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PEACE BY COERCION? HOW UN SANCTIONS IMPACT THE OCCURRENCE OF PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS IN CIVIL WARS

by

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for graduation with Honors in the Political Science

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Honors Thesis B.A. Political Science

Thesis Advisor Professor Brian Lai

I. Abstract

Previous studies have employed the bargaining model of war to explain likelihood of negotiation in intrastate conflict. Building upon this framework, this article provides an analysis of the effect of targeted UN sanctions on the onset of negotiations between warring parties in civil wars. Using novel monthly negotiation data and UN targeted sanction data from thirteen African civil wars between 1989 and 2020, my analysis finds that when sanctions target governments, negotiation onset is more likely. These findings contribute to the limited research on the effect of targeted sanctions on intrastate conflict and have important implications for policy-makers using sanctions as a tool of conflict resolution.

I. Introduction

The use of sanctions as a tool of intrastate conflict resolution has changed significantly in the post-Cold War period. In the early 1990's, comprehensive UN sanctions were frequently implemented as a tool to constrain regimes perceived to be bad actors in the international system. However, concerns about the ethics, human rights, and devastating impacts that total sanctions were having on civilian populations led to intense international backlash, particularly following the total sanctions regime in Iraq. Since then, comprehensive UN sanctions regimes have disappeared, and targeted measures have taken their place as tools of international conflict management. Despite relatively limited research on the efficacy of targeted sanctions in brokering peace, shortening conflict, and reducing conflict intensity, these targeted sanctions continue to be implemented, both by international organizations like the UN and EU, and unilaterally by individual states.

Today there are ongoing targeted UN sanctions regimes in fourteen countries that are intended to support the settlement of conflicts, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and counterterrorism efforts (un.org). However, the effectiveness of targeted sanctions is largely unproven. Sanctions implemented by the UN and other international organization are often perceived as a relatively low-cost tool by which the international community can show commitment to taking action without dedicating troops or other higher cost interventions. Further scholarship seeking a more well-rounded understanding of how targeted sanctions impact conflict dynamics and support the peaceful resolution of conflict is essential to ensure. A better understanding of targeted sanction will ensure that these measures are employed in the most effective manner possible.

This paper seeks to explore the relationship between UN sanctions and negotiation onset in intrastate conflict. This analysis builds on previous scholarship which uses the bargaining theory of war to explain factors that contribute to the presence of negotiations in intrastate conflict. I argue that sanctions placed upon one of the warring parties, either the government or the rebel side, leads to asymmetric changes in power. As public information about the distribution of power becomes available, parties will choose whether or not to negotiate based on the new balance of power, affecting the likelihood of negotiation. Alternatively, sanctions that simultaneously target both rebels and the government lead to symmetric changes in power that do not impact the likelihood of negotiation onset because the overall balance of power has not changed. I test these hypotheses using negotiation and sanction data for thirteen African civil wars between 1989 and 2020. I find preliminary support for my theory that sanctions targeting government actors increase the likelihood of negotiation onset.

These findings have important implications for scholarship on peacebuilding and the effectiveness of sanctions. Limited research exists on how international, and particularly UN sanctions, effect the likelihood of negotiation onset in intrastate conflict. Employing the bargaining model framework to analyze the effect of sanctions on negotiation onset builds on previous conflict resolution scholarship. The use of novel negotiation data, collected by a research team at the University of Iowa, provides important insight and further promotes the model that scholars should analyze peace as a process, rather than a single event.

Empirical evidence of the effectiveness of sanctions in influencing negotiation onset contributes to smart and targeted policy that reduces the economic and human rights costs to both the senders and recipients when possible. Targeted sanctions impose costs on both senders and recipients, though sanctions are typically a less costly conflict intervention from a sender's

perspective. Understanding how and under what conditions sanctions work to end conflict is critical for effective policy. Despite having fewer ethical and human rights concerns than total sanctions, targeted measures still incur criticism, and policymakers should ensuring that sanctions are employed where they will be most effective Examining the effectiveness of targeted sanctions in reducing conflict violence and ending conflict will contribute to the robustness of sanction policy in withstanding international criticism and bringing peace to countries in conflict.

II. Literature Review

Sanctions Overview

Sanctions are a broad range of interventions that are increasingly employed in both inter- and intrastate conflict as a means to coerce, constrain, or signal international disapproval to one or more governments, warring parties, individuals, or corporate entities (Elliott; Giumelli; Biersteker et al.). UN Sanctions, which typically supplement unilateral and regional sanctions, provide legitimacy to international efforts to contain conflict. Sanctions “encompass a broad range of enforcement options that do not involve the use of armed force” (un.org) and are an explicit tool of the UN Security Council, as stated in Article 41 of the UN Charter, requiring all 193-members states to comply in implementing the agreed upon sanctioned measures. Since 1966, there have been 30 sanctions regimes imposed by the UN Security Council with 14 regimes active in 2021 (Elliott; Biersteker et al.).

In the post-Cold War environment, sanctions became a favored method of conflict containment, especially in wars where bad actors threatened to upend liberal world order. Early comprehensive UN Sanctions regimes targeted countries like Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Haiti and

marked international disapproval anti-democratic regimes, state-sponsored terrorism, and the believed pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Elliott). Reports and images of malnourished and starving Iraqi and Haitian children in the early and mid-1990s led to harsh international outcry. Comprehensive sanctions were found to impact not only warring parties, but cause immense hardship among civilian populations, even when blanket humanitarian exemptions were allowed (Carisch et al.).

Human rights concerns regarding the effect of sanctions on civilian populations have prompted studies analyzing health concerns of populations under sanctions versus under war conditions. The exposures experienced by civilian populations as a result of war differ from those experienced as a result of sanctions. Armed conflict exposes civilians directly to the possibility of death and disability, while sanctions prompt indirect health concerns such as reliable access to clean water, food, and quality healthcare. Despite these differing exposures, Allen and Lektzian find that sanctions which have limited economic effects on target countries as a whole have no substantial public health effects. However, when sanctions have large economic effects on target countries, public health consequences to the general population are similar to health outcomes associated with major military conflicts (Allen and Lektzian).

The discovery of the immense adverse effects and human rights concerns that had occurred as a result of comprehensive sanctions regimes showed that sanctions violated the UN responsibility to stem conflict while upholding international norms and protecting citizens (Elliott). Beginning in the mid-1990s, UN sanctions shifted to become targeted or “smart”, seeking to reduce the negative effects of sanctions on the broader population and mitigate human rights concerns (Eriksson and Wallenstein). Targeted UN sanctions are almost always applied in conjunction with other conflict mitigation efforts such as mediation, peacekeeping, the threat or

use of force, or regional and unilateral sanctions. Today, the vast majority of sanctions are smart, targeting individuals, corporate entities, regions, or economic and political activities (Biersteker et al.).

Targeted sanctions typically take shape in one of the following categories: individual, diplomatic, commodity, sectoral, financial, or territorial. Individual sanctions can include asset freezes or travel bans on individuals or corporations. Diplomatic sanctions typically restrict the activities of governments or other political entities by restricting visas or constraining activities of diplomatic personnel. Commodity sanctions seek to limit trade of a specific resource, typically natural resources. Sectoral sanctions place restrictions on specific industries including arms trade, technology, or transportation. Financial sanctions often include investment bans or restrictions on sovereign wealth funds. Lastly, territorial sanctions may limit sanctioning activity to a specific region (Biersteker et al.).

Though targeted sanctions seek to, and largely succeed in, mitigating negative externalities that affect the health and well-being of the broader population, there are growing concerns about the ethics and legality of largely unregulated targeted sanctions regimes. Individual sanctions mark new territory for the United Nations, an entity that is accustomed to dealing with states and other international organizations. Critics worry that individual sanctions imposed by the UN violate individual, group, or corporate right to property, freedom of movement, fair hearing, and effective judicial review (Biersteker). The process of listing and delisting individuals, groups, and corporation from the UNSC Consolidated List has garnered scrutiny from over 50 member states due to the lack of transparency and due process. In addition to legal grey areas that surround the process of individual sanctioning, concerns about economic and psychological effects to individual as a result of being “listed” are also of note (Biersteker).

Efficacy of Sanctions

There is mixed understanding about the efficacy of UN sanctions and of international sanctions as a whole, especially in terms of intrastate conflict. Comprehensive sanctions that impose broad costs on the target are more likely to succeed (Drury; Cortright and Lopez) and to achieve coercive goals (Elliott; Escribà-Folch). There is conflicting evidence as to whether length of sanctions regimes and civil war duration are negatively or positively related. Economic intervention has been found to increase civil war duration (Regan) whereas reductions in private information, resources available to rebels, and expected payoffs from victory, all results of sanctions, have been shown to shorten civil wars (Strandow; Escribà-Folch; Collier and Hoeffler).

Sanction success can also be understood in terms of cost to sender. Sanctions, particularly targeted sanctions, are often seen as inexpensive interventions that allow senders to influence conflict dynamics at relatively low-cost, compared with other conflict interventions. However, without ample commitment, often translated as costs, by the sender, sanctions are unlikely to be effective (Lektzian and Regan). UN sanctions are typically reinforced with another method of conflict mitigation, and Lektzian and Regan suggest that peacekeeping forces are an effective way to demonstrate sender commitment to sanctions.

Characteristics of sanction senders, aside from demonstrated commitment, may also play a role in determining sanction success. Combined sanctions regimes, which often include regional or individual sanctions preceding UN sanctions, ultimately increase the effectiveness of UN sanctions (Brzoska). However, too many layered sanctions regimes yield potential for negative perception due to growing discontent among non-western states for unilateral sanctions that often precede UN sanctions regimes (Brzoska).. The role of international institutions such as

the UN as a unifying sanctioning body should not be understated. When many individual states cooperate to send unilateral sanctions in conjunction with each other, the effectiveness of sanctions actually decreases (Drury). Conversely, if an international body is present to coordinate the sanctioning effort, there is an increase in effectiveness of sanctions and probability of conflict termination (Drury; Escribà-Folch). Additionally, coercive effects of sanctions are greater if the target state is a member of the international institution that initiated sanctions (Escribà-Folch).

Though comprehensive study on sanction type and efficacy is lacking, certain sanction measures have proven to be more successful. Comprehensive economic embargoes have been found to be the most effective at producing coercive results and may also increase the likelihood of either military or negotiated end to conflict (Escribà-Folch). Contrastingly, sanctions that restrict arms trade seem to reduce the likelihood of military victory (Escribà-Folch) but may still contribute to a reduction in conflict duration because actions that target military power, such as arms embargoes, reduce uncertainty over military capabilities (Strandow).

Measuring the success of sanctions in intrastate war proves to be more difficult. Difficulty arises because of the varying goals that accompany each separate sanction regime. Most sanctions imposed in civil wars seek one of three broad goals: to signal the disapproval of the international community, to constrain the ability of one or more warring parties to fight by limiting access to resources, or to coerce a change in behavior in one or more warring parties (Biersteker et al.; Elliott; Giumelli). However, secondary objectives and costs, often political, social, or economic against the sender or recipient, must also play a role when measuring the success of sanctions (Elliott). When analyzing all UN targeted sanctions between 1991 and 2012, Biersteker et al. find coercion to be the most common primary purpose, appearing in 56% of sanctions, though sanctions appear to be least effective in achieving this goal, finding success

only 10% of the time. UN sanctions are relatively more successful for goals of constraining and signaling, achieving positive outcomes 27% of the time (Biersteker et al.).

The debate on the effectiveness of sanctions remains, in part due to discrepancies in analysis methodology. Sanctions are often studied from a policy-making perspective and appeal to governments and international organizations as a low-cost way to manage conflict, but these perspectives fail to take into account conflict dynamics that may affect sanction success (Eriksson and Wallensteen). *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* is one of the earliest comprehensive works on the success of economic sanctions, with three editions published between 1985 and 2007, is often cited in subsequent literature on success of sanctions. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott find 11 indicators where sanctions are more likely to be successful and develop 9 policy recommendations that are supported by these findings (Hufbauer et al.). However, after altering their bivariate analysis to include control variables, Drury finds only four of eleven original findings and two of nine original policy recommendations to be supported (Drury).

Negotiations

Scholarship into why and under what conditions rebel groups and governments are incentivized to negotiate is somewhat limited. However, there are several generally accepted circumstances under which negotiation is more likely to take place. A shortcoming of many civil war literature is the practice of treating peace agreements as isolated bargaining events, rather than outcomes of multi-event negotiation processes, or treating each negotiation attempt as separate, rather than interconnected. What sets this analysis apart from other negotiation-related studies is the use of novel individual-level negotiation data, rather than monthly negotiation prevalence or agreement data that has previously been available. By using this micro-level

negotiation attempt data, this study seeks to further emphasize the importance of negotiations as a process, rather than a single bargaining event.

Conflict scholars typically present war as the result of bargaining failure where parties face both information asymmetry and commitment problems (Fearon). Information asymmetry presents a major hurdle in bringing warring parties to the negotiating table. Power uncertainties that provoked conflict will continue, and parties will continue to fight, as long as the distribution of power remains unknown (Strandow). As fighting continues, information about relative power between warring parties becomes more accessible. As this occurs, warring parties must weigh their ability to impose costs upon an opponent as well as their ability to absorb costs that are inflicted by opponents in deciding to negotiate (Schelling). Typically, when rebel's strength relative to the government increases, negotiations are more likely to occur. Similarly, if the government side undergoes losses that cause a diminished capacity to impose costs on rebels, it is more likely to participate in negotiations before experiencing further losses, and thus, diminished bargaining power (Hinkkainen Elliott et al.).

Resolution of information asymmetry and the commencement of negotiations reveals the second hurdle of conflict resolution: commitment problems. Commitment problems refer to the dilemma under which no consequences exist to punish parties that renege on commitments made in peace agreements (Bapat). Commitment problems can be involuntary, referring to the inability of a party to deliver on a commitment, or voluntary, when a party purposely chooses not to deliver on a promise due to lack of credible enforcement. Third party interventions have been shown to mitigate commitment problems by serving as guarantors of peace (Maekawa et al.).

Conflict dynamics such as rebel strength, conflict duration, and timing play important roles in determining whether or not negotiations will occur and if so, when they will occur. In conflicts

where rebel groups are well equipped militarily, as well as in conflicts with long duration, negotiations are more likely to occur. When a battlefield stalemate occurs, typically evidence of a strong rebel group, negotiations are more likely to occur. Rebel willingness, and often, desire to negotiate increases as a result of military stalemate due to a perceived enhancement in rebel bargaining position (Pechenkina and Thomas).

Timing plays an important role in the bargaining model. Governments are hesitant to grant legitimacy to rebel groups early on and often refrain from negotiations, opting instead to defeat rebel groups using military force. However, if rebels resist government assaults, rebels will adapt and grow in strength, often leading to a mutually hurting stalemate. Under these conditions, negotiations are more likely. Using this logic, by negotiating earlier, governments can earn a relatively cheaper peace, meaning they will be able to attain peace without granting as many concessions as possible. However, the opposite typically occurs, and negotiations are most likely to occur after four or more years of fighting, once parties have reached a military stalemate (Bapat).

III. Theory: Linking Targeted UN Sanctions and Negotiations

The conditions under which negotiation between rebel and government parties take place can be understood using the bargaining model (Fearon, Schelling, Hinkkainen Elliott et al., Bapat, Pechenkina and Thomas). Parties' descent into war is marked by power uncertainty, while the decision to negotiate comes as private information about the power balance between combatants becomes public and information asymmetries are resolved. I draw on the bargaining model to understand when negotiations are likely to occur in civil war, and the effect that UN sanctions can have on public information about power imbalances.

The bargaining model approach has been developed in civil war scholarship (Fearon, Schelling, Hinkkainen Elliott et al., Bapat, Pechenkina and Thomas) and argues that public information about the distribution of power incentivizes rebel groups and government actors to negotiate in different ways. In most circumstances, government actors determine if and when negotiations will take place. At the start of armed intrastate conflict, governments are often hesitant to grant legitimacy to rebel actors by holding talks with them and hope instead to end insurgency through military means. Negotiations are unlikely to occur at the beginning of civil conflicts due in large part to information asymmetries that lead government forces to believe they have significantly more power than rebels. Throughout the conflict, government forces remain unlikely to negotiate with rebel forces if they believe to have a disproportionate military advantage over rebels (Hinkkainen Elliott et al.). In the case of a vastly asymmetric distribution of power between rebels and government forces, government actors see military defeat as a less costly option given the alternative of offering rebels political or territorial concessions in order to end the insurgency.

Government actors are incentivized to negotiate as the power asymmetry between rebel forces and government forces shrinks. The balance of power can shift either through losses incurred by government forces, or gains made by rebels. Power changes can occur suddenly, such as an important rebel battle victory, or over time, as rebel groups tend to gain strength as the duration of a conflict increases. As power discrepancies between warring parties decrease, governments may no longer see military defeat of rebels as the least costly option. As this occurs, governments may seek to negotiate to minimize continue military losses that would further impact the balance of power, forcing governments to grant more concessions to rebels.

When events take place that reduce government power relative to rebel power, governments should be incentivized to negotiate. Governments seek to relinquish as little power as possible in the negotiating process by granting as few concessions as necessary to achieve a peace agreement with rebels. When governments are faced with an asymmetric decline in power relative to rebels, they seek to negotiate before incurring further losses which would force them to concede even more to rebels.

Effect of UN Sanctions Targeting Government Forces

UN sanctions targeting a government's ability to inflict losses on rebel combatants narrows the power gap between rebels and government forces. This shift in power dynamics incentivizes governments to negotiate before suffering further losses and allows rebels to negotiate from a relatively more advantageous position. Possible UN sanctions that target government military power include restrictions on arms and other sectoral trade as well as commodity embargoes that restrict a government's ability to earn capital, thus diminishing their battlefield capacity. Government losses as a result of UN sanctions do not imply that rebels become more powerful or even equally powerful to government forces, but rather have a relatively more favorable position from which to bargain from, incentivizing participation in negotiations.

As UN sanctions target the capacity of government forces, likelihood of negotiations between rebels and government actors will increase. This is a result of a change in public information about government power and the shrinking power asymmetry between warring parties, incentivizing both government and rebel actors to negotiate.

Hypothesis 1. *The implementation of UN sanctions against government actors increases the likelihood of the onset of negotiations between warring parties.*

Effect of UN Sanctions Targeting Rebel Groups

While government actors and third parties tend to set talks, rebels may decide whether or not to attend negotiations and whether or not to negotiate in good faith. Rebels seek to negotiate when their bargaining power is greater, or the perceived bargaining power of government actors is diminished. When rebels are weak, neither party is incentivized to negotiate because government forces see total military defeat as the least costly option for ending the insurgency, while rebels have little to no bargaining power to achieve desired concessions. Rebels are often weak at the beginning of a conflict, typically gaining military strength as conflict duration increases. Rebels may also be weakened by suffering military losses at the hands of government or third-party forces.

UN sanctions that target rebel groups seek to constrain the ability of rebel groups to fight by limiting resources, hindering recruitment, and causing territorial losses (Radtke and Jo). As the power asymmetry between rebels and government forces widens, conflict intensity and battle-related deaths will often decrease. However, as rebel groups become relatively weaker than government forces, negotiations are again disincentivized for both sides. When rebel group capacity has been substantially diminished, they no longer pose a powerful enough threat to legitimize their cause through negotiations with government actors, and instead, government forces will seek military victory.

As UN sanctions decrease rebel groups capacity, the power imbalance between warring parties will grow. A broad power asymmetry does not provide either party with incentives to negotiate, leading to a lower likelihood that negotiations will occur.

Hypothesis 2. *The implementation of UN sanctions against rebel actors decreases the likelihood of the onset of negotiations between warring parties.*

Effect of UN Sanctions Targeting Both Government Forces and Rebel Groups

I hypothesize that public changes to the power asymmetry, such as battle defeats, territorial losses, and loss to military capacity due to sanctioning, affect negotiation occurrence in intrastate conflict. Changes in the power distribution that affect all warring parties equally will have no effect on the relative distribution of power between parties and will bear no impact on the likelihood of negotiation. When UN sanctions are applied to both government and rebel forces, the overall balance of power will not change, and thus will have no effect on warring parties' desire or likelihood of engaging in negotiations.

Hypothesis 3. *The implementation of UN sanctions against both government and rebel actors will have no effect on the likelihood of the onset of negotiations between warring parties.*

IV. Research Design

The unit of analysis in this study is conflict month. My analysis employs civil war data from thirteen African civil wars from 1989 to 2020. The civil war data used in this analysis is taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/ Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al.) which codes state-based armed conflict. Per the UCDP definition, state-based armed conflict is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year.”

I limit the scope of my analysis to thirteen African civil wars from 1989 to 2020 due to the availability of data. My research team had only compiled negotiation data for thirteen African wars that also coincided with the Targeted Sanctions Consortium and UCDP/PRIO datasets. Four African civil wars that received targeted UN sanctions between 1989 and 2020 were not included in my analysis: Angola, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia-Eritrea. To make my

analysis more generalizable to all targeted UN sanctions, I would like to collect individual-level negotiation data for the remaining civil wars that have been targets of UN sanctions.

To test how targeted sanctions impact conflict resolution processes, I code one dependent variable, negotiation occurrence. A limitation of past studies related to negotiation attempts in civil war is the lack of comprehensive, individual-level negotiation data for each conflict. The individual-level negotiation data used in this analysis comes from a negotiation attempt dataset that I, in conjunction with several other undergraduates at the University of Iowa have compiled using open-source news articles from ReliefWeb and Lexis Nexis Academic. The research team has collected information about negotiation attempts in 25 African civil wars from 1989 to the present. In our dataset, a negotiation attempt is coded as a direct meeting between two or more combatant parties where one of the parties represents the contested government and where a political or military means to end the conflict is discussed. The resulting dataset codes conflict-negotiations as the unit of analysis.

In order to match the negotiation data with the UCDP/PRIO civil war dataset, I created a binary variable to code negotiation occurrence per conflict month. Conflict-months in which a negotiation occurred, whether starting, ongoing, or ending, were coded as 1, whereas months in which no negotiation occurred were coded as 0. When paired with the transformed UCDP/PRIO conflict-month data for thirteen conflicts, there were 135 conflict-months (11.1%) where negotiations occurred from 1989 to 2020.

The independent variable in my analysis is targeted UN sanctions. I use data from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC) Database which codes all UN targeted sanctions imposed between 1991 and 2013 (Biersteker et al.). The TSC is a comprehensive quantitative database of targeted UN sanctions and is the product of a collaboration between the Graduate Institute

Geneva, Uppsala University, and the University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute. The TSC dataset codes over 200 variables, several of which indicate the primary target of sanctions for three different sanction purposes: coercion, constraint, and signaling. For the purpose of my analysis, I chose not to differentiate between sanction purpose, and looked instead at the binary indicator of the presence of sanctions. To test my hypotheses about the I created two binary variables to indicate the presence of target sanctions of any purpose against rebel groups and rebel leaders and sanctions of any purpose targeting the government and government leadership.

To extend my analysis temporally, I collected sanctions data for each of the thirteen conflicts for 1989-1990 and 2014-2020. To collect information on sanction start date, end date, and target, I used open source reports from the United Nations. Collecting sanction data for these additional years allows me to more completely analyze the UN sanctions regimes in these thirteen conflicts and allows me to utilize the negotiation data that my team collected through 2020. After compiling these data, my analysis includes 1,219 conflict months clustered over thirteen different African civil wars with a range of 1 to 378 conflict-months and an average of 247 conflict-months.

These data are organized by civil war month until the onset of a negotiation. Cases of civil war months continues until a negotiation occurs and the binary negotiation dependent variable is coded 1. Successive civil war months where negotiations continue after the initial start-month of negotiation are not included in the data. If the negotiations end and do not produce an end to the armed conflict, civil war months for that particular civil war start again in the data.

I also employ a time variable to measure the time trend until a negotiation occurs. I include time, time², and time³ in my analysis. After using AIC to select the best fit model, I included time, time², and time³ in my model.

In my analysis, I will fit a logistic regression to examine the probability of negotiation occurrence given sanctions that target either the government, rebels, or both simultaneously. I am using a logistical regression because my dependent variable, negotiation occurrence, is binary.

The results of this test are reported in Table 2.

V. Presentation & Discussion of Results

Table 1. Data Summary

Civil War Location	Start Date	UN Sanction Start Date	Frequency of Negotiation Onset
Algeria	1-Jan-1991	-	5
Central African Republic	27-May-2001	-	4
Chad	18-Dec-2005	-	11
Comoros	3-Sep-1997	-	1
Democratic Republic of Congo	2-Jul-1998	28-Jun-2003	16
Guinea-Bissau	7-Jun-1998	-	3
Ivory Coast	19-Sep-2002	15-Nov-2004	14
Liberia	1-Jan-1989	19-Nov-1992	11
Libya	28-Feb-2011	26-Feb-2011	13
Mali	10-Jun-2009	-	6
Nigeria	4-Jun-2004	-	1
Somalia	1-Jan-1991	23-Jan-1992	34
South Sudan	20-Aug-2011	15-Mar-2015	16

Table 1 shows the location and start date of the thirteen African civil wars analyzed. The table also shows the start date of targeted UN sanctions regimes, if they occurred in the country

at the time of conflict. Six of the thirteen conflicts analyzed experienced UN sanctions regimes that coincided with the unit of analysis, civil war month. Table 1 also shows the frequency of negotiation onset in each of the thirteen conflicts. The average number of renewed negotiation onsets per conflict is 10.4 with a range of 1 to 34 onsets.

Table 2. Logistic Regression of Negotiation Occurrence by Sanction Target

	Coefficient
Sanctions Targeting Rebels	-0.1000 (.157)
Sanctions Targeting Government	0.8058* (.412)
Sanctions Targeting Both	-0.1915 (.236)
t	-0.0621** (.0224)
t ²	0.000145 (.0006)
t ³	0.00000095 (.000004)
Constant	-1.3786*** (.1756)
ln(Likelihood)	-395.13
Chi ²	.00001
Observations	1,219

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

As seen in Table 2, when there is a presence of sanctions that target government actors, the odds of a negotiation occurring increases by nearly 224%, found by exponentiating the coefficient (.8058), when compared to when there are no sanctions at all. This result is significant at the 95% confidence level. These results hold with my hypothesis which suggests that a decrease in government strength relative to rebel strength incentivizes government actors to open negotiations with rebels.

In cases where UN sanctions target both the government and rebel actors simultaneously, a negative, but not statistically significant relationship occurs. The lack of a statistically significant relationship supports my theory that when sanctions target both rebels and the government,

causing symmetric power shifts, there is no substantial change in the probability of an onset of negotiations.

Where sanctions target only rebel groups, my analysis points to a slight, but not statistically significant, negative relationship between sanctions that target rebel groups and negotiation occurrence. While not significant, this relationship holds with my original hypothesis that sanctions targeting rebel groups are likely to decrease negotiation occurrence.

The time variable I employed in this analysis is significant only in the original form and points to a negative relationship between civil war months and likelihood of negotiation occurrence. As duration of civil war increases, the odds of a negotiation occurring decrease by 94%. This breaks with findings that negotiations between rebels and the government are less likely at the start of conflicts but reaching peak likelihood after four years of armed combat (Bapat). This unexpected relationship may be a function of the thirteen cases I used in my analysis, several of which are wars with particularly long duration. In these cases, it may be the case that as conflict duration increases and successive negotiation attempts fail to produce agreements that facilitate lasting peace, parties choose to stop engaging in negotiations altogether.

A limitation of this analysis is that the data on UN sanctions that I employed does not differentiate between strength and comprehensiveness of measures. Different sanctions measures have been shown to have differing impacts on conflict dynamics and certainly have the ability to affect the balance of power between parties in differing ways. In further study, it would be interesting to use more detailed sanctions variables to see how different types of UN sanctions change the likelihood of negotiations. This more detailed analysis would provide additional insight cases where sanctions are applied to both government and rebel groups, as sanction

regimes are unlikely to cause the same level of losses to both parties. More detailed sanction data will also make important distinctions where sanctions are applied to individual rebel and government actors, either simultaneously or separately, as these are unlikely to have the same effects on bargaining power as, for example, an arms embargo.

VI. Conclusion

Sanctions have long been a tool for conflict management and since the virtual disappearance of the use of total sanctions by the United Nations in the mid-1990s, targeted sanctions against specific individuals, groups, or entities have taken over as non-combative means of conflict intervention. The effectiveness of targeted sanctions in easing and ending conflict is understudied, and this paper attempts to answer the question: in intrastate conflict, how do targeted sanctions impact the likelihood that warring parties will negotiate?

I attempted to assess the effect of targeted sanctions on negotiation onset when sanctions target only rebels, only the government, or both simultaneously. The results of my analysis indicate some support for my second hypothesis, that sanctions targeting only the government lead to an increased probability of negotiation onset. This could be because sanctions targeting the government lead to a decrease in government bargaining power, incentivizing government actors to commit to talks at the risk of incurring further losses to their bargaining position.

This analysis is a preliminary look at the effect of targeted sanctions on negotiation onset. Future study should differentiate between sanction types and strength to assess the effectiveness of differing sanctions in incentivizing parties to negotiate. Future analysis should also incorporate controls for additional regional sanctions, conflict intensity, a measure of polity, conflict type, and recurrence of conflict. Controlling for these measures will increase the validity

of the results discussed in this paper and allow for a more complete explanation of the impact of sanctions on negotiations in intrastate conflict.

Beyond contributing to the greater literature on intrastate conflict and international sanctions, this paper seeks to inform sanction policy. As international scrutiny of targeted sanctions increases, policymakers must prove that the benefits outweigh the costs for both senders and recipients and that sanctions constitute an effective tool for conflict management. Though more analysis is needed, this paper points to the effectiveness of sanctions that target government regimes in increasing the probability of the onset of talks between warring parties, which is an essential step towards a negotiated settlement of conflict, and eventual peace.

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