Some Characteristics of Gen. U. S. Grant

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SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF GEN. U. S. GRANT.

BY MAJ. GEN. GRENVILLE M. DODGE.

For twenty years following the death of General Grant, I was at the head of the Grant Birthday Association of New York City. At its meeting on each birthday gathered statesmen, diplomats and distinguished citizens of our country to honor his memory. Of all the great, eloquent and interesting tributes paid to him, it was the opinion of the Association that two of the best and most eloquent were delivered by Iowa men, Robert G. Cousins and John S. Runnells.

It is a fact not generally known, that after every successful battle, after every campaign that General Grant was engaged in, almost before the dead upon the field were buried, he had made in his own mind a plan for the using of the army composed of veterans that had already fought and won the battle, to move immediately again upon the enemy. Every one of those plans, up to March, 1864, was disapproved. In some cases he was relieved of command, in others his armies were distributed over the country and did not accomplish much for a year.

General Grant started out as Colonel of the Twenty-first Illinois Infantry. His first movement upon the enemy was from Hannibal, Missouri. He was ordered out to a place called Florida, Missouri, to attack Colonel Harris, who was in command of a Confederate force there. He used to tell us with what great trepidation and fear he went on that trip, and he described it a great deal better than I can. He said:

As we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see Harris' camp and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher, until it felt
to me as though it was in my throat. I would have given anything then to have been back in Illinois, but I hadn’t the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; I kept right on. [When it was found that Harris had left] it occurred to me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of him. This was a view of the question I had never taken before; but it was one I never forgot afterwards. From that event to the close of the war, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though I always felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that the enemy had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his. The lesson was valuable.\(^1\)

General Sherman always said that the difference between himself and General Grant was that Grant never was afraid of anything he could not see, while he was afraid of what he could not see.

From this expedition, General Grant was sent to command the district of Cairo. He had not been there long before he was ordered to make a reconnaissance to the west side of the Mississippi river, opposite Columbus, Kentucky, with a view to holding what force there was on that side of the river, keeping them from moving out to the aid of some Confederates stationed at St. Francis, on the St. Francis river, which another force of the Union army had gone to attack.

General Grant said that when he started out he had no idea of fighting, but when he got aboard the boat, he found every man on board expected if they saw the enemy to attack him. He further said, "I saw that if I met the enemy and did not attack him, I would lose the confidence of those men, and I made up my mind no matter what force I met I would fight." Hence the result of Belmont. It was not a big battle, but was one of the first in the West, and first drew the attention of the West to Grant.

When General Grant got back to Cairo he found the enemy’s line of defense stretched from Columbus, on the Mississippi river, due east to Fort Henry on the Tennessee, Fort Donelson on the Cumberland and due east to Bowling Green in Kentucky, and as a trained soldier he began to study the line and how to break it. He decided that the way to break it was to attack its center by way of either the

Tennessee or the Cumberland river and he immediately wrote to General Halleck his views. The letter received such a response that Grant did not know whether he had made a practical suggestion or not. However, it was still in his mind and he obtained leave to go to St. Louis to consult General Halleck in relation to the views with which he was so strongly imbued. He said when he went into the office and saw General Halleck, he was received with so little cordiality that he thought he had stated the subject of his visit with less clearness than he might have done. He had not uttered many sentences before he was cut short as if his plan was preposterous, and he returned to Cairo very much crestfallen.

On his return to Cairo, General Grant did not give up his plan up. Commodore Foote was then in command of what was known as the "Tin Clad Fleet" on the Mississippi river, and having his headquarters near, General Grant consulted him, knowing that General Halleck had confidence in his judgment. The Commodore saw immediately the strength of the plan and wrote to General Halleck, who then wrote to General Grant and authorized him to go as far up the Tennessee river with his force as to capture Fort Henry. There he was to stop, but as soon as he took Fort Henry he immediately marched on Donelson, notifying Halleck of the move and that he should go and capture Donelson unless he was stopped. He captured Donelson and as soon as he captured it with all the rebel forces there, General Grant, in his own mind, knowing that Buell was marching from Bowling Green toward Nashville, said, "If Buell and I can join our forces, the enemy are so demoralized and I have captured so many of them, there is nothing to prevent us from moving from here immediately to Vicksburg and opening the Mississippi river."

General Grant visited Nashville to consult Buell on his plan and he gives his reason as follows:

If one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all of the troops west of the Alleghany, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth,
Memphis and Vicksburg with the troops we then had, and as volunteering was going on rapidly over the North there would soon have been force enough at all these centers to operate offensively against any body of the enemy that might be found near them. Rapid movements and the acquisition of rebellious territory would have promoted volunteering, so that reinforcements could have been had as fast as transportation could have been obtained to carry them to their destination. On the other hand, there were tens of thousands of strong able-bodied young men still at their homes in the southwestern States, who had not gone into the Confederate army in February, 1862, and who had no particular desire to go. If our lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of them never would have gone. Providence ruled differently. Time was given the enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twice afterwards he came near forcing his northwestern front up to the Ohio river.²

General Grant was relieved because, as Halleck stated to McClellan, they could get no reports or dispatches from him; they could not hear from him; they didn’t know where he was; he had gone outside of his command and was guilty of violation of the regulations and his orders. McClellan, after receiving several dispatches of this tenor, authorized Halleck to relieve and if necessary arrest Grant, but in a few days they discovered that all of Grant’s dispatches went to a telegraph operator who was a rebel, who took the dispatches and instead of sending them to Halleck sent them to the rebels. General Halleck in his dispatch declared General C. F. Smith had won the battle, and recommended his promotion to Major General.

Instead of following the plan of Grant, which was very feasible, Buell’s and Grant’s armies lay there nearly two months before they moved to Pittsburg Landing. In the meantime, as we read the Confederate records now, the enemy were completely demoralized. They had no army in our front. They thought that Buell and Grant would immediately move forward into their own country, as Grant proposed, and were greatly astonished that they did not. They

could not understand it. In the meantime they gathered courage and organized a force under General Albert Sidney Johnston, concentrating it at Corinth.

General Grant, in referring to his troubles with Halleck wrote a letter to his wife that states more clearly than I can the position he was in and the reasons for his being relieved of his command. He wrote as follows:

All the slander you have seen against me originated away from where I was. The only foundation was the fact that I was ordered to remain at Fort Henry and send the expedition up the Tennessee river under command of Major General C. F. Smith. This was ordered because of Fort Donelson. The same thing occurred with me. I was not receiving the orders, but knowing my duties, was reporting daily, and when anything occurred to make it necessary, two or three times a day. When I was ordered to remain behind, it was the cause of much disappointment among the troops of my command and also of astonishment. When I was again ordered to join them, they showed, I believe, heartfelt joy.

I never allowed a word of contradiction to go out from my headquarters, thinking this the best course. I know, though I do not like to speak of myself, that General Halleck would regard this army badly off if I were relieved. Not but what there are generals with it abundantly able to command, but because it would leave inexperienced officers senior in rank. You need not fear but what I will come out triumphantly; I am pulling no wires, as political generals do, to advance myself. I have no future ambitions. My object is to carry on my part of this war successfully, and I am perfectly willing that others may make all the glory they can out of it.\textsuperscript{5}

This letter is characteristic of General Grant.

When General Grant was removed, General C. F. Smith was assigned to the command with instructions to move the army to Savannah and Pittsburg Landing. Soon after General Halleck received General Grant's reports of his campaign and ascertained the reason for the delay in receiving his dispatches, he reinstated him in command of the army and he proceeded to Savannah and relieved General C. F. Smith, who was sick at the time and soon after died.

Grant went to Savannah with no idea of holding his army there but of concentrating his forces on the west side of the

\textsuperscript{5}F. D. Grant.
Tennessee river and moving immediately upon Albert Sidney Johnston’s force, no matter where it was. There has been a great deal of criticism of General Grant and General Sherman and all the generals at Shiloh, but there is only one thing that might be fairly criticised, and that was when General Smith landed the green troops on the west side of the river, he did not intrench them. We learned something from the failure to do that; it was a good lesson. From that time our army never stopped anywhere where there was an enemy near our front that we did not intrench; in fact, every soldier buried himself before he went to sleep. But we did not know anything about throwing up intrenchments then.

General Grant in his conversation with us after Shiloh said that when he knew the enemy had all their men in action during the day and yet he had been able to hold them, he had no doubt by midnight of the first day, that with Wallace’s twelve thousand men who had not fired a gun, he would have been able to defeat Beauregard in the morning and march on Corinth. When Buell came it was doubly sure. The two armies combined made a much larger force than Beauregard’s army.

Grant then said in a telegram that in two days he could take Corinth if he were allowed, but Halleck ordered them not to go beyond a certain point until he arrived. That order of General Halleck’s was the reason why Grant is criticised for not going forward when he had Buell’s army and his own. Grant was satisfied Corinth could have been captured in a two days’ campaign made immediately after Shiloh, without any additional reinforcements. After Corinth they had a movable force of 81,000 men, besides sufficient force for holding all territory acquired in any campaign. New Orleans and Baton Rouge were ours, and the enemy had only a single line of railroad from Vicksburg to Richmond, and in one move we had the opportunity to occupy Vicksburg and Atlanta without much opposition, but we continued to pursue the policy of distributing this great army and for nearly a year accomplished no great results from it, giving up the territory back to Nashville, holding only the line from the Tennessee river to Memphis.
As soon as General Halleck took command, General Grant was virtually relieved. He was second in command. That means nothing. I have heard General Grant say that when they were approaching Corinth he proposed that he should take what was known as the Army of the Mississippi under General Pope and swing to the south of Corinth on the enemy’s communication and flank Beauregard out of Corinth or make him come out and fight. But he says in his statement in relation to it that it was turned down so promptly and abruptly that he thought possibly he had made an un-military suggestion.

It was not long until Beauregard was driven out of Corinth, and General Halleck was called to Washington by President Lincoln to the command of the armies. General Grant, instead of being put back into the place he was entitled to, the command of the army, was simply given the command of the district of west Tennessee, the same district that I commanded afterwards, and it was quite a time before he was given the higher command of the Army of the Tennessee. Up to this time our Government and the officers in Washington had no confidence in Grant for some reason, and it is hard to tell why.

A criticism made by a staff officer to me of this action of General Halleck’s in not giving Grant the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and of the fact of Halleck, who had never fought a battle, being selected to go to Washington and take command of all the armies, shows the views at that time of men who were under General Grant and knew him:

As one reads the reports and makes comparisons, first Grant fighting at every opportunity, winning every battle, planning to move on the enemy after every battle, but stopped, humiliated after each campaign, and finally when given a command only allowed a district, while on the other hand Halleck, who had not fought a battle, who took fifty-five days or more with two men to the enemy’s one to make twenty miles, which by a simple flank movement could have been accomplished in two days, with one of the best opportunities of the war to capture or destroy an army of 50,000 men, Halleck who prevented Grant from reaping the full benefit of every battle he fought, is brought to Washington and given full command of all the armies, while Grant was not even allowed to resume command of the department he vacated, the record is most astonishing.
Halleck had no confidence in Grant. The officers in the field looked on in amazement, and wondered what the powers in Washington could be thinking about. Grant accepted whatever was given him, never making a word of protest or complaint.*

Right after Shiloh, General Grant was left with about fifty thousand men. The army of General Buell was moved to Chattanooga up the Tennessee river, proposing to occupy that country, but the enemy forced him clear to Louisville, so that all the ground we had gained was lost, except the line from the Tennessee river to Memphis, including west Tennessee, which Grant had to occupy with his fifty thousand men. And the result was the enemy took advantage of this condition and brought over from the west of the Mississippi river, Generals Van Dorn and Price and all their forces. They combined on Grant and the battles of Iuka and Corinth were fought and won, and General Grant says this was the most anxious period of his service. He was not satisfied with General Rosecrans, who did not follow up the enemy as he ordered him to do, and there was a great deal of friction among the officers there, so that General Grant did not think that we reaped the full results of the battle. However, he said nothing about that at the time. Generals McPherson and Ord and those officers that were there made a very strong protest to Grant in relation to the action of General Rosecrans and against his official report.

Just at that time, two days after the battle, I was in command of the Central Division of the Mississippi and had just finished the railroad from Columbus to Humboldt. I was down at Humboldt attending personally to the work, when I received a dispatch from General Grant, through General Quimby, my commanding officer, to report immediately to Corinth and take command of the second division of the Army of the Tennessee. I was dressed in a working blouse, only I had my shoulder straps on. There was a train just starting south.

I went aboard this train. When I reached Jackson, Tennessee, which was General Grant's headquarters, Col. Rawlins, his Chief of Staff, came aboard the train and asked the conductor if I was aboard. The conductor brought Rawlins

*Dodge Record.
to me. It was the first time I had ever seen him. He said General Grant was on the platform and wished to speak to me. I said to Colonel Rawlins, "I am not properly dressed to meet the Commander in Chief." Rawlins laughed and said, "You never mind about that; we all know about you." I went out to the platform and General Grant met me very cordially. He was no better dressed than I was, so that I was greatly relieved and felt at ease immediately. He thanked me for what I had been doing, and was very complimentary in praising the work I had accomplished in rebuilding the railroad in so short a time, and then he said, "I have assigned you to the Second Division of the Army of the Tennessee, and I want you to understand that you are not going down there to command a division of cowards." I had not then heard anything of the friction at Corinth. I did not know what he meant and I could not ask him, and, of course, I said nothing, but thanked him. When I got to Corinth, I ascertained that General Rosecrans in his report had denounced the second division commanded by General Davies as being a division of cowards because they fell back into the town, holding it when attacked by an overwhelming force of the enemy. On protest of General Davies, General Grant returned this report to General Rosecrans for correction, who, after investigating the matter, recalled the denunciation of the division, stating that he made it on the report of a staff officer.

As to the protests that were sent by Generals McPherson, Ord, Davies and other officers, General Grant, as a soldier, said right off: "I cannot relieve General Rosecrans; he has already fought two battles and won them." Then these officers appealed to Mrs. Grant. You know when she came to visit General Grant, any one who had grievances they did not like to take to Grant, took them to Mrs. Grant, who was always very kind. She used to say to us, "I have no influence with Ulysses on these questions but I will speak to him about it." Mrs. Grant, in speaking to me afterwards, said she talked to the General and told him how all the men felt about

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5The enemy have since come in on the Chewalla road and have driven in Davies' left. Our men did not act or fight well. I think we shall handle them.—Rebellion Records, ser. i. v. 17. pt. 1. p. 106.
General Rosecran's report. She said it greatly disturbed him but he refused to take any action, and that the next morning he came out of his tent with a dispatch in his hand, waving it with great glee, and said: "Julia, see this! It settles our troubles already." He had in his hand a dispatch from the War Department relieving General Rosecrans from the command at Corinth and appointing him to the command of the Department and Army of the Cumberland. General Grant said he believed he would be a success there and that he thought he would do better as a commanding officer than he did in a subordinate position.

After the failure of Grant and Sherman's first movement on Vicksburg, General Grant immediately made preparations for the second Vicksburg campaign. It is generally supposed he formed his plans of going to the rear of Vicksburg, long after he got into that country, but that is not true. He had formed these plans before he started, but he says he did not dare divulge them even to his staff officers or to report them to the War Department because he knew if he should make them known, they would be disapproved and his campaign stopped, as they were contrary to the military strategy and science then taught. He, therefore, kept them in his own mind. For a long time, high water in the Mississippi river blocked his progress. So while waiting for the river to fall, he kept his army busy trying every other plan that seemed feasible, until he could run the batteries and march his army to a position below Vicksburg, where he could cross the Mississippi river and go around Vicksburg and carry out his plans. I state this because there are a great many who claimed after the war that the plan of going to the south and rear of Vicksburg came from other officers, but Grant states in his Memoirs fully and frankly his plans of that campaign, and we know he never made a statement that was not true. General Grant said to me that the political situation in the North was such that unless he had carried out this original plan he would have had to fall back to Memphis again and renew the attempt by land. The excitement in the North was such that this movement would have caused the election to have gone against the administration, and that
alone, he thought, justified him in taking the great chances he did in this the greatest piece of strategy and the boldest and most successful that has been written in history.

As soon as the city of Vicksburg was captured, almost the very day, General Grant proposed to the Government that he should take his victorious army and move immediately on Mobile, but the Government had other plans and ordered that magnificent army, 70,000 strong to be again distributed.

General Parks' Ninth Corps which came from east Tennessee, was immediately sent back there. General Sherman, with the Fifteenth Corps, was sent to Memphis and started east across the country. He did not know where he was going. When he reached me at Corinth he said he had no idea what his objective point was. His orders were to go up the Tennessee river valley and rebuild the Memphis and Charleston road as he marched. So you see there is another case where a veteran army, after a great campaign, could have moved forward, and in a month or two they could have captured Mobile, or, as an army, they could have gone anywhere over the South.

After General Sherman got to Bear river he received General Grant's orders to take with him the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Army Corps and march as fast as possible to Chattanooga.

President Lincoln, against the advice of his Cabinet, sent General Grant around to take command of Chattanooga after the failure at Chickamauga; in fact they first tried to get General Thomas to take command of that army before they sent for General Grant.

On the 21st day of December, 1863, General Grant called to Nashville the officers he proposed to use in his next campaign. Generals Sherman, Sheridan, Rawlins and myself were there. General McPherson had gone north on a leave of absence. General Logan and the Fifteenth Corps were to be left at Huntsville. General Blair and the Seventeenth Corps were on the Mississippi river.

We were a sorry-looking lot, as our army had been away from any base of supplies for nearly a year and we were
poorly clad, most of us wearing soldiers’ overcoats. As soon as we reported, General Grant suggested that we call upon the military governor of Tennessee, Andrew Johnson. We found him in a fine mansion. He received us cordially and immediately opened with a tirade against the disloyal citizens, denouncing them and declaring that while he commanded Tennessee they need expect no favors from him. He was forceful in his talk and while speaking brought his fist down upon a piano, by which he was standing, with such force that you could hear it all over the room. We left immediately after this speech. No one made any comment but every one thought his tirade uncalled for. I had some experience with him as my corps wintered in middle Tennessee and had to subsist off the country, and every time I foraged on a prominent rebel, I felt Governor Johnson trying to stop it.

After returning to Grant’s headquarters, we took dinner; then General Sherman suggested that we go to the theatre, and all agreed. The army was then veteranizing and the theatre was full of soldiers on leave or returning. We all paid our way in, taking seats in the balcony. No one knew we were in Nashville. The play of “Hamlet” was on and it was being murdered. General Sherman was a fine Shakespearean scholar. I sat next to him and he criticised the play severely and loudly. I cautioned him and said, “Sherman, keep still; these boys down in the pit will discover you and then there will be a scene here.” Just at that time, there came on the grave digger’s scene, where the actor soliloquizes on Yorick’s skull, holding it in his hand. As he got about the middle of his discourse, a soldier way back in the rear, a tall man, stood up and yelled, “Say, pard, what is it? Yank or Reb?” The house came down in one great roar and General Grant said we better get out of there, and we got out.

Sherman then said, “Let’s go and get some oysters.” We hadn’t had any for a year, and he put General Rawlins forward to find the place. He took us to a very fair saloon. We went in; the place was nearly full, there was only one large table that would seat all of us and one man occupied it. There was a smaller table next to it. You know what a
modest man Rawlins was. He went up to this man and asked him if he would just as soon take the side table there, and let our party have the large one. He didn’t tell him who the party was, but the fellow looked at him, and said, “I guess this table is good enough for me.” Rawlins said, “I think we had better get out of here.” So out we went. Sherman then went for Rawlins and said if we depended upon him we would never get anything to eat, so Sherman hailed a police officer, and he showed us a basement where there was an oyster saloon kept by a widow. We went in there and ordered our oysters. That was the first time we had all gotten together to talk, and instead of eating oysters as we should have done, we went on talking to each other. Twelve o’clock approached and the woman came to us and said, “We are obliged to close up at twelve o’clock,” and asked us to pay our bill. We were obliged to get out of there, having eaten only half of the oysters. We went to General Grant’s headquarters where we camped for the night. When we got back, we had to tell the story of what occurred during the evening to the staff, and the papers had it in the morning. Before General Grant was up, the proprietor of the theatre, the saloon man where Rawlins got downed and the widow who turned us out were all up at headquarters expecting to be punished, I suppose, for the way they had treated the commanding general of the army, but they got to General Grant and he said, “That is all right; you obeyed your order.”

In the morning, I remember, General Grant took us to a back room of the house he occupied as headquarters, and laid down his plan for the winter campaign. He did not propose that his army should lay still that winter. His plan was this: he was to take thirty thousand men from the Chattanooga force, go down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to New Orleans, there take boats and with the navy make a combined attack on Mobile. Sherman was to go to Vicksburg, and with the Seventeenth Corps, which then lay at Vicksburg, and what force he could gather along the Mississippi river, move from Vicksburg on Meridian, and then as soon as Grant landed at Mobile, was to move down and join him. I was to
take the Sixteenth Army Corps and some ten thousand cavalry that had been organized by General William Sooy Smith at Nashville, and was to move south as far as the Tombigbee river, then to sweep west into Mississippi, meet Forrest and drive him out, and swing around by Corinth, destroying all the railroads and supplies in that country, and return to middle Tennessee. General Grant’s theory was to destroy everything in Mississippi, Tennessee and all that territory, so that the enemy could not occupy it again, and then in the spring he could concentrate all his forces for the spring campaigns. He believed that if he captured Mobile, he could move by the Alabama river as a base, capture Selma and Montgomery and approach Georgia on that line, having a water base instead of the long railroad line from Louisville which we had to protect in our Atlanta campaign.

We all returned to our commands prepared for the movement, but when General Grant presented his plans to Washington, President Lincoln disapproved of it for this reason—he was afraid if Grant took thirty thousand men from Chattanooga, Longstreet, who was encamped up east of Knoxville, wintering in east Tennessee, would come back and retake Chattanooga. But Grant considered that the forces he had left at Chattanooga and in east Tennessee were ample to hold all that country. This decision of Lincoln’s was a great disappointment to General Grant, so much so that he immediately went to Knoxville himself with the intention of taking the force that was at Knoxville under General Foster and going out to attack Longstreet and drive him out of east Tennessee, and then coming back and continuing his campaign. But when he got to Knoxville he found the winter so severe that Foster and the forces there thought they could not accomplish what he desired of them. He thought he had no time to bring other forces there, and finally concluded that Foster with his forces were doing better holding Longstreet than to attempt a winter campaign and perhaps not succeed.

Grant afterwards said to us one of the mistakes he made was that he did not carry out his original plan to attack Longstreet; therefore, no part of his plan was carried out except that General Sherman went to Vicksburg and marched
out to Meridian without meeting any force, and destroyed
the railroad. General William Sooy Smith with a cavalry
force undertook to join him, but was attacked and defeated
by Forrest in Mississippi and fell back to Memphis, so that
nothing was done the whole winter and we all lay there, those
great armies, from the time of the battle at Chattanooga
until the next May, without accomplishing anything. This
was the third plan of General Grant's that was turned down
by the Government.

When General Grant came back from Washington about
March 21, 1864, he called us again to Nashville and laid be-
fore us his plan for that year's campaign. He told us of his
visit to Washington and what President Lincoln said to him
and what he said to the President. I will not go into that,
only this far, that General Grant accepted his command upon
the condition that his plans should not be interfered with;
that he should have a right to carry them out on his own
judgment and that all the staff departments should be placed
under his command. Every one who was in the service knew
how difficult it was in the field to get prompt action from the
staff departments, especially the commissary and quarter-
master departments; they claimed allegiance only to the War
Department, and the staff departments in Washington did
not recognize the authority of any commanding general in
the field. The reason of that is because by law they were
subject only to the order of the Secretary of War. Mr. Lin-
coln answered General Grant's request by saying, "I cannot
give the order that the staff departments at Washington
shall obey you," but he said, "General Grant, there is no
authority here to order them to disobey your order but me
and you can rest assured I shall not." And he said, "I think
if your order comes up here, it will be obeyed."

General Grant laid down the principle which had always
been in his mind, that every Union army in the field that
faced a rebel army should move against it on a certain day
and fight it until one or the other was destroyed or cap-
tured. I heard him say to General Sherman when he laid
down the plan that he was going to move on the first day of
May: "Now, General Sherman, I expect you to keep so close
to Johnston and give him so much to do that he cannot take
any part of his army and send it to Lee. And I say to you
that if Lee sends any portion of his command to Johnston, I
will send you two men to his one.''

Under the theory of some of our leading officers which pre-
vailed for nearly three years in our war, it was not good policy
or strategy for two of our armies to fight at the same time.
The theory was that if one of them should be whipped they
could not succor each other. Grant's theory was that every
man in the field from the beginning of the war to the end,
every armed force, should move upon the enemy and keep
them busy. The enemy had the interior lines and therefore by
keeping them busy, they could not do as they did when our
army in the West was lying still while there was fighting in
the East, and the western rebel forces were sent east. Then
when our army in the West was fighting, the Army of the
Potomac would be lying still, and Longstreet and a great
many others were sent to the West. So that in fact while
they talk a great deal about preponderance in numbers, there
were very few battles fought in the Civil war where there
were not as many of the enemy facing us as there were men
on our side. It was just that policy of handling their forces
and sending them where the fighting was going on that Grant
said in this meeting of the 21st he proposed to stop.

After I got a Confederate leave at Atlanta, General Grant
in October, 1864, sent for me to come to City Point, before
General Sherman marched to the sea. I went down there and
spent ten days with General Grant and saw the armies of the
Potomac and James. General Grant was thinking of giving
me command there but General Rawlins advised me not to
take it. As we sat around the camp-fire in the evenings, Gen-
eral Grant told me the difficulties he had met in his campaigns
from the Wilderness to the James river and of his suc-
cesses and his defeats. The real fact is that in the movement
of May 1, 1864, there were only three armies successful; those
commanded by Grant, Sherman and Sheridan. Banks was a
failure up the Red River. Hunter, a splendid officer, was
overpowered in the Shenandoah valley, though at first he nearly reached Lynchburg, Virginia. Sigel was defeated and driven out of the valley and Butler was defeated at Bermuda Hundred.

There was great criticism of Grant in the East because he had not destroyed or captured Lee’s army, and when I left General Grant I returned by way of Washington and had a long and interesting interview with President Lincoln on Grant and his campaigns. To show the feeling, as Lincoln pointed out, of the Staff and the War Department and the Cabinet at Washington toward Grant and his campaigns, I give the dispatch that Grant sent and Lincoln’s answer. When Early defeated our forces in the Shenandoah valley, Grant wanted to send Sheridan there. There was great opposition to that in Washington; but he finally sent him against their protests and dispatched this word to General Halleck:

I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also.5

This was disregarding the timidity that kept a large force dodging to the right and left in front of Washington for fear the enemy might otherwise slip up and capture the city. Lincoln got hold of this telegram some way, and sent this characteristic dispatch to General Grant. It is a very important dispatch because it shows that Lincoln had absolutely lost all faith in everybody around him in Washington. He said:

This, I think, is exactly right as to how our forces should move, but please look over the dispatches you may have received from here even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here of “putting our army south of the enemy,” or of “following him to the death” in any direction. I repeat to you, it will neither be done nor attempted, unless you watch it every day and hour and force it.7

Think of that coming from the President of the United States with everybody subordinate to him, telling Grant unless he went there in person and saw that his order was car-

ried out it would not be done. Grant immediately went to Washington himself and put Sheridan in command, and you all know what Sheridan did.

Now, when we read the war records we see that there was no reason why each one of Grant’s recommendations made after every battle should not have been adopted. Distributing his armies with a view to holding territory, instead of attacking the enemy, which was Grant’s policy, was a fatal mistake, and the policy advanced that while one army was fighting a battle the others should be held in reserve and intact was also fatal to carrying out Grant’s policies. Again, even after all of Grant’s great victories, up to 1864, the only person in Washington in the Cabinet and in the War Department who had faith in General Grant was President Lincoln. As we look at the question after reading all the reports, it is evident if any one of Grant’s great plans had been carried out after Donelson, Shiloh, Vicksburg or Chattanooga, the West would have been freed of any great rebel forces and the greater part of our forces in the West would have been concentrated in the East. When the officers near General Grant discussed these questions with him, his answer at the time they occurred was that no doubt the authorities at Washington had good reasons for their actions which we did not know of; that we were only looking at one part of the great problem. But in after years General Grant could see as well as any one that every one of his plans should have been adopted, and that if our armies had been kept upon the move winter and summer, it would have brought success to our forces and terminated the war.

General Grant in discussing the criticisms upon him, said:

Twenty years after the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers who profess devotion to the nation trying to prove that the nation’s forces were not victorious. Probably they say we were slashed around Donelson to Vicksburg and Chattanooga, and in the East, Gettysburg to Appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out from sheer exhaustion. I would like to see truthful history written and history will do full credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the American citizen, no matter what section of the country he hailed from, or in what ranks he fought.
Speaking of those who opposed our country during the war, Grant gave his opinion:

The man who obstructs a war in which his nation is engaged, no matter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life or history. The most charitable posthumous history the stay-at-home traitor can hope for is oblivion.

I saw a great deal of General Grant after the war, and he was just the same in civil life that he was in the service. If there was nothing doing, General Grant didn't do anything himself. If you wrote him a letter or sent him a dispatch when the campaign was not on, he was slow in answering it, but the moment he got into the saddle, and you sent a letter or a dispatch, it seemed as though you got an answer before you had sent it. He seemed to anticipate just what you wanted. It was the same in civil life, so that as President and as General of the army, if some occasion for action arose, he met it and conquered it.

He stood high as a statesman abroad. I was all over Europe during the time he was President, and all the great civil questions that arose during his administration he met and solved, and Europe looked upon him as highly as a statesman as he had shown himself as a soldier.

He was so modest and simple that the impression of his greatness was absolutely forced upon one from his very acts. His simplicity astonished the world. No critic in this nation or any other has been able to write a word against his military course or civil life which carried strength enough to be mentioned a second time. Grant's greatness was admitted long before he left our shores, and although simply a citizen, he was honored as no one ever was before. Some critics of General Grant have said that during the war he absorbed from others many of his great qualities as a soldier, but no one can read the war records without seeing that the strength of his dispatches and orders, the boldness of his plans, his fearless attack of superior numbers and his decisive victories in the early part of the war were equal to if not superior to those of the last years of the war.
The great distinguishing qualities of General Grant were truth, courage, modesty, generosity and loyalty. He was loyal to every work and every cause in which he was engaged; to his friends, his family, his country, and his God, and it was these characteristics which bound to him with bands of steel all those who served with him. He gave to others honor and praise to which he was himself entitled. No officer served under him who did not understand this. I was a young man and given much larger commands than my rank entitled me to. Grant never failed to encourage me by giving me credit for whatever I did, or tried to do. If I failed he assumed the responsibility; if I succeeded, he recommended me for promotion. He always looked at the intentions of those who served under him as well as their acts. If they failed, he dropped them so quickly and efficiently that the whole country could see and hear their fall.

BURIAL OF BLACK HAWK.

The Iowa Gazette gives the following account of the burial of this celebrated chief:

"His body, we understand, was not interred, but was placed on the earth in a sitting posture, with his cane clenched in his hands, enclosed with slabs or rails. This is the manner in which the chiefs of the Sac nation are usually buried, and was done at his own special request. A considerable number of whites, we understand, were present at this disposition of his remains."—Albany, N. Y., The Jeffersonian, November 3, 1838.
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