Teaching caritas: reintegrating women's voices into thirteenth-century theological education

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TEACHING CARITAS: REINTEGRATING WOMEN’S VOICES INTO
THIRTEENTH-CENTURY THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION

by
Dauna Marie Kiser

An Abstract
Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in History
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

December 2010

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Katherine H. Tachau
ABSTRACT

Thirteenth-Century women engaged in educational activities within their chosen communities, as did men. Yet, traditional scholarship has claimed women were not active in teaching theology because they did not leave behind theoretical works nor hold public teaching offices. I argue that if we expand our view of education beyond familiar structures, titles, and specific textual content, we find there were many more individuals engaged in teaching and learning than appear at first glance. We also discover their teaching within existing texts. Recent scholars have successfully demonstrated the participation of women in manuscript copying and editing, traditionally seen as male activities; others have investigated alternate ways that help us better understand medieval ways of knowing as well as how women expressed what they knew. My dissertation, Teaching Caritas: Reintegrating Women’s Voices into Thirteenth-Century Theological Education, takes these reassessments one step further and locates women and their texts within educational venues more generally associated with men. It seeks to reintegrate some of the many unheard voices into the dialog through a direct comparison of texts written by men and women in the thirteenth century. In my analysis, I show how both entered into the conversations regarding one theological subject, that of caritas (charity or love, in English). Caritas, from the Greek agape and eros, was a subject important to Christian thought and works; therefore, theories regarding it appear in numerous texts written by both men and women.

New approaches to the study of medieval women have drastically changed the historical landscape over the last fifteen years. Feminist scholars have shown that women’s practices cannot simply be added into the narrative of men’s history; rather, women’s very presence in history changes the narrative. Scholars have revised patterns
depicting male-to-female influence in monastic reform movements, explaining how women actively engaged in those movements. Scholars of literature and rhetoric have demonstrated that medieval women used their own voices to speak, and how their voices were silenced only during subsequent centuries as dominant educational institutions narrowed their canonical and professional focus. Not surprisingly, when we pick up medieval women’s texts and listen to their voices we hear original insights on theological and philosophical issues – whether in Latin or in the vernacular.

My project takes up two of these women’s texts and finds common ideas that they and men’s texts contain. I have chosen to focus on four authors writing within the Episcopal jurisdiction of Cologne: Albertus Magnus, Beatrice of Nazareth, Hadewijch of Brabant, and Meister Eckhart. They wrote in Latin or the vernacular for the benefit of their readers. By the thirteenth century there were a number of terms for caritas in both Latin and in the vernacular languages. This synonymous nature of caritas makes possible an analysis such as mine, which crosses genre, gender and language. These religious women and men learned various theories regarding the essence of caritas, and all knew (or knew of) certain techniques used to initiate visionary events. They were able to learn and then teach their thoughts and techniques because of the connection caritas provided between the knowing soul and the divine mind. Finally, although much of our educational history has been intellectual history, there was no one dominant or correct method of teaching in the thirteenth century. By bringing these aspects to light, my work will help women’s voices re-enter the historical documentary of education.

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Thesis Supervisor: Professor Katherine H. Tachau
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PH.D. THESIS

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Julie Berger Hochstrasser
To my husband, Marty Kiser
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INTRODUCTION

In a world filled with suffering, one source of comfort primary to thirteenth-century Christians came from a divine love, *caritas*, with its accompanying assurance that they were loved and cared for. Amid the pain, violence, and fear in their everyday lives, medieval Christians clung to the idea that a heavenly being, filled with love, was ever aware of the struggles they endured on earth. *Caritas* bound this divine being to every individual soul, and then bound each person together with others to generate a continuous web of support. So pervasive was the idea of loving and being loved both by God and fellow human beings that the nature of *caritas* touched all levels of society and all vocations in one form or another. In their efforts to understand it, men and women learned and taught about this significant Christian love within a variety of venues; their additional goal was to help both religious members and lay patrons in their efforts to comprehend the meaning and proper expression of *caritas*. Whether enclosed deep within a cloistered monastery, preaching in towns or villages along a road, garnering donations from wealthy patrons, or debating policy in mother houses of a religious order, men and women engaged in passionate discussions about *caritas*. What did the term mean? What type of love was it? What did it do in relation to the Trinity and the human soul? These are a few of the complex questions taken up by thirteenth-century thinkers in the western Christian world and which will be discussed throughout this study.

The term, *caritas*, was, in the medieval tradition, an inclusive all-encompassing force that gently attracted the soul toward a higher spiritual life. The English term, “charity,” does little justice to the beauty and inclusiveness of the Latin *caritas*. There is no direct English translation, although “love,” simply stated, seems to fit the overall meaning of the term more clearly than “charity.” The English term comes through the
French term *charité* and requires context to verify it is a translation of the larger meaning of *caritas*. "Charity" often only refers to almsgiving, which connotes an unequal overall worth between giver and recipient in the specific relationship at hand. The medieval notion of *caritas* promoted a sharing between human equals facilitated through mutual utilization of divine benefits. It also provided the potential for each human soul to be joined to the divine source by becoming "like" as much as "with" a divine being. Since the Reformation, however, *caritas* has slowly become a near-pejorative term imposed on obligatory Christian (mainly Catholic) almsgiving; a phenomenon brought sharply to bear in Anders Nygren’s *Agape and Eros* in the 1930s. Mid-twentieth century scholars might defend or criticize Nygren’s notion of *caritas* as a medieval synthesis of *agape* and *eros*, but many accepted that his attack on *caritas* was an attempt to weaken his perceived authority of traditional Catholicism over Protestant Evangelicalism. *Agape* had become

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2. Irving Singer, *The Nature of Love: Plato to Luther* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); A more balanced notion of *caritas* as love, although translated as ‘charity’, is in Gene Outka, *Agape: An Ethical Analysis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 133. Outka (pp. 44-47) brings in divine-self-neighbor as an acceptable triad in the idea of ‘neighbor-love’, a term he uses in place of *caritas* or charity.

3. Anders Nygren, *Agape & Eros*. Trans., Philip S. Watson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Romand Coles, *Rethinking Generosity: Critical Theory and the Politics of Caritas* (London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 5. Coles (p.1) relegates *caritas* to almsgiving while he rejects medieval theories of this divine love as blind embodiments of the misuse of *caritas* in later centuries, claiming that “*caritas* and *agape*, giving and love” conjure up terrifying images of destruction as they “swept across the Americas during the Conquest with a holocaust of ‘generosity’.” Centering on Kantian theory and advocating a ‘post-secular caritas’, he also sees Ockham as the secularizing liberator of generosity from the gifting grip of a punishing and rewarding God into the hands of the human givers themselves. See p. 4. An interesting work, although *caritas* appears seldom in the actual discussion. Gene Outka again provides a less antagonistic approach to ‘charity’ as a Catholic form of love that also encompasses generosity, Outka, 48, 134-5, 145.

Luther’s term of choice against this medieval Catholic synthesis, particularly against the merits a person could earn through his or her own will. Modern scholarly debates over agape often begin with St. Paul, pause for Augustine of Hippo, and then vault over the Middle Ages to Luther and onward to join the twentieth-century debate over Nygren’s theory. Caritas might be mentioned briefly – and then solely as it was interpreted by Nygren, who argued that it “contained more elements of self-fulfillment and mutuality” than post-Reformation agape which places the “other” foremost and which, according to Nygren, is superior. In partial response to the tension over caritas-agape, Hegel coined an alternative term for this all-encompassing, compassion-centered love in the late eighteenth-century. “Altruism” (other-regard at the expense of self) entered the debates as a term which twentieth-century scholars considered untainted by religious or medieval debts, and which they argue make it preferable for the study of love in the human psyche, society, or biology within various scientific fields. While “altruism” is based on the Latin alter (other) and the care of another based on cura, a large number of these current scientific discussions of altruism begin with the Darwinian evolutionary processes as if

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5 Catholicism, as a specific sect of Christianity, was not yet established in the thirteenth century. Singer, Nature of Love, 324, 327. An interesting question is whether Luther targeted the Franciscan idea of the superiority of the will over the intellect, since, according to Singer, he targets a Dominican, Aquinas. If not, Singer demonstrates another pitfall in the attribution of medieval theories on caritas exclusively to Aquinas. Singer also claims that Aquinas’ questions on Caritas, “Is caritas something created in the soul or is it the Holy Spirit”? is actually a question comparing eros and agape as the Greek Paul meant to use them. (p. 319) I have not studied Aquinas closely enough to comment, but for Albert, the created was not ‘eros’ and the uncreated ‘agape’. The question was on a rather different matter regarding the Latin terms they had had on hand for centuries. Outka specifies agape as “the referent for any alleged distinctiveness in Christian love.” Outka, 7.

*cura alterius* had no history of use before this time.⁷

Modern scholarship on medieval *caritas* reveals its own limitations. Most discussions of medieval theories on *caritas* that are free of the imposition of post-modern sensibilities refer exclusively to the opinions of Thomas Aquinas.⁸ *Caritas*, in the medieval sense that it universally binds divinity, and soul, and that it lifts the human spirit toward “becoming like” that divinity, is most likely reinterpreted according to a Thomist determination. Inspired by Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, which promotes friendship (although more in the sense of business relations), Aquinas continues a line of thought began in Albertus Magnus’ later work that associates *caritas* more strongly with human relations than with a divine-soul-neighbor bond. Compassion and empathy become slightly skewed toward practical actions, and the values inherent in prayers and gratitude for the alms given begin to fade. That other medieval thinkers avoided this trend is lost on modern readers, who learn of Thomist opinions to the exclusion of other, equally valuable, medieval theories.⁹

But, we now know, other thirteen-century thinkers across disparate educational programs did discuss *caritas*, or vernacular synonyms for it, and they did so passionately. Because the topic reached across social levels and beyond monastic walls it did not fall

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⁷ In an excellent collection of essays, *Altruism & Altruistic Love*, the introduction provides the etymological basis for using the term altruism, then remains post-Darwinian throughout until the Nineteenth chapter when a brief history of *agape*, *eros*, and *caritas* appears. See *Altruism & Altruistic Love*; Stephen Post, in his 1990 monograph, argues that to detach love from any higher aspect of self or happiness is to do away with a large portion of love altogether. Post, *Theory of Agape*, 10; Outka defines altruism but prefers to use *agape* for a higher form of love. Outka, 12-13.

⁸ Singer, *Nature of Love*, Chapter 14: "Luther versus *Caritas*.” This chapter discusses Augustine, Aquinas, and Luther, with sprinkles of Plato mixed in; Browning, 338.

under the jurisdiction of any exclusive group. Theologians such as Hildegard of Bingen, Bernard of Clairvaux and our four authors here gave it extensive treatment; mystics and scholastics opined equally; indeed, medieval scholastics were also mystics, and medieval mystics also made use of scholastic methods. Similarly, women’s and men’s voices joined in debates regarding divine love, and women’s generation of visionary material as teaching tools drew in students as often as they attracted censure or disdain at a fictive lack of logic or reason in their written theories. An inverted cone of examination focused only on the theories (or that misogynistic disdain) expressed by a fraction of the medieval population excludes those women (and many of their teaching contemporaries) from any scholar’s historical view.\(^\text{10}\) *Caritas* was significant whether in a house of women, in a community of men, in a castle, at a saint’s shrine, or *in cathedra* within the papal palace. Against traditional arguments that claim women’s silence increased as the Middle Ages progressed, current work has shown that women’s vocal expressions on theological matters amplified as the mystical and vernacular theological traditions developed. Always present during the middle ages, these expressions have required a “rediscovery” after centuries of neglect because they were unfamiliar to scholars searching for specific discourse.\(^\text{11}\) Much of the medieval conversation centered on *caritas*. Thus, *caritas* is an excellent topic for reorienting our gaze toward the vast number of medieval actors actually working on the historical stage.

\(^\text{10}\) Patricia Ranft, *Women in Western Intellectual Culture, 600-1500* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 54-5; Anthony Steinbock argues that the nature of the vision is little reason to dismiss its “domain of experience” from philosophical consideration because the writer’s presentation did not meet predetermined criteria for content or method of argumentation. Anthony J. Steinbock, *Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 158.

The difficulty in assessing women’s activities as educators, however, stems from the fact that the received scholarly tradition has, over the last several hundred years, denied that women participated in the educational system because evidence of their activities did not existed in official records. An alternate approach in current scholarship has demonstrated that a lack of official records does not, in fact, preclude a study of groups or conversational circles when the thinkers involved could be situated within venues whose existence is clearly documented. Through non-traditional methods of determining lines of inquiry in the study of their texts, Hester Gelber has demonstrated that conversational communities existed among lesser-known Dominicans in the Oxford schools. Additionally, if we add to this John Van Engen’s suggestion that we view the university – traditionally held as representative of all medieval education – as only one of many thirteenth-century institutions, we can see that its developments, constraints, power struggles, factions, and emergent structure of pedagogy shaped education in one (but not every) distinct venue. University teachers met the requirement set down by ecclesiastical authority that learning be “useful,” which meant, among other things, that the results of university learning promoted orthodox Christianity. This specific use did not, however, extend to every other program of learning – what we now see in the history of education is that members of the medieval university competed with, and shared

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12 A fairly recent survey by T. Sullivan of Cistercians in the Collège Saint-Bernard who received licenses as Masters of Theology at the University of Paris, is helpful for understanding graduation patterns in medieval colleges. Sullivan promotes his method as one “by which scholars can gauge the academic success of differing university constituencies using the University of Paris’ Ordo licentiarorum.” Sullivan is careful to clarify the parameters of his study which otherwise might lead readers to take him to mean that other non-university educators (or even those whose record of licensure was lost) did not teach because they were not titled. T. Sullivan, “Cistercian Theologians at the Late Medieval University of Paris,” Cîteaux 50 (1999), 85-102 at 86.


recognition with, participants from other programs, and that the collective community shaped the whole of medieval education.\textsuperscript{15}

Following Gelber’s lead, then, the present study approaches the subject of women teaching \textit{caritas} as a normal segment of the overall medieval program of education and takes up Van Engen’s suggestion to move beyond the venue of the college or university. To do this, we must first locate women educators in social environments where intellectual discussions could have taken place, and then uncover their presence in intellectual or educational environments where they and those observing them reveal that their movements and actions were the norm rather than the exception. This bypasses a search for women’s teaching activities in the records of an institution that does not recognize women even as members; a rather futile endeavor similar to the search for the existence of women’s Cistercian houses in the early decades of the order. Since women’s houses were neither officially members nor excluded from membership, the claim that they were or were not engaged in the order in both respects is often unsupported by evidence.\textsuperscript{16} Women teachers were teaching whether traditional scholarship in the history of education has chosen to recognize their educational activities as such or ignore them as lacking evidentiary support.

Once there is a broader arena in which to survey activities, this study then demonstrates there was not only evidence for teaching activities, but that those activities were an integral part of the overall variety of programs for teaching in medieval society.

\textsuperscript{15} This is shown by Jacques Verger, “The First French Universities and the Institutionalization of Learning Faculties, Curricula, Degrees,” in \textit{Learning Institutionalized}, 5-21 at 13.

It is here that the topic of caritas becomes relevant. This analysis concentrates on a select group of women and men who all wrote about the subject of caritas and who flourished in the Low Countries and the western region of Germany. Beatrice of Nazareth (1200-68), Hadewijch of Brabant (fl. 1250), Albertus Magnus (1200-1280), and Meister Eckhart (1260-1327) were all teachers in their own right. Each explained caritas, its place in the divine hierarchy, and its importance to the spiritual and epistemological development of the human soul. All were active as religious or semi-religious during the mid thirteenth-century. The locus of their work in Western Germany or in the Low Countries came under the Episcopal jurisdiction of Cologne and, in the thirteenth century, became part of the Dominican Province of Germany. They were connected, either directly or indirectly, through their religious affiliations – either as beguines, Cistercians, or Dominicans; in fact, each writer can be linked in some way to beguines, a specific beguinage, or a convent in the Dominican or Cistercian order.

Scholars accept that Beatrice and Hadewijch were educated by or involved with beguines. Antwerp and Brussels, in the county of Brabant in the Low Countries (what is now modern Belgium), were urban centers near the place of religious or scholarly life for Beatrice and Hadewijch.¹⁷ Beatrice was educated at the beguinage in Zoutleeuw, (north of Brussels), a testament not only to the educational activities of beguines, but also to the notion that young women attended school and attended together with young men. As her training progressed, she entered the convent of Nazareth, where her position and comportment earned her a place in the community as a person to be exemplified. Her

¹⁷ Two of the manuscripts for Hadewijch are currently held at the Royal Library in Brussels. They were originally held at the monastery of Augustinian Canons in Rooklooster, just north of Brussels, then at the Augustinian monastery at Windesheim, near Mainz. One of the manuscripts contains commentary in Latin, one in Middle Dutch. Another manuscript, held in Ghent, also contains Middle Dutch commentary. That manuscript is inscribed “Beatis hadewigis de Antwerpia”. Although this does not indicate that Hadewijch was located or lived in Antwerp, scholars generally accept she resided in this area. See Hadewijch, Brieven, ed. J. van Mierlo, 2 vols., (Standaard-Boekhandel: Antwerpen/Gent, 1947).
work, *Seven Manners of Minne* was later translated into Latin and published along with her *vita*. It is itself a witness to her ability as a teacher, her ideas on love, and the significance of vernacular texts in expressing theological teachings in the thirteenth century.

Hadewijch’s life is relatively unknown, and while historical tradition has placed her squarely in a beguinage, she may have (also) been a Cistercian nun.\(^{18}\) She was well educated and chose to communicate to her students in letters and visions that were also in Middle Dutch. While her *vita*, if written, is not extant, she left us a rich collection of works in her own words. *Caritas*, which she employs in the Latin, figures prominently in her letters; this love along with its vernacular counterpart, *minne*, are central to her theories on knowing the mind of God. She was both respected and shunned, living in exile from her followers, yet responding to their continued questions and to those of the prelate in charge of a nearby male community.

Albertus Magnus was a prolific Dominican writer deeply involved in the German Dominican Province, a master of the *studium generale* of Cologne, and later the Bishop of Cologne. His paraphrases, or summaries and explanations, were specifically designed to help new members of that order understand the difficult works of Aristotle as they came to Albert through the Arabic texts.\(^{19}\) In addition, evidence points to sources of records for Dominicans of the German province in that city (a province which encompassed eastern Belgium after about 1260).\(^{20}\) This evidence suggests that

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19 While Albert’s pupil Tomas Aquinas is better known for his work on *caritas* in modern scholarship, Albert was much more renowned at the time he lived. His title, *Albertus Magnus*, used during his time, indicates the widespread contributions he made to thirteenth-century learning.

Dominicans and Cistercians there were often responsible for the administration and spiritual care of beguinages as they were in the greater Cologne diocese. This link makes possible a closer connection between the four authors treated in this study. Meister Eckhart, a later Dominican and possibly a student of Albert’s for a short time, was influenced by the great Doctor’s work. His ideas tread on the cusp between scholastic logic and theological mysticism; he demonstrates and teaches both to his students. A number of his sermons were written for women’s houses, possibly for beguines.

When we begin to examine their ideas on this divine love, we find theories on caritas that are eloquent and insightful, often demonstrating common agreements, but, as significantly, showing disagreements on specific issues. The words of each author demonstrate their concern for an appropriate understanding of the word of God and the orthodox teachings of the church. As theologians, Beatrice and Hadewijch held their followers (nuns, monks, or semi-religious men or women) fully responsible for correctly understanding sacred texts and held themselves as fully responsible for teaching their followers correctly. With this in mind, a direct comparison such as this can add to our understanding of theological opinions among women and men in thirteenth-century education.

21 For discussions on Eckhart’s relationship with Albertus Magnus or his works, see Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense, translation and introduction by Edmund Colledge and Bernard McGinn (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), 327, fn. 1.

22 Eckhart, Essential Sermons, 25.

CHAPTER ONE
THE SOCIAL CONTEXT

Thirteenth-century associations among Beguines, Cistercian monks and nuns, and Dominican friars developed, in part, out of the monastic reform movements of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. These reforms called for a return to a religious life that emulated the lives of the original twelve apostles in the primitive Christian church: a life of poverty, prayer, celibacy, and teaching. Against the opulence of Cluny and many rich bishoprics, this call resonated among members of religious communities who wished to return to a more austere practice. Reformers demanded that the external appearance of churches and monasteries (and monks and nuns) return to a more austere form – one befitting an apostolic image. Several reformers also stressed the need for monasteries to throw off the yoke of secular rule which they felt tainted the spiritual purity of their members through interaction with the outside world. Restless men and women directed their energies toward reshaping themselves into apostolic performers by reviving the art of preaching or strengthening ascetic customs.

The reform movement and the growth of new orders were made possible by a network of communication already in existence from northern Germany westward toward the steppes and southward into Spain and beyond. This network was exploited by

1 While ties among Beguines, Cistercians and Dominicans seem unlikely when considering only thirteenth-century records, there was, in fact, a long and close relational history that brought these groups together during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.

merchants, pilgrims, scholars, and soldiers; medieval religious also traveled along the same routes. Members of individual communities had maintained close ties forged during the houses’ foundational years; each house may have seemed isolated, but many kept abreast of new developments throughout the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Contact among members and abbots, abbesses, bishops, and lay patrons, was crucial to the establishment and survival of religious houses. Personal relationships, along with social and economic circumstances surrounding growing communities, then contributed to the formation of important networks of communication. As monks or nuns traveled to affiliated houses or to the residences of lay patrons, they brought with them knowledge of teachings they had heard or had read, sharing their own ideas about the content of a sermon or letter with others who continued the discussion or spread the information to others. As a result, tightly-knit organizations made up of individual houses took shape in France and Germany. In later years these existing houses might affiliate themselves with an existing or newly forming order. New information could pass relatively quickly from house to house; messages arrived in written texts or were delivered in person, and often contained decisions regarding resource procurement, advice on religious observances, or instruction regarding doctrine. Mother houses provided services and materials to daughter houses of men and women in newly expanding orders; supplies or replies also

3 Literary ties such as these existed among individuals and groups in different regions as well, promoting the formation of textual communities outside of physical locales. See Brian Stock, *The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretations in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), esp. Ch. 2; For recent work on Cistercian women’s houses and ties between them and the larger communities surrounding them, see Constance Hoffman Berman, *The Cistercian Evolution: The Invention of a Religious Order in Twelfth-Century Europe* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), Ch 3, esp. 101,109.


5 Degler-Spengler, 90.
traveled reciprocally. Nuns in certain houses communicated with each other about their lives, work, and practices; these activities would, in later decades, earn them reprimands and result in commands to them to observe rules of enclosure.\(^6\) Doctrinal topics were often an important component of conversations in these houses, as they were among religious members and lay patrons.\(^7\) Abbesses, who often ruled double monasteries for men and women (as in the case of Fontevrault),\(^8\) discussed new policies or gave instruction to their convents of nuns. Such continuous movement from house to house and order to order facilitated the rapid spread of ideas and growth of new orders during the twelfth century.

Networks of contact also existed between religious and lay circles. Lay preachers, disenchanted by the shortcomings of the clergy, took it upon themselves to spread Christian teachings, seeming at times more educated than priests in charge of their salvation. In the late twelfth century this type of activity spread through southern France to the alarm of bishops and the papacy, who saw themselves alone as holding orthodox views.\(^9\) True orthodoxy, said the pope with cardinals and bishops at his side, was to be determined only by those with sanctioned authority, and pretenders to this authority were

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\(^6\) Ibid., 103.


dangerous to the general community of unlearned Christians. But within groups such as the Cathars, leaders believed that they understood and taught orthodox Christian doctrine. The Cathar network was as extensive and organized as any monastic order at the time. The secular protection they enjoyed in such places as Toulouse allowed them a high degree of independence over the course of the twelfth century; freedom from persecution enabled them to expand freely and to claim they had the same right to determine the correctness of Christian doctrine as did the Roman papacy. Waldensian preachers recruited members in a similar manner and trained them in biblical knowledge. Their followers learned the gospels and epistles, sometimes when still young. Just as a network within monastic orders served for the efficient dissemination of information, so an equally effective inner network of members served to promulgate Cathar and Waldensian ideas and garner cooperation across Western Europe. The parallel Cathar “church” included men and women who worked, prayed, taught, and preached – outside of the control of papal or episcopal authority. Whatever they actually thought, members of this church expressed confidence that what they were teaching was correct Christian doctrine.

One of the orders central to both the reform movement and rapid growth of monastic communities was the Cistercian Order. As proponents of the early Gregorian reforms, the Cistercians promoted simplicity in their physical environment, adherence to the Benedictine Rule, and an austere lifestyle that considered all property to be held in common. Early Cistercians presented their way of life as an alternative to the

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11 There is some debate among modern scholars as to the extent to which ‘heretical’ movements accepted women as equals. The numbers of women who gravitated toward heresy (for whatever reason) also differs according to interpretations of the evidence. See Alcuin Blamires, “Women and Preaching in Medieval Orthodoxy, Heresy, and Saints Lives,” in *Viator*, vol. 26 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 135-52 at 136-7.
sumptuousness of Cluny which, some Cistercians claimed, grew fat off the labors and tithes of others. In line with the new ideals of the apostolic movement, Cistercians attracted members to whom simple fare, self sufficiency, and plain surroundings better exemplified the apostolic life than did rich robes, exotic foods, or elegant manners. The early Cistercians based their way of life on the principle of caritas, also attractive to prospective members because the visible emanation of this type of love was manifested by the original apostles in the divine luminance that shone outward from their persons. Bernard of Clairvaux elevated caritas to an abstract concept so powerful that the entire world would know the one who lived it because God’s love (caritas) in the observer would recognize the same love in the holy person and effect the return of the observer to the correct way of loving God (diligere). The “perfect law of God” (Psalm 19:7), Bernard claims, refers to caritas, which “alone is able to turn the soul away from love of self and of the world to love of God.” The Cistercians would later come to adopt the notion that caritas would shine forth through their collective actions as an order. They were convinced they were benefiting the world at large by changing the face of it as they changed their own countenance when imbued with the light of caritas. To them, the best Christian world was a Cistercian one. However, their actions did not always seem like expressions of caritas to others, who might be on the losing side of those benevolent

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actions. If *caritas* motivated the takeover of a house of nuns for the declared reason that they were unable to take care of themselves, when this was not actually the case, the nuns might well feel that *caritas* had been inappropriately invoked to justify the appropriation of their home.\(^\text{15}\)

As the network of the Cistercian Order touched more and more existing and new religious houses, members sent out from Cîteaux, Clairvaux, and other early Cistercian mother houses brought into the order both new and existing communities. Existing houses could furnish the order not only with economic assets, but also with a congregation and network through which Cistercian reform ideals might be spread more quickly.\(^\text{16}\) It is possible early Cistercian houses chose their filiations based on wealth or location of rights-holding bishops, but they might also have had their sights on locations that enabled networking with members in their respective communities.\(^\text{17}\) Bernard’s charismatic presence was essential in the development of the new Cistercian order and he was involved in the establishment of several houses for nuns and for monks. He and other monks traveled extensively from mother houses to daughter communities, cementing ties between founder and house or laying the foundation for future connections among subsequent foundations. Other travelers along the Cistercian network brought innovative ideas to the various houses of that order in the same way as they did for the houses of other orders. Ideas were verbally expressed or contained in texts (such as the Arabic works coming through Spain), and included new learning, philosophy, and religious practices.


The monasteries that would become the originators of the Cistercian order (Molesme, Cîteaux, Clairvaux) were tied to houses for women who had adopted the Cistercian way of life even before the order was labeled as “Cistercian.”18 The involvement of these women might have include living a common life in various houses around or near a monastery (as at Molesme), or a coenobitic life in a separate monastery such as that of le Tart.19 Other existing monastic communities of men and women adopted the way of life exemplified by the monks at Cîteaux and Clairvaux and the nuns at Jully and le Tart.20 The cartulary evidence shows that a large, wide-spread community of nuns lived in the various houses affiliated with Molesme before they moved together into the castle of Jully. The prioress there was the wife of a man who had also taken vows and entered Cîteaux. Le Tart grew into a large monastic network of daughter houses between 1132 and 1169, demonstrating the popularity of the observances and life those nuns lived.21

By the mid-twelfth century, numerous convents in Spain, Italy, Germany, England, and the Low Countries had adopted the Cistercian way of life (ordo). When the Queen of Castile, Leonor of England, daughter of Henry II of England and Eleanor of Aquitaine, founded a Cistercian community in 1187 with her husband Alfonso VIII, there were already several Cistercian women’s houses in northern Spain. The oldest of these, Tulebras, sent several nuns and the abbess to found this new women’s community of Las Huelgas. Inspired by the network of affiliations in France and the idea of regular annual

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18 Degler-Spengler, 87-88.


meetings, the king and queen established an administrative system similar to that of Cîteaux’s General Chapter assembly. The abbess of Las Huelgas and her affiliated daughter houses held a position of great authority; she accepted the professions of candidates, appointed (and punished) priests, administered and regulated the temporal and spiritual lives within parishes of approximately 60 communities and villages, and held judicial power that could not be overturned by any bishop. Because she was responsible for the spiritual lives of her nuns and a vast network of other communities, she had to understand the environment they lived in as well as be familiar with new theological ideas circulating in the region. Her responsibilities required an active, educated woman able to converse easily with bishops, preachers, monks, even the pope if necessary. Another influential and related role held by a woman has been called ‘The Lady of Las Huelgas’, and involved the activities of an infanta, or Castilian princess. This woman was generally a mediator between the monastery and the royal patrons; she was well educated and held a position of honor and respect both in the religious and secular spheres – a role that enabled her to offer protection and support to the women and the monastery alike.

The nuns of these communities in Spain and southern France quite possibly communicated with women of other communities or groups, sharing ideas, resources, stories, and doctrine. Given the chastisement Innocent IV meted out to the Abbess of

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Las Huelgas for assuming the role of a public preacher, the idea of widespread communication that could involve teaching gains strength. Visitations of convents by abbesses were common in the order; preaching and other forms of direction brought members in houses of both sexes up-to-date. In the same way that Peter the Venerable provided instruction for his nieces at Marcigny and Abelard advised Heloise at the Paraclete, Cistercian men, noble women, or royal patrons involved in the founding of women’s houses left behind directives for the sisters. The magistra, prioress, or abbess could then continue the indoctrination of new or hesitant converts. Bernard of Clairvaux advocated learning for monks and nuns because he felt that training in both texts and in observances made possible correct performance and preaching of orthodox doctrine. What the task at hand was mattered less than that it express orthodox doctrine. Mundane tasks should be completed with the same attention to the divine as should the hours; proper comportment included proper attention to the divine humanity of Christ. All members needed to have a correct understanding of sacred texts, so as to avoid falling into the sin of error. Instruction, explanation, example, and methods of correction were the essentials of teaching and learning in these communities. Stories of successes (when following the Cistercian code) or failures (when ignoring the code) were employed effectively as teaching tools themselves. Many of Caesarius’ exempla describe the consequences to young monks and nuns who ignored the “correct Cistercian way” when performing various activities. One story recounts a lesson learned by a fat monk who

26 This chastisement had previously been attributed to Innocent III, but new evidence challenges that assertion. See Berman, White Nuns, Ch. 7, 23-4.

27 Degler-Spengler, 95.


ignored stricter rules imposed by the new abbot of Springirsbach; one of those rules was to abstain from eating meat. The monk not only ate it, he stole a piece from his thin neighbor at table. Immediately he choked, and this, Caesarius claims, taught him—and the rest of the congregation—to abide by the abbot’s new rules. Caesarius’ stories abound with examples for proper eating, sleeping, walking, reading, working in specific ways, and correct chanting—all of which demonstrated a novice’s success in understanding the reasons for correct performance of these tasks.

Until recently, historians have ignored whether women taught within these networks of houses. Indeed, a traditional Cistercian narrative has told us that there were no early Cistercian houses of nuns at all, and that what later houses there were remained few, enclosed, and silent. Scholars now know the misleading nature of that narrative and have found that connections among houses may have been systematically broken over the course of the thirteenth century and the resulting situation then projected backward onto the origin of the order. Not only are scholars correcting this misperception, but are, as a consequence, rethinking the entire history of the Cistercian Order. Members of other monasteries, cathedral schools, and abbeys of canons and canonesses also provided the teaching and learning that were a part of everyday life. This


31 Ibid., 87; Berman, “Were there Twelfth-Century Cistercian Nuns?” 831-2.

32 Strong evidence for this claim comes from cartularies and shows the resulting effects of restrictions on visitations by mother abbesses [14-15], denial of their presence in chapter meetings[16], continued attempts to enclose all women’s houses [36-41], and aggressive, even hostile incorporations of wealthy women’s houses [29-30] in Berman, White Nuns, Ch. 7. This narrative of passive silence has also affected the way scholars view the literacy and education of women, as see Berman, “Sisters in Arms: Reshaping the Research Agenda for the Future,” Magistra 3:2 (1997) 48-69, at 59; McNamara, esp. Ch. 12; Barbara Newman, Sister of Wisdom, 3.

33 Degler-Spengler, 85-6; Berman, Evolution, Ch 5, passim.
kind of education is documented for men’s houses much more thoroughly than for women’s communities; recent scholarship has uncovered a wealth of evidence for women’s participation in the educational system.34 Whether preaching for reform, as Hildegard did, or copying a manuscript to share with other members of a household, religious women worked to promote their chosen ordo.

Out of this variety of energetic, chaotic, and interlacing networks in which men and women debated and discussed doctrinal or practical issues, the Dominican order came into being. From the beginning, members of this order were immersed in the conflict between right doctrine and heresy, and between the Cistercian ideal of contemplative prayer and the need to recapture for Catholic orthodoxy those Christians who had fallen away from the fold. Throughout the twelfth century Cistercians had often filled the pastoral role of public teacher by preaching correct doctrine outside of the cloister. While this task was traditionally that of bishops, Cistercians were often elected as bishops and maintained close, trusting friendships with ecclesiastical authorities. Many were elected as cardinals; Eugene III (1145-53) had been a monk at Clairvaux.35 Popes and bishops called on their learned Cistercian brethren whom they knew were capable writers and powerful speakers. In addition, the Cistercian network reached well into areas threatened by the increase in heretical doctrine being taught in southern France. As the connections between mother and daughter houses often crossed episcopal boundaries, monks were able to move beyond one specific diocese in order to preach.36 These Cistercian preachers struggled to combat heretical doctrine with simple, elegant

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34 This point is made throughout this study. See above, fn 4, and Chapter Two.

35 Kienzle, 29-30.

36 It was the Cistercians’ efforts to forge beneficial relations with bishops that at first enabled them to rapidly expand their number of houses and later to gradually become independent of episcopal discipline and oversight in several diocese. Ibid., 37; Newman, 143-5.
sermons as they moved through Languedoc. In this they were urged on by Innocent III and Fulk, Bishop of Toulouse, himself a former Cistercian abbot.\(^{37}\) However, it was clear by their discouragement that the legates were having little success. In 1206, in Montpellier, a group of Cistercian preachers received much needed help from Dominic of Guzman, and Diego, Bishop of Osma.\(^{38}\) Diego had been familiar with the Cistercians in Spain for some years. After a journey to Denmark, then to Rome, he and Dominic visited Cîteaux, where Diego may have taken on the Cistercian habit and may have asked a number of Cistercian monks to accompany him back to Spain and teach him the Cistercian way of life. His wish to preach in Denmark alongside the Archbishop there had been refused by Pope Innocent, but he was determined to do what he could for the cause he supported. Whether Diego actually did become Cistercian is less important here than the fact that he was familiar with the Cistercians and their way of life.\(^{39}\) Also important here is the fact that during the time they traveled with the legates, Diego and Dominic bolstered the Cistercians flagging spirits and gave them advice about better ways to reach those who so far had been resistant to preaching. Diego himself taught them, by example, how *mores* that included humility, poverty, and a simple lifestyle would carry their learned messages farther than elaborate style, large entourages, and ornamentation. He also taught the Cistercians better skills in disputing heretics, showing

\(^{37}\) Nicole Schulman, *Where Troubadours were Bishops: The Occitania of Foc of Marseille* (1150-1231) (New York: Routledge, 2001), 45; and see below, fn 59.


them how to counter and quash opposing points of argument.\footnote{Kienzle, 146.} This would influence the way Dominic envisioned future preachers.

Diego and Dominic returned to Osma; the Cistercians continued preaching in various groups, but continued to encounter resistance and mostly failure. Their inability to connect with the apostolic poverty of their intended audience and their lack of training in the art of disputation weakened their effectiveness as preachers. Another source of difficulty lay in the temporary nature of their preaching commissions. They preached only temporarily in the diocese for which they were commissioned, and then had often to return to their duties in the cloister after a certain length of time.\footnote{Ibid., 151; Mulcahey, 8, 13.} These two factors meant that their replacements would face anew the adaptation to a life of apostolic poverty and effective disputation as they traveled and preached. They did succeed, however, in passing on something Cistercian to the young canon Dominic. They were educated in correct doctrine and already trusted by the orthodox hierarchy to counter heresy.\footnote{In addition, Innocent III felt the same about Diego, and for this reason would allow neither him nor the Cistercian legates to abandon their preaching mission. See above, fn 68.} Their network of houses reached beyond diocesan boundaries which lent spiritual and economic support to each house.\footnote{See above, fn 30; Mulcahey, 22.} Dominic would remember these elements as he returned to Osma. When commissioned in 1215 by Bishop Fulk of Toulouse to preach in the diocese, Dominic and his group were delegated to preach on a permanent basis. Fulk thus enabled the new group to grow in experience rather than endure continual turnover. Fulk also took a novel approach to the commissions -- that of employing men from the orthodox church’s own clerical ranks.\footnote{Ibid., 9, 15.} Finally, among other
important developments, 1217 saw Dominic’s young order titled “fratres praedicatores” and commissioned by Honorius II to preach under papal, not episcopal, jurisdiction.45

More creative developments came from within the group itself. Not only did Dominic agree his order needed the freedom to travel wherever the need to preach took them, but he also felt they needed freedom from ties to one specific church and the pastoral duties a canon in Osma was expected to perform. There are striking similarities between the vow of profession sworn by new members at Osma and in a Dominican Convent.46 But even as the Dominican rule required members to swear a vow of stability, it required that such a vow be sworn to the order rather than to a specific church. It was this modification of their Rule that proved significant to the future development of the order.47 They were now free to travel extensively without a need to return periodically to a specific cloister. Some scholars have contrasted the public life of the canons with the “flight from the world” ideal of monastic orders such as the Cistercians, but if we look again at the Cistercian preachers in the south of France as well as the “traveling teacher” in Caesarius of Heisterbach, this contrast loses strength. In fact, while canonical life included the edification of all Christians, that distinction did not necessarily involve widespread public preaching.48 Even as teachers, canons were still tied to duties surrounding a particular church, a situation that prevented them from lengthy absences. Recent scholarship has shifted the argument from an effort to find significant differences


47 The Dominicans adopted the rule of St. Augustine, as it allowed for the flexibility and modifications they needed. Vicaire, “Saint Dominique,” 30-1; Mulchahey, 17, 44.

between monastic and canonical orders at the end of the twelfth century to an exploration of the variety of experiences dispersed through relatively similar spiritual lives.\textsuperscript{49}

The spiritual life of his companions and their service to lay persons were of great concern to Dominic. Preaching, to him, would meet a dual need, so it would become part of the friars’ pastoral work. With his group, he aspired both to minister to the needs of the masses and to teach correct doctrine as did the Cistercian legates. He would not, however, eschew the new learning of the cathedral schools since he was himself a well-educated product of the schools at Palencia.\textsuperscript{50} Instead, he would include this learning in his nascent order. He would also make use of the methods of the canons regulars he joined at Osma. That life was somewhat different from the lives of canons in the north, near Paris, because theological education in Osma still retained much of the old, prescholastic learning that emphasized instruction of mores and in biblical literature.\textsuperscript{51}

While the canons there embraced some scholastic ideas, Osma was located close to arease where there were confrontations (perceived or real) with members of the Muslim society. They viewed the new learning and texts coming from the south as more threatening than beneficial – the source was simply too close for comfort. It appears that long after the time of Dominic and Diego, the canons of Osma were still more comfortable with the pre-scholastic works of the old learning than with the newer Arabic works welcomed by theologians of Paris and Oxford. The late thirteenth-century library of the canons regulars of Osma held a number of books from Patristic writers, twelfth-

\textsuperscript{49} Christopher Nugent Lawrence, \textit{Churches and Churchmen in Medieval Europe} (London: Hambledon Press, 1999), 223-4; Caroline Walker Bynum, \textit{Docere Verbo et Exemplo: An Aspect of Twelfth-Century Spirituality} (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1979), 4; Ibid., \textit{Jesus as Mother}, 25. There is a renewed debate regarding the argument that the public life of canons and the inner spirituality of monks marks the significant difference between them. See also Christopher Harper-Bill, \textit{Medieval East Anglia} (Woodbridge, Rochester: Boydell Press, 2005) 210-11.


\textsuperscript{51} See below, fn. 59.
century biblical commentaries and works by Hugh of Saint Victor and Peter Comestor.\textsuperscript{52} They had fewer Arabic commentaries or thirteenth-century scholastic texts that consulted those Arabic works.

Encouragement from Fulk, and possibly Diego, seemed to have enabled Dominic to see the value in both the old and new learning. Fulk, in particular, was knowledgeable about the educational environment in Paris and surrounding areas, and knew firsthand what developments were underway there. In fact, Fulk was a much more important figure than this chapter has given him credit for thus far. His life as a troubadour-turned-Cistercian-become-bishop connected Cistercians, canons regulars, and the young Dominican order in the south to the network of Beguines and Cistercians in the north.\textsuperscript{53} Without his influence and direct actions, the Dominican emphasis on education and preaching would not have taken root deeply enough to have lasting strength. This hypothesis is lent support by the fact that Fulk was familiar with the new learning and new logic and newest texts studied at Paris and Toulouse; it was he who brought theology master Alexandar Stavensby from Paris to Toulouse so that Dominic and his companions could learn the scholastic pedagogy.\textsuperscript{54} He also seemed to understand the importance of an education in orthodox Catholic doctrine for women.\textsuperscript{55}

The Dominicans differed from both their Cistercian associates and canonical brethren in the place they gave to preaching as a method of education. While Cistercians

\textsuperscript{52} Vicaire, “Saint Dominique” 22-3.


\textsuperscript{54} Mulcahey, 134.

preached publicly, in their perception teaching by preaching was only a secondary, not a primary, reason to preach. Although countering heresy was accomplished in part by teaching (via the verbal and written word), the Cistercians advocated preaching as a way of disseminating the caritas that emanated from them as they reformed the world. The beauty in the words from God, if understood in depth, could be transmitted to the unlearned through words. This outward expression of caritas was enhanced by the superior knowledge and personal authority of a spiritual elite. Bernard of Clairvaux provided the ultimate example of the balanced master whose charisma, personal authority, and learned eloquence overcame most obstacles. His personal abilities were legendary, inspiring Fulk, Diego, and Dominic – a fact authors of their respective vitae and of Cistercian histories would pass on to their brethren. But it was neither personal charisma nor a commanding presence that in the early twelfth century would impress upon heretics the error of their entrenched beliefs. Knowledge of traditional biblical literature, coupled with persuasive methods of disputation, would prove more useful for an effective preacher. Heretics had as much interest in learning and teaching doctrine (that was correct in their eyes) as did orthodox religious. They were aware of the new ideas coming from the East and on which points Christian beliefs differed from those of other religions.

59 The legend of Bernard included his commanding presence and voice. Authoritative behavior seemed to have less effect if the audience was less interested in learning. See Martha Newman, 168.
On the other hand, although canons, such as Dominic and his companions were primarily teachers, their method of edification neither necessarily included teaching through public preaching nor involved a thorough knowledge of correct doctrine. Rather, their pedagogy included teaching by example, edifying via a silent inner light shining through their person and illuminating the student regardless of whether the student was attentive or was distracted with other thoughts.60 Like Cistercians, canons learned through the imitation of saintly example. They therefore deemphasized the use of text and word to some extent, as the purpose of instruction at Osma continued to center on *mores.*61 So while a canonical life stressed teaching, it was still not conducive to a sustained life of preaching. Hence, Dominic came to understand the twofold method needed to connect with heretics. First, one needed to emulate them in order to gain their trust; this he learned from the canons and taught the Cistercians. Second, one needed to dispute with them, an activity less suited to the canons but which Cistercians did well. Dominicans, in combining these two methods against heretics, made the teaching of others the demonstration of their love as well as the means for individual spiritual salvation.62 So, even as Dominic adopted the canonical way of teaching by example, he retained the monastic philosophy of improving individual character and collective lives.63 The uniqueness of the new order was to combine the old and new learning: teaching through example and word, authority through the presence of knowledge, transformation of the world through a wide-ranging, edifying ministry. Dominic’s group would benefit

60 Bynum, *Jesus as Mother,* 42; Jaeger, 13.

61 Vicaire, “Saint Dominique” 22.

62 Mulcahey, 38.

by knowing they performed good works through preaching and improvement of self by means of a textual education.

**Cistercians, Dominicans and Beguines in the Low Countries**

During the second half of the twelfth century individual *sanctae mulieres*, women’s communities, and beguine (or beguine-like) communities were already in development in the Low Countries. The Cistercian way of life (including nuns’ involvement) had officially made its way there by the 1180s, although religious houses in the larger region had adopted the Cistercian *ordo* much earlier in the century. While the Dominicans had not yet arrived, we can see the earliest links between Cistercian monks, Cistercian nuns, beguines, and future Dominicans. After his self-imposed exile from Toulouse, Bishop Fulk, a Cistercian in Provence since 1195, traveled to Liege while he preached the Albigensian Crusade in 1212 specifically to see certain holy women. According to Jacque de Vitry, in his *Vita Maria Oigniacensis*, it was Marie d’Oignies’ (d. 1213) reputation that came to Fulk’s attention during his time of “wandering” and preaching in France. Fulk made it a point to speak with her, a clear indication that her thoughts were important to him. Indeed, in her presence and by her words he gained consolation in regard to his state of exile. He certainly learned something of importance

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65 There is ongoing discussion as to whether the convent of Wechterswinkle in Franconia was Cistercian as early as 1144, although official records do not show incorporation. Kuhn-Rehfus, 136.

66 See above, fn. 49.

67 *Vita Maria*, 41; King, 78.
from her. She was, herself, aware of the Cistercians, and from a young age (in the later twelfth century) admired at least the outward appearance of the White Monks she saw in her home town of Nivelles.  

Dominicans, like Cistercians, were, at the outset, involved both in the foundation of women’s houses and in the administration and pastoral care of sisters of their order (and later, of beguines). At the same time that Hildegard of Bingen was preaching and teaching in Germany, Diego, again with the help of Fulk, founded Prouille, following what may have been influential examples from northern communities. He established it as a school for women, possibly former female heretics. Dominic may also have been involved in this foundation; more likely his role, if any, was a minor one. He did become the head of the new convent, attesting to his concern for the edification of Dominican women. Consciously or subconsciously, he would pass this concern on to other members of the Dominican order. Prouille was an important community for the new order, and it possible that newly trained preachers ventured out into the region from Prouille after trying out their sermons on the Dominican nuns there. If this was the case, the nuns would have become educated enough to give the young preachers quality

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68 Vita Maria, 12; King 50.

69 On the early Dominican house of Prouille for women, see Schulman, 76 esp. fn 120; also see Teofilo Portillo Capilla, Dominicas de San Esteban de Gormaz, fundacio´n de Santo Domingo de Guzman, 1218/19-1270 (Salamanca: Editorial San Esteban, 2003), 34.

70 The foundation document names Dominic instead of Diego: “...dominus Fulco, Dei gratia Tholosanae sedis minister humilis, dedit et concessit, consilio et assensu domini praeposit S. Stephani, in quantum fieri potuit, (ad preces domini Dominici Oxomensis praecipue sibi visum fuit esse pietatis et misericordiae) ecclesiam beatae Mariae de Pruliano et territorium... mulieribus conversis per Praedicatorum ad praedicandum contra haereticos et ad repellendum haeresim pestiferam delegatos, tam praesentibus quam futuris, ibidem religioso viventibus, absque tamen dicimis et primitiis...” Doc. 1, Cartulaire de Notre-Dame-de-Prouille, ed., Jean M. Guiraud, Vol.1 (Paris), 3. Nicole Schulman confronts accepted scholarly tradition that claims Dominic as one of the original founders of Prouille. She contends that he was not, but that the foundation charter was amended to include his name in 1259. See Schulman, 75, fn 112.

71 See above, fn. 51.
feedback on their sermons; there is no reason to believe they were little more than passive listeners. Equipped with the tools of knowledge regarding religious doctrine and practices of the new order, the nuns themselves took up the task of teaching new female members the developing customs of Dominican life. The work of Dominican tertiaries in the Low Countries was also important, as in the case of Margaret of Iper (Yper) whose life was written by Thomas of Cantimpré, a canon who later became a Dominican. Whether Dominican nuns left the enclosure to preach in public is less evident in the sources, and is an important subject for future study.

The evidence does show, however, that women circulated and taught within public venues elsewhere. As the Dominican order moved northward, they spread their vision and their enthusiasm for learning through their new Cistercian relationships, as well as through new recruits. Dominican nuns continued to form new communities, and other groups of women were similarly interested in furthering the vision of active religious life. Religious women’s pedagogical methods might utilize different skills than those of preachers, yet their purpose was similar. They taught others about Christianity, about correct doctrine as it developed, and emphasized aspects of their faith other orders might disregard. Women’s desire for participation in education was certainly evident in the Cathar and Waldensian sects; their willingness to manage houses of followers attests to this. It seems illogical to assume that women who survived persecution by returning to orthodoxy and entering a convent would easily forget the educational opportunities they had enjoyed in their former organizations. Given the continual attempts of

72 Lambert, Heresy, 122-5.

73 See Barbara Newman’s preface in Send Me God, trans., Martinus Cawley (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), xxxii.

74 Lambert, Heresy, 122-5.
ecclesiastical authorities to cloister women and prevent them from preaching, we can say with confidence women were indeed preaching and teaching, however quietly.\textsuperscript{75}

The Dominicans were closely related to the Cistercian order, and both men’s and women’s Cistercian houses in the Low Countries were closely related to the semi-religious Beguine communities. Like the Cistercian houses in the twelfth century, Dominican convents for women often began as pre-existing communities that took on the Dominican customs and way of life, or transferred their \textit{ordo} from that of other orders, including Cistercian. Many of these women had been beguines, as in Cologne, where Albertus Magnus was a lecturer and then provincial prior of the Dominican \textit{studium generale}.\textsuperscript{76} Albert himself apparently established two convents of nuns, one of which was the Paradisus near Soest in Westfalia.\textsuperscript{77} Evidence points to sources of records for Dominicans in the German province which encompassed eastern Belgium after about 1260.\textsuperscript{78} In some cases it is unclear which order administered a convent, as in the case of the famous convent of Helfta in Germany — Gertrude the Great was an important writer there and she refers often to the “\textit{schola caritatis}” of the Cistercian way of life. The work of another Helfta writer, Mechthild of Magdeburg, appears to have influenced Meister Eckhart, who lived in the nearby community of Dominicans at Erfurt.\textsuperscript{79} This is entirely possible, as Dominicans were also involved in the administration of that convent. One

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\item[75] See above, fn. 26.
\item[76] Hinnebush, \textit{History}, 378; Mulchahey, 368.
\item[78] Walter Simons, \textit{Bedelordekloosters in Het Graafschap}.
\end{footnotes}
interesting side-note: In the late thirteenth century, in spite of the fact that efforts to enclose nuns had continued to increase, the 1298 Bull of Bonifice VIII stipulates that no nuns should be received into monasteries unless those monasteries can support the nun with “goods, income, and without penury,” except houses of the mendicant orders. That houses of the mendicant orders continued to accept women without providing this type of support could indicate that Dominicans were relatively unconcerned over the multitude of religious women or had found a solution to the care of poor nuns.  

We know both Cistercians and Dominicans were involved in the administration of beguinages and sometimes involved with convents of Cistercian nuns in the Low Countries and Germany. Dominicans tended to administer beguinages in Germany, while the Cistercians did in the Low Countries, but neither of these were general rules. Dominicans were sometimes chastised for seeking out individual “timid” beguines in order to interview them and hear their confessions. Although those confessions could have been elicited from simple, timid, nervous women seeking constant assurance that they were free of any sin, those same confessions could as easily have been intellectual conversations that were mutually beneficial to all persons involved.

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80 “…districtus inhibemus, ne in monasteriis ordinum non mendicantium aliquaee recipientur de cetero in sorores, nisi quot poterunt de ipsorum monasteriorum bonis sive proventibus absque penuria sustentari, si secus actum fuerit, irritum decernentes.” Elizabeth Makowsky, *Canon Law and Cloistered Women: Periculoso and its Commentators, 1298-1545* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 134; Berman, *White Nuns*, Ch.7, 34. The reasons behind the exemption are unclear and merit further study. Personal poverty of both friars and nuns does not explain either the nuns’ method for supporting themselves or the friars’ involvement in providing the mass or other offices for them.


82 For example, the canons of the cathedral of Saint Goedele & Michiel in Brussels had regular interactions with sisters from the hospital and beguinage nearby during the thirteenth century. Charters #43, 44, 51, 58, Oud Archief St. Goedele & St. Michiel, Rijksarchief Anderlecht, Cartons #39-40. There are numerous charters which will be included in future research. Also see John Coakley, “Friars, Sanctity, and Gender; Mendicant Encounters with Saints,” in *Medieval Masculinities: Regarding Men in the Middle Ages*, Ed. Clare A. Lees (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 91-110 at 97.
Evidence of friendships between religious men and holy women in the Low Countries attests to the interchange and edification they provided for one another. Topics of conversations included spirituality, love, life, and vocation. They often made provisions for each other after death. The Cistercian lay brother Arnulf of Viller had several friendships with *religiosae mulieres*, with whom he conversed and exchanged counsel on various matters, including the education of a holy woman’s student. The canon Jacques de Vitry, influenced by the traditions of the Victorines, left a promising career to settle as an Augustinian canon at Oignies. He did so to be near his spiritual teacher, Marie d’Oignies, and, according to Thomas de Cantimpré, to live among the flocks of beguinages in the area. Even in situations in which the existence of a female friend seems to be in a monk’s story as a teaching tool for other monks, she is herself, in some cases, teaching monks in the story. In his *Dialogus miraculorum*, Caesarius of Heisterbach reveals his reliance on numerous female sources for his edifying stories, further indications of the wide network through which Cistercians operated. One is the


84 Doc. #1695 (1298). In this example Kateline, a beguine in Mechelen, deposits funds into the chest of the beguinage and pledges a sum for members of various groups after her death, including the pastor, canons, scholars and sick beguines. *Corpus van Middelnederlands Teksten*, (tot en met het jaar 1300), ed. Maurits Gyseling (‘s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1977), 2540.

85 Goswin of Villers, “Arnulf, Lay Brother of Villers,” in *Send Me God*, 122-205 at 175,192.


87 McGuire, “Cistercians and Friendships,” 181. Also see below, Chapter Two.

story of a Cistercian monk, Walter, who travels to see the ecstatic Cistercian nuns of Brabant to ask for a special grace. A woman, writes Caesarius, asks Walter why he wanted to visit “those beguines.” She then proceeds to guide him to a different woman who is equally capable of obtaining this special grace for him. Who this other woman was we are not told, but she seemed to be in competition with the nun for the privilege of assisting monks. What is important here is that whatever else the term ‘beguine’ meant for the monk and the woman, it indicates a close relation between beguine ideas and those of Cistercian nuns. 89  This use of the term also locates some individual beguines near or within the Cistercian monasteries, where existing and potential members were instructed in Cistercian practices. Storytelling and one-on-one conversations were important aspects of Cistercian education, 90 and however much we might perceive Caesarius’ stories as pure fiction or embellishments, his example indicates that the term “beguine” referred to (or labeled) women by the manner in which they expressed themselves rather than by their monastic affiliations. Thus, if a “beguine” was a woman who taught via verbal explanations of visions or phenomenological experiences, then there were, according to Caesarius, at least some Cistercian “beguines” (or some “beguine” Cistercians). 91  Beguines may have adopted the role of lay-sister while maintaining close ties with Cistercian women (who were the mystics), and then have


taken on the label of mystic themselves over time. The later and more negative use of the term neither invalidates the link Caesarius establishes between Beguines and Cistercian nuns nor nullifies the benefits a beguinage contributed to the overall community.

The close and positive relationships between beguines and Cistercians is also evident in the case of Beatrice of Nazareth. At the age of seven she was sent to learn from the *magistra* of the beguinage of Zoutleeuw (*devoto beghinarum collegio*).\(^92\) Here she learned the liberal arts (*liberales artes*),\(^93\) manners (*mores*), and virtues (*virtutes*).\(^94\) At ten she entered the Cistercian convent of Bloemendaal to study. She made her profession there at fifteen and shortly thereafter went to study manuscript production at the Cistercian community of La Ramée, where she developed a close and enduring friendship with Ida of Nivelles. Sometime after she returned from La Ramée, she moved to the new Cistercian monastery of Nazareth. Here she was consecrated and later became prioress. She remained close to Ida throughout her life, and her dialogs with Ida reveal much about the lip-to-ear nature of visionary education. Nazareth, founded in 1235, was within the direct jurisdiction of the Cistercian mother house of Citeaux, and under the supervision of the Abbot of St. Bernard’s Abbey, itself founded as a Cistercian Monastery by Duke Henry II of Brabant in 1243.\(^95\) The Duke of Brabant was also responsible for taking beguinages under his protection in 1285; although supportive of the Inquisition he seemed to feel beguinages were similar to houses of nuns rather than

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\(^93\) *Vita Beatricis*, I, 21; Reypens, 25; De Gancke, 26.

\(^94\) *Vita Beatricis*, I, 23; Reypens, 26, De Ganke, 28.

centers for heresy. Most interesting here is that there was additional cooperation between orders, since Beatrice’s biographer was not necessarily a Cistercian monk. Why a Cistercian would not have taken up this task for a direct daughter house is unclear, and may point to more autonomy for the nuns in choosing a biographer. This could also have implications for what, precisely, was included in the biography. Whatever the reason, the sharing of administration among orders further illustrates the permeable boundaries and cooperation (or competition) between various religious groups. Beguines, Cistercian monks and nuns, and Dominicans crossed such boundaries during their daily course of business, since supervisory or religious tasks brought members of these orders together on a regular basis.

Members of these orders shared ideas not only regarding administration, but also concerning discipline, prayer, confession, and the underlying doctrines that drove decision-making in these areas. Regulations were not arbitrary – they were guided first by correct doctrine and second by a consideration of the best ways to express it. This required a certain level of understanding on the part of both the decision maker and of the house superior. Abbesses, prioresses, and the magistrae of beguinages conversed, negotiated, or argued over decisions that affected their lives. They were both present within conversational circles and fully engaged in the discussions that took place there. Their opinions, whether overt or subsumed under “official” vocalizations, helped shape the course of development in medieval religious movements and in intellectual discourse.

96 Doc. 153, Paul Fredricq, Corpus documentorum Inquisitionis haereticae pravatitatis Neerlandicae (Ghent-The Hague, 1889) vol. 1, 146; Reypens, 62.

97 Introduction to Beatrice of Nazareth, Seven Manieren van Minne, eds. Leonce Reypens and Joseph van Mierlo, 2 vols. (Leuven: De Vlaamsche Boekenhalle, 1926), 27.

98 See Newman, preface in Send Me God, xxxvi.
Western European society in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries reflected rapid political and spiritual changes. Networks of religious communities continued to develop in southern France and Spain and expand northward into the Low Countries and across Germany. Pilgrims, scholars, jongleurs, monks, nuns, friars, crusaders, and merchants carried with them new and different theological and philosophical ideas as they traveled – sometimes unaware since they journeyed for other reasons. For those who consciously brought tools of learning to their destination, new pedagogical methods went hand in hand with the latest religious theories and practices; teaching in general was, after all, tied closely to the teaching of religious tenets. Novel ideas circulated within the regional network of religious, semi-religious, and even courtly communities in the Low Countries and the western region of Germany. Various types of new and existing “schools” developed – monastic and cathedral schools, schools of thought, the talmudic yeshivot, groups of religious or lay people forming textual communities,¹ and the one-on-one tutoring activities that were ever a staple of education. Each type of school may have differed according to specific curricula or pedagogy, but they were not isolated from the communities they served nor did they fail to communicate with each other. Educational, social and administrative relationships between Beguines, Cistercian nuns, and Cistercian monks made possible the likelihood of mutual exchange of ideas about theological subjects and texts.² Members of the young

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¹ Stock, 90-1.

² The networks established among Cistercian monks and nuns, Dominicans, and Beguines are
Dominican order would inherit this style of interaction and would later enhance it with their own pedagogical modifications. The exchange of knowledge between teacher and learner took many forms; both speaking and writing were equally important for a thorough understanding of any given topic.¹

Religious communities, in general, were places of learning and teaching.⁴ Whether a member received training for a worldly career or for a monastic vocation, learning was an integral part of their life. Women’s religious communities were vibrant centers of education that may be less familiar to many scholars than are the monastic or cathedral schools for men. Despite their unfamiliarity to modern scholars, however, women’s educational programs were highly regarded during the thirteenth century. These programs are somewhat more difficult to categorize and their participants may have eschewed titles, labels, or official positions, but if we look closely at the sources we can see women who taught were respected as authorities in their own right. In fact, recent scholars are rethinking the significance of official positions and the twentieth-century bias against the possibility that women, such as deaconesses and abbesses, were leaders, teachers, and scholars ordained in the Christian church. The significance discussed in Chapter One.

³ The power attributed to women’s voices during much of medieval history began to come under greater control as a more confident clergy imbued textual knowledge with increasing influence. Male writers more frequently argued to make use of this power to convert husbands and to change undesirable behavior. See Sharon Farmer, “Softening the Hearts of Men: Women, Embodiment, and Persuasion in the Thirteenth Century,” in Embodied Love: Sensuality and Relationship as Feminist Values, eds. Paula M. Cooey, Sharon A. Farmer, and Mary Ellen Ross (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 115-133 at 127.

⁴ Bynum, “Women Mystics,” in Jesus as Mother, McGinn, Flowering, 267. Mulcahey challenges the argument that the centers of university learning (Paris, Oxford, Bologna) contained “the only comprehensible source of preachers’ knowledge of the art of preaching, the only identifiable centre for the diffusion of sermon materials,” for the Dominicans as well as all sermon training. In fact, she contends, the conventual (convent) school in the provinces was the primary locus of training in the Dominican order, and that it is the focus of intellectual historians on the large centers of learning that has veiled activities in other areas. I add here that the convent or monastery was the center of learning for most religious women and men in the thirteenth century. See Mulcahey, 130-1.
accruing to a title (or lack thereof) remained in flux well into the thirteenth century; the evidence left by canonists making a concerted effort to disallow women’s ordination attests to plausibility of these recent assertions.⁵ Titled or no, Beatrice of Nazareth and Hadewijch of Brabant contributed to a growing body of knowledge regarding God and caritas as significantly as did Albert the Great and Meister Eckhart, who were “Doctors of Theology.” However, since the women’s involvement in teaching may be less recognizable as such, what follows first places them and other religious women into the intellectual context to reveal the manner in which activities such as conversation or counseling were employed in teaching others. This will illustrate how each of our four authors represents an existing program of education important at that time.

A large number of references to women in teaching roles exist in their biographical records, or vitae. The vita of Marie d’Oignies by Jacques de Vitry and the supplement to it by Thomas de Cantimpré are rich in details about Marie as both a student and a teacher. She was given knowledge by God so she would know when to act and what to do, but she also learned outwardly by listening to sermons. These two means to knowledge were not in competition in her life; while she spent a great deal of time in visionary contemplation, she directed her own continuing education by hiring a preacher specifically for her intellectual and spiritual needs:⁶

Although she was taught inwardly by the unction of the Holy Spirit and by divine revelations, yet externally she most gladly listened to the testimonies of the Scriptures which were entirely in accord with the Holy Spirit.⁷

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⁶ Book II, Chs. 64, 69, Jacques de Vitry, Vita Maria Oigniacesis, 542-572; The Life of Marie d’Oignies, 98, 102-3.

⁷ De Vitry, Vita Marie, ch. 71, 103.
Marie was able and willing to learn through two methods – through the experience of her
own inward understanding with the help of the Holy Spirit, and through the verbal
instruction of her confessor.

While Jacques de Vitry might have initially written Marie’s vita to promote the
type of another monk, Richard of St. Victor, Jacques nevertheless also promoted the
“office of the voice” as one that could be authoritatively held by women. Marie would
need to understand Christian doctrine and liturgy deeply enough to determine whether a
sermon agreed with her revelations, or whether her revelations could contribute to the
modification of a sermon. A rich merchant who became a monk as a result of her
influence had gone to her specifically for edification. During their conversation she
taught him about purgatory. Later in her life, when she was close to death, she sang and
chanted her thoughts about the Trinity as well as her beliefs and ideas about Christian
doctrine. Jacques tells us that the prior, her servant, and other men could not understand
many of the things she sang about.

She expounded the Holy Scriptures in a new and marvelous way
and subtly explained many things from the Gospels, the Psalms
and the Old and New Testaments which she had never heard
interpreted.

The secrets she revealed were beyond them. While some modern scholars may see this
as a sign of incoherence on her part, Jacques and his brethren did not; he admits he

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9 Chapter 1, Vita Mariae Oigniacensis, Supplementum, ed., Arnold Rayssius, Junius 5 [June 23]
(Paris, 1867) 572-581 at 574:1; Thomas de Camtimpré, Supplement to the Life of Marie
d’Oignies, Ch. 1, in Two Lives, 200.

10 Ch. 99, Vita Maria, 29.
cannot relate her ideas because of his lack of understanding rather than her lack of clarity.11

Marie’s contemporary, Juliana of Mont-Cornillon, was also a leading figure in the early thirteenth-century Low Countries. Her followers were many, from all walks of life – religious and lay people came to her for edification and counsel. She “could read anything written in Latin or French with ease,” her biographer tells us, and “she used to read St. Augustine’s books with great sympathy.” He relates to his readers how familiar she was with the works of Bernard of Clairvaux, particularly from his sermons on the Song of Songs.12 Edification came also from her person and the conduct with which she did everything in her daily life:

Her speech, her gait, her gestures, her expression, her dress, her face – what is not edifying and admirable in all of these?13

It is clear her biographer saw nothing awry in the authority this woman held as a spiritual leader as well as a learned teacher. Responsible for the instigation of the feast of Corpus Christi, she demonstrated she was versed in doctrine surrounding the Eucharist which became a major feast.

Juliana’s revelations largely influenced church rituals in Liège and eventually throughout Christendom. The authorized composer of the office for the new feast was one “young and innocent John,” who was a brother of her house and somewhat lacking in

11 Ch. 108, Vita Maria 137.

12 The details of her education and teaching are in her vita, books I, Chs. 3, 6, 7, 20. Her biographer describes how, during a vision, she understood the Trinity in a scholastic sense without the need to consult any books. Vita Beatricis Book II, Ch. 2. See The Life of Juliana of Mont-Cornillon, translated by Barbara Newman, (Toronto: Peregrina Publishing Co, 1999).

literary knowledge. She told him to write anyway and promised divine assistance, assuring him that God could speak through an uneducated person. Given the number of corrections she made it, is possible that she collaborated in the composition of this new office. Her biographer sees no threat in this.\footnote{Life of St Juliana, Book II, Ch. 9.} Her conversations about theology took place with beguines, Cistercians, Dominicans, and secular canons.\footnote{Ibid., Book I, Chs. 17, 36, 37, 38, 41, Book II, Chs. 7.} Even famous theologians came to see and converse with her.\footnote{Ibid., Book II, Ch. 25.} She is a prime example of the holy woman conversant across various religious orders and lay groups of followers.

The Cistercian Caesarius of Heisterbach made wide use of the teaching tool of storytelling (the \textit{exempla}), a type of pedagogy important to that and other monastic orders. While \textit{exempla} were moral stories designed to teach people about right actions, they also provide the modern scholar with a window into perceptions of gender and professional roles that the storytellers themselves held, whether on a conscious or subconscious level. Although Caesarius borrows from the dialogs of Gregory the Great, he does not follow Gregory’s lead in describing women. Caesarius is much more sensitive and accepting of the feminine in women’s characters than was Gregory.\footnote{See Brian Patrick McGuire in the Introduction to \textit{Friendship and Faith: Cistercian Men, Women, and their Stories, 1100-1250} (Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate, 2002), vi-ix; “Written sources and Cistercian inspiration in Caesarius of Heisterbach,” in the same, 227-282 at 261-2.} Caesarius’ tales are themselves edifying, yet within those stories we can see evidence of women in the role of teacher often enough to assert that he does not view the notion that they are educators as either abnormal or threatening.\footnote{McGuire emphasizes that the Cistercian tradition would not allow Caesarius or another author of \textit{exempla} to “give free play to his imagination...” and although Caesarius may have accepted the information from others uncritically, it doesn’t mean he added his own embellishments to the stories. McGuire, “Written sources,” 234-5, 236.} In one of his stories a nun was so
depressed she threw herself into the river to be drowned and disappear into it rather than face buried in unconsecrated ground because of her depression. She was revived, and restored – owing to the grace of God – but as the story progresses Caesarius reveals to his readers that she was an established member of a convent and a teacher of some renown. Girls were sent to her to learn because of her reputation in the religious life. In another story, Caesarius speaks through the voice of an abbot Walter, who himself told the story of a monk asking a specific nun to pray for him so that he would have the grace of tears. The nun was knowledgeable in this type of prayer and lived in a convent of nuns distinguished for their holiness. Indeed, the nun did pray successfully for him. If she had had no authoritative answers for the monk, he would not have singled her out to ask for this prayer. Walter, as the abbot, provided verification of her authority by telling the story himself. In reality, a nun with her success and knowledge only gained such notoriety as a result of many similar requests from other monks. As her reputation grew, she might also attract younger nuns who desired training in this efficacious method of prayer. While the actual knowledge she gained regarding the monk’s tears came “from the spirit” and not from a book, she would likely have known the most successful technique for effecting this prayer, either by trial and error, or through similar training from another experienced religious person.

Equally significant was the competition among other wise women, possibly from the same religious circle or social area. Abbot Walter himself had traveled to see the holy woman described above before he was abbot. He did not see her, however, because he was rerouted to another woman by the matron of the house at which he stayed. She scoffed at “those beguines” (referring to the above nun) and convinced him to visit a

19 Bk IV, Ch. 41, Dialogus Miraculorum, 210; A Dialogue on Miracles, 238.

20 Dialogue, Book II, Ch. 19, Strange, 88-9; Scott & Bland, 98-9.
different wise woman who was equally able to pray successfully for him and assist him in
his wish. This woman was even more knowledgeable and skilled, said the matron, as she
could “get anything from God she asked for.” After admonishing him that a monk like
himself should know how to gain the gift of tears, the women sent him away. The next
night the tears flowed from him in abundance.\textsuperscript{21} Whether this was a rivalry between
secular and religious women or between two religious communities is unknown, but what
is important in this is that these monks sought out the women’s authoritative advice on
how to attain a skill they (according to the nun) should already have understood.

Caesarius seems to have no firmly established gendered roles for religious
members. He told his readers in another story how a Cistercian monk and nun
demonstrated their respective devotions to John the Baptist. Although the story is
intended primarily to exhort the Saint, Caesarius’ religious characters stand out for their
own, independent, reasons. The monk praised John in the choir through the medium of
song, and the nun, “well-learned in letters,” composed verses and prayers to the Saint and
preached to others to do the same. She emphasized that if others would emulate her
actions, they would benefit themselves while pleasing John.\textsuperscript{22} Another story portrayed
two nuns as debating over the attributes and authorship of John the Baptist and John the
Evangelist. Unconcerned about how they might be perceived (as women), they immersed
themselves in the content of their argument.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, by placing his religious characters in

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Dialogue}, Book II, Ch. 20, Strange, 89; Scott & Bland, 99.

\textsuperscript{22} Of the monk: “Supra reliquis sanctos illum [monachus] diligit, et quotiens aliquid ad ipsum
pertinens psallitur, ut est canticum patris eius Zachariae, ibi voci penitus non parcit.” Of the nun:
“Nec sufficit ei de illo cogitare, illum obsequitis et orationibus honorare, consororibus illius
praerogativas praedicare, quin etiam ad perpetuandum eius memoriam versificaretur de eius
annunciatione, nativitate, et gudio parentum. Litterata siquidem fuerat, et ideo versibus prosequi
studuit, quicquid de illius sanctitate legeret.” \textit{Dialogue}, Book VIII, Chs. 49-50, Strange, pp.120-
1; Scott & Bland, pp.48-50.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Dialogue}, Book VIII, Ch. 51, Strange, 51; Scott & Bland, 122-3.
their select academic roles, Caesarius demonstrates no unease with the gender of the teacher who occupies a particular authoritative position. The status and sagesness of the teacher is most important in his stories.

Also present in his exempla is evidence that young women learned in a monastic setting. In one instance sister, who was ill, tried to bribe the prioress to stop another sister from advancing in her studies during that illness. While Caesarius means for this story to warn against the sin of envy, it provides yet another example of a normal situation in which women were teaching and learning. The infirm young woman was more concerned with her academic status among her peers than with attending to other items young people might care to buy.\textsuperscript{24} Here another bit of evidence enhances that of Caesarius’ teaching story. A 1206 statute of the Cistercian General chapter prohibited nuns from educating children in the monastery (which they were apparently doing) and decreed that those “who presumed to this” would cause grave scandal and be punished severely. The statute did not apply to nuns teaching young, promising oblates, which might explain exceptions local convents often made to age requirements at the time of a girl’s admittance.\textsuperscript{25} Beatrice of Nazareth earned such an exception. On the other hand, beguines may have taken up this task of teaching lay children, and the growth in the number of beguinages may have been, in part, a result of this Cistercian decree. Beguines taught children and possibly young adults in their communities during the day. Some students lived at the beguinage, others spent only the day there.\textsuperscript{26} Hadewijch, who

\textsuperscript{24} Dialogue, Book IV, Ch. 25, Strange, 196; Scott & Bland, 222.

\textsuperscript{25} 1206: no. 5, “Sententia de pueris qui in claustris eruduntur, irrectractabiliter sicut ab antiquo lata est, teneatur, et qui in claustris monialium hoc ipsum praesumpserit, quia hoc fit cum graviore scandalo, graviori adnimadversione punitur.” Statuta Capitulorum Generalium Ordinis Cisterciensis ab anno 1116 ad annum 1786, Joseph-Maria Canivez (Louvain: Beureau de la Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique, (1933-1941) 320-1.

\textsuperscript{26} Walter Simons’ influential work on the beguines includes an informative section on beguines and their teaching activities. See Simons, Cities of Ladies: Beguine Communities in the Medieval Low Countries, 1200-1565 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 80-85.
was most likely a beguine, addressed young women in several of her letters; they were probably female students she had been teaching (and continued to teach through her letters).  

As we part from Caesarius’ entertaining exempla, we come to evidence that shows religious women also engaged in more familiar educational activities, both along with, and separate from, male religious members. They took part in writing and copying texts as well as illuminating them – in fact, one reason the texts of Beatrice of Nazareth and Hadewijch of Brabant are under analysis in this study is that each woman wrote her text. Composition and copying were essential for providing knowledge to students at a distance, and could also enhance the verbal or experiential lesson taught face to face. For many, copying a text was one way to learn the words and their divine meanings thoroughly, as we shall see among Cistercian monks and nuns. For others, the terms, concepts, definitions, as well as the relationships between them had to be understood well in order to make a successful logical argument. The majority of texts under study have traditionally been those written by men; until recently scholars have even credited the large number of anonymous texts only to male production. This assumption is being challenged, however, as evidence for female authors, or copyists, is coming to the fore in recent studies. There are still many texts without known authors; as we find the


29 The anonymous beguine of Tongerin, whose Latin Verbum joins Beatrice’s Middle Dutch treatise on mlinne is one example of a beguine who wrote about a familiar topic in Latin, caritas, and gained amore et congnitione as she enjoyed it. The owner of the book is likely to have known how to read in both languages. Stephanus Axters, “De Anonieme Begijn van Tongeren en haar Mystieke Dialoog,” Ons Geestelijk Erf 23 (1941): 88-97 at 96 (Latin text). Also see below, fn 80.

30 Allison Beach, Women as Scribes, 4-5; Felice Lifshitz, “Demonstrating Gun(t)za,” 67-96, esp.
anonymous writers there is little doubt we shall find more similarities between the writings of women and men. Until then, we can nevertheless expose comparable ideas regarding caritas by investigating the theories that lay beneath differences in genre and discourse.

**Thirteenth-Century Education: A Representative Sampling**

Beatrice, Hadewijch, Albert the Great, and Meister Eckhart were members of only a few of the many different “schools” in operation in the thirteenth century; these were schools of thought (groups of like-minded individuals) as often as they were structures where classes were held. Within these schools of thought, teachers offered a variety of pedagogical methods and types of texts from which students learned. Reading texts, teaching by example, explaining inner visions, practicing argumentation, or teaching through stories – all of these were useful methods with which learned persons might pass on knowledge, according to the method they felt was best. Hence, there was no single configuration comprising the overall educational system at this time and an attempt to even touch on all of them is beyond the scope of this study. The four authors under discussion here utilized methods they themselves had learned or developed and also taught through the written text or their person. Their texts represent various pedagogies which appear unrelated when viewed through the lens of one or another of these diverse

75-6; on ownership and authorship of Psalters by beguines see Judith Oliver, “French Devotional Texts,” 250-1.

communities. However, when these texts are brought together in the discussion of a common topic, such as caritas, they reveal significant similarities in underlying theories, which make possible a comparison of their collective treatment of that subject.

Beatrice of Nazareth represents two thirteenth-century pedagogies, those of beguines and of Cistercians. While the educational activities of beguine communities in the early thirteenth century are difficult to discern from available sources, we can catch a glimpse of the beguine teacher from the vita of Beatrice. The chronology of her lessons and her entrance into the Cistercian life also illustrate some of that method of schooling, and together reveal something of the configuration of the educational system in the Low Countries at that time.\textsuperscript{32} While the Cistercians did not take in children to teach in an external school,\textsuperscript{33} they did accept young male and female oblates that showed a genuine desire for the religious life. The Cistercian preference was to admit adults whom they assumed were educated upon arrival.\textsuperscript{34} This might explain why Beatrice’s father sent her first, at the age of seven, to learn at the beguinage of Zoutleeuw (devoto beghinarum collegio); his clear preference for the Cistercians makes his choice of the beguines for Beatrice’s early education an odd one unless there were circumstances that caused him to choose otherwise. It could have been that the beguine school was simply his choice for a young Beatrice. The beguine magistra was a capable and honorable instructor (instructica), versed in mores and virtues which she (and the other beguine sisters) could

\textsuperscript{32} There are several accounts of her youth and early training. For a brief summary, see Mary Ann Sullivan, An Introduction to the Vita Beatricis,” in Hidden Springs I, 348-354; for a thorough treatment, see Roger De Ganck, Beatrice of Nazareth in Her Context, 2 vols, and his introduction to The Life of Beatrice of Nazareth, 1200-1268, Trans. Roger De Ganck (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications 1991).

\textsuperscript{33} Roger De Ganck presents a good summary of this situation during Beatrice’s childhood in his introduction to Life of Beatrice, xiv-xvi; also see above, fn. 23.

teach young students by example. Beatrice apparently lived with these beguines, because she also continued her liberal arts education in “the discipline of the scholar” (disciplines scholaribus) spending the whole day listening and studying. A year later her father recalled her home and questioned her carefully on her conversione – the strength of her conviction to faithfully live a religious life. Her steady desire to live such a life qualified her for entrance into the internal Cistercian school, and she took on the oblate’s habit at the Cistercian monastery at Florival (or Bloemendaal) at the age of ten.

That she learned virtues and mores at the beguinage in Zoutleeuw tells us the beguines taught this valuable subject to young children. The lessons in mores (cultured disposition in addition to manners) were taught and learned via the physical body which was expected to be disciplined and well composed in all its actions. The teacher’s person was the text to be “read” even if the human in that body also wrote words on a page for instructional reading. Since the Cistercians provided no schooling except to young


36 Vita Beatricis, I, 21; Reypens, 26; De Gancke, 26.

37 “stabilitate sua et conversatione morum suorum et oboedientia...” Chapter 58:17 of the Rule of St. Benedict, meaning that the novice would agree to the conversion or modification of manners that a religious life would continuously demand. It is not clear whether the beguines taught Beatrice from the Rule, whether her father saw himself in the role of religious leader while questioning her, or whether the biographer added this to further emphasize her readiness for the religious life at this young age.

38 LeClercq, Love of Learning, 114.

39 Vita Beatricis, I, 23; Reypens, 26; De Gancke, 28. This account of Beatrice’s education is interesting in that her biographer spends quite some time explaining it as if to emphasize that she was not only of the correct disposition for a holy life, but educated well enough to have carried out the tasks of prioress and writer later in her life. If her education – in letters in addition to mores – was a threat to members of the male hierarchy either in the order or the church as a whole, we might have expected to see it de-emphasized rather than stressed.

40 Jaeger, 10-11.
people certain to enter the religious life, perhaps the beguinage filled the role of the external school for lay children. So the mores Beatrice began to learn from the beguines prepared her for the continued conversatione morum of the regular religious life with the Cistercians. Additionally, she was sent to learn subjects in the liberal arts from another type of school in Zoutleeuw (or nearby) to continue in liberal arts training. Her studiousness here earned her praise from her biographer.\textsuperscript{41} His pride in her achievements shows as clearly as does the fact that her father’s investment in her education paid off. She was accepted into the convent at Bloemendaal at an exceptionally young age to continue her education in the liberal arts and mores with the Cistercian nuns.\textsuperscript{42}

Beatrice’s mature religious work illustrates the pedagogy utilized by the Cistercian order. “Schooling,” according to the Cistercian outlook, was a reorientation of human love which has turned away from God toward more earthly things. Teachers (masters) were those who maintained the full spirit of apostolic Christianity and helped their followers to return to God. They demonstrated virtues, and were, at least in their own minds, able to do what most people were not. The Cistercian ideal was to live the conservationem caritatis\textsuperscript{43} and learn in the schola caritatis to be the embodiment of the apostolic spirit itself. Caritas, as a way of life, was the lesson itself, taught (ideally) by the words and example of the Cistercian master just as it had been taught by Jesus. The textual community surrounded the master, reading the “text” of the master’s pen or of his body in order to understand his or her explanation of the word’s meaning.\textsuperscript{44} Beatrice

\textsuperscript{41} Vita Beatricis, I, 21; Reypens, 26; De Gancke, 26.

\textsuperscript{42} It is clear throughout her vita that she continues her education in mores and in reading, writing, patristic and biblical studies. Reypens assumes this includes a full program of the trivium and quadrivium although her vita does not specify this. It does, however, seem probable. See Reypens, Vita Beatricis, I:23, p. 26, fn. 2.

\textsuperscript{43} From the Rule of St. Benedict; also see Gilson, Mystical Theology of St. Bernard, 62 n. 68.

\textsuperscript{44} Stock, 90; Gilson, 61.
“read” the text of the body of her superiors at Florival as well as of the bodies of her older companions; she walked in the same manner as the other nuns walked, ate the way they ate, spoke the way they spoke and attempted in many ways to emulate the conduct that she considered perfect.45

The Cistercian was second a teacher, and first a student. Yet knowledge for its own sake was secondary – one learned because one loved. If the student learned from the teacher it happened because the student loved to learn, was improving his or her individual self, and thus watched the master to learn. One Cistercian was not obligated to teach another, although learning did take place in the monastery. New monks were expected to watch and listen to others, observe in order to know, and learn because they desired the truth. If they were tuned to it, the force of love emanating from the Cistercian teacher would show them the optimal way to be. The relationship between Beatrice and Ida of Nivelle at La Ramée illustrates this well. Beatrice watched Ida constantly, loved her as a “mother,” asked her about spiritual matters, and nearly shadowed her the entire time she was training in calligraphy and illuminations.46 Ida returned this devotion, giving Beatrice advice and mentoring her, particularly in learning the visionary experience and understanding the special grace that made visions possible.47

At the same time, a Cistercian education was wrapped up in an ideal that utilized both oral and written literature. This was exemplified by one of the earliest and most famous Cistercians, Bernard of Clairvaux, who – although the community saw him as the charismatic “text” to observe – was in reality more present in the texts he left behind than he was present at the monastery. He himself eschewed the development of the inner,

45 Vita Beatricis, Bk. II, Ch. 4, DeGanck, 125-7.
46 Vita Beatricis, I, 50; Reypens, 42; De Gancke, 60.
47 Vita Beatricis, I, 51; Reypens, 43; De Gancke, 62.
spiritual self through the discipline of the outer, physical self. Instead, he taught that outer beauty expressed an inner self illuminated with the light of a pure conscience, which was mostly innate but could be attained through the inner discipline of contemplation. *Mores* involved an internal teacher, one that cultivated spiritual greatness through the beauty within; this instructor could not be found in any school room, but in the letter of God’s words. His writing was influenced by the elegant and prolific Benedictine, William of St. Thierry, and Bernard showed himself to be the student who studied the texts of both the written word and the master’s person. The Benedictines taught that written texts were to be studied with care, through the *lectio*. This was a slow, often vocal reading during which the learner was expected to absorb the meaning through the appearance of the word on the parchment, the letters in the word, and the sound made as the word was spoken. From this, the Cistercians retained the idea that the “*lectio* is a meeting with God in and through his Word.” It was not just reading, whether performed silently or out loud. Nor was it done simply for knowledge of what the text contained. It was a study of each word as the reader encountered it, just as the observer studied each gesture or action of the body of the master as the master lived through his or her day.

However, a correct understanding of either type of text (written or charismatic teacher) first came to the student inwardly, through the Holy Spirit. The lesson at hand engaged the whole person in such a way that no teacher could supply the necessary

48 Jaeger, 270.
49 Jaeger, 273.
51 1 Cor. 2:10.
information for any student to learn from him or her. The text on parchment or flesh could be “read” but the inner spiritual teacher (the spirit) alone could inscribe the true (sacred) text on the body and soul.\textsuperscript{52} So the Cistercian student, at least when learning from a written text, was taught to begin each lesson, known as a meaningful lectio, with a prayer to the Holy Spirit to assist him or her in understanding the deeper significance of the text. Here, too, Beatrice exemplifies the Cistercian pedagogy. The words and manners of the thirteenth-century female master (magistra) were serious texts, as were those of men.\textsuperscript{53} Just as she had learned from the magistra at the beguine school and from Ida of Nivelle, Beatrice herself provided an educational example for other members of her monastic community. Her vita joins her to a long line of learned women praised for their wisdom and education,\textsuperscript{54} and allows us to see how the “body” of a teacher (as if a text) could edify others. Medieval notions of body and mind joined the two much more closely than modern sensibilities allow. The actions of the body demonstrated the workings of the mind, so her vita shows in actions something of what her own work tells us were her inner thoughts. Beatrice left the members of her community a short treatise that explained seven modes or manners of love (minne).\textsuperscript{55} In her Middle Dutch text, Beatrice explains the different levels the human soul experiences as it progresses in its

\textsuperscript{52} Leclercq, Love of Learning, 73.

\textsuperscript{53} Muessig, 54-66.

\textsuperscript{54} Jane Tibbetts Schulenburg, Forgetful of Their Sex: Female Sanctity and Society ca. 500-1100 (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 96. Beatrice’s biographer was a learned cleric in the thirteenth century, yet he was probably not alone in deciding what went into the Vita. The nuns themselves would have looked it over to approve what he had included – certainly they would not have commissioned him had he misrepresented this important member of their community. It is also safe to assume that at least some of them would have been her students as well as trained in the Cistercian tradition of schola caritatis; it is doubtful they would have accepted misrepresentations of her teachings.

\textsuperscript{55} Beatrice of Nazareth, Seven Manieren van Minne, eds. Leonce Reypens and Joseph van Mierlo, 2 vols. (Leuven: De Vlaamsche Boekenhalle, 1926)
efforts to live according to minne’s requirements. When taken together, her written text and her actions explain what her outward, physical expressions meant to those around her.

In this way, we are shown by her biographer what Beatrice herself tells us, if we look carefully at the way in which she herself portrays the actions of minne. He emphasizes the instructional nature of her thoughts by organizing her vita according to the modes of minne that she herself explains. In addition, he often describes learning events during which she has little concern over the doctrinal significance of the subject she studies. She feels she deserves to study the divine mystery of the Trinity, he tells us, and his description of her studies emphasizes her authority in also teaching about that subject.56 While making thorough use of both books and divine illumination, she teaches that the most important activity for a spiritual adept to engage in is to become more like minne. The implication of this last topic is that Beatrice, as teacher, can’t quite teach how to become like minne if she has not done so herself. Her treatise illustrates the methods she has used in learning those very lessons she teaches. She describes the actions of the soul, which she says “has minne” already, and it is in the soul that minne exhibits the seven manieren (modes or manners). Thus, she carefully describes each maniere van minne (mode or manner of love), or via caritatis (path or method of love), in order to assist her readers in understanding that each may be different, yet important for reaching the overall goal. This combination of document and action shows us how Beatrice taught using two methods; her person as teaching text is recorded by her biographer, and her treatise showing us how she taught is written by her own hand.

56 There are several places in her vita where her biographer details the extent to which she studied the mystery of the Trinity. He also describes her method of learning. Some examples occur in Bk. II, Ch. 1 & 17 and in Bk. III, Ch. 7. Vita Beatricis, Also see The Life of Beatrice of Nazareth, 110, 192, 246.
Students learned by reading her words, by watching her person, or, after her death, by reading the description of her actions preserved in writing by her biographer.

While Beatrice does not use the term *caritas*, her hagiographer does, and he uses the term in specific instances and when explaining specific behaviors and their value. At the of her *vita*, after he has translated her own treatise into Latin, he is honest about the fact that he has modified her words so that a larger audience can understand her teachings; even he was not learned enough to fully comprehend everything she said.57

She has written about two types of *caritas*, he tells us, because *caritas* is the Love (*dilectione*) of God and of other humans. He begins with the first section on *caritas* which is about the love of God and he illustrates the degrees of love (*caritas*) by which Beatrice “arrived at a state of perfection.”58 The Latin version he presents of her *Seven Manieren Van Minnen* is significant here because he substitutes three different words for *minne*: *dilectio*, *caritas*, and *amor*. There is general consensus among scholars that *minne* connects with the monastic tradition of *caritas*,59 but since Beatrice does not employ *caritas* specifically, so her biography assists us in this respect. His interpretation of her short treatise is instructional in understanding how *caritas* and *minne* were similarly understood, particularly since he was much closer to the source than later translators.60

Representing another program of education are Albert the Great and Meister Eckhart, both members of the Dominican order. Because they studied and taught years apart, they each learned through different instructional methods within the same order.

57 *Vita Beatricis*, III, 275-6, Reypens, 185-6; De Ganck, 342-6.

58 “At quoniam in Dei proximique dilectione consistit caritas, ad primum eius membrum, id est ad caritatem Dei, narrationem interim applicemus et quibus caritatis gradibus ad statum perfectionis...,” *Vita Beatricis*, I, 246; Reypens, 43; De Gancke, 288-9.


60 Chapter Three more fully explains the relationship of *minne* to *caritas* in the thirteenth century.
Albert was self taught in his youth, whereas Eckhart benefited from the Dominican program of education that Albert helped to establish. Members of the mature Dominican order based their organization, most administrative procedures, and their spiritual life on learning and teaching. Because of this the Dominican pedagogy included an emphasis on preaching correct doctrine to other intellectuals, learned religious, and also to lay persons. Their interaction with Cistercian nuns and monks, as well as with canons and bishops, influenced their own educational program. Several aspects of the Dominican order reveal influence from the policies of Cistercians, the training of canons, the schools of the Praemonstratensiens, and elements from the developing scholastic programs. Unlike the Cistercian preachers, however, who had eventually to return to the cloister, and unlike canons regulars (of which Dominic was a member in Osma), whose duties to a parish required their presence there, Dominicans endeavored to be itinerant preachers who were free to travel as they needed.

At the time of Dominic’s death, the Friars Preachers were in Paris and Bologna and on their way to Oxford. From the outset, their order drew members from and networked with the learned circle(s) of the secular schools. In 1218, when the Dominicans moved into the hospice of St. Jacque in Paris, they did so in the midst of developments in another community organization -- the guild of secular masters. This guild had coalesced sufficiently in the 1220s to begin developing policies designed to regulate access to employment positions as well as educational resources such as lectures and texts. While the Dominicans did not join this guild and so were not bound by its

61 This history of the Dominican order relies heavily on Mulcahey’s seminal study. See above, fn. 4.

62 A. H. Thomas, De Oudste Constituties, esp. Ch. 3 on the sources; on the influence of the Cistercian and Benedictine “collation,” see Mulcahey, 194; also see Chapter One here, fn. 42.

63 Mulcahey, 12-13.

64 For example, in 1252 and 53, secular masters at Paris issued statutes that stipulated all scholars
regulations, the curriculum and texts used in their provincial *studia generalia* paralleled
the Parisian structure to a large extent to enable their friars to effectively interact in the
university environment.65 They matched pace with secular scholars in the latest
intellectual and doctrinal developments, with the intent that these skills would best be
used to combat heresy and educate the Christian community as a whole. At the same
time, however, they retained some of the structure of monastic orders. They ranked their
offices similarly, such as prior, conventual and provincial prior, and “master of the order”
(distinguished from other *prelati* in the provinces).66 So, even as they gained positions of
authority at Paris, Oxford, or Bologna – earning the master’s license and two teaching
chairs – they did not consider themselves under any guild obligations and did not
conform to guild regulations. The acquisition of a teaching chair was *per se* a lesser
priority than was access to resources, texts, and ideas that the order sought as a means for
achieving the ultimate Dominican goal. This goal was to save souls,67 accomplished
mainly through preaching, and effective preaching was to be accomplished through
effective education. The need for effective education prompted the Dominican
construction of an internal network of schools and a program of study. Better teachers
generated better preachers.

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65 Mulcahey, 380.

66 *Ibid.*, 45. The prelate was the head of a monastic *ordo*, which could be one house or priory, or
several houses in a province. Hadewijch’s Letter 12 is advice to one such officer in an unnamed

67 *Essential Sermons*, 26; Mulcahey, 4.
The backbone of the Dominican educational program quickly became the convent school. Unlike their Cistercian associates, early Dominicans created a policy that required each convent to include a doctor (a teacher) as well as a prior when established; each convent thus became a school. In the General Chapter of 1220 early leaders designed the curriculum and lifestyle of new brothers in such a way that study became the first priority in each convent. The teacher even had his own assistant brother, designated “master of students.”

Young men in these schools learned the trivium and quadrivium, moving on to study theological books and possibly Peter Lombard’s Sentences as they advanced in the program. This was a deliberate decision on the part of the chapter and distinct from most secular schools that offered the study of canon law and medicine as well as natural philosophy. When the first Dominican gained a chair in the theology faculty, the addition of this chair brought the university curriculum into St. Jacques. Students qualified to study there attended ordinary lectures and participated in disputations along with other students; they also attended the sermons of other theology masters. But while Dominican masters both influenced and were influenced by the syllabi around them in other schools of Paris; they did not simply copy and implement the curriculum or pedagogical methods employed by other schools there. Their overarching goal was to return their knowledge and wisdom to the order by taking up teaching positions as quickly as possible in their own conventual and provincial schools. In those schools other Dominican students trained for the time they would move out into

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68 Ibid., 39-40, 130; Constitutiones antique ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum, II.23 and 28 in A. H. Thomas, De oudste Constituties, 358-61.

69 While study of the Sentences increases near mid-century, it is not certain Dominicans studied this text in the early decades of their order. See Mulcahey, 134-5.

70 Ibid., 378-9. Albert’s involvement in the Dominican Order’s acceptance of natural philosophy into the curriculum is discussed in more detail below.

71 Ibid., 224.
surrounding religious and lay communities and preach (a public form of teaching) – the true purpose of their learning.\textsuperscript{72} As a rule, Dominican friars studying at the \textit{stadium generale} of St. Jacques in Paris stayed there only three years, after which they were expected to return to their province to continue the cycle of teaching and hold a post as \textit{doctor} at the convent school.\textsuperscript{73} Members of the order understood that what they gained as assistants to the orthodox church far outweighed earthly attractions, such as a titled position recognized by the secular world.

Both Albert and Meister Eckhart held a teaching chair as Dominican Regent Master in theology at St. Jacques. Albert held the Theology chair at Paris from 1245-1248 while Eckhart taught there in the late thirteenth and again in the early fourteenth century. There is some debate as to whether Eckhart attended Albert’s lectures, either at Paris or as a young student in the Dominican provincial school in Cologne prior to attending St. Jacques.\textsuperscript{74} Thomas de Cantimpré, colleague of Jacques de Vitry, did attend Albert’s lectures while a student;\textsuperscript{75} his connections with the Dominicans and the holy women of Brabant provide a link between the two religious groups. Dominicans, like other monastic orders such as the Cistercians, learned in several different ways. Even as they embraced the use of texts for the knowledge contained in them, they also continued to use traditional methods of teaching. New Dominican preachers learned how to preach first by watching and imitating experienced teachers; the person of the preacher infused

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Ibid.}, 384. Other than Albert and Eckhart, the German Dominicans were less influential at the University perhaps because they strove to return their learning to the provinces so quickly. It is not clear whether this was a disadvantage for them. William Courtenay, \textit{Universities and Schooling in Medieval Society}, 15-18.

\textsuperscript{73} Mulcahey, 382-3.


\textsuperscript{75} Thomas de Cantimpré, \textit{Supplement}, Ch. 27.
as much meaning into the sermon as did the words he used.\textsuperscript{76} Preaching was not confined to fellow brethren, either. Since teaching lay people constituted part of a Dominican’s duty, new brothers observed their elder brothers preach from the convent pulpit to a congregation that came to the church; more advanced students first watched their mentors, and then practiced themselves in churches outside of the convent school.\textsuperscript{77}

Albert was the first Dominican to advocate including the new logic in their curriculum. Although he was mostly self-taught, he was learned and esteemed enough for Dominican leaders to involve him in the development of Dominican education in various forms. After teaching at Paris, he headed the Dominican \textit{studium generale} in Cologne, was the provincial prior for two years, and served as bishop of Regensburg for a time.\textsuperscript{78} In this capacity he was responsible for the education of many young friars in the still-developing order. Albert’s guidance of the order’s developing curriculum shows how carefully the order considered texts and pedagogies before approving the addition of logic for their \textit{studia artium}. The traditional biblical commentary remained a staple of these schools, but other commentaries, such as those on Peter Lombard’s \textit{Sentences} (opinions), had come into use by the time Albert penned his opinions on \textit{caritas}. The response to Albert’s efforts to bring Aristotle’s texts on natural philosophy into the curriculum via the development of a \textit{studia naturarum} reveals both the hesitation of the

\textsuperscript{76} Mulcahey, 184-5.

\textsuperscript{77} While more work needs to be done in this area, there are numerous instances of beguines traveling to hear Dominicans preach. Perhaps they were members of the congregation for practicing student preachers. For example, the beguines of Mechelen were warned in 1287 not to attend the mass or sermon of another priest than of their own parish. They required special privilege from the bishop or dean of Brussels to attend another sermon. This warning was repeated in 1304. Docs #4886 & #4930, \textit{Stadsarchief Mechelen, Invantaris van het Archief} (Mechelen, 1957), 596, 600. Also see Mulcahey, 190 and below, fn. 81.

order to embrace this controversial subject and the importance some Dominicans placed on this new type of learning. It was only after several years and many requests that he began commentaries on books of Aristotle’s works for new members of the order. In 1259 he and other members of a committee assembled by master-general Humbert of Romans wrote a number of pieces of legislation on the Dominican curriculum that were added to the acts of the general chapter held at Valenciennes of that year. During this Chapter meeting, the committee called for the creation of one or more *studia artium* in each province. While this meant the art of logic and disputation rather than of natural philosophy linked to Aristotle’s work that was part of the curriculum at Paris, it did signal a need for the order to expand the structure of Dominican studies. It would be some time yet before natural philosophy would make its way into a Dominican student’s coursework.

A prolific writer, Albert generated texts in a variety of genres required for scholastic training, as well as treatises and letters for Dominican students. His paraphrases were meant to explain Aristotle without the point-by-point technical exposition of his other scholastic works. The paraphrases not only show his keen interest in incorporating Aristotelian works into the Latin theories, but also show the manner and extent to which Albert corrected the ancient theories he felt were wrong or incomplete. Because he spent a great deal of time “digressing” on important points, it is clear he saw a need for a way to teach these difficult subjects to students (*socii*) in the Dominican

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79 Mulcahey, 251-2.


81 Mulcahey, 223-6; Weisheipl, “Albert the Great,” 30-1.
schools. It is possible these paraphrases were also disseminated to other groups in the area, such as to Dominican nuns by students practicing sermons. For the subject of caritas, however, his earlier writing, the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, contain the bulk of his ideas. This voluminous work spans four large books, each of which is divided first into Distinctions and then into Articles. This study concentrates on Book One, Distinctions Fourteen through Eighteen, and Book Three, Distinction Thirty-Three, and brings in sections of his other works as they become relevant. In his writings, Albert presents a variety of arguments surrounding caritas that were part of the ongoing debates in the secular schools at Paris and the Dominican studia in the German province.

Meister Eckhart, too, represents the Dominican pedagogy. Both Albert and Eckhart learned and taught from a variety of teaching texts in the Dominican schools in which they taught, and Eckhart demonstrates the successful results of Albert’s efforts with the Dominican curriculum. They were both examples of those viri evangelici early Dominicans envisioned, yet the careers of the two men diverged after their conventual training. While Albert wrote some sermons, his life consisted more in teaching the preachers and ensuring they had the best resources at hand. He also concentrated on natural philosophy and the Aristotelian texts. Eckhart knew Aristotelian texts and the scholastic method well, but his ideas on caritas appear most often in sermons and biblical commentaries. Often seen as a chimera and enigma in his resistance to categorization, Eckhart both exemplified and undercut the developing Dominican pedagogy; his writing often crosses boundaries between scholasticism, with its emphasis on logic, and the

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monastic method that emphasizes experience and inner knowing.\textsuperscript{84} In doing so, he lent
voice to his mystical interests more so than did Albert, but less so than Beatrice or
Hadewijch.

The integration of these two teaching methods shows through in his complex and
beautiful sermons on divine knowledge. This genre of the sermon was important in the
transmission of knowledge from learned speaker to audience or as a teaching tool from
one preacher to another. Eckhart wrote his sermons on caritas in both Latin and Middle
High German, demonstrating his intent to reach audience members outside of the Latin-
speaking community.\textsuperscript{85} Two of his Latin sermons treat caritas specifically, and he
presents a fairly full discussion of its properties and activities. He prepares these sermons
to be delivered during masses where it would be a relevant topic. For example, his
sermon treating the subject “God is Love (Caritas),” in the First Letter of John to the
Romans, is delivered at the first Sunday mass following the Feast of the Trinity.\textsuperscript{86} Since
this passage is about God’s Love (dilectio, caritas), which comes to humans through the
Holy Spirit and the Trinity, it is appropriate for this subject to appear during this time in
the Christian year. In another German sermon, he substitutes two terms for the Latin
term caritas (liebe and minne), indicating his awareness of the need for a multilingual
explanation of the same subject matter.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{84} For some of the debates surrounding Eckhart as scholastic or mystic or both, see Davies,
Meister Eckhart, 12-18.

\textsuperscript{85} See the body of Eckhart’s work in Meister Ekhart: Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke, eds.,
J. Quint and J. Koch (Stuttgart and Berlin: W. Kohlhammer, 1936-). Hereafter referred to as
D&L Werke.

50-74 at 51.

\textsuperscript{87} The German terms liebe and minne translate into English as love rather than charity. This point
is important to Eckhart’s theories on caritas and is more fully treated in Chapter Three, see fn. 91.
Sermons such as those given by Eckhart were likely heard by nuns and Beguines who learned via the sermon and could communicate with others outside of their residence during those events. There were specific situations within which these women were allowed to attend sermons, and although prescriptive documents forbade listening to sermons from anyone but their own priest, many behaved as if they had the freedom to hear sermons that were preached in another community. This becomes even more significant for understanding medieval learning if we approach the word “sermon” as an event, somewhat like a modern-day lecture, which could (and did) attract women as learners away from the preaching of their own parish priest. The result is an interpretative shift that helps to modify our perception of the behavior of the beguines and nuns from that of passive listeners to active learners.

Hadewijch of Brabant taught her followers about caritas first in person and later, when separated from them, through her writings. Her letters are the primary genre under analysis here, as they were means by which intellectual conversations took place. Learned men and women wrote to each other, giving advice, expounding on points of spiritual life, discussing religious practices, and commenting on the liturgy. Letters were often written with the understanding that they could become public, be copied, and be circulated for the edification of followers. The importance of the physical instructor did not diminish; in fact, the authority of the teacher remained present in the words on the parchment which could now reach followers over vast distances. Letter writing was a staple of education, as students often learned the art of writing in the eleventh and twelfth centuries by composing letters. The method of learning included copying the style and


89 See above, fn. 74.

90 Joan M. Ferrante, To the Glory of Her Sex: Women’s Roles in the Composition of Medieval Texts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 18.
content of existing texts, specifically to learn to communicate effectively the substance of one’s mind in an eloquent manner.\textsuperscript{91} This type of written communication complemented verbal dialog at a time when most people were relatively unconcerned to make writing the sole medium of educational communication.\textsuperscript{92}

Hadewijch’s letters of instruction to a small group of followers exemplify this type of intellectual interaction among individuals, groups, and communities surrounding her.\textsuperscript{93} Although scholars know little about her personal life, she was clearly well educated, presumably having received a courtly education and religious training as a beguine. Her correspondence with a group of young women reveals that she was once present with them and that after separation from her they continued to ask her for advice and instruction. Others of her letters are addressed both to women and to men – all are in Middle Dutch. In Letter Twelve she responds to a prelate who has asked for her opinion on a spiritual matter, apparently that of becoming attached to a worldly office. She exhorts him to remember how best to serve (via love, or \textit{minne}), and how he can use his office of prelate in the local monastery to promote the way of \textit{minne}, both for himself and for others over whom he might have charge.\textsuperscript{94} He must also teach (and pass on her instructions by doing so) through his commands, counsels, and admonitions, and by being an example of someone in an office who is not attached to the trappings or power

\textsuperscript{91}Mews, 14.
\textsuperscript{92}Stock, 13.
inherent in such an office. Her words to him are sure and direct, expressing confidence in her position of authority as well as her confidence in his abilities to carry out her instructions.

Variations among pedagogical methods and the complex use of physical, written, and verbal types of “texts” illustrate a multifaceted and interactive educational system in the thirteenth century. Within this overall educational context various groups and organizations advocated their teaching programs as beneficial to the students or followers interested in them. From these organizations came four authors who treat a common topic, *caritas*, in theoretical texts that are representative of various genres. Differences among the texts (language, terminology, style, and phrasing) are due to choices the authors made as they wrote or dictated their work. Each took into account his or her subject, audience, and conventions of the genre they chose. As teachers, these individuals felt confident enough to educate others whom they could assume were interested in what they had to say. They did so within an environment that fostered interaction among varieties of religious peoples and groups, and in this context we hear their passionate discussions on *caritas* and its significance to education as well as to human spirituality.

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95 “Dit behoert oec te uwen prelaetscape: dat ghi die droeghe stoppelen ontsteken selt met goeden exemplen ende met manieren ende met biddene ende met radene ende met dreighenne.” *Ibid.*, 111.
CHAPTER THREE
CARITAS: TERMINOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY

The Latin term *caritas* was one of several words employed by thirteenth-century authors as they wrote about the love between humans and the divine, and between one human being and another. In order to analyze medieval perceptions of this love, it is important to understand the use of *caritas* and other words for “love” that appear in the texts under study here. Latin, Middle Dutch, and Middle High German all have words for the English “love” and within each language there is more than one choice. Because this study is about *caritas*, the focus here is in regard to the way in which other terms for love point specifically to that term. This will hopefully avoid causing more confusion since any term for love can relate to any other term and thus, can completely change the direction of the discussion.

The difficulty in explaining the meaning of *caritas* in the thirteenth century is that it was used to describe a particular type of relationship among the Holy Spirit and God, the soul and divine beings, and human beings and each other. *Amor-amare* and *dilectio-diligere* were other Latin terms that described these relationships and helped to define the meaning of *caritas*. So *caritas* could hold several meanings and several words could be synonymous with it. For example, one way of defining *caritas* was to say it “is the love (*amor sive caritas*) by which we love (*diligimus*) God and our neighbor.”¹ Three terms

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stand for love in this passage, and those terms of love define love itself. This issue had emerged in early Christian texts and in the bible – the main source of references for thirteenth-century theories regarding *caritas* – and had continued to trouble theologians in the High Middle Ages. The books of Paul and letters of John were the foremost scriptural texts as were Origen, Augustine, Boethius and works by near-contemporaries of Beatrice, Albert, Hadewijch and Meister Eckhart. These four authors traced their theories back to the bible and their writing echoes influences from other authors who wrote before them. Each had to make decisions regarding *caritas*, its definition, and its synonyms. In addition, there was a variety of vernacular terms that were widely used in medieval texts by the thirteenth century. The Middle Dutch and Middle High German term for love, *minne*, contained its own variety of definitions. For this reason, it is worthwhile to spend some time exploring discussions of *caritas* by some early Christian theologians and why this makes possible the synonymous use of *minne* in the thirteenth century.

**A Brief History of Caritas**

*Christian Debates into the Middle Ages*

As Christians continued to define their identity in the Mediterranean area, they read and commented on biblical and patristic works regarding the nature of Christianity. Part of their goal was to understand and explain to fellow Christians how the love of God, love from God, and love toward God worked in their lives. Because Jesus instructed Christians to love each other, the explanations of this term by early Christian leaders needed to include relationships with other humans as well. Words from Hebrew, Greek, Egyptian, Persian, and other eastern languages surrounded the new Christians and gave them several choices in each language. In the Greek, three terms were employed in the
New Testament: *agape, eros, and philia*. In the Roman and Greek worlds, there were disagreements among theologians regarding the use of words best suited to a human-divine relationship. *Eros*, the most widely used word, carried both a higher, spiritual meaning, and a lower meaning that indicated a desirous or acquisitive feeling; this last was a love directed toward earthly or carnal pleasures. It was also the source and initiator of original motion, according to Aristotle, moving the universe “as if being loved (*eromenen*)”. Another word, *agape*, meant ‘a distant, detached love of the gods toward human beings’, although *agape* could also mean ‘a lower, acquisitive love’ if directed toward bodily or earthly pleasures. *Philia* was the accepted term for friendship and amicability among colleagues in a social or business sense.

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3 Aristotle’s use of *eromenon* as that unmoved, unchanging essence which causes first movement, is also a source of discussion. (*Metaphysics*, Book 12: 1072b). He equates the object of desire with the object of thought, and it is thought that is the first principle that moves all others (the best good thinking on itself, thus causing movement). Nygren, 184.


5 Aristotle’s discussion of *philia* in the *Nicomachian Ethics* (VIII; 2, 8) indicates it is akin to a calculated discernment regarding actions rather than an intense emotion or universal force. *Philia* has often been conflated with the term *eromenon* used in the *Metaphysics*, but they are in fact two different terms that have both been translated into “love.” See fn. 53 below. Catherine Osborne analyzes this difference and discusses the impact that Aquinas has had on subsequent scholarship.
The earliest Greek Christian authors chose to employ the word *agape* most often in their work, including those that would influence thirteenth-century thinkers – the four Gospels and the Letters of Paul and John. Scholars cannot be certain of the reasons early Christians made their decision to use *agape* rather than *eros*, but it is clear that *agape* was the term of choice for those who saw a new, love-centered perception of their relationship with their God. Some modern scholars claim their decision was based on the negative connotations of *eros* and its link to erotic, lustful, carnal desire. There is evidence that the stoic, disciplined, hierarchically ordered, masculine sensibilities of the time frowned on public expressions of emotion linked to excessive lower aspects of *eros* although perhaps they did not feel excessive fear over normal physical impulses such as sexual desire. There is some merit in the argument that the higher/lower aspects of *agape* seemed less severe than those for *eros*, and although *agape* was generally employed far less often than *eros*, it was in wide use in the Septuagint and other religious or philosophical texts by the time Jesus preached and the apostles. Christian familiarity with *agape* in regard to spiritual matters was one reason they continued to use it. Perhaps they did so because it was not *eros* and their use of *agape* helped them feel distinct from other cults.

A different theory stems from the fact that Paul, a Jew writing in Greek, through his integration of *philia* and *eros* into *caritas*. Osborne, 137 and 152-63.

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6 See above, fn. 2.

7 According to Peter Brown, the social environment in which early Christianity developed was not so casual nor was Christianity with its ideas on sexual renunciation quite so novel to Mediterranean sensibilities as recently thought. Peter Brown, *The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 21-2.

8 Bernard McGinn, *The Foundations of Mysticism* (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 72. It is Nygren’s classic treatment of this tension between *eros* and *agape* that has spurred much scholarship on the subject. However, he stresses the opposition of the terms to extremes, and goes so far as to claim first, that the terms were mutually exclusively used, and second, that Greek writers employing *agape*, such as Paul, did not know of *eros* at all. This is an unrealistic statement to make since *eros* was the predominant word used throughout the region. It is reasonable to believe that Paul would know that term better than he would know *agape*, if,
used the noun *agape* consistently rather than personify the verb (*agapao*), which was more the norm in Greek and Hebrew.\(^9\) Catherine Osborne’s useful analysis of Paul’s choice – the abstract noun *agape* – brings out some interesting ideas. Paul uses the noun *agape* in phrases where he means to signify ‘love of God’, which could mean love from God, love to or for God, or it could mean the love that comes from God to human beings that “causes” them to love each other. The verb (*agapao*) signifies action, and from the context we can tell in what direction love is moving. This is more difficult with the abstract noun, however, because it could signify potential action, action in the past, or an object, being, or person that does or could act. It does not, however, signify which direction that action could or did take, and even the context does not always make it clear.\(^10\) While not all of Osborne’s conclusions are convincing, the idea that Paul may have chosen *agape* for ‘love of God’ because it is ambiguous as a noun may have merited a discussion of *caritas* in subsequent Latin theorizing.

Early Latin-speaking Christians confronted the same difficulty as the Greeks in settling on one term because the Latin language also included several words for love. *Caritas, diligere-dilectio, amor-amare* all signified types of love. Translators debated which terms were most appropriate for both their borrowed and original works. For example, they translated *agapao* most often as *diligere*, but not always, and *agape* as both *caritas* and *dilectio*.\(^11\) While educated Greek and Latin authors and readers knew the subtle differences among these terms and so would understand their placement in the

\(^9\) Osborne, 24 fn 1, 25-6, 41.

\(^10\) *Ibid.*, 28-36. Osborn criticizes Nygren for acknowledging that “love of God” could indicate love from God and causal love from God, but underestimating the possibility that it could also indicate love for God from humans. She feels that Nygren may have avoided that point because it would break down his dichotomy of *eros* and *agape*. See Osborne, p 29 fn. 18.

scriptural texts, biblical scholars were concerned that less educated Christians could more easily be confused. In the classical Roman world, Latin-speaking peoples accepted that *amor-amare* were suitable as the noun/verb for general love (although with connotations of a lower type), while they employed *diligere-dilectio* in situations where they conferred high esteem, respect, or even reverence in a relationship. *Diligere* also implied a rational choice in extending affection toward the loved object, whereas *amor* involved a spontaneous and sometimes uncontrolled emotional impulse directed toward the thing loved. *Caritas*, on the other hand, indicated the something loved – denoting that which was dear, costly, or precious. In regard to parents, superiors, and the divine, Cicero uses both *caritas* and *diligere-dilectio*, while he employs *amor* when addressing family, friends, or political colleagues.\(^\text{12}\) Seneca’s use of *amor* and *amicitia* as terms of mutual affection between two people is similar to Cicero’s.\(^\text{13}\) Both men linked *caritas* more closely to moral philosophy than to relations with other human beings, perhaps one of the reasons later theologians preferred it over the other terms for love.

Use of *caritas* as the Christian term of choice increased as more communities adopted it. But Christian writers had quickly to accept a reality; they would not ever be able to separate *caritas* from *amor* or *diligere* – whether regarding the downward or upward direction of movement or whether that movement was initiated from an impulse or a choice. Unlike the Greek *agape* or *eros*, *caritas* had no corresponding verb form. Since it could not imply action, authors had to use either *amor* or *diligere* for the verb. Origen was one of the first to openly confront the difficulty presented by this issue as well as the confusion surrounding the variety of terms. In his *Commentary on the Song of Songs*, he undertakes an explanation of terms for love used in Greek texts and in


\(^{13}\) *Ibid.*, 41-2.
Christian scriptural texts. New Christians experienced confusion with the terminology of the text as it seemed to promote sexual desire, but, according to Origen, it actually referred to the union of the soul with the divine Word.¹⁴ This text is of interest here as it only survives in the Rufinus translation and the Latin term chosen for Origen’s original Greek (assumed to be agape) is caritas.¹⁵ There are two surviving Greek fragments that are taken from the Baehrens’ edition and reproduced in the 1991 Du Cerf edition, but Greek words for love do not appear in either of those fragments. Greek words for love (agape) and friendship (philia) do appear in the fragments of Origen’s Commentary on Lamentations but Rufinus seems not to have taken the same care in translating his commentary on the Song of Songs as he does with Lamentations.¹⁶ Thus it is difficult to say for certain how Origen resolved the confusion regarding agape, eros, and philia.

Origen drew mainly on Plato’s works for his Greek terminology and he also borrowed from the Greek texts of Paul and John. In these is ample use of agape and eros, and they provided him with evidence that there are indeed different words for love that appear in texts that Christians study. In the Song of Songs he explains that scriptural texts use homonyms for other things, such as parts of interior humans called by the same names as the exterior fleshy parts, or parts of the soul named the same as corresponding parts of the physical body. The important skill is in knowing when the names are

¹⁴ Origin, Commentaire Sur le Cantique Des Cantiques, Prol. 2.5-7 (63), Vol. I, eds. Luc Bresard & Henri Crouzel (Paris: Les Editions Du Cerf, 1991), 84. Scholars such as Anders Nygren, Bernard McGinn and Catherine Osborne accept that the pairing of the Greek and Latin followed the tradition of eros/amor and agape/caritas. The New Testament Vulgate also generally follows this trend. I will also accept the paring; exceptions will be noted as relevant. See Nygren, 388; McGinn, Foundations, 119; Osborne, Eros Unveiled, 52.

¹⁵ Origin, Cant., Prol. 2.67-75, 90-2.

referring to the interior person or the external person. Not knowing the direction of the meaning is what causes confusion, and knowing the direction is what is important to understand. So it is with the terms in scriptural texts. These texts seek to make sure the reader knows the terms are all directed to spiritual matters. For this reason, at times, the original terms were changed to more respectable words.\textsuperscript{17} There are places, he says, where writers of Divine Scripture avoided the word \textit{amor}, and instead used \textit{caritas} or \textit{dilectio}.\textsuperscript{18} Origen then presents the reader with various examples in the Old and New Testament where he feels the words had been altered so that the meaning was clearer. He concludes that as long as the reader understands the phrase indicates a higher spiritual meaning, “it is of no concern whether in divine Scripture (the word) is called \textit{amor} or \textit{caritas} or \textit{dilectio}, except that the name of \textit{caritas} is so extolled that even God himself is called \textit{caritas}.”\textsuperscript{19}

The tendency to choose \textit{caritas} for the higher, spiritual aspects of both \textit{eros} and \textit{agape} continued as Christian doctrines solidified. As Jerome and Paula translated the Bible from the Greek into the Latin Vulgate, they chose among several words, none of which adequately carried the Greek and Hebrew meanings into Latin. They settled on \textit{caritas} to represent the higher aspects of agape and translated \textit{agapao} into \textit{cupiditas} when the object of love was of a lower, carnal order.\textsuperscript{20} But early Latin translators also

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{17} "Videtur autem mihi quod divina scriptura, volens cavere ne lapsus aliquis legentibus sub amoris nomine nascetur, pro infirmioribus quibusque eum qui apud sapientes saeculi cupidus seu amor dicitur, honestiore vocabulo caritatem vel dilectionem nominasse…..” Origen, \textit{Cant.}, Prol. 2.20.

\textsuperscript{18} “Et in his ergo et in aliis pluribus locis invenies Scripturam divinam refugisse amoris vocabulum, et caritatis ulationisque posuisse.” Origen, \textit{Cant.}, Prol. 2.22.

\textsuperscript{19} “Nihil ergo interest, in scripturis divinis utrum amor dicatur an caritas an dilectio, nisi quod in tantum nomen caritatis extolitur ut etiam Deus ipse caritas appelletur, sicut Iohannes dicit : Carissimi, diligamus invicem, quia caritas ex Deo est.” Origen, \textit{Cant.}, 2.25.

\textsuperscript{20} Jeffrey, like Nygren, sees polar opposition between \textit{eros} and \textit{agape} in the choices made in their
had to contend with the ambiguity of the substantive noun agape as well as the fact that caritas is also a noun with no corresponding verb form. Other words, such as amore and diligere had to be employed to fill this function. In other words, a human can have love for God or other humans (agape) and also love God or others (agapon), but souls who have caritas cannot also caritas God or other souls. The translators resolved some of this with the use of diligere, as in the first letter of John (I John 2:15 and 4:7); in other cases they used both diligere and amare, as in the Gospel of John 21:15-17. Part of the problem still existed in the connotations of the terms, however, since amor, like eros, could be (and most often was) connected with a lower, worldly kind of love.

Later theologians would offer their own theories on the subject. Augustine of Hippo was at once more influential in his treatment of caritas, and more ambivalent than Origin in his attempts to decide whether amor, dilectio, caritas were synonymous or distinct terms. All these words for love permeate many of his works, and his opinions regarding their meaning and usage shift frequently. While the abundance of his writings precludes an in-depth analysis, an inspection of three key texts will help to illustrate his choices. Bearing in mind the extent to which his work countered ontological arguments of heretical groups, such as the Arians, we can nevertheless observe something of his rationale. He is careful to explain that caritas comprises the higher aspects of love, and

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Iamblicus, Porphyry, and Plotinus commented on Aristotle; future research will include their work.

There is abundant scholarship on Augustine’s work, including his ideas on amor, dilectio, caritas. Nygren considers Augustine’s thoughts to be original and pivotal in regard to subsequent theories of caritas. In his opinion, Augustine’s theories completed the synthesis of agape and eros for Christians (also unfortunate, in his view, for it caused too much emphasis on the self-fulfillment of eros rather than a strict other-regard of agape, the true Christian love). The first three chapters of Volume Two are devoted to Augustine. Nygren, pp. 450-3. Also see fn. 2 above. Other examples include Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in Augustine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 11, where he suggests that some of Augustine’s apparent ambiguity stems from stylistic choices rather than indecision; and Luigi Gioia, The Theological
uses that term mainly for love among persons of the trinity and among “brothers” loving each other for the sake of God. *Cupiditas* is the love (*amor*) for earthly things, the lower, downward direction of desire. So the same type of love can be superior or inferior, or good or bad, depending on the direction of the love and the object toward which the love is directed.²³ Although he does not say specifically that *amor, dilectio* and *caritas* are interchangeable, he does say in *De Trinitate* that *dilectio* and *caritas* are “two names for the same thing,” namely, two names for the Holy Spirit as *caritas* itself.²⁴ He attempts to make this argument – that the Holy Spirit is *caritas* – in spite of the lack of biblical passages to support such a claim. As we will see, he uses *dilectio* and *caritas* as terms for the same object, the Holy Spirit.²⁵

In *De moribus ecclesiae* Augustine treats the terms for love within the context of another subject, this time that of the virtues. Here he employs *amor* and *caritas* interchangeably as he counters Manichean interpretations of Christian doctrine. Ancient philosophers and early Christian apologists treated the virtues as one, or four, or many in number. Socrates considered one, wisdom, to be above all; Plato insisted four were equal (wisdom, courage, temperance, justice); Aristotle increased these four to many, placing them in specific categories; and the Stoics returned them to four (prudence, courage, justice, temperance), although slightly different in meaning than those of Plato.²⁶

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²³ D’Arey, 74-5.


²⁵ “*Nescio cur non sicut sapientia et pater dictur et filius et spiritus sanctus, et simul omnes non tress ed una sapientia, ita et caritas et pater dicatur et filius et spiritus sanctus, et simul omnes una caritas.*” *De Trinitate*, Bk. XV, 17:28, *CCL* 503. Chapter Four includes a more extended discussion of this aspect of *caritas* as the Holy Spirit.

Augustine looked closely at these four virtues and, in a rather Socratic move, concluded that the four together were expressions of one thing – not of wisdom, but of the highest form of a human beings’ love for God, *amor dei*. He quite literally re-demoted the virtues from four equal powers working independently within the soul to four aspects of *amor* dependent on each other and working together within an umbrella of this love. 27 However, in this same text, he does not actually allow *amor* supreme position as ‘love for God’. Augustine refers to this highest love, with its object as God (*amor dei*), also as *caritas dei*. 28 In addition, he claims that *caritas dei* is the love a worthy mind cannot be separated from 29 and that it is the love that unites the mind to God (although the mind can only know God intellectually). 30 Moreover, it is through *caritas* that the soul finds a way to conform to a better likeness of God. 31 Thus, the noun for love is not *amor*, but *caritas*.

But this is not the end of his discussion, either. In the same text, *De moribus ecclesiae*, he claims *dilectio* is that love by which the created mind (*mens*) returns to God; 32 this suggests he considers it to also be a uniting form of love as is *caritas*. Finally,

virtues, see Houser, pp 14-16.

27 “Quod si virtus ad beatam vitam nos ducit, nihil omnino esse virtutem affirmaverim, nisi summum amorem dei. Namque illud quod quadripartite dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario quodam affectu, quantum intelligo, dicitur.” Augustine, *De moribus ecclesiae*, 15:25; PL 32, 1322; Houser, 37-8 and 207.


30 “ergo cum etiam deus dignis animis notus non nisi per intelligentiam posit esse…verendum erat ne animus humanus eo quod inter invisibilia et intelligibilia numerator, eiusdem se naturae arbitraretur esse, cuius est ipse qui creavit; et sic ab eo superbia decideret, cui charitate iungendus est.” Augustine, *De moribus ecclesiae*, 12:20.


in his section on the highest Good, he asserts that the highest Good is God, and humans that love \((diligere)\) God, love \((diligere)\) the highest Good, yet the love(s) by which we cleave to this highest Good itself is not \(dilectio\) alone but can also be \(caritas\) or \(amor\).\(^{34}\)

Augustine’s discussion of \(caritas\), \(dilectio\), and \(amor\) continued into his other works where he both specified the term he employed at a given moment and used one or more of these terms synonymously. In \(De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus\) he spends much of Question 35 employing \(amor\) as he asks what <human beings> ought to love \((amare)\). Here it is fairly clear that \(amor\) is connected with the love humans have for some thing or another \((aliquam rem)\), including the things he thinks we should love – divine things that cannot be possessed, but can be known. Ultimately, for Augustine, God is the object of this knowing love \((amor)\) and the love \((amor)\) of God and divine things “that should be loved, is better called \(caritas\) or \(dilectio\).”\(^{35}\) In this case, then he makes a clearer distinction when \(amor\) should be replaced. Augustine’s oscillations in the above examples demonstrate the difficulty writers experienced with \(caritas\). While

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\(^{33}\) “Si igitur diligentibus deum omnia procedunt in bonum, et summum bonum quod etiam optimum dicitur non modo diligendum esse nemo ambigit, sed ita diligendum ut nihil amplius diligere debeat… Quis, queso dubitaverit… nihil nobis alius esse optimum… quam deum? Item si nulla res ab eius charitate nos separate, quid esse non solum melius, sed etiam certius hoc bono potest?” Augustine, \(De moribus ecclesiae\), 11:18.

\(^{34}\) “Nam quid erit aliud optimum hominis, nisi cui inhaerere est beatissimum? Id autem est solus deus, cui haerere certe non ualemus, nisi dilectione, amore, charitate.” Augustine, \(De moribus ecclesiae\), 14:24.

\(^{35}\) Sancti Aurelii Augustini, \(De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus. De octo Dulcitii quaestionibus\), Quaestiones 35 & 36, Ed., A. Mutzenbecher, Corpus Christianorum Series Latin 44A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1975), 50-58; Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, ed. David Mosher, (Washington D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2002) 66-69, esp. 66, fn. where he explains the difficulty of various terms for love and justifies his decision to translate \(amor\), \(caritas\), and \(dilectio\) into the English ‘love’ rather than translate \(caritas\) into the more restrictive ‘charity’.
our analysis must move on to other writers, his questions continued regarding *caritas* and *dilectio*.\(^{36}\)

Augustine’s theories merited respect from his successors, many of whom adopted his opinions. Nevertheless, theologians continued to debate the equivocal nature of the terms regarding love. *Dilectio* and *amor* might or might not be interchangeable in regard to certain feelings such as affection, spontaneous passion, or esteem. Isidore of Seville repeated a Ciceronian distinction that *dilectio* implied a choice, whereas *amor* was spontaneous and more closely related to emotions.\(^{37}\) Peter Lombard (~1100-1160/4) adopted Augustine’s view that love was the one expression of all four cardinal virtues, but in Lombard’s Sentences *amor* becomes *caritas*.\(^{38}\) Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173) insists that private love (*amor*) is distinct from *caritas*, because *caritas* is perfect and private love is not so is unable to be divine. However, he uses both terms when discussing the necessity of full or highest love and the plurality and unity of the three persons of the Trinity. At times *dilectio* is also in these discussions.\(^{39}\) Those authors whom Albert, Hadewijch, and Eckhart explicitly reference struggled to determine whether there was one and only one term that would fit all situations. The context of their writing is often the only way to determine whether they were indicating love from

\(^{36}\) O’Donovan, 11. Also see Gioia, 173.


\(^{39}\) For example, he claims that the three persons cannot exist unless the *plenitudo caritatis* is also present, as “…nec caritatis plenitude sine divinarum personarum pluralitate,” Richard de St. Victor, *De Trinitate*, Bk. 3, c.2. edited by Jean Riballier, (Paris: Librarie Philosophique, 1958), 137. Also see Ch. Four, fn. 27 that *plenitudo amoris* must exist for the Trinity to exist, as in Bk. 5, pp. 214-216.
God, love toward God, or God’s love in general. Given that the debate continued with their contemporaries (and in present scholarship exists in different attire), we can safely conclude they had not yet found a solution.\footnote{See the brief, but illuminating discussion regarding Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, and Bernard of Clairvaux in De Ganck, \textit{Toward Unification}, 453-4.}

\textbf{Caritas in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries}

At the time that our four authors were writing, there was still tension surrounding the meanings of \textit{caritas} because writers still employed other Latin words for love. In fact, Christians were used to seeing various words across languages that denoted this special human relationship with God, and each other. \textit{Amor, dilectio, caritas, amour, charité, liebe, liefde, minne}….each could, according to a higher or lower intent, signify a human-divine love. \textit{Caritas}, in the Latin tradition, was one of several words that could signify human-divine love. In the biblical sense, \textit{caritas} retained its scriptural meaning of ‘the love that causes us to love God and neighbor’, but in the High Middle Ages also meant almsgiving, a burning desire, or a personified feminine god principle.\footnote{Barbara Newman, \textit{God and the Goddesses}, 148.} Writers on courtly love, figuration, motion, essence, gift, passion or suffering all claimed \textit{caritas} at their heart, yet their interpretation of it diverged as they directed their compositions toward their specific literary audience. Most of those divergences will not concern us here; however, variations in literary style obscures the commonality of some opinions among our four authors because the author make use of other genres or discourse in his or her explanation of \textit{caritas}. The task in such cases will be to delve beneath these superficial differences to find shared elements among their theories of \textit{caritas}. Debates
regarding direct or indirect meanings of *caritas* continued to create confusion among
believers, and our theorists’ concerns for this confusion – as well as their attempts to
resolve it – appear in the sections below.

There were two paths by which thirteenth-century thinkers acquired an
understanding of *caritas*. The two were not exclusive, but they can be described as
interrelated threads that intersected repeatedly through the early middle ages. One path
has already been described as the *via patristica* that leads from Plato, through Origin (as
*eros-amor, agape-caritas*), Augustine, and Boethius. On this path, biblical texts and their
original Greek terms were translated into Latin and the ideas were passed down through
the centuries in the Christian religion. The second, *via philosophorum*, had also brought
*eros* through Plato’s works into those of Aristotle, then through Arabic translators and
commentators (mainly Avicenna and Averroes) to the Latin west. These two paths
began to converge slightly after Peter Lombard wrote his *Sentences Commentaries* in the
mid-twelfth century, and met in the studies of early thirteenth-century theologians such as
Robert Grosseteste. Grosseteste was among the first Christian scholars who became
more familiar with ancient Greek thought through the Latin translations of Arabic texts;
many Arabic works were themselves translations from Greek. Robert Grosseteste was
one of the few Latin scholars who translated several of those Greek texts directly into
Latin. Several of Aristotle’s philosophical texts were among them.

The two most influential Aristotelian texts that conveyed terms for love into the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries were the *Metaphysics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. The
influence of these texts on theories of *caritas* is noticeable in Albert the Great’s

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discussion on various aspects of that kind of love. As one of the earliest commentators to confront the new translations of pertinent Aristotelian texts, Albert struggled to incorporate traditional opinions on Aristotle’s thought with conflicting statements in the Aeropegite’s own words. While his treatise, De Caritate, is not extant,\textsuperscript{44} caritas appears in numerous ways throughout his other works. In these, he presents several definitions of caritas that had come down to him and his contemporaries before the rediscovery of Aristotle’s texts, revealing ongoing debates at the time as well as the shift in his thinking as these new sources came to his attention.\textsuperscript{45} In his Sentences Commentary, written earlier in his career, Albert discusses the relation of caritas to the Trinity or, more specifically, as related to the person of the Holy Spirit. Caritas is also significant in his treatment of the highest good and of universal motion in his earlier Sentences, as well as in his Commentaries on the Metaphysics and Nicomachean Ethics, written somewhat later.\textsuperscript{46} Most demonstrative of the complications introduced by Aristotle’s thought and terminology are Albert’s commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics. Precisely as he was writing, Grosseteste was translating the whole of the Nicomachean Ethics from the Greek into Latin in 1246/7, after Albert had already written a great deal on the Ethics from only partial – and far more inferior – translations. Albert was so enthusiastic about this new

\textsuperscript{44} Albert references this work several times in De Bono. See Bernard Geyer, “Prolegomena,” in Alberti Magni, De Bono, eds, Henric Kuhle, Carl Feckes, Bernhard Geyer, and Wilhelm Kubel, (Cologne: Ashendorf, 1951), xi.

\textsuperscript{45} Some of the ongoing debates were a continuation of those against using the works of ‘pagan’ philosophers. See Katherine Tachau, “God’s Compass and Vana Curiositas: Scientific Study in the Old French Bible moralisée,” Art Bulletin, 80 (March, 1998), 7-33, esp. 9-10.


In his *Sentences Commentaries*, his analyses of the specific aspects of *caritas* reveal a mind confronting multiple terms that could signify the Holy Spirit (\textit{amor}, *caritas*, and \textit{dilectio}).\footnote{These are mainly treated here from Book I, Distinctions 10 and 17, and Book III, Distinction 27. In reality, Albert discusses *caritas* in many of the distinctions throughout Books I and III, but the discussion about the terminology between \textit{amor}, \textit{dilectio}, and \textit{caritas} occur primarily in the distinctions listed above.} He argues that all three “among the free gifts, name the same \textit{habitus}, or condition, according to different deliberations of the act of that \textit{habitus}.” Each of these names refers to God, the Holy Spirit and the human-divine connection (*caritas*) when they specify “the freely-given love (\textit{amor})” through the faculty of reason (*rationaliter*). However, when any one of the names refers specifically to itself, then that name points to an individual thing as indicated by genus and species. “All \textit{dilectio} is \textit{amor}, but not the reverse; all \textit{caritas} is \textit{dilectio} and \textit{amor}, but not the reverse.” Thus, they are they are ranked in this way: \textit{amor} includes \textit{dilectio}, and both include \textit{caritas}.\footnote{“Dicendum, quod amor et dilectio et charitas in gratuitis donis nominant idem, secundum diversas tamen considerationes: tamen in se considerata se habent sicut superius et inferius: si enim ista ponantur circa gratuitum amorem tantum, tunc nominant eumdem habitum secundum diversam considerationem sui actus. Amor enim dicat adhaesionem affectus ipsi bono quod amat. Dilectio autem dicit eundem affectum, secundum quod est ex electione rationis praeelegantis illud de bonis alis quae amantur…. Sed charitas nominat eundem affectum, secundum quod sub inaestimabili pretio ponit amatum: charum enim dicitur quod magni pretii aestimatur…. Si autem ista tria non circa gratuitum amorem considerentur, sed in se, tunc differunt sicut genus et species. Omnis enim dilectio est amor, sed non convertitur; et omnis charitas est dilectio et amor, sed non convertitur, quia tunc amor est in sensibiliter amatis et}
Albert goes on to explain that the “love” of God (amor Dei) moves all virtues toward their acts. Since caritas is the same as amor with respect to “order and the final condition as act,” or, as the highest Good (summum bonum), is that amor that moves all virtues toward their acts, caritas is the “universal mover” of virtues toward their acts.

But this did not settle the matter in the discussion of caritas once full texts of Aristotle’s work arrived. These included other theories surrounding the notions of caritas, definitions for it, and its relationship to other terms for love. For example, one common Christian term, amicitia, became much more significant for the theories about caritas when it arrived in the complete version of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics. As caritas is the love for one’s neighbor as well as for God, the implication of a new way to love one’s neighbors would affect the way humans also loved God. The love among friends appeared under a new label – philophilos, from the Greek philophilous, “lover of friends”, from philia, meaning ‘affection or fondness for’ someone or something, or ‘mutual love between two friends’. As a type of Christian love for others, philia had


50 “charitas cadit in difinitione earum (amor) non secundum substantiam habitus, sed secundum ordinem et finem habitus ad actum, qui est summum bonum.” Albertus, Sent III, D. 27, Art. 2, ed. Borgnet, 512.

51 “…charitas non habet in se actus aliarum ut habitus ex quo vel cujus partibus eliciantur illi actus: sed habet eas ut motor non proximus et conjunctus motori, sed potius ut motor motoris ad actum. Amor enim Dei omnes virtutes movet ad actum…. Et ideo charitas bene est motor universalis virtutum ad actum.” Albertus, Sent III, D. 27, A.2, Borgnet 28, 511. Also see below, fn. 59.

52 “Et amicis quidem existentibus nihil opus est iustitia, iusti autem existentes indigent amicitia, et iustorum maxime amicabile esse viditut. Non solum autem necessarium est, sed et bonum; philophilos enim laudamus, et pholphilia videtur bonorum aliquid esse, et quidam eosdem existimant viros bonos esse et amicos.” From the Grosseteste translation of Aristotle’s Ethics, 1155a:30. Super Ethica, Bk. 8, Lect. 1, ed. Cologne, 593. Also see Aristoteles Latinus I.

53 Modern scholars do not agree on the precise definition of philia. For example, Edward Collins Vacek defines it first as “covenantal love” and then “mutual and communal” love, Love, Human and Divine: The Heart of Christian Ethics (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
made its way to the Latin west through the Vulgate Bible, and authors such as Origin did include it in their debates on Christian love since there were variant meanings in ancient texts for _philia_ just as for _agape, eros, amor, dilectio_, and _caritas_.\(^{54}\) Although less apparent than _agape_ in Biblical texts,\(^ {55}\) _philia_ was nevertheless a topic of extensive theorizing among ancient and medieval thinkers. In Latin it was generally translated as _amicitia_, which could convey attraction or affection while also signifying friendship, right behavior, and beneficial political and social relationships among colleagues.

The problem for scholastic thinkers was that _philia_, like _eros_, had also been translated into Latin as _amor_. Thus, _philophilos_ (lover of friends) commanded attention when it appeared in the Latin west with the transmission of Aristotle’s full text of the _Ethics_. In Grosseteste’s translation, _philophilous_ had been translated into Latin both as _philophilos_ and as _amicos amicorum_.\(^ {56}\) Its negative counterpart, _philautia_ (self love), in Latin was _amor sui_, or _dilectio sui_, also negative in connotation. Albert was familiar with _amicitia_, yet the full translation of the _Ethics_ presents him with not only another new term, but also a new theory regarding _amicitia_. Along with his contemporaries, he has then to incorporate _amicitia_ and _philophilos_ into the discussion of _caritas, dilectio_, and _amor_. He understands _amicitia_ does not perform the same functions as _caritas_, yet it is...

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\(^{54}\) According to Nygren, Origin, in his defense of Christianity against Celsum, uses _philanthropia_ more than _agape_. Nygren, 374. Ancient writers who treated the subject of _philia_ as friendship argued over the precise definition of various ranking between members of groups along the friendship hierarchy.

\(^{55}\) McGinn, _Foundations_, 72.

\(^{56}\) Albert explains the Aristotelian passage thus: “Secundum quamcumque dispositionem laudantur homines, illa est de numero bonorum honestorum; sed secundum pholiphiliam, idest multiplicatam amicitiam, laudantur homines ut philophili, idest amatores amicitiae; ergo poliphilia est bonum et honestum.” _Super Ethica_, Bk. 8, Lect. I, ed. Cologne, 595.
important in Aristotle’s thought and Aristotle’s thought is important to Albert. In addition, the negative use of ‘amor sui’ in the Nicomachean Ethics is presented as incorrect. Aristotle claims (following Plato) that philautia should not be considered negative, and that a lover of friends is naturally a friend of oneself. Whether Albert attempted to tackle the implications of this last revelation is unclear, but it certainly would have given him something more to consider.

Given these and other aspects of caritas that necessitate re-evaluation, Albert devotes a great deal of attention to appropriating Aristotle’s theories into contemporary Christian doctrine. He nearly thinks aloud in Book III of his Sentences Commentary when he defends caritas as a crucial assistant to the soul’s powers (vires) in loving God. He refutes the contention that human reason recognizes God as the highest Good on account of himself, and that a special power (vis) for loving that higher Good is not necessary. His opinion is that we are unable to become aware of higher things and to be affected by them “except if elevated above our abilities by the Gift that God gives to us.” This is in the love (dilectione) that is caritas. He finds it necessary to clarify the point again in Distinction Thirty-Three when treating Lombard’s use of caritas as the unifier of all expressions of virtue. He points out that certain thinkers hold that the term “virtue”

57 This fascinating issue is treated fairly well, if briefly, by O’Donovan, 2-4. Although there is no thorough study of the Latin amor sui as there is for the Greek philautia, O’Donovan contends that the neutral to positive use of philautia by Aristotle was largely overlooked by later philosophers and Christians, although Cicero and some Stoics made use of it. Albert likens it to concupiscents and defines it as “quod vulgus dicat illum maxime se amare, qui plus sibi tribuit de dictis bonis, quia si aliguis tribuit sibi plus de bonis operationibus, nullus vulgarium dicet eum philautum, idest sui amatorum secundum se, a philos, quod est amor, et autos, quod est per se, neque vituperabit eum.” He also says a great deal more which is beyond the scope of this study. Super Ethica, Bk. 9, Lect. 10, ed. Cologne, 688.

58 “Multa enim cognoscimus, quae operari non possumus; et multa cognoscimus circa quae ut cognoscimus, affici non possumus, nisi elevemur supra posse nostrum a dono Dei dato nobis. Et ita est in dilectione quae est charitas.” Albertus Magnus, Sent. III, D. 27, A. 1, Borgnet 28, 509.
contains in its meaning the more general *amor* rather than the more specific *caritas*, or the even more specific *habitus caritatis*, the ‘habit or condition of having *caritas*’.59

Others say it is *caritas* that unifies the virtues. While he does not side with one or another, he does point out that the latter opinion would mean that *caritas* is “in the virtues as a general form,” and thus is the root from which all virtues “formed from the love of the highest good” begin their growth (*radix est caritas*).60 So in some ways, Albert leans toward agreement that *caritas* is the unifying term for virtues, but his emphasis is on the qualification that *caritas* is that unifier as a subcategory, or species, of *amor*.61 His inclination becomes clearer as he responds to this opinion: If all virtues hinge on the presence of *caritas* as that which is necessary to make all human work into something good, then only *caritas* can be a cardinal virtue. Not at all, he replies, because the other virtues are not reduced to *caritas* so much as they are all related to it in a way in which

59 “...*amor secundum quod cadit in diffinitione virtutis, ut quidam dicunt, non est habitus charitatis, sed potius generalis amor, quo omne quod est amat suam perfectionem. Alii intendunt dicere, quod est charitas, et tunc non est verum nisi de virtute formata, et non informi. Et charitas tunc est in eis sicut forma generalis.” Albertus Magnus, *Sent. III*, Dist. 33, Art.1, ed. Borgnet, 607. A full excerpt from this Distinction can be found in Houser, 128-141.

60 “Similiter, omnis virtus formata ex amore summi boni trahit incrementum, et sic *radix est caritas*... Opus perfectum, ut perferice est formae, sic est caritatis.... Dico autem ‘formae’ ad esse meriti, non ad esse virtutis, et hoc infra probabitur in quaestione, qualiter caritas sit forma virtutum.” Albertus Magnus, *De Bono*, Tr. II, Q. II, Art. 6, ed. Cologne, 108.

61 See above, fn. 48. The debates influenced by the *Nicomachean Ethics* over the connection between virtues and the place of *caritas* or *amor* in that connection would continue on into the fourteenth century. However, fourteenth-century scholastic thinkers would less frequently include *caritas* within their discussions. This interesting trend is beyond the scope of the present work, but modern scholarship on it is worth mentioning. For an overview of various theories on virtue connectedness, see Rega Wood, *Ockham on the Virtues*, (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1997), 43-46. On the disappearance of *caritas* in discussions of the *Ethics*, namely friendship, see Marco Toste, “*Utrum Felix Indigeat Amicis*: The Reception of the Aristotelian Theory of Friendship at the Arts Faculty in Paris,” in *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 1200-1500*, edited by Istvan P. Bejcy (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 173-95, 173-185.
they are not related to each other. *Caritas* is the general mover, the form, and the final cause of human life. This does not require reduction of the other virtues. In one other example, he maintains that *caritas* is also related to grace (*gratia*) and can be essentially commensurate with grace (as it can be essentially commensurate with God). However, the proper name for *caritas* is not grace and, therefore *caritas* can unify all virtues whereas grace cannot. In later decades, Meister Eckhart will also struggle with the issue regarding *amor* and *caritas* in relation to the virtues – while he accepts that the virtues are unified, he uses both *amor* and *caritas* as the unifying principle without providing the distinction between the terms that Albert presents.

One other text proved significant in Albert’s attempt to incorporate Aristotle’s work into his own theories on *caritas*. In the *Metaphysics*, Book 12, Aristotle claims that the prime (and unmoved) mover moves as if loved or desired (*eronomen*). Although *eronomen* is generally translated into Latin as *amor*, the Latin version accessible to Albert (the *media* translation) supplies the Latin *desideratum* for the Greek term

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62 “Charitas non est cardo ad cuius rationem aliae particulares reducuntur.... Sed humana vita refertur ad charitatem ut ad motorem generalem et formam quamdam et finem, et non ut ad cardinem, ut dictum est.” Albertus Magnus, *Sent. III*, D. 33, Art. 2, ed. Borgnet, 609; See also Hauser, 135.

63 D’Arey, 85.

64 Eckart’s use of *amor* and *caritas* are treated below, fn. 90, and is incorporated into his usage of *minne*.

65 Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, Bk. 11, tr. 2, ed. B. Geyer, in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Institutum Alberti Magni Coloniense 16.2 (Munster im Westfalen, 1964), 489, 494; see the *media* translation there and in “Metaphysica Translatio Anonyma sive ‘Media,’” in *Aristoteles Latinus*, XXV 2, edidit Gudrun Vuillemin Diem (Lieden: E. J. Brill, 1976), 212-13. On whether he does closely follow Averroes, see *Ibn Rushd’s Metaphysics*, trans Charles Genequand (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), 151. The Arabic term Averroes uses is *shahwa* which Genequand translates as “desire,” (p. 35) yet in the English translation Genequand uses the term “love” to stand for *shahwa* (p. 151 and passim). Because of this it is not clear whether the translation Averroes read from used *shahwa* or he himself translated the word into *shahwa*. At any rate, the choice by Genequand to use “love” rather than “desire” for *shahwa* carries the confusion surrounding *eros* into modern scholarship. On the other hand, it strengthens my point that disagreements over terminology
Albert accepts that “desire (desiderium) is the cause of all motion,” yet indicates there is uncertainty in allowing desire alone to cause all universal motion. This appears already in his Sentences Commentary on caritas as a virtue where he argues that caritas is the universal mover but desiderium is the prime mover. In a manner similar to that of Origin and Augustine, Albert attempts to differentiate between a love directed upward toward the divine and a love directed downward toward the world. In order to avoid a misunderstanding that desiderium is directed to baser forms, he qualifies it extensively. Following other philosophers, he indirectly (or directly) links eronomen to amantum and amantum to motion. He claims that the unmoved mover is pure and simple actuality, and it is this essence that moves as if desired:

The text of Aristotle in the Cologne edition uses the term desideratum at 1072a, “Et enim alicui cuius, quorum hoc quidem est, illud vero non est; movet autem quasi desideratum, et motum vero alia movet.” Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica* VI-XIII, c.9, ed. Cologne, 494.


Albert does not connect amantum and bonum directly to each other, although he sets down the arguments of Epeocoles and Anaxagores that claim amor is the first mover. I believe he recognized the problems with the translation he was using. “Ipsa <intellectus purus> igitur est maxime amata et desiderata ab omnibus, et omne quod movetur, desiderat ipsam. Hoc igitur modo movet non-mota, eo quod ipsa nihil desiderata extra se. Desiderium autem est causa motus omnis. Movet autem sicut desiderabile et intellectuale bonum omnium secundum esse et naturam uniuscuiusque.” Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica* VI-XIII, Ibid., c.6, 490. Later translations would replace the Latin term desideratum with amatum. See Aquinas, *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria*, (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1926), Lib. 12, l. 7 n. 5: “Secundo per comparationem ad primum mobile, ibi, movet autem ut amatum.”
The unmoved existent (*existens*) moves by its essence (not by its accidents).\(^{70}\) and this is what moves, just as if we distinguish the beloved or lovable and desired and desirable from lovable on account of oneself and through accidents. (The prime unmoved mover) is lovable through itself because it is the highest good…. This is the most loved and desired by everything, and everything that is moved desires it.\(^{71}\)

But this still does not settle the matter in regard to what is desired and what does the desiring. Albert goes on to explain further that the essence of the unmoved mover is linked through the intellect rather than the senses. This is further discussed in Chapter Five.

Although more research is called for on this situation, it seems evident that over time, *caritas* as a divine-human love permeating all activities of souls becomes *caritas* as a topic for discussion primarily within the subject of ethics. This move is continued with Thomas Aquinas in *De Caritatis*, where he emphasizes the meaning of *caritas* as friendship.\(^{72}\) These other meanings caused difficulty for philosophers attempting to fit the new Aristotelian intellectual and non-emotional methodology into a long tradition that accepted high emotion in a dialog regarding *caritas*.

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\(^{70}\) “Omnes igitur moventes causae resolvuntur ad causam primariam moventem. Causa autem primo movens non potest esse nisi illa quae per essentiam movet et cuius actus essentialis est ipse motus quem movet…. si detur, quod non per essentiam movet, sequitur, quod movet per aliquid additum essentiae suae. Et sic est per accidens movens; nullum autem per accidens movens est primum… et sic contradictoria verificantur de codem.” Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica* XII, Tract. 2, Ch. 2, ed. Cologne, 484.

\(^{71}\) “Immobile autem existens movet per essentiam… et hoc est quod movet, sicut si distinguamus amatum sive amabile sive desideratum et desiderabile in amabile per se et per accidens. Amabile enim per se est, quod per se est bonum et optimum….Ipsa igitur est maxime amata et desiderata ab omnibus, et omne quod movetur, desiderat ipsam.” Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica* XII, vol. 16, pt. 2, ed. Cologne, 489-90.

Vernacular Expressions of Caritas

What was troubling in the Latin tradition proved an opportunity for authors writing in vernacular languages to offer their own synonymous terms for *caritas*. I have thus far concentrated on Albert the Great while setting down some developmental history of *caritas* in Latin texts because his work clearly demonstrates the continuing effort to clarify *caritas* and its relationship to other terms for love in theological discussions. However, words in vernacular languages also gave expression to this special, yet widespread, type of human-divine love. *Minne*, in the Middle Dutch and German vernaculars, is one such term and its use as a synonym for *caritas* is best evidenced by the three other writers. Beatrice, Hadewijch, and Eckhart all use the Germanic term *minne* instead of, or in addition to, the Latin term *caritas*. Hadewijch and Eckhart use both Latin and vernacular languages in their texts regarding *caritas*. In one of Eckhart’s sermons, he actually replaces *caritas* with both *minne* and *liebe*.73 Hadewijch also employs both *caritas* and *minne*, with *minne* as the primary term and *caritas* brought in for specific passages. Beatrice employs some Latin terms and phrases, but *caritas* is not one of them. In her treatise, however, *minne* has characteristics very similar to *caritas*. Some scholars accept that *minne* is a vernacular term used interchangeably with *caritas* just as *amor*, *caritas*, and *dilectio* are used interchangeably in Latin.74 But for an in-depth discussion of *caritas* it is important that we see clearly that Beatrice means *caritas* when she employs *minne*. It is for that reason that the above historical summary precedes the assertion that she does: the usage of a variety of terms both in Latin and the vernacular

73 See below, fn. 84.

lends support to the claim that Beatrice can mean for minne to stand for caritas. Also, since minne can be the vernacular term for the lower aspects of amor or cupiditas, it is important to look at the context of each use. The context of the term will tell us whether she meant caritas, as her Latin biographer often indicates, or whether her usage is closer to amor, felicitas, or something else. While her biographer’s use of the Latin caritas for specific instances of minne also provides evidence in support of an equivalent use, the optimal evidence comes from her own words.

Augustine specifically argued that amor, dílectio, and caritas all signified the love of God in different aspects, and I assert here that Beatrice is following his lead. Given the variety of terms that describe the human-divine relationship, and given the various meanings for each term, already Beatrice is within her right to use minne instead of caritas in her text. Since hers is the earliest extant Middle Dutch text, she could well be taking up the task of providing an initial translation to reach a larger audience wishing to learn about caritas. Three examples help to shed light on this idea. In the first example, two separate phrases state that the soul is in service; in the first to The Lord, to minne in the second. In the first phrase, the soul offers herself to “serve Our Lord” (onse here Te dienne) in minne alone without expecting compensation. Later in the same paragraph her longing is to “serve minne with minne” (met minne te diene der minnen), also without thought for herself. According to Augustine, God, caritas, and the Holy Spirit are all

75 Chapter Four treats the contextual significance of each aspect of caritas as it relates to minne in Beatrice’s Treatise.

76 Pederson argues against a rationale that elevates texts in Latin above vernacular texts in analytic or preservation value. Beatrice’s explanation in Middle Dutch might be subsequently rendered into Latin, but that does not lessen their worth to her own community. Also, while her autobiography may have been lost, it is unlikely that it would be so respected by her hagiographer that he followed it closely and then destroyed it. Pederson, “Vernacular,” 196-7.

77 Seven Manieren, ed. R-VM, 7-8.
one in the same, so one who serves God would also serve caritas and serve the Holy Spirit. 78 The second example from Beatrice has to do with the notion that caritas, as the Holy Spirit, is the love (amor) that makes us to love (diligimus) God and our neighbor. 79 Throughout the Seven Manieren, minne causes the soul to do several types of things, including longing for and loving God. At the beginning she tells her reader that the first manner or mode of love is a longing that comes actively (comt werkende) out of minne herself. This first mode of minne conquers opposition from the heart to cause the soul to feel such longing that she will spend her life climbing to greater “heights of minne and into a closer knowledge of God.” 80 Later, Beatrice asserts that it is the force of minne that has taken hold of the soul and led her on, tended to her needs, given her wisdom and strength, among other things. 81 Here minne is clearly the cause of at least some of the actions the soul has undertaken, and in these examples can be taken to mean caritas as one with God and as a medium between God and the soul. Finally, because minne, in the Germanic languages, translates into “love,” and not into “charity” as in French and then English, the wider application of caritas as love is present in her writing. Chapter Four treats these aspects of caritas and others in greater depth.

Hadewijch of Brabant’s works provide an interesting bridge connecting the Middle Dutch and Latin terms for love. Minne appears most often, but Hadewijch also uses the term caritas. Both mean ‘love’, yet at times she seems to indicate they are not

78 See above, fn. 24.
79 See above, fn. 1.
80 “Die ierste es ene begerte die comt wekende uter minnen; si moet lange regneren int herte eer si al die wedersake wale mach verdriuen…Hier in so begeertsi al hare leuen te leidene ende hier mede te werkene ende te wassene ende te clemmene in meerre hoecheit van minnen ende in naerre kinnesse gods….” Seven Manieren I, R-VM, 3-4.
81 “Die geweldicheit der minnen heft die ziele ge<ї>rect ende geleidt, hehuet ende besceremt ‘ende si heeft hare gegeven die vroetheit ende die wijsheit…” Seven Manieren VI, R-VM, 26.
the same kind of love, nor do they perform the same functions. She writes *caritas* when she turns her discussion to the human soul on earth, whether in a relationship with God or with other human beings. There are many examples of this in her letters; I will give three. In one letter she reminds her students of Paul’s words on *caritas*. The student should apply themselves to *caritas* in various aspects and should follow *caritas*, but with the “strength of burning desire for *minne*.“ In the next sentence it is *minne* that is to be followed. In another letter she advises her students to follow the example of Jesus in following *minne* to God. In this letter it is *caritas* that Jesus worked and burned inwardly with - outwardly for friends and strangers. Others should love (*minnen*) God. She repeats this idea twice more, that Jesus’ type of love toward humans was *caritas* and love toward God is *minne*. Love herself is also *minne*. Additionally, she refers to both *caritas* and *minne* as a bond, glue, or medium that both holds the soul to God and provides a conduit through which God’s gifts can be transferred to the soul. Her use of both terms interchangeably suggests she means them to be synonymous.

In some respects, she uses *caritas* to emphasize specific aspects of God and what God provides for the humans soul. For example, she explains that living according to the

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83 “…hi wrachte ende hoe hi berrende in karitaten van binnen, ende in werken van doechden van buten te vreemden ende te vrienden...hi geboet den mensche hoe sere si minnen souden haren god….” *Brieven*, Letter 15, ed. Van Mierlo, 118.


85 In Letter 16 she claims nothing must come between the soul and God but *minne*, the glue which bonds them in union. In Letter 28 *caritas* is the medium between the soul and God. See Ch. Five, fn. 68 for more on this topic.
demands of Love (Minne) requires constant dissatisfaction regarding the work to be done. However developed the soul becomes, there is always another level of perfection to achieve. Caritas, she says, “understands God’s commandments without error and fulfills them (houtsen) without work or labor” Caritas here is an abiding love, an aid to doing the work demanded by minne, that something that can make the way of doing the work less laborious. “For the one who loves does not labor,” she continues, “because he does not feel his labor.” Do the tasks of Love (Minne) with love (caritas), she says, and those tasks will not feel like work but will be easier, lighter, and will proceed more swiftly. 86 On the other hand, caritas can be directed inaccurately, as when a person allows emotional attachment to the act of doing good to overshadow the virtuous reason for doing good. The individual gets pulled away from a higher directive and becomes mired in “the sweetness felt by frivolous minne.” 87 In these passages she indicates that minne and caritas have some underlying differences. When she personifies Love, it is Minne she chooses as the signifying name. In one of her visions she claims caritas affects her differently than “actual love,” (minne selue) or, perhaps, “one’s own love.” She defines this minne as ‘the divine power that must go before <others>’. 88 This may look as though Hadewijch is confused about caritas and minne. On the contrary, she is so familiar with the different aspects of both types of love that she can discuss the subtleties of them without trouble. In fact, she is doing much the same as Albert is when

86 Interestingly, van Mierlo does not see this description of caritas as likening it in any way to “charity” or love of neighbor. Brieven, Letter 13, VM, 15.

87 Letter 12, VM 108, Hart, 72.

he gives his lengthy explanation of *caritas*, *amor*, and *dilectio*. She argues, as he does, that the relationship between *minne* (as *amor* or *dilectio*) and *caritas* is, on one level, a hierarchical relationship. “*Minne* can dwell in *caritas,*” she argues, “but *caritas* cannot dwell in *minne.*”\(^{89}\) This difference here is that instead of presenting her exposition via Aristotelian categories, she describes the relationship in inclusionary or exclusionary terms. The meaning is similar even as labels differ.

In addition to his expositions on *caritas* using the terms *liebe* and *minne*, Meister Eckhart identifies *caritas* with God (and so identifies *liebe* and *minne* are with God). In his German Sermons 5a and 5b, he treats the passage “In this the *caritas* of God appeared to us.” (I John 4:9) Both of these German terms translate into *love* in the English language. In Sermon 5a, the corresponding text of the sermon reads: “Sant Johannes spricht: ‘Doran ist unns gottes *liebe* geoffenbart…’” In Sermon 5b, the text reads: “In dem ‘In demist uns erzeiget und erschinen gotes *minne* an uns,’”\(^{90}\) Each sermon does cover a slightly different range of ideas, yet this initial passage reveals his perception of the synonymous nature of *caritas*, *liebe*, and *minne*. He also considers *amor* and *caritas* each as a unifying principle for the virtues. Although his full exposition on this is not

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89 “*De minne* mach wonen in caritaten, mer caritate en mach niet wonen in *minnen.*” Hart adds “for others” after *caritas* but that phrase does not exist in the Dutch texts. Van Mierlo also suggests that the *caritas* here is specific to charity (*naastenliefde*), but again, Hadewijch herself does not limit her words to that aspect of *caritas*. Letter 20, VM, 172; Hart, 92. Without the addition of the limiting phrases, Hadewijch’s statement denotes *caritas* in its divine form and in its relationship to other terms for love, such as *amor*, *dilectio*, and *minne*.

extant, he refers to it in his *Commentary on the Book of Wisdom*, where he reminds himself to explain that all virtues are connected in love (*amor*) (in this case, specifying love of goodness) and to discuss the theories of other theologians, who argue that they are connected in *caritas* (Augustine is named). He does not repeat his prior opinions, except to say in passing that *caritas* is also the love (*amor*) of the Good, and that this *amor* is God. In his German Sermons we have a clearer example in that he preaches in German and refers to his Latin debate with a Franciscan, Gonsalvo of Spain. This debate is over the primacy of either the intellect (*intellectus*) or the will (*voluntas*), both of which appear often in Eckhart’s Latin works; *caritas* is generally related to the will (in the affections). Eckhart refers to the debate in one of his sermons and also to the importance of both knowledge (*bekanntsise*) and love (*minne*).

We have seen here that *caritas* can have a number of different meanings. It signifies a common, divine love among humans, a specific type of friendship, benevolence toward other humans, and one of the three persons of the Trinity (the Holy Spirit). On the other hand, it is one of several terms that can signify divine-human love, which is the specific meaning we are interested in here. *Amor, dilectio*, and *minne* can also signify this kind of love, and all of these words can also stand for the Holy Spirit as love, if the direction of their affect is upward toward the divine. Thirteenth-Century authors may have tried to solidify the terminology and definitions of terms, but none as yet had the last word. Beatrice, in her use of *minne*, meant that term as a synonym for *caritas*, and the in-depth analysis of her treatise in Chapter Four shows how close to

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92 Kurt Ruh argues this sermon refers to Eckhart’s *Parisian Question* Three and the debate therein regarding the Dominican position on the primacy of the intellect over the will. More significant for our purposes is his view that Latin meets the vernacular in Eckhart and in the documentary evidence of this debate. Kurt Ruh, *Geschichte der abendländischen Mystik*, V. 3 (Munchen: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1990), 278; Eckhart, *Teacher & Preacher*, 261, fn. 20.
caritas she means minne to be.

**Education: Theory meets Practice**

Once we pierce the issues surrounding *caritas* that are created by variations in opinions and discourse, we are better able to compare individual theories regarding this form of love. Beatrice, Albert, Hadewijch and Eckhart approach the subject of *caritas* or *minne* from different viewpoints and write for diverse audiences. These factors affect the genre they choose to write in as well as the discourse they engaged in. Beatrice and Hadewijch define *caritas* or *minne* within a discussion of the effects either term might have on the human soul, and while Eckhart brings in some experiential ideas, he is careful to follow Albert in relating *caritas* to other theological expressions. However, their collective purpose for writing about divine love was to edify their audience about various aspects of it. Their purpose was to educate.

If we set aside the notion that there was one educational system defined linearly as unidirectional and hierarchical, we allow ourselves to see a lateral view of the system; lateral in the sense that there are various horizontal, vertical, and diagonal paths to knowledge, all interacting with each other in a twining yet progressive manner. On these paths are a multitude of individuals conversing, copying, reading, speaking, and listening, all taking in, processing, and transmitting such knowledge as they encounter, and all contributing to the overall system in greater or lesser amounts depending upon the time of day, or month, or year (and so on). This approach allows us to think about a thirteenth-century system of education that comprises a variety of programs in which learning is taking place simultaneously, each program intersecting others through the interactions of
individuals with each other and with “texts.” The text, as we’ve seen, can be a person, a written document, or an artifact, all of which emit a “message” (fictional or factual). But even the spread of a message is not enough for both teaching and learning to occur. There must also be the active agreement to receive a message from any of those three types of texts. As all teachers know, students unable or unwilling to give their attention to a lesson cannot receive any message presented in any type of text. This section, then, will assume interest on the part of students, and will explain how the texts analyzed here indicate the teaching method utilized by each author. Presuppositions regarding similarities and differences among the manuscripts might obfuscate the theoretical discussion; nevertheless, there is a lesson contained in all of the texts. Moreover, each writer has an educational purpose for discussing caritas or minne within their individual text; acknowledging their authority illuminates their ideas of themselves as teachers and enables us to discover the underlying ideas they held about caritas.

We can also discern something of the pedagogy utilized by each educator as he or she discussed caritas. It is probable that each employed other instructional tools in addition to writing, such as verbal conversation or meditation on visual images, but the written words are our focus. By analyzing the collection of theories in the texts under study, we can discover two distinct yet interrelated teaching methods regarding caritas and minne. One method describes the affects and experiences caritas produces in the human soul when the two cooperate and explains ways in which the soul can interact with God through this divine love. The other describes the words that define caritas, its relationship with God and the Trinity (these are also terms defined), and the relationship

93 See Chapter Two fn. 31, in section two on educational programs.

94 Hester Gelber’s work on detecting and reconstructing conversational circles of teaching and learning has been influential in this. See Gelber, esp. Ch. 2.
of the properties of caritas to properties and definitions of other words for “love”. While Beatrice clearly uses the first method and less clearly uses the second, Albert makes the most use of the second. Hadewijch and Eckhart are more obvious in their blend of the two methods, alternating between describing the experiences of the soul and analyzing the properties of the terms they use. All make use of the faculty of reason, but all emphasize the importance of experience in acquiring truth. What is interesting, and telling, is that their expressions of reason or rational analysis are quite different from each other.\footnote{For the importance of experience in relation to reason, see Edward Grant, God & Reason in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 160. The topic of caritas and reason is covered more thoroughly in Chapter Five, beginning with fn. 113.}

In her treatise, Seven Manieren van Minne, Beatrice approaches the discussion of minne generally as a description of the effects on the human soul of making contact with divine love, a love she seems to personify.\footnote{I am less certain she thought of minne as a persona distinct from herself but suggest that she used the noun minne because it was less complex to explain each time she needed to refer to the varying experience of each vision. Also, it would be easier, perhaps, for a new student to relate to.} The contact and communication with minne that the soul undergoes is vital for comprehending the nature of minne as love and as divine being. Becoming like minne is of the utmost importance, and without direct participation a human cannot become like, join with, or know minne and God. God and minne are much more than words to Beatrice, they are divine persons known through direct contact rather than (or in addition to) being defined as abstract concepts.\footnote{DeGanck says this well, “God is rather apprehended than comprehended, to be talked to than to be talked about.” Roger DeGanck, Beatrice in Her Context, 44.} Her approach complements that of Albert, who explains the distinctions among amor, dilectio, and caritas as determined by the direction of the desire. An upward direction of the soul’s intent makes amor a suitable term to use for the Holy Spirit as much as would
be *dilectio* or *caritas*. Beatrice also explains the importance of an upward direction for the soul’s desire or intent; in addition, she tells her readers *what happens* when the soul reaches upward. The human *minne* awakens in the soul and rises to meet the downward flowing divine *minne*, which then infuses the soul with itself and creates a longing in the soul, draws the soul upward once again. This longing is initiated by *minne* in the same way as *caritas* infuses love into the heart. The soul then takes up this longing and begins the work of striving upward to reach God and *minne* under its own power, struggling to “greater heights of *minne*” in order to become more like God. The goal of the human soul is to be close to and as much like God and *minne* as possible; this includes those goals of the soul in its “teachings and seekings.” Beatrice adds techniques the soul can follow to maintain this upward intent:

This soul often revisits what she is and what she should be, what she has and what her longing lacks. With all her concentration and with greater desire and with all the skill she has she strives to retain and to eschew all that works to trouble and hinder her in doing so.

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98 See above, fn. 69.

99 This is discussed in Chapter Four.

100 “Hier in so begeertsi al hare leuen te leidene, ende hier mede te werkene ende te wassene ende te clemmene, in meerre hoeheit van minnen, ende in naerre kinness gods, to dier volvomenheit daer si toe volmaket es ende gheroepen van gode.” *Seven Manieren*, R-VM, 4.


102 “Dese siele besuect dicwile erenstelec wat si es ende watsi wesen soude ende wat si heft ende wat hare begerten ghebrecht. Ende met al haren nerenste ende met groter begerten, ende met al dier behendichet datsi mach, so pijnj si hare te huendene ende te scuwene al dat hare commeren mach ende letten te dusgedanen werken….” *Seven Manieren*, R-VM, 5.
Here theory connects with praxis as she guides the student in correct thought and subsequent action. She provides clues as to the tasks the student should undertake, and warns the student of the need for discipline to continue this self-reflection. Hers is a phenomenological approach rather than one of semantics. The experience as a whole is worthy of conveyance; one piece or another is insufficient to relate to the reader. Definitions of terms are important, yet as important are the emotions and sensory events that take place within the soul itself as well as the place or space in which the entire interaction occurs. She elucidates the terms (minne) and their signified objects (caritas, God, the Holy Spirit, and the Trinity) with definitions drawn from the experiences themselves. Through the experiences that surround contemplation and oneness with the divine, the soul is able to understand minne and God, who at the same time love the soul as they are love itself. There is no need for the soul to rationalize the emotions, sensations, sounds, or visualizations; in fact, these effects are best understood if not rationalized. Her primary task is to elucidate the existence and activities of minne by describing the events or phenomena as they occur and as she experiences them. A seeming lack of division or subdivision in her text takes nothing away from an affective analysis of minne. She writes as she does because she is aware that any soul’s journey to God with minne can occur along various routes and in more than one order.

After an infusion of a new type of divine love in the fourth and fifth manieren, the sixth manner of love of the soul emerges from the struggles it has undertaken in order to

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104 See Martin Heidigger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 232. Also see Chapter Five for more on the relationship of minne and caritas to reason.

integrate this new source of spiritual energy. Along with an awareness of an increased confidence and a greater understanding of God:

The bride of our Lord advances, and climbs into greater holiness, she feels love to be of a different nature, and her knowledge of this love is closer and higher.¹⁰⁶

This is both an intellectual realization and an increased emotional awareness experienced by the soul as it begins living in this new manner of minne. The whole of the experience and the subsequent intellectual conceptual analysis are both aspects of the discourse Beatrice uses in her lessons; her ‘what it is’ definition includes the ‘how it makes you feel’ phenomenon that a student will also experience when “apprehending” or understanding God, or caritas, or minne. Her account is meant to be instructional as well as descriptive.

Minne is a kind of love that can at the same time be the awakened soul, the agent and action of loving within the soul, the emotions the soul feels, and the changed soul as it develops:

Sometimes it happens that minne sweetly grows in the soul….and the heart is so gently touched by minne…and so intensely overwhelmed and so lovingly encompassed in loving (minnen) that that she is wholly overcome by minne. Here she feels a great closeness to God and a clarity of understanding…and the she feels that all her senses are integrated in loving (minnen) and her will has become minne, and that she is so deeply immersed in minne…that <the soul> has entirely become minne.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ “Alse die bruut ons heren vorder es comen ende hoger geclommen in merren vromen, so geuult si noch andere maniere van minnen in naerren wesene ende in hogeren bekinne.” Seven Manieren, R-VM, 23.

¹⁰⁷ “Selestont gesciet dattie minne sueteleke in der zielen verwecket wert, ende blideleke op-ersteet ende datsi har selven beruert into herte sonder enich toe-do'en van menscheliken werken. Ende so wert dan dat herte so morweleke gerenen van minnen…ende so starkeleke bedwongen met minnen ende so liefleke behelst in minnen datsi altemale verwonnen wert metter minnen. Hier inne ghevuet si ene grote naheit te gode ende ene onderstendeleke clarheit…. ende dan
So here, as Beatrice defines the attributes of *minne*, she presents in language those attributes that exist in relation to the student, who would experience them (loving God) in addition to relating the terms to each other (the words love, God). There is no separation of the body – within which the soul feels the affects of sensory experiences and emotions – and the mind – with which the soul utilizes the faculty of reason to logically analyze and express those experiences. Learning about *minne* requires the wholly integrated human soul, body and mind, at the time of the lesson.

Although she demonstrates her own learned authority (as does any teacher) that is less important than her role as facilitator for her students in learning to understand their experiences directly with the divine. For this reason, her brief, dense, and often charged statements show how she expects her students to meditate on their own spirituality and expand her text as it takes on meaning to them. Once this happens, the student begins to expand the statements Beatrice makes, only to find that there are various layers to the seven *manieren*. In each *maniere*, Beatrice defines and describes attributes of love by utilizing familiar metaphors the student would understand. For example, she draws on the learned meaning of color or shape or symbolism in her social, intellectual, and spiritual context. In another, she uses the likeness of a wife with her household in

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109 These ideas are indebted to Mary Carruthers and her useful explanation of learning by building images (*memoria*) in the mind to help in retaining what has been understood. *The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 62-3.

110 For a fuller explanation of the various metaphors, see Pederson, 194.

111 This is to say that there is no separation of what the color or shape or symbol has come to mean from the experience of it at the moment. *Understanding Phenomenology*, 5.
order, explaining it this way to illustrate the confidence that exists in the soul when this maniere is active. This was one way to teach the concept of caritas ordinate, or well-ordered love that was important in the Cistercian life and other monastic orders, such as the Dominicans. Indeed, Beatrice touches on the encompassing of the love of God, in the self, neighbor, and nature in the various manieren.

The minne of Beatrice’s treatise is not only the divine minne coming to the soul from God. It is also the reworked minne within the soul, that is now joined with the soul and working toward a return to God (and herself). Each of the seven manieren, then, becomes a pathway through which the soul can journey toward love. Minne takes different pathways in both vertical and horizontal directions, in both linear and lateral fashions in order that the soul can most fully explore the various facets of it. These reveal to the student at once universal minne and individual characteristics of minne. Beatrice has not funneled the significance of any task into only one maniere designed to help her readers accomplish specific tasks needed to acquire title that would demonstrate they had advanced in hierarchical stages. She expects her students to unpack her guiding statements and follow the manieren or minne in any order and on whatever level they embark. Understanding comes to the student as they journey around, left, right, up, down, through, and under, finally arriving at that place that is beyond any logic or language. Here the soul is with minne and God, when the lesson ends and she arrives “home.” Fully accepted as part of the Cistercian program of education, her pedagogy influenced students and teachers from other programs alike.

112 Seven Manieren VI, R-VM, 20.

113 For more information on right-ordered love in the Cistercian tradition, see Roger De Ganck, Towards Unification, 455-6.

114 See Chapter Four, fn. 42.
Albert is part of a different style of teaching. As seen in the first part of this chapter, his method involved a thorough analysis of *caritas*, surrounding terms, and their relevant meanings as they relate to each other. Squarely within the familiar scholastic tradition, he was at the same time the first to attempt to systematically synthesize the new translated works from Aristotelian texts with those traditional biblical texts studied in monastic education. Excited by the challenge these new texts presented, he set about learning and understanding new aspects of *caritas* and the Trinity that challenged indoctrinated Christian teachings. It was important to him to show his students how abstract meaning of each term was most carefully defined, and it was also important that he fit these definitions and explanations into the discourse established by the authorities he references. His discourse did not include experiential phenomena, because Aristotelian logic in the syllogism related terms to each other in a way that was meant to arrive at a concrete truth for all readers. Individual experience when learning from these texts was secondary. Although Albert realized truth, in this way, could not actually be so concrete, his lessons for his Dominican students still attempted to present something of certitude in their changing world. His paraphrases were an attempt to present Aristotle’s work in a way that preserved the core of the philosopher’s thought while correcting mistakes he saw as incompatible with Christian doctrine.\(^{115}\) His goal was to provide his readers a theory that was correct, above all other theories, in regard to the relationship between God and the human soul through the medium *caritas* provided.

Faced with the variety of terms for *caritas*, he explained their differences in the most intellectually specific manner he could while maintaining the strength of his own demonstrative argument.\(^{116}\) As was Beatrice, Albert was a role-model for students

\(^{115}\) See Chapter Two, fn. 82.

\(^{116}\) See above, fn. 45.
learning according to this particular program; unlike Beatrice, Albert needed to present as thorough an explanation as possible, not only for his students to view as authoritative, but one that would also stand up to disagreement. As discussed in Chapter Two, new developments in the religious environment affected both the scholastic method and the Dominican program of education. Albert was intent on incorporating the new logical syllogistic type of argument into the existing program because he and his students needed to advance to higher levels of public distinction in order to reach as many souls as possible, and to bring those souls to a life of correct Christian belief. But to reach these higher positions, Dominicans found themselves competing with each other as well as with scholars from across Western Europe. They needed to train well in a competitive world, where collaboration was useful within the order as it provided each preacher with tools to defend against the opposition (heretics, unbelievers, and possibly secular clerics competing for a title or recognition). As much as Albert might himself welcome collaboration, however, he and other Dominicans worked in a world that was fiercely competitive and required success (being right) be measured by another’s defeat (proving them wrong). His writings for his students demonstrate this; revered Greek philosophers were not exempt from being wrong, no matter how intriguing their thoughts might be.

The letters of Hadewijch of Brabant reveal a method of teaching that blends personal charisma and the use of written texts to replace the physical teacher. She provides models of writing for her students to follow, theological lessons they can meditate on, and authoritative resources for them to reference in their own work. It is clear in her letters that she has often written at the request of her students or of others within her textual community; for example, she offers asked-for advice to the prelate of a nearby men’s religious house.\(^{117}\) In these letters she imparts her thoughts on minne,

caritas, and the soul’s relationship with the divine, urging her readers to look inside themselves for many of the answers they want from her. Her method includes using experiential terminology and explaining sensations and emotions in a relational way – by relating the experiences at hand with other emotions or sensations. Through direct counsel as well as examples from her own experiences, she advises her readers regarding skill-improvement in their chosen vocation, and explains to them what happens when the soul is in contact with God or with minne.

Just as God speaks to her in her visions in a personal and intimate way, so too, in her letters, does she speak directly to her readers with warmth and encouragement as did Bernard of Clairvaux to Hildegard, or Hildegard to Elizabeth. In these letters, her explanation and discussion of caritas occurs amid an overall explanation regarding ways to live according to the wishes of minne. Using her own experiences as examples, she teaches her readers what it means to live what they learn. She tells them how she is “taken up into the spirit” or taken somewhere away from worldly things during a spiritual journey. “God,” she writes, “withdrew my senses from every remembrance of alien (physical) things,” and she travels to a place where earthly sensations do not affect her, at least for a while. She is taken out of herself, likely out of her physical body, and is first drawn inward, then lifted up toward heaven where she sees, hears, and feels what is happening around her. Throughout her letters and visions she also reveals to students what takes place after an encounter; the effects of such an event are important for her followers to understand. Living according to the demands of minne means never feeling


119 “In enen dertiendaghe wasic binnen der messen op ghenomen inden gheeste vte mi selven....” Visioenen, Vision 12, van Mierlo, 125; Hart, 293.
satisfied that the work is done, since no matter how developed the human soul becomes, there will always be another level of perfection to achieve. *Caritas*, she says, “understands all that God bids without error and fulfills them without effort.” *Caritas* is an aid to performing the labor demanded by Love, she tells her tired readers, “For the one who loves does not work because he does not feel the work.” Do the tasks of *minne* along the pathway of *caritas*, and those tasks will not feel like work but will be easier, lighter, and will proceed more swiftly. Letter Fourteen follows suit. Here she exhorts a young, possibly discouraged, follower to take heart in her difficult tasks set to her by *minne*. She suggests that the reader remember the being or essence of *caritas* as ascribed to it by Paul the Apostle. The reader can then draw on those qualities of *caritas* within themselves to gain strength, patience, perseverance.

Fully aware of the various schools and styles of teaching around her and her students, Hadewijch cautions her readers that in this school of *minne* other methods must be set aside. If one only reads books, she says, much of the lesson is missed. *Minne* and reason mutually assist each other, but no one can learn how this happens except through experience. Reasoning alone results in error, she tells her readers; experiencing the love of God (*caritas*) yields knowledge as effectively. Reason (*redene*) and love (*minne*):

Greatly help each other, for reason teaches Love, and love enlightens Reason. As reason falls in the presence of love’s will, and love consents to remain within the bounds of reason, they accomplish great work; and that no one learns but through experience.

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121 I Cor. 13:4-13.

122 “...doch helpen dese twee hen herde sere onderlinghe; want redene leert minne ende minne verlicht redene. Alse redene dan valt in begherten van minnen ende hare minne dwinghen laet
She expresses her understanding of reason as an additional learning tool rather than a weapon that replaces *minne* or the act of learning through direct experience. That she sprinkles her discussions of reason and love through several letters rather than place them in a specific order illustrates the multi-faceted soul, and the way in which each facet of the soul connects with and mirrors the related face of *minne* or God.

While expressing a desire to be within a community of students, she is nevertheless fully aware of her role as teacher, even to her peers. Her letters make it clear that she sees herself as being in charge, and the sorrow in them is as much because she sees her students making mistakes as it is her absence from their company. They are learning together without her supervision, and this bothers her immensely. Although some of them demonstrate their need for her guidance (evidenced by the fact that she is responding to their questions), in her responses to them she often mentions those students no longer taking her advice. She sees this neglect as dangerous to their spiritual progress, she warns her students to avoid those “aliens” who attempt to undo the teachings she herself has imparted to them. The identity of these aliens, threatening her integrity as a teacher, is unclear, but her letters indicate she does feel threatened or even usurped.

As a member of the Dominican order, Meister Eckhart is fully immersed in the titled scholastic milieu; within this context, however, he is also interested in the multilayered aspect of a journey to God. His theories, for some scholars, integrate both the experiential and philosophical approaches to an understanding of *caritas* and other subjects.\(^{123}\) Blending scholastic terms with an explanation of their practical application, he provides valuable tools for his audience to take with them and use in their daily lives.

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For example, he teaches about the divine image in both Latin and German sermons. Both of these sermons explain characteristics and aspects of the divine image and then suggest ways to apply one’s new understanding. While each sermon emphasizes different aspects of the image, each also presents uses for members of the audience to use the new knowledge they have acquired. His use of both liebe and minne to explain caritas in his German Sermons indicates his understanding that Latin is not the only language of theological investigation, and that his audience is able to learn about caritas even if they are outside the scholastic membership. At the same time, it is his audience. He is the master, the preacher, the teacher. In these texts, he speaks directly to his audience, and it is his voice that disseminates truths. Like Albert and Hadewijch, Eckhart speaks as the authoritative figure that is aware of the learning audience either listening to or reading the text. By the early fourteenth century the scholastic program placed even more emphasis on a titled rank, and the Dominican Eckhart needed to retain that title both in the scholastic and Dominican communities. Like Albert, he might feel privately that everyone (including women) were able to understand the divine mind, but the program he adhered to had established the rules of engagement. He now had to play the roles he had taken up.

There are three factors that bring these different methods and teaching texts together and make possible a comparative analysis. First, all of these authors teach theological subjects, one of which is caritas. Each author theorized about the subject of caritas and made their own determination as to its substance, qualities, characteristics, relationship to the Trinity, and the manner in which it interacted with human souls. Second, the texts here were written down for the edification of students or followers.

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Whatever the gender of the teacher, each expressed his or her thoughts in a deliberate manner using specific terminology and discourse. There were two reasons for this. The first reason was so that the writer could best articulate the message they were trying to convey; the second reason was that there was a particular style and discourse that the writer felt was the best medium for their particular students. They all assumed their readers had attained a certain level of training or would attain greater skills while progressing through the material. The third factor in this analysis is the use each author made of biblical and patristic authorities. All the authors in this study were well-versed in biblical texts and were also familiar with the works of Augustine, Gregory the Great, Boethius, Bernard of Clairvaux, William of St. Thierry, and Richard of St. Victor. Both male and female authors clearly had access to these texts and referred to them in ways useful to their own pedagogical methods.  

While each author here made use of alternative terminology or discourse should in no way deter us from examining their works and their ideas regarding caritas. As their teaching methods have become clear upon examination, so to their theories on caritas will surface through the differences in genre and discourse. The outdated notion that one type of writing is superior to another because it contains recognizable terminology, structure, or organization loses strength when we analyze the thoughts within the writing rather than focus on the superficial aspects of the text.  

Recent scholarship has acknowledged there is increasing evidence to attest for the fact that women’s access to biblical texts was not nearly as limited as traditional histories of women’s education have claimed. The question of legitimacy as tied with self-expression or theorizing is still being sorted out. See Amy Hollywood, *The Soul as Virgin Wife: Mechthild of Magdeburg, Marguerite Porete, and Meister Eckhart* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 20. There are certain instances when Albert credits Hugh of St. Victor for a thought when it in fact is from Richard’s work. These will be noted when applicable. See Albertus Magnus, *Sent.*, I, Dist. 14-18, and the Introduction to the critical edition of Richard of St. Victor’s *De Trinitate*, 8, n.4.

Herbert Grundmann, *Religious Movements in the Middle Ages*, trans. Steven Rowan (Notre
of organization requires the seeker to exclude all texts that appear to be different.\textsuperscript{127} However, once we set aside expectations regarding discourse or organization, and study the thirteenth-century ideas in the context of the thirteenth century, we find a variety of intellectual works produced by both women and men. Beatrice and Hadewijch, examples of the monastic method of “teaching by example” and of a literary pedagogy, were developing their experiential theories at relatively the same time as Albert the Great was sorting out the best way to make use of Aristotle’s ancient ideas in his own treatises and commentaries. The Dominicans themselves were uncertain about accepting information contained in Aristotelian texts; there is no reason to believe that all, or many, monasteries, convents, or other religious communities promoted or even attempted to incorporate the new knowledge, logical texts, or pedagogy of the disputation into existing lessons. Most important to each writer was to share what they had learned, and the texts in this study provide examples of how each author did this in regard to caritas.

\textsuperscript{127} Leclercq confronts scholarly opinions that the Cistercian commentators rambled in an unsystematic way and argues that, in fact, to the commentator and his Cistercian audience, digressing while commenting was a convention that enabled the reader to follow the true meaning of a word or passage before moving on to the next. Leclercq, Love of Learning, 74. This lack of systematic treatment has been leveled against Hadewijch as well. See the unsuccessful attempt to find a systematic scholastic pedagogy and discourse in her abstract thought by R. Vanneste in “Over de Betekenis van Enkele Abstracta in de Taal van Hadewijch,” Studia Germanica I (Gent, 1959), 9-95. Vanneste does, however, discover indications that Hadewijch was familiar with several concepts also discussed in scholastic texts.
CHAPTER FOUR

CARITAS AND THE HOLY SPIRIT

In the thirteenth-century Latin West, theologians considered *caritas* a love that flowed from God above the heavens to earth and connected intimately with, or diffused into, the human soul. Across immeasurable distances *caritas* could bind human souls to a divine being on an intimate level, and also tie one soul to another on earth. This special quality of *caritas* made it important for Christians to understand, yet the numerous subtleties of that quality also created confusion and consequent debates among theologians and teachers. One of the core difficulties was that *caritas* was at once God and yet not a person of the Trinity. So how did medieval theologians integrate *caritas* into the heavenly scheme?

This chapter builds on the arguments of Chapter Three, which begins with an explanation of the overlapping, sometimes synonymous relationships among *caritas* and other words (*amor*, *dilectio*, *minne*, *liefde*, *liebe*, and others). *Minne*, in particular, stands in the place of *caritas* for Beatrice of Nazareth and at times for Hadewijch of Brabant and Meister Eckhart. Each different approach to *caritas* taken up by these four authors illustrates how they might agree on similar aspects of the term using vastly different pedagogical methods, textual genres and discourse. Here we explore each author’s opinion on the various characteristics and qualities of *caritas* determined by the relationship between it and the Holy Spirit. Certain issues arise when *caritas* and its synonyms are equated substantially with the Holy Spirit that are absent if this specific love is something other than *spiritus sanctus* in every way. On the other hand, some qualities of *caritas*, such as its ability to bestow rewards, depend on this sameness or essential oneness with the Holy Spirit, decreasing in effectiveness if the two are kept
distinct in some way. The method by which each author determines the relationship between divine love and spirit is significant in addressing these and subsequent topics, such as the role caritas plays in the soul’s ability to know God.

**The Relationship between Caritas and the Holy Spirit**

The relationship between caritas, God, and the Holy Spirit is significant to certain activities of caritas in relation to souls, such as its ability to bring the soul divine benefits, or “gifts,” and its role in initiating the soul’s development or progress upward toward a higher spiritual life. *Caritas deus est* is John’s definitive statement – caritas is God (I John 4:13). For every Christian theologian this passage must be addressed, as it is one of the most definitive statements in the New Testament. Yet its very exactness has resulted in continual controversy generating volumes of debates. If God is caritas, what do Christians do with the Holy Spirit, entrenched in doctrine as the third Person of the Trinity, and through whom “caritas is diffused in our hearts?” The lack of a corresponding statement “The Holy Spirit is God” had troubled early Christians and continued to worry thirteenth-century theologians. Albert the Great spends a great deal of time explaining why caritas is (yet is not) the Holy Spirit, and, as we shall see, Meister Eckhart claims both that it is and is not (with clever qualifications). Hadewijch of Brabant is less concerned about calling minne and the Holy Spirit one and the same, while at the same time distinguishing more clearly the distinctions between caritas and spiritus sanctus. Beatrice of Nazareth refrains from engagement in the argument altogether, yet her descriptions regarding the activities of minne and the Holy Spirit reveal her view they are at least very closely related.
Two major issues arise when we ask the question whether *caritas* is the Holy Spirit. The first emerges if *caritas* and the Holy Spirit are identified by the same name (their proper names: *caritas; spiritus sanctus*) as if all names pointed to the same object. While much of the effort that went into arguing the Holy Spirit was God depended upon the Holy Spirit’s identity with *caritas*, this assertion required *caritas* to also be identified with each proper name of all three Persons of the Trinity. Doing so, however, threatened to displace *logos* or *verbum* as one of the proper names for the Person of the Son. So Christian thinkers needed to find ways both to identify *caritas* with the Holy Spirit and with God (as a person of the Trinity), and yet avoid equating the proper name of *caritas* with that of each Person of the Trinity. Attached to this puzzle is a related issue in regard to the Holy Spirit as the First Gift from God. If the Holy Spirit is *caritas* and the Holy Spirit is the First Gift, then *caritas* is the first gift that arrives in the soul before any other divine benefit. But, as we shall see, Albert and Eckhart argue that knowing God results in loving God, so that intellectual endowments arrive before those of love. Their opinions on the identity of *caritas* and the Holy Spirit reflect this priority. The second issue, involving synonyms for (and alternate definitions of) *caritas*, emerges once this divine love is determined to be the same as any other entity, whether the Holy Spirit, the Trinity, or God. Other terms for love used synonymously with *caritas* must then be the same as the entity under discussion. This creates a problem that loops back into the first issue above, wherein these synonyms are then identified with the Father and the Son. How our authors deal with this circular problem gives us a glimpse into their efforts to resolve the continuing confusion over terminology regarding *caritas*.

Augustine had tackled both of these thorny issues directly. A large portion of his *De Trinitate* is devoted to various comparisons of divine entities. For Augustine, *deus caritas est* is indeed John’s famous scriptural passage wherein the spirit of God introduces the mutual love (*caritas*) of the Father and the Son for each other to the human
soul. This makes it possible for (or requires) human beings also to love (diligere) with this type of love. Yet, he admits, in the matter of the Third Person of the Trinity, the divine word is obscure in order to test our mind (and our faith). “The scriptures have not said, ‘The Holy Spirit is Love (caritas),’” he laments, acknowledging shortly thereafter that the omission is most unfortunate for theological inquiries. \(^1\) Since scripture does not supply a connection between God and the Holy Spirit, Augustine himself endeavors to do so. Through a lengthy examination of biblical passages, parallel usages of terms, and equivalent qualities that ancient writers had attributed to each of the Persons of the Trinity, he links the three divine individuals together as one. Although three, the Persons of the Trinity are not three Gods but one; not three essences (essentia) but one. His argument for their essential oneness also requires him to explain that the term ‘essence’ (Greek ousia) is, in Latin, more often called ‘substance’ (substantia) than ‘essence’ (essentia). \(^2\) The term Augustine then uses is ‘substance’ whether he means ‘essence’ or ‘substance’, and he explains that he would not call the Three Persons “one essence and three substances” but “one essence or substance and three persons because there is no more suitable way to say it.” \(^3\) Reasoning from the above, he concludes that if caritas is

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\(^1\) “Vt autem nos exerceret sermo diuinus non res in promptu sitas sed in abdito scrutandas et ex abdito eruendas maiore studio fecit inquiri. Non itaque dixit scriptura: 'Spiritus sanctus caritas est,' quod si dixisset non paruam partem quaestionis istius abstulisset, sed dixit: Deus caritas est, ut incertum sit et ideo requirendum utrum deus pater sit caritas, an deus filius, an deus spiritus sanctus, an deus ipsa trinitas.” Augustine, De Trinitate Bk. 15, c. 17:27, CCLa, 501-2.

\(^2\) “Quemadmodum enim deus est pater et filius deus est et spiritus sanctus deus est, quod secundum substantiam dici nemo dubitat, non tamen tres deos sed unum deum dicimus eam ipsam praestantissimam trinitatem... Quoniam quippe non aliud est deo esse et aliud magnum esse, sed hoc idem illi est esse quod magnum esse, propterea sicut non dicimus tres essentias, sic non dicimus tres magnitudines, sed unam essentiam et unam magnitudinem. Essentiam dico quae ‘ousia’ graece dicitur, quam usitatius substantiam uocamus.” Augustine, De Trinitate, Bk. 5, c. 8:9, CCL, 215.

\(^3\) “Sed quia nostra loquendi consuetudo iam obtinuit ut hoc intellegatur cum dicimus essentiam quod intellegitur cum dicimus substantiam, non audemus dicere unam essentiam, tres substantias,
God and if the Holy Spirit can be shown to be deus, then caritas and spiritus sanctus are one-and-the-same essence (substantia). One of his arguments draws on the idea that both the Holy Spirit and caritas are the same love (caritas sive dilectio) of the Father and the Son. Another is that both are benefits from God. Here he pulls together various biblical passages as evidence that the Holy Spirit is a Gift from God, concluding that the Holy Spirit is caritas itself, because caritas is a donum since it is given through the Holy Spirit. This member of the Trinity is God and is also a gift from God, proceeding from

sed unam essentiam uel substantiam.” Augustine, De Trinitate, Bk. 5, c. 9:10, CCL, 217. Albert the Great will make a greater distinction between the two terms in the Thirteenth Century.

4 “Dilectio igitur quae ex deo est et deus est proprie spiritus sanctus est per quem diffunditur in cordibus nostris dei caritas per quam nos tota inhabitet trinitas. Quocirca rectissime spiritus sanctus, cum sit deus, uocatur etiam donum dei.” Augustine, De Trinitate, Bk. 15, c. 17:31, and “Ipsa vero dilectio sive caritas (nam unius rei est nomen utrum que)” Bk 15, c. 18:32.

5 Some of Augustine’s passages in De Trinitate refer to the Holy Spirit as the gift of God as he treats other topics. For example, in Bk. 5, c. 11:12, CCL, 219, he discusses the relationships of words or names that mutually reference each other, such as the Trinity, God, and the proper names of the three persons of the Trinity. He adds the phrase ‘gift of God’ to his explanation of the Holy Spirit. “Itaque pater et filius et spiritus sanctus quoniam unus deus et utique deus sanctus est et deus spiritus est potest appellari trinitas et spiritus et sanctus. Sed tamen ille spiritus sanctus qui non trinitas sed in trinitate intellegitur in eo quod proprorie dicitur spiritus sanctus, relatiue dicitur cum et ad patrem et ad filium refertur quia spiritus sanctus et patris et filii spiritus est. Sed ipsa relatio non apparet in hoc nomine; apparet autem cum dicitur donum dei. Donum enim est patris et filii quia et a patre procedit, sicut dominus dicit, et quod apostolus ait: Qui spiritum Christi non habet hic non est eius, de ipso utique spiritu sancto ait. ’Donum’ ergo 'donatoris' et 'donator doni' cum dicimus relatiue utrumque ad inuicem dicimus. Ergo spiritus sanctus ineffabilis quaedam patris filiique communio, et ideo forte sic appellatur quia patri et filio potest eadem appellatio conuenire. Nam hoc ipse proprie dicitur quod quod illi communiter quia et pater spiritus et filius spiritus, et pater sanctus et filius sanctus. Vt ergo ex nomine quod utrique conuenit utriusque communio significetur, uocatur donum amborum spiritus sanctus.” In Bk 7, c. 4:7, CCL, 255, he explains the differences between the Greek and Latin views of essence and substance of the Trinity. “Itaque loquendi causa de ineffabilibus ut fari aliquo modo possemus quod effari nullo modo possumus dicit est a nostris graecis una essentia, tres substantiae, a latinis autem una essentia uel substantia, tres personae quia sicut iam diximus non aliter in sermone nostro, id est latino, essentia quam substantia solet intellegi. Et dum intellegatur saltum in aenigmatc quod dicitur placuit ita dici ut dicetur aliquid cum quaeretur quid tria sint, quae tria esse fides uera pronuntiat cum et patrem non dicit esse filium, et spiritum sanctum quod est donum dei nec patrem dicit esse nec filium.” In Bk 8, c.1, CCL, 268, he again stresses that the Holy Spirit is the gift of God as he begins to explain how there can be three persons yet one
the Father and Son at once as an emission and donation (donum, datum, donatio, datio). So not only is the Third Person given, along with its gifts, but deus is also freely given of himself. Because caritas is diffused through the Holy Spirit, it is given as one of these offerings; since deus caritas est (and now that spiritus sanctus deus est), it follows that spiritus sanctus caritas est. Moreover, the Holy Spirit “consists in the same equality and unity of substance (which he has claimed the Greeks mean as ‘essence’) as the Son with the Father,” according to Paul, and also is (itself) that unity, which is the unity of the holiness, or the love (caritas).

number. “Diximus alibi ea dici proprie in illa trinitate distincte ad singulas personas pertinentia quae relatiue dicuntur ad inuicem sicut pater et filius et utriusque donum spiritus sanctus; non enim pater trinitas aut filius trinitas aut trinitas donum. Quod uero ad se dicuntur singuli non dici pluraliter tres sed unum ipsam trinitatem sicut deus pater, deus filius, deus spiritus sanctus…. “In Bk. 7, c. 6 :4, CCL, 254, he refers to spiritus sanctus as caritas. “Spiritus quoque sanctus siue sit summa caritas utrumque coniungens nosque subiungens, quod ideo non indigne dicitur quia scriptum est: Deus caritas est, quomodo non est etiam ipse sapientia cum sit lumen, quoniam deus lumen est?” In Bk. 8, as he describes what true love (dilectio vero) is and why we should love God and each other, he references the biblical passage, “…quia caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis,” Rom.5:5. In Bk. 13, c. 10 :14, CCLa, 400, he refers to God’s gifts: “Quia et ea quae dicuntur merita nostra dona est deum. Vt enim fides per dilectionem operetur, caritas dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis.” In Bk. 15, c. 19:37, CCLa, 513, he summarizes his thoughts, “ipse spiritus eius est deus caritas. Deinde si in donis dei nihil maius est caritate et nullum est maius donum dei quam spiritus sanctus, quid consequentius quam ut ipse sit caritas quae dicitur et deus et ex deo?”

6 De Trinitate, Bk. 15, c. 17:27-28. Also, “Deus igitur spiritus sanctus qui procedit ex deo cum datus fuerit homini accendi eum in dilectionem dei et proximi, et ipse dilectio est,” c. 17:31, CCLa, 506. The arguments are listed in Albert’s Sentences, taken verbatim from Lombard, who refers himself to Augustine and other patristic authors.

7 “Quamobrem siue ita dicatur deus de deo ut et singulis hoc nomen conueniat, non tamen ut ambo simul duo dixi, sed unus deus sit (ita enim sibi cohaerent quod etiam in distantibus duversisque substantiis fieri apostolus testis est, nam et solus dominus spiritus est et solus hominis spiritus utique spiritus est, tamen si haeret domino unus spiritus est; quanto magis iber ibi est omnino inseparabilis atque aeterna connexione ne absurde dici uiueat quasi filius amborum cum dicitur filius dei si id quod dicitur deus non nisi de ambobus simul dicitur), siue quidquid de deo dicitur quod substantiam eius indicet non nisi de ambobus simul, immo de ipsa simul trinitate dicitur; siue ergo hoc siue illud sit quod diligentiis discutiendum est, nunc unde agitur satis est uidere nullo modo filium aequalis esse patri si in aliquo scilicet quod pertinet ad significandum eius substantiam inaequalis inuenit sicut iam ostendimus. Apostolus autem dixit aequalis. In
Therefore the Holy Spirit is something common both to the Father and Son. But that communion (which is the essence), consubstantial (\textit{consubstantialis}) and co-eternal, is more aptly called \textit{caritas}, which is also essence \textit{(substantia)}, since God is essence \textit{(substantia)}, and ‘God is \textit{caritas},’ as it is written. But as He (Holy Spirit) is essence \textit{(substantia)}, together with the Father and the Son, that (essence), together with them, is great, and…good, and…holy… if \textit{caritas} is less great (in God) than wisdom, then wisdom is loved \textit{(diligere)} less than (it should be) according to what it is; \textit{caritas} is therefore equal, in order that wisdom may be loved \textit{(diligere)} according to its being; but wisdom is equal with the Father, as we have proved above; therefore also the Holy Spirit is equal; and if equal, equal in all things, on account of the ultimate simplicity which is in that essence \textit{(substantia)}. And therefore they are not more than three: One who loves Him who is from Himself, and One who loves Him from whom He is, and Love itself \textit{(dilectio)}. And if this last is nothing, how is God ‘Love (\textit{dilectio})’? If it is not essence \textit{(substantia)}, how is God ‘essence \textit{(substantia)}’?\footnote{‘Siue enim sit unitas amborum siue sanctitas siue caritas, siue ideo unitas quia caritas et ideo caritas, quia sanctitas, manifestum est quod non aliquis duorum est quo uterque conjungitur, quo genitus a gignente diligatur generatoremque suum diligat, sintque non participacione sed essentia sua neque dono superioris aliquius sed suo proprio seruantes unitatem spiritus in uinculo pacis…. ‘Spiritus ergo sanctus commune aliquid est patris et filii, quidquid illud est, aut ipsa communio consubstantialis et coaeterna; quae si amicitia conuenienter dici potest, dicatur, sed aptius dicitur caritas; et haec quoque substantia quia deus substantia et deus caritas’ sicut scriptum ‘est’. Sicut autem simul substantia cum patre et filio, ita simul magna et simul bona et simul sancta et quidquid aliud ad se dicitur quoniam non aliud est deo esse et aliuid magnum esse uel bonum et cetera sicut supra ostendimus. Si enim minus magna est ibi caritas quam sapientia, minus quam est diligitut sapientia; aequalis est igitur \textit{caritas} ut quanta est sapientia tantum diligatur. Est autem sapientia aequalis patri sicut supra disputanuimus; aequalis est igitur etiam spiritus sanctus, et si aequalis in omnibus aequalis propter summam simplicitatem quae in illa substantia est. ‘Et ideo non amplius quam tria sunt: unus diligens eum qui de illo est, et unus diligens eum de quo est, et ipsa dilectio. Quae si nihil est, quomodo deus dilectio est? Si non est substantia, quomodo deus substantia est?’” Augustine, \textit{De Trinitate}, Bk. 6, c. 5:7, \textit{CCL}, 236. Sub-quoted passages are later included verbatim in Lombard’s \textit{Sentences}, D. 10, c. 2:5, 113.}

\textit{omnibus ergo aequalis est patri filius et est unius eiusdemque substantiae. Quapropter etiam spiritus sanctus in eadem unitate substantiae et aequalitate consistit.” Augustine, \textit{De Trinitate}, Bk. 6, cs. 4:6 & 5:7, \textit{CCL}, 234-5.}

\footnote{“Siue enim sit unitas amborum siue sanctitas siue caritas, siue ideo unitas quia caritas et ideo caritas, quia sanctitas, manifestum est quod non aliquis duorum est quo uterque conjungitur, quo genitus a gignente diligatur generatoremque suum diligat, sintque non participacione sed essentia sua neque dono superioris aliquius sed suo proprio seruantes unitatem spiritus in uinculo pacis…. ‘Spiritus ergo sanctus commune aliquid est patris et filii, quidquid illud est, aut ipsa communio consubstantialis et coaeterna; quae si amicitia conuenienter dici potest, dicatur, sed aptius dicitur caritas; et haec quoque substantia quia deus substantia et deus caritas’ sicut scriptum ‘est’. Sicut autem simul substantia cum patre et filio, ita simul magna et simul bona et simul sancta et quidquid aliud ad se dicitur quoniam non aliud est deo esse et aliuid magnum esse uel bonum et cetera sicut supra ostendimus. Si enim minus magna est ibi caritas quam sapientia, minus quam est diligitut sapientia; aequalis est igitur \textit{caritas} ut quanta est sapientia tantum diligatur. Est autem sapientia aequalis patri sicut supra disputanuimus; aequalis est igitur etiam spiritus sanctus, et si aequalis in omnibus aequalis propter summam simplicitatem quae in illa substantia est. ‘Et ideo non amplius quam tria sunt: unus diligens eum qui de illo est, et unus diligens eum de quo est, et ipsa dilectio. Quae si nihil est, quomodo deus dilectio est? Si non est substantia, quomodo deus substantia est?’” Augustine, \textit{De Trinitate}, Bk. 6, c. 5:7, \textit{CCL}, 236. Sub-quoted passages are later included verbatim in Lombard’s \textit{Sentences}, D. 10, c. 2:5, 113.}
Here he draws threads together a bit differently and holds up that which is shared in common with the Holy Spirit and with God (which he calls caritas) to argue for the oneness of the Holy Spirit with God. Neither this divine love nor spirit can be anything other than essentially one in all things; to say otherwise would result in either spiritus sanctus or caritas becoming less than the highest, which would then result in God becoming less than what he is. However, this creates the pater-verbum-spiritus predicament because it also identifies caritas, in name, with all individual names of the Persons in the Trinity, and this cannot be so.

In attempting to resolve the situation, Augustine adds that God is called caritas not because this love is a substance (and here I believe he means ‘substance’) worthy of the name of God, but because this love that is essentially all persons of the Trinity comes to the human soul as a reward (donum) from God. His method is to shift away from identifying caritas substantially with each Person, which entails that the divine names would be entirely synonymous, to identifying caritas with the essence, or unity of substance, which all three are. This allows something more of a distinction between caritas and the members of the Trinity while maintaining closeness between caritas and the Holy Spirit. This might also help to explain why in the above quote, after such a forceful argument about the equality of caritas, the Holy Spirit, and God, he suddenly brings in dilectio as another form of love toward God. In any case, he asserts, the Holy


10 Augustine does this again in De Trinitate, Bk. 8, c. 8:12, CCL, 287, where he is required to use diligere or amare for the verb, but continues to use dilectio after he’s begun explaining how one sees caritas. “Dilectionem autem fraternam quantum communem commendet Johannes apostolus attendamus…. Manifestum est quod iustitiae perfectionem in fratris dilectione posuerit…. Et tamen uidet dilectionem deo tacuisse. Quod numquam faceret nisi quia in ipsa fraterna dilectione uult intellegi deum.” This synonymous treatment is repeated in Gioia, 298-300, where he discusses Augustine’s conviction regarding the primacy of love (caritas). Gioia notes that the
Spirit may be called *caritas* in a proper or personal sense without simultaneously claiming that the Father and Son are also properly called *caritas* (rather than *pater* or *verbum*). In short, it is the essence oneness of *caritas*, God, and the Three Persons of the Trinity that can be called the Holy Spirit, Father and Son although the label, ‘*caritas*’, does not signify the proper name ‘Father’ or ‘Son’ in the way it signifies ‘*Caritas*’ or ‘Holy Spirit’.\(^{11}\)

Centuries later, Peter Lombard enters these conclusions into his own work while acknowledging the effort required of the earlier bishop. He echoes Augustine’s lament that John says *caritas deus est* but “does not say that *caritas spiritus sanctus est*.”\(^{12}\) He agrees that had John done so he would have made the entire discussion a much shorter and easier one. Noting also with Augustine that biblical sources did not say that *caritas* is the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the way that Wisdom is the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; he expresses his concern that this omission leaves open the question as to whether

\[\text{inner life of the Trinity is love (}\textit{dilectio})\text{ and also that the unity of the substance of the Trinity is love (does not specify }\textit{caritas, amor, or dilectio}).\] This is not to criticize Gioia’s fine work, only to point out that inconsistencies regarding these terms continue into present-day scholarship.

\(^{11}\) “Quapropter sicut sancta scriptura proclamat: Deus caritas est, illaque ex deo est et in nobis id agit ut in deo maneamus et ipse in nobis, et hoc inde cognoscimus quia de spiritu suo dedit nobis, ipse spiritus eius est deus caritas. Deinde si in donis dei nihil maius est caritate et nullum est maius donum dei quam spiritus sanctus, quid consequentius quam ut ipse sit caritas quae dicitur et deus et ex deo? Et si caritas qua pater diligit filium et patrem diligit filius ineffabiliter communionem demonstrat amborum, quid convenientius quam ut ille proprie dicatur caritas qui spiritus est communis ambothus? Hoc enim sanius creditur uel interlegitur ut non solus spiritus sanctus caritas sit in illa trinitate, sed non frustra proprie caritas nuncupetur propter illa quae dicta sunt. Sicut non solus est in illa trinitate uel spiritus uel sanctus quia et pater spiritus et filius spiritus, et pater sanctus et filius sanctus, quod non ambigit pietas; et tamen ipse non frustra proprie dicitur spiritus sanctus. Quia enim est communis ambothus, id uocatur ipse proprie quod ambo communiter. Alioquin si in illa trinitate solus spiritus sanctus est caritas, prefecto et filius non solius patris uerum etiam spiritus sancti filius inuenitur.” Augustine, \textit{De Trinitate}, Bk. 15, c. 19:37, \textit{CCLa}, 513-4.

the Three Persons are not three but one *caritas* as they are not three but one Wisdom.\(^{13}\)

Because of this omission, Lombard must acknowledge that the Holy Spirit cannot be called *caritas* in a proper sense (as the proper name, *Caritas*) because then the equality of the Three Persons would mean that the Father and Son could also properly be called *caritas*. This would create contention between *caritas* as the proper name for the Holy Spirit and *verbum* as the proper name for the Son. Nevertheless, once the naming is properly sorted out, Lombard insists no one would refrain from calling the Holy Spirit *caritas*,\(^{14}\) and he presents several reasons why this naming is possible. Distinction Ten in Book I of his *Sentences* is entirely taken up with the naming of the Holy Spirit and its relationship to *caritas* (and *amor* and *dilectio*) in a way that would avoid creating further problems with the individual persons. Happily for Lombard, Augustine had done what John did not do (equate the Holy Spirit, God, and *caritas*, and allow synonyms of *caritas* to be used in this equality), and so Lombard makes use of two of Augustine’s arguments to support his own.\(^{15}\) He first argues that since the Holy Spirit is not of either the Father or the Son alone, but of both (as a procession), and because *spiritus sanctus* proceeds as the same essential love by which *pater* and *filius* love (*diligere*) each other, the Holy


\(^{14}\) “‘Non ideo tamen quisquam nos inconvenienter aestimet caritatem appellare Spiritum sanctum, quia et Deus Pater et Deus Filius potest *caritas* nuncupari,’ sicut ‘proprie Verbum Dei etiam sapientia Dei dicitur, cum et Pater et Spiritus sanctus sit sapientia.’” Lombard, *Sent*. I, D. 10, c.1:4, ed. Rome, 111. In Augustine, the first part of the sentence is ‘Hoc ideo dixi ne quisquam propter nos,’ *De Trinitate*, Bk. 15, c. 16:30, *CCLa*, 505.

\(^{15}\) See above fn. 11. O. Davies claims that Lombard equated grace and the Holy Spirit in D. 17 and that this influenced the Dominican school and Meister Eckhart. (Lombard does equate *caritas* with the Holy Spirit in this distinction, but does not equate *caritas* or the Holy Spirit with grace) Davies also references Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1.2, q. 110, art.3. Davies, *Meister Eckhart*, 141.
Spirit gently intersperses (insinuare) the essence of caritas into the soul. Moreover, he argues, ‘essence’ is one of two labels that can be applied to caritas — as the properly-named oneness of all three persons, or as an individual Person’s proper name, such as is applied to the Holy Spirit. For this argument he follows the biblical example that Wisdom is all three Persons in One (Cor. 1:24) The names given to the Three Persons, he claims, can also pertain to them universally (universitaliter) or individually as each Person’s own (proprie) name. The Holy Spirit is caritas properly, while the Father and the Son are caritas universally. In addition, and as significantly for the present study, Lombard maintains that the words caritas, amor, and dílectio are synonymous. To him, if the Holy Spirit is caritas it is also amor and dílectio, as John himself had stated.

Lombard’s solution allowed him to claim the Holy Spirit was equal to the Father and Son without jeopardizing the individual person of each member of the Trinity. It also preserved the oneness of caritas and God established in John’s words “caritas deus est” as well as the special connection between caritas and the Holy Spirit. He goes on to

16 “Spiritus Sanctus nec Patris est solius, nec Filii est solius, sed amborum; et ideo commumen, qua invicem se diligunt Pater et Filius, nobis insinuate caritatem.” Lombard, Sent. I, D. 10, quoting Augustine, De Trinitate, Bk. 15, c. 17:27.


18 “Sicut ergo unicum Dei Verbum vocamus nomine sapientiae, cum sit univeraliter et Spiritus sanctus et Pater ipsa sapientia; ita Spiritus Sanctus proprie nuncupatur vocabulo caritatis, cum sit et Pater et Filius universaliter caritas.” Lombard, Sent. I, D. 10, c. 2:1, 111, and c. 3, p. 114, where he again quotes Augustine, as seen above, fn. 11.

19 “Spiritus Sanctus amor est sive caritas sive dílectio Patris et Filii.” Lombard, Sent. I, D. 10, c. 1. For more on the relationship between these three words, see also Chapter Three.  

emphasize that the Holy Spirit is the love (amor) that the Father and the Son have for each other. It is also the love (amor sive caritas) by which we as human beings love (diligere) God and each other. Following the Venerable Bede, he adds that the procession of the Holy Spirit is the giving of the grace of both the Father and the Son to human beings, so the giving, the spirit given, and the procession are all the same. Since caritas is God and the Holy Spirit, caritas is one with the giving and proceeding. The Holy Spirit as and with caritas, arrives first in the human soul before any other divine benefits or favors.

Richard of St. Victor is more concerned with the equality of the Holy Spirit and God than with the equality of the Holy Spirit and caritas. He follows Augustine in arguing that the Holy Spirit is God, (Spirit es Deus) by explaining thoroughly that the procession from the Father and the Son together is amor and that this amor is the Holy Spirit. While each person of the Trinity might be called by a personal, or different name, (e.g. amor for the Holy Spirit, verbum for the Son), all three divine persons are of a common, highest, and most simple substance. As a coequal person of the Trinity, the

21 “Dictum quidem est supra et sacris auctoritatibus ostensum quod Spiritus Sanctus amor est Patris et Filii, quo se invicem amant et nos. His autem addendum est quod ipse idem Spiritus Sanctus est amor sive caritas, qua nos diligimus Deum et proximum.” Lombard, Sent. I, D. 17, c. 1, 142.

22 Quoting the Venerable Bede: “De temporali autem processione Beda in homilia Dominicae I primae post Ascensionem ita loquitur, ‘Cum spiritus sancti gratia datur hominibus, profecto mittitur spiritus a patre, mittitur et a filio, procedit a patre, procedit et a filio, quia et eius missio est ipsa processio’. His verbis aperte ostendit, donationem gratiae spiritus sancti dici processionem vel missionem eiusdem.” Lombard, Sent. I, D. 14, c. 1, 126.

23 “Hic igitur amor qui communis est ambobus, dictus es Speritus Sanctus, hic est ille qui a Patre et Filio sanctorum cordibus inspiratur, iste per quem sanctificantur, ut sancti esse merantur.” Richard de St. Victor, De Trinitate, Bk. 6, c. 10, 187b, ed. Ribaillier, 239.

24 “Nam si in nullo a se invicem different, utique plures esse non possent, siquidem ubi differentia nulla est, pluralitas esse non potest…in illa summa Trinitate sit omnibus in commune summum et summe simplex esse, nec aliud aliquid sit quilibet unus quam quilibet alius, et iccirco in illa Trinitate tres substantias esse negamus.” Richard de St. Victor, Bk. 4, c. 9, 159b, De Trinitate,
Holy Spirit communicates the delights of caritas to the soul;\textsuperscript{25} it is the person of the Holy Spirit to whom goodness (and caritas) is especially attributed among the divine Persons.\textsuperscript{26} To Richard, all persons of the Trinity must be present for the highest caritas to be present, and caritas in its most perfect form is unable to be absent from either the oneness of the Trinity or from the plurality of divine persons. These three divine Persons are equal and necessary for caritas to be present because no one, from their own private or particular love (amor) of themselves (in contrast to divine love), is able to have their own (propriè) caritas. Any private love (amor) – as this individual caritas would be – could not be ordered correctly and would be directed toward something imperfect (personal ownership). Only the highest, supreme love would be directed upward toward perfection; as such it is the only love worthy of holding as it is shared with others and with divine beings. In addition, the Trinity is incomplete unless the plenitude of goodness and the plenitude of caritas are both present.\textsuperscript{27} So Richard’s proof that the

\textsuperscript{171.} See Book 6, chapters 12-14 for one of several examples regarding the naming of the persons of the Trinity.

\textsuperscript{25} “Sicut enim Filium coesse sibit voluit, ut haberet cui communicaret magnitudinis sue divitias, sic et Spiritum Sanctum coherere sibi voluit, ut esset cui communicaret caritatis sue delicias.” Richard de St. Victor, Bk. 6, c. 13, 189c, \textit{De Trinitate}, 244.

\textsuperscript{26} “Quid sit potentia, quid sit sapientia, quid caritas vel bonitas, omnes in commune novimus, et cotidiano experimento probamus… Item quia in bonitate proprietas Spiritus sancti invenitur, merito et ei bonitas specialius assignatur.” Richard de St. Victor, \textit{De Trinitate}, Bk. 6, c. 15, 190-91, 247-8; for a lengthy discussion on the commonality of the three persons, see Bk. 5, c. 25, 181d, 224-5; on the unity of the three persons, see Bk. 6, c. 25, 198a, 264.

Holy Spirit is God in a way is dependent upon the equality of caritas (as amor) and God. But Richard makes a greater distinction between amor and caritas than does Augustine or Lombard. While his argument establishes essential oneness between the Holy Spirit and the other persons of the Trinity and maintains that the Holy Spirit alone is best suited to bringing itself, as the token of love, to humans, it is amor gratuitis that is the Holy Spirit, not caritas. The reference is to Paul, “Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus,” but the love Richard describes as the Holy Spirit – in relation to the Trinity – is amor. He does not himself actually make the claim that caritas is the Holy Spirit, only presents it as evidence for a related topic.

So the questions continue as to whether caritas is the Holy Spirit, whether either or both are First Gifts of God, and whether the other terms for love would be identified with this Gift as synonyms of caritas. By the thirteenth century our four authors have the works of numerous authorities on which to draw. While they all have an opinion on these two issues, they do not necessarily agree any more than did their predecessors. Each agrees on the following: First, caritas (or minne) is God; second, in some respects caritas is one of several words for divine love, including minne; and third, caritas comes from God and does so mainly via the diffusion of the Holy Spirit. Each authority treats caritas or minne as given from God, although in different ways. All but Beatrice discuss endowments in relation to caritas and the Holy Spirit. But they do not agree that caritas (or minne) is the Holy Spirit even as they agree that caritas (and sometimes minne) is God and is from God. Neither do they agree about which benefit, caritas or knowledge,
comes to the human soul first. These issues are significant to the study of thirteenth-century theories on *caritas*, and the development of subsequent ideas on divine love.

Albert’s theories surrounding the equality of *caritas* and the Holy Spirit present an example of thirteenth-century struggles to clarify theories regarding *caritas*. He makes use of Lombard’s organization and Augustine’s ideas, and then sets out his own opinions on each topic – not necessarily agreeing with their conclusions. While Lombard stresses the point that the Holy Spirit is *caritas*, Albert, like many other theologians of his time, backs away from full agreement. Again, part of the problem for him is the lack of a statement connecting *caritas* and the Holy Spirit in biblical literature.\(^29\) This is compounded by the fact that *caritas* is linked directly to God while the Holy Spirit is not. So he, like his predecessors, must simultaneously equate the Holy Spirit with God while acknowledging *deus caritas est* but not *filius caritas est* (because *filius verbus est*).

Following Augustine and Richard, he explains that the Holy Spirit proceeds from that love (*amor*) with which the Father and Son love each other, so it is not a begetting as is the generation of the Son but is a procession of the mutual love between the Father and the Son. This third person is of the same essential love (*dilectione essentiali*) as in the other Persons, and is the one love that all three are.\(^30\) In fact, the procession of the Holy Spirit cannot happen unless as a unity in substance, but this unity does not extent to

\(^{29}\) “*Deus caritas est,*” I John 4:8. Albert notes that some authors use the biblical *caritas*; “*Deus caritas est,* and some use “*Deus dilectio est,*” namely Augustine. For the specific discussion in Augustine, see *De Trinitatis*, Ch. 27 and fn. 3 above.

created things.\textsuperscript{31} Thus, for Albert, God is the Father, is the Son, is the Holy Spirit, and all are consubstantial with each other.

At the same time, the Holy Spirit and \textit{caritas} are also one with each other. \textit{Caritas} is most appropriately suited to the Holy Spirit, which is closer to humans in proximity than the other two Persons. So \textit{caritas}, as the Holy Spirit in this way, is held in the soul and moves the soul as the model (\textit{exemplar}) for souls (on earth) and the distributor (\textit{distributor}) of gifts in which all offerings are conveyed.\textsuperscript{32} Indeed, \textit{caritas} is brought to humans as part of the invisible emission (\textit{missio}) of the Holy Spirit,\textsuperscript{33} transmitted to the human soul in the overflowing that proceeds from the Trinity and the Holy Spirit – even as from God himself.\textsuperscript{34} But this love is not precisely the Holy Spirit, which Albert claims is due to the duality of its properties. \textit{Caritas} is a dual love, being both personal and essential. Personally (\textit{personalis}) it is properly called the Holy Spirit, because it is not something else. But essentially (\textit{essentialis}) it is appropriately called

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\textsuperscript{31}“Ad hoc dicendum, quod in veritate secundum substantiam non est hic procession nisi una Spiritus sancti.” Albertus Magnus, \textit{Sent. I}, D. 14, Art. 9, ed. Borgnet, 397; “missio <spiritus sancti> potest esse in creatura non unita.” \textit{Ibid.}, Art. 8, 397.

\textsuperscript{32}“Charitas qua habitualiter diligimus Deum et proximum, non est Spiritus sanctus; sed Spiritus sanctus appropriate non proprie est charitas qua effective diligimus Deum et proximum – hoc enim efficiunt in nobis committere Pater et Filius Et Spiritus sanctus, licet appropriate Spiritus sanctus, quia ipse est proprie charitas, et sic est exemplar nostrae charitatis, et est distributor donorum in quo omnia donatur…” Albertus Magnus, \textit{Sent. I} Dist 17, Art. 1, Borgnet, 464:2.

\textsuperscript{33}There are twin processions of the Holy Spirit, one temporal and one eternal. In Albert’s commentary this is a direct quote from Lombard’s \textit{Sentences} in Book I, Distinction 14. The temporal emission is both visible and invisible. \textit{Caritas} is one of the benefits given through the invisible emission, whereas the tongues of fire over the heads of the apostles during Pentecost and the dove over the head of the baptized Jesus are visible emissions (created manifestations). See also McGinn, \textit{Foundations}, 76.

\textsuperscript{34}“In veritate secundum substantiam non est hic procession nisi una Spiritus sancti…..” Albertus Magnus, \textit{Sent. I}, D. 14, A. 9, ed. Borgnet, 397.
itself, because it has an individual essence. Albert disallows any consubstantial unity of *caritas* and the Trinity or its persons, and argues it is not one and the same substance as the Holy Spirit; it is the same essence as the whole of the Trinity and is one with the three persons in this essential way. While the Father and Son love each other (diligunt) by the love that is the Holy Spirit, that love is essentially the act (*actum*) of *caritas* rather than the essence of *caritas* itself. So the Holy Spirit can be called *caritas* as it can be called the love (*amor vel caritas*) by which the Father and Son love (diligunt) each other, but it is not, in essence, any one of those names, since it is an individual person of the Trinity called the Holy Spirit. Thus, *caritas* it is not substantially or personally the Holy Spirit even as it is essentially the Holy Spirit and all persons of the Trinity.

He further demonstrates this point by connecting *caritas*, God, and the Holy Spirit through the notion of the highest Good. That which is desired on account of itself and not on account of something else is the highest Good. That which is loved (diligere) both *per se* and *propter se* has that love in him by which and on account of which he is loved, and so meets the condition of the highest Good. God, then, is the highest Good. But there is more. *Caritas* does not seek the good, and is the absolute Good, and even

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37 “Omnis finis qui non propter alium desideratur, sed omnia propter ipsum, est bonus et optimus; sed aliquis finis est huiausmodi; ergo ille erit bonus et optimus.” Albertus Magnus, *Super Ethicorum*, Bk. 1, 2, Cologne, 10. Grosseteste’s translation (included in the Cologne edition): “quem propter ipsum volumes,…et non omnia propter alterum desideramus....” *volere* from the Greek term *boulomai*, meaning to will, to wish, or to want.
causes the good. As such, it does not depend on anything (such as reason) in order to be the absolute Good; in fact, it perfects reason by effecting the love of God: “To love (diligere) God on account of himself and above all other things; this is the act (actus) of caritas…” Thus, caritas as God and as God as himself desired above all else is the Holy Spirit because the Holy Spirit is itself God as a person of the Trinity and itself caritas essentially as the highest Good.

While Beatrice does not use the term caritas, she does identify minne with the Holy Spirit in some sense. Chapter Three set out examples to show how minne can stand for caritas, and how her way of speaking about minne gives it similar qualities to those of caritas. That same approach allows us to see how she describes aspects of minne that are similar to those of the Holy Spirit, even if she does not explicitly equate the two or discuss substance or essence. One or two example passages can illustrate the layers of meaning in her dense writing:

Seven manieren zijn van minnen, die comen uten hoegsten ende keren weder ten oversten.

There are seven modes of loving which proceed from the heavens and returns again to the heights.

Here, minne issues forth from the heavens and returns there again. It proceeds in or along seven different manieren on its way to the soul as well as back to the heavens with the soul. In order for her to explain the manieren of minne, Beatrice needs to assume her readers understand the technical aspects of maniere. While it means “manner or way

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Charitas autem non sic quaecit bonum sed quod potius absolute bonum est et causa boni; nec innititur illi propter rationem, quia probat hoc ratio, quod oppositum est, sed quia illud bonum efficit talem dilectionem, unde cum dicitur, ‘diligere Deum propter se, et super omnia, est actus charitatis…” Albertus Magnus, \textit{Sent. III}, D. 27, A. 1, ed. Borgnet, 509.}
\footnote{Maniere I, \textit{Seven Manieren}, R-VM, 3.}
\end{footnotes}
(wijze, via) of doing, being, or living”, there are more subtle meanings at work as well. Maniere also means custom (mos), mode (modus); demonstration (of lifestyle by the postures or gestures of the body; houding van licham); method, procedure, conduct (handelwijze); or display (of qualities or knowledge). It is reasonable to assume that her readers would have an understanding of these subtle variations in the meanings of the term. Thus, within an apparently simple statement, Beatrice describes the emanation of love from a divine source, in much the same way as Albert described the invisible emission of the Holy Spirit, which is caritas.

But minne doesn’t just arrive and return. Keren contains an underlying meaning that includes an ordering, reordering, or a “sweeping clean” of that which it touches as it turns to return. Throughout her treatise, minne is working (werken) with and within the soul to further the cleansing or progress the soul makes. Beatrice also explains that minne consists of seven manieren (manners or modes) that first bring divine benefits to

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40 Etymologicum Teutonicae Linguae, C. Kiliaan, (editie F. Claes s.j.) Mouton, Den Haag 1972, 304. Also see Huls, Seven Manieren, Mystieke Proces, v.1, 137, 139.

41 Middle Nederlands Woorkenboek (MNW). The are variations in the mss regarding the word keren. In Ms B (KBH 3067-3073, cir. 1400) the copyist used werken. In mss H and W (KBDHaag 70, E.5, cir. 1400; NBVienna 15258, cir 1400-1450) the copyists use keren. For the critical edition, Reypens considers Ms. B to be the best, and earliest, manuscript, but he considers keren the best fit with the sense of the opening line. While werken carries a meaning that includes an active, or working, influence on that which it touches, it is less specific as an ordering action. Keren is more particular in that it is a correcting influence. In addition, minne keren acts upon the soul whereas minne werken acts with as well as on the soul. In the MNW werken translates to laborare, operari, opus facere, agere; we find these terms in Albert’s and Eckhart’s discussions. It is difficult to determine which term Beatrice herself used, but she does stress the soul’s active participation in whatever progress is made throughout her treatise. After the heading, keren does not appear again in the mss. Reypen’s decision to use keren suggests a need to provide an influencing to Beatrice directly from Bernard of Clairvaux, and Hugh and Richard of St. Victor who emphasized caritas as a well ordered love. See Roger DeGanck, Toward Unification, esp. Ch 15 on minne. where he credits original ideas from either Beatrice or Hadewijch back to a male influence. See Reypens-Van Mierlo, Seven Manieren, 77, and for a complete discussion of the manuscripts, pp. 111-125.
the soul and then initiate action within the soul to begin an upward movement toward unity with the Holy Trinity in a manner similar to the way in which *caritas* makes the soul love God.\(^4\) In the first *manieren, minne* joins with the soul, initiating a permanent connection with the soul and quickening a desire to follow and serve God. Beatrice does not indicate whether the potential for this connection is already in the soul - so that *minne* merely activates the connection - or whether the desire in the soul only becomes active because desire is carried to the soul along with *minne*. Over the course of time, the soul becomes used to this longing, integrates the connection, and becomes finely tuned to the different *manieren of minne*. The soul is now the *minne* that rules the soul, having become closer to the likeness of *minne* and to the likeness of God. The will of *minne* has become the will of the soul.\(^3\) This is important because *minne* has guided the soul and like *caritas*, binds the soul to God, providing a conduit by which the soul and God can exchange love. *Minne* here also provides unity with God as does the Holy Spirit as a person of the Trinity. Given these similar qualities with *caritas* and with God, and given the Holy Spirit would also have these qualities, *minne*, to Beatrice here, is both *caritas* and the Holy Spirit.

Hadewijch’s opinion on the oneness of the three persons of the Trinity is relatively clear. In Letter One, she asks her readers to “practice (*pleghene*) the truth with regard for all existence (*wesenen*) for the glory of the noble love (*minne*) that God is,” quoting the famous passage from 1 John 4:16, *Deus Caritas Est*.\(^4\) *Minne* is substituted

\(^{42}\) “Die ierste es ene begerte die comt werkende uter *minnen*…” *Seven Manieren*, R-VM., 3.

\(^{43}\) “Si es *minne* end *minne* regrnet in hare geweldelike [regnerende] ende mogendeleke wekende ende rustende, doende ende latende van buten ende binne na haren wille.” *Seven Manieren*, VI, R-VM, 25.

\(^{44}\) “…ende van allen wesenen waerheit te pleghene omme claerheit der edelre minnen die god es,” Hadewijch, *Brieven*, Letter 12, VM, 16-17.
for caritas of the Latin, but her reference to the biblical passage is evident. Later in that letter she explains that certain psalms are sung three times because Truth, Goodness, and Totality “contain in their one essence (enighen wesene) all the virtues together (doechde versamenen), from whichever works (welken ambachte) are of these three beings (wesenen).” She quickly connects these three through minne, in the sublime “love (minne) of the Three Persons for one another (deen vor dander).”45 Throughout her letters, unity with God is associated with both the Trinity as a whole and with the Holy Spirit in particular. The essence of God is, in fact, unity with the Three Persons.46

Scattered fragments stand out, such as her conviction that “he himself is his nature,” that with his “being from all eternity…acts in one fruition of his own love (minne), in his ‘unity he has fruition in himself” and “he pours forth his unity in Persons.”47 The “emanation of his name has enabled us to know his unique name in the properties of the Persons,” she tells her readers, and “the flood of his one name pours out with … an

45 “Omme de welke men singhet .iij. sanctus inden hemel omme dattie ,iij. namen in haren [30] enighen wesene alle doechde versamenen van welken ambachte si sijn ute desen .iij. [32] wesenen….Besiet hoe hoghe minne es deen vor dander ende dankes hem met minnen.” Brieven, Letter 12, ln. 28, VM, 17. Van Mierlo treats this passage as indicating the Trinity, and that “die iij namen”” stands for the three persons in one being in their unified divine nature. Vanneste argues for the definition of wesen in this and other letters as that meaning of essence (essentie) and being (esse) that can apply both to the unity and Trinity of the Godhead, such as ‘wesene’ as ‘essence’ at line 30, and ‘wesenen’ as ‘beings’ at line 32. See R. Vanneste in “Over de Betekenis van Enkele Abstracta in de Taal van Hadewijch,” Studia Germanica I (Gent, 1959), 24-26.

46 Some examples of God, the Godhead, or the Trinity as Unity are in Letters 17:31and 28:81 (Unity of the Godhead); Letter 30 (Trinity of the Unities of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). Also see Vanneste, 32-4.

invitation that They, one and triune, claim for one another.”

“God is the Holy Spirit in his glory…. He works with the Three Persons as one Lord, and with one Lord as Three Persons,” she adds.

Whether caritas (or minne) and the Holy Spirit are one in the same is less evident and requires a deeper analysis of Hadewijch’s thoughts. In Letter Fourteen, She asks her readers to consider the “lofty essence of eternal caritas” in the way St. Paul has described it (1 Cor. 13:4-13); they are then asked to follow caritas with the strength with which they follow minne. Both caritas and minne enlighten souls while God and minne enlighten reason. Caritas and the Holy Spirit are connected to fire; caritas illuminates others with burning flames, and the Holy Spirit is described as the “high flaming will” of God that gives many rewards to the soul through both caritas and minne in order that they might, in turn, illuminate the soul as well as enkindle the soul’s desire for a higher

48 “Dat vloyen van sinen name gaf ons te kinnen in properen persone sinen eneghen name. Die vloet signs enechs eweleecs namen storte vt met …maninghen, die si hem onder manen eenuoldich ende driuoldich,” at line 264. Brieven, Letter 22, VM, 199-200; Hart, 96, 99. Van Mierlo claims that properen persone does not mean the persons of the Trinity, but given that the rest of the letter discusses the nature of God, the Trinity, and each person that comprises it, I would argue Hadewijch understood what she was teaching.


50 “Hier omme haest v te veruolghene karitate met crachte van vieregher begherten der gherechter minnen.” Van Mierlo argues Hadewijch is using caritas in place of minne to explain the biblical passages of Paul to her readers. Brieven, Letter 14, VM, 120.

51 Caritas and minne enlighten souls in Letters 11, 12, and 18; God and minne enlighten reason in Letters 18, and 22. The relationship between caritas, knowledge, and reason are covered more extensively in Chapter Five.

52 “...ende metter vlammen der bernender caritaten salmense verlichten.” Brieven, Letter 12, VM, 110.
life.\(^{53}\) This is implied, too, in her statements that “perfect minne is a fire” and that caritas, as “one of the perfections” (gheweldeghe) gives each of God’s “common people” whatever they need.\(^{54}\) Caritas creates a bridge between God and the soul, and caritas, along with minne, brings the gifts of the Holy Spirit – the riches of feasts – to the soul. She also discusses the “Nature of the Holy Spirit,” which she claims is generous and zealous in the same way as is his proper person who bestows rewards upon the soul.\(^{55}\) The Holy Spirit, a Person of the Trinity, is itself a gift from God, presented as a clarity of riches for the soul in order that the soul may contemplate him in several ways.\(^{56}\) These riches are given with the Holy Spirit during feasts of words exchanged during rapture; these words in turn give to the soul the tools for contemplation. But between God and the soul is caritas, also revealed by God to the soul.\(^{57}\) So while Hadewijch does not directly state that caritas is the Holy Spirit in her letters, she assigns them similar attributes and places both in the same position relative to God and the soul. One of her visions presents a most direct connection between the Holy Spirit and minne:


\(^{54}\) “Die volcomene minne es een brant.” Brieven, Letter 22, ln. 205, VM, 196; “Hi gheuet…bi…sine gheweldeghe boden…. Caritate bewaert dat ghemeyne vanden rike ende gheuet elken dat hi behoeuet.” Mercy and Wisdom are the other perfections named in this passage. Letter 18, ln. 13, VM, 152.

\(^{55}\) “Want gheonstech ende snel, date s de nature vanden heileghen gheest, daer met es hi proper persoen.” Brieven, Letter 17, VM, 140.


\(^{57}\) While Hadewijch herself utilizes minne most often, Van Mierlo adds liefde to the Trinitarian outflow. Brieven, Introduction to Letter 28, VM, 224.
God embraced me in my inner senses...and brought me before the Countenance of the Holy Spirit, who possessed the Father and the Son in one Essence... A voice issuing from this Countenance...said to me: ‘Behold...you have called me and sought me, what and who I, Love (minne) am....know what I, Love (minne) am in them.’

This connection with the Trinity and with minne implies again the sameness of love and the Holy Spirit. Perhaps she, like Albert, is of the opinion that caritas and the Holy Spirit cannot be exactly the same love named caritas, but they can if the essential caritas of Paul, and the Essence, which the Holy Spirit possesses, are the same minne.

Hadewijch distinguishes caritas from minne in certain ways as well. In her definition of caritas, she emphasizes that it is a love of other people as often as she identifies it as a love of the Holy Spirit and the Trinity (as did Augustine and Peter Lombard). Her texts are frequently instructional statements to her readers that they should do something; they should think a certain way (“consider the lofty essence of eternal caritas... pursue minne and caritas... be fervent and persistent”), act a certain way, avoid certain types of reasoning or emotionally attractive expressions of caritas. While she has in mind the second part of the commandment to love one’s neighbor as one’s self, she is, in a manner of speaking subordinating caritas to minne in a method similar to that of Albert the Great when he argues in his Sentences that caritas is a

58 Daer na eens paeschs daghese wasic te gode ghegaen ende hi omuine mi van binnen mine sinne ende nam mi inden gheeste ende voerde mi in dat anschijn des heyleghen gheests die den vader ende den sone in enen wesene heuet. Ute dien gheheelen wesene dies anschijns ontsfinghic alle verstennissen ende soe lasic alle mine vonnissen. Ende ene stemme ute dien anschine luedde also vreeseleke alse ouer al ghehort ende si siede te mi: ‘Sich hier, oude, die op mi gheroepen heues ende ghesocht wat ende sie ic minne ben....van allen bekinne wat icker minne in ben.’

Hadewijch, Visioenen, Vision 3, ed. VM, 42-3; Hart, 272.

59 She gives several examples regarding ways in which her readers should observe how others had acted ‘in charity’ and do the same: Brieven, Letter 14 & 15.
subspecies of both *amor* and *dilectio*. For Hadewijch, *caritas* clearly enables human beings (the soul) to better understand the mind and will of God, yet it does not as often hold the position of oneness with the Holy Spirit and the Trinity as does *minne*.

Meister Eckhart’s complex, often contradictory statements are well known to scholars who study his work, and this is no less the case with his thoughts on *caritas* and the Holy Spirit. In certain of his sermons, he claims *caritas* is not the Holy Spirit, while in others he claims it is. To confound the issue further, he uses several terms: *caritas, amor, minne, even liebe* when discussing divine love in relation to *spiritus sanctus*. He faces the same problem as other theologians; *caritas deus est* is a biblical passage, but there is no corresponding *spiritus sanctus deus est*. Like his predecessors and contemporaries, he makes use of similarities between *caritas* and the Holy Spirit to argue for the equality of the Holy Spirit with God. However, as we shall see, he is more consistent in his claims regarding *spiritus sanctus deus est* than he is in regard to *caritas spiritus sanctus est*. For that reason we shall begin with the firm base of his latter arguments and weave in the former as they become relevant.

In his argument that the Holy Spirit is God, Eckhart first endeavors to clarify those aspects that evidence the Holy Spirit as God without the resulting *spiritus sanctus verbum est*. So he begins by separating the three Persons of the Trinity in name, and then reunites them by bringing them back together again in essence. The biblical passage, “All things are from him, through him, and in him,” (Romans 11:36) refers to God, but “in him” or “existence in” is the property or quality of the person of the Holy Spirit, not of the Father whose personal property is ‘through which’ or of the Son, the ‘from

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60 See Chapter Five, in the section on knowledge.

which’.  

Because ‘existence in’ is the personal property of the Holy Spirit, neither the Father nor the Son can be the Holy Spirit in this special way. Yet the very existence of all things is from God, including his own existence, the Son’s existence from him, and the Holy Spirit’s existence in him. God, as his very being, contains all things, and although the property of his that is the name deus is not the same as the property of the Holy Spirit that is the name spiritus sanctus, he is the Holy Spirit by being the existence that contains the Holy Spirit. Thus he can say with confidence that:

‘All things are in him’ in such a way that if there is anything not in the Holy Spirit the Holy Spirit is not God.... Existence is from God alone, and he alone is existence.... If there were anything in him or not him, the spirit is not God.

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64 “Esse autem a solo deo est, et ipse solus est esse, ‘ego sum qui sum’.... Si autem extra ipsum aut non in ipso esset aliquid, ipse non esset esse nec deus per consequens.” Eckhart, LW IV, 1:23, p.24.

65 Eckhart’s claims regarding existence as God were among those for which his theories were suspected of heresy. See Eckhart, Essential Sermons, 30-35.

66 “Ex ipso, per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia’. Ex ipso patre, per ipsum filium, in ipso spiritu sancto. Circa li in ipso nota primo quod in ipso spiritu sancto sic sunt omnia, ut quod in ipso non est, necesse sit esse nihil.... ut si aliquid sit non in ipso spiritu sancto, spiritus non est deus.” Sermo IV, “In Festo S. Trinitatis de Epistula Secundum Missale Romanum,” LW IV, 1:22, ed. Stuttgart, 24; also see Eckhart, Teacher & Preacher, 208.
Anything not in the Holy Spirit is not the Holy Spirit, nor is it God because it is not in God. He extends this ‘being in the Holy Spirit’ to the Son, then shortly thereafter strengthens his argument by including anything that remains in love (caritas):

There in I John 4, ‘Deus caritas est.’ I say ‘God,’ the Holy Spirit, ‘is caritas,’ according to Augustine, and so whoever remains in caritas (that is, the Holy spirit) remains in God and God in him.\(^{67}\)

Since ‘being in caritas’ is ‘being in the Holy Spirit’, and since biblical and patristic sources claim first that God is caritas, and second that remaining in caritas is remaining in the Holy Spirit, “whomever remains in caritas” remains in the Holy Spirit, and thus, also remains in God and God in him.” Thus, he concludes, the Holy Spirit is God.

Another way he argues that spiritus sanctus deus est is through the essence of triune ‘unity’. Although unity is ascribed only to God appropriately (appropriare) and through existence (esse), it is ascribed to the whole Trinity in (or from) essence (essentia). Essentially, the relations of the Three Persons are indistinct because there is no number of essences in the Trinity, only the essence of the Trinity. Like Augustine and Albert, he asserts that the three Persons are one, in essence, so, in essence, the Holy Spirit is also Unity.\(^{68}\) Unity is the Father, and the One, which includes the Holy Spirit, and like

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existence, union is in the Holy Spirit. As above, he brings caritas deus est into the argument here as evidence for the unity of the Holy Spirit with God. Unity in essence also applies to caritas when he introduces it to the Holy Spirit as Unity. Caritas is unifying, bonding the soul to God and being in the Holy Spirit in essence without being the Unity of the Trinity in all existence or properties.

As we turn to caritas spiritus sanctus est, he seems at the outset to be on firm footing. As above, he points out the well-known passage from John 4:8, “Deus caritas est.” Eckhart makes it a point to speak of the qualities of caritas that justify calling God and caritas one in the same thing. The following are those most relevant to the question of whether caritas can be called the Holy Spirit. He first says that God is caritas because caritas shares something with each and every being without exception. God also shares something with all beings and with all of existence containing these beings, so the existence of God is in all creation that exists. That which is shared among all things is itself infinite, unbounded, and unlimited, unlike humans who are finite, bounded, and

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69 “Ich hân ez ouch mê gespochen; bekantnisse und vernüfticheit einigent die sêle in got….und einunge in dem heiligen geist.” Werke I, 38; Teacher, 244-5.

70 “Secundo dic quare potius caritas dicitur, cum pari modo sit sapientia, decor et similia, scilicet quia amor est uniens, diffusivus…. Pertracta quomodo caritas sive amor est uniens, et quanta est illa unio. Item, quomodo se totum diffundit amor in abstracto.” Sermo VI: “Dominica Prima Post Trinitatem De Epistula,” 1:52 in Meister Ekhart: Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke: Die lateinischen Werke, Vol. 4, eds. Ernst Benz, Bruno Decker, and Joseph Koch, (Stuttgart and Berlin: W. Kohlhammer, 1936-), 50-1. Hereafter called LW IV. That he says caritas sive amor here is treated below, fn. 77. Also see Teacher & Preacher, 212. Eckhart’s claim here is similar to Albert’s in that he asserts that caritas is both personal and essential. In the personal sense it is its own; essentially it is one with God and the Trinity. See above fn. 35.

71 See fn. 62 above.

72 “Deus caritas est, primo, quia caritas communis est, nullum exclusens. Ex qua communitate nota duo. Primo, quod Deus communis est: omne ens et omne omnium esse ipse est; ‘in ipso, per ipsum et ab ipso’. Sed nota quod Deus est omne quod cogitari potest melius aut desiderari a quocumque et ab omnibus et adhuc amplius.” Ekhart, LW IV, Sermo VI, 51-2.
limited. God is *caritas* in something commonly shared with all things and so *caritas* is God in this shared way. Thus Eckhart can claim that “God, in his whole self, is a love (*caritas*) shared among all things.”

The second point he makes is that God is the ultimate object that all things and persons love (*amare*) and seek. Here he concurs with Albert, referring to Aristotle’s theory that it is love (*eros*) that is the Prime Mover of the universe. Just as the prime mover causes the universe to move by being loved, he explains, the action of all that exists is in this seeking and loving. His third claim is that God is *caritas* because he loves us (*diligere*) with the same love (*amor*) by which he loves himself, his coeternal Son and the Holy Spirit. This love (*amor*), he says, is the Holy Spirit himself. So it would seem he claims that since this love (*amor*) is God, and God is *caritas*, so the Holy Spirit is *caritas*. But identifying *amor* rather than *caritas* with the Holy Spirit allows him to skirt the thorny issue plaguing other theologians, including Albert. Does he mean that *amor* is *caritas*, and both are the Holy Spirit? Or is *amor* a different aspect or kind of love that our Preacher can claim is the Holy Spirit without forcing himself into agreement with Lombard and equating the third Person of the Trinity with *caritas*?

73 “Secundo nota quod omne commune, in quantum commune, deus, et omne non commune, in quantum non commune, deus non est, sed creatum est. Omnis autem creatura finitum quoddam, limitatum, distinctum et proprium est, et sic iam non caritas est; deus autem se toto communis caritas est.” *LW* IV, Sermo VI, 52.

74 See Chapter Three, fns. 65 and 66 regarding Aristotle’s theory.

75 “Secundo principaliter ‘deus caritas est’ et diciture pro tanto, quia ipse est, quem amat et quaerit omne, quod amare potest. Iterum: ipse est, qui solus ab omnibus et in omnibus amatur et quaeritur. Adhuc ipse est, quem quaerendo et amando subsistit omne, quod est aut esse potest.... Praeterea ‘deus caritas est’ quia se toto amabilis est, se toto amor est.” *LW* IV, Sermo VI, 52-3.

76 “Tertio ‘deus caritas est’ quia se toto amat.... qui eodem et pari amore, quo se ipsum, filium suum coaeternum et spiritum sanctum diligit sive amat, nos amat.... quia amor, quo nos diliget, est ipse spiritus sanctus.” *LW* IV, Sermo VI, 53.
Throughout the sermons he emphasizes the essential oneness of the Persons of the Trinity, even as each Person is distinct. This essential oneness of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, includes the oneness of caritas and the Holy Spirit. It would seem this direction in his arguments would allow for caritas spiritus sanctus est. However, his German sermons introduce another troublesome situation particularly when he uses minne exclusively. This is the case in German Sermon Sixty-Five on I John 4:16. “There is a master,” he says, referring to Peter Lombard, “Who says that this love (minne) that is in us is the Holy Spirit, and that <claim> is not true.” To explain, he compares reception of the spirit to the taking in of food. Although humans change food into their bodies, they do not change the spirit they receive into themselves because that would result in more than one type of spirit. Rather, the spirit changes the human into itself, retaining the simple, indistinct properties or qualities it had prior to contact. Arguing against Peter Lombard that human love (minne) is not the same love (minne) as that of the Holy Spirit, he presents a substitute for Albert’s rational as to why this is so. But the terminology he employs muddies the waters again because he relies on minne for both human love and the love that is God as the Holy Spirit. He does not use an alternate German term, such as liebe, for either type of love in order to clarify that human love differs from that of the divine. Since his Latin sermon VI specified that caritas was God yet amor was God as the Holy Spirit, minne in this sermon could mean both amor and caritas. Additionally, he uses minne exclusively throughout this sermon on John 4:16, even when quoting the Vulgate text that clearly uses caritas. Thus, even though he argues that minne is not the Holy Spirit, is he arguing the same about caritas? If so he

would clearly disagree with Peter Lombard. But his use of *minne* here obscures that clarity.

In other German sermons he claims that *minne* is the Holy Spirit. In one sermon, for example, the love (*minne*) by which God loves the soul is himself and his being, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from this love and “this same love (*minne*) is the Holy Spirit.”

In another:

The greatest masters say that the love with which we love is the Holy Spirit. There were some who would dispute this. That is eternally true; in all the motion with which we are moved to love, we are moved by nothing but the Holy Spirit. Love at its purest and at its most detached is nothing but God.

“The love (*minne*) with which we love (*minnen*)” could refer to the love in humans, as in the above Sermon on John. If so, he is refuting his own argument against Peter Lombard and allowing that love (*minne*) moves the soul toward God; the *minne* that is already in the soul. On the other hand, he may also mean that the *minne* that moves the soul does not originate in the soul, but only causes motion once it has entered the soul. In either case his opinion once again seems ambivalent – the Holy Spirit is and is not *caritas*, and *caritas*, in the Holy Spirit, is and is not the Holy Spirit. It is unclear whether he feels the issue matters less to his German audience than to his Latin audience or means to leave the matter open because he might believe *minne* and *caritas* is in fact the Holy Spirit in the

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78 “wan diu selbe minne, dâ mite got die sêle minnet, daz ist sîn leben, und in der selben minne blüejet üz der heilige geist, unde diu selbe minne ist der heilige geist.” *DW* III, Predigt 69, 163-4. Also see *Teacher & Preacher*, 312.

way that Dionysius, Augustine, and Peter Lombard did. Whatever his intent, the fact that he uses the term minne allows him to leave the matter slightly open to interpretation.

**Caritas as Gift of the Holy Spirit**

While all four authors see caritas as one with the Holy Spirit, they do not all give it primacy as that same First Gift that is the Holy Spirit. Their differing conclusions significantly affect their further opinions on the ordering of those gifts and on the role of caritas in acquiring knowledge. This section shows their similarities and differences, and also discusses whether their differing opinions on the status of caritas affect their respective views on the effectiveness of caritas in conveying other endowments to the human soul.

Biblical passages relating spirit as gift have been employed by patristic authors to argue for the Holy Spirit as God. These same authors also claimed that the Holy Spirit was the benefit certain authorities, such as John, referred to in letters. “And by this we know that he abides in us, by the Spirit, which he has given us,” John says not once (I John 3:24) but again, “by this we know that we abide in him and he in us, because he has given us of his own Spirit” (I John 4:13). Augustine extends the notion of ‘spirit’ as ‘Holy Spirit’ into ‘Holy Spirit as gift’ in his arguments for the essential oneness of the Holy Spirit with caritas and with God. So for Augustine, spiritus sanctus is the first donum of God, and caritas is essentially this same first gift. In regard to whether caritas or knowledge arrives first in the soul, Augustine claims it is caritas, because “something can be loved that is unknown,” as long as the lover believes in what is loved.80 Lombard

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80 “Amatur ergo et quod ignoratur sed tamen creditur.” Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Bk. 8, c. 3.6.
indicates his agreement with this assessment (or, more specifically, his lack of disagreement with Augustine) by quoting entire passages out of his predecessor’s *De Trinitate*. The Holy Spirit is sent as a offering (*datum sive donum*) in many ways, and nothing, Augustine has claimed, is more excellent than the Holy Spirit as that gift of God. But he adds that this gift, like all favors from God, is no help to human beings without also including *caritas*. In fact, the ability of the Holy Spirit to divide itself between good and sinning souls and draw them back to God is only possible because of the love (*dilectio, caritas*) that is one with the Holy Spirit and is able to diffuse among souls as well as infuse into each soul. This love and reward that is the Holy Spirit is *caritas*. Richard of St. Victor also agrees that the Holy Spirit is the Gift of God, but for


82 Lombard is still quoting Augustine, “Dantur et alia per Spiritum munera, sed sine caritate nihil prosunt. Nisi ergo tantum impertiatur cuiquam Spiritus sanctus, ut eum Dei et proximi faciat amatorem, a sinistra non trasfertur ad dexteram. Nec Spiritus sanctus proprie dicitur donum nisi protper dilectionem, quam qui non habuerit, etsi ‘loquatur omnibus linguis, et habuerit prophetiam et omnem scientiam et omnem fidem, et distribuerit omnem substantiam suam, et tradiderit corpus suum, ita ut ardebit, nihil ei prodest’ (Romans 2:36).” Lombard, *Sent.* I, D. 17, c. IV, 145.

83 “Quantum ergo bonum est, sine quo ad aeternam vitam neminem tanta bona perducuunt? Ipsa vero dilectio vel caritas (nam unius rei nomen est utrumque) perducit ad regnum. Dilectio igitur, quae ex Deo est et Deus, proprie Spiritus sanctus est, per quem ‘diffunditur in cordibus nostris Deus caritas,’ per quam nos tota inhabitat Trinitas. Quocirca rectissime Spiritus sanctus, cum sit Deus, vocatur etiam ‘donum Dei.’ Quod donum proprie quid nisi caritas intelligendum est, quae perducit ad Deum, et sine qua quodlibet aliud Dei donum non perducit ad Deum?” And Lombard goes on to give his assertion, “ecce hic aperitur, quod supra dictum erat, scilicet quod caritas sit Spiritus sanctus et donum excellentius.” Lombard, *Sent.* I, D. 17, c. IV, 146.
him there is a debt of love from God to human beings (*debitus amor*) the he links to the Holy Spirit in his discussion. For him, *caritas* is curiously absent.\(^{84}\)

In her treatise, Beatrice states first and foremost that *minne* (*amor/caritas*) comes to the human living on earth from the divine or celestial regions, and then returns or works its way back to the heavens.\(^{85}\) God the Creator acts toward both *minne* and the soul before either act with each other. He gives (*gheven*) *minne*, bestows rewards (*loen*),\(^ {86}\) consoles (*troesten*) the soul as he (*set*) it up in another *maniere*, and above all calls (*reopen*) the soul and brings (*bringhen*) it to himself. It is God who allows the soul to advance into another *maniere*, or to progress closer to his presence or knowledge of him. DeGanck includes endowments that are listed in her *vita* as well, such as her faculties of reason, memory, and intellect.\(^ {87}\)

In describing God’s relationship to *minne*, Beatrice is rather ambiguous; other than the giving of *minne* to the soul, God acts in no other way toward *minne* itself. In fact, Beatrice often describes the activities of God and *minne* in the same way, suggesting she sees them as one in the same without requiring hierarchical rank. In the first maniere, she states that the soul, made in the image (*beelde*) and likeness (*ghelikenesse*) of the Creator, must preserve those qualities. At the same time, she claims that the soul petitions to God to allow it to come close to the likeness of

\(^{84}\) “Quid etaque est Spiritus sancti datio vel inmissio, nisi debiti amoris infusion? Spiritus sanctus ergo tunc homini divinitus datur, quando debitus deitatis *amor* menti humane inspiratur.” Richard of St. Victor, *De Trinitate*, Bk. 6, c. 14, 189d, 245.

\(^{85}\) “Seven manieren zijn van minnen, die comen uten hoegsten ende keren weder ten oversten.” The Brussels ms uses “werken weder” which could be loosely taken as “working, returns to the heights.” KBH 3067-73, f. 25r. See fn. 42 above.

\(^{86}\) This is implied in the second maniere, when the soul serves without asking for reward or payment. “...sonder eneghen *loen*...” *Seven Manieren*, ed. R-VM, 7.

\(^{87}\) DeGanck, *Beatrice in her Context*, 155.
minne. In maniere VI she says that when the soul reaches this stage it has knowledge of minne that is closer and higher; shortly thereafter the soul feels close to God and a close comprehension of Him. In maniere VII, the soul ascends to the highest level of minne, where it dwells in the limitless abyss (diepe afgronde) of the godhead (gotheit), which is all in all things. The dwelling place of the soul, even while still in the body, is this godhead, also known as the high/exalted Trinity. The similarities in the use of these terms, and the manner in which Beatrice attributes similar characteristics and activities to them demonstrates her perception of God, The Trinity, and Love (minne) as one and so sees minne as containing all the gifts of God and the Holy Spirit.

For Hadewijch, divine rewards are objects to praise, worry over, accept, and actively seek. Three types of giving emerge in her letters; God is the giver and is connected to the Holy Spirit, caritas is giver or intermediary, and grace as a gift and giver. God gives many favors, or riches, in an outpouring of various aspects of himself. The outpouring is in the form of his name, his nature, time, and Unity with the Three Persons. God pours out these gifts freely, one of which is himself. This, along with caritas now infused in the soul, enabled her to then feel a connection with others (gheuoele/gevoelen). The Holy Spirit, given as and with God’s nature, comes to the soul while linked to the will, and is a power that makes the soul love God. For

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88 “…ende dit es...hare eischinge te gode....hoe si hier toe comen mach ende wie si moghe vercrighen die naheit ter gelijcheit der minne....,” Seven Manieren, ed. R-VM, 4-5.

89 “…so geuult si noch andere maniere van minnen, in naerren wesene ende in hogeren bekinne;” “Dan so geuult si ene godeleke mogenheid ende...een nakenisse van gode.” Seven Manieren, ed. R-VM, 23-24.

90 “…ende in die hoge drieuuldicheit es hare liefleke rustinge ende hare genuechleke woninge.” Seven Manieren, ed. R-VM, 30-31.

91 Brieven, Letter 22, ed. VM, 198.

92 Brieven, Letter 29, ed. VM, 244.
Hadewijch as for Albert, as we shall see in Chapter Five, the affections (or affects of minnelamor) are the link between God and the will in the person of the Holy Spirit (and thus, caritas or minne).\(^{93}\) The nature “and proper person” of the Holy Spirit is swift and willing, ready to embrace and impart to the soul those benefits it will transfer when the soul becomes ready to accept them.\(^{94}\) Caritas, placed between God/Holy Spirit and the soul, prevails over the conveyance of these benefits;\(^ {95}\) it is revealed in the soul during the the process of preparation and it assists the soul in seeing benefits clearly enough to recognize what they are.\(^ {96}\)

Interestingly, caritas is not itself a gift in Hadewijch’s examples of riches bestowed. It is, rather, a conduit along which divine rewards travel, and along with those mentioned above, these also include mercy and wisdom, which are given by God. Those who provide divine benefits she calls God’s messengers or his perfections, and she includes caritas as one of them. These perfections give and are given; wisdom, mercy, caritas, and perfection itself come from God along with other tokens she names throughout Letter Eighteen. God and minne confer grace as well, although Hadewijch

\(^{93}\) “Hi gaf sine nature inder zielen met .iij. crachten, sine drie persone met te minnen. Met verlichter redenen den vadr, metter memoien den wisen gods sone, met hoghen berrenden wille den heyleghen gheest. Dit was die ghichte die sine nature der onser gaf, hem met te minnen.” 
\textit{Brieven}, Letter 22, ed. VM, 193. See also Chapter Five, fn. 51.

\(^{94}\) “Die wesene die ic daer noeme, die sijn volcomeleke hare nature. Want gheonstech ende snel, dat es de nature vanden heileghen gheest; dar met es hi proper persone.” 

\(^{95}\) “Ende soe moesti oec mildeleke na uwe rijcheit gheuen ende alle arme rike maken; want gherechter caritaten en ghebrac nie, sine quam emmer ouer die met fierheiden van gheheelen wille begonsten. Ende sine verwan dat si verwinnen woude, ende sine onthiel dat si onthouden woude.” 
\textit{Brieven}, Letter 6, ed. VM, 62.

\(^{96}\) \textit{Brieven}, Letter 28, at lns. 10 & 121. See fn. 68 above on the relation between caritas and clarity, and Chapter Five for more on the role of caritas in seeing and knowing.
does not call grace a reward. In Letter Ten she describes how grace carries with it obligations to the soul to cooperate so that it might avoid vice. When the Trinity, in union with the soul, makes demands on that are too heavy for the soul to bear, minne bestows grace in a flash of lightning so the soul has the capacity to act well. Wisdom’s benefit is as a means to perfection through that understanding enabled by caritas. So for Hadewijch, although caritas is intrinsic to the flowing out that is the giving process, it is not itself so much as a gift as an interlaced channel that both flows and enables the outflow of favors.

For Albert the Great, the Holy Spirit includes caritas in those benefits it brings to the human soul and so may contend with Hadewijch that such a channel is precisely what makes caritas the First Gift with the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is a person of the Trinity that proceeds from God as an offering; in fact it is the First Gift through which all other benefits are bestowed. Healing and sanctifying grace are conveyed to all creation

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97 The relevant passages are scattered throughout Letter 30. “(at 69) Bider scout die ons vander drieheit wert ghemaent, soe wert ons gracie ghegheuen werdeleke na die edele drieheit te leuenne tameleke.... (at 155) Blixeme dat es licht van minne dat selue in enen vliene, ende gheuet gracie in menighen dinghen om hare te toenne wie si es.... (at 167) Alse dit versament wert vten menichfuldeghen ghichten, dan wert men al dat selue dat dat es. Ende dan alre eerst heuet de eneicheit datse ghemaent heuet, ende dan eerst eest manen te rechte begonnen, ende dan machmens ghegruken vander drieheit die hare tot noch bedwonghen hadde. Dan selense emmermeer met ere vren manen ende ghelden enen wesene, Jn enen wille, Jn enen hebbene, Jn enen ghebrukene.” Brieven, ed. VM, 258.


99 “Quandoque autem operatum trium personarum est appropiabile uni inter personas, et inseparabile a missione unius personae; sicut charitas creata data rationali creaturae, quae appropiabilis est Spiritui sancto, et inseparabilis a missione Spiritus sancti in cum cui confertur donum caritatis, et tunc ratione appropriationis et inseparabilitatis in talibus accipitur notionale et personale in essentia.” Albertus Magnus, Sent. I, D. 10, A. 6, ed. Borgnet, 320. Augustine and Richard of St. Victor are two of the sources all four authors seem to use in this. Augustine, De Trinitate, Bk 5, c. 6; Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, Bk. 6, Ch. 14, ed. Ribaillier, 245.
through the procession of the Holy Spirit; and this is essentially the same as with caritas. God gives love (amor) freely to all creation; in this love is the Holy Spirit, which also proceeds from it as the First Gift. Additionally, this First Gift contains all others and so they can be called donations of the Holy Spirit. Albert carefully explains why the Holy Spirit conveys caritas, being diffused, to the human soul and why the Holy Spirit is The Gift more so than is the Father or the Son. Only the Holy Spirit is specially suited to proceed from the Trinity as The Gift, he says, because the Holy Spirit is essentially the love (amor) that is also God as the Trinity. While other thinkers debated over previous uses of various terms concerning the nature or characteristics of the actual sending out and or emitting of the Holy Spirit, Albert sees little trouble with the differences among these various terms. He explains the giving that is the Holy Spirit as it moves from God toward the human soul. Donum, donatio, datio, missio -- these are designations for the giving or sending of the Holy Spirit. While he acknowledges the distinction between the award (donatio), act of giving (datio), and the “being sent,” (missio), he argues that all

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100 “Dicendum, quod sine dubio temporaliter procedere non convenit nisi Spiritui sancto et Filio, et proprie convenit Spiritui sancto, si accipiamus procedere prout dividitur contra generationem, ut supra expeditum est; et tunc processio satis bene dicitur manifestatio Spiritus sancti in collatione doni gratum facientis ad sanctificandam creaturam, quae diffinitio de plano hic in primo colligi potest.... Sed est iterum processio boni in effectibus gratiae gratam facientis rationalem naturam, sicut est charitas, et hujusmodi; et quia talia manifestant amorem gratuitem ad nos, ideo in his manifestatur collatio doni primi. Et hoc est Spiritus sanctus, ergo in his manifestatur processio Spiritus sancti.” Albert, Sent. I, D. 14, A. 1, ed. Borgnet, 391.


102 “Dicendum, quod dari in donis praecipue convenit illi qui ab aeterno procedit ut donum, in quo alia dona donantur; et hic, ut ex praedictis patet, non est nisi Spiritus Sanctus.” This last phrases appears often in his defense of this claim. Sent. I, D. 14, A. 4 ed. Borgnet, 393; A. 13, ed. Borgnet, 402, and “…dicendum quod effectus sanctitatis in quantum effectus, communiter est Trinitatis, sed in quantum sanctitatis est, non est aequaliter appropriabilis Trinitati, sed potius ex ratione sanctitatis ponit convenientiam ad proprium Spiritus sancti, quod est donum vel amor in quo omnia dona donantur... Spiritus procedit ut donum, non Pater et Filius.” A. 13, 403.
three are essentially the same just as all persons of the Trinity and their attributes are essentially the same although individual. The Holy Spirit brings love and gifts along with it, such as the virtues of grace and *caritas*. *Caritas* is presented to the human soul with and at the same time as the Holy Spirit, so *caritas* is, itself, the greatest gift. To him, *caritas* provides form to all the Good (*boni*) and binds all to their potential perfection (*vinculum perfectionis*); thus all other benefits have *caritas* in them.\(^{103}\) Finally, *caritas* is necessary for the human to affect or influence practical life intellectually; while thinking about many things, he claims, we cannot act on them unless elevated above ourselves (or our present condition) by the gift of God that is given to us. This is what happens when we are in the kind of love (*dilectione*) that is *caritas*.\(^{104}\)

Albert’s predecessors have held that Wisdom, named as a *donum* of the Holy Spirit, is infused in the spirit coming down from the heavens, and for this reason they claim that wisdom is the first gift of the Holy Spirit.\(^{105}\) Albert answers that this is not so; wisdom gives us a taste of God, but this taste, or refinement (*sapore*) comes from *caritas* (*saporem facit charitas*), and the taste of God that wisdom holds and conveys are its accidents and not substance from itself. *Caritas* holds refinement in itself and thus makes other things refined when it joins with them. Therefore, *caritas* is given directly from God and wisdom partially from *caritas*.\(^{106}\) In one other point, he refutes the objection

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\(^{103}\) See below, fn. 108.

\(^{104}\) “*multa cogniscimus, circa quae ut cogniscimus, affici non possumus nisi elevemur supra posse nostrum a dono Dei dato nobis. Et ita est in dilectione quae est charitas.*” Albert, *Sent. III*, D. 27, A. 1, ed. Borgnet, 509.


\(^{106}\) Albert’s response: “*Dicendum quod sapientia dicitur primum donum inter dona ibi enumerata, quae secundum Gregorium, dantur in adjutorium potentiarum vel virium. Vel dicatur melius: quod sapientia primo ponitur, habet hoc a sapore charitatis conjuncto sibi, quia sapientia nihil
that the Son, sent in wisdom, makes wisdom equal to or greater than *caritas*, which is sent with the Holy Spirit. In agreement with the premise that the Son was sent in wisdom, he nevertheless points out that this does not assume (*sumere*) the equality of wisdom with *caritas*, because the highest understanding is ordered toward affections in us. These affections involve *caritas*, not wisdom. As mentioned elsewhere, *caritas*, as the perfection of the intellect toward affections, and it is the highest, best, and greatest divine benefit.

Eckhart has a somewhat different view on this subject. As shown above, he has tied *caritas* closely to the Holy Spirit in essence and in unity by claiming that *caritas*, in these aspects, is the Holy Spirit, and by adding that the love (*amor*) by which God loves human beings (*amare*) is the Holy Spirit as well. All things that are in God are in the Holy Spirit, so God’s offerings are from the Holy Spirit. Through these favors,


108 Albert’s response: “Dicendum quod in sapientia mittitur filius, hoc verum est, sed tamen ab illo ordine non sumit sapientia aequalitatem quia intellectus ulterius ordinatur in nobis ad affectum. ‘Intellectus enim est bonus omnibus facientibus eum.’ Et ideo etiam perfectio affectus ordine finis melior est perfectione intellectus; et cum charitas in perfectione affectus sit ultimum et optimum, charitas est maximum donorum.” Quote is from Psalms 110:10. Albert, *Sent I*, D. 17, A. 7, ed Borgnet, 476.

109 The notion of God’s gifts is mentioned in a number of Eckhart’s works; on the surface these seem to be afterthoughts, or rough notes to himself. The term often appears in regard to a variety of topics that do not mention either *caritas* or the Holy Spirit. A close analysis of these statements is at present beyond the scope of this study, so here I restrict my comments to his thoughts on divine bestowals that relate to *caritas*, to the Holy Spirit, or, for reasons which will become evident, to grace.

110 See above, fn 70.
“whether of nature or of grace,” God becomes known; they raise the soul up so that it may be irradiated by his divine light. Each gift prepares the soul for another that is greater than the one given previously. God gives the human soul love and the ability to love, and, since God is caritas, this award comes to humans from caritas and arrives in the soul before anything else. It would appear, then, that God, “who gives himself and everything he has,” would present caritas as one of these awards. However, Eckhart does not explicitly say that caritas is a divine gift, and due to the authoritative yet contradictory statements in his works, this specific omission seems odd; although the entire sermon is on the topic of caritas, and although caritas deus est (which cannot be ignored), caritas is not, in the sermon, elevated far above all other divine benefits as are other terms when he is discussing them. Caritas, diligere, spiritus sanctus, and gratia are each most important at one time or another in this sermon. This could explain why the order in which the endowments “of God himself” are given is lacking in the explication as are which elements of those mentioned are God’s gifts. Unlike Albert, whose opinion is clear in that he considers caritas as the First Gift (i.e., the Holy Spirit), Eckhart has no such firmness in his works. In fact, his focus shifts away from caritas to include a

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112 “…Ipse (deus) causat in nobis et dat dilectionem qua diligimus…ipse per essentiam diligit nos ante dona superaddita…ipse est dilectio qua diligimus,” Ekhart, LW IV, Sermon VI, Part II; 65, p. 63.

113 “Septimo, quia adhuc inimicos nos amat. Unde prius dat se ipsum quam sua dona nobis, quasi non posit expectare praeparatoria et disponentia. Octavo, quia omnia sua et se ipsum etiam dat. Ubi dice quod nihil creatum dat suum. Item non dat omne sui, item non dat se ipsum.” LW IV, Sermo VI, 54; Teacher & Preacher, 213.
discussion of grace, which in some of his sermons replaces *caritas* as the divine light poured out by God. When we turn to other sermons to find out what he considers to be divine rewards, *caritas* is seldom mentioned as such. The few discussions of his that touch on God’s gifts involve the presentation of grace as often as Albert’s work treats the infusion of *caritas*.

Latin Sermon Forty-Five gives us some insight into this. In this sermon on wearing the armor of God in the form of instruction (*disciplina*), Eckhart implies that the soul’s reception of this instruction entails first a giving from God; here he explicitly equates grace with *caritas* (or *caritas* with grace). This gift of instruction, he says, is a kind of union of knowledge (*scientia*) and love (*caritas*). He goes on in this rather long sermon to treat the topic of receiving instruction, but *caritas* is no longer mentioned in relation to knowledge or as divine riches. Rather, the detailed topic of reception includes grace as a favor received from God because the least amount of grace is armor against sins. In Sermon Twenty-Five, his topic again is God’s bestowal of divine offerings, but once more he focuses on grace. Grace is sent from God, but no mention is made of the Holy Spirit’s involvement in the giving; the single reference to *caritas* places it far below grace. In fact, grace here has many of the attributes Albert had given to

114 “Rursus nota quod non est orandus deus, quod nobis lumen gratiae suae infundat aut aliquid huiusmodi, sed hoc orandum est, ut digni simus accipere.... ‘In hoc apparuit gratia dei, caritas, in nobis, quoniam deus filium...’ Nota primo: ‘in hoc apparuit caritas etc., quia secundum Augustinum maior gratia hae cest etc.’ Eckhart, LW IV, Sermo VI, 1:56 and 2:57, p. 56. He also centers on grace in sermon Twenty-Five and in his German Sermon Fifty-Eight. The relationship between *caritas* and light is discussed in this study in Chapter Five.


caritas, and is not only above caritas, but even above intellect. Each work, act, and even gift of God is a ‘grace’, which Eckhart claims is above caritas, outside the category of genus, and so is above intellect.117 Because he has previously equated caritas and grace this hierarchical placement seems contradictory. It is particularly so because those things freely given from God are the general perfections (caritas is one) and grace.118 It is possible the change in the location of caritas is connected to the order’s emphasis on the primacy of the intellect. It is also possible this change is related to the Aristotelian texts that require less of the Latin terms for divine love. Ruh has correlated Eckhart’s later German sermons with his Parisian Questions and shows how the sermons reflect Dominican emphasis on the primacy of the intellect over the will. In the text of the Franciscan Gonsalvo, with whom Eckhard debated this topic, dilectio is Gonsalvo’s term of choice although he does introduce caritas when he refutes Eckhart’s arguments (rationes). He holds that the intellect and the appetite, as acquired virtues, are not the highest perfections; the highest are the infused virtues, of which caritas is one. In Gonsalvo’s rendition of Eckhart’s arguments, there is no mention of any divine love.119

117 “Omne opus dei in creatura est gratia, et solius dei actus sive donum est gratia…. Gratia longe super caritatem; primo sicut anima super potentiam, secundo sicut esse super opus, tertio sicut principium et causa super casatum, sic extra genus, sicut scis, et consequenter est super intellectum…. Nota gratia est a solo deo pari ratione sicut et ipsum esse.” These are just a few examples. LW IV, 235-43; Eckhart, Teacher & Preacher, 216-221.

118 “Hinc est quod huiusmodi, scilicet perfectiones communes et gratia, dicuntur gratis dari, a deo dari…” LW IV, 240. Hadewijch and Albert both consider caritas as one of the perfections, see above, fns. 56, 110.

Since Eckhart’s text is not extant, we cannot verify Gonsalvo’s version of Eckhart’s claims, and we can only glimpse Eckhart’s terminology from a few of his German Sermons to help us remember that to him grace is a “perfection.” At one point in his German sermons he claims that “perfections” exist both in knowledge and in love (minne). How this affects his overall theory is unclear.

In spite of Eckhart’s continued theoretical shifts, it is clear that he views love (caritas, minne) as sometimes equal to and sometimes inferior to the intellect. What was a new and troubling question for Albert had matured into a full-fledged debate by the time Eckhart began his tenure as a Master. The notion that the intellect was superior may have begun as (or provided) a solution for Albert as he confronted the issue regarding the inability of the Holy Spirit to bind with the soul as caritas could. It caused unforeseen issues for later Dominicans, however, in that they needed to then elevate the intellect above the source of light illuminating it (which we will see, in Chapter Five, is caritas). Something else would now be necessary as the illuminating element. Albert posed the question and struggled with it; Eckhart seems to have resolved it by replacing caritas with grace. Yet caritas still demands a role somewhere in the highest divine essences and cannot be entirely displaced. Eckhart’s shifting emphasis indicates the Dominicans had determined which position they would take, but their arguments were far from solidified.

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120 In Sermon Seventy, Eckhart refers to this debate and the perfection of (or in) both bekantnisse und minne. DW 3, 751. Also see Ruh, 278-9 on Eckhart’s German Sermons Seventy through Seventy-Five; McGinn, Mystical Thought, 5-6.

121 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, 197-8; Davies, 142, 198; Gerald Schlabach, For the Joy set Before Us: Augustine & Self-Denying Love (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 78, 81-2. Future research will involve bringing authors from the Franciscan side of the debate into this study to analyze their opinions on the issues and on the relationship between caritas and grace.
In the divine hierarchy, *caritas* is essentially one with the whole Trinity, and is one-in-the-same as the Holy Spirit. *Caritas* is placed at a level in the divine order that is very near or touching the Holy Spirit so as to assist in the conveyance of benefits. All of the authors under study here make some distinction between *caritas* and the Persons of the Christian Trinity and they each distinguish it at times from a more general love (*amor* or *minne*). *Caritas* is in no way set aside, for it is God; how it is God, however, is open to at least some interpretation. For Albert, Hadewijch, and Eckhart, *caritas* is God yet is not exactly the Holy Spirit. Although not all of them consider *caritas* a *donum*, and not all feel this love is the Gift that is the Holy Spirit, each does consider *caritas* a conduit for giving. An author’s determination of *caritas*-as-gift becomes more significant in regard to role *caritas* plays in conveying other divine benefits to the human soul, such as healing and knowledge. Additionally, the question arises as to whether *caritas* occupies a primary position in our understanding of the divine mind, either by motivating us to accept God’s gifts, strengthening our use of reason, or increasing our intellectual ability to comprehend truths. These issues are taken up in Chapter Five.
CHAPTER FIVE
CARITAS AND THE SOUL

The previous chapter explored the idea that caritas is one with the Holy Spirit; the strength of the essential bond between caritas and the Trinity yields a divine oneness that diffuses into the human heart for the benefit of individual and all (Rom. 5:5). Caritas is the conveyor and the conveyed, the mover and the moved; as such is itself one of the benefits brought to the human soul. Caritas, like the benefits it brings, is a “gift” given to humans from God. As the organ or instrument of the Holy Spirit, this love elevates the soul above the world. The four authors here are generally in agreement that caritas and spiritus sanctus are essentially one, but are less in agreement as to the status of caritas as the same kind of gift as is the Holy Spirit. Each acknowledges that caritas (or minne) is sent and given from God for the benefit of the soul, but they explain, in differing ways, how caritas relates to other divine benefits, such as knowledge and the correct use of reason. Albert the Great and Meister Eckhart both place importance on the intellect; Beatrice and Hadewijch emphasizes experience in knowing divine truths. They each also discuss the relationship between caritas or minne and reason; all agree that human reason cannot, on its own, understand either divine knowledge or spiritual experiences, but again, their opinions differ on the role caritas plays in assisting comprehension.

1 See fn. 49 below.

2 “Unde caritas, organum spiritus sancti, vide quantum elevare possit.” Meister Eckhart, Sermo 1, LW IV, 3-4.

3 Albert, primarily, feels that caritas is this First Gift presented to the soul at the same time as is the Holy Spirit. The other three authors do not emphasize this point.
**Caritas as Divine Gift**

The first divine benefit that *caritas* conveys, and the one that enables reception of other benefits, is *caritas* itself. Much of this topic is contained in others throughout this study, but a few statements are pertinent here. All four authors agree this love comes to the human soul through the Holy Spirit, and is essentially God as the Holy Spirit is God. Yet, *caritas* is closer to the human soul than is the third person of the Trinity, having a particular quality that allows it to enter into the soul and dwell there as God. This particular property of *caritas*, in turn, enables it to present other gifts from God to the soul. As Augustine puts it, “when we love (*dilectio*) *caritas*, we love her loving something… she is not *caritas* if she is not loving something.” *Caritas* cannot even love herself without “loving herself loving something;” that something, for Augustine, is the human soul. This giving to or loving of the soul is the action that makes *caritas* herself something to be loved.\(^4\) Brought to the soul via the Holy Spirit by the infusing breath of the divine Trinity, *caritas* illuminates the unknown or the unseen, bringing inner light in the love (*diligere*) that is part of her nature.\(^5\) For Richard of St. Victor, that breathing-in brings with it a love that is owed to the human soul from the divine, and which is infused

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\(^4\) Quia cum diligimus caritatem, aliquid diligentem diligimus propter hoc ipsum quia diligit aliquid. Ergo quid diligit caritas ut possit etiam ipsa caritas diligi? Caritas enim non est quae nihil diligit. Si autem se ipsam diligit, diligit aliquid oportet ut caritate se diligit.” Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Bk. 8, c. 5.12, Hill, 253.

\(^5\) Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Bk. 8, c. 5.12, Hill, 253; also see Gioia, p. 171, where he discusses God as truth and as light and connects this visionary illumination to *caritas*.
into the human mind to affect or initiate ardor or divine fire directed toward spiritual things.  

Beatrice sees *minne* as the embodiment of all things given from the heavens.  

Love rises or initiates itself (*op-ersteet*) in the human heart “without any intermediary (*toe-doen*) of human workings.” On moving itself, *minne* also moves the soul so that the individual experiences the motion in all senses at once, often to the point of being overwhelmed. This sensory overload accompanies the “filling up” of the human soul with the gift of love and wellbeing (*waelheit*). Albert views *caritas* as a something located both in the heavens and on earth, able to diffuse into the soul by moistening it and preparing it for the fertility of divine gifts. It is first in divine realms, and then is sent to the soul. The Holy Spirit, giving *caritas* and itself as gifts, is closer to the soul in proximity than the other persons of the Trinity, yet cannot join to the body in the permanent way as the Son.  

According to Long, Albert considers the soul to be

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7 See Chapter Four, fn. 90.

8 “…ende blideleke op-ersteet ende datsi har selven beruert int herte sonder enich toe-doen van menscheliken werken.” *Seven Manieren*, R-VM, 13.

9 “Alse aldus har selven gevuelt in die overuloedicheit of waelheit ende in die grote volheit van herten, soe wert hare geest alemale in minnen versinkende…” (Thus as she feels her ‘self” in the overflowing of wellbeing and in the great feeling of heart, so did her soul completely sink down in *minne…*) *Ibid.*., 15.

10 “Dicendum quod ad insinuandum duo praecepta charitatis bis deit, id est, in duobus loci, quia in coelo in quo magis refuget gloria Dei qui charitate diligendus est, et in terra in qua nobiscum conversatur proximus…. quod diffusio sumitur metaphorice ab humido quod foecundat divisum per partes terrestres siccas; quia sic charitas terrena corda sicca rigat ad foecunditatem.” *Sent.* I, D. 14, A. 12, ed. Borgnet, 400.

11 See below, fn. 49.
conjoined with the body (forma coniuncta) according to being, or existence (esse) but separate according to essence (essentia).\(^\text{12}\) Caritas, as an uncreated substance, joins with the soul not through that which is created, but according to what is similar and an emanation of the same Good as God; by this same Goodness, God joins with the soul.\(^\text{13}\) As such it provides a medium between the soul and God, making it possible for the gifts of God to enter the soul (and also the body).\(^\text{14}\) This is important, as we shall see, because other divine benefits, such as knowledge, are (and must be) given with caritas to be of any use to humans. This love of God must be inherent in the thing given, as it is necessarily inherent in itself.\(^\text{15}\) While Hadewijch does not see caritas itself is a gift, its significance in the gift-giving process is imperative. Caritas reigns between God and the


\(^{13}\) “…charitas non jungit nos per hoc quod est creatura, sed secundum quod est similitude et emanation quaedam bonitatis Dei, qui Deus ex eadem bonitate in ipsa jungitur animae,” Sent. I, D. 14, A. 1, ed. Borgnet, 465.

\(^{14}\) “..quia in tertio Sententiarum probatur, quod Spiritus sanctus nullo modo unibilis est.” This conclusion comes at the end of a long argument agreeing with some thinkers on the uncreated and the substantive nature of caritas, and disagreeing with others that the Holy Spirit joins to the will of the soul separably unlike the Son that joins to the body eternally/permanently. Further, he argues, these erroneous thinkers claim that the Holy Spirit itself is that caritas that joins to and perfects the will. Albertus Magnus, Sent. I, D. 17, A. 1, ed. Borgnet, p. 464.

\(^{15}\) See fn. 54 below.
soul that “has become God with God” implying that a type of connection has already been made. Precisely how this connection occurs she does not say, but other statements in the letter suggest God, the Trinity, or the Holy Spirit (all in one) has initiated the contact. “In the riches of the clarity of the Holy Spirit, the soul celebrates…feasts,” she says in one passage; a short time later she credits God with presenting this clarity to the soul. So here there is something of a connection between this clarity and caritas, although she does not say this directly in this letter. What she does say is that it is spiritual caritas that is revealed before any truths are “opened” or revealed to the human soul. “The soul waits,” she says, “and God gives.” Finally, for Meister Eckhart, caritas is “unifying and diffusive,” reaching equally to all or to none. No one is given caritas and another left out of that giving. God’s nature is such that he shines with love as the sun shines with light. Caritas (love) emanates from him the way light and heat emanate from the sun. The difference between one human’s “having” of the gift of caritas and another human’s lack of it depends on each human soul’s ability to receive it. Those who accept more receive more.

**Caritas and Knowledge: Their Relationship and its Affects**

All gifts of God are given freely to all humans, without reservation or (bias) for individual differences of any kind. The only determining factor in the amount of caritas


17 “In de rijcheit der claerheit des heilichs gheests, Daer inne maket de salighe ziele verweende feeste.... Soe wanneer god der zalegher zielen gheuet die claerheit, dat sine besien mach in siere godheit, soe besiet sine in siere ewelechei...groetheit...wijsheit...edelheit.... In ieghenwordicheit...vloyelecheit, ende in siere gheheelheit.” *Brieven*, Letter 28; 1-15, 229-30.
a human can receive is that human’s ability to receive more. If the human is filled with love, healing, or wisdom, that person holds such an abundance of this quality that he or she can help others to receive more of the gift that is their own portion. One of these gifts is knowledge of divine truths. *Caritas* brings knowledge of the mind of God to the human soul, Augustine has told us in the past; “what is possessed by the mind is had by knowing, and no good is completely known that is not completely loved.”

Beatrice spends a great deal of time explaining how the soul understands something new as she makes her way through each *maniere*. Her instruction stresses that any intellectual realization accompanies an increased emotional awareness, and both are experienced by the soul as it learns through the various *manieren of minne*. An intellectual analysis of the experience is necessarily holistic; her definition of “what it is” and explanation of “what it does” includes the “how it makes you feel” aspects. A person cannot know whether they know the truth of the experience unless the experiential knowing that comes from the emotions verifies that truth. For this reason, she sometimes repeats an emotional state the soul might be feeling, or adds to her description of that state an alternate explanation of it. She does so because she feels that in any given *maniere* the relationship between the soul, *minne*, and God could be viewed from a slightly different perspective; therefore, the resulting experience might also be different.

For example, throughout the first three *Manieren* the soul feels desire to do, or grow, or serve, or suffer in more or different ways. Each success brings another round of longing. One of the first lessons she stresses to her readers is that all the intellectual work of the soul as well as the physical work of the body is meant to enable the soul to better know God/*minne*, to be closer and more like God (being perfected) and to serve *minne*.

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18 “Quidquid autem mente habetur, noscendo habetur; nullumque bonum perfecte noscitur, quod non perfecte amatur.” *De diversis quaestionibus*, Q. 35:2; Mosher, *On Diverse Questions*, 66.
Beatrice specifies what some of these activities are – seeking, teaching, praying, and meditating. The end result is to become more suited to God and *minne* by being closer to the likeness of them, and to be in the constant presence of *minne*. “The soul feels that all her senses are made holy in *minne* and her will has become *minne*... and her whole self has become *minne,*” she says when success is achieved. Encountering and experiencing God, *minne*, and the Trinity makes possible knowledge of the divine mind. To experience it is to know what it is, what it does, and how the participating soul reacts to this emotionally epistemological activity. She imparts her understanding of the event through the description of her experience with the divine, her elevation into the company of the flaming seraphim, and her immersion in the “certain truth, pure clarity, bright knowledge ... and the soul... <that> will be with the spirits in the immense Divinity and the exalted Trinity.” Knowledge of God is linked with inner vision; both *minne* and God illuminate her internal sense of sight. Indeed, part of the soul’s longing is to ‘see’ the

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19 “Ende dit es hare vraginghe ende hare leeringhe ende hare eischinge te gode, ende hare peinsinge; hoe si hier toe comen mach ende si moghe recrighen die naheit ter gelijcheit der minnen…” *Seven Manieren*, I, R-VM, 4.

20 In 15: “si in ghemaket es van haren sceppere na sign beelde ende na sijn ghelikenesse, dat hart es te minnene ende te huedene.”; ln. 28: “...; hoe si hier toe comen mach ende wie si moghe vercrighen die naheit ter gelijcheit der minne.” *Seven Manieren*, R-VM, p. 4.

21 “Ende dan ghevuelt si dat al hor sinne sijn geheilicht in der minnen ende har wille es worden minne, ende datsi so diepe es versonden ende verswolgen int afgront der minnen ende selve al es worden minne.” *Seven Manieren* IV, R-VM, 14-15.

22 “Dar es hare wesen ende al har wille hare begere ende har minne in die sekere waerheit ende in die pure clarheit, ende in die edele hoecheit, ende in die verwende scoenheit ende in die suete geselscap van de ouersten geeste...int clare bekinnen ende int hebben ende int gebrukhen hare minnen...ende meest onder die bernende seraphine in die grote godheit ende in die hoge drieuulichheit es hare lieffle rustinge ende hare genuchleke woninge.” *Seven Manieren* VII, R-VM, 31. Several medieval thinkers discuss an illuminative source that assisted the mind in more clearly seeing intelligible objects. Robert Grosseteste and Albert the Great are among those who felt this type of irradiation was necessary for clearer spiritual or intellectual vision. In some images this irradiation appears precisely depicted in images that demonstrate the action of this type of illumination. See Katherine H. Tachau, “Seeing as Action and Passion in the Thirteenth
object of its love, God, and once in God’s presence will, in fact, “look upon that which it has so sorrowfully longed for.” The soul sees God when in the divine presence, which means it has gained likeness to God, has “come closer to the light of that truth” (illumination as one of minne’s attributes), and this likeness is itself a better understanding since one becomes like that which it desires to know. Just as emotion cannot be separated from the feeling and knowing, vision cannot be separated from the seeing and knowing. Beatrice is likely following Augustine here, as her references to him demonstrate her familiarity with his work. His own theory included the notion that the soul united with God, or who has God, can see caritas when in this state. In addition, caritas then becomes a means for seeing the Trinity; he mentions this more than once in De Trinitate. If, as Gioia argues, Augustine joins caritas (or amor or dilectio) inseparably to knowledge, the nun is possibly acknowledging her agreement with the African bishop.

and Fourteenth Centuries,” in The Mind’s Eye: Art and Theological Argument in the Middle Ages, eds. Jeffrey F. Hamburger and Anne-Marie Bouche (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 336-359, at 343-4; also see fn. 42 below for Albert’s explanation of caritas as one illuminating source. Future research will include the study of similar types of images that may depict caritas in this manner.

23 “Daer salsi niedeleke anesien datsi so morwelike heft gemint, ende si salne hebben te haren eeuweliken wromen diensi so getrouwelike heft gedient. Ende si sal sijs gebruyen met volre genuchten dien si dicke in hare siele met minnen heft behelset.” Seven Manieren VII, R-VM, 37-8.

24 “So hare meer wert gegeuen van bouen, so si meer es eiscende ende so hare meer wert uertoent, so si meer uerhangen wert in begerten naerre te comene den lichte der warheit, ende der purheit, ender der edelheit, ende der gebrukelicheit der minnen.” Seven Manieren V, R-VM, 22


26 Augustine in De Trinitate: “Immo uero uides trinitatem si caritatem uides.” (8:12) Gioia points out several of Augustine’s claims about the inseparability of various elements of caritas, dilectio, and amor in the Trinity. For example, amor and vision are inseparable (DT, 8.4, Goia, 172);
All of the soul’s faculties are employed in attaining the most important kind of knowledge Beatrice emphasizes to her students: self-knowledge. The knowing soul understands that while it dwells in the physical body there are limits to its ability to “do for minne” or for God, or to comprehend what divine information minne or God is presenting at any given moment. The soul knows that it wants to achieve far beyond its powers of human reason and sensory reception. But, she admonishes, this is no reason to cease trying, because the lesson is partially for the soul to acquire the discipline to strive continuously, improving beyond each limitation as it more clearly understand how to do that which it needs to do. God and minne continuously test the soul: God allows a closer knowledge and a different maniere of minnen to happen and with this additional knowledge the soul surpasses current limitations. Minne then hides the soul’s own power from itself and the soul must struggle anew. This love is involved in both controlling information that reaches the soul and in transferring that information to the soul once the soul becomes able to accept it. How the soul gains knowledge of its own limitations, Beatrice does not exactly explain. Yet it is clear that through the effort of overcoming limitations, the soul more perfectly understands both itself and God.

amor is tied to light and knowledge (De Trinitate, 8:12, Gioia, 128, 173).

27 “Dese begerte werte onderwilen seere verstorent in der zielen ende so begrijpt si met starker begerten alle dine te doene ende alle dogen te volgene al te dogene ende te verdragene, ende al har werke sonder sparen ende sonder mate in der minnen te volgene.” Seven Manieren III, R-VM, 9-10.

28 “In der pinen moet si bliuen tote dien male, datse onse here troest ende set in ander maniere van minnen ende van begerten, ende in noch naerre kinnesse te heme. Ende dan moet si werken na dien dat hare wert gegeuen van onsen here.” Seven Manieren III, R-VM, 12.

29 “Nochtan heftsi hare geweldicheit der zielen verborgen, tote dies male, datsi in meerre hoecheit es geclommen, ende datsi altemale hars selfs es worden [vri] ende dattie minne geweldeleker regneert binnen hare.” Seven Manieren VI, R-VM, 28.
For Albert the Great, caritas is vital for the human being to know and understand the divine mind so as to live as perfectly as possible while in via, or during this lifetime. Knowledge is conveyed to the soul as a gift from God. The Holy Spirit is this gift, and because caritas is essentially the Holy Spirit, it is also this gift. Caritas leads the soul to the kingdom of God, brings wisdom to the soul and enables her to recognize that wisdom, and makes all human beings and their works pleasing to God. In fact, without caritas nothing humans do comes to anything at all. Therefore the soul must be able to know on many levels; from the question of whom to help with alms to the awareness that a vision is indeed a vision of divine things, caritas diffuses herself and her gifts through and within every soul, apportioning sufficient, vital information to each soul as it requires and is able to accept. Albert’s opinions on what is necessary to know and how caritas facilitates understanding are scattered throughout his numerous works, at times seeming to contradict each other as to whether it is caritas, dilectio, or amor that performs a specific function. But a close examination of those topics specify caritas in relation to knowledge reveals his firm point of view that love, in some form (amor, dilectio, vel caritas), is required in knowing divine truths.

Albert follows Augustine and Peter Lombard, among others, in many of his opinions, departing when necessary to clarify specific issues. He also introduces Aristotle’s theories on knowledge and the intellect that came to the Latin west in the works of Avicenna, Al-Ghazalli, and Averroes, although he also corrects these when he feels it is necessary.\(^{(30)}\) The Bishop’s opinions rest on the biblical tradition that no human

\(^{(30)}\) There are a number of works that focus on the extent to which Albert agreed with or disagreed with Avicenna and Averroes on the mind and knowledge; because caritas is strictly a Christian term, none of the aforementioned authors treated it specifically even as they discussed love in Greek and Arabic. For examples, see Dag Nikolaus Haase, “The Early Albertus Magnus and his Arabic Sources on the Theory of the Soul,” Vivarium 40 (2008) 232-252; A. de Libera, Albert Le Grand et La Philosophie (Paris: J. Vrin, 1990); Albert Zimmermann, “Albertus Magnus und der lateinische Averroismus,” in Albertus Magnus, Doctor Universalis: 1280/1980, (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1980), 465-493.
work comes to anything without caritas.\textsuperscript{31} Real knowledge can only arrive in the soul if it arrives via this type of love, whether both caritas and the knowledge it carries are hidden in revelations or are visible or audible in signs or in words.\textsuperscript{32} Sensibles and signs that the soul perceives indicate the Holy Spirit and caritas have conveyed this information – along with themselves – to the mind, which can then process them.\textsuperscript{33}

Albert refrains from commenting on Lombard’s claim that in reaching the soul even the Holy Spirit requires love (dilectio vel caritas) for the work it does in the soul to come to anything at all. Having quoted the master, he moves on to treat other topics at hand.\textsuperscript{34}

Of interest is the manner in which human beings become acquainted with the world. A great deal of knowledge comes to the soul through the body via the external senses (touch, taste, smell, hearing, vision). This material and other immaterial

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\textsuperscript{31} Statements to this effect appear throughout his works; see fn. 45 below. “Multa enim cognoscimus, quae operari non possimus; et multa cognoscimus circa quae ut cognoscimus, affici non possimus, nisi elevemur supra posse nostrum a dono Dei dato nobis. Et ita est in dilectione quae est charitas.” Albertus Magnus, Sent. III, D. 27, A. 1, Borgnet 28, 509:2; “Nihil facit hominem et opus ejus valere vitam aeternam, nisi melius vita aeterna vel aequivalens illi; caritas facit hominem et opus ejus valere vitam aeternam...” To this claim that caritas is uncreated, Albert adds that caritas makes the gift of itself an even greater gift. “Dicendum, quod caritas secundum hoc quod conjuncta est Deo per similitudinem suae bonitatis, est valens vitam aeternam, non condignitate, quia vita aeterna Deus est cui nihil est condignum, sed reputatione divina, quia Deus non tantum exigit a nobis pro vita aeterna quantum valet, sed quantum nos valemus dare ex suo dono. Majus autem pritium quod offerre possimus ex suo dono, charitas, est et actus charitatis.” Sent., I, D. 17, A. 1, ed. Borgnet, 462, 466.

\textsuperscript{32} “Nec spiritus sanctus proprie dicitur donum nisi propter dilectionem , quam qui non habuerit… nihil ei prodest.” Albertus Magnus, Sent. I, D. 17, Part F, ed. Borgnet, 478. He follows Lombard in quoting Augustine’s passage here, who himself quotes Romans 2:36. Lombard adds his agreeing opinion, but Albert adds nothing more.

\textsuperscript{33} “Dicendum, quod est augmentum sensiblile per signum, et augmentum insensibile. Verbi gratia, charitas incipiens manens in statu incipientium augetur, sed insensibiler; sed illa quae mutat statum, ut jam sit proficiens, et fiat perfecta, in illo augmento quod est sensibile per signum, dico quod Spiritus sanctus mittitur.” Albertus Magnus, Sent. I, D. 17, A. 9, ed. Borgnet, 479.

\textsuperscript{34} See Chapter Four, fn. 82.
information enters the internal senses (common sense, imagination, phantasy, estimation, memory) for processing by the intellect. Our external senses come directly into contact with material objects and receive information about their size, shape, smell, sound, sight, and other characteristics. The external senses are passive, meaning they do not act upon the object they contact; it is the objects themselves that act on their surroundings by emitting likenesses of themselves (also called species) into the medium (air or aethers) as in an ever-expanding sphere (also called emanation, to use the Neoplatonic term) much as the sun emits rays of light and heat that the sense of touch receives as warmth and of sight as a blinding orb. Both material and immaterial objects transmitted species of themselves in this way, and these species multiply themselves rectilinearly, or point-by-point, along lines, or rays, from each previous point as they move outward from the object. When they make contact with the external organs of sense (skin, eardrum, eye, tongue, nostril), they pass through the medium of that organ into the brain where they are received by the internal senses and leave an image (imago, similitudo) as a lasting impression on those senses. The internal senses are primarily passive, although they do possess some powers in sorting, compiling, re-compiling, storing, or recalling all or pieces of the species they encounter. Medieval philosophers disagreed as to where in the brain the internal senses resided, how passive or active they were, and the exact abilities of


36 Robert Grosseteste, Albert, and Roger Bacon were among the medieval philosophers that accepted the multiplication of species in visual theory. Roger Bacon used several synonyms for species, including imago and phantasma, which confuses the distinction (if any) between image (imago) and species. See Katherine H. Tachau, “‘Et maxime visus, cuius species venit ad stellas et ad stellas et ad quem species stellorum veniunt’: Perspectiva and Astrologia in Late Medieval Thought,” in La Visione e lo sguardo nel Medio Evo, vol. 1. Micrologus 5 (Florence, 1998), 201-24 at 211; Ibid., “Seeing as Action and Passion,” 340-1. Steneck provides a thorough explanation of the internal senses and how they operate according to Albert. See his Problem of Internal Senses, 9-18 and Chapters 2 and 3.
each, but, in general, these senses collected and prepared images, of the species for processing by the intellect. This sorting and recalling ability is important because the mind necessarily uses the images (original and recompiled) in knowing and understanding whatever the object is.

The internal sense of estimation has the ability to process species emanating from an object that are not specifically sensed by either the external senses, or by what Albert considers the first of the internal senses – the common sense. The estimative sense is involved in the recognition of intentions (intentio) (friendliness, hostility, or a personal relationship with another person) and is active in knowing in that it motivates both animals and humans to do something (run, smile, hug). The internal sense of imagination stores images of objects and intentions and works together with the estimative sense and the sense of phantasy to recognize the specific nature of these intentions and relationships. Phantasy (or cogitative power) is active in that it combines, compiles, and recompiles images and intentions in order to produce new images of things not exactly in the world but possible in some world. Medieval examples include imagining a gold mountain or a goat-stag. The fifth internal sense, memory, stores images, species, and intentions as does the imagination, but memory connects them with temporal events, such as a baby’s first birthday or an encounter with a homeless person when one had just run out of change. The time and often place of these events can then be recalled at a later time – hence the making of memories.

The objects of the abovementioned senses can be material (also called sensibles) or immaterial (insensibles). Both emanate species and those species make their way

37 For discussions on these issues, as well as the materiality of the species themselves, see Katherine Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics 1250-1345. Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill, 1988, 17-21.

38 Steneck, 14-17.
through the external and internal senses. The images and intentions subsequently generated are not in material form but are separated, or abstracted from the material object as they pass through the media of the senses. For the human mind to make use of any images and intentions in order to know them, the intellect, located in the brain, must be able to perceive them clearly. Comprised of a passive (potential) and active (agent) component,\(^{39}\) the intellect performs the task of clarifying and perceiving images and intentions. The passive intellect encounters and receives images, but does not act on them until the active intellect – which is auto illuminated – provides enough brightness for the species to be perceived. This active, agent intellect provides adequate light for many types of perception, but not nearly enough for those immaterial objects whose species are much more refined than those that material objects emanate. It is here, Albert claims, that \textit{caritas} becomes vital for knowledge.

There are four acts that the light of \textit{caritas} performs to assist the soul in better perceiving which objects are worthy of further contemplation. The first act is to drive out clouds of sin in the same way sunshine dispels rain clouds. The second is to reveal those things that lay hidden in the mind, especially those in the mental equivalent of our peripheral vision. Third, \textit{caritas} increases the power or intensity of inner light rays that shine directly on the object under scrutiny, bringing it into greater relief. The fourth act, effected only by divine light and not by others, is namely to vivify and propel species through that light as if the species were of things naturally generable and corruptible.\(^{40}\)

\(^{39}\) Albert asserts that there is a agent intellect in the mind, “Similiter dicimus intellectum agentem humanum esse con junctum animae humanae et esse simplicem et non habere intelligibilia sed agere ipsa in intellectu possibili ex phantasmatibus sicut expresse dicit Averroes in commento libri de Anima,” (\textit{Summe De Creaturis}, ed. Borgnet, 466) and a Universal Agent Intellect (stated in \textit{De causis et processu universitatis}, as in Gilson, 672, fn. 13) which is God whose light is the cause of all existence. More discussion on this in relation to \textit{caritas} below, fn. 54.

\(^{40}\) “Charitas lumen est per effectum luminis qui est multiplex; sed tantum quatuor sunt principialiores actus ejus. Quorum primus est illuminando pellere tenebras. Secundus est ostendere ea quae latebant, et hoc praecipue secundum quod est in extremitate perspicui tangente
Albert holds that caritas is able to increase the mind’s ability to see objects (including universal truths) because caritas is itself a source of light that adds illumination to the mind’s own source of light. He treats the performance of the light of caritas as analogous to the divine light except that the light of caritas is slightly less bright and reaches slightly less far into the darkness. But each adds “a more ample light” to the lamp of the mind’s intellect (the agent intellect lit) as it attempts to apprehend that an object is there, and then what that object is that it now perceives. This is one way in which the diffusion of caritas works with the intellect in the soul, specifically, the agent intellect, which has its own dimmer source of light.41 The light of caritas is so much brighter that when it adds its illumination to that of the agent intellect within the chamber of the mind, the intellect can better perceive objects it could not otherwise discern. So the object may be hidden, but the additional light of caritas in the room brightens the entire room to reveal that object. Once the intellect sees the object more clearly it can process the information (size, shape, sound, taste, etc.) and identify what the object actually is as well discern the object’s purpose.

At the same time that caritas assists the soul in knowing the truth of things, it makes itself known even more effectively. Caritas, as an auto-illuminated object, enables both itself and other species to be better seen and thus better known by the


41 “Est autem alius intellectus non accipiens ex phantasmate, sed in lumine agentis intellectus tantum, et in his in quibus illuminatur etiam ampliori lumine quam sit lumen agentis intellectus, sicut est radius divinus vel radius revelationis angelicae. Nec hoc intelligo, quod sint duo intellectus numero et subjecto, sed duo per modum conversionis ad superius et inferius.... Quia de natura sui magis se habet ad superius, de statu autem hujus vitae magis ad inferius.” Albertus Magnus, Sent. I, D. 17, A. 5, Borgnet, 472.
intellect. This auto-illumination makes caritas an effective light (that enables this revelation to take place) for the reasons mentioned above. It is not seen because of other causes (other sources of light) but is seen because, like the sun, it shines and so is known in-and-of-itself (per se). And, Albert asserts, an object known by its own light is better known than an object known by the reflected light of another source. For example, the sun is easier to see than is the moon reflecting the sun’s rays. So while caritas is assisting the soul in knowing unlit objects, it is making itself known even better and far more powerfully. Thus, caritas enables one to know love as well as to know whether one is ‘in caritas’ while in this life (in via). Such knowledge requires a revelation of that very fact – a revelation that comes from divine love (dilectio) freely given, not from the tumultuousness (as clouds or storms) of concupiscence or from phantasms. Knowing the love (dilectio vel caritas – nam unius rei nomen est utrumque) with which one loves

42 “Charitas lumen est effective, quia pellit tenebras peccati, et etiamsi lumen esset per se spirituale, quod tamen magis convenit veritati, non sequitur, quod seipsa videretur propter causas prius dictas, quamvis esset visibilis de se.” Albertus Magnus, Sent. I, D. 17, A. 5, ed. Borgnet, 473.

43 “Similiter distinguo ex parte ejus quod noscitur; aliquid enim ita noscitur secundum sui potestatem, quod ipsum est lux et ratio ad alia cognoscenda. Et si attendatur potestas notitiae vel intellectus ex parte objecti moventis intellectum, magis erit notum quod noscitur in luce propria et est ratio cognoscendi alia quam id quod tantum cognoscitur in luce aliena.” Albertus Magnus, Sent. I, D. 17, A. 5, ed. Borgnet, 472.


45 “Nullus sine revelatione ad se facta, potest scire se esse in charitate, duabus de causis quarum una jam dicta est; quia licet charitas manifesta sit de se, non tamen nobis ita manifestetur propter tumultum concupiscentiae et phantasmatum in cordibus nostris. Alia causa est, quia amor naturalis simillimum habet actum cum actu charitatis quandoque. Et ideo una videtur pro alia, scilicet dilectio, naturalis pro gratuita.” Albertus Magnus, Sent. D. 17, A. 5, ed. Borgnet, 473. “Qui non diliget non novit Deum quoniam Deus caritas est.” I John 4:8.
(diligere) is important as that love is essentially one with God.\textsuperscript{46} Knowing dilectio while loving and knowing one’s neighbor being loved is thus an intellectual process in which divine light illuminates the agent intellect of the soul. The soul’s intellect is assisted by this divine ray (radius divinus) by which it then knows the superior object, dilectio, and the inferior object, the neighbor.

Caritas flows out from the Holy Spirit, infuses the soul, and holds God (and the Holy Spirit) in itself while joined to the soul. It is able to join with the soul unmediated according to what is uncreated in us and is a likeness (similitudo) and emanation (emanatio) of God’s goodness (bonitatis). In other words, Albert accepts Lombard’s claim that caritas has being with the individual it has been sent to and while one with them makes them also a lover of God.\textsuperscript{47} In an earlier distinction he has specified that the gift of caritas flows out to all things, transferring divine benefits through the sense of touch.\textsuperscript{48} The Holy Spirit might hold itself to the soul as mover but is not conjoined according to essence because it is not able to be united to any created thing. Caritas, however, can join with the soul, and, thus, is the medium through which the Holy Spirit as gift and with giver is infused into the soul. So, just as the soul holds itself to the worldly body as the form of matter and the mold for the body, the medium (inferred here

\textsuperscript{46} See Chapter Four for the essential oneness of amor, dilectio, and caritas with the Holy Spirit and God.

\textsuperscript{47} Quoting Lombard: “Ecce hic aperitur quod supra dictum erat, scilicet quod caritas sit Spiritus sanctus et donum excellentius...ita habet esse in aliquo, ut cum faciat Dei et proximi amatorem.” Albertus Magnus, Sent. I, D. 17, A. 5, ed. Bornet, 479.

to be *caritas*) enables the soul to touch and to join with the body.\(^{49}\) *Caritas* is vital to this acquisition of knowledge because it is the prime mover, moves the soul’s intellect to understanding, and joins with the soul as it conveys divine gifts.\(^{50}\)

One final point regarding caritas and knowledge connects Albert’s theories with those of Beatrice, Hadewijch, and Eckhart. To Albert, the inner senses of sight and hearing associate with the intellect, whereas touch and taste are suited to the affections. *Caritas* is more affiliated with the affections (*affectus*) than with the intellect; these are themselves closely associated with the will (*voluntas*).\(^{51}\) While both the intellect and affections are important for complete knowledge, their objects differ. Intellect perceives God as Truth (*veritas*); the affections (*affectus*) apprehend God as Goodness. Albert then compares the acts of *veritas* and *caritas*,\(^{52}\) claiming they divide different acts between them; the act of illuminating the intellect is better suited to truth,\(^{53}\) and the

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\(^{49}\) “Dicendum, quod caritas non jungit nos per hoc quod est creatura, sed secundum quod est similitudo et emanatio quaedam bonitatis Dei, qui Deus ex eadem bonitate in ipsa jungitur animae…. anima se habet ad corpus ut motor et forma, et ideo immediate est ei sicut forma materie; sed Spiritus sanctus se habet ad animam ut motor non conjunctus secundum essentiam. Praeteria, proportio est inter animam et corpus; inter animam autem et Deum non, sed distantia infinita. Et ideo necesse est medio conjungi.” Albertus Magnus, *Sent.* I, D. 17, A. 1, ed. Borgnet, 465.

\(^{50}\) See above, fn. 42; below fn. 58; and Chapter Three, fn. 68.


\(^{52}\) While Albert compares *bonitas* and *veritas* in many places, it is as of yet unclear whether he directly compares their acts rather than comparing the acts of *veritas* with *caritas*.

\(^{53}\) How *veritas* illuminates the intellect differently from *caritas* is unclear. More study is ongoing.
expulsion of sin (which occurs through corrupted affections) is better suited to *caritas*. In this case, perfection in *caritas* is better ordered to end in the affections than in the intellect. Both *caritas* and *veritas* make (things) grow; *veritas* makes fertile our understanding and *caritas* our affections. Most significantly, for human knowledge, our highest understanding is ordered toward the affections (with *caritas*). So the knowledge in the affections (e.g. the heart) is vital for overall comprehension of the divine mind; knowing God in one’s heart is as necessary as knowing Him in one’s mind, if not more so. Although the Dominican order at this time had begun to place importance on the primacy of the intellect over the will (and, thus, *caritas*), it is difficult to discern whether Albert felt as strongly about this as would his student, Aquinas (and more strongly, Eckhart). He has stressed that universal intelligibles cannot be perceived by the soul without the illuminating presence of *caritas*, and so *caritas*, as mentioned above, is vital for the human agent intellect (within the mind) to perceive those intelligibles already present. So the Universal Agent Intellect, which exists uppermost in the range of brightness (in the mind), must be the intellect that is primary to the will and the light next to which *caritas* is slightly less bright. Aristotles *Metaphysics* supports this notion.

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55 There is a vast amount of discussion on this rather confusing topic – is the Universal Agent Intellect an intellect along a range of intellects or along a range of illuminating acts, or is it a separate intellect all together? How does it relate to *caritas*, and, now that *veritas* illuminates the human Agent Intellect, to *veritas*? Albert’s theory appears in several different works, and modern scholars struggle to piece it together. The topic is out of the range of this study at present, but for more information, see above, fn. 40 for two texts that contain some of his theory. Gilson cites those and also *De unitate intellectus contra Averroem, De Anima*, and *Intellectus et intelligibili*, 670, fns. 9,10; De Libera cites these, *De Anima*, and several other works, *Albert le Grand et La Philosophie*, 222, 233, 237, 242-3.
because the media translation employs the term *desiderium* when referring to the prime mover rather than any form of *amor*, and both the media translation and Averroes’ commentary state clearly that, in regard to the prime mover, the objects of understanding or intellect are primary to desire. Desire is the mover and understanding or thinking is the act.\(^{56}\) Albert introduces *amare* into the discussion, but in key statements continues to

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\(^{56}\) The following is found in *Aristoteles Latinus, XXV 2 Metaphysica Translatio Anonyma sive “Media”* In the media translation, Aristotle sets down a sequence of thoughts regarding the Prime Mover. First, both the object of desire and the object of thought move without being moved. They are the same primary objects. “Movet autem sicut quod desiderabile et intellectuale; movet non mota. Et horum prima eadem.” (1072a 26, p. 213) Thinking is the starting point, Aristotle determines, so desire is consequent on opinion, which is part of thought. Thought is moved by the object(s) of thought. “Desiderimus autem quia videmus bonum aut videtur eo quod desideramus; principium enim est intelligentia. Sed intellectus ab intellectuali movetur.” (1072a 30) The final cause produces motion as if being loved. “Et enim alicui cuius, quorum hoc quidem est, illud vero non est; movet autem quasi desideratum, et motum vero alia movet. (1072b 3). He then explains that the highest and best act (implying motion) is the act of contemplation, because the actuality of thought is life. The divine mind engages in this activity, which is self actualizing and actualizing all else. The divine being is the actualization as well as the act. “Verum intelligentia secundum se eius est quod secundum se optimum, et maxime eius quod est maxime. Eum autem intelligent intellectus secundum transumptionem intelligibilis; intelligibile fit ordinans et intelligens, quare idem intellectus et intelligibile. Nam susceptibile intelligibilis et substantie est intellectus, agit autem habens, quare illud magis hoc quod putat intellectus divinum habere et theoria dulcissimum et desiderabilissimum. Si ergo sic se habet, ut nos quando, Deus semper, mirabile; quodsi magis mirabilia. Habet autem sic. Et vita existit; nam intellectus actus est vita, sed illud actus. Sed et actus secundum se illius est vita optima et sempiterna. Dicimus autem Deum esse animal sempiternum noilissimum, quare vita et semper continua, sempiterna inest Deo; hoc enim est Deus” (*Met*. 12, Ch. 7, 1072b 15-29, 214.) After detailing motion of the heavens and planets, Aristotle returns to explain again the first cause of motion, which is thinking. Because the thinker is the object of thought, and because the object of thought is the highest, best, (and actualizes all life), the most excellent of all things to think about is itself, so that divine [thinking (creating) is thinking on thinking]. “Se ipsum ergo intelligit, si est quod potentissimum est, est et intelligentia intelligentie intelligentia” (1074b 33 220). *Aristoteles Latinus, XXV 2 Metaphysica Translatio Anonyma sive “Media”* ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976); The Latin is also printed in Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, Bk II, Tract. 2, Ch. 5-6, ed. Cologne, 489-90; see the media translation there and in and if he does closely follow Averroes, see *Ibn Rushd’s Metaphysics*, trans Charles Genequand (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), 151. For Albert’s opinion, see fn. 57 below.
use desiderium as well.\textsuperscript{57} So caritas, as a form of amor, is inferior to this highest intellect.

Additionally, in his Liber de causis et processu universitatis, Albert claims that we know God through the effects of the First Cause (the Prime Mover). The first effect of the movement that discloses God (the Universally Agent Intellect) is Intelligence.\textsuperscript{58} Although he has previously claimed that caritas is that prime mover, that form of amor is not mentioned in the Liber de causis. It is possible, then, that this early Dominican is modifying his position on the role or position of caritas in acquiring knowledge? After all, if the Universal Agent Intellect is in the mind, and if it is a brighter light than caritas, what need does the mind have for caritas? Albert confronts this issue in several of his works; at times he seems to reach only tentative conclusions, at other times he seems to increase the complexity of the issue. As he did he was aware that his contemporaries were critical of his method and conclusions.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{57} For example, while he adds amare here: “Ipsa igitur est maxime amata et desiderata ab omnibus, et omne quod movetur, desiderat ipsum” he omits it a few lines later, “Desiderium autem est causa motus omnis. (For the relevant Latin text of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Albert probably read, see fn. 56 above.) He then goes on to distinguish desireable good from intellectual good, but doesn’t include amor in either aspect. “...hoc bonum quod est intelligentia, semper est bonum vicens desiderium et ideo semper movet, quia quotiescumque motor fortior est eo quod moveri debet, fit motus, et quando non est fortior, movere non potest. Unde hoc modo intellectus movetur ab intellectuali bono sine dilatatione et sine medio, quia non fit primo nuntiatio boni per sensum, qui moveat appetitum, nec est aliquid retrahens ex parte accipientis intellectus, cum id quod amat, per se bonum sit et immediate influat et sit vincens totum desiderium eius cui influitur. Et ideo motus statim est actio eius in eo quod movetur ad ipsum.” Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica II, Tr. 2. ed. Cologne, 490.

\textsuperscript{58} L. Sweeney, “Are Plotinus and Albertus Magnus Neoplatonists?” in Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, ed., Lloyd P. Gerson (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983), 177-202 at195. More study is underway on this text of Albert’s, which seems to indicate he now considers intellect as primary to the will and to affect.

\textsuperscript{59} Minnis makes this point in his discussion of Grosseteste’s translation of and commentary on the Greek text of Dionysius’ Mystical Theology. He compares Grosseteste’s placement of amor above all others as “the superior function of the mind,” with Albert’s view on “the essential superiority of the intellect in unitive experience.” A. J. Minnis, Medieval Literary Theory and
Hadewijch emphasizes in several letters that minne/caritas brings knowledge to the human soul. The very first letter opens with a salvific wish that her reader be enlightened and to enjoy the benefits of understanding coupled with the feelings that accompany love or the emotional awareness of being loved. Within twenty-five lines, love, radiance, and illumination are repeated several times, each connected both with loving and understanding. Minne and terms of light (light) are central to Hadewijch’s theories on knowing the divine mind or will. All the Persons of the Trinity are engaged in this effusion of Light; the Holy Spirit, in particular, in-spirits divine light and love into the soul. Caritas and minne play their part in this effusion of light as well; they transfer light to the soul in order that the soul can unlock the knowledge that seems to exist within and around it. Caritas provides the catalyst to the soul that initiates a desire to know this mysterious life” and to comprehend the divine mind. While minne appears most often

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60 “God die de clare minne die onbekint was verclaerde bi siere doghet daer hi alle dohet bi verlichte in siere clairheit der minnen. Hi moet u verliechten ende verclaren metter claire clairheit daer hi hem seluen clear met es ende al sinef vrienden ende sinef naesten gheminden… Ende gheheelheit alre doghet gheheekele omme de welke men singhet .iij. sanctus inden hemel omme dattie .iij. namen in haren enighen wesene alle doechele versamene van welken ambachte si sijn vte desen .iij. wesenene… Siet hoe vaderlike v god ghehuet heuet ende wat hi v gheheuele heuet ende wat hi v gheheuele heuet. Besiet hoe hoghe minne es deen vor dander ende dankes hem met minne, wildi dit besien hoe god dit es ende werken in hem in siere clairheit ghebrukeleke in glorilecheide ende toenleke in claireheiden alle dinc te verlichtene ende te demsterne na hare wesen”, Brieven, Letter 1VM, 16 and van Mierlo in his introduction to that letter, 13.

61 “Want dat onbekinde leven dattu in hare heues ghesticht inder bernender karitaten, dat heefse hier gheleidt.” Visionen, Vision 6, VM, 66; Hart, 278.
throughout Hadewijch’s works, the epistemological role of *caritas* is heightened by its rare appearances.

In order for her students to understand the function of *caritas* in transferring knowledge or information to the soul, Hadewijch gives several examples of an experience that might be called an “intimate exchange” or a mutual pledge (*pleghene*) or “mutual enjoyment” (*gebruikende*) between the soul and God during which the soul experiences feelings, sensory input, visual imagery, intellectual activity and an increase in understanding. There are two modes in which the soul engages in this unitive experience, both of which Hadewijch considers worthwhile and valuable for acquiring knowledge. One manner, which she calls “beyond the spirit” (*buiten de gheeste*), can be likened to a Plotinian *unio mystica*, wherein all intellectual functions cease and any feelings of individuality ceases with it (fix this). The other manner she calls “in the spirit” (*inden gheeste*) during which she continues to see, hear, and feel sensations that signal she is still an individual entity. This manner of immersion might be seen as similar to an Augustinian *in intellectu* experience. Whenever one of these types of visions

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62 “Ende bi al dien tekenen die ic vantusschen hem ende mi in na pleghene van minnen.” *Brieven*, Letter 11, Ln. 20, 94; Hart, 69; Moemmers, 85. Hart translates *pleghene van minne* as “intimate exchange of love”, while Moemmers translates the same as Hadewijch’s new “devotion to love.” I follow Hart, as the sense of Hadewijch’s words indicates that the unitive experience is mutual, since pledge connotes equality, rather than subordinative. “Ende hier ende sijn vriende soe dore vloyekek Ende soe weeldeleke ghbrukende sijn, ende in siere goetheit sijn vloyende ende weder vloyende in allen goede.” Letter 12, Ln. 60, VM 104. A similar union is described between God and friends who enjoy goodness (maybe or *minne*) as a profusion flowing through them while they also flow. Moemmers’ translation, *De Brieven*, 91. Hart translates this mutual flowing as “interpenetration” which, like *plegene* suggests a mutual fusion of being which then enables knowledge to pass unmitigated from God and the soul to each other. See Hart, 71. Rudy considers *pleghen van minnen* as a “close intercourse of love.” Rudy, 155, fn. 48.

63 Anna Bardoel has analyzed the Plotinian and Augustinian versions of the mystical union, and convincingly argues that Hadewijch’s visions can be representative of these two types. She does not contend that Hadewijch deliberately followed either predecessor, but that the similarity between these visionary models can increase our understanding of mystical traditions over time. See Anna Bardoel, “On the Nature of Mystical Experience in the Visions of Hadewijch: A Comparative Study of the Unitive and Intellectual Traditions,” *Ons Geestelijk Erf*, 66 (1992),
occurs, she says, the soul enjoys the ‘fruition’ of God. Hadewijch employs the term *gebruke* (akin to the Latin *usufruct*) often, and does so deliberately, because it is during the immersive union that the exchange of knowledge and the soul’s increase in understanding takes place. Her first letter charges her students to follow certain instructions in order to:

“Contemplate what God is and to work in him, in his radiance, with fruition in glory ad manifestation in radiance, in order to enlighten all things or to leave them in darkness, according to what they are.”

The *via* to union is through love and radiance, and the goal of union is fruition, as in Letter Nine where she tells her young student that in this state “there he shall teach you what he is.” The “enjoyment” here is a holistic learning event; it is not a time of divine superior directives to a passive soul but a mutual sharing between peers such that both parties benefit from the experience. *Minne* is vital to the success of the lesson, as the fusion between the soul and God can only take place with her help because it is *minne* that brings God down to the soul. *Caritas* is also necessary in the exchange, because it

318-340, 324-5. Rudy disagrees these distinctions are significant, as Hadewijch often ‘undercuts’ them as well as stress them; Rudy, cf. 97, fn 49. I think he misses the point, however, that Hadewijch, like her predecessors, is (in several places) teaching her students to expect a time when no humanly receptive senses (physical or spiritual) function and the individual may experience a complete (and frightening) void.

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64 Some examples of *ghebruiken* appear in Letters 1, 2, 6, 9, 12, and several others. Hadewijch uses this term on numerous occasions in her letters, poems and visions, usually linked to a session during which an individual is in communication with the divine. See Bardoel’s analysis of Hadewijch’s visions, 325-331.

65 “Wildi dit besien hoe god dit es ende werken in hem in siere claerheite ghebrukeleke in glorilecheiden ende toenleke in claerheiden alle dinc te verlichtene ende te demsterne na hare wesen.” Brieven, Letter 1, VM 17: Hart, 47.

66 “daer sal hi u leren wat hi es.” Brieven, Letter 9, VM 79.

67 “Ay ia hi god, die men met ghenen wesene van arbeyde bekinnen en mach daer en sit gherechte
is *caritas* that initiates a rising of “friendship” or a similar divine bit of essence that enables the two likenesses to meet as equals when they join in union.\(^{68}\)

Once this amicable session begins, it is necessary for the soul to be aware of the various feelings and sensations that arise when it reaches immersion with God. This is because the knowledge that Hadewijch considers important is new or is a variant on some knowledge the soul holds already. New sensations or feelings may or may not be a result of the transfer of new divine knowledge, and an inexperienced individual could have a visionary experience and be so overwhelmed that they can’t remember anything they learned. So Hadewijch tells her readers they must also know themselves, in that they know what feelings, images, thoughts, sounds, even actions are in the physical realm or from their own will.\(^{69}\) Her very first visionary experience recounts a tour through a meadow where several trees grew. Each tree, in its own way, was a tree of knowledge, and the first tree she encountered was the tree of knowledge of oneself. She had to understand this tree before her guide took her on to observe trees of any other kinds of knowledge.\(^{70}\) She is of the opinion her students need to know this (and, supposedly to know when different sensations signal a vision) so that they can participate in the full mystical state and reap the greatest benefits from it. This is what she calls “experiencing that perfection,” which she has previously called *caritas*.\(^{71}\) *Caritas* here guides the soul,

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\(^{68}\) See below, fn. 76.

\(^{69}\) “Wildi dese volmaectheit bekennen, soe moeti te alre eerst v seluen leren kennen.” *Brieven*, Letter 14, VM, 120.

\(^{70}\) “Ende ic verstont, ende hi toende mi dat dat are die kinnesse ons selfs.” *Visionen*, Vision 1, VM, 3, 11.

\(^{71}\) See Chapter Four, fn. 58. In addition, there are specific steps a visionary experience entails, and an individual new to the event would not necessarily know when it was happening well
since it “understands all God’s commandments” and can assist the soul in knowing itself so that it can move beyond the novelty of the visionary experience and better follow reason so as to understand the will of God.  

Hadewijch gives the readers specific examples of cognitive activities that *caritas* performs during the acquisition of knowledge while within an immersive union. *Caritas*, she writes, is the power of sight that “enlightens the soul in all the truth of God’s Will.” This power of sight is one of God’s gifts by which the two eyes, reason (*redene*) and love (*minne*) work together to enable the soul to learn. In this case, *caritas* carries to the soul what *minne* and reason see separately. The soul increases knowledge by learning through each eye, and *caritas* operates as the power of sight. It does so because when God reveals *caritas*, this revelation provides for the soul a “clarity” by which the soul is then able to contemplate the Godhead. *Caritas* is the medium through which this clarity is delivered to the soul and it is *caritas* that enables the soul to actually “see” God by transferring divine light to the scene. 

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够足的照明的照耀，能够从自己的感觉中辨别出什么来自原始的直觉，什么来自一个新的神的来源。


74 “Dat zien heuet .ij. oghen, date s minne ende redene.” *Brieven*, Letter 18, VM, 155. Hadewijch may be following William of St. Thierry and Richard of St. Victor in this analogy. Vanneste, 28; Rudy, 155, fn. 45.

75 “Soe wanneer god der zalegher zielen gheuet die claerheit, dat sine besien mach in siere godheit, ende in siere wijsheit.” *Brieven*, Letter 28, ln. 10, VM, 229.

76 “Soe wanneer god openbaert dese gheestecke caritaten in der zielen, soe gheet in hare op ene gheuoelecke vrientscap….Soe siet si, ende sine siet niet. Sie siet ene properlike, een vloyeleke,
that which is perceived and also enlighten the faculty of reason. Once enlightened, reason can then inform the other inner senses as to what, intellectually, the soul is perceiving and experiencing – how the images should look if they actually exist, whether the sound is divine or imagined – in what she says comes into existence within (*binnen es*) during this immersive union.\(^{77}\) All of these coming-into-being objects of inner senses are linked in some way to light; those visuals she sees, the sounds she hears, the emotions she feels are all brought into cognitive perception because the soul can now see them. The importance of light and vision come into full relief in her Ninth Vision. Here she tells of a dress full of eyes, worn by Queen Reason, who herself reveals to Hadewijch that each of the thousand eyes is fiery with the knowledge of *Minne*. The queen, who is Hadewijch’s faculty of reason, knew well the importance of light and sight in understanding and comprehending the divine mind.\(^{78}\) In describing the queen as she does, Hadewijch makes clear the additional collaboration necessary between love and reason, as discussed below. A valuable experience does not necessarily require constant visual imagery, but there must be something ‘seen’ for a vision to be most successful.

And even if the sense of sight fails, the soul nevertheless continues to participate in the exchange of knowledge while in spiritual immersion. Hadewijch relates this to her readers in some of her visions.\(^{79}\) In this most refined unified state, the immersion is of


\(\text{“Ay dat daer binnen es, dat moet meest versweghen sign.” Brieven, Letter 22, VM, 192.} \)

\(\text{The queen asked “witstu wie ic ben? Ende ic seide, ‘Jaic wel, ghi hebt mi soe langhe wee ende leet ghedaen, ende sidi die redene mijnre zielen.” Visionen, Vision 9, VM, 97.} \)

\(\text{Visionen, Vision 10, ln. 70; Vision 13, ln. 255: Vision 14, ln. 145.} \)
such a nature that words, she says, cannot describe it, nor can earthly reason make it understood in words, including words in the Dutch language.\(^\text{80}\) Whether the soul can actually see imagery or feels God’s presence, when *caritas* is ‘revealed’ to the soul by God it provides for the soul a feeling she calls ‘friendship’; a ‘becoming similar’ in certain ways in the first step of understanding. As the human soul accepts and becomes used to each new experience, it can move on to the next awareness and open ‘inner eyes’ or inner senses to more clearly ‘see’ the greater aspects of God.\(^\text{81}\) Thus, ‘seeing’, in this respect, encompasses both the sense of sight in viewing spiritual images and in perceiving in a cognitive yet non-intellectual manner that she claims is beyond all human senses.\(^\text{82}\) Like Beatrice, Hadewijch acknowledges the value of emotional knowing. She comes to know the divine mind partly through the recognition of her changing feelings, whether sensory or emotional. Also like Beatrice, Hadewijch demonstrates an advanced soul’s awareness of limitations. The soul knows it is limited, and when it cannot ‘see’ or perceive, or understand, or “content love.”

Eckhart, like the others, has a great deal to say about *caritas, minne*, and knowledge.\(^\text{83}\) *Caritas or minne* are quite closely related to knowing God, understanding

\(^{80}\) “Want hemelsche redene en mach ertrike niet verstaen, want van allen dien dat in ertrike es, mach men redene ende dietsch ghenech venden. Mer hier toe en wee tic gheen dietsch noch ghene redene.” *Brieven*, Letter 17, VM, 144.

\(^{81}\) See fn. 78 above.

\(^{82}\) Rudy suggests she may even consider *minne* as referring to the sensing body in addition to assisting the senses in perceiving objects. Rudy, *Mystical Language*, 69.

\(^{83}\) There is a dizzying array of statements scattered throughout Eckhart’s numerous texts. He is notoriously inconsistent with his usage of terms for intellect, reason, light, existence, and essence as well as the relationships among them. In addition, scholars often choose one text (or perhaps two) and focus on his theories contained therein; Eckhart as often claims the opposite elsewhere. Hence, this section is somewhat disorganized. I focus on his theories as they relate to *caritas* and its role in acquiring knowledge and will continue to smooth out this section as my research progresses.
God or enabling the soul to better know the mind or will of God. As with our other authors, particularly Albert, Eckhart needs caritas to be close to or ‘in’ the Trinity in some way in order to respect John’s statement that caritas is God. But he also needs to separate caritas somewhat in order to preserve the Trinity as a Unity that does not include that which can itself connect to created things. Caritas, he has claimed, unites the soul to God, but if it unites the soul directly to God, the soul becomes one with God existentially, which is not possible. So Eckhart qualifies the unifying properties and actions of caritas as those not exactly of the Holy Spirit. Once he distances caritas ever so slightly from the Unity itself, he can allow caritas to unite the soul to God through the Holy Spirit in order that the soul is able to acquire knowledge and understanding when in its own kind of union with the Trinity. What is interesting is the role of minne in knowledge, for it is here that Eckhart makes use of the distinction between minne and the Holy Spirit, and, in addition, makes a further distinction between caritas and minne in regard to knowledge.

Caritas provides a link between the mind of the soul and God. Following Thomas Aquinas, Eckhart argues that because all divine commandments are ordered toward a goal that consists of uniting the mind to God, and because that which unites the human mind to God is caritas, without caritas no divine command can apply because it is included in all commandments. In the heavens themselves, he links love (amor and caritas) to the cherubim, who are traditionally identified with the intellect. Love (amor)

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84 See Chapter Four, fn. 77.

is unifying and diffusive he claims, and it sits “upon the Cherubim” as it is known as from Psalm 79:2; *amor* traditionally begins where intellect (*intellectus*) ceases. “*Caritas sive amor*” also is unifying, he then notes, a condition that connects *caritas* to the Cherubim and to the angelic identifier, intellect.\(^86\) Whether *caritas* also begins where intellect ceases he does not say explicitly. But this implies that *for caritas* to be in a unifying role, it must be able to touch both *amor* (or *minne*) and the intellect of the soul.

In his German Sermon Three he claims that it is both knowledge and intellect that unite souls to God, and that this Union itself is in the Holy Spirit.\(^87\) Previously, he has argued that Unity is the Holy Spirit, in essence, and *so caritas* is the Holy Spirit, in essence.\(^88\) Because the Holy Spirit is the unmediated bond of the Father and Son,\(^89\) *so caritas* can also, essentially, be in a bonding role, although more appropriately between the human intellect and the pure intellect that is God. So Eckhart can assert John’s statement, “God is love” (*minne*), in his German Sermon Seven, and still distance love (*minne*) from a uniting role between the soul and God. Love connects, but it does not unite; it might bring the soul up to God, but does not “place us into God” because only God’s existence, Pure Intellect, can be that unifier and Unity that is God.\(^90\)

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\(^86\) “…*amor* est uniens, diffusivus….incipit ubi intellectus cessat. Lucta hoc expone illud: ‘qui sedes super Cherubin.’ Pertracta quomodo *caritas sive amor* est uniens, et quanta est illa unio.” Sermo VI, *LW* IV, 51; *Teacher & Preacher*, 212.

\(^87\) “Ich hân ez ouch mê gespochen; bekantnisse und vernüfticheit einigent die sêle in got….und einunuge in dem heiligen geist.” *Werke I*, 38; *Teacher*, 244-5.

\(^88\) See Chapter Four, fn. 76.

\(^89\) “…necessario ponitur hoc ipso immediate spiritus sanctus, nexus patris et filii.” *LW* III, 486.

\(^90\) “Aleine Sant Johannes spreche, minne diu einige, minne ensetzet niemer in got; vil lihte limet si zuo. Minne eneiniget niht, enkeine wîs niht; daz geeiniget ist, daz heftet si zesamen und bindet ez zuo. Minne einiget an einem werke, niht an einem wesene.” *Werke I*, 38; *Teacher*, 254.
His Latin Sermon Twenty-Nine delves deeper into the relation of intellect to the joining of the mind to God. Here, Eckhart first argues that God, as ‘one’, and out of this being “one,” necessarily unites all things and unites them in and to himself.\(^91\) He then points out that Unity (the One) both pertains to, and is a property of, only the intellect. This intellect, in this case, is uncreated because it is God, God’s pure existence, total intellect, and the existence out of which all other things were created.\(^92\) He has, in other places, qualified this statement in saying that Unity is the Father in regard to existence, and is the Trinity in regard to essence. In this sermon, he is treating Unity in regard to existence. Thus, he can say that in regard to existence, Unity is a property only of the intellect, and thus, only of God. Yet, at the end of this sermon he exhorts his listeners to rise up to intellect, to become attached to it or unite with it, because to be united to intellect is to be united to God.\(^93\) The uniting activity that takes place, in this situation, is the joining of the human mind to the intellect (God) and it is caritas that Eckhart has previously placed in a bonding role. This makes instruction of the soul possible through divine means, because, he adds, “instruction is as if a joining of knowledge and caritas”

\(^91\) “Praeterea deus non uniret sibi quid quam, nisi quia unus et ratione qua unus. Praeterea hoc ipso quod est unus necesse habet unire omnia et in se et sibi unire.” Sermo 29, LW IV, 263.

Although Eckhart is discussing the intellect, Mojsisch argues here that unity is the property of reason, and so reason, not the intellect is the unifying element. It is unclear whether he means Pure Intellect and is referring to it also as Reason – more discussion on this in future versions using his original German work and Eckhart’s Quaestio Parisiensis I, which Mojsisch subsequently references. See Burkhard Mojsisch, Meister Eckhart: Analogy, Univocity and Unity, trans., Orrin F. Summerell, (Amsterdam: B. R. Gruner, 2001), 99; see also fn. 151 below.

McGinn translates the phrase, “nisi quia unus et ratione qua unus” as “except because he is one and by reason of being one.” See Eckhart, Teacher & Preacher, 224.

\(^92\) “Ubi nota quod unitas sive unum videtur proprium et proprietas intellectus solius…. Entia vero immaterialia, puta intellectualia, sunt non unum, vel quia ipsorum essentia non est esse, vel potius fotassis, quia ipsorum esse non est intelligere. Deus…qui scilicet intelligit et solo intellectu capitur, qui est intellectus se toto.” Sermo 29, LW IV, 266-7.

\(^93\) “Ascendere igitur ad intellectum, subdi ipsi, est uniri deo. Uniri, unum esse, est unum cum deo.” Sermo 29, LW IV, 270; Teacher & Preacher, 226.
or as an integration of knowledge (scientia) illuminating the intellect (intellectum) and grace or caritas enkindling the desire (affectum) to know.\textsuperscript{94} Thus, while caritas is involved in the reception of divine knowledge, it shares that role with the divine intellect – unable to perform alone the assisting of the soul in the learning process.

In a method similar to that of Hadewijch, Eckhart places caritas between the divine mind and the human soul as a “glue” that joins them and makes possible the transfer of information from one to the other. In his German Sermon Sixty-Nine he adds a discussion of visual media to this. Firstly are the opinions of those masters that claim that if there were even a small amount of a medium, the soul would not see either an ant in the sky nor God, because even a modicum of an obstacle could obstruct the clarity of vision. The opposing opinions come next; a visual medium is necessary, because without at least a modicum of a medium neither the inner nor outer eyes could see anything. Both, he says, are correct.\textsuperscript{95} Either type of medium affects the soul’s intellect to seek out or gravitate toward that which it desires to know.\textsuperscript{96} The first type of medium is described as if within the topic of internal vision, and if any object that is not divine gains the attention of the viewer, it directs the intellect downward toward earthly knowledge and obstructs divine image. The second type of medium assists the physical eye in viewing

\textsuperscript{94} “Tractantibus verbum dei necessaria est scientia illuminans intellectum et gratia sive caritas inflammans affectum.”. In this passage he uses the term disciplinam for instruction, which indicates the lessons could be the discipline of the body as well as intellectual instruction. “Disciplina enim est quasi copula scientiae et caritatis.” Sermo 45, LW IV, 374; Teacher & Preacher, 227.

\textsuperscript{95} “Ein meister sprichet in dem bouche, von der sêle: »enwaere kein mittel, daz ouge sache eine âmeizen oder eine mücken an dem himel« und er sprach wâr, wan er meinet daz viur und den luft und vil dinges daz swischen dem himel und dem ougen ist. Der ander meister sprichet: »enwaere kein mittel, min ouge ensache niht.« Sie meinenet beide wâr.” Predigt 69, DW III, 164-5.

\textsuperscript{96} Eckhart’s Predigt 3 treats the active, passive, and potential intellect in detail, but its authenticity is in doubt. More research on that sermon is required before including those opinions in this study as Eckhart’s. See Meister Eckhart, German Sermons and Treatises, trans. M. O’C. Walsh (London: Watkins, 1979), 36, fn. 1; Quint, LW IV, 102.
an object that requires enough of it to be refined in air in order to be seen (e.g. needs to be far enough away). His descriptions separate inner sight from external sight in order to argue that intellect, viewing God, cannot do so if any medium exists between them.  

The role of the medium comes into play again when Eckhart asks the question whether understanding or love (minne or caritas) is primary in regard to universal truths. This is important, as Dominicans considered the intellect and truth above the will and love, whereas Franciscans held to the reverse. For Eckhart, an unmediated link with Divine Knowledge provided the ultimate mode of knowing for the soul. The potential intellect, united to the Pure Intellect without a medium, was then also united to the Knower (existence) and the creator (God himself). The divine image is optimally received by the potential intellect when the existence of that image (the intellect’s object) is also wholly received. This ‘exemplar’ is the only source from which the intellect receives the image. Because contact is direct, (e.g. occurs unmediated) it requires no divine illumination, unlike the emanation of visible species received by the faculty of sight. The latter does require an extrinsic light specifically because a medium exists between the species and the faculty; this suggests a medium reduces the effectiveness of any divine light.  

Caritas is nowhere mentioned in these Latin discussions, either as a

97 See McGinn’s explanation, Teacher & Preacher, 315. Also see fn. 94 above.

98 C. F. Kelly, Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 77-8. This is an informative, if Thomist, treatment of Ekhart’s theories on the intellect and acquisition of knowledge.

99 “Imago enim, in quantum imago imago est, nihil sui accipit a subiecto in quo est, sed totum suum esse accipit ab obiecto, cuius est imago. Iterum secundo accipit esse suum a solo illo. Adhuc tertio accipit totum esse illius secundum omne sui, quo exemplar est..” Expo. Johannem, c. 1, 23, LW III, 19. His Predigt Fifteen claims the same for God as a ‘simple understanding’ of the pure, unmediated divine. This is less clear in regard to what is unmediated, but that understanding is linked to intellect and not the will or love (minne) makes the passage relevant. See Eckhart, Essential Sermons, 56.

100 “Nam si ab aliquo aliquo quidquam acciperet imago vel quidquam exemplaris sui non acciperet,
medium or as a source of light. Moreover, numerous statements about the production of the intellect and intelligence as primary to all other creation appear throughout his *Commentary on Genesis*. God created the heavens and the earth in the intellect as a ‘principle’ that he defines as the Son who is the Image and *idealis ratio* of all;101 “God’s nature is the intellect, so he produced things in being through the intellect.”102 In German Sermon Seventy, Eckhart claims also that “the best masters say that the essence of happiness consists in knowledge.” He mocks a priest who thundered and ranted the opposing view.103 In this same sermon, he spends some time repeating his ideas regarding the medium and that the highest form of knowing God happens without any medium (âne allez mittel).104 He then proceeds to discuss inner vision and illumination, claiming that the light of grace far exceeds the light of the intellect, and is far dimmer than divine light – until grace is “brought to its highest perfection,” which then renders it

101 “Hinc est quod sancti communiter exponunt deum creasse caelum et terram in principio, id est in filio qui est imago et ratio idealis omnium.... Sic ergo creavit caelum et terram in principio, id est in intellectu.” *Expo. Genesis*, ch. 1, 5-6, *LW* I, 188-9. McGinn translates *ratio idealis* as ‘ideal reason’ but I suggest considering *idealis* as ‘idea, form, or eternal prototype’ and *ratio* as ‘root’ (archtypical human) which to me fits better the notion of Christ as that which the human image is modeled upon. Eckhart, *Essential Sermons*, 84.


into that brighter divine light. Because he has elsewhere equated grace and *caritas*,

it is not out of the question to suggest that he means to conform to the Dominican standard
regarding the primacy of the intellect, and yet retain the notion of divine illumination – in
which case he prefers to use Grace as the illuminating element in the intellect. He also


treats this topic in some depth in Sermon 37, and, as expected, places intellect over either
will or love (*minne*). The analogy of the senses, likened to the ‘five husbands’ of the

wife, demonstrates briefly his theory that the senses (linked to the will and to love) die
away easily whereas the intellect can (should) remain as that which serves God and

whom the wife should serve in turn. The prudent wife who obeys this last husband

brings future benefits to her family, such as the children of the intellect (the potential and

actual intellects). Sermon Seventy-One is similar, and here he states clearly that

“knowledge is a solid bedrock and foundation for all being. Love (*minne*) has no place to

inhere except in knowledge.”

On the other hand, as we have seen above, and as McGinn points out, Eckhart

“sometimes takes a different view.” With familiar ambiguity, the Meister changes his
tack somewhat in at least two of his German Sermons. Love and knowledge are both

actions proper to human beings, he tells us in one of them, and although some masters

argue that blessedness consists of one and those who advocate for the other, he takes the

position that it is neither. There is something in the soul from which knowing and loving


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105 See above, fn. 94.

106 “…die vernünfticheit ist kleine wider dem liehte der gnâde….Daz lieht der gnâde, swie grôz
ez ist, ez ist doch kleine wider dem götlichen liehte….Wenne aber diu gnâde wirt volbrâht üf daz
hoehste, sô enist ez niht gnâde; ez ist ein götlich lieht, dar inne man got sihet.” Predigt., *DW* III,
196; *Teacher*, 318.


108 “Bekanntsise ist ein gruntveste und ein fundament alles wesennes. Minne enmac niht anders
haften wan in bekantnisse.” Predigt 71, *DW* III, 229; *Teacher*, 324.
flow of which blessedness consists. While he does not specify here what that something is, he returns to the notion that it is a higher power of the soul that can unite, unmediated, with God. Another German sermon counters this claim as well as his otherwise consistent emphasis against *minne* as a uniting agent between the soul and the divine mind. Wisdom or understanding can bring the soul to God, he says there, but cannot bring her directly into God. *Minne* (which he now considers the highest power), breaks through into the divine realm, bringing the soul with her into a union with God that yields the greatest understanding. While this restores the role of love, it is less helpful for assuring the reader of the Meister’s rationale. Is he unsure of his own claims or is he attempting to argue that nothing or all things are highest at different times? This question is difficult to answer since he is in the first sermon certain of the superiority of one power, in the next he is certain of the superiority of another, and in the next sure of the highest power of a third. This may be Eckhart’s way of explaining that there is, in reality, no linearity in the divine mind or in the manner in which it unites to the soul. Intellect, knowledge, *minne* and *caritas* are all highest at one time or another, or, to put it another way, they each come to the fore (in contrast to the top) as the soul requires. If

109 “Nû ist des menschen eigen werk minnen und bekennen. Nû ist ein vrâge, war ane saelicheit allermeist lige. Etlîche meister hânt gesprochen, daz si lige an bekennenne, etlîche sprechent, daz si lige an minnenenne; ander sprechent, si lige und bekennenne und an minnenenne, unde die sprechent baz. Aber wir sprechen, daz si niht enlige an bekennenne noch an minnenenne; mêr, einez ist in der sêle, von dem vluzet bekennen und minnen…” Predigt 52, Werke I, 556; *Essential Sermons*, 201.

110 “Cherubîn bezeichent die wîsheit, daz ist die bekantnisse; diu treget got in die sêle und leitet die sêle an got. Aber in got enmac si sie niht bringen. Dar umbe enwürket got sîniul götlîchiu werk night in der bekantnisse, wan si in der sêle mit mâze begriffen ist – mêr, er würket sie als got götlîch. Sô tritet diu oberste kraft her vûr – daz ist minne – und brichet in got und leitet die sêle mit der bekantnisse und mit allen irn kreften in got und vereinet sie mit gote.” Predigt 60, DW III, 22.

111 McGinn is one of several scholars who recognize the vaccilations in Eckhart’s theory, see McGinn, *Mystical Thought*, 152; Mojsisch, 5;
this is his purpose, it would explain a great deal and connect him again with the method that Beatrice utilizes in her teaching.\textsuperscript{112}

\textit{Caritas and Reason}

All four authors discuss the relationship between reason and love (\textit{caritas} or \textit{minne}) either directly or tangentially to the discussion of knowledge (Eckhart does the latter). Reason is distinguished from knowledge in that it is a faculty of the mind used by the soul to acquire knowledge, but reason is also the capacity to seek rather than the thing sought. The ability to logically analyze problems, for many medieval thinkers, provides a more certain method of getting to universal truths in an atmosphere where the physical world is distrusted because it is viewed as impermanent. The power of reason assists in the analysis and interpretation of experiences, such as visions or in resolving questions in theology or in natural philosophy.\textsuperscript{113} Medieval theologians or philosophers might also debate other aspects of it, such as whether it is superior or inferior to intellect, or as having being or non-being.\textsuperscript{114} They might also argue over whether reason, as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item This is plausible; more analysis is beyond the scope of the present study.
\item Edward Grant discusses reason primarily as it applies to the logical demonstration important to scholastic education in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. As Aristotelian theories spread, objects observed, or sensed, became more verifiable through experience, although continued distrust of them meant the reasoned, or logical, argument remained the primary method for determining truths. This change took place in Albert’s work and in the work of others who first encountered Aristotelian ideas. Edward Grant, \textit{God & Reason in the Middle Ages} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), passim and esp. 160-1. It should be noted that Beatrice and Hadewijch already trusted the experiential basis of their encounters with God, employing reason when appropriate without sacrificing balance between the rational and emotional. Perhaps they were at the forefront of the trend to verify the sensory, or perhaps helped convince scholastics to do the same.
\item Albert and Eckhart are among those who discuss the relations between \textit{intellectus} and a Divine
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
exemplified by the logical syllogism, is superior to revelation, explained through accounts of visions or spiritual journeys. A wide proportion of the religious community accepted that both reason and revelation brought a human to an understanding of the divine mind. This larger community also accepted that sensory input during a vision was as important for obtaining pieces of knowledge as was the observation of a tree blowing in the wind in the physical world. Modern scholars also might debate whether reason was subordinate to faith in the Thirteenth Century, particularly since medieval thinkers still accepted that universal or divine truths had been revealed to figures that appear in scriptural texts. Women such as Beatrice and Hadewijch would have known this atmosphere far better than modern scholars as would men such as Albert and Eckhart. Interestingly, competition between reason and faith is largely absent from the texts in the present study; the authors are of the opinion that reason is important for getting to truths, but not more important than divine giving of those truths. Hence, the issue here is not in regard to a comparison between reason and revelation, but in regard to collaboration between reason and caritas, as Albert and Hadewijch claim. Indeed, for three of our four authors human reason has a distinct relationship to caritas that makes it significant to the present study.

Reason, but do not mention any terms for love in the specific texts they have written on the topic. Ideas from these works will appear when relevant from Albert’s *Tractatus de intellectu et intelligibili*, ed. Borgnet, v. 9, 477-523. Eckhart’s theory is in his *Quaestio Parisiensis I*, in *LW V*, ed. Koch, 48-56; also see *Meister Eckhart Werke II*, ed. Niklaus Largier, (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1993), 539-53. For scholarship on these theories, see Mojsisch, Chs. 2, 4; Robert J. Dobie, *Logos & Revelation: Ibn ’Arabi, Meister Eckhart, and Mystical Hermeneutics*, (Washington D. C.: Catholic University Press, 2010), Ch. 6.

115 For a useful description of the way medieval scholars viewed reason and the restrictions on their use of logic to refute revealed truths, see Grant, 10-11.

116 Grant’s examples from Albert’s work is somewhat misleading on this point, as he generalizes Albert’s statement in the *Physics* to all of Albert’s texts. Grant, *God and Reason*, 191-95.
Reason is a faculty of the mind that all humans possess. This, our authors all agree upon. How the human being made use of this faculty and the process by which it operated were also questions continually debated as the middle ages moved on. The issue here in regard to human reason is whether it can still comprehend the divine mind on its own or whether it requires additional ‘tools’ in order to arrive at its fullest understanding or knowing of God. If so, is caritas one of the tools that provide such assistance? Augustine, in *De moribus ecclesiae* claims it is “the pure and guileless love (caritas) that does the work” of making heretics (the Manicheans) desire to understand.\(^\text{117}\) Albert agrees. *Caritas*, as is the First Gift sent to the soul along with the Holy Spirit, assists the human intellect in acquiring knowledge of the divine mind when that soul reaches a certain state of awareness. *Caritas* illuminates reason as a love that is a light and as a light that is God. The resultant knowledge is of God *vis a vis* the Holy Spirit and the Trinity.\(^\text{118}\) He refutes the notion that natural reason causes the soul to become aware that God is the highest good and as such he should be loved above all:

> Nature satisfies itself in and of itself, and no elevated virtue (or power) is required (for this satisfaction): nature is sufficient through itself toward loving the highest good on account of itself (the highest good) and above all else….\(^\text{117}\)

In addition, the argument goes on:

> The powers of the soul in the human are proportional, and reason in comprehending (that God is the highest good and so should be loved for himself and above all else) suffices for reason to love

\(^\text{117}\) “quare vobis cum modo sic agendum est, non ut ea iam intelligatis, quod fieri non potest; sed ut intelligere aliquando cupiatis; facit enim hoc simplex et pura charitas dei.” Augustine, *De moribus ecclesiae*, 17:31.

\(^\text{118}\) Gioia, 171.
God as the highest good and above all else. So there is no need for an elevated power assisting the soul in this kind of love.\textsuperscript{119}

But, Albert contends, reason is not enough to effect the loving of God above all. Humans need to be elevated above their natural abilities, including those of reason. In fact, he contends, \textit{caritas} does not depend/lean on reason to move humans toward loving God.

Nature never suffices, not toward the act of \textit{caritas} – \textit{that} belongs to its (\textit{caritas'}) own work and act… and this work is not sought according to the vegetable and sensible but according to the rational. This act is to chose and to love (the highest good) above all because it is good in and of itself and not because it is in relation to another (good). \textit{Caritas} does not seek the good. In fact it \textit{is} the absolute good and is actually the \textit{cause} of the good. Nor does it depend on that (the good) on account of reason (because it \textit{proves} this reason, which is the opposite), but because it \textit{is} that Good it causes such love (\textit{dilectionem}) as is said,\textsuperscript{120} ‘To love \textit{(diligere)} God on account of himself and above all else is the act of \textit{caritas}…’\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{119} “Id ad quod sufficit sibi natura in se, non oportet ad hoc habere virtutem ellevantem….ad \textit{diligere} autem summum bonum propter se et super omnia, dufficit natura per se…. Vires animae in homine sunt proportionate, ergo ad quod sufficit, ratio in cognoscendo; ad hoc sufficit ratio in diligendo. Ratio autem in primo statu suffecit ad hoc quod cognosceret Deum summe bonum, et propter se diligendum, et super omnia, et ad hoc etiam sufficit modo…. Ergo affection sufficet in diligendo Deum propter se, et super omnia, non ergo oportet ad hoc dare virtutem specialem.” Albertus Magnus, \textit{Sent.} III, 27, A.1, 508.

\textsuperscript{120} This is said by other philosophers, whom he does not specify. One of them could be Augustine, who claims the highest love (\textit{amor dei}) is nothing other than the highest Good as well. “sed hunc amorem non ciuslibet, sed deis esse diximus, id est summri boni.” \textit{De moribus ecclesiae}, 15:25. Augustine uses \textit{amor} in this instance, but he also uses \textit{caritas dei} in other books of this sermon, such as 12:21, 13:23 and 17:31.

\textsuperscript{121} “Natura numquam sufficit, nec sufficient ad actum charitatis…quod sicut unicumque inest proprium opus et actus…et quod hoc opus non quaeritur in ipso secundum vegetabilem et sensibilem, sed secundum rationalem; hoc autem est eligere et dilegere super omnia id quod per se et non in relatione ad alterum est bonum…. Charitas autem non sic quaerit bonum, sed quod potius absolute bonum est, et causa boni, nec inmititur illi propter rationem, quia probat hoc ratio, quod oppositum est, sed quia illud bonum efficit talem dilectionem, unde cum dicitur, \textit{Diligere} Deum propter se, et super omnia, est actus charitatis.” Albertus Magnus, \textit{Sent.} III, D. 27, A. 1, ed.
He goes on to say that some philosophers claim that a twofold love (duplicem dilectionem) explains how natural reason in humans recognizes God to be loved; this love consists of friendship (amicitia) and desire (concupiscence). Those thinkers argue that in the love of friendship (dilectione amicitiae) a human loves (diligere) a friend on account of themselves, but do not love their friend as something higher than themselves. “But in the love of desire that is natural, <they say> nothing, except that all things are loved as good in themselves.”

These Philosophers do not discuss whether those who love in this dual way have caritas (reference to the biblical passage from John or Paul), so this dual-loves argument doesn’t work, he says, because “no one loves (diligere) anything above them “ex caritas.” So caritas is necessary in assisting the powers of the soul to rise up toward God.

As we have seen, caritas is, to Hadewijch, the single faculty or power of sight by which the soul can behold God. There are two aspects/parts of this faculty: minne (love) and redene (reason). Minne is that unbounded love that brings God’s light toward the soul so that the soul has the opportunity to learn through reason – reason that is then enlightened. In this aspect minne sometimes causes the soul to become emotionally attached to either superior or inferior things. The mediating aspect of caritas provides a directive for these eyes, keeping them focused on higher things. For Hadewijch, reason

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Borgnet, 509.

122 “…et illi distinguunt duplicem dilectionem, scilicet amicitiae et concupiscientiae, et dicunt quod dilectione amicitiae aliquid diligitur propter se, sed non supra se; dilectione autem concupiscientiae quae naturalis est, nihil, sed omnia diliguntur ut bona sibi.” Albertus Magnus, Sent. III, D. 27, A. 1, ed. Borgnet, 509.

123 “Tamen quia legitur in libris Philosophorum tantam esse dilectionem honesti, ut etiam fortes periculis se committant, qui tamen charitatem non habent, difficile est dicere, quod nemo diligat aliquid supra se, nisi ex charitate.” Ibid., 509.

124 See above, fn. 74.
is a certain kind of discernment that should be used under the vigilance of insight.\footnote{125}{Je sal v segghen sonder voeghen: en laet v niet men dan minne ghenoeghen. Gheuet der redenen haren tijt Ende merct aloes waer ghi hare sijt Te lettel ocht ghenoech. Ende en versuemt v aen ghene ghenoechte, daer bi v redene te verliesene. Vwe redene die ic meyne dat es, dat ghi uwe kennesse aloes wakende selt houden in onderscedicheiden.” Brieven, Letter 24, VM, 208; Hart, 103.}

Reason instructs and enlightens humans so they can contemplate (grace and goodness) with (wisdom and prudence). Humans must submit to reason if they wish to subject other things to themselves, and must “keep themselves pure… and seek his growth in all things and <all> work, according to the manner prescribed by reason.”\footnote{126}{Die wilt dat hem alle dinc onderdaen sijn, hi moet onderdanich sijn siere redenen bouen al dat hi wilt ocht dat hem yeman wilt. Want nieman en mach volmaect werden in minnen dan die siere redenen onderdanich es. Want dese mint gode om sine werdichheit ende de edele minschen omme dat si ghemint sijn van gode, ende de nedere minschen omme dat sijs beho<e>uen.” Brieven, Letter 13, VM, 114; Hart, 74.}

This manner is the rule that governs a life according to \textit{minne}, and enlightened reason teaches how to judge properly what is good for one when appropriately followed.\footnote{127}{“Mer de edele die sijn regule houden wilt, na dat hem verlichte redene leert, hine ontsiet der vreemder ghebode niet...” This is one of several examples that compares reason (and \textit{minne}) to a rule of life akin to a monastic \textit{ordo}. Brieven, Letter 18, VM, 158; Hart, 88.} Those who follow enlightened reason will never be deceived, although unenlightened reason is often in error because humans fail to understand how to properly combine it with \textit{minne} or to devote sufficient attention to following it upward. If the soul does not train itself and its faculty of reason to direct its attention ever upward, its judgment is affected. The lower or baser earthly are judged to be good when in fact they are spiritually and possibly physically unhealthy.\footnote{128}{“Hier ommte steet wel, dat elc mensche besie de gracie ende dat goet gods wiselike ende vroedeleke, want god heuet den mensche ghegheuen scone redene, die den mensche in allen weghen leert ende in 61 allen werken licht. Woude haer de minsche uolghen, soe en worde hi nummermeer bedroghen.” Letter 14, Brieven, VM, 122; Hart, 77. “Want men doelt in herde vele dinghen die men goet acht ende die oec goet sijn. Nochtan doelt redden daer in, als mense niet in hare beste en versteet noch en volghet; daer doelt redene.” Brieven, Letter 4, VM, 37; Hart, 53.} So both reason and \textit{minne} are necessary, she says, since reason

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127 “Mer de edele die sijn regule houden wilt, na dat hem verlichte redene leert, hine ontsiet der vreemder ghebode niet...” This is one of several examples that compares reason (and \textit{minne}) to a rule of life akin to a monastic \textit{ordo}. Brieven, Letter 18, VM, 158; Hart, 88.

teaches minne and minne enlightens reason, and only together can they help the soul learn – and they accomplish a great deal.\textsuperscript{129}

Enlightened reason is vital to the spiritual growth of the individual. Enlightened reason directs the soul toward correct ways of thinking, acting, and if attended to properly “interprets a little of God to the interior senses.” This enables the soul, led by reason, to contemplate the nature and totality of God. Reason is now the way to a higher kind of minne, and the understanding gained there is not that of logic, or analytical thinking, but an understanding that this kind of minne requires a separation from desire of those very things.\textsuperscript{130} As the soul ‘sees’ this in understanding, Hadewijch relates this kind of minne to caritas in its higher aspects – those that provide the enlightenment for the faculty of reason. If the desire Hadewijch considers inherent in caritas is directed toward lower, material things, the love that caritas is will also direct itself toward those things, and will not enlighten reason. It is important that the individual avoid the emotional attractions that present themselves as worthy of caritas (such as deeds that garner praise or feelings of self-satisfaction) and focus on the more difficult but higher attractiveness of God/Trinity.\textsuperscript{131} The way to properly follow reason is to allow it “to abandon itself to

\textsuperscript{129}“Want redene leert minne, ende minne verlicht redene…soe vermoghense een ouer groet werc; dat en mach nieman leren sonder met gheuoelne. Alse dan redene verdonckert wort, soe wert die wille cranc ende onmechtich, ende soe vernoyt hem aerbeits want hem redene niet en liechtet.” Brieven, Letter 14, VM, 156; Hart, 86.

\textsuperscript{130}“Verlichte redene toent den innehgen sinnen een lettel van gode, daer si hi moghen weten dat god es ene eyselike ende ene ouervreselike suete nature ane te siene van wondere…” Letter 22, Brieven, VM, 188; “Mer teerst dat dan die opslach miere verlichter redenen ontwaecte, die mi oyt sint datter god in scheen, verlicht heuet in al dien dat mi volmaectheid ghebrac ende oec den anderen, soe toense mi ende gheleide ter stat, daer ic mijns lieues na werdichet van door gane een ghebruken soude. Die stat van minnen die mi verlichte redene toende, was soe verre bouden menscheleken sennen, dat ic dat weten moest, dat mi niet en behoerde te hebbene bliscap noch rouwe en gheen, groet noch clene, sonder van dien dat ic mensche was, ende dat ic gheueldé minne met minleker herten, ende dat god soe grot es ende ic soe onghe bruukeleke metter menscheit ane de goheet gherinen can.” Brieven, Letter 29, VM, 244.

\textsuperscript{131} Also in Letter 18.
minne’s wish,” which is to attach itself to something. Minne, in turn, must be held within
the bounds of enlightened reason, or it will lower itself into what Hadewijch calls
“frivolous minne and attach itself (and the soul) to baser things.” Therefore, the human
soul must follow reason and be in union with Love – these together provide the way. She
repeats this often throughout her letters. Hadewijch uses reason in a different way than
intellect – reason is not so much thinking as it is awareness of a knowing what is a correct
course of action to follow. This awareness is how she knows that she has become more
enlightened, as after receiving a kiss during a visionary experience. She tells her readers
that she knew the essence of God more clearly than “by speech, reason, or sight, one can
know anything that is knowable on earth.”

Beatrice herself says little about minne and reason, although she does claim that
the soul in union with God is unable to rule itself by reason or even find reason in
understanding what she senses. It has been taken above human reason to the place
where she understands divine mysteries that books and learned persons cannot teach

132 “Bi affectien van lichter minnen verghetmen der oetmoedicheit die de werdechste stat es, ende
de reynste zale daer men minne in onfteet. Ende in die affectie verliestmen verlichte redene, die
onse reghele es, die ons leert wat wi doen souden in rechte van minnen; daer men der minnen
ghenoech wilt doen. Want verlichte redene doer licht alle die wege van dienste na dien
bequamen wille der hoochster minnen. Ende toent clare alle de wesene die der minnen ghenoech
sijn. Ay aerm, dat dese twee verdreuen werden bi affectien van lichter minnen.” Brieven, Letter
12, VM, 106; Hart, 72.

133 Humans must follow reason: Letter 4, Letter 14, Letter 12, Letter 18; Humans must be in
union with minne: Letter 14.

134 “Ende in die enicheit daer ic doen in ghenomen was ende verclaert, daer verstondic dit wesen
ende bekinde claerlikere dan men met spreken ocht met redenen ocht met siene enighe sake Die
soe bekinleece es in ertrike bekinnen mach.” Brieven, Letter 17, VM, 144; Hart, 84.

135 “Maer metten bande der minnen es si so sere beduongen, ende metter onmaten der minnen es
si so verwonnen, so datsi ne can gehouden mate na redene, noch geufenen redene met sinne, noch
sparen met maten noch geduren na vroetheit.” Seven Manieren VI, R-VM, 22.
Her biographer treats this another way in her *vita* by explaining that there were times when she could not understand the mystery of the Trinity as explained by her teachers or through the collection of books on the Trinity she kept near her during her life. When human intellect and reason failed to yield the understanding she desired at certain times, the illumination of the Holy Spirit and the guidance of grace enabled her to penetrate the meaning of the mystery. According to her biographer, this dependence on divine illumination occurred often throughout her life. This is not to say she did not advocate learning through the written word or from sacred scripture, as she herself was an avid reader and “passed over nothing in which she found some matter of instruction or edification.” But she and her biographer agree that the highest degree of understanding occurs when the soul leaves reason and worldly intellect behind and connects in union to the Holy Spirit. During this union the grace of the Holy Spirit illuminates the current issue or topic, as Beatrice reveals when during such a union she struggles to comprehend rationally. She had failed to grasp the mystery fully until, with her whole person (senses and reason) she understood “in a flash what her faculty of reason could not.” However

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136 “..dati es getrect bouen menschelicheit in minnen, ende bouen mensceliken sin ende redden, ande bouen alle die werke ons herten…” *Seven Manieren* IV, R-VM, 28-9.

137 See Chapter Two, fn. 56.

138 Beatrice, at an early age, could learn the words of the Psalter, and soon after understand their meaning. “non magistrali peritia, sed sola sancti spiritus duce gratia, penetrauit,” Bk I, Ch. 3, and in later years, “nam interdum cum in libris de sancta trinitate confectis, quorum penes se copiam retinebat, id quod investigare querebat ingenij viuacitate diligenter exquireret...accidit ut, aperto corde, lumen celestis veritatis in ill ud tamquam fulgur influeret.” *Vita Beatricis*, Bk. III, Ch. 7, DeGanck, 25 & 247.

139 “nichil horum quasi neglectum preteriens, in quibus aliquam instructionis aut edificationis materiam deprehendit.” Bk. II, Ch. 1. In this chapter, her biographer first makes certain the reader understands that any person engaged in this program of education will place Holy Scripture first and foremost in their daily study. Beatrice did this as well; however, she grasped the most sublime understanding through divine illumination. *Vita Beatricis*, Bk. III, Ch. 7, DeGanck, 109-111.
briefly her understanding lasted, it was still beyond that which she was able to retain when she returned to her conscious, rational, self.\textsuperscript{140}

One example of her own learning method illustrates more clearly her opinion of the relationship between \textit{caritas} and reason. This involves the method by which she gained an understanding that a divine connection takes the soul beyond mere worldly learning. As mentioned, her biographer tells us Beatrice employed both the study of texts and contemplative techniques in order to reach an understanding of the mysteries of the Holy Spirit. While the study of texts was necessary as a step to knowing the will of God, it was not, in fact, the ultimate means to the final goal. To comprehend at the highest level she needed first to approach the topic “with a devout mind and fervent love \textit{(caritas).}”\textsuperscript{141} Without the aid of \textit{caritas} she could not make a strong connection to the Holy Spirit, which was itself the origin of the divine illumination she required in order to grasp the mystery of the Holy Spirit itself. It was her senses that grasped the knowledge during her union with the divine spirit, which she controlled and called on in their full keenness. When she attempted to commit what she understood through her heightened senses to memory and tried to make use of her faculty of reason, “the light of knowledge was suddenly withdrawn…. What she thought she held in her mind eluded her heart, passing like a flash of lighting.”\textsuperscript{142} Time and again she attempted to hold in her conscious mind that which she was able to understand with her whole senses, but:

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\textsuperscript{140} “Unde frequenter accidit, ut de profundis misteriorum divine pagine, siquando lectio suis se conspectibus ingessisset quam proprii viribus ingenioli nullatenus intelligere valuisset…repente gratia spiritus sancti, illuminans intellectum illius.” \textit{Vita}, DeGanck, 110.

\textsuperscript{141} Non temere, more quorumdam altiora se querentium \textit{et} sensu proprio profundiora scrutinantium, sed humili corde, mente devota, caritate quoque feruida ad assequendum rem inassequibilem aspiravit.” \textit{Vita}, DeGanck, 246.

\textsuperscript{142} “Cum ergo totam sensuum suorum viuacitatem ad apprehensionem patefacte sibi veritatis exigere, et quod ad momentum ad ictum oculi, de summe trinitatis cognitione perceperat, memorie commendare disponeret; repente cognitionis subtracto lumine.” \textit{Vita}, DeGanck, 246.
\end{flushright}
“When she believed she had grasped the mystery of the all-high Trinity and was holding it, immediately the mystery would disappear like lightning, leaving the searcher’s intention frustrated of her desire.”

Reason alone was insufficient to gain a thorough understanding. Beatrice and her biographer both emphasize that something else must be in place. That something is love (minne to Beatrice and dlectio to her biographer). Her biographer notes the primacy of love dlectio when he describes the way in which she establishes a cloister in her heart that follows the model of an actual monastery. The highest position of abbot is not held by the masculine faculty, reason, but by dlectio. Here again, divine love makes possible the highest operation of the soul.

Meister Eckhart holds a distinctly different view on the relationship between love (caritas, minne) and reason. This is mainly due to the manner in which he discusses the concept of human reason (ratio) generally within the topic of intellect; the human being, a rational animal (animal rationes) created in God’s image, is an intellectual being placed above the sensitive faculty. The sensitive faculty is subordinate to the intellective (sub intellectivo), which Eckhart treats as the soul’s faculty of reason. Within this intellective faculty falls superior and inferior human reason (ratio superior et inferior). The chain

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143 “cum quesitum summe trinitatis misterium iamiam apprehendere iamque retinere se credidit, mox illud instar fulguris non comparens, frustratam suo desiderio querentis intentionem continuo dereliquit.” Vita, DeGank, 248.

144 It is interesting that in this instance the writer uses dlectio rather than caritas, although he does give caritas a role as cellarer, which he ranks lower than reason. This aspect of caritas, however, is the charitable aspect between persons rather than the divine caritas between God and the soul. Vita Beatricis, Bk. II, Ch. 7, DeGank, 136. For a discussion on the cloister of the heart as it relates to caritas, see Jeroen W.J. Laemers, “Clastrum animae: The Community as Example for Interior Reform,” in Virtue And Ethics in the Twelfth Century, eds István P. Bejczy and Richard G. Newhauser (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 119-132 at 122-3.

145 “Ad horum igitur evidentiam suppono primo quod homo, utpote ‘animal rationales’ et imaginem dei, est quid altius sensitivo et est quid intellectivum. Intellectus autem in nobis se habet sicut tabula nuda et rasa, secundum philosophum, et est in ordine intellectualium sicut
of communication he sets up prevents the sensitive faculty from directly touching the intellective faculty; instead it must first contact the inferior then superior reason. Only the superior reason can directly communicate with the intellective faculty in the same way as the husband (superior reason) communicates with God and the wife (inferior reason) converses with the husband. The physical world of the senses (the serpent) makes contact with the inferior reason only through the sensitive faculty.\footnote{146} He explains that this is a natural order, an order that makes something good because outside of order evil exists. In this natural order the lowest point of the superior touches the highest point of the inferior and the highest point of the lowest does not communicate at all with the superior thing, in this case the intellect.\footnote{147}

To confuse the matter, he also argues that the intellective faculty is itself subordinate to a ‘reason as being’ in which ratio is a principle of creation, and is traditionally translated as ‘idea’ more so than ‘reason’.\footnote{148} Thus ratio is that which exists

\footnote{146} This structure is explained and maintained throughout his Liber parabolarum Genesis. For examples see Ch. 3, nos. 139-41, 143-146. At 145 is an analogy of the sensitive and rational faculties linking together as pins do when touching a magnet in a chain, and at 146 he likens this point-to-point contact to a kiss. LW I, 604-16.

\footnote{147} “Ordo enim ipse est qui facit bonum, adeo quod impossibile est esse bonum sine ordine, et e converso impossibile est esse malum, ubi ordo est. Ordo autem naturalis est, ut supremum inferioris attingat infimum sui superioris. Supremum autem animae in nobis intellectus est.” Liber parabolarum Genesis, no. 139, LW I, 605-6.

\footnote{148} For example, Dobie considers rationes divinae to be ‘divine ideas’ which are somewhat akin
as God, or Pure Intellect, that human reason cannot actually comprehend. So when Eckhart is speaking of ‘reason’ he could be referring to, 1. *ratio*, the highest idea or source of being; 2. *ratio superior et inferior*, human thought processes or logical analysis; or 3. *intellectus* or *rationale*, reason as a natural faculty of the soul.

*Intellectus*, in the German texts, is rendered as *vernünfticheit*, and these two terms are primary in his discussions on human knowledge, thinking, or the powers that enable the soul to know God. On rare occasions, he uses the term *redelicheit*, which can also mean ‘reason’.

So his neat, orderly arrangement regarding human reason and the sensitive faculty seems to be an attempt at maintaining a traditionally rigid and vertically linear structure within a holistic, multivalent, and lateral exposition on the soul’s relationship with the divine mind. His efforts to explain universal truths that he knew actually lay beyond the bounds of linearity (as did Hadewijch and Beatrice) were still bound up in the strict paradigm of his scholastic training. While a thorough analysis is beyond the scope of the present study, we can get a glimpse of the complexity regarding *intellectus*,

to Platonic ideas or forms. Dobie, 71. McGinn reads *ratio causae* efficientis as ‘idea of the efficient cause’ and *ratio circuli* as ‘idea of the circle’. McGinn, *Mystical Thought*, 102 and *Teacher*, 99, respectively. Eckhart also treats a notion of *ratio idealis* as an ‘ideal reason’ in regard to existence in the highest intellect. Further study is needed on this topic; but since *caritas* doesn’t appear within Eckhart’s discussions of reason-as-being, I will focus at present on his treatment of the human faculty of reason and how it relates to *caritas*. For more on *ratio idealis*, see Mojsisch, 35-47, Eckhart, *Teacher & Preacher*, 399; Kelly, 32, 100-1.

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149 See above, fn. 98.

150 Mojsisch views Eckhart’s univocal and anological theory of reason (and as Divine Reason) in relation to *intellectus* as against the tradition of his time. He considers this “intellectuality of divine reason” as Eckhart’s way of showing a being that presupposes intellectuality – a primal not-being. The Preacher is not entirely successful as he determines absolute intellect (and even thought) cannot be themetized and so refrains from doing so, to the detriment of his argument. Mojsisch, 39-41, 45.

vernünfticheit, and ratio superior et inferior as they relate to caritas, the soul, and the divine mind.

Amidst the confusing array of definitions and terms is an interesting reallocation of divine roles in assisting the soul’s ability to understand divine truths. Missing in the Dominican Preacher’s theory of human reason is a clear connection between this faculty of the mind and caritas, amor, or dilectio. Caritas may have an epistemological role to play between universal truths and the intellective faculty as seen above, but has no place in the heights with Reason, Pure Intellect, and is often missing from the connection between divine intellect and human intellect. “Reason pertains to the intellect and to truth,” he claims. “Indeed, truth is only in the intellect, not outside of it.” ¹⁵² Neither does minne have a place to adhere (haften) except in the solid ground of knowledge (bekanntsise).¹⁵³ Modern scholars have translated bekantnisse also as ‘intellect’, and Eckhart may well have chosen this term because its multivalence allowed him to use it interchangeably with vernünfticheit. At times he intends it to mean intellect, which can then refer to the highest aspect of God; when he means knowledge, it relates to the union of the soul with Intellect or Reason (ratio) that does not happen through the will (and love).¹⁵⁴ Eckhart has already claimed that minne does not actually unite anything, it only acts to bond those things already united; he has also argued that it is knowledge (bekantnisse) and intellect (vernünfticheit) that unite the soul in God.¹⁵⁵ He then infers that minne joins to the soul, but must do so even through what might be the lower form of

¹⁵² “Ratio id quod est ad intellectum pertinet et ad veritatem. Veritas enim in solo intellectu est, non extra. Igitur perfectiones in rebus extra non verae perfectiones sunt.” Eckhart, Expositio libri Exodi, LW II, no. 176, p. 152.

¹⁵³ “Minne enmac niht anders haften wan in bekantnisse.” Predigt 71, DW III, 229

¹⁵⁴ Kelly considers it ‘Divine Knowledge and Pure Intellect.’ Kelly, 173.

¹⁵⁵ See above, fns. 87 and 90.
intellect, human intellect, as that (as well as superior reason) is directly linked to (divine) knowledge. In fact, he considers love (minne) to be blind, claiming the soul needs to know where this emotion comes from – an answer that is supplied by the intellect or reason through the inner sense of sight. Minne only provides the desire to see, not the ability to do so.

The inability of love to assist the soul in seeing God in Eckhart’s theory correlates with his view that the source of light that illuminates reason comes from aspects other than love (caritas or minne). While both grace and love (minne) might create desire for knowing, of the two, only grace is an illuminating source. The most powerful source of light for the human intellect (superior reason) is Intellect, the Pure Intellect that is God. There are lesser sources of light that assist the thinking soul, but they do not include caritas or minne. Grace is one, knowledge is another, and the third source of illumination comes from the angels. The light of grace has been mentioned more than once; the divine light, Reason (ratio), enlightens other “more perfect” beings through itself and through grace (Eckhart calls grace the supernatural light). This light can assist human beings in seeing the hidden things of God, and is given wholly or not at

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\begin{align*}
156 \text{“Swenne diu sele blint ist und anders niht ensihet, so sihet si got, und daz muoz von not sin. Ein meister sprichet: daz ouge in siner groesten luterkeit, da ez keine varwe enhat, da sihet es alle varwe.” Predigt 71, DW III, 229-30.} \\
157 \text{See above, fn. 94.} \\
158 \text{See above, fn. 106.} \\
159 \text{“Verum quidem est quod diversos et diversa diversimode illuminat et ipsis influit; quaedam lumine sub proprietate esse – et sic illuminat omnia entia entia sive universi – alia vero et pauciora lumine, ut est vita, puta viventia. Adhuc alia perfectiora et pauciora illuminat, prout est ‘lux hominum’, secundum illud Psalmi, ‘signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine’, id est ratio indicans et ostendens quae sint bona.... Adhuc autem quinto alios illuminat gratia, lumine supernaturali.” Expo. Joh., no. 89, LW III, 77; Essential Sermons, 156 #89.}
\end{align*}
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all. As shown above, the knowledge that is the divine also illuminates the soul’s superior rational faculty. Angels as an illuminating source are unique, for they not only provide light but drop lower to bring the soul upward toward a greater source than exists in the human intellect. God himself illumines the minds of the angels, as Augustine also had claimed, and they in turn illumine the soul from above. Once the superior rational faculty has itself been illuminated, it then illuminates inferior reason, which then communicates with the sensitive faculty, drawing it up, forming and informing it. The directives flow downward in a smooth, orderly fashion that creates peace and stillness within the soul. Because this order is natural and fixed, the superior reason must, like

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161 “Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit XI Super Genesim post medium, quod ‘deus loquebatur’ homini <sic> instituto ‘intrinsecus vel effabilibus vel ineffabilibus modis’, ‘sicut cum angelis loquitur ipsa incommutabili veritate illustrans mentes eorum, ubi est intellectus nosse simul quae cumque per tempora non fiunt simul’.” Liber parabolarum Genesis, Ch. 3, no. 154, LW I, 625; Essential Sermons, 117.

162 “Alle crêatûren die engewallent gote niht, daz naturlîche lieht der eêle uüberschîne sie in dem sie ir wesen nement, und des engels lieht überschîne daz lieht der sêle und bereite und vüege sie, daz daz götlîche lieht dar inee gewûrken müge...” Predigt 19, Deutsche Werke I, 214.

163 “Hinc est quod tertio loco rationale inferius sic infusum lumine et virtute sui superioris et etiam lucis divinae imibitae ipsi superiori, haec, inquam, sentiens et audiens vocat etiam, format et informat, ducit et trahit sensitivum, ipsi rationali, secundum illud Rom. 4, ‘vocat ea quae non sunt tamquam ea quae sunt’.” Liber parabolarum Genesis, Ch. 3, #141, LW I, 608; Essential Sermons, 110. “Posset etiam satis convenienter dici quod ‘lux hominum’ accipitur pro ratione inferiori, quae per mulierem caput habentem velatum intelligitur, Cor. 11. Vir autem non habens caput velatum, et est imago dei, ratio superior, accipitur ter tenebras, cum dicitur, ‘lux in tenebris lucet.’” Expo. Joh. Ch. 1, #84, LW III, 72; “Illo vero ordinata et sub potestate viri, rationis scilicet, redacta totum regnum animae est pacatum...” Expo. Exodi. Ch. 20, v.17, #228, LW II, 189; Eckhart, Teacher & Preacher, 115. These are only a few examples of the way in which Eckhart explains the rational faculties using courtly metaphors.
the husband, always be in command and the inferior reason of the evolved soul obedient to it.

One final point in Eckhart’s theory regarding human reason is worth mentioning. In his German Sermon Nine he adds that the soul has in it a drop, or a spark of Pure Intellect. The soul also has powers it can draw upon, one of which is in the eye, and the eye holds the soul within itself. The eye also has a power in it with which it thinks. This power forms things in the mind that are not there (in the imagination) and through this power the soul can “work in nonbeing and follow God in nonbeing.” The Intellect grasps these things as they are in it, and as the intellect is higher than the will (and love) it grasps God unadorned, unmediated, and thus, more completely. His is an interesting introversion of the double eye analogy that, Hadewijch’s theory, gives each eye dual abilities. The spark in the soul here is intelligence, or rationality (redelicheit), which, as the highest part of the mind (gemüntes) holds the image (bilde) of itself. According to McGinn, gemüntes can mean emotions or reason, which allows Eckhart to indirectly speak in a holistic way (including both faculties as important) while maintaining the primacy of the intellect over the will. Also held in the soul is a power that allows the mind to know external things through the senses and through reason, as through sensible


165 See fn. 75 above.

166 Diu sêle hât erwaz in ir, ein vünkelîn der redelicheit, daz niemer erlischet, und in diz vünkelîn setzet man daz bilde der sêle als in diz oberste teil des gemüetes; und ist ouch ein bekennen in unseren sêelen ze üzern dingen, als daz sinnelîche und verstentlîche bekennen, daz dâ ist näch glîchnisse und näch rede, daz uns diz verbirget.” Predigt 76, Werke II, 128; Teacher & Preacher, 331 n. 5.
images and concepts. Reason here is linked to lower, earthly things, and Eckhart’s point is that reason directed toward knowing these material things will require a medium, and once that medium is engaged, it will obstruct the seeing and knowing of God.\textsuperscript{167} He returns to the topic of perfections here again, claiming that any perfection outside of the intellect is an unproven perfection, and he later makes the case that the good (the perfect) in human beings exists within this reason-as-pure-intellect while evil exists outside of reason.\textsuperscript{168} What is interesting here is that Eckhart is careful to avoid linking \textit{caritas} to this spark of intellect. As a “perfection” and a unifying factor between the mind and God, love (\textit{caritas, minne}) exists within the realm of intellect and of reason, but its role in the acquisition of knowledge is subordinated to the intellect.\textsuperscript{169}

\textbf{The Soul’s Participation}

While \textit{caritas} is significant in the soul’s acquisition of knowledge and use of rational and emotional faculties, the soul also acts to bring about learning and understanding of the divine mind as well as the spiritual life. A brief survey of some examples from our authors illustrates they feel there is at least some active participation of the soul in its own spiritual development. It is agreed among our authors that \textit{caritas}

\textsuperscript{167} “Die sêle hât etwaz in ir, ein vünkelnîn der redelicheit, daz niemer erlischet, und in diz vünkelnîn setzet man daz bilde der sêle als in daz oberste teil des gemüetes; und ist ouch ein bekennen in unsern sêlen ze ūzern dingen, als daz sinnenliche und verstentlîche bekennen, daz dâ ist näch glîchnisse und näch rede…” \textit{DW} III, 315-16; \textit{T&P}, 327.

\textsuperscript{168} “Rationale per essentiam in nobis unum est, rationale vero per participationem duo et sensus plures; bonum autem in nobis est secundum rationem esse, malum autem praeter rationem esse, ut ait Dionysius \textit{De divinis nominibus}.” Eckhart, “Exp. Johannem,” \textit{LW} III, no. 555, p. 484. Also see \textit{Teacher & Preacher}, 184-5.

\textsuperscript{169} See fn. 94 above.
brings the benefits of God to the soul, whether alone or in conjunction with the Holy Spirit or grace. But in order for these gifts to be useful and valued, the soul must open itself to accept them. In this aspect, caritas is the catalyst that initiates the “workings” of itself and the other gifts in the soul. Augustine mentions several times that caritas moves the soul to action, or toward herself. As the soul develops in its ability to receive the gifts, the Holy Spirit gives more. The soul becomes filled with the Holy Spirit and the gift(s) it accepts. It also becomes aware that all humans have the opportunity to receive their own gifts, and then begins to feel a desire to assist them through example, writing, and verbal communication.

In her treatise, Beatrice states first and foremost that minne comes to the human living on earth from the divine realms, and then returns or works its way back to the heavens. Given by God to the human soul, minne interacts with the soul in various ways. While Beatrice specifies seven manieren of minne, what she describes is often the activity of the soul itself. Divine minne acts as a catalyst or initiator of activity in the soul, yet the soul experiences various emotional and intellectual states in reaction to this activity. Minne alone does not “do” or “work.” The soul participates actively in a reciprocal effort to gain access to God. Just as minne performs a number of divine functions that help the soul perfect itself, the soul performs a series of tasks to achieve its particular and general goals.

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170 “…adsit tantum ipsa ut moueamur caritate ad aliquod bonum.” De Trinitate, Bk. 8, c. 5.12; Hill, 253.

171 “Seven manieren zijn van minnen, die comen uten hoegsten ende keren weder ten oversten.” The Brussels ms uses “werken weder” which could be loosely taken as “working, returns to the heights.” KBH 3067-73, f. 25r; Seven Manieren, ed. R-VM, 3.

Two examples will help illustrate this. The soul’s participation begins after the first maniere, when minne has come to the soul and has “worked” (werken) to develop a longing in the soul to be in (or return to) a union with God. Minne brings to the soul a desire to serve God and, among other things, to maintain the quality of God’s image and likeness in which the soul was made (ghemaket). It also spends time teaching the soul to maintain this desire. Beatrice does not explain exactly how minne causes the soul to desire to serve God, only that it does. She may be suggesting that minne provides an example while it “rules” the soul during spiritual development. Minne, she says, strives for the purity, exaltation, and excellence that is its “very nature,” and as it does this minne teaches the soul to strive as well. The goal of this striving is to become more like love, and thus, more like God; in this way the soul becomes more suited to remaining in their eternal presence. So the soul petitions to God to allow it to come close to the likeness of minne. In maniere VI she says that when the soul reaches this stage it receives knowledge of minne that is closer and higher; shortly thereafter the soul feels close to God and a close comprehension of Him. In maniere VII, the soul ascends to the highest level of minne, where it dwells in the limitless abyss (diepe afgronde) of the

173 “Die ierste es ene begerte die comt wekende uter minnen; si moet lange regneren int herte eer si al die wedersake wale mach verdriuen…” Seven Manieren I, ed. R-VM, 3-4.

174 “Maer die minne es allene werkende ende staende na die purheit, ende na die hoecheit, ende na die ouerste edelheit – alsi selue es in hare selven – wesende, hebbende, ende gebrukende. Ende aldusgedane were, so leert si den-ghenen die hars plegen.” Interesting here is that Beatrice emphasizes that the soul should follow the teachings of love, not fear. Seven Manieren, ed. R-VM, 7.

175 “…ende dit es…hare eischinge te god…hoe si hier toe comen mach ende wie si moghe vercrighen die naheit ter gelijcheit der minne…,” Seven Manieren, ed. R-VM, p 4-5.

godhead (gotheit), which is all in all things. Once the soul has taken up this desire as its own, it becomes active in its relationship with minne and with God.

For Beatrice, then, the soul and minne work together in the spiritual development of the soul and in its participation with minne (and thus, with God) in divine becoming. In the First Maniere, she says that desire for God proceeds from minne toward the soul as if from a divine source. While minne comes to the soul initially, the soul responds with its own activity once the connection is made and it takes up the desire for God. In the Second Maniere, the soul attempts in different ways to do what she thinks minne wishes, although nothing she does gives her a sense that she has done enough. Suffering is inherent in the desire to serve (even if that service is unsuccessful), since the soul has not yet understood that uncertainty in regard to satisfying minne has now become part of life. The soul’s distress is only alleviated when its intellectual and emotional experiences are unified. Either by its own actions, or by additional giving from God or from minne, the soul comes into the divine presence, comprehends, sees, hears, and feels what before was merely a glimpse or a snippet, or a fragment, none of which could be described. For a moment the soul is with the divine – is the divine – and understands in a manner that is beyond any thinking. At this point it grasps what it comprehends; in the Seventh Maniere, the soul is drawn upward “above humanity, into minne,” and the manner of love that enables this is not minne’s but the soul’s manner of loving. Beatrice does not say what does the drawing upward of the soul, but she does say in the next section that it is it soul itself that “sinks down” into minne, actively alerted by its spiritual senses. Shortly after this it is once again minne that draws the soul on or “thrusts it back,

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177 “Die ierste es ene begerte die comt werkende uter minnen…” Seven Manieren, ed. R-VM,

178 “<Si es> jonfrouwe die dient haren here van groter minnen, ende sonder loen, ende hare dat gneucht datsi heme moge dienen ende dat hi dat gedoget, datsi hem gediene...” Seven Manieren, II, R-VM, 8.
or instigates more longing, or leaves the soul alone to rest.” Spiritual development is never static; even at rest the soul is doing something (feeling, hearing, or seeing) and is always in motion in some way, as are the heavens. Beatrice’s soul is not passive, but is actively engaged doing the work of minne for its own spiritual advancement.

Albert explains the actions of caritas as it emanates from the divine source to the human soul. Caritas is in the power of God as a virtue best able to diffuse into the soul, moistening it and preparing it for the fertility of divine gifts. Until that time, caritas remains within divine power, waiting to be sent to the soul. Once caritas diffuses, or joins with the soul, Albert explains, the Holy Spirit works with caritas, as love, to deepen its relationship with the soul, to perfect it and to turn its attention to the divine will. Since the soul conjoins with the body as the mover and as the form of the body’s matter, the soul also provides a means for vivification of the body. In the same way the soul provides a way for caritas to enter (essentially as the Holy Spirit). Also, in order to know God (and to see the beatific vision) the soul (or mind) must be in a state beyond ordinary physical awareness. Only during the experience of rapture can one perceive the rarified divine image “when the human being does not use the intellect for receiving phantasms.”

God, present in the soul, is discerned by his effects, especially in caritas, because it is the best and most profound virtue and is most similar to life in the father (the beatific life after physical death), and because it (caritas) essentially and substantially remains “in the father.” Caritas is a source of light that enables the individual to


182 “Et ideo videtur mihi, quod Deus praesens in anima cernitur in suo effectu qui est gratia nobis
discern these effects and know God. It is the soul, however, that in the end must accept and process the knowledge it gains.

A brief glance at both Hadewijch and Eckhart reveals their views on the actions of the soul as it relates to God and love. Hadewijch gives many examples of the soul seeking *minne* or striving toward God, actively participating in maintaining the connection with the divine. At times *caritas* is the term she uses when explaining this activity; at times she uses the term *minne*. Both assist the soul in acting to further its own spiritual development; the soul, however, is responsible for making good use of the benefits that come from the divine.\(^{183}\) The soul must “fly above itself,” to reach the heights that *minne* wishes,\(^{184}\) so that the soul can behold God and be beheld by God in turn. If the soul maintains a worthy state of mind, it and God will share each other’s presence and the enjoyment that comes from that.\(^{185}\) The soul also has the ability to be aware that the reason it often fails to achieve the tasks *minne* seeks is a lack of the divine within itself; there are tools the soul knows exists but does not yet have access to them. While the tasks of *minne* include finding and taking these tools, the notion that either

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\(^{183}\) Also see Chapter Four, fn. 59.


minne or God withholds them sometimes causes the soul to feel anger.¹⁸⁶ Eckhart’s exhortations to his readers to act inwardly in reaching God are many, and are often linked to work that gives rise to, or “birth” to, the divine Word within the soul.¹⁸⁷ The soul accepts God in understanding, he asserts, and goes into God in loving;¹⁸⁸ “working and becoming are one.” Knowledge and love (minne) are important to this work and the soul engages fully when both are present. In the soul, a power seeks God and oneness with God, dissatisfied with anything else but this oneness. All three Persons of the Trinity are the object of the soul’s seeking, since their own union is greater than any other and oneness with God means oneness with the Trinity.¹⁸⁹ Thus, for Eckhart as for our other authors, the soul is active in its own improvement, and does not sit passively even if the body is immobile for a time. The work of the soul is the work of development.

In these various examples regarding the acquisition of knowledge, the use of reason, and the actions of the soul, we can see that love (caritas or minne) is important to the soul’s development. Caritas provides one way for knowledge to be transmitted from divine sources to the human soul and for Albert, at least, is itself transmitted first before it begins conveying other benefits. Yet, for Albert, caritas is not the only term for divine

¹⁸⁶ *Brieven*, Letter 22, VM, 197.

¹⁸⁷ For an introduction to Eckhart’s theory of the birth of the Word in the soul, see McGinn, *Mystical Theology*, esp Chapter Four.

¹⁸⁸ “Got und ich wir sin ein. Mit bekennenne nime ich got in mich, mit minnenne gân ich in got…Daz würken und daz werden is ein.” *DW I*, Predigt 6, 115; also see Dobie, 85.

love; *amor* and *dilectio* also hold a place in the divine hierarchy and at times sit higher than *caritas*. Hadewijch and Eckhart see *caritas* as subordinate to *amor* and *minne*, differing in their opinions from that of the earlier theologian, and Beatrice considers *minne* at a level nearly the same as that of God. Whether *caritas* is primary in reaching the soul is an issue treated secondarily to all but Eckhart; by the time he wrote the topic had become a more important one. Still, for each author, love is fully engaged in assisting the soul in acquiring a better understanding of divine things and helping the soul shape the discernment that comes with a proper use of the faculties of reason and emotion. The presence of *caritas* is required even if the illuminating light comes from a highest intellect, or is provided by grace rather than by *caritas*. Additionally, the active state of the soul works closely with *caritas* or *minne*, better able to achieve oneness and complete understanding with the help of this divine love.
An analysis of thirteenth-century theories on *caritas* reveals fascinating and complex ideas forwarded by religious teachers active in a number of educational programs. In the texts of our four authors there was general agreement about certain aspects of *caritas* (or *minne*) such as its role in conveying divine benefits to the human soul or its essential oneness with God and all of the persons of the Trinity. Significant here was the consensus among Albert, Hadewijch, and Eckhart, that *caritas* was essentially, but not substantially, the same as the Holy Spirit (or any other Person of the Trinity). While Beatrice did not specifically express this same opinion, her treatise indicated that she, too, distinguished *minne* from a ‘common love’ directed toward other human beings on earth. She did not specify that this common love was *caritas* but both Albert and Eckhart had claimed it was. So, in some way, all four authors acknowledged that *caritas* was God and the Trinity in certain aspects, but maintained that this love was not completely equal in all properties. This hesitation appears to have helped our thinkers avoid identifying this divine love with the same exact proper name of each Person of the Trinity.

Beneath those generalities, however, there was individual interpretation. The exact nature of the relationship between the Holy Spirit and *caritas* differed somewhat among our authors, and, surprisingly, they each held the opinion that there was something distinct between differing terms for love such as *minne-caritas* and *amor-dilectio-caritas*. Beatrice, Hadewijch, and Eckhart, who taught in the vernacular languages, had discussed *minne* with an understanding, in some respects, that they could mean *caritas*. *Minne* is sometimes used synonymously as *caritas*, yet Hadewijch and Eckhart had seemed to aligned *minne* as often with *amor* as they did with *caritas* when they employed *minne* to mean a more general kind of divine love. Hadewijch was more illustrative in this, with respect to vernacular and Latin use, because
she distinguished *caritas* from *minne* within the same Middle Dutch text. Although vernacular synonyms for *caritas* allowed for individual interpretations of some aspects of *caritas* and other terms, such as *minne*, this distinction remained even if slight. Vernacular synonyms reduced the clarity of some Latin definitions or explanations, yet if viewed in their own context these synonyms were less ambiguous than if examined through Latin or scholastic lenses. So the context in which *minne* has been used needs close analysis before one can say with confidence it stands for the Latin term.

Discussions of *caritas* among these authors also seemed to indicate that its placement in the divine hierarchy had changed from theories promoted by earlier theologians than they. While Augustine and Lombard may have questioned the substantial nature of *caritas*, they nevertheless placed it on the same level as *amor* or *dilectio*. Albert did that as well, yet he made a different distinction among these terms, beginning what appears to be a trend in relating *caritas* more closely with friendship. He, Hadewijch, and Eckhart had located *caritas* within or even beneath *amor* or *minne* and had placed it between the soul and these more general terms for love. By the time Eckhart was teaching, there was a decided change in the role of *caritas* as conveyer of divine benefits and illuminator of the intellect. In Eckhart’s work, a higher Intellect arrives first in the soul, and grace is as likely as *caritas* to provide illumination or other means by which the soul can understand the mind of God.

While the reasons for the shift this are uncertain, and while more needs to be researched on this topic, it is possible that one or both of two developments contributed to the change in the placement of *caritas* in the divine order. The first has to do with the Dominican stance on the topic of the primacy of the intellect over the will, a position that necessarily lowers the primacy of *caritas*, since that love is closely related to the will. The second development was the introduction of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, which placed importance on friendship (*amicitia*) and which may have given Albert and his successors a way to alleviate tension surrounding the notion that *caritas* could be God without becoming identified with each person of the Trinity. Were *caritas* more akin to *amicitia*, and were God were the soul’s *amicus*, it
might allow theorists to more easily explain the separation of *caritas* from certain properties of the Trinity. It may have helped to solve a number of issues, at least for Dominicans.

Throughout this analysis of each thinker’s opinions regarding divine love, it has become clearly evident that women were teaching about this important topic. As Beatrice and Hadewijch discussed *caritas* or *minne*, they explained their ideas on the Trinity, relations between the Holy Spirit and the human soul, and methods by which they felt human beings acquired an understanding of divine will. They treated doctrinal topics with the same care as they did instructions regarding correct practices for gaining knowledge. Their words indicated that they considered their elucidations valuable to their students and that they were aware their words were helpful, even influential. From Beatrice and Hadewijch we learn that experiential learning was as vital to their readers as was logic or intellectual learning; Eckhart seems to attempt to meld the two teaching methods in ways that as yet appear unsuccessful, but may have assisted a wider audience than that of scholastics. The pedagogy of these three authors and other teachers like them may be less familiar to modern scholars of education than they were at the time to Albert, but he himself would have known of other methods of teaching as well as their value. It is our inheritance of a claim that considers intellect and intellectual training to be primary to education that has resulted in the narrowing of our spotlight onto certain types of educational texts. Other valuable lessons were also learned, and not all utilized the same pedagogy. Current trends in elementary education that have begun to revive experiential, visual, and immersive methods of learning are not so much creating novel ways for students to receive instruction as they are renewing pedagogies that medieval teachers knew were optimal for a holistic education.

Finally, if Van Engen is correct and learning was and is to be useful to a larger society in some way, I suggest that historians look further at the ways in which educational institutions and particular programs of study had been useful to the communities they served. The city surrounding a beguinage would have found certain policies and activities to be more beneficial to them than would a convent of Dominican friars. Colleges of Paris served a community with different needs than did houses of Cistercian monks. A hospice attracted members interested in
serving needs unlike those in the above institutions. Modern internet communities would certainly benefit from the element of compassion inherent in *caritas*. While educational activities may have overlapped (and still do), the overall purpose of each institution differed from others. If we can study the programs of education within these institutions without elevating one or another to a position of superiority during their own time, we will have a better view of learning and teaching in medieval society as a whole.
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