The development of the doctrine of the soul among the Greeks

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Recommended Citation
https://doi.org/10.17077/etd.fpkokdng

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL AMONG THE GREEKS

by

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A Thesis
Presented to the Graduate Faculty of the State University of Iowa
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in the
Department of Philosophy and Psychology

Iowa City, Iowa
June, 1915.
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INTRODUCTION.

The history of philosophy is becoming more and more the history of ideas. The biographical method of studying the systems of particular men, except as their contributions throw a light upon the course of development of a thought-movement, is passing into disuse. This change is in large part, it would seem, due to the change in the conception of the study of history in general.

Just as when we study the history of a nation we are not so much concerned with events, wars, dynasties and happenings in and for themselves as we are in their results and meanings for the national life, so also when we concern ourselves with the history of philosophy, it seems most worth while to us to follow the movements of thought, with their ideas and ideals and their great controlling concepts, and to search out their inner meanings.

Not only this, but the genetic method now prevalent in psychology is invading the study of philosophy. For this method we are in large measure indebted to Darwin. His doctrine has to be sure proved inadequate for an explanation of the origin of species, but
Darwin's method, the genetic method, has revolutionized the whole field of research in regard to the development of man's physiological nature. On the same principle we study the unfolding of man's psychic nature, and in order to get some light on this phase of his life, we find it profitable to study the origins and developments of the great ideas which have been a working force in the process. One of these ideas, and perhaps the most fruitful and helpful (or shall we say the most misleading and pernicious) is the idea of the soul. It has permeated and largely controlled the history of philosophy since Plato. It has permeated the history of psychology, and, as many think, has handicapped its progress. The soul idea has been a prominent one in all systems of religion and philosophy, and to some extent in science, whether ancient, mediaeval or modern. It should be interesting, therefore, to follow up the history and development of an idea which has proven itself so persistent and so momentous, so aged and so universal, so incapable of exact definition yet refusing to be discarded. Its comprehension has been esteemed worthy of the best efforts of the most able minds that the human race has produced. All the theories of the Schoolmen and rationalists concerning the nature of mind and matter, and all metaphysical problems, have plainly been developmental forms of the soul-theories that were formulated by Plato and Aristotle, but especially as they were presented by Plato. The important question now becomes: How did Plato arrive at his notion of the soul?

It is the purpose of this thesis to enquire into the sources from which Plato drew when he constructed his doctrine of the soul. For, although Aristotle was followed more essentially by the later
Schoolmen, and Plato only by the earlier ones, yet the fact remains that Plato's treatment of the problem of the soul has influenced and permeated the religion of the Christian world to the present time, more than has any other thought system.

In the whole history of the soul-idea as we find it in religious and philosophic thought both before and after him, his doctrine appears to occupy the pivotal point. Since his time, all theories refer back to him. Before his time, we venture to say, all theories led up to him.

To those acquainted with the history of philosophic thought since the time of Plato, the various theories upon the subject in question are generally familiar; but even among scholars there are perhaps comparatively few who have stopped to ask what were the foundations upon which Plato built. But if Plato formulated a soul-doctrine that all subsequent philosophers have found it necessary to adhere closely to the general framework which he furnished, then it must be that the foundation upon which he built was of greater importance than any contributions or elaborations that have been attempted since his time. In fact that is just the claim we would make. Undoubtedly the two thousand years or better that have elapsed since Plato, have been less fruitful for the development of the soul-idea than were the efforts of the human race in this direction during the long periods before the time of this philosopher. It is to these older efforts that we are now directing our attention.

Although written language was invented about ten thousand years ago, we have few written historical records of any kind exceeding four thousand years in age; yet the oldest records that we possess are full of suggestions concerning the attitudes which were taken
by ancient peoples toward the soul-question. We also feel safe in inferring that the traditions and customs prevalent among such races as have remained out of contact with civilizing influences retain the concepts of more primitive times. But though we have few written accounts and few names of great thinkers that have come down to us from a remote past, yet there are unmistakable evidences that powerful thinking was done, and that certain ideas exerted a controlling sway over the lives of races and individuals. May it not be true that these early concepts, formed, perhaps more intuitively than rationally, more nearly correspond with the real facts than those which have later been formulated according to the rules of logic and scientific procedure?

It seems probable that the most primitive notions concerning the nature of the soul contain something of truth within them, and that with increasing development of psychic life, such notions became richer and nobler. Intellect served a function in the process of comprehending the vital problems of existence, but it could not proceed far apart from the feeling side of the psychic organization. We must agree with Professor Bergson who says in his Creative Evolution (p. 165): "We see that the intellect, so skillful in dealing with the inert, is awkward the moment it touches the living. Whether it wants to treat the life of the body or the life of the mind, it proceeds with the rigor, the stiffness and the brutality of an instrument not designed for such use. The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life. Instinct, on the contrary, is molded on the very form of life. While intelligence treats everything mechanically, instinct proceeds, so to
speak, organically. If the consciousness that slumbers in it should awake, if it were wound up into knowledge instead of being wound off into action, if we could ask and it could reply, it would give up to us the most intimate secrets of life."

The soul-problem remains out-side of our comprehension more completely if we approach it entirely from an intellectual viewpoint than if we approach it in conjunction with the emotional side of our nature, more especially religious emotion or experience. Even Professor James had to resort to the expression "mysterious" when he referred to the soul. In his Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, P. 181, he "posits a soul influenced in some mysterious way by brain-states. The bare phenomenon, however, the immediately known thing which on the mental side is in apposition with the entire brain-process is the state of consciousness and not the soul itself."

It is thus evident that our most modern and prominent thinkers are as unable to tell us the exact nature of the soul as were the Greek thinkers who lived two or three thousands years ago. The ablest then as now seem to agree that the soul can be intuitively felt rather than intellectually described.

Professors Bergson and James have come to the conclusion that the soul can not be intellectually comprehended after they have had recourse to all the best works on the soul-problem from the days of Plato to the present time. These works have been stupendous efforts, and among them we note the writings of Plotinus and other neoplatonists who concerned themselves largely with the question of the origin and nature of the soul, as did also the Church Fathers and the Schoolmen, "who adopted in turn the different theories of the Greeks."
St. Augustine, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Occam, rendered epoch-making contributions to the soul-concept. These essentially Christian philosophers who set themselves the task of harmonizing religious mysticism with logic and science, were succeeded by Descartes, who was a determined opponent of animism, and who presented a theory of distinct dualism." (Ibid p. 231). Then came Spinoza who declared that, "Substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance." (Ethic II, Prop.VII).

Leibnitz, in his "New System of the Nature of Substances," and of the communication between them, tells us that it was the "problem of the union of the soul and body that led him to consider the general problem of the intercommunication of substances."

For Fichte there is only one substance, the infinite Ego, and that is the only soul which he recognizes.

Then we have Fechner, Lotze, Wundt and other idealists whose especial aim was to try to solve the soul-problem.

When we review the efforts of all these powerful intellects to know the soul in its essence, and observe that up to the present time they have remained futile from a scientific point of view, we are inclined to say that perhaps it is destined that its nature shall always remain an enigma to us. But on the other hand, have we not also a right to maintain that such efforts can never be without beneficent results? Is not the very striving to know itself a valuable manifestation of soul nature? The capacity to strive indicates vitality and growth, and seems to be one of the very attributes the exercise of which develops its powers, sets it upon a higher plane, and causes it to soar closer to the source from which it originated, if we may borrow a figure from Plato.
Why should man seek to know his soul, from whence it came, for what purpose it exists, what it is, how it came, why it should be, and whither it is going? His soul, he feels, is, as Aristotle said, that which really is; and in striving to find himself, his soul discovers a means of expressing itself.

It has been this desire to find himself and to understand his relation to the world in which he lives, that has led man in all times to ponder upon the phenomena which he has experienced, both in his waking life and in his dreams. He early learned to recognize the fact that the objects of his dreams had not been bodily present even though they had seemed very real to him. He knew that his body had not moved from its resting place, he had uttered no sound, and the objects which he had encountered so vividly had not been near him. What was in him, then, that had walked or talked or fought, and what was it in the enemy, in the beast or in the thunder-bolt that had seemed so real to him at the moment, even though the experiences had rapidly vanished? The most natural explanation was that all objects are endowed with a mysterious something capable of existing not alone within the body to which it belongs but also as an independent entity. He inferred that when a man was asleep this entity or spirit could leave his body for a short time and go out into the world to encounter other spirits which had likewise become temporarily separated from the individuals to whom they belonged. He concluded that it was not only other human beings than himself who possessed something which he thought of as spirit, but also animals, plants, objects, and the forces of nature. And the spirit, he reasoned, must be a very real and potent thing, for when the spirit of a man stayed away too long, he died. The same must hold good of animals and plants. When their spirits departed, death and decay set in. But their spirits live
on, for did not the spirits of deceased relatives or of pet animals reappear in the experience of the dreamer even after many seasons had elapsed since their death?

It was probably rather by instinct than by reason that primitive man inclined to interpret the world in terms of himself, that is anthropomorphically. Thus, everything that he could see, hear or feel appeared to be closely akin to himself. The sun, the moon, the fire, the river, the mountain, the wind-storm were actuated by spirits resembling his own.

It would seem that in man's earliest acquaintance and interpretation of nature, it did not seem very friendly toward him. It was full of terrors to him and he was its helpless victim. It displayed to him a multitude of forces that were to be feared while he was the victim of their capricious activities which he was powerless to understand. For the lightning, the earth-quake or the devastating cyclone, he had no rational explanation nor even a scientific hypothesis with which to calm his excited emotions. The havoc and suffering that followed in the wake of storm or flood or volcanic outbreak were evils that were angrily inflicted by some mysterious powers whose only meaning were cruel authority and danger. He could not at first have conceived of these unseen powers as possessing any real traits of personality but rather as mechanical manifestations of force combined with some degree of will and intelligence.

This stage in man's development could not have been a very happy one. More modern thinkers have sometimes loved to refer to the advantages that life held out to the primeval man of the forest, and have extolled the natural state of the human mind before it had advanced very far in its search for knowledge and in the profound problems of civilized thought; but we fail to see why the primitive man
should have been happier or better off with his crude notions of vague quasi-mechanical spirits that dominated over his timid, undefined self which had as yet arrived at no definite conception of self-conscious personality.

Man early learned to fear the powers of nature for his strongest instinct was that of self-preservation. Fortunately, the fear-instinct in his psychic life was not the only one that strove to take out its rights. He had a homing-instinct that demanded recognition, and he craved sympathy and happiness. His manifold emotional nature awakened to the sense of beauty coincident with the feeling of joy and well-being that he experienced when eating luscious fruits, or drinking sparkling water, or riding graceful animals. His gliding canoe upon the gently flowing stream; the tonic, exhilarating experience of the clear air as he climbed the mountain-side; even the stones that resisted his efforts to move them, yet offered him an inducement to exercise and so increased his bodily vigor; and the lights in the sky that beamed upon him by day and by night; each and all of these had meaning for him. They seemed to answer with something of their inherent substance to his own personality. That which he experienced was conceived by him as a power residing in the objects, a mysterious potency which, though not seen, was yet recognized by him as being real and active. He felt it as a subtle bond of life common to himself and nature, but as yet it was, perhaps as mechanical as it was personal.

A time came when this mysterious something, at first conceived in the abstract became concrete. The unseen power was no longer one vague, unnamable potency, everywhere the same but it was split up into the many. The many were consigned to particular objects
and localities. The power peculiar to an object or spot took on a definite personal quality, with personal attributes of intelligence, will and capriciousness. These indwelling powers were recognized distinctly as spirits and became almost infinite in number. There were spirits of mountain-peaks, of rivers, of stars, of dawn, of trees, of places, and of animals, an innumerable host.

Everything that existed had now been conceived of as endowed with spirit or life, and the spirit of a thing was that which made it alive. This idea was carried out even in funeral rites. In the tombs of the departed loved ones, primitive man placed food and broken weapons, broken in order that their freed souls might serve the souls that had left their human habitations. The articles were broken that their spirits might not be tempted to cling to or return to the objects.

We find, as we should expect, that spirits were thought of as higher and lower, yet all spirits had attributes similar to those of human beings and animals, for we find that trees and plants were assumed to have souls in both human and animal form. In ancient Greece the water or river-spirit had the form of a horse, bull or serpent. The spirit of the growing corn and of vegetation in general was personified as the corn-spirit, and forest-trees had spirits that were goat-footed.

In the lower stages of culture, man did not recognize any great distinction between the psychic attributes of the lower animals and himself. Indeed, he often attributed much greater power and cunning to them than to human beings. In his conception of them he did not deny them powers of reasoning or even of speech. He undoubtedly admitted that they possessed souls quite as early as he thought of one for himself. The idea that natural forces,
objects, plants, animals and human beings have souls, does not in its earliest stages appear to have had anything to do with religion.

Animism is in the first instance an explanation of phenomena rather than an attitude of mind toward the cause of them. The term may, however, be conveniently used to describe the early stage of religion in which man endeavors to set up relations between himself and the unseen powers, conceived as spirits, but differing in many particulars from the gods of polytheism. As an example of this stage in one of its aspects may be taken the Egyptian belief in the corn-spirit, which is, however, the object of magical rather than religious rites. Dr. Fraser has thus defined the character of the animistic pantheon: "They are restricted in their operations to definite departments of nature; their names are general, not proper; their attributes are generic rather than individual; in other words, there is an indefinite number of spirits of each class, and the individuals of a class are much alike; they have no definitely marked individuality; no accepted traditions are current as to their origin, life and character." (N.W. Thomas).

Animism appears to be primitive to ancestor-worship, for in the majority of primitive cultures "the pantheon is made up by a multitude of spirits in human, sometimes in animal form, which bear no signs of ever having been incarnate; sun gods and moon goddesses, gods of fire, wind and water, gods of the sea, and above all gods of the sky, show no signs of having been ghost gods at any periods of their history. (N.W. Thomas: Animism, in the Encyclopedia Brittanica, Vol. II. p.54).
II

MOIRA.

(See Cornford's Book entitled From Religion to Philosophy for all references referred to as "Cornford").

While primitive man was learning to look upon the whole visible world as teeming with spirit forces, he was also forming a conception of an over-ruling power that was controlling and dominating the whole, for we find that from very early times the world was regarded as the kingdom of Destiny. Destiny is called Moira or Lachesis in Greek sources, and was an impersonal force which determined order in the universe. (Cornford, p22) It was conceived as more fundamental than the gods both in time and in potency. Moira was mentioned by classical writers as a "personification" who stood for the provincial ordering of the world, but she was not a deity. (Cornford, p.21). The term was a mere representation that stood for the notion of Destiny or Necessity. It was a something that determined the happenings in an orderly manner, and must have implied a meaning to the primitive mind closely analogous to the modern concept of natural law.

The term Moira was no doubt invented by Greek thinkers of an advanced period in Greek life as a race, but the force of Moira had made itself in man's mind long ages before. We say that it
was felt. It was not an invention of the primitive man, but some-
thing which he met with as already existing. We must not suppose
that his conception of Moira was clearly distinguished or differ-
entiated by him, it was simply comprehended as a mysterious, power-
ful something which was beyond his control, but which governed his
life in a very essential manner.

It was to him the undefinable, unfathomable reality which gov-
erned him despotically and to which he must submit in a large measure
that he might be permitted to even exist.

In its broadest sense, Moira stands for that which determines
order in the universe, but the primeval man must have had but the
faintest possible notion of an over-ruling Destiny that controls
the all. He undoubtedly had a much clearer conception of that
which the term stands for in a more constricted meaning where it
signifies the "collective representation of group life." (Cornford,
p.46). The very fact that the term is used with both the narrower
and the broader signification in Greek literature implies that the
one meaning developed from the other. The notion that order must
reign in the universe must have grown out of a recognition that or-
der is a necessary factor for the existence of group-life.

Moira in the sense where it signifies "the collective represen-
tation of group life," was a very true reality indeed in primitive
man's experience. It was, in a sense, the most stubborn fact which
he had to encounter. Of the rule of moira he was always conscious,
always reminded—so much so indeed that he found little or almost
no room to conceive of himself as an individual. The "collective
representation" of his group life exerted an authority over him
which he had little power and perhaps little inclination to resist.
To be sure, he lived in a world of inner and outer sensations, and of
movements and activities peculiar to his organism, but he knew that he had no right to demand that any of his desires or pursuits be respected as being his in any individual sense, it was only as a member of his group that he had any rights. He must go to no places that were forbidden by his tribe, he must not marry except with its sanction. He must not eat certain kinds of flesh, must not dress except after a definitely prescribed fashion. He was compelled to undergo certain rites of initiation into the customs and beliefs of his people, and he was obliged to follow his pursuits of hunting, fishing and warfare according to established rules. He was controlled by moira at all times and under all conditions. His parents had been influenced by it in giving him his earliest care and training. All his experiences throughout his life were colored by it. Even his burial rites and his beliefs in a hereafter were subject to the power of moira. It was thus brought constantly to his attention that he was not free to do as he pleased, but that he was ever under the domination of unseen power outside of himself, of moira.

Thus the primitive man was impressed with the notion that he was subject to a power or authority existing apart from his own objective body, that he was in fact, not his own, but the victim of a something not himself. For at this early stage the "average" man or "subject" within the group does not appear to have oriented himself as an individual member in the collective group having a voice in its affairs, nor fights demanding recognition. The herd-instinct within him prompted him to seek its protection, while at the same time he submitted to its rules and contributed his allegiance. The necessity for order in his group was no doubt gained
through many bitter experiences. The facts were forced upon his
powers of observation again and again until he comprehended that
certain forms of activity led to certain results in his relations
to his fellow-beings. These results whether of punishment or
success seemed to be contingent upon authority as well as upon
order as expressed in the customs that existed in his environment.
If therefore authority and order were indispensable features in the
narrower realm of the group, why should not the same hold true for
the larger realm, for nature in its entirety?

Moira, the power that makes for order in the group, is moral,
for that which is sanctioned by, which conforms to its established
customs, is right and just. Likewise, moira as the power that
orders the happenings in nature, is the principle of which ordains
both what must be and what ought to be. "Moira is a representation
of the Necessity and Justice (Must and Ought) of the elemental
disposition. That is the whole content of the notion of Destiny."
(Cornford, p.21.).

Moira, as we have noted was at first an impersonal power, older
than the gods and superior to them, but when she is later mentioned
as Lachesis, she appears to have taken on a more personal quality;
for in Pindar's description of the division among the gods she
presides in person. "The ancient legends tell how that, when Zeus
and the immortals were dividing among them the earth, Rhodes had
not yet appeared upon the surface of the ocean, but the island lay
hidden in the salt depths. Helios was not there so that no one
designated a lot for him, and they left the holy god without an
allotted land. When Zeus was reminded, he was about to order a
fresh drawing of lots; but Helios would not suffer him, because he
said that his own eye saw within the gray sea, growing up from the
the bottom, a land that would feed a multitude of men and be kindly to flocks. And immediately he bade Lachesis of the golden front-let hold up her hands and not gainsay the Great Oath of the Gods, but rather with the son of Kronos affirm, that when the island should be sent up into the open light of day, it should be a seat reserved for him for the time to come." (Cornford, p. 22).

The anthropomorphic tendency is in evidence in all of these concepts of the primitive mind. We see how Moira came to be supreme in nature over all the subordinate wills of men and Gods, because it was first supreme in human society, which was continuous with nature. Here, too, we find the ultimate reason why Destiny is moral; it defines the limits of mores, of social custom." (Cornford, p. 51). And when moira had been conceived to be the ruler not alone of the group but in all nature, it tended to be thought of not merely as a mechanical power making for order but as a moral entity possessing certain attributes characteristic of intelligent personality.
Moira as the constraining, moral power within the group was conceived as intimately bound up with the constraining power in nature. Cornford says: "We have now to watch the process by which this force (moira) shapes itself unto spirits, gods and human souls, and to realize that this process, with all its advance in clearness of conception and imagery, is as it were an over-growth, which leaves untouched beneath it the fundamental conceptual framework within which it springs up."

Moira was "the socially organized force expressed by a group." In other words moira was what we would call custom. But, "we may go a step further and say that custom and nature were, not merely harmonious, but identical." (Cornford). This identity is illustrated in totemism. The totemic group, "consisting of its human members and their totem-species, is defined by the collective function it exercises as a continuous whole." (Cornford). The essential principle of totemism "involves an extension of the structure and classification of human society to include the departments of the non-human universe." (Cornford).

It cannot be conclusively proven that totemism in the form that we find it among other primitive races ever prevailed among
the early Greeks, but we have good right to infer that it did, for the reason that they practiced magic, and it can be shown "that a great part of magical practice is essentially based on a certain relation of continuity between a human and a non-human group—a continuity which is said to amount to identity. This is all our thesis demands. Totemism is merely a social system in which this fundamental representation has hardened into a permanent framework still extant for our observation." (Cornford).

Cornford says that the word totem means simply 'tribe'; "and this fact marks that the totem rather is the social group, embracing human and non-human members alike, than an external badge, or attribute or anything of that sort."

It is evident that in the savage mind there was an absence of any sense of distinction between the human tribe and its totem-species. This fact is emphasized by the definition of the term totem as given by Andrew Lang, as follows: "Totem denotes the object generally of a natural species, animal or vegetable, but occasionally rain, cloud, star, wind, which gives its name to a kindred. Each child inherits this name either from its mother or its father. Between each person and his or her name-giving object, a certain mystic rapport is supposed to exist. The individual may not kill or eat the name-giving object of his kin, except under dire necessity; while less usually it is supposed to protect him and give him monitory dreams. Among the many guesses at the original purpose of totemism, one has been that the primal intention of totem sets of human beings was to act as magical cooperative stores for supplying increased quantities of food to the tribe... The myths of savages as to the origin of totemism are of no historical value. Some savages claim descent from the totem object; others believe that an
original race of animals peopled the world; animals human in character, but bestial, vegetable, astral or what not in form. These became men while retaining the rapport with their original species..... All the myths of savages, except mere romantic Märchen, and most of the myths of peoples who, like the Greeks, later became civilized, are "aetiological," that is, are fanciful hypotheses made to account for everything, from the universe, the skies, the sun, the moon, the stars, fire, rites and ceremonies, to the habits and markings of animals. Of the origin of these beliefs, which have practical effects in the evolution of society and religion, much is conjectured. Whether or not survivals of totems are to be found in the animal worship of ancient Egypt, in the animal attendants of Greek gods, in Greek post-Homeric legends of descent from gods in various bestial disguises, it is impossible to be certain." (Andrew Lang's Social Origins, Encyclopedia Brittanica, Vol. 27, p.79).

This absence of any sense of distinction between the human tribe and its totem-species was in its positive aspect what one might term a "sympathetic continuum." It represented the collective consciousness which embraced in the concept of the primitive mind both the moral power of the group and the moral power of nature. This sense of collective consciousness or "sympathetic continuum" tended like all other concepts belonging to this stage in man's mental history to take on an anthropomorphic character. It was a collective consciousness, therefore it was felt as superindividual or superhuman. It was experienced as the collective emotion and activity of the group, thus it was recognized as manifesting energy, as a bond of "kinship" uniting a social group—a supposed vehicle of sympathetic interaction. "Kinship is to our minds an
immaterial entity—a relation. But, as we have said, to conceive anything in early forms of thought, was to conceive of it as material, as possessing bodily existence. "The Logos of Heracleitus, the Being of Parmenides, the Nous of Anaxagoras, the Love and Hate of Empedocles, are all indubitable possessed of material and spatial properties. Even when the term 'bodiless', 'incorporeal' makes its appearance in Plato, it is often doubtful how many properties it negates.... We may be certain, then, that when a savage was driven to form a mental image of the collective nature or powers of his group, he would conceive them as a subtle and mobile form of matter, not distinguished from vital force." (Cornford).

Evidently, then, group-consciousness was a mysterious entity to the savage mind possessing material and objective reality and in addition something of a living and personal nature. This consciousness had active and emotional phases, it expressed the social force of the group, and the only form in which it could be conceived was that of "a material continuum, the substrate of kinship and the vehicle of sympathetic interaction within the group." (Cornford: Contents XVII: also p. 83).

It was this material conception of the substrate of kinship between the human tribe and the objects and forces of nature that constituted the vitality of totemism. This material substrate, expressing itself as collective emotion and activity, was regarded as "fluid charged with life." (Cornford). This fluid was held to be identical with the common blood of the kin, having the peculiarity, however, that it was a "mythical entity", uniting the members of totemic clans rather than the blood-relatives of the tribe.
The conception of the social consciousness as a material entity was the source from which sprang the ideas of spirits, Gods and human souls. It was, in fact, the source of primary religion.

As representing the collective life of the group in its dynamic expression, it was the soul of the group. As representing super-individual or super human power, it gave rise to the notion of the divine, of God. "The notion of the soul sprang from the original fact of group-consciousness, while the notion of God, as distinct from Soul, arose by differentiation." (Cornford: p.90).

The recognition of group-consciousness as a material entity led to belief in its activity as a potency possessing attributes characteristic of sentient life, that is, powers of thinking, willing and acting such as primitive man ascribed to animals as well as to himself. The mental imagewhich he formed of the powers of his group was that of a supernatural power that worked to effect everything which was beyond the ordinary power of man and outside of the common processes of nature. This group-consciousness found expression in sympathetic emotion and collective action, and the members recognized a bond of solidarity which caused them to act and react upon each other. This bond was felt to exist not among human members alone but to the non-human kindred as well, to the totem. The human members naturally desired to win their non-human kindred to their favor. This desire was the basis of magic.

In the earliest type of magic the human and non-human members were not distinguished, and neither could be said to control the other (Cornford, p.76). The magical ceremonies were essentially cooperative and sympathetic. The means employed were generally mimetic dances, in which magical action consisted in actually doing that
which the performers wanted done. The magicians were not merely imploring their group-totems for the gift of rain but they recognized an identity of the group with its totem-members so that they believed themselves to be "making rain," not merely mimicking rainfall as a ceremonial process. (Cornford, p.77).

In this primitive magic there was no religious representation. The collective life and emotion of the group were felt as a collective power, but there was no image of another power as contrasted with the group consciousness. All that existed were the natural facts of collective emotion, desire and action.

It is thus evident that the primitive mind recognized the psychological facts which modern students of social science designate as social consciousness, mob-mind, herd-instinct, crowd-suggestion, etc., but with this difference that these phenomena were not looked upon as the manifestations of mental laws but as the activities of a material entity possessing bodily existence and personal attributes. As an example of the possible existence of such a state of mind we may refer to a statement by Messrs. Spencer and Gillen to the effect that "the Central Australian natives ... have no idea whatever of the existence of any supreme being who is pleased if they follow a certain line of what we call moral conduct, and displeased if they do not do so. They have not the vaguest idea of a personal individual other than an actual living member of the tribe, who approves or disapproves of their conduct." (Cornford, pp.78-79).

Magical practice at this stage had no need for a God. It was satisfied with the power that was expressed by the sympathetic force which it possessed and exercised in the cooperation of the human and non-human members of the group. No God was here required
since man and nature were one. Nature was not worshipped by man in the practices of magic. Man, as represented by the magician, made the rain fall, was himself the 'rain-maker', as distinct from the man of a later stage who worshipped a spirit of God, distinct from himself in power, offering the deity gifts and praying for benefits in return.

The kindred blood pervading a magical group, or in other words, a totemic group, was not natural but mythical, even though it was conceived to be a material fluid. The magical ceremonies were simple and business-like, mere acts to influence the weather or to bring about increased food-supplies. Gradually, however, these simple processes commenced to "gather round them the apparatus of mystical rites, which at all times resort to emotional stimulants, with the very purpose of restoring the old sense of perfectly unbroken communion." (Cornford, p.91).

This primitive social consciousness is the source of two collective representations. At first the group-soul was a unity or identity of man's ego with nature. The continuity was unbroken and undifferentiated as we have seen in our study of the phenomena which we called the sympathetic continuum. This group consciousness comes to be recognized as the soul of the group; while in the sense that its attributes are felt to be superhuman, it takes on the nature of being not a part of the natural order but above it, and it becomes divine, becomes God.

When group-consciousness had thus been comprehended as something more than the common group soul, as a something existing above and apart from man and his kindred, as a God, simple magic
commenced to be superseded by ceremonies of a radically different nature. Magic gave place to religion.

The magician was no longer the rain-maker executing his mimetic dances to bring down the rain because he was en rapport with nature, but he became the priest who interceded for the people by means of prayers and offerings to persuade the God to grant the coveted blessing as a gift.

The "sympathetic continuum" or mysterious fluid was thus "separated into two pools." (Cornford:p.92). Simple, primitive magic was represented by one force consisting of the magical powers of the human group or clan, while the other force was a something in Nature, not continuous with the human tribe, but which could be wooed, flattered or bribed. This something in Nature became less and less human but increasingly more mysterious. Its ways were no longer the same as ours. It commenced to acquire a will of its own. "The liberated force may acquire, one after another, any or all of the attributes of personality, by an advance which moves, step for step, with the advance of self consciousness in its worshippers. At whatever point the worshippers stop, the God will be arrested too. He may crystallize as the vague, impersonal genius or daemon of his moira—a power resident in some department and strictly confined to it. Or,like the Greek Gods, he may travel the whole road to completely self-conscious personality, and become a figure so distinct that, if he would visit mankind unrecognized, he is forced to assume a disguise, since any one who met him in the street would instantly know him by sight. (Cornford: p.92).
The parting of the magical continuum into two pools overthrew the totemic type of social structure. The human tribe was no longer identical with its totems. The outline of a group of kindred was determined by real affinity of blood, while in Nature the old province of Moira could still remain in force. The rule of Moira or custom within the human group had now become distinct from the rule of Moira or Destiny, the supreme power in the universe. The social consciousness of the human group was its group-soul, and its nature consisted of its collective functions.
Another type of group, the magical group, arose, however, whose powers were no longer limited to one totem-species, as had been the case when the primitive type of magic had been practiced, and this latter form with its magical organizations claimed a wider control over Nature, over the sun and rain and thunder, and over the weather and the elements. "In Greek legends these magical societies are mentioned as the Satyrs, Telchines, Kouretes, and others, and in some cases they survived as secret cult-societies far into historic times." (Cornford:p.94).

These secret societies claimed exceptional powers. Their members were something more than ordinary mortals, embodying magical, superhuman force. Their force was derived from the collective soul or daemon of the society, and "the members were daemones in so far as the soul of the society resided in them, but they were set apart in a peculiar way." (Cornford:p.96). This mysterious soul of the magical group was quite distinct from that daemon or collective soul whose structure was based on natural blood-relationship. This daemon was restricted to a particular kin, surviving the death of any individual or generation. It transmitted hereditary qualities, including the taint of hereditary guilt and entailing collective responsibility.

IV.

DEMONOLOGY.
Thus there were daemons of magical societies and daemons of clans. There were daemons also of nature, a fire-daemon, a water-daemon, a fever-daemon, and a host of others. All the affairs of life were supposed to be under the control of daemons among peoples who have held to daemonology. Each daemon ruled a certain element or even object, while they were themselves in subjection to a greater spirit. They were superhuman beings, but they were not gods.

(Thomas: Demonology: Encyclopedia Brittanica: Vol. 8, p. 5). The original sense of the term "daemon" was a benevolent being, but the demonology of some peoples was especially complicated.

Natural causes, either of death or disease, have hardly if at all been recognized by the uncivilized; everything has been attributed to spirits or magical influence of some sort. "The daemon theory of disease is still attested by some of our medical terms; epilepsy (Greek ἕπιλψις seizure) points to the belief that the patient is possessed. As a logical consequence of this view of disease the mode of treatment among peoples in the lower stages of culture is mainly magical; they endeavor to propitiate evil spirits by sacrifice, to expel them by spells, to drive them away by blowing; to keep away disease by placing thorns and brushwood in the paths leading to places decimated by the disease, in the hope of making the disease demon retrace his steps." (Thomas: Demonology: Encyclopedia Brittanica: Vol. 8, p. 5).

A nature-daemon was the force or soul resident in some species of material phenomena. It was the soul of a group, not of an individual thing, except in cases where a species happened to have only one member, as, for instance, the sun. "It is for this reason that daemons, in Greek theology as elsewhere, remain impersonal; they consist of will and force without individuality, because they
are each the soul, not of an individual object, but of a species or kind, (γ' γος), to which they are related exactly as the daemon of a human kindred (γ' γος) is related to his group." (Cornford; p. 97).

Although demons were regarded as spirits they were not regarded as such in a strictly modern sense of the term. They were often supposed to give real proof of their bodily existence and were thought of as possessing material existence of some sort so that it is evident that they were never held to be mere representations of abstract mental forces.

As recognized by primitive animism, demons might be discarnate spirits which had never inhabited a body, or they might be the spirits of a departed superior human race. According to Hesiod the men of the golden race became after death guardians or watchers over mortals. "The evocation of spirits, especially in the form of necromancy, is an important branch of the demonology of many peoples. Sometimes the spirits were summoned to appear as did the phantoms of the Greek hero to Odysseus; sometimes they were summoned to enter a crystal; sometimes they are merely asked to declare the future or communicate by moving external objects without taking a visible form." (Thomas: Demonology: Encyclopedia Brittanica: Vol.8. p.5).

"Corresponding to these personal tutelary spirits there were genii of buildings and places. The assignment of genii to buildings and gates was connected with an important class of sacrifices; in order to provide a tutelary spirit or to appease chthonic deities it was often the custom to sacrifice a human being or an animal at the foundation of a building; sometimes a similar guardian was provided for the frontier of a country or of a tribe."
"Another important conception was that of the so-called corn-spirit. The life of the corn was supposed to exist apart from the corn itself and to take the form, sometimes of an animal, sometimes of a man or woman, sometimes of a child. The animal which popular belief identified with the corn-demon was sometimes killed in the spring in order to mingle its blood or bones with the seed; at harvest-time it was supposed to sit in the last corn, and the animals driven out from it were sometimes killed; in some instances the reaper who cut the last ear was said to have killed the "wolf" or "dog", and sometimes received the name wolf or dog and retained it until the next harvest. Side by side with the conception of the corn-spirit as an animal was the anthropomorphic view of it; and this element must have predominated in the evolution of the cereal deities like Demeter; at the same time traces of the association of gods and goddesses of corn with animal embodiments of the corn-spirit are found." (Ibid).

With these nature daemons who were the soul of some species of natural phenomena such as the spirit of the corn, or of the wind, may be classed also the spirits of striking natural features—river, rocks, trees, mountains, wells, etc.—which among the Greeks tended to be female (nymphs).

Then there were local good daemons of fertility whose functions consisted mainly in providing an abundant and regular supply of the fruits of the earth. They were mentioned by Herodotus who described them as a class of divine beings who belong to a phase of Greek religion which preceded Olympianism. "We must think of Greece, in pre-Olympian days, as parcelled out among as many of these undifferentiated local fertility spirits as there were distinct agricultural communities." (Cornford p.98).
When a tribe passed into the agricultural state its chief center of interest was naturally the land which it tilled, and the earth was looked upon as the source of the mysterious properties which bring forth her products. The earth was personified as Tyche or Fortuna, while each agricultural group had a local Good Spirit "possessing the bare elements of personality." (Cornford: p. 98).

Among the primitive Greeks four types of daemons were recognized, namely, (1) the daemon of the social group united by blood-kinship; (2) the local Good Spirit of fertility, embodying the life-giving power of the earth inhabited by a particular group; (3) the daemon of a magical society exercising a magical control over nature; (4) the daemon of a natural element or department as in the case of the corn-spirit or wind-daemon. "From these four types of daemons there emerge four types of divine beings who are individual—the King, the Hero, the Mystery God, and the Olympian." (Cornford: p. 101).

In primitive society the concept of group-consciousness apparently played a more prominent role than the concept of individual consciousness. The customs of his tribe dominated the savage so rigorously that he could hardly think of himself as possessing a soul in any real sense his own. How to conform to the will of his group so as not to incur its disapproval was of more concern to him than to reflect upon his own wishes or qualifications as an individual. The initiatory rites into the secrets and privileges of his group which were impressed with solemn and mystical ritual; the authority manifested in taboos and in ceremonies; the prestige of magicians and chiefs; all of these social forces exerted an influence and pressure that fostered the hard instinct at the expense of individuality. As the primitive man became more conscious of
his personal traits and recognized a craving for self-expression he broke away from a complete servility to the group. Though he was still aware of the collective consciousness as a moral force superior to his own he nevertheless oriented himself as participating in it.

Gradually the separating contrast between the collective consciousness and the individual consciousness became more marked. The collective consciousness was thought of as more and more super-human and mystical, until among the Greeks it assumed the name of Moira which was an impersonal being "restricting the aggression of individual egoism." In later Greek thought Moira was especially "the social consciousness of Olympus which still rises even above Father Zeus." While Moira was becoming increasingly vague and remote the demand kept growing more urgent for a power who should represent the cause of the individual in a direct way and who should be more in sympathy with him as an individual. One solution of the need was met when the magical power possessed by a clan was vested in an arch-magician who was known as its king. He was held to have invested in him the daemonic powers of the clan and it was expected of him that he regulate the weather, stimulate the growth of herds and crops, and see that the sun may shine and the rain fall." Thus the head of society was the head of nature also. He was the source of the laws which governed not alone mankind but the forces of nature as well. The dooms" of the king, according to Hesiod (Theog. 80ff.) were inspired. The king was "spokesman of the world-order of destiny and law. This king of men was to become in time the king of gods; "for the divine monarchy evolves step for step with the human institution which it reflects. Hence we are not surprised to find the human king conceived by developed theology as the embodiment or representation of the divine king--the Greek Zeus. (Cornford: p. 106).
Another development of the daemonic conception is that of the eponymous hero. Thus the hero, Ion, was the type and genius of all Ionians, and as such he was the representative of the daemonic soul of a group. The life of such a hero was not that of a particular person. This is illustrated in a remark by Cornford: "It has been shown conclusively that many of the duels of the warriors of the Iliad are simply real conflicts between the tribes, individualised into the personal achievements of the eponyms that represent them. This is mainly the work of epic poets who endow a daemon of purely mythical origin with a quasi-historic personality so vivid and distinct that the Euphemerists of all ages will defend his historic existence." (Cornford, p. 106)

A real man may in some cases have become an object of worship in instances where some chieftain of great renown, rendering exceptional service to his tribe, was recognized as representative of the daemonic powers of his group. His personal achievements blending with those of his tribe combined to give him a sacred significance in the traditions in which he figured. His exploits had proved momentous in the fortunes of the tribe, he had proved a guardian and benefactor to his people during his life. Gratitude and admiration tended to keep his memory alive
after death. His example was looked upon as something to be emulated and even became a source of inspiration. Seeing that he had had the welfare of his people at heart and that he had been endowed with capacities that enabled him to promote their good, they were willing enough to believe that his departed soul might still be interested in their behalf. If some one of his surviving companions happened to dream of him after his death and to report messages which the dreamer claimed to have received from the departed one, there was ground for belief that his spirit was still active. But there were probably greater influences than the dreams of certain individuals that were working to cause his memory to be elaborated into a matter of worship.

We have seen the prevalence of the custom to attribute to local daemons of fertility the power to bestow crops and food-supplies in general. If there must be daemons whose functions were to control the fruits of the soil, then there was also a need for daemons whose functions should be to control the happenings of war. The need for the warrior-demon was felt, therefore he must be found. He was found where it was natural that he should be found—in the group soul as embodied in the person of its leader, for the leader, as its representative, was looked upon as the incarnation of the tribal genius. It was thus the need for a tribal warrior daemon and the fact that some individual had during his life time served his tribe on some critical occasion that naturally gave rise to the cult of hero-worship.

The belief that the spirit of the deceased warrior continued to exist after his death and that it was desirable to have his kindly efforts for the benefit of the tribe continued, were probably the main reasons for worshipping the dead hero.

The fact that there was a felt need for a warrior daemon who should be a representative of the martial affairs of the group was
another factor.

The fact of worship tending to focalize the psychic life of
the tribe and give to the group-soul the additional power from
supernatural influence as bestowed by beneficent spirit-guides who
were supposed to have increased in wisdom and efficiency after
their passing over to the realm of the unseen, was another contrib­
uti ng cause to the rise of hero-worship.

The practice of magic for the purpose of securing the aid and
good-will of the warrior-daemon was still another means by which
the interest in heroes grew to be a distinct cult familiarly known
as hero-worship.

The concepts of the arch-magician or king and of the warrior-
daemon or hero emphasized the fact that there were magical or
superhuman powers vested in certain individuals. In a tribe, its
chief and was apt to be confounded with his individual will.
Being the head of the tribe he represented the total consciousness
or soul of the group. "Beginning as the collective and impersonal
life of the group, it, (soul of the group,) becomes confounded as
we have seen, with the individual personality of the chief; and
there was probably, a stage in which only chiefs or heroes had
immortal souls. The tradition of such a phase seems to survive in
Hesiod's Age of Bronze-a class of immortals which consists of the
heroes who fought at Ilion and Thebes, but does not include the
undistinguished mass of their followers." (Cornford)

It is probably here that we find the germ for the belief in
the individual soul's immortality; for if the soul of the group was
conceived to outlive every generation of its members primarily
because it was at first impersonal and superindividual; and if the
soul of the king or hero were immortal because they were the good
daemons of the group and had vested in them its authority and its
responsibility; then there must come a time when the common folk
would awaken to the need of believing that they, each for himself, must have a soul that is immortal.

The worship of heroes among the Greeks, whether these heroes were idealized historical personages or symbolical representations of tribal history, was in reality an ancestor-worship which existed in pre-Homeric times, and was preserved in local cults. According to Porphyry (De abstinentia, IV. 22) Draco ordered the inhabitants of Attica to honor the gods and heroes of their country "in accordance with the usage of their fathers" with offerings of first fruits and sacrificial cakes every year, thereby clearly pointing to a custom of high antiquity. Solon also ordered that the tombs of the heroes should be treated with the greatest respect, and Cleisthenes sought to create a pan Athenian enthusiasm by calling his new tribes after Attic heroes and setting up their statues in the Agora.

Aristotle in his Ethics stigmatizes as "extremely unloving" the denial that ancestors are interested in or affected by the descendants, and it is evident that he has been a staple feature, in most religions, ancient or modern, civilized or savage.

We find little information in reference to ancestor-worship among the Greeks but we find ample accounts of hero-worship which is closely related to the ancestor-worship of certain other peoples. In reality their hero-worship was but a special development of ancestorship which existed in pre-Homeric times, and was preserved in local cults.

Various theories have been put forward as to the nature of the Greek heroes. According to some authorities they were idealized historical personages; according to others, symbolical representations of the forces of nature. According to E. Rhode (in *Psyche*) they are souls of the dead, which after separation from the body, enter upon a higher, eternal existence. But it is only the
distinguished men of the past who attain to the rank of heroes after death."

The practice of worshipping heroes and maintaining it as a distinct cult appears to have been a later development of an older cult consisting merely in a certain type of burial ceremonies. Renan refers to the burial rite of an ancient Scythian king (as described by Herodotus, IV 71) at whose tomb were strangled his concubine, cup-bearer, cook, groom, lackey, envoy, and several of his horses. In Homer the term hero is applied especially to warrior princes, to kings, and kings' sons, even to distinguished persons of lower rank, and free men generally. Neither in Homer or Hesiod is there any trace of the idea that the heroes after death had any power for good or evil over the lives who survived them. Nevertheless, traces of an earlier ancestor-worship appear, e. g., in funeral games in honor of Patroclus and other heroes, while the Hesiodic account of the five ages of man is a reminiscence of the belief in the continued existence of souls in a higher life.

Side by side with gods of superior rank, certain heroes were worshipped as protecting spirits of the country or state; such were Ajax son of O'ilens and Hector at Thebes. Neglect of the worship of these heroes was held to be responsible for pestilence, bad crops and other misfortunes, while on the other hand, if duly honoured, their influence was equally beneficent.

Plutarch (Aristides, 21) describes a sacrificial feast in honor of spirit-heroes at which they were solemnly invited to partake. "On the sixteenth of the month Maimacterion, a long procession, headed by a trumpeter playing a warlike air, set out for the graves; wagons decked with myrtle and garlands of flowers followed, young men (who must be of free birth) carried jars of wine, milk, oil and perfumes; next came the black bull destined for
the sacrifice, the rear being brought up by the archon, who wore the purple robe of the general, a naked sword in one hand, in the other an urn. When he came near the tombs, he drew some water with which he washed the grave-stones, afterwards anointing them with perfume; he then sacrificed the bull on the altar calling upon Zeus Chthonios and Hermes Psychopompos, and inviting them in company with the heroes to the festival of blood. Finally, he poured a libation of wine with the words: "I drink to those who died for the freedom of the Hellenes."

The oracle at Delphi was largely instrumental in promoting hero-worship and keeping alive its due observance. Special importance was attached to the grave of the hero and to his bodily remains, with which the spirit of the departed was inseparably connected. The grave was regarded as his place of abode, from which he could only be absent a brief period; hence his bones were fetched from abroad (e.g. Cimon brought those of Theseus from Cyros), or, if they could not be procured, at least a cynotaph was erected in his honor. Their relics also were carefully preserved: The house of Cadmus at Thebes, the hut of Orestes at Tegea, the stone on which Telamon had sat at Salamis (in Cyprus). Special shrines were also erected in their honor, usually over their graves. In these shrines a complete set of armour was kept, in accordance with the idea that the hero was essentially a warrior, who on occasion came forth from his grave and fought at the head of his countrymen, putting the enemy to flight as during his lifetime. Like the gods, the cult heroes were supposed to exercise an influence on human affairs, though not to the same extent, their sphere of action being confined to their own localities.


The question has often been raised, what is the relation of
private cults of ancestors to public religion? Do men after death become gods? Euphemerus of Messenia tried of old to rationalize the Greek myths by supposing that the Olympian gods were deified men." (F. C. Conybeare). The effort of Euphemerus in this direction failed, and it is easy to see the reason when we recall how the "sympathetic continuum" separated into two pools. The hero was a representative and in a way a product of group-consciousness and its recognition of Nature, kinship and social bonds; while the god represented the idea of the supernatural and supersensible, distinct from his worshippers.
THE GREEK MYSTERIES.

We must not suppose when trying to trace the different beliefs regarding soul-life among the Greeks that each belief existed by itself a number of centuries at the end of which it was discarded as out-grown and superseded by a more advanced one: Although we have reason to think that animism was the first conception of the unseen forces we can only surmise that such was the case. In the oldest histories of the Greeks references are made to the worship of rude stones and other fetishes. Also, the worship of the river-god and the corn-spirit suggest animism as their origin. In a more advanced stage of social development, the belief in totemism has had strong sway, while at the same time the animiotic tendencies have retained much of their old force. In the case of peoples who have possessed a highly developed demonology the concepts regarding the spirit-forces have grown more complex yet they have retained much that is essentially identical with the old view of a life-principle inherent in stones and totem-emblems. The soul-idea is not so much changed as it is enlarged. There is not alone a soul of the stone or river or weather, but of vegetation, of tribe, of country. When soul has been conceived to be immortal, first as that of a group-soul with the deference for the kinship blood, and later as individual soul, the belief being expressed as ancestor-worship, there are still evidences that the simpler views have not
been abandoned, but that the new cults have been merely grafted upon the old, due to the fact that man's needs have become more complex with his growing powers of reflection.

The new is a development and a departure from the old yet retains its basic principles. This fact is especially brought out when studying the development of the soul-doctrine among the Greeks. While still adhering to their cults in which they regarded the spirits held to be associated with stones and places and ancestors, they also recognized their need for gods. These gods did not come ready-made, but evolved from lower to higher grades according as man's developing capacities for appreciation required them. The first gods were the Mystery-Gods.

These Mystery-Gods were the daemons of human groups. Their worshippers formed secret and mysterious societies, essentially of the same type as the secret societies of magicians, with whom they easily amalgamated, if they did not directly arise from them. (Cornford).

The oldest of the mystery cults is that of Elensis. This cult, maintained at Eleusis on the Thriissian plain from immemorial times, was devoted to the worship of Demeter, the goddess of the earth. It was a local institution controlled by a few great families in the immediate vicinity. About the end of the seventh century B.C., Eleusia became united with Attika upon which the cult was reformed and broadened, and opened to the use of the state. No one was from this time on excluded from its benefits. Citizens and slaves, men, women and children were all admitted and permitted to enjoy its sacred rites. The communicants were required to take a sacred vow to live "a life in the fear of god toward stranger and toward friend" but the real secret of their rites was never betrayed by any one of the thousands who were initiated. The cult must have been a noble one judging by the
testimony that is available, "Blessed is he," says Pindar, "who having seen these rites goeth under the earth. He knoweth the end of life, he knoweth the end of life, he knoweth too its god-disposed beginning. "And Sophocles remarks: "Thrice happy they among mortals who depart into Hades after their eyes have seen these rites; yea, for them alone is there a life; for other men all there is ill. And Plato says in the Phaedo: "The founders of the Mysteries would appear to have had a real meaning, and were not talking nonsense, when they intimated in a figure long ago, that he who passed unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will be in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods."

The power of the Mysteries seems to have been imparted through some form of drama rather than through doctrine or creed. (Wheeler). By this means the beholder obtained some suggestion of a definite state and condition of future existence, and this assurance was reserved for the initiated alone; and "they believed gladly, because constrained by their yearning to believe. The faith and its authority were within themselves." (Wheeler).

In the sixth century, B.C., a reform took place in the Eleusinian worship which gave to the cult its anthropomorphic and more human form. This reform occurred in the ingrafting of the Dionysos spirit. The rise of Dionysos worship was, as Wheeler says, "the most important single phenomenon in the history of Greek religion."

The personality of the mythical Dionysos is shrouded in a variety of representations. He was sometimes said to be the child of Demeter, the earth, and as such was the symbol of the seed-corn buried in the earth. This was in accordance with the primitive belief that regards the life and death of vegetation after the analogies of human life. The spirits or daemons of vegetation
must be wakened to renewed activity in the spring of the year, and this was to be accomplished by way of dances, cries and ecstasies by those who acted the life of the spirits they wished to recall. The female magicians or maevads who scattered blood over the ground, fed the spirits and brought them to consciousness while losing themselves in union with the spirit world during their holy madness in the Dionysos revels, their souls thus communing and influencing spirits outside the realm of visible experience.

There came to be many outgrowths of this primitive practice which gradually assumed more and more the nature of religion. Even the drama, the choicest of its products, was of the nature of religious representation. The impersonation upon which the drama depends for its existence was an effort to visualize the attributes of the unseen powers that they might impel men's souls to seek the higher realities and to refresh themselves in the contemplation of the enlarged possibilities of which the soul is capable.

The significance of Dionysos was to represent the soul of a human group and that of all animate nature as well. Thus it was natural that the life of nature should be modelled after that of the cycle of human life, of birth, death and rebirth, which apply both to the life of man and to the seasonal round of vegetation. The Mystery God was a product of human society, and his cult was characterized by sacramental rites conducted to effect communion and reunion with the group-daemon. At every celebration of the rite, the God entered into his group while man rises out of and above the prison of his individuality and loses himself in the common life of the whole, becoming immortal and divine. (Cornford).

During the sixth century, a special development of the Dionysiac faith is seen in the Orphic religion. Orpheus appears
to have been the theologian of the Dionysiac faith and to have brought out its spiritual aspect in the form of a definite theology. He taught the doctrine of the body as a prison-house and of the soul as akin to God; and he taught the wheel of births, the long toil of liberation, and the union of the soul with its own. This long toil to become free from the prison-house and to be reunited with God, was not, however, a matter of morality. The soul was not to be saved through the mortification of the body nor by moral asceticism, but by the uplifting power of the new insight.

The new insight came not from works but through faith, and thus the concept of "salvation by faith" is at least as old as this old Orphic religion of the Greeks. The element of enthusiasm in Orphism was Bacchism, the purpose of which was to attain communion with the divine, and the cult might well have been called the evangelical religion of Greece. One of the means by which the soul is aided in achieving the new insight and in retracing its course toward the divine is through music, and we are told that "Orpheus made the wild things gather to his music." Not alone the human soul but that of the lower animals feel the agony of the separation from the true Source and long to return thereto.

The belief in the dualism of the soul and the body is clear-cut in the Orphic religion. The soul which is god-born has visions from time to time of its higher being and mission, and revels in communion with its own. The problem of salvation is how to turn the brief vision into continuous life. Death will not accomplish it, therefore the soul must pass through a long circuit of births, "freeing itself more and more from the dross, until at the distant goal, rescued from misery, it breathes free at last." (Wheeler: )

(Dionyus and )
(Immortality. pp. 43)
In Eleusis we saw the vitality of mysticism exemplified. In Dionysus we saw its force increased and its dominion enlarged. In Orphism we see the mystic cults of the Greeks at the stage where they are highly spiritualized.

Mysticism is fundamentally not an intellectual but an emotional experience. It is a sense of oneness of reunion and communion with the life of the world, which the mystical temperaments of all ages seem to have in common. The state is induced by mystic ritual in which music and dramatic ceremonial stimulate collective feeling. The 'truth' comes only to those who participate in the exercises, being conveyed to the heart by suggestion, not by dogmatic instruction.

Upon Eleusis, Dionysus was ingrafted. With him came the concept of the "unity of all life in the cycle of death and rebirth, and the conception of the daemon or collective soul, immanent in the group as a whole, yet something more than any or all of the members that partake of it."

Dionysus worship was the religion of earth, and of the life and death of her trees and plants. The wheel of births was here seen in the changing of the seasons when life was reincarnated, appearing in new forms, lasting for a time, then passing out to take on another phase of existence.

Orpheus inherited the reincarnation doctrine from Dionysus, and made a practical application of it in his doctrine of the soul. The human is a part of a common soul.

Just as the life or soul of the plant is a part of the life or soul that is common to nature; and as the soul of the tree or of the corn does not cease at death to exist but takes on a new body through its seed, or new evidences of life in the spring of the year, so must the soul, the immortal part of man, be born again and pass through a series of earthly bodies. But the soul
of man is not of earthly but of divine origén, says Orpheus, therefore it longs to escape from its degradation in earthly bodies, and to be restored to peace and unity with its celestial source.

"To Orpheus is due the shift of focus from earth to heaven, the substitution for the vivid, emotional experience of the renewal of life in nature, of the worship of a distant and passionless perfection in the region of light, from which the soul, now immortal, is fallen into the body of this death, and which it aspires to regain." (Cornford:)

Orphism becomes a religion of the heavenly bodies, and especially of the sun. The sun moves with the seasons but comes to be looked upon as an immutable and deathless God. This promotes the notion of immortality.

Orpheus taught that the soul had fallen from the stars, and that it was an indestructible, individual soul, persisting throughout its round of reincarnation. In its pure state the soul consists of fire, like the stars from which it falls, and it is weighted down, throughout its wheel of births, by its contact with the prison-house, the flesh.

A religion which in this way stresses the importance of the remote and transcendent tends to be other-worldly. A higher Reality is contrasted with a visible world of sense-experience. This characteristic was prominent in Orphism as well as in all the mystical systems inspired by this cult, and we find it predominant in the teachings of Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedocles and Plato.
VII.

GREEK MYTHOLOGY.

The oldest sources as literary documents concerning Greek mythology are the Hesiodic and Homeric poems. The old myths do not appear to be much concerned with the nature nor destiny of the soul whether in the present state or in a hereafter, yet Greek mythology offers a tribute to the belief that a spirit world and spirit forces exist.

Hesiod gives us the more barbarous and probably the more ancient account of the faiths and practices of the old Greeks in connection with their attitude toward an unseen world which they tried as best they could to interpret. The classical myths were derived from the local myths that were told by priests to travellers who visited the shrines of various local mysteries. Thus the epic and national myths were the outgrowth of local myths. "Of these local myths we have fragments and hints in Herodotus, Pausanias, in the tragic poets, and in the ancient notes or scholia on the classics. In these we more distinctly perceive the savage element. Here Cronus is a horse, Rhea is a mare. Zeus begets separate families of men in the shape of a bull, an ant, a serpent, a swan. His mistress from whom the Arcadians claim descent is a she-bear. Another echo from the period of savage thought comes from Pindar in his reference to tales of
cannibalism among the gods, of the loves of Hera in the shape of a
cuckoo, and of the divine powers of metamorphosing men and women
into beasts and stars. Evidently, then, the deities of Greek
mythology were originally elemental, the elements being
personified in accordance with the laws of savage imaginations.
But we cannot explain each detail in the legends as a myth of this
or that natural phenomenon or process as understood by ourselves.
Zens is the sky, but not our sky; he had a personal character, and
that a savage or barbarous character. He became anthropomorphic,
and his myth was handled by local priests, by family bards, by
national poets, by early philosophers. The other Greek myths
are equally complex." (Andrew Lang.)

We are indebted to Hesiod for his valuable story of the
mythical personages and traditions of his time. He enumerates
the children whom Earth bore "when couched in love with Heaven.
They are Ocean, Coeus, Crius, Hyperion, Iapetus, Theia, Rhea,
Themis, Mnemosyne, Phoebe, Tethys, and the youngest, Cronus.
Others were Cyclopes, Bronte, Sterope, and Arge, and three chil-
dren of enormous strength, Cottus, Briareus and Gyes, each with
fifty heads and one hundred hands. The chief stock of the divine
species was continued by the marriage of Rhea, probably another
name for the Earth with Cronus. Their children were Hestia,
Demeter, Hera, Hades and Poseidon. All these Cronus swallowed.
At last Rhea bore Zeus. Zeus grew up, administered an emetic to
Cronus, and had the satisfaction of seeing all his brothers and
sisters disgorged alive. The first thing to be ejected was a
stone, and it was this stone which Pausanias saw at Delphi. A
series of wars then followed between the older children of
Heaven and Earth and the younger branch of the family consisting
of Zeus and the brothers and sisters whom he had rescued from
the maw of Cronus. The younger branch came out victorious, and
it was these, Zeus and his brothers and sisters, who became the Olympic Gods of the Homeric Epic. (Adapted from Andrew Lang.)

In Homer we find the best account of the mythical beliefs of the early Greeks, and we feel that his story reveals to us the most developed type of mythical religion. But we must note also that he stands at the end, not at the beginning of an order of thought and civilization. He occupies the pinnacle of the mythical tradition and in this position he already betrays the tendencies that make for the downward trend in the beliefs and practices connected with the souls importance and potency. Homer betrays in his forms of speech and thought the tendencies toward materialism and commercialism that were becoming more and more prevalent among the Ionians of his period. He relates the "tales of a mighty world whose record is left in the walls and art and treasure of Mykenai, Teryns, Orchomenos," but the real spirit that animated the old traditions about the Heroes and the Gods is on the wane in the lives of the people. Trade, commerce and mechanical arts are beginning to usurp the place in the lives of the citizens rather than the observance of the cultus of the dead. The souls of the departed are no longer thought of as tutelary or guardian spirits guiding and leading those who had been their blood-kindred in the flesh, they are now mere shadows "flitting off like a dream is flown" to the asphodel moors" beyond the river. In this shadowy place the soul has neither memory nor will nor power to intrude itself into the affairs of men. When it had once been led by Hermes the guide down "the dank ways" and under "the misty gloom" it never returned as a force or a ghost to influence the world of life and activity. Proper burial was observed but all rites of soul-worship were discontinued. Some degree of consciousness was still attributed to the soul after death but its power had vanished completely. The psyche of Patroclus appeared
to Achilles but it was as a suppliant, not as an advisor or
benefactor. "Give me," he says, "I entreat of thee, thy hand,
for nevermore shall I come back from Hades' land, when ye have paid
me once my due of fire; and nevermore among the living shall we sit
without the circle of our comrades and there take counsel with
each other."

This land of Hades where the shades abode was as gloomy a
place as a despondent fancy could picture. Its air was misty and
murky, its paths slimy and wet overshadowed by black poplars and
willows, while the pale, ghastly asphodel made its barren wastes
still more repelling. Odysseus upon his entrance was asked: "What
seekest thou now, wretched man? Why hast thou left the light of
the sun to come here and look on the dead and see this joyless
place?" It is only once in this dreary picture of the land of the
dead that Homer alludes to a pleasant spot, "where is no snow, and
no wintry storm, nor ever the torrent of rains." But such spots
of refuge were only occasional for some great personage who had
been, as in the case of Menelaos, a kinsman of the gods, and such an
exception was a reminiscence of the old hero-worship which was in
Homer's time in abeyance, though we find that this old practiced
was revived at a later period in Greek national life.

The soul, as pictured in the Epic, was a shadow or image of the
deceased, capable of visiting his survivors in their dreams. This
soul was the psyche which escaped from the month or the wound at the
moment of death. It was the recognisable shape of the dying person
"without capacity for joy or activity." (Fairbanks.)

The psyche did not exist until the moment of death and did not
take with it any of the vital force of the person. But it was
only one of two kinds of soul. In the other soul, the mortal
soul, existed the vitality of the dying man, and the kinship bond
or the "sympathetic continuum which related him to his group. In
other words, the latter kind of soul was the blood-soul. It was only by drinking blood that the psyche could recover its wits or consciousness. The blood-soul was less personal, being a part of the kinship soul, than the individual and recognisable psyche, and we may infer that the blood-soul, because it was connected with the group, was held to be of greater importance than the psyche.

The psyche, devoid of phrenes, the organs of will and emotion, flitted hither and thither without plan or purpose or hope until it had been "fed." In the "Nekyia" it is stated that it is only through drinking the sacrificial blood from Odysseus' trench that memory or the power of recognition are restored to it.

Odysseus had dug the trench and was guarding it with his sword for he was waiting to catch sight of the seer Teiresias. Among the shades that flocked about the trench he saw the psyche of his mother: "and I wept at sight of her and pitied her in my heart, but even so, sore grieved as I was, I suffered her not to draw nigh to the blood, till I had first inquired of Teiresias."

Belief in the soul's existence after death had been characteristic of pre-homeric religion, in which it had been a distinguishing feature. In Homer, the belief remains but its life and significance have largely disappeared.

References are made by various ancient writers to the original practice of offering sacrifices of food and blood to the souls of the departed. The offerings were intended to appease and conciliate the souls and prevent the baneful intrusion of their wrath into the life of living individuals, a belief in a place beneath the earth, a deep cavernous abode where all the souls were assembled, not for punishment or blessing, but simply for residence, was a part of the earliest faith. To induce the soul to retire into this common abode of the dead and there find contented rest is apparently the supreme aim and purpose of the rites of the grave.
among the early Greeks.

Feeding the soul on blood appears to have been a symbolic rite pertaining to the belief in the mythical kindred blood of the group. If we recall here our division of the sympathetic continuum or collective consciousness into two pools, we find that in the concept of the mortal soul as related to the kindred blood, is the source of the concept of the Mystery God of Greek religion. The blood-soul was in fact the "soul as the principle of force and motion."

The psyche, on the other hand, which escaped out of the mouth or wound of the dying person, was an ethereal, material body resembling that of the living man, but whose influence and capacity for enjoyment were nothing.

Thus the Mysteries expressed a soul concept pregnant with spirituality and optimism, while the Epic concept was the most materialistic and pessimistic that we find in the history of Greek thought.

There were definite forces at work about this time that were responsible for the change of attitude of the Greeks toward spiritual things. This was the time of transition from mediaeval to classical Greece, marked by rapid colonial.
VII.

GREEK MYTHOLOGY.

The worship of the Mystery Gods never became identified with that of the Olympian gods, but retained its social characteristic, the ritual being always adapted to emphasize the bond of union between the God and his group. The Olympian God was however the impersonal daemon of a natural department in contrast to the Mystery God who was the personal soul of a human group. Thus the Olympian was more remote and required to be humanized. In other words the powers of nature are to be conceived as men, they are to be made anthropomorphic. A mystery religion, being based on the collective consciousness of a human society had a monotheistic tendency. The Olympic Gods on the other hand, being the daemons of distinct natural provinces were thought of as distinct individuals having their abode in a remote and transcendental heaven from which they looked down upon their realms and ordered natural affairs. The Olympian is thus apart from man and is looked up to as a superior individual while the Mystery God is always closely akin to man, is, in fact, one with man through a sympathetic continuum. The Mystery Gods were never identified with the Olympian Gods, as we said, neither were they subordinated to the latter. The Mystery Gods were older but the two types after the Olympians had appeared, existed side by side serving each their distinct functions. Although the Olympians
seemed for a while to fill a historically more prominent place in the records of Greek mythology, yet in their influence upon the progress of human thought, the impetus that came from the Mysteries is perhaps greater than that which arose from the other type of worship. "In this type of religion (the Mysteries) the central fact is the human group, with a homogeneous, inorganic type of solidarity, held together by the unique relation in which it stands to its daemon—a relation by which, man can participate in the divine, and, conversely, the divine can enter into man. It is the parent of mystical philosophies, of monistic and pantheistic systems, which hold that the One can pass into the Many and yet remain One. It is also idealistic in tendency, in the sense that it is other-worldly: the One is no only within, but beyond and above, the Many, and more real, because more powerful, than they. Accordingly, the Many, as such, are condemned to unreality, to mere seeming or appearance-half-false representations In Eleusis of the One reality." (Cornford.) p. 107.

The appearance of the Olympian God marks the appreciation of the personal, individual self. Although the Greeks had begun to recognize themselves as distinct personalities by this time it would seem, it may have appeared too audacious and preposterous to acknowledge themselves to be free and powerful. The longing to be free and superior was felt, however, and it must take expression in some way. The ideals which they conjured up in their own minds must in some way be realized. Fancy was given free rein to fashion her ideals as she chose and it is to poetic minds rather than to priests and magicians that we are indebted for the Olympic polity.

Andrew Lang says of Greek mythology: "If we try beginning with myths of creative gods, we find that the world is sometimes represented as pre-existent to the divine race. If we try
beginning with myths of the origin of the world, we frequently find that it owes its origin to the activity of pre-existent supernatural beings. As used here, gods merely mean non-natural and powerful beings, sometimes magnified non-natural men, sometimes beasts, birds or insects, sometimes the larger forces of the universe conceived of as endowed with human personality and passions."

It is this variety of representations in mythology that we have tried in the foregoing pages to account for. We have seen how the world came to be regarded as pre-existent to the "divine race," and find that it was because the divine race is a late development in mythology, arriving in the history of thought long ages after men had become accustomed to regard sticks and stones as the habitats of spirits; or to conceive of their totem emblems, beasts, birds or insects as endowed with mysterious powers; or to look upon the larger forces of nature in rain, fire or vegetation as endowed with human personality and passions; or to worship non-natural and powerful beings such as the Heroes or Olympic Gods. All these concepts constitute man's tribute to the unseen world, to the mysterious power which he firmly believes to exist though he can not place his finger upon it and state what it is. Retaining always the old concepts even though they are cast from time to time in new moulds, nature always appears to the primitive mind a congeries of animated personalities. Mr. Lang says: "The savage's notion of personality is more a universally diffused feeling than a reasoned conception, and this feeling of a personal self he impartially distributes all over the world as known to him.-----We must remember, however, that to the savage, Sky, Sun, Sea, Wind, are not only persons, but they are savage persons. Their conduct is not what civilized men would attribute to characters so august; it is what uncivilized men think probable and befitting among beings like themselves."
The Greeks could not well be called savages at the time when they possessed the well-developed mythology which has come down to us in history, but their myths of later times were the product of older beliefs retaining the traits of savage opinion in which "sky, wind, sun, sea and many other phenomena have, being personal, all the powers attributed to real human persons. These powers and qualities are: (1) relationship to animals and ability to be transform others into animals and other objects; (2) magical accomplishments, as (a) power to visit or to procure the visits of the dead; (b) other magical powers, such as control over the weather and over the fertility of nature in all departments. Once more, the great forces of nature, considered as persons, are involved in that inextricable confusion in which men, beasts, plants, stones, stars, are all on one level of personality and animal existence. This is the philosophy of savage life, and it is on these principles that the savage constructs his myths, while these, again, are all the scientific explanations of the universe with which he has been able to supply himself."

E. B. Tylor and Herbert Spencer in their anthropological explanations of myths attribute special significance to the reflections upon dreams and dream-life as a source of primitive man's belief in a spirit-world. "It is in this state that the self or spirit seems to wander free from the bounds of time and space, to see things remote, and to meet and recognize dead friends or foes." Another source would seem to consist of speculation on the experiences of trance and of phantasms of the dead or living, beheld with waking eyes, and by pondering on the phenomena of shadows, of breath, of death and life. The spirit was also believed to be capable of entering a material object which became a fetich, and as such was held to be endowed with magical powers capable of bringing to successful issue the designs of the owner,
preserving him from injury, curing disease, etc. In the doctrine of spirits more fully developed, spirits are allotted to the great elemental forces and phenomena of nature, sky, thunder, sea and forest. Here we have the beginnings of departmental deities such as Agni, god of fire; Poseidon, god of the sea; Zeus, god of the sky. In the Odyssey V. 450, we have notice the prayer of Odysseus to the river, whose mouth he had reached after three days swimming on the tempestuous sea, "Hear me, O king, whosoever thou art, unto thee I am come as to one to whom prayer is made——nay, pity me, O king, for I avow myself thy suppliant: So spake he, and the god stayed his stream, and withheld his waves, and made the water smooth before him."

Pausanias tells us that the oldest worship among the Greeks consisted in the worship of rude stones. Almost every temple, he says, had its fetish stone, on a level with the pumice stone. The Argives had a large stone called Zeus Cappotas. The oldest idol of the Thespians was a rude stone. Another has been found beneath the pedestal of Apollo in Delos. Among monstrous images of the gods which Pausanias, who saw them, regarded as the oldest idols, were the three-headed Artemis, each head being that of an animal, the Demeter with the horses head, the Artemis with the fish's tail, the Zeus with three eyes. We also hear of the bull and the bull-footed Dionysus. Many examples of the sacrifice of human beings and of animals are mentioned in Greek legend. The survivals of rites, objects of worship, and sacrifices like these prove that religious conservatism in Greece retained much of savage practice. The gods of mythology revealed all the characteristics of man's concepts of spirit-forces which he had formulated throughout preceding ages.
A time came in the course of Greek thought when men commenced to ask the question whether the power that rules the world and its happenings might not be inherent in Nature herself rather than in spirits distinct and different from her. They accordingly set out to account for Nature in terms of nature, or, in other words, they undertook to formulate a scientific hypothesis to replace the old guesses and myths. But this power in nature which orders her events is not a merely natural element, but "an element endowed with supernatural life and powers, a substance which is also Soul and God." This element was called physis by the Milesian philosophers, and they declared it was (Cornford: From Religion to Philosophy, pp. 123.) "a homogenous matter, charged with vital force," and that it was "the substrate of all things and the source of their growth." (Ibid.) This subtle stuff, considered as both animate and divine, was endowed "with all the properties that are held to belong to Soul and God." (Ibid pp. 125.)

This idea of physis as the ultimate living stuff out of which the world grew was not, strictly speaking, either a "materialistic" nor a "spiritualistic" conception in the modern sense of these terms. It was not spiritualistic for the reason that the first philosophers could not conceive of anything in terms of pure mind.
Everything to them was matter even though it be as fine and subtle as possible. Yet the notion of physis was not a truly materialistic one either. It was neither an objective thing nor a mechanical law. Physic is derived from the notion of "something not ourselves." It is therefore of the nature of a moral power imposing constraint from without, in its negative aspect; while in its positive aspect, it is the vehicle of supernormal, magical power. Physis is but a later development of the old notions of group-soul, daemon, individual soul, and personal God.

These objects were all made of the same stuff, that is, of the old sympathetic continuum or collective consciousness, more or less etherealised. They all consisted of a supersensible vital fluid, yet there was some difference between souls and Olympian Gods. Souls which have visible, tangible bodies can be identified with the blood. But the Gods, even though their visible bodies such as stars would seem to make them material, are nevertheless anthropomorphic personalities exerting intelligent influences and functions.

The physis retains the characteristics of the animate and divine substance whose mysterious potency had always been the supreme motive for speculative thought; and the work of the early philosophers was to attempt to analyze this heritage from religious or even pre-religious material. That is, philosophy "redisCOVERS in the world that very scheme of representation which had, by a necessary process, been projected into the world from the structure and institutions of society in its earlier stages of development."

The physis or nature of things was their ultimate essence. It was something more vital in their being than the more tangible or visible part. When Thales said the physis of the universe and of things is water, he meant something more than that they were merely various combinations or modifications of material particles of
water. This is shown in his three doctrines: (1) the nature of things is water; (2) the All is alive (has soul in it;) and (3) is full of daemons or Gods. (Ibid p. 127.)

The material properties of physis in Thales hypothesis are of no greater importance than are the other properties attributed to physis under the names 'Soul' and 'God.' In fact, the life or 'Soul' in the 'All,' or in other words the World-Soul, is identical with physis. "The materiality of physis is supersensible, a stuff of that attenuated sort which is attributed to all supersensible objects, souls, spirits, Gods—as well as to all sorts of eidola, ghosts, concepts, images, etc." Water or air or fire are embodiments of physis, but "physis itself is soul, with a supersensible substance of its own—that minimum of materiality without which nothing could be conceived. Water or air or fire are mere gross vehicles of the primary soul-substance. Thus the vitality of the concept of water as physis lies in its metaphysical aspect, inherited from mythical tradition. Water as, physis is also declared to be 'divine:' 'the All,' says Thales, 'is full of daemons or Gods.' This aspect of the All touches two contrary notions in Greek religion. In the notion of "daemons," divine stands for man's relation to nature; in the notion of "Gods," divine stands for the Olympian notion of gods who have withdrawn from man and assumed a position of aloofness and independence.
"The divinity of physis thus contains the germ of a latent contradiction, the discovery of which will constitute a dilemma for philosophy." (Ibid p. 129.)

The Greek philosophers generally described physis as standing in the same relation to the universe as soul does to body. Anaximenes says: 'As our soul is air and holds us together, so a breath or air embraces the whole cosmos.'

The word 'Soul' and the word 'physis' had the same meaning to
the Greek philosophers. Both signify to their minds ultimate matter, but when they commenced to distinguish between life and inanimate matter, they were forced to conceive the ultimate reality either as mind or as matter. But "whichever choice they make, the nature of Soul will be the same as that of physis." (Ibid p. 131.)

The early philosophers assumed that motion is the test of the presence of life. Thus Thales ascribed life to the load-stone, because it moves iron. (Arist. de anima,) This shows that mechanical motion was not distinguished from vital activity. When later thinkers commence to distinguish the mechanical from the vital phenomena, we shall find that, whereas the earlier ones looked upon the mechanical as a manifestation of the "spontaneous activity" of physis, the later ones tried the expedient of "levelling down life to external mechanical motion."

Soul was not only the mover in the world but the knower. That is the reason, they said, that 'like knows like'. Action can only take place between like objects, and the reason is that a pervasive soul runs through all the class. The idea is a heritage from the old concept of the "sympathetic continuum" which was originally the substrate of kinship. This sympathetic bond was "the vehicle of interaction only within a group of the same kin: and that kinship is the primitive form of all likeness." (Ibid. pp 134.)

Physis was not only full of motion and soul but it also possessed daemonic energy. The 'limitless' of Anaximander was 'divine, immortal and imperishable.' Anaximenes speaks of the Air, which is his physis, as God. Diogenes of Apollonia says 'that what men call air is that which possesses thought, and it directs all and masters all; for just this is, I believe, God, and it reaches everywhere and disposes all things and is in everything.'
This attribute of 'divine' as applied to the primary physis points strongly to the fact that "the conceptions of the philosophers of the relation between ultimate reality and the manifold sense-world are governed by older religious conceptions of the relation between God and the human group or Nature." (Ibid pp. 135.)

It can be shown that two main currents in Greek philosophy took their departure from the two types of Greek religion, the mystical and Olympian. The function of philosophy was to rationalise the guesses and myths which the theologians had gleaned from the experiences and traditions of the ages, and consequently two distinct departures are seen in philosophy based respectively upon the mystical and Olympian traditions in religion. The temperament of the individual philosopher determined his choice of the representation that he would follow. But whichever view he based his doctrine upon, his physis was always a supersensible substance, not a natural object. "Although it was called 'Nature,' it was really metaphysical—a representation whose mythical origin we have traced." (Ibid p.136.)

"Considered as matter apart from its life, it differs from the ether of modern physics chiefly in that it was not recognised to be a merely hypothetical substance, but believed to be actually existent." The various schools believed that they were speculating about an actually existing ultimate reality, yet they all treated their physis as if it were a mere scientific hypothesis." It is evident that they were not concerned primarily with external nature as perceived by the senses, but with "a metaphysical representation" of reality as a supersensible extended substance which is at first both alive (Soul) and divine (God,) and also has 'a matter' of its own, distinct, or distinguishable from visible
and tangible 'body' with its sensible properties. The problem, all along, was: given that reality is a substance of this sort, how can it be related to the sense-world; how can it be adapted and remodelled so as to account for what we perceive; how can we get out of it the world we see around us? (Ibid p. 138.)

Philosophy is in one sense the bridge between religion and science. In another sense it is the reconciler. Its former function is exemplified by the history of its conceptual tool, physis. The notion of physis grew out of magic, and in its early stages was, though not mysterious as magic had been, nevertheless metaphysical, all its attributes, matter, Soul and God, being supersensible and amenable to a priori treatment. As philosophy grows more 'scientific,' the material attribute tends to be stressed until it becomes something that can be measured mathematically; all that will be left of Soul will be mechanical motion; all that will be left of God will be immutability, which can be ascribed to matter. Such philosophy reaches its fulfillment in Atomism.

In its other function, philosophy is the reconciler between religion and science, or, between the spiritual and the material, or, between the supersensible and the practical. Philosophy, as we find it in Aristotle, leads back again from the material to the spiritual and we have a scientific treatment of the spiritual. Aristotle, the most scientific of the Greek philosophers, pays this tribute to theology: "Our forefathers in the remote ages have handed down to us a tradition in mythical form, that these substances (the firmament and the heavenly bodies) are Gods, and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form, to persuade the multitude and for its utility with respect to the laws and expediency: they
say the Gods are of human form, or like the other animals, and so on. But, if we separate the original point from these additions, and take it alone—that they thought the primary substances to be Gods, we might regard this as an utterance divinely inspired, and reflect that, while every art and science has often been developed as far as possible and perished again, these opinions have been preserved until the present, like relics of the ancient treasure." (Met. 8, 1074 b 1.)
IX.

THE "SOUL" AMONG THE GREEK SCIENTISTS.

We shall now attempt to trace the development which the soul-concept received at the hands of science.

In the first place we must take into consideration that the scientific tendency, with its fulfilment in atomism, had its source in Olympianism. Later we shall see that the more truly philosophical tendency, which is based largely on religious poetic material, and which reaches its highest development in Plato and Aristotle, originated in the Mysteries.

The scientific movement as recognised in the history of the Greeks, started among the Ionians. "It takes its rise among that race which had shaped Homeric theology, and it is the characteristic product of the same racial temperament."

Science and Olympianism are seen to have certain characteristics in common. (1) Both are pluralistic. The strongly scientific thinkers, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and the Atomists, admit "innumerable worlds"
(2) Both are rationalistic as opposed to the mystical tendency.
(3) Both are fatalistic as implying the activity of fixed laws.
(4) Both are realistic as opposed to otherworldliness.
(5) Both are adapted to the world of practical affairs.

Miletus, the birth-place of science, was an important centre
of commerce, and it was here that science was given recognition as it was called in to serve the practical needs of human enterprise. Thus, Thales, when studying means for measuring the distance from land of ships at sea, accidentally discovered trigonometry. When, by mathematics and methods of procedure that have since been termed scientific, he predicted an eclipse of the sun in 585 B. C., he demonstrated to the world that speculative thought may be something more than mere guess-work. Thought could now employ the experimental method under conditions of control, and arrive at definite results. The variability which had been seen to follow when the phenomena of nature were interpreted as resulting from the capricious activities or oracular utterances of the Gods had now been superseded by something more uniform and reliable. Thales, the first scientist, discovered that the moving force in Nature was within herself, and that this force could be depended upon to act always in the same way under the same conditions. But he was not prepared to declare that the world consisted of inert material particles moved from without by mechanical law. The moving force in the world was life or soul, something like a magnet (arist. De Anima, I. v, 411 a. 7,) the force in the magnet which attracts things to itself being its life. For this motor and attractive force was identical with life, and was everywhere present. (Janet and Seailles, History of the Problems of Philosophy, p. 147.)

The really important member of the Melesian school is Anaximander. He attempted to distinguish the primary physis from the visible elements. He put aside the human shapes of divinity and recognised the "substance which has informed those shapes, the function of which is to inform and animate, not Gods, but the world we see." As Cornford says: "He isolated in conception that soul-substance which we have called the primitive datum of
philosophy, from the water with which Thales had confused it, and kept it clear also of fire, air, and earth." (From Religion to Philosophy, p. 144.)

Anaximander takes for his physis the Limitless. His Limitless is in reality a mental abstraction but he does not recognize it as such. Its governance is moral, and 'not things.' (Arist. Phys. 24,20366.)

Anaximander's Limitless, physis, is a mixture of all the elements. The becoming of things is birth, and all birth results from the mixing of opposites. The moral character of the elemental disposition is shown in his statement that individual things owe their existence to 'injustice,' consisting in the encroachment of one element upon another. "The elements in his scheme correspond to individuals; the moral ordinance of physis enjoins them to keep within their regions, exactly as Morra, in Olympian theology, restricted the Gods to their departments." (Cornford: From Religion to Philosophy, p. 147.)

The trend of thought that is started by Anaximander is thus the beginning of the tendency which reaches its height in Atomism. The elements as conceived by Anaximander in a limitless mixture are left undefined as to their substance. He does not say whether they are mental or material. He recognizes the antagonism of opposites, thus suggesting that the elements are of different kinds. He admits that there is motion among the elements but does not say that it is mechanical motion. The motion is due to moral power, hence must be of the nature of mind or soul. He did not confuse soul-substance with an actually existing form of matter.

Anaximenes, his successor, did not distinguish, however, between soul and matter, for he says: "Just as our soul, being air, holds us together, so do a breath and air encompass the whole world." (Frag. 2_ Act. i. 3. 4.) Thus he identified the soul-
substance with air; for air is breath, and breath is life or soul. Air is an element of the same nature as the other elements, only it is the fundamental element of which all other things are transformations. The fact which underlies all qualitative differences is simply difference of quantity; that is, more or less of the same stuff in a given space. All change and transformation are due to 'thickening and thinning.'

Anaximenes' soul-substance is air. It is matter in its most subtle form. But soul is also life, hence everything is alive, and Anaximenes is a typical hylozoist. There appears to have been a confusion in the mind of this philosopher when he identified his physis or soul-substance with atmospheric air or mist, yet his concept does not appear to be radically different from that of modern idealists who assume for their hypothesis that all is mind; for it is difficult to distinguish between the import of the terms 'soul' and 'mind.'

Empedocles was both a man of science and a mystic. We shall therefore consider his contribution to the soul-concept in so far as it was scientific before we consider it later on in its mystical aspect.

Empedocles distinguished two kinds of material substance, namely the four elements, air, fire, water and earth, which are bodily, and two new soul-substances, Love and Strife, which move those bodily elements mechanically from without. The soul-substances were mixed with the bodily substances as if the soul element "were a kind of extended fluid." (Jenner and Seailles: Problems of Philosophy p. 216.) Love and Strife, the two self-moving fluids, provided a vehicle for motion, outside and between, the portions of the bodily elements which were held to be dead, inert matter. Birth or coming into being is a mixing of immutable elements, and the mixing is caused by the soul-
substances.

Empedocles approaches closely to the fundamental principle of the Atomistic conception, by building up bodies out of distinct parts, and treating motion as communicated from without, but with this distinction that whereas the Atomists conceived motion as purely mechanical, Empedocles confused motion with life or soul. He distinguishes himself from the hylozoists by positing soul as outside of body, so that soul-substance is distinct, even though it is still material. In other words, Empedocles is a dualist.

Empedocles admitted the materiality of the elements earth, air, fire and water, and that these when mixed in certain proportions made up the substances that we see such as hair or flesh, so that all becoming was nothing but a mixing.

Anaxagoras objected to this view. He argued that if hair or flesh are divided into ever so minute particles, each particle is still hair or flesh. The four elements of Empedocles, he declares, are not ultimate, but each is a collection of heterogeneous seeds. The original mass out of which the world was made was a mixture of all the 'seeds.' This mass was a chaos out of which the cosmos was made.

These 'seeds' were lifeless and inert. A moving force was needed to run through the mixture and set things in order. Like his predecessors, he could not conceive of the mover as mere mechanical energy. It must be something which is alive, a soul-substance, a physis. This soul-substance is not emotional like Love and Strife, but intellectual. He calls it Nous or Mind. This Nous has life and it knows everything, but after the motion initiated by Nous has once been started things proceed to become arranged in an orderly fashion as they are meant to be. Nous, the world-mind or world-soul had to get the seeds started and separated so that they could move into the places where they
belonged. But although Anaxagoras had the seeds take the places where they belong he did not go so far as to say that the resulting world was good. Socrates complains in the Phaedo (98 B) because Anaxagoras failed to make Nous a benevolent God, who designs everything for the best.

Thus Anaxagoras eliminated the anthropomorphic element in his Nous to a very great extent. The personal attributes were reduced to a minimum. It remained for the Atomists to propose a moving force in the world that was reduced to sheer mechanical energy, to conceive of a soul that was without life or mentality.

Leukippus, the founder of Atomism was a Milesian. He posited unlimited and ever-moving elements and called them atoms. Their shapes were infinite in number. They were compact and full, and they were said to move in the void. The full and the void were said to be just as real, the one as the other.

"Leukippus thought he had a theory which would agree with sense perception, and not do away with becoming and perishing, or motion, or the plurality of things." (Arist. de Gen. et Corr. 325 a. 1. 23.) What is consists of an infinite number of indivisible bits of matter, impenetrable, and invisible because of their smallness. These atoms differ from one another, not qualitatively, but only in shape and position. Everything that exists is reducible to these minute bodies. The coming into being and perishing of all things is nothing but the coming together or the separation of a set of atoms, moving mechanically in the void.

But Leukippus should have offered an explanation for motion. Atoms constituted what is (\( \sigma \nu \)); void or empty space he called what is not (\( \mu \, \sigma \nu \)); both are realities. The atoms move in empty space, without any soul-substance running through. Soul-substance has become a superfluous hypothesis. What then is the
mover? Leukippus does not tell us. He did not attempt to account for motion at all but took it as a phenomenon that "is given." And why not? Every hypothesis must postulate something as "given." If atoms and space were conceived as "given," then it was just as consistent to take motion as given. He dealt with the world as given to sense-perception, dealt with it scientifically, and therefore disregarded the Giver of what is given, entirely.

The physis of Leukippus is sensible as contrasted with the metaphysical matter of Thales; it is without life; and it is without daemons or Gods. The physis of the universe being a mere collection of atoms, it follows that the soul of an individual must be similar. The soul-atoms are spherical and more easily movable. They are the first to be set in motion, and impart the shock to other atoms of more stable figures. Thus there is a suggestion that soul is at least in some degree distinct from other forms of matter. They do not succeed in quite overcoming the distinction between mind and matter, between soul and body.

Aristotle says (de anim. a 2,3): "The Atomists assume that it is soul which imparts motion to animals. Hence they take respiration as the distinctive mark of life. For, when the surrounding air compresses bodies and tends to extrude those atoms which, because they are never at rest themselves, impart motion to animals, then they are reinforced from outside by the entry of other similar atoms in respiration, which, in fact, by helping to check compression and solidification, prevents the escape of the atoms already contained in the animals; and life, so they held, continues as long as there is strength to do this."

The knowing function of the soul is also explained on the mechanistic principle. The soul, being a group of physical atoms knows other souls by colliding with its atoms or with filmy wraiths.
thrown off by them. This is what occurs in touching. (Arist. de Sensu, 442a 29: So all senses are reduced to one-Touching.)
Thus all that is mysterious in the ideas of soul and of life is eliminated.

This mechanistic doctrine of reality has been found satisfactory for practical purposes ever since. Not life nor mind but mechanical motion is responsible for everything that happens. "The Gods and the immortal soul have vanished in the dance of material particles." (Cornford: From Religion to Philosophy. p. 158.)
X.

THE SOUL IN MYSTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

We have seen how the soul was conceived by science in the atom system as motion-motion that can be measured and determined according to definite laws. But this soul-concept was not adapted to satisfy all types of minds. There were thinkers who could not dispense with the supernatural. They believed that the world of sense was not all there was to reality. Life, mind, ends and purposes must in some way be accounted for otherwise than in terms of matter and motion. They believed there was something behind the visible world, something more essential, something transcendent and divine.

Philosophy proper has aimed "to translate a certain view of life, of God, and of the soul and its destiny, into terms of a physical system." In thus trying to rationalise the mysterious, philosophy has often made use of scientific material while on the other hand philosophy has contributed much that has been utilised by pure science.

Science as we have seen was an outgrowth of man's practical needs, of commerce, navigation, "the affairs of the market-place." Mystical philosophy was the out-growth of man's intellectual needs. Man wanted to know himself as a living soul and his relation as a soul to the ultimate reality of the universe.
This yearning to know ultimate truth was not satisfied by mere control over nature in a practical sense, and hence countless efforts have been made to fathom what is back of immediate experience.

Mystical philosophy, which is based upon the spiritual needs in man's nature, has for its source all the old mystical and religious beliefs which preceded it. We saw that belief in the supernatural was strong in the Greek mysteries; in the Dionysiac and Orphic cults the doctrine of the soul as a "Wheel of Life" was the central feature. Likewise in mystical philosophy, the nature of soul or life is the chief consideration.

The mystery cults, as we saw, were founded on the belief that the one life of the group or tribe extended continuously through its dead members as well as through the living; the dead were still part of the group in the same sense as the living. It was this idea of life perpetually renewed which was the source of the belief in Reincarnation, or of a soul-substance or life principle existing distinct from visible matter.

When the Dionysiac religion which grew out of observations upon the phenomena of life and death in nature, was reformed and spiritualised, the result was Orphism. But although Orphism was sufficiently like the older worship to emerge from it, there is a contradiction between the conceptions of the respective cults concerning the soul and immortality.

The first concept is that life or soul is simply a stream of living stuff, flowing perpetually in a circle, but without any trace of a moral significance. This was the view referred to by Socrates when on the day of his death he referred to "the ancient doctrine, that souls pass out of this world to the other, and there exist, and then come back hither from the dead, and are born again. (Plato, Phaedo, 70c.)
For if the souls did not thus go round in a circle, but the process went forward in a straight line, instead of bending round again to its starting-point, a moment would come when all would reach the same state, and becoming would be at a stand-still. The living are constantly going over to the dead: unless the supply is renewed by a reverse process, life would be exhausted, and all would end in death." (Ibid: 72 B.) This kind of soul-stuff would naturally be impersonal, having no organic connection with the series of bodies it temporarily informs. (Arist. de anim. 407 b 21.)

The second concept is that soul has moral attributes. A hint of this concept is seen in Hesiod's Works and Days. "The mere practical operations will not be effective, unless there is a sympathetic correspondence between man's ways and Nature's course. He must keep straight upon the path of custom or right, or else the answering processes of natural life will likewise leave the track." (Hes. Erga. 117.) This suggests the first interpretation of a moral maxim with which ethical philosophy has since been much concerned: Life according to Nature.

Euripides suggests that the soul or life activities of man are bound up with the activities of Nature. In the Phoenissae, (See F. Diimmler, Prolegomena zu Platons Staat, Basel, 1891, pp. 538.) Jocasta argues with Eteocles: "Equality is what is naturally lawful for mankind: the more and the less are in eternal enmity, and herald the day of hatred. Equality it is that ordained for man measure, and the divisions of weight, and the distinctions of number. Equal on their yearly course, move the rayless eye of night and the light of the sun, and neither of them grudges the victory of the other. So the sunlight and the night are the servants of men; and can you not bear to hold an equal place with your brother, and allow him an equal share?"

This quotation suggests that the ancients recognised that it
was Nature, not supernatural Beings, that constituted the authority for morality or right behavior.

The two soul-concepts we have just discussed are developed severally by different thinkers. The first or more strictly Dionysian view is represented by Heraclitus; the second, or Orphic view, by Pythagoras.

HERACLITUS.

The Dionysiac faith was concerned with the notion of one continuous and homogeneous Soul, or Life, in all things, not with individual immortality.

This faith formed the basis of Heraclitus' philosophy. Heraclitus, who was a mystic and a monist in the strongest sense of those terms, developed the central thought of Dionysism, namely, of the one continuous and homogeneous Soul or Life, treating it as his first principle. He called it by different names, to be sure, but its essence was always the same identical thing. "It is, as before, the divine soul-substance, physis, only with all the emphasis thrown, not upon its nature as material filling space, but upon its life, one and continuous in the round of death and rebirth, which is like the cycle of 'the seasons that bear all things.' It is God, who is 'day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, surfeit and hunger; only he takes various shapes, just as fire, when it is mingled with spices, is named according to the savour of each' (frag. 36.) It is also Soul (ψυχή), the principle of life. 'Heraclitus takes soul for his first principle, as he identifies it with the vapour from which he derives all other things, and further says that it is the least corporeal of things and in ceaseless flow; and that it is by something in motion that what is in motion is known; for he,
like the majority, conceived all that exists to be in motion.'
(Arist. de anim. a 2, 405 a 25.)

Heraclitus conceived the divine Soul as the "least corporeal of all things;" and its appropriate vehicle is Fire, the element which is ever-moving and 'ever-living.' Fire is an embodiment of a substance other than itself, since that substance remains the same through all embodiments and transformations. Soul is called fire because the mobile nature of fire seems nearest to the moving force of life; but "the soul-substance itself is a sort of metaphysical Fire, composed of the supernatural, daemonic mana of fire, the least corporal or most 'spiritual' form of matter, which can be identified with the force of life." (Cornford: p. 188.)

Another name for the divine soul-substance, whose life consists in movement and change, is Logos. The Logos is also the one divine Law, the law of Nature (physis) which is the Will of God.

It seems that in the last analysis, the Will of God was, to Heraclitus, the social consciousness. He says: 'It is Law (nomos) to obey the will of One' (frag. 110.) This is true of the universe, no less than for human society; it is common ( ) to all things. 'Those who speak with understanding must hold fast to what is common to all, as a city holds fast to its law, and even more strongly. (frag. 91 b.) 'So we must follow what is common, yet the many live as if they had a wisdom of their own.' (frag. 92.)

This Will of God or Logos is also the Way of Life; it is Justice; and, in one sense, it means the proportion of equivalence. (Cornford, p. 188.)

This variety of names by which Heraclitus called his soul-substance, which, though he could not conceive it as immaterial but only "the least corporal of things," shows that he was striving
to define his soul-substance as mental, for he ascribed to it only such attributes as we modernly ascribe to pure mind. Heraclitus thus came very close to distinguishing between immaterial soul and material body.

In the way in which he identifies the Will of God with the Social consciousness and with life and law, he shows how truly he built upon the Dionysiac soul-view.

We have already noted that to Heraclitus the elements, fire, air, earth, water, were corporeal, while divine Soul was "the least corporeal of things." Are we justified on the basis of this statement to declare that he was a materialistic monist? Or, does he come closer to being a spiritualistic monist? For, when we see that his divine soul-substance, which he identifies with God, has all the attributes that are associated with pure mind, how can we say that he conceived of anything as truly "materialistic?" The question whether the universe is mind or matter in the last analysis was evidently as live a problem to the first Greek philosophers as it is to philosophers in Europe and America at the present time; and it was perhaps due solely to the lack of the word mind in its modern meaning rather than to the lack of a conception of its significance that the early Greeks spoke of soul as corporeal rather than as mental.

PYTHAGORAS.

Behind the school of Phthagorases was the Orphic religion, and its system was a combination of mysticism and science.

We must recall that the Orphic movement was a revival to a type of religion more primitive than the prevailing Olympianism. "It was a return to Dionysus and his thiasos—the daemon and his church, held in one by the unique, mystical relation." But the
revival was also a reformation. The religion which had been devoted
to observing the phenomena of life and death and rebirth in nature,
becomes a religion of the heavenly bodies, and especially of the
Sun. The Sun, then comes to be thought of as an immutable and
deathless God. Upon this conception, the "Olympian notion of
immortality (athanasia, as a life that negates change and death,
intrudes itself. With the doctrine of the fall of the soul from
the stars, went as we have seen, the belief in an indestructible
individual soul, persisting throughout its round of reincarnation."
(Cornford: p. 196.)

This Orphic doctrine of reincarnation, concerned with an
"indestructible individual soul, persisting throughout its round
of reincarnation" presents a marked contrast with the soul-doctrine
of Heraclitus. That of Heraclitus was older. It went back to
the belief in which only the group had a soul, the group-soul pass­
ing from the living state to the dead, and round again, the cyclic
movement being simply that of life, not an upward flight to higher
states of existence.

In Orphism the soul in its pure state consists of fire, like
the divine stars from which it falls, and as such it is good.
Throughout the period of reincarnation, it is infected with
darkness and evil, and with the baser elements. In the philosoph­
ical systems that are based upon this conception, fire or heavenly
light will be set in contrast to the grosser elements, air, water
and earth. The heavenly light, the Sun, will symbolise the unseen
unity of God. The visible world will be condemned as false and
illusive, "a turbid medium in which the rays of heavenly light are
broken and obscured in mist and darkness." There is evidently in
such systems some confusion between material fire and the divine or
other-worldly, as well as in the conceptions of the "flesh" and of
the "soul."
The Pythagorean philosophy was a reformation of Orphic religion. It was an attempt to intellectualise the content of Orphism while preserving to a great extent its social form. Orphism was a cult. Pythagoreanism becomes a Way of life. Dionysus and Orpheus had emphasised the Way of death as leading to rebirth, but Pythagoras gives a new meaning to the theoria, "the passionate spectacle of the suffering God." The way of life is still also a way of death; but to him it means death to the lusts of the body, and a release of the intellect to soar into the realm of "theory." This is the only way by which the soul can follow God, who has ascended beyond the stars.

Pythagoreanism is a reformation of Orphism, yet Pythagoras also held strongly to the Dionysiac concept of soul or life as a general thing or a unit in nature. His best known doctrines were: "First, that soul is an immortal thing, and that it is transformed into other kinds of living things; further, that whatever comes into existence is born again in the revolutions of a certain cycle, nothing being absolutely new; and that all things that are born with life in them ought to be treated as kindred." (Ap. Porph. Vit. Pyth. 18, 19.) The idea of the unity and kinship of all life or soul, and its continuous rebirth in periodic revolutions, contains the core of his doctrine. But while he dwells strongly upon the concept of the common soul, he also takes account of the individual soul. Life to him is both one and many. Personal immortality is as real a fact as the group-soul. "The One can go out into the many; the many can lose themselves in reunion with the One." It is this conception of the One and the many which is the key to the understanding of the "number doctrine" of which Pythagoras was the founder.

From the Orphics he inherited the doctrine of the fall of the soul from its state of union with the divine, its degradation into
the life of the flesh, and its final restoration to its source. In his philosophy he must hold that all existence proceeds out of the One and returns to it again. Thus the primitive wheel of birth of the Orphics is metamorphosed into a mathematical representation. Divine unity is One; the plurality of individual souls and conditions gives us the many. This movement of the One into the many and the many into the One is revealed in his science of number. In Pythagorean arithmetic, "One was not itself a number, but the source in which the whole nature of all numbers was gathered up and implicit. In the earlier Pythagoreanism, we must think of the One (which is not itself a number at all) as analaogous to Anaximander's άρχη βάση. It is the primary, undifferentiated group-soul or physis, of the universe, and numbers must rise from it by a process of differentiation. Similarly, each of these numbers is not a collection of units, built up by addition, but itself a sort of minor group-soul—a distinct 'nature,' with various mystical properties."

(Cornford. p. 210.)

The moral qualities of the individual soul were based in a certain sense upon mathematics, for it may be argued that mathematical principles are involved in the notions of 'arrangement,' 'order' and 'proportion.' A knowledge of geometry should teach "the great power among Gods and men, of Proportion; whereas the ignorant believe in grasping more than one's due share." The Pythagorean society seems to have been founded largely upon this concept; for, "to this society men and women were admitted without distinction; they had all possessions in common, and a common fellowship and mode of life." (Ibid: p. 202.)

Harmonic proportion between numbers was called by the Pythagoreans harmonia. The first number symbol which they used was
evidently the tetractys, obtained by the addition, 1+2+3+4 = 10

Another form of the tetractys was used by Plato in the Timaeus to symbolise the harmonic constitution of the world-soul:

```
  1
 / \ 3
/   \ 4
\   \ 8
 \ 9 27
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Such a tetractys or harmonia is a continuous entity knit together by a principle of unity running through it, as the ratio $\frac{2}{3}$ or $\frac{1}{3}$ which links every term to its predecessor by the same bond.

In the tetractys or harmonia the order and relationship of the terms was emphasised, the tetractys itself being a harmony, that is, a unit. This stress upon unity was analogous to that which we found in the Dionysiac faith which was "the one continuous life in all things." In later Pythagoreanism, on the contrary, we find the Orphic element predominating in which the plurality of souls is given chief consideration. The question whether the world is one or many was no doubt as fascinating to the Pythagoreans, as it has ever been to any thinkers.

These later Pythagoreans of the fifth century proceeded to construct the whole world out of numbers, but they supposed the numbers to have magnitude. (Arist. Met. p. 6, 1080 b. 18ff.) In place of the doctrine that everything proceeds from the One, bodies are built up out of numbers, now conceived as collections of ultimate units, having position and magnitude. These number-atoms are "hardly distinguishable from the atoms of Leukippus and Democritus, who, as Aristotle says, like these Pythagoreans, in a sense make all things to be numbers and to consist of numbers." (Cornford: p. 213.)
When the Pythagoreans granted magnitude to their number-units their system showed a marked tendency toward materialistic atomism. Nature now lost her unity and continuity, and was remodelled as an aggregate of little indestructible atoms. The world becomes the dominion of Destiny, while the God who had ruled from within is a superfluity. The 'life' or 'soul,' which was the 'nature of things' itself has vanished beyond the stars, and the universe has become a vast mechanism, in which dead atoms moving in space due to Chance or Necessity, whichever this outside power may be, is all that we have. Nature has become self-subsistent. She can do without soul.
The contribution of Parmenides in connection with the doctrine of the soul, appears to be slight. He taught that "men were first born from the sun (Diog. IX 22,) and that the dead body cannot perceive light and warmth and sound, because the fire has failed out of it. (Theophr. de Sensu, 3.) Fire, or Light, is thus the soul-substance, and nearest akin to the substance of God." (Cornford: From Philosophy to Religion. p. 223.)

His soul-concept is in harmony with his cosmology. In his cosmology, Being is that which alone exists, and it is unlimited, unchangeable, indivisible, unmovable, without beginning or end. It is One. Non-being is not the opposite of Being, for it is merely a word that stands for no positive thing whatever. It is here that Parmenides clashes with Heracleitus. The latter had "explained "change" or "becoming" by the separation and conflict, or harmony and reconciliatation, of opposites, regarded as equal and balancing powers, each with a domain, or a force, of its own. Parmenides sweeps this whole conception away. In these pairs of antagonists which 'men have agreed to name,' one member is a nothing, a mere word; only the other stands for anything real.' " (Ibid. p. 221.)

When he said that cold, heavy, dark, etc., are mere names
without things to correspond, he simply meant that cold means not-hot, dark means not-light, and so on. Heat and light represent something that exist; cold and darkness are absences of them.

The process of becoming which brought the visible world into existence was not a strife, as with Heracleitus, but a mere "degradation of light." The heavier and more compact a body is, the more unreal it is. But even the earth, though low in the scale, has still some fire and heat and light in it. But in the centre of the earth, at the nadir, where the earth is verging on non-existence, we reach "the power of darkness." Here is the throne of Moira, or Necessity. Yet this place of darkness is nevertheless the throne of Aphrodite, the Queen of Life, so that from the realm of densest matter, there exists something that makes for a return to the spiritual. "The downward fall of life from the heavenly fires is counteracted by an upward impulse which 'sends the souls back from the seen to the unseen.'" (Ibid. p. 223.) Thus we perceive a hint that from the greatest depths of corporeality and darkness, Nature aspires towards that perfection which lies above and beyond her reach, and in that aspiration she regains the life which God has lost.

God, soul, life, light, fire, were terms which Parmenides used to represent Being or that which is. But none of these terms appears to signify that he used them to represent reality as materialistic. In fact, though he said that Being is One, and thus gave us a purely monistic system, he did not state whether the universe consisted of an elemental substance, whether of mind, matter, or what not. Even when he mentions fire and light and identifies them with soul, there is no reason for believing that he meant physical fire. What, then, did he conceive
Being to be? He did not tell us what Being was as a substance, yet in a way, he seems to suggest that it was mental. He was the "father of Logic" (Ibid: p. 221.) and his doctrine appears to have been more essentially a system of reasoning than an ontological hypothesis. The consistency of his logic must have led him to believe that mental facts possessed a reality of their own. If this was the case, then it is possible that he thought of mind as the "Way of Truth" or that which is, and of the visible or sense world as the "Way of Opinion." On this supposition, one might venture to state that Parmenides was the first idealistic philosopher of whom we have any record. His world was a mental world in which mind or Soul is all that exists in the ultimate analysis.
Empedocles was both a man of science and a mystic, and he wrote two long poems displaying this dual trend of his philosophy. The scientific trend is shown principally in the poem *About Nature*, the mystic in the one entitled *Purifications*. His science embraces the leading features of Ionian physical science, and his mysticism is a development of the prominent concepts in the Orphic and Pythagorean doctrines of immortality.

His soul theory is given mainly in the *Purifications*, but this does not become clear until we see that it is developed upon the same principles as his physical theory, for the two are mutually dependent upon one another.

We find, then, that he posited the universe as consisting originally of a Sphere, wherein all the elements are mixed by Love. Love streams out of this mass while Strife pours in from outside. The elements are segregated into four regions. Then the process is reversed, so that Love again prevails drawing the elements into fusion again, ending in the complete reunion of the sphere.

The bodily elements constituting the Sphere are fire, air, water and earth, while the remaining two, "Love and Strife are of
that attenuated and fluid consistency which belongs to soul-substance, with the least conceivable degree of corporeality. Empedocles, says Aristotle, identifies Love with the Good; and Love is both a moving principle, since it draws together, and a material, since it is a part of the mixture. To move is the function of Soul, or God; but Soul and God can still only be thought of as the finest forms of matter." (Cornford: p. 230.)

Aristotle also says that Empedocles' Love is the substrate of the One, in the same sense as the Water of Thales, the Fire of Heracleitus, the Air of Anaximenes. (Met. B1,996 a 7.) For all of these philosophers, the primary element was alive and self-moving. It is a living and self-moving soul-substance that Love is like the physis of the Ionians.

In Empedocles, Strife plays the part of Moira; not, however, as a dim, mythical personality, but as a living self-moving soul-substance. (Ibid: p. 231.) The picture which Empedocles contrived was as follows: a Sphere consisting of four primary element, fire, air, water, earth, with Love, a soul-substance continuously diffused throughout the whole mass; while outside them is Strife, forming an envelope'at the outermost limits of the round,' and completely separated from the elements. (Frag. 36. 9.)

This Sphere is also the body of God. Love is the Soul which pervades it, and binds it together in the bonds of harmony. 'There is no discord or unseemly strife in his limbs.' (Frag. 27.)

There is a close analogy of this 'Love in the Sphere' with the harmony-soul of the Pythagoreans, which we saw, was both a ratio and a spiritual substance. "It is once more the group-soul, the solidarity of a group still conceived, as it had been by primitive man, as a material medium." (Cornford: p. 235.)

So long as Love ruled supreme within the Sphere, peace and
harmony prevailed, but a time came when "Strife leapt to claim his prerogatives, and waxed mighty in the limbs of the God, and they all trembled in turn. (Frag. 30.) As Strife poured in, Love rushed out to meet it. In the mixing of elements which now occurs, all the individual things in the world have their beginning. The elements 'prevail in turn, as the circle comes round, and pass into one another, waxing small and great in their appointed turn; for they alone really are, but as they run through one another they become men and all the tribes of beasts' (Frag. 26.)

But was not alone the Sphere or "body of God" that separated into fire, air, water and earth and formed all the visible, individual things, but the Soul-substance, Love and Hate became mixed, and allowed the formation of individual souls. "The fall of the individual soul thus means its separation from the original unity of God, the principle of Love and Harmony, and its passing into an impure state, in which it is mixed and tainted with the evil principle of Strife." (Cornford: p. 238.) The principle of division has broken up the one all-pervading God, or Soul, of the Sphere into a plurality of daemons, each composed of Love and Strife, of Good and Evil. Such a daemon can pass from one body to another and go the round of the elements, which all 'loathe' it, because it contains an admixture of loathsome Styx. (Frag. 115. 12.) The daemon will find no rest till it is purified of the evil principle and gathered back into the perfect Love, or Soul of God.

The individual soul consists of mixed portions of Love and Strife, which remain combined so long as the soul is impure. It migrates from body to body for a great year of thirty thousand seasons. (frag. 115. 2.) (Cf. Hes. Theog. 793.) The end of this year will come at the end of our world's existence, "when the bodily elements are given over to the rule of Strife, and Love
passes out of the pass to form a continuous fluid, enveloping it, as Neikos had done at the opposite pole." (Cornford: p. 239.)

Empedocles regarded the flesh as an "alien garment," to which the senses belonged. (Frag. 126.) Thus his soul-doctrine is essentially the same as that of the Orphics and Pythagoreans. The line is distinct between the higher, spiritual faculties which perceive unseen things, and the senses of the body which perish with it.

In so far as soul is one, it is bound together by Love. In so far as individual souls are recognised, be see the principles of plurality, disunion and Strife. Pythagoreanism in its early form emphasised the principle of unity, ratio or harmony. In its later form, out of its contact with Orphism, came the attention to the many, to the individuals. Empedocles harmonises the two views and shows wherein the universe is both one and many. His system was more than that of Parmenides, however. The system of Parmenides was more correctly a way of approach, or a logical method by which philosophical questions might be considered. Empedocles, on the other hand, offered a truly philosophical hypothesis in his two poems. We must agree with Cornford when he says: "The two poems show us a religious doctrine, and a translation of it into physical terms, which stands out as extraordinarily ingenious and successful." (Cornford: p. 140.)
Plato gives us two distinct soul-doctrines in his dialogues, both of which he professes to have received from Socrates. The first of these is found in the Apology, Laches, Charmides, and other minor dialogues, written within ten years after the death of Socrates (399 B.C.). The second, which is found in the Gorgias, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic and Symposium, was the product of the riper efforts of the great philosopher.

There is a strong contrast of doctrines as set forth in these two groups of dialogues. That of the former, as typified by Socrates' speech at his trial and which is recorded in the Apology, does not bear much resemblance to that which characterizes Socrates' last conversation with his intimate friends, as recorded in the earlier part of the Phaedo.

The reason for the contrast seems obvious upon a little reflection.

In the first place, the speech at the trial was probably not the appropriate occasion in Socrates' own judgment at which he would choose to express his private convictions regarding the immortality of the soul. In the second place, Plato, who was present at the trial, was at that time only twenty-eight years of
age, and was furthermore unacquainted with the soul-doctrines of mystical philosophers like Pythagoras, so that, even if Socrates' had referred during his trial to mystical beliefs concerning the nature and immortality of the spirit, Plato might not have felt competent to interpret them. And, in the third place, the soul-view that is given in the Phaedo was not overheard by Plato himself, but was obtained by overhearing the accounts of the friends of Socrates who had been with him in the prison. Having heard these reports and reflected upon them, and compared and enriched them due to his contract with Pythagorean thought during his sojourn in Sicily, after the death of Socrates, Plato was enabled to produce his famous soul-doctrine.

But, to return to the soul-doctrine that we discover in the Apology, we find it to be as follows: The view of death to which Socrates gives expression suggests that we have no definite knowledge whether there is an immortal soul that continues after the death of the body, or whether all consciousness is at an end when the breath ceases. He does not say that the soul in this condition is annihilated, but rather that it is in a condition of dreamless sleep, and remarks, that few of our waking days and nights are better and pleasanter than dreamless sleep.

If, on the other hand, "death is like a journey to another country, that means that man possesses, in addition to his visible body, an immortal part or soul. This soul has consciousness, and upon its arrival in Hades it recognizes Orpheus, Hesiod, Homer, Odysseus, Agamemnon, Ajax, and all the other spirits of the departed. Thus, whether the soul after death is in a state of dreamless sleep or unconsciousness, or whether it is actively conscious, communing with friends and following the pursuits it had lived while still inhabiting the flesh, its condition is in either case such that "the dead are happier than the living."
Such a crude view of the nature and significance of the soul could not have failed to be unsatisfying to as strongly philosophical a mind as that of Socrates, and to prove still more inadequate to a thinker like Plato. What was more natural, therefore than that a greater and more profound soul-theory should follow, expressing both the inner views of Socrates, as well as the elaboration upon them which Plato was able to contribute after several years of research and reflection? This larger and more valuable doctrine of the soul is given in Plato's later works, and is well shown in the earlier part of the Phaedo.

Judging by the account which Plato gives us in the Phaedo of Socrates' discourse with his intimate friends in the prison, we are led to believe that Socrates was well acquainted with the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul. We are a little surprised that the mystic view of immortality is nowhere referred to in the Charmides, Laches, and other early dialogues, but this must be due to the circumstance that Plato is not supposed to have belonged to the inner circle of Socrates. (See Burnet, Phaedo, 1911, Introd. p. XXVI.) Evidently, therefore, Plato did not learn it from Socrates, but from Pythagorean friends after his master's death.

The subject of the early dialogues is the definition of virtue, or of particular virtues, such as courage and temperance, and the purpose is to show that virtue is knowledge. Knowledge is thus exalted as the supreme end in life. It then becomes important to discover what is the nature of real knowledge as distinguished from the practical or apparent knowledge of the Sophists. Socrates therefore sets himself the task to discover the meaning of a name like Justice, as distinct from the many things called that name. This was in fact the key-note in Socrates' teachings-to discover the meaning of names, to disclose their inner purport.

The force of Socrates' efforts evidently found a place to
mature in the fertile mind of Plato. The inner meaning or truth of names must evidently exist in the unseen, the meaning must be the substantial, existing thing, and more real than the many things that pass for justice, or any other concept, and merely bears its name.

It must have been a moment of supreme satisfaction to Plato when it dawned upon him that the 'meanings' which Socrates had sought were the living natures and indwelling souls of the names which represented them. These 'meanings' could "take the place of the Pythagorean 'numbers,' and once more fill the gap, left by Parmenides, between the immutable One and the manifold world of sense." (Cornford: p. 249.) Thus Plato became a mystic, subscribing to the belief that there is an unseen something behind the world of sense, and that this unseen something is more potent than the seen, as well as the cause or source of the seen.

The Phaedo acknowledges the existence of two kinds of worlds. "The world of the body is a prison, or a tomb; that other world of the soul and of Ideas is the realm of true life and reality, in which all worth resides." (Ibid. p. 246.) The world of sense with which the body deals is merely the world of seeming or appearance, and it is this world that we must endeavor to escape from in order to behold the world of truth.

We shall now try to discover what Plato conceived Ideas to be. We recall that his contemporary, Democritus, explained visual perception by the entrance of "images which flow off continually from the objects seen, and are of like form with them, and impinge upon the eye." (Arist. de Sens. p. 56.) Atomism reduced these 'images' to 'wraiths' or filmy tissues of atoms. Since atoms were material bodies, these 'images' thus possessed objective reality, with bodily properties such as resistance, extension and localisation in space. The task of philosophy has
been to try to get mental concepts, or Ideas, free from material soul properties. Did Plato succeed in this task?

In the Phaedo (79D), he seems to recognize two grades of supersensible existence: (a) pure, unmixed with body, and (b) impure, mixed with body, for he says: The Soul may be withdrawn 'by itself' and retire to that which is pure, ever-existent, immortal, and unchangeable, and be with this for ever, being akin to it."

During this mortal life, and even for a time after death, the soul-substance is infected by the bodily, unless the soul has been purified in life by the pursuit of wisdom. Hence the doctrine of Plato. If the soul escapes pure, not dragging with it anything of the bodily, there would be no reason why it should fall back into another mortal form. The soul, then, when it reaches its state of purity, is free from the bodily, the material, or that which pertains to the world of sense.

Ideas and souls are described in very similar language. For example, the instance of the idea of Beauty in us (See Phaedo 102 D) is in some sense distinguished from the Idea itself, which is in nature. In the Symposium, (211,) the Idea, when it is 'by itself' and free from matter, is called uniform, unmixed, pure, divine. And the conclusion of the argument in the Phaedo 80 D, is that "soul is most like the divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, unchangeable Idea; while body is like the human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, dissoluble, and perpetually changing." (Cornford: p. 252.)

In its impure or immanent phase, Idea is infected with sense-material such as "human flesh and colors and all sorts of mortal rubbish." (Symp. 211 E.) In the same way Soul is filled by the body with passions and appetites and fears and all sorts of phantoms and rubbish." (Phaedo, 66 C.)
Should we conclude from such passages that souls and Ideas were identical in Plato's estimation or did he conceive of them as simply analagous? There may have been a confusion in his own mind as to whether or not they were identical, but for logical purposes, Ideas and souls lent themselves equally well as representations for the elements of reality. As Cornford says: "the 'nature of things' is to be found in these supersensible Ideas, each of which is the centre, and indwelling soul, of a group of objects in the sense-world." (Cornford: p. 253.)

We noted above that the conclusion of the argument in the Phaedo (80 D,) was that Ideas are objects of the same kind with souls, however, but souls of groups, or classes of things. They exist in the same way as do the impersonal spirits or daemons of human groups or natural departments. Thus Justice is the collective soul-idea which is shared by all just persons. The Idea is shared in the same way that a mystery-daemon, like Dionysus, was shared by his group of worshippers. In the orgiastic rites all the worshippers partook of the one divine nature, and it is with this representation as a basis that we must interpret the terms-methexis, parousia, koinonia -terms implying participation \((\mu \in \theta \in \gamma \zeta)\) by which Plato tries to describe the relation of an Idea to its group. Aristotle says in this connection: "whereas the Pythagoreans say that things exist by representing numbers, Plato says it is by participation; he merely changed the name." (Arist. Met. a VI. 987 b 9.) Aristotle adds that both alike 'left it an open question what on earth this representation or participation may be.' Plato in his Parmenides ponders whether we are to understand that the whole Idea, or only a part, is present in each thing which partakes of it. It appears that the problem can not be solved according to the analogy that Ideas are indwelling group-souls which can impart themselves to a
whole group, and yet remain one. The Ideas dry up into mere concepts or logical objects of thought, without life or power. Participation or the relation of *methexis* is thus reduced to the relation of logical subject to universal predicate. Thus logic gains where mysticism turns out to be the loser.

When Plato tried to rationalise the soul and to make it consist of pure intellect, we feel that he failed. When he had analysed Idea into its state of purity, he discovered that it had lost its life and its power as a cause in the world. It was then no longer soul, but a mere form of thought. Plato saw this inconsistency in his doctrine and was dissatisfied with it. In the *Sophist*, (248 E,) he breaks out: "Can we ever be made to believe that motion, and life, and soul, and consciousness, are not present in that which is perfectly real? Can we imagine it as neither alive nor conscious, but, in all its irreproachable solemnity, a senseless, immovable fixture?"

When Plato realised that his Ideas had turned out to be without life or consciousness, to be in fact only forms of thought they could not be regarded as the cause of that which exists. His doctrine of Ideas had failed to afford a cosmology, just as Parmenides' doctrine of Being had failed as a cosmology. Both philosophers had merely rendered a valuable contribution to dialectic from a scientific point of view.

But the mystic element in Plato was too strong to permit him to rest content with the offering of a merely logical piece of work. He must produce a cosmology even if reason must be sacrificed to fancy.

If the realm of Ideas could not afford him a moving power for a cosmology it must be introduced arbitrarily from without. Hence he brought in an emotional force into his hierarchy of mental forms, and called it Desire. This Desire is the mythical
Demiurge of the Timaeus, for which there is no tolerable explanation in rational terms. "An immutable, passionless Reason may trace the outlines of a scheme of classification, and divide its concepts into duly subordinated genera and species; but it can do no more. To account for the existence of anything whatever, we have to ascribe to it the unworthy and lower faculty of desire, and give this desire an unworthy and lower object—the existence of an imperfect copy of perfection. But that is the language of religion, not of science. (Cornford: p. 261.)

In spite of all his efforts to do so, Plato did not seem to be able to make the rational and the mythical features of his soul-doctrine coincide. His treatment of the Idea was valuable to the science of dialectic. His treatment of the nature of the Soul was an important contribution to poetry and religion, but he did not prove that Soul and Idea are identical.

Plato appears, however, to have given us a consistent ontological hypothesis in this, that he reduced all reality to something that is mental in its nature. He had no need of a bodily substratum consisting of atoms such as Democritus' system demanded; nor material elements, earth, air, fire and water, like those of Empedocles, and which were moved from without by mythical personalities, Love and Hate; nor a multitude of different kinds of elemental bodies like those of Anaxagoras, moved from without by a mental Nous which was not produced mechanical motion; nor did he require other material elements such as water, air, or fire. His substratum most resembled that of the Pythagoreans, who conceived numerical relations to be the underlying reality of all that exists. To them these relations evidently existed among the things or quantities to which they pertained. Plato goes a step farther, however, and recognizes that relations exist not between things and quantities, as such but as Ideas in the mind.
Thus for his doctrine appears clean-cut and concise. His difficulty arose when he attempted to identify his Ideas with Soul or mind itself. Ideas or concepts when traced to their logical finality turn out to be *forma* of mental activity. Soul, on the other hand, he recognizes as alive and moving, and 'present in that which is perfectly real.' But although he failed to show that Soul is "Idea" or pure intellect in its last analysis, he offered an ontological doctrine in which he dispensed with matter and accounted for the universe in terms of something mental.

Plato surmised, as we have seen, that Soul is something more than Idea. When Idea and the intellectual method of treating it proved too unsatisfying to his temperament he abandoned the way of science in a measure and turned to mythology.

So long as he remained in the field of science he must fail to state what the Soul really is, and must fail to produce a cosmology. But a cosmology he would have. He could do no better than let his natural temperament and genius absorb what best suited it from the environment and the experiences which he encountered. Thus the myths of the Orphics and Pythagoreans, as well as other traditions and characteristics of the Greeks of his day, were made to contribute their quota to the poetic and philosophic productions of which he was the author.

Pure reason could produce an ontology that was logically consistent, mind could be shown to be a sufficient substratum for reality by methods of dialectic, but reason was not sufficient to give a cosmology that would satisfy the demands of the Soul, or the heart. Plato's philosophy had to be constructed out of the mythology, traditions and religious notions which had grown out of developing human reflection, combined with the results of dialectic. This philosophic system in which pure Idea or Reason is so vividly
contrasted with the world of sense in which the feelings, instincts and emotions aspire for the first place, seems to fill in a large measure, the needs of both rationalistic and mystical temperaments.

Thus the teachings of Plato became authority in the philosophical systems and theological disputes of the Neoplatonists and Schoolmen, as well as in much of the speculative reasoning of some of the world's great thinkers up to the present time.

Although his soul concept proves to be ambiguous in its last analysis, as we have clearly seen, it has nevertheless been regarded as being satisfactory for the requirements of Christian theology. It is generally considered to be the foundation for the notion in the popular thinking of modern civilization concerning the nature of the soul. It is for this reason that we find the study of Plato's doctrine of the Soul both interesting and fruitful.

Plato's doctrine of the Soul turned out, after all, to be more mythical than scientific. It remained for Plato's pupil and successor, Aristotle, to make a further attempt to dispense with the mythical features of the system, and to further develop and systematise the scientific aspect of the doctrine of Ideas. For this contribution to dialectic, Aristotle well deserves the title of Founder of systematised Logic.

Aristotle made a supreme effort to clear philosophy of everything that was vague and mythical in religion. He therefore conceived God as Form, or pure Thought, without Matter. God being identical with Form or Thought, has no active or creative energy. He is the object of love, but cannot love. In this system, Form has escaped from its content, and is mere intellectual activity without a vestige of life, desire or power inherent in it.
To live the life of pure Thought or Reason, is the ideal which Aristotle recommends to humanity. In his Ethics, Nic. K VII, he says: "If, then, Reason is divine in comparison with man, the life of Reason is divine in comparison with human life. We ought not to listen to those who exhort man to keep to man's thought, or a mortal to the thoughts of mortality; but, so far as may be, to achieve immortality, and do what man may to live according to the highest thing that is in him; for, though it be little in bulk, in power it is far above all the rest.

It would seem, too, that this is the true self of every man, since it is the supreme and better part. It will be strange, then, if he should choose not his own life, but some other's. What we said before will be appropriate again here: that what is naturally proper to every creature is the highest and pleasantest for him. And so, to man, this will be the life of Reason, since Reason is, in the highest sense, a man's self. Therefore, this life will also be most blessed."

In the passage just quoted we see that even Aristotle does not find logical thought as such a reality in itself can act as a cause or source of the world as we find it. It is only in the measure that his Forms are the modes in which life expresses itself that they mean anything.

Plato had hinted that "that which is perfectly real" must have "motion," "life," "soul," and consciousness." These attributes of mere animal existence, but life in its greatest sense such as Aristotle argues for in his Ethics is not simply animal life, but life that is "most blessed" because it is under the control of Reason. This is the real worth or "soul" of a man, when he has risen to a state where his life is not ruled by instinct nor impulse alone, but by conscious, self-controlling Reason.
When Aristotle's "ideas" or "forms" of thought were recognized as subjective, that is, as belonging to the mind of the individual who conceived them, he was able to discard the doctrine of the reincarnation of souls that had been taught by Plato and others. When the form of a thing was seen to be inseparable from the matter in which it was expressed, then, also, the soul of a man was recognized as being his own. It was no longer a mere distorted copy of an "idea" that he had seen when he was "face to face with truth" in a mythical, celestial world in his prenatal existence.

This, then, may be looked upon as the triumph of Greek thought that man's soul is recognized as a self-conscious ego, possessing a meaning in itself, together with a purpose and a mission of its own.

A modification of this concept was offered several centuries later by Plotinus. Plotinus also accorded to the rational mind the highest place, even identifying Intelligence with God, and the soul's bliss with its communion with Divine Intelligence. But, though he accorded to Intelligence the supreme position, he added that the Divine can not be wholly comprehended by man's rational powers. Faith and revelation must be depended upon also.

This admission does not detract, however, from the dignity of man's reason. It rather suggests the vastness of the intellectual world, which may first be vaguely anticipated by the intuitions to be later defined by thought processes in distinct terms.

The view of the soul held by Plato as a purely immaterial being or divine essence, and the spiritual view held by Plotinus, have been powerful influences in modern thought. One has only to understand the vast extent of the influence of Plato on early Christian theology and philosophy, and the almost unmeasured influence of St. Augustine and the other Church Fathers in determining the whole direction of modern religious and ethical
thought to appreciate the importance of Plato's doctrine of the soul. The attempt to trace back this Platonic immaterialism to its roots in early Greek thought becomes of the highest importance to the understanding of the ultimate sources of one of our great ruling ideas.

This we have attempted to do. We have pointed out how primitive man first expressed his belief in spirit existence when he recognized forces in nature as distinct from the objects with which they were connected, as for instance, when he reflected upon his dream-life, gradually deducing that not he alone possessed a mysterious something that had reality apart from his body, but that all objects of nature had the same.

This spirit concept worked itself into all phases of social and moral life. Among the Greeks it takes a special form at an early period in their culture as soul rather than as spirit. The soul is at first a representation defined by collective functions and is called moira. These functions are superindivid., expressing the collective emotion and activity of group-life. The soul at this stage is a "sympathetic continuum" uniting the members of the group with a mysterious bond. The bond is conceived in a material form, as a fluid charged with life. This fluid, since it takes the out-line of a social group, whose "nature" it is, will inevitably be identified with the blood which is common to the kin. This kindred blood is, however, a mythical entity, in the sense that it may be conceived as uniting members who are not really akin by blood, as in totemic clans, where the members belong to different classes of natural species.

We found also how the ideas of God and Soul arose out of this "sympathetic continuum," how the original continuity of the group broke down when the magical energy of the human group became distinguished from that of the species or natural department
formerly identified with it. This is where the totemic structure fell and the θεός pools could be said to take their origen; one pool retaining the preservation of the daemonic powers of the group, the other, the formation of the Olympian God cut off from man.

The collective consciousness which imposed moral constraint from without was the source of the conception of a supreme force, that is, Moira. Moira, as the "nature" of a group, could be visibly embodied in the blood, which is the substrate of all kinship. Out of this representation arose, by differentiation, the notions of group-soul and daemon, and finally the individual soul and God.

Souls and Gods thus arose out of the old sympathetic continuum. But since this representation was a material fluid as well as a spiritual entity possessing life and power, it is easy to see where the Ionian philosophers derived their notion of a physis or primitive substance that was "alive" while at the same time it was "water" or "air."

Then followed the various attempts to explain matter in terms of soul and soul in terms of matter, as we have seen in the mystical and in the scientific philosophies until we come to Plato and Aristotle who see in "Idea" and in "Reason" that which represents our "true self." (Eth. Nic. 1178 a 2.)