democrats,* author Mark E. Neely Jr. notes that, “for the most part,” historians have “simply neglected” the Democratic Party during the Civil War years (85). For the most part that is true. In the past decade or so, however, the Peace Democrats, or Copperheads, have received considerable attention. War Democrats, though, have remained largely in the shadows. Although Neely does not say so directly, this slim volume attempts to shed light on that less flashy group while making some (rather limited) efforts to knit their story together with that of their more cantankerous political brethren. The result is a collection of thought-provoking essays that is easily accessible for advanced undergraduates and the interested public as well as more scholarly types.

Neely is one of the leading political historians of the period, so one should always pay attention to what he has to say. In this, which he says is his last book on the Civil War, he does not disappoint. He argues, for instance, that the Civil War era was far less partisan and divided than other scholars have suggested; that the main reason Democrats performed so well in the 1862 elections was that Lincoln did not campaign, even indirectly, for his party; and that Lincoln helped bring the country into a “new era of human rights” (204). Each of these arguments is likely to make Civil War historians sit up and pay attention, for each is new and innovative—and compelling.
In this volume, however, Neely’s arguments can also be a bit frustrating. In perhaps the most important scholarly contribution, the essay on the election of 1862, Neely’s evidence often feels thin. While he references other states, including Iowa, on occasion, Neely draws most of his evidence from his home state of Pennsylvania. He acknowledges this, arguing that it was a “crucial state in all national electoral calculations,” but that is an unsatisfying justification given the wide variety of state-level experiences during the war, especially between the eastern and western states. An ambitious graduate student would do well to follow up on Neely’s argument with a more national approach.

The other element missing from the book is the war itself. One would scarcely realize from these pages that battles were being fought and thousands of men were losing their lives. Granted, Neely is a political historian, and the focus of this work is politics. Still, one cannot write about wartime politics without acknowledging what is happening on the battlefield. Those events help shape politics, after all, just as political calculations help shape what happens in the field. This oversight becomes glaringly apparent in the chapter on the Democratic Party and racism. Most of the chapter is a fascinating study based on the attitudes of the Democratic press (though not political pamphlets, which seems like a relevant oversight). The latter part of the chapter, though, is dedicated to the 1864 election. Precious little attention is paid to the sagging morale of northern civilians in the summer of that year because of the real and perceived failures of the Union armies. The fall of Atlanta goes entirely unremarked upon, even though it was a major victory that reenergized support for the war and revived Lincoln’s political fortunes.

This book, then, is a mixed bag. Neely’s arguments are stimulating and, as always, worth taking seriously, but he leaves enough unaddressed that he doesn’t make his cases airtight. On the other hand, what Neely has done, at the very least, is to lay a trail of bread crumbs for his intellectual heirs to follow. And, really, what many scholars want to do is start a discussion. Neely has succeeded wildly in that regard.


Reviewer Kathleen Gorman is professor of history at Minnesota State University, Mankato. Her research has focused on Reconstruction in the New South. This collection of 15 essays offers a wide variety of approaches to the study of irregular or guerrilla warfare during the Civil War. Kenneth