Faulkes de Bréauté in England (1207-1224): a feudal study

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Faulkes de Bréauté in England (1207 - 1224)

A FEUDAL STUDY

by

Benton Gerald Moeller

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, in the Department of History in the Graduate College of the State University of Iowa

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PREFACE
Faulkes de Bréauté was one of many men of uncertain origins who rose to positions of prominence in thirteenth-century England through service to the Crown. The life of such a man takes the reader into the workaday aspect of royal administration, the involved feudal disputes both within the baronage and between the baronage and the Crown, and finally, the feudal aspirations and disappointments of a great magnate.

I have not dealt with Faulkes de Bréauté in strictly a biographical way. Much that would be of interest to the student of the man, has been, perforce, banished from this thesis, so that I might picture the man as illustrative of his environment at greater length. It is because this is, in very large part, a feudal study, or to be more precise, a study of the rise of an able man from the bottom of the secular hierarchy to its uppermost reaches, that the full dramatic effect of Faulkes' life may have been in large part lost. If this thesis helps to dispoll an illusion that is slow a-dying, i.e., that feudal society was a static one, and that what social fluidity there was in that society was provided by the beneficent influence of the Church, it will have fulfilled its function. There is more to be garnered from a study of the career of Faulkes'de Bréauté which is of interest to the student of general history, but primary emphasis has been placed on the way a very able man, of uncertain moral predilections, made his way as an agent of the Crown, in this case both as administrator and military palmar, first in a type of apprenticeship, then with widely expanded authority, into the circle of the very greatest men of England. It reflects the sort of opposition with which such a man might be expected to
be confronted, from Churchmen and established Barons. Finally this study reflects what may well be one of the very few "laws" of history, that a man who grows great performing the most obsequious services for the instrument of his magnification, whether it be a King, as in Faulkes' case, or a party, or a class, as in the case of many modern revolutionaries and politicians, once given a stake in the established order will fight with dogged determination to maintain his personal position though it seem to his former benefactor the most base betrayal.
CHAPTER I

FAULKES AND KING JOHN
The origin of Faulkes de Breauté was a subject of some disagreement for the monastic chroniclers of his day. They agreed only in one respect, namely that they all believed him to have been of mean or low birth, possibly born out of wedlock. Ralph de Coggeshall says that he was the bastard son of a Norman knight. Ralph also believed that name, Falcesius, had been given him after an early exploit "wherewith he had slain a knight in his father's meadow in Normandy. Since Falx or Faulx was the word for sythe, the medieval chronicler, wont to indulge in fantastic etymological digressions, felt justified in ascribing this significant incident to Faulkes' early life. Another writer, Matthew Paris, thought that Faulkes had been given the name at the time of his baptism and that the name was prophetic of the violent role that Faulkes was to play as a violator of the peace of the Church.

It seems likely that these chroniclers had little or no idea about the exact nature of Faulkes' antecedents and that their statements on the subject have more significance as indications of the way the churchmen felt about Faulkes than as informative items upon which the biographer could attempt to recreate the early years of the life of the man whom one described as "the rod of the Lord's Fury".

It would seem that Faulkes and his several brothers and sisters came originally from a small Norman town near Le Havre called Bréauté. Their father probably was of the low knighthly class, a man whose children would be expected to learn the art of war and to leave the family circle in the search of adventure, fame and fortune beyond the crowded confines of the Norman Duchy. He may have served his apprenticeship in warfare during the
campaigns between John and Phillip Augustus for the mastery of the continental possessions of the Angevins in the years prior to 1204.

It is possible that while King John was still the Count of Mortain, Faulkes was one of his household sergeants. If more were known about Faulkes' age, it would be easier to speculate as to his probable training previous to the appearance of his name in the official records.

Faulkes was apparently a respected military engineer and leader of auxiliaries very early in the reign of John, because he was intrusted with several important Welsh castles before being sent to Glamorgan to replace William de Braose as the Royal Sheriff of that county in 1209. As the constable of Cardigan, Carmethin and Gower and Sheriff of Glamorgan, Faulkes was given a position of importance, one requiring diplomatic ability and military acumen to maintain Royal power against the intractable Welshman, Llewellyn, Prince of North Wales, and William Marshal, the Earl of Pembroke. Wales was the center of the power of the sometime favorite of John, William de Braose, and when John undertook his vendetta against the Braose family in 1209, he was showing considerable confidence in Faulkes by establishing him as Sheriff and Constable of Glamorgan.

The Close and Patent rolls for the years 1209-1212 give us fleeting but significant glimpses of Faulkes as the trusted Welsh expert of John. He is directed to see that certain men are put in possession of their lands. He accounts regularly with the Barons of the Exchequer for the firma of Glamorgan. He is shown giving aid and provisions to military bands which John
sent to him from time to time to pacify the always rebellious Welsh clansmen. Finally in 1214 when William Marshal had made his peace with John, Faulkes is directed to turn over the castles of Cardigan, Caermethin, and Gower to the great Earl Marshal. The immediate crisis over in Wales, Faulkes came to be given ever more important and more varied royal commissions during the years following 1212, although he did not surrender custody of the County and Honor of Glamorgan until January, 1214.

In 1213 he was sent to Flanders with Brian de L'Isle, William Longspee and others probably in order to recruit mercenaries for John's campaign of 1214 and to undertake the diplomatic negotiations necessary to coordinate the military efforts of the Duke of Flanders and Hainault with those of John against Phillip Augustus. This military and diplomatic mission to the Netherlands must have been a considerable undertaking, for the plenipotentiaries had access to 20,000 marks for subsidies to the Flemish Duke and soldiers to be recruited in his realm.

John's confidence in Faulkes and the other members of this mission is illustrated by the large amount of money and the weighty matters which were involved. Faulkes, who is later seen as a sort of combination head of the military Inspector General and Corps of Engineers, must have had a deciding voice in the matter of selecting engineers, archers and foot soldiers for the army which was to be defeated at Bouvines in the next year.

After he returned to England, he apparently spent the rest of the year as a special financial messenger of the crown, for on several occasions he is shown to be either taking or delivering
substantial sums of money from or to other of John's agents in England. 14

During John's campaign on the continent in 1214, Faulkes did not play a large part. Although it seems likely that Faulkes commanded one of a number of detachments which he had recruited earlier in Flanders. The only concrete evidence of any direct participation by Faulkes in the warfare is a letter patent which indicates that Faulkes was the Constable of Veu until 15 June, 1214. 15 At that time Faulkes was directed to commit Veu Castle to Gaudin of Clizun. We know further from an entry which is hard to date exactly, but must come from the period 7 May - 22 August, 1214. that Faulkes was in Flanders again with John F. Hugh, probably in command of over one hundred knights. 16 Beyond these two cryptic entries there is nothing which indicates that Faulkes had an important position in the English council of war or that he was present at Bouvines.

It is only after the defeat at Bouvines that John began to rely upon Faulkes as one of his principal agents. He can be shown to have been in attendance upon the King quite often in the period from Bouvines to Magna Carta. He is first styled Seneshal of the King in March of 1215, during the period when the financial organs of the Household had usurped many of the collecting and dispersing functions of the Exchequer. 17 This period was one of the grave emergency for the Crown. The expansion of the financial duties of the Household and the establishment of castle treasuries, reflect the "hand to mouth" nature of the way in which government was carried on. Moreover, the frantic way in which John caused the major castles of the Midlands and the Marcher
areas to be brought into a state of repair shows that these must have been anxious months for John and his advisors.

It is impossible to say whether Faulkes had anything to do with the financial innovations of this stage of John's reign. Although as the Seneshal of the King, as financial messenger, and as the custodian of one of the short-lived castle treasuries, he must have been privy to these innovations, I suspect that such tried financial experts as John F. Hugh and Hustace Falconbridge were the guiding hands behind financial policy which was dictated by the urgent necessity of the Crown to have its funds ready at hand.

On the other hand Faulkes seems to have been given for a time a special office, that of the overseer of the fortifications which were in the control of the Crown. We, who suffer under the present day preoccupation with tables of organization in government, are unable to appreciate the capacity of one person to enter into and control state machinery which performed almost an infinite variety of functions. Although the relatively undifferentiated machinery of the Angevin state did not produce an office of military Inspector General to replace the no longer performed office of Marshal, for a few months, at least, the functions of such an office were performed by Faulkes de Bréauté. Faulkes was back in England by the end of October 1214. John, who had arrived from La Rochelle on the second day of that month, apparently commissioned Faulkes with the immediate responsibility of seeing to the repair of strategic castle defenses of England. Faulkes was sent with engineers and soldiers to Peter de Maulay, Phillip Marc, and Engelard de Cygony at their respective castles on 30 October.
Later on 21 and 23 November, letters close were sent to Brian de L'isle, William de Harcourt, and Phillip Marc relating to certain artisans who were being sent by the King to those military leaders, presumably in order to ready their castles for the rigours of siege warfare.

We are sending Master Nicholas de Audelus, Hugh de Barentin, ...our carpenters...(to be paid the following) Nicholas nine pennies per day, Hugh six pennies per day,...(they are to make) duas bonas petrarias et bon Mangunelas Turk.21

The foremen in all three cases, probably master carpenters, were to receive nine pence while their journeymen comrades were to be given the rather large salary of six pence per day. The task of putting these castles in readiness was apparently not one requiring large gangs of builde[r] or a considerable length of time, for Faulkes had many other duties during this period.

Chronologically, Faulkes' period of close attendance to the person of the King falls after this survey of English defenses. In the spring of 1215, when the rebellious barons were organizing the opposition to the crown which was to bring John to Runnymede in early summer, Faulkes came to be styled senecalus nostrus, our seneschal, along with Brian de L'isle. His office was shared by several persons during the last years of John's reign, by men who, like Brian, John fitz Hugh, and Faulkes, had no appreciable baronial position and whose fortunes could only be made through loyal service to the monarch.

When the barons assembled their complaints, one of their chief aspirations was to rid England of the middle persons, the ministeriales who had come to monopolize the important advisory positions of the King. The Barons hoped to supplant the Household by the "Council of the great barons" of England. In short, they
wished to restore to themselves the ancient baronial prerogative of paying suit of court to the King.

The King, unable to trust most of his great vassals, was forced to rely on the ministeriales to perform the most varied functions of government. These men led the mercenary forces of the royal army; they had infiltrated into the Exchequer; they peopled the Royal Household and were steadily gathering more and more shrieval and constabular offices to themselves. In return, the King granted many of the wardships and escheated lands to this new class.

Faulkes came to be associated with this class by the Magnates who inspired Magna Carta, and even after he had established himself as a considerable feudal figure he was unable to gain acceptance with the great members of the feudal elite. To the Monastic chroniclers, Faulkes was King John's serf, the friend of the Cygonys, Gerard de Athée, and all the rest of the social outcasts who strove through the exercise of their great ability and audacity to carve a place for themselves in the upper reaches of Feudal Society.

While the Barons were busy writing such articles as those which demanded that the king rid himself of the "whole brood" of foreign advisors and mercenaries and to replace them with men who "knew the law of the land", Faulkes was in immediate attendance upon the King. During March and April of 1215 Faulkes was with the King in the Midlands. He first witnessed a letter close on March 6 at Rochester, moved with the King to Nottingham toward the end of that month, and must have been with the King at Clare on 26 April, when he petitioned the King to restore to Philip Hareng, later a noted justice itinerant, his lands in
Dorset. Although earlier in the year he had been used to transport large sums of money from John's castellans to the King, Faulkes seems to have been given temporarily more mundane duties near the King as the time for military activity came with the spring.

There is no way of knowing what Faulkes was doing just previous to John's meeting with the Barons at Runnymede. It seems likely that he was in command of one or more of the contingents of foreign mercenaries which had been ordered by the King from the Lowlands and Wales. Some of these troops were sent back according to the demands of the Baronial confederates, but at least one contingent had secret orders from John to stand by in case of a further outbreak of violence on the part of the Barons, but it is uncertain whether Faulkes was in command of this group. The last word of Faulkes' activities immediately prior to the signing of Magna Carta was the demand made by the King for Faulkes to turn over 400 Welsh mercenaries under his command to William Longspee. Therefore it seems likely that some of the time in the early summer was spent by Faulkes in his old Welsh bailiwick in recruiting this fighting band.

One of the curious aspects of the first ten years of Faulkes' career in England is the fact that the "Great Interdict" and the excommunication of John would seem to have affected Faulkes not in the least. It is only later in the course of the Civil War that Faulkes came into unhappy contact with the monastic houses whose chroniclers were to attach such approprium to his name. Faulkes, who can by no stretch of the imagination be considered to have been overly pious, was certainly covered by the effects of the
interdict, yet he is not mentioned once in the records as having been one of John's agents for extorting money from the English clergy.

During a period which had seen the Loss of Normandy, the Great Interdict, the Rebellions of the Braose and Llewellyn the Great in Wales, the attempt to recover the overseas empire of the Angevins, and the Baronial revolt leading to Magna Carta, Faulkes de Bréauté had performed a variety of functions for his lord and benefactor, John Lackland. He had probably fought with John in 1204. He had been an important castellan and later a Sheriff in the trouble spot of Wales, and had undertaken the transport of royal treasure countless times. He had helped to recruit an Army for the campaign of 1214, spent several months in a personal inspection of the defenses of Royal castles in England, and had finally become an important member of the Royal Household in the spring of 1215. By his competent performance Faulkes had earned the confidence and gratitude of his lord and King.

Faulkes' feudal position by the time of John's meeting of the Barons was still unimpressive. He had been granted the Manor and appurtenances of Newbury about the same time that he was given the shrievalty of Glamorgan. At the time when he was sent on the Flemish mission he was awarded "as long as it please us", the manor of Congresbury in Somerset. Before 27 April 1214 Faulkes had been endowed with the custody of the lands of Griffin fitz Rhys. The last may have been rather extensive, although it is highly unlikely that Faulkes enjoyed this gift for long, if ever. Finally 5 March, 1215 he was given the custody of the land and heirs of Walter de Ely.
in Magna Carta was but a hollow peace, that Faulkes received his most important commission until that time. Although earlier Faulkes had been John's principal military engineer, in the fall of 1215, John had determined to give Faulkes an even more difficult position. On 18 September, Faulkes had been ordered to send auxiliaries and sappers to Hastings and Rye. These men were chosen and trained by Faulkes to undertake those essential military functions which were beneath the dignity of the gentlemen who figure so largely in chivalric romance and epic. However, Faulkes was no longer merely the chief military engineer of the Royalist army.

On 4 October letters patent were directed to the constables of all the important castles still in Royalist hands to the effect that Faulkes had been given authority to "remove, diminish or augment" the garrisons and provisions of their castles. Almost every castle of primary importance, i.e. Oxford, Bristol, Sireburn, Marlborough, Corfe, Devizes, Winchester, Berchamstead, Windles, Northampton and Exeter, was included in the number of castles thus put under the control of Faulkes. With one bold sweep the multiplicity of commands which were exercised by the castellans of the centers of Royalist power were subordinated to one coordinating authority. Faulkes had been given the authority to command the energetic castellans, among whom were numbered men like Engelard and Peter de Mauley, that they dispose their forces according to his strategic decisions.

A superb capacity for organization, if need be, for rapid and forceful decision, and a mind capable of seeing the realities of military strategy in the largest sense, was required for this job.
The demands of the task were enormous; the rewards, at best, uncertain. The most that Faulkes could hope to do would be to hold as many of the important castles as possible, not to dissipate the strength of the Royalist forces in a concerted offensive to drive the rebels out of England, or even to clear up the islands of rebel resistance within the Midlands. As we know, this was one of John's darkest hours. The Rebels, aided by the theoretical claims of the Dauphin of France, and the material aid of French knights, auxiliaries and warstuffs, were in a position to take any single stronghold which they cared to besiege. The fact that in these trying months the 'loyalist cause did not collapse due to material weakness or ill-conceived strategy must have been in large measure due to Faulkes successful fulfillmment of the 'job' with which John had entrusted him.

A commission of such considerable importance required that Faulkes have a semi-permanent headquarters, with a location central to his entire command. Such a headquarters was provided by the castle of Oxford. A map discloses the unique strategic importance of Oxford for the control of the central group of castles which Faulkes commanded. On 21 October Faulkes was granted the shrievalty of that county and the custody of its castle, and from this time until some time after John's death in the autumn of the next year, would seem to have made it the seat of his defensive command. In the spring of the next year, he was granted the county and castle of Northampton, from which time he seems to have divided his time between the two great castles.

Although Faulkes never seemed to have had personal control over such outlying castles as Dover, which was under the command
of Hubert de Burgh, and Corfe in the South, he continued to play a considerable role in Welsh Marches. On one occasion Faulkes was directed to ready the castle of Bruges in Shropshire, probably against a possible attack by the men of Llewellyn, Prince of North Wales. Later, on 3 August 1216, he was directed to consult with Robert de Beauchamp on matters which concerned the Honour of Gloucester, which included the Welsh Honour of Glamorgan, Faulkes' old bailiwick.

Faulkes had been granted the county of Oxford in October, and was granted the county of Northampton in May of 1216. Besides these counties which were mostly under Royalist control, Faulkes was granted on 9 March of 1216 the counties of Cambridge and Huntingdon. On the same day he was granted the custody of the lands and other franchises of the Bishopric of Ely, which included the swamplands which were called the Isle of Ely. At the time of the Royal grant, most of Cambridgeshire, Huntingtonshire and the Diocese of Ely were part of the "no man's land" between the Eastern counties under effective control of the Baronial forces and the Midland area which Faulkes held for the King.

The first occasions of Faulkes' unhappy relations with certain ecclesiastical persons and corporations falls chronologically in the period between Magna Carta and the death of John. Few of the chroniclers fail to mention in extravagant fashion the way in which Faulkes pillaged the Isle of Ely when his men were directed to pursue a sort of "scorched earth" campaign in that desolate area. Previous to this time many baronial supporters, lay and clerical, had apparently repaired to the swamplands of the Isle for refuge, and Faulkes would seem to have dealt especially harshly with these
victims of feudal warfare.

As incident to his job as sheriff of the several midlands counties, Faulkes was given the custody of the lands and Abbey of Ramsey. Although the letter directing him to take possession appears to have been lost, a letter remains which is filled with implications concerning the way in which Faulkes handled such custodies. On 19 April 1216, Faulkes was ordered to render to the monks of the Abbey the vital necessities by which they might sustain life—those things which pertained to the cellar, table and wardrobe of the Abbey itself. A previous directive of the King dated 17 April, another letter dated 20 April, and a final letter ordering Faulkes to see that Henry Foliot was given possession of the Abbey and its lands completes the record of Faulkes' relations with the monks of this establishment.

It seems that Faulkes must have been ordered to take the Abbey into the King's hand early in the spring. Later, Faulkes may have been rather sparing in provisioning the monks with food, drink and clothing, for the letter of 17 April is phrased in such a way that it seems even King John, who was often less than solicitous in his treatment of clerics, thought that Faulkes was dealing rather too severely with the monks. This Huntingtonshire Abbey was very close to the zone in which the main fighting was done during the civil war, so that an alternate explanation is possible for the plight in which the monks of Ramsey found themselves. Since military forces of both the Baronial and Royalist armies would be expected to be in the area quite often, it is possible that the Abbey had been from time to time pillaged of its provisions by either or both sides in the conflict. Moreover,
it seems highly unlikely that the Abbey could rely on the crops from its own lands, which were for the large part concentrated in the zone of the fighting. To the individual historical imagination is left the decision as to whether Faulkes was to the monks of Ramsey a protector or a pillager.

In the course of his shrieval and military duties Faulkes was put in charge of some very important hostages during this period. The most important of these was the son of Hugh Bigod, Earl of Norfolk, one of the great barons of the eastern counties who had adhered to the cause of the rebellious Barons. Later when Henry III was about to make the final truce with Louis of France which ended the war in England, Faulkes was in possession of several other important hostages, among whom was the eldest son and heir of Henri de Braybroc, the man who was later to play a fateful role in the life of the Breaute family. John was wont to make great use of hostages as a form of feudal blackmail, and it is not surprising that among the duties which Faulkes was called upon to perform was that of providing a place of safe keeping for some of the noble captives of the King's army.

One of the principal objects of the loyalists was to wean away from the baronial cause as many of the lukewarm members of the Dauphin's forces as possible. Faulkes was granted the right to provide reversi, men who came back to the peace of the king, with safe conducts to the current abode of the Royal court. When granted to Faulkes on 22 September, this power was of little importance. However, when the Baronial army started to melt away following the "reversal" of William Longspee and William Marshal, Jr., early in the reign of Henry III, the power to grant such
safe conducts became tantamount to passing on the acceptability of Barons returning to the allegiance of the King.

Sometime in 1215-16 Faulkes was married to Margaret de Revers, née Fitz Gerald, who was one of the greatest heiresses in England. Margaret, as the wife of Baldwin, son of the Earl of Devon, and the mother of Baldwin fitz Baldwin, the heir to the lands of the Earls of Devon, and a considerable heiress in her own right, would bring to any husband a large feudal inheritance. At approximately the same time, on 15 September 1216, little over a month before John's death, Faulkes was granted the escheated lands and barony of Baldwin de Bethune, former Earl of Albermarle. Although we shall have a great deal more to say of these grants in another chapter, suffice it at this point to remark that Faulkes, who had held an important position as a royal official, one whose loyalty to the monarch was ensured by the lack of any other source of income than that provided by the sporadic monetary grants of the king, and a very few scattered holdings of a feudal nature, was raised to considerable baronial rank by these grants. This was what an ignobly but clever officer of the crown or of a very great baron must have hoped for as he pursued the manifold, onerous, and often dangerous commissions of his lord. The way was hard, and often slow, the opposition from established classes was vigorous and outspoken. But this was one of the very few ways in which parts of the lower classes could hope to rise to a status of feudal significance without too much discord following.

Faulkes may well have been with John in those days after he lost the royal treasure in the Wash and consumed the fatal green peaches. He was mentioned along with the great barons,
the Earl Marshal, Ranulf of Chester and others, and a very few men of less than comital rank, such as William Brewer and Hubert de Burgh, as the "executors" of the final Royal testament. One of the very last letters emitting from John's chancery, on 18 October, only a day before his death, informed the men of Luitûn, a manor belonging to the lands of Baldwin de Bethune, that Faulkes had been given the manor by John as an outright grant. Faulkes may or may not have been at the King's side at this time. It does seem probable that on the next day, as soon as the King was known to be dead, Faulkes would have repaired to his counties to attempt to prepare them for the shock of a change in the person of the King.

John seems to have planned that Faulkes would be a mainstay of his young son Henry in the process of establishing the minor Angevin as the legitimate heir to the throne. John could not have provided for the allegiance of Faulkes to the cause of Henry any more effectively than he had before his death. Faulkes had been given a baronial stake in the Angevin cause by the recent grants of wife and lands. By including Faulkes' name in the testament, John wanted to leave no doubt in the minds of the other members of the royal party of the legitimacy of Faulkes' position in the new government. John relied on a few very great men to protect the kingdom for his son. He chose wisely, for it seems unlikely that the throne could have been saved for Henry III by any less dynamic and able figures than people like William Marshal, Peter des Roches, Hubert de Burgh, Ranulf de Blundeville and Faulkes de Bréauté.
CHAPTER II

PAULKES AND KING HENRY III
After a week of debate, anxious waiting for the Earl of Chester, and feverish reckoning of the chances for failure or success, the Royalist leaders determined to attempt a defense of Henry's cause. Faulkes was probably not present at these meetings, but within two weeks of Henry's coronation, Faulkes arrived at a great council at Bristol, where the immediate strategic and diplomatic concerns of the King's cause were to be discussed. The first matter which found its way to the issuance of royal letters at Bristol was the granting of considerable lands to Faulkes. Incredible as it may seem, considering the weighty matters of an impersonal nature which must have concerned the assembled nobles and clergymen at Bristol, the allegiance of Faulkes seems to have been the first item on the agenda. On 13 November, Faulkes was confirmed in his right to the manor and castle of Stokescurcy in Somerset, part of the dower of his wife Margaret; he was further granted the custody of the heir and lands of William fitz Martin, a small baron of the southwestern counties; finally, he was granted the lands of Isabelle de Mortimer until she had paid to him the debt which she owed to John.

It is impossible to determine whether the elder Marshal, who had signed the letters of grant, was attempting to bribe Faulkes or whether he was merely granting these extensive holdings as a mark of his confidence in Faulkes' merit and ability. The reason given in the letters close are that this was part of John's gift to Faulkes, which bespeaks a personal attachment and sense of gratitude which far outweighs that which John had displayed toward any favorite in his late years. Earlier John had been
lavish in his grants, official and feudal, to men like William de Braose and William Brewer, but in the later years a certain suspiciousness had rendered him niggardly until the last moments of his reign, when he showered upon Faulkes lands and custodies which made him one of the great barons of the realm.

It is part of the greatness of the elder Marshal that he, who had risen from fairly obscure origins to the position of royal protector, could overlook the non-chivalric origins of de Breauté. During the period of William Marshal's regency, Faulkes continued to be used in more and more varied official duties, and his lands were increased as he proved again and again his usefulness and ardor for the cause of Henry III. It is to these years—years of bitter warfare, and a truce which by its terms was to deprive the military leaders of the Royalist side of much which they must have considered to be prizes of warfare, escheated castles and lands, hostages, and exclusive rights to royal favor—to which we must turn.

The matter of most extreme importance was winning the war against Louis and the rebellious barons. If outright victory might not be obtained, a long term truce was eminently desirable in its stead. For several months the rebels concentrated on the siege of Dover and on the sport of the tournament, while the Royal forces traded time for the occasional castles which the rebels were able to invest.

In the late spring of 1217, the military advisors of the King determined on a bold plan of offensive. They knew the forces of the Baronage to be split into several different groups,
one large force besieging Dover, another concentrated around London, and a third besieging Lincoln castle. For many months the remarkable female constable of Lincoln castle, Nicola de Haye, whose family held the semi-heritable shrievalty of Lincoln, had been holding the castle against the very considerable besieging forces of the enemy. She had several occasions complained to the chief military men of the King's council that without material and human reinforcements she could scarcely be expected to withhold the forces commanded by the Count of Perche for very much more time.

The Royalists believed that if they concentrated their whole strength in a drive on Lincoln, they would probably have a clear superiority in men and military machines over the besieging forces. They expected to accomplish a twofold result by such a campaign. In the first place, if the besieging army could be driven off, Lincoln could again be an effective anchor for the left flank of the line of royal castles which held the Baronial forces from an invasion of the north. In the second place, if the supporters of the king were fortunate, they might be able to destroy or render ineffective a force which consisted of roughly one third of the rebel strength in England.

Faulkes was one of the three or four leaders of the Royal Host which fought and pillaged its way up the Vale of Belvoir and into Lincoln County in May of 1217. All the great men were there except a very few who were detained elsewhere, such as Hubert de Burgh, who had all he could do at the besieged castle of Dover. The chronicler of the life of William Marshall has given us the most extensive account of the campaign which ended in the so-called
"Fair of Lincoln", and of course his account might be expected to have a bias in favor of William Marshal and chivalric elements of warfare. He does, however, list the other leaders who were present in the Royalist Host and gives them credit for considerable bravery and accomplishment in that battle. Besides Marshal, hoary with age, and thus seemingly incapable of undertaking the sort of single exploits for which he was cited, his son, William Marshal, Jr., William Longspee, Peter des Roches, the fighting Bishop of Winchester, Ranulf of Chester, and Faulkes de Bréauté were the leaders of the several divisions of the army.

Roger of Wendover thought that Faulkes with his auxiliaries, engineers, sappers, and archers formed the vanguard of the army, while the French chronicler of William Marshal does not make it quite clear who did lead, although he mentions that there was some debate and impassioned words as to whose division deserved that signal honor. When the town was reached, the Royalists were scouted by men of the Count of Perche, who mistakenly estimated the Royalists to be twice their actual number. Thus the numerically superior rebel army, rested and with a secure base of operations in the city of Lincoln, did not attack the tired and disorganized Royal Host.

Soon after the arrival of the Royalists, Nicolaé was able to send a message to the relieving army disclosing that there was a way to enter the castle without coming into the city itself. Faulkes was dispatched with his several hundred archers to enter the castle and cover the attack of the several groups of knights with a barrage of arrows. It seems that Faulkes' bowmen were
fairly effective in diverting the attention of the besieging forces, for the mounted knights and esquires of the other leaders gained entrance to the town shortly after Faulkes' men had taken their positions on the walls of the castle. There followed the day-long, but almost bloodless battle which was termed the "Fair of Lincoln", presumably because the nobility of the participants and the chivalric nature of its course made it seem more like a tournament than one of the battles which so seldom resembled the idealized versions of warfare which abounded in the literature of chivalry.

Because this battle has been discussed at great length by Tout, Oman, Painter, Norgate and others, we shall not proceed with what is one of the more delightful chapters in the history of medieval warfare, but will concentrate on the activities of Faulkes during this day. It is significant that Faulkes, who had a very extensive barony by the time of this battle, did not, like the rest of the great barons, fight as a mounted knight in command of a section of cavalry. It would not have been unseemly for the husband of Margaret de Revers, sheriff of 8 counties, and possessor of lands of Baldwin de Bethune, to have insisted upon his right to the command of a division of regular knights. Yet he had been chosen to a command whose prestige apparently did not coincide with its real military importance, probably by men who had seen his effectiveness in battle as a commander of auxiliaries.

Walter of Coventry says that on one occasion Faulkes sallied forth from the castle surrounded by a small group of his archers, and was immediately captured by the enemy. Although he was very
shortly set free by some of his own men, it is hard to understand why Faulkes would have dislodged himself from the elevations of the castle walls to attack on foot the soldiers of the enemy. Archers were notoriously ineffective from any but a fairly stationary position, so there was little tactical advantage which could be gained from such a move. The chronicler quite obviously would have lauded such a brave and audacious gesture, and clearly retains it in his history as one more concrete bit of detail which testifies to the general worth of the men who were assembled at Lincoln on 20 May, 1217.

One of Faulkes' household, a certain Reginald Croc, killed the only great nobleman lost by either side during the last stages of the battle. Croc, probably an infantry lancer, struck the Count of Perche dead by a stroke of his spear through the count's helmet. By the end of the battle this same Croc had been killed by the Count's men. If one of Faulkes' household was thus in the thick of the fray in the late afternoon when the decision was still in doubt it does not seem unlikely that Faulkes also was near the center of activities, although there is no reference to his activities after his recapture fairly early in the day's fighting.

After the day had been won, the victors claimed the sack of the city as the legitimate spoils of the day. Not sated with a day's fighting and the material gains which the capture of many hostages of great worth would bring, the greatest men in England proceeded to the rape of citizens and their city. The burghers had not been of great help to Nicola de Haye, having supplied the French forces with food, clothing and other necessities during the
course of the siege. Even so, it is significant that the men who were trying to restore England to her legitimate royal line, and to bring peace after the long period of civil war should have given vent to their lusts in such a primitive way. In the thirteenth century, civilization—the learned and delightful arts of gentility which could make of the Earl Marshal a minor poet and charmer of courtly ladies, was a thin veneer which cracked with slighter strains than such a day as the "Fair of Lincoln".

Faulkes took part in several other campaigns of less importance and color than that of Lincoln. On one occasion he was with a minor host commanded by William of Salisbury which besieged Henri de Braibroc at the castle of Mount Sorrel in Nottinghamshire. This siege was unfortunately interrupted by the arrival of a relieving force of Baronial forces which necessitated Longspee's retreating southward to an area which was more firmly held in Royalist grasp. Immediately after the battle of Lincoln, the Royalist Host split into several parties, one of which was commanded by Faulkes and William of Salisbury. At this time those two warriers proceeded to the conquest of the Isle of Ely and other parts of the eastern counties which were still in the vast no man's land.

Several of the stories which have found their way into the monastic chronicles date from this campaign. They speak of the horrible desecrations which Faulkes made against several abbeys and cathedrals in the Midlands and the East. Whatever of these stories are true came from his activities at this time, and much of what has been written had some basis in fact. If they were wholly
untrue, it is inconceivable that the chroniclers would have vented such hatred toward Faulkes. Matthew Paris called him the "Rod of the Lord's Fury". Faulkes tore down two churches in Bedford to rebuild the castle there. He stole the holy vestments and beat the clergymen at St. Alban's. He wasted with fire and sword the lands and ecclesiastical buildings in the Isle of Ely and elsewhere in that diocese.

Matthew Paris would have him several years later receiving a premonition of a horrible fate which would await him if he did not repent of his horrid acts against the monks of St. Albans. In this delightful story, which is probably almost pure invention of the vindictive Matthew, Faulkes was awakened in the night after a horrible dream of being struck dead by lightning and was counseled by his wife to go to St. Alban's and make his peace with God and the men of the Abbey. On the next day he did so, but when he got to St. Alban's his wicked nature regained a hold on him and Faulkes refused to repent of his crimes against God and man, and to restore to the monks what was theirs. In fact he struck down the Abbot when that venerable gentleman attempted to ask Faulkes for the restitution of some of the valuables of the Abbey.

Such stories are legion in the monastic annals and it is impossible to give a final answer as to the degree of their veracity. There would seem to be little doubt that Faulkes did on many occasions plunder ecclesiastical corporations of their goods, and more than likely was guilty of doing violence to the persons of clerics. He, of course, was not alone in doing such acts. The French were terrible in their pillaging and other of the military leaders of the Royalists are reported to have been rather
firm in their dealings with ecclesiastical persons and properties. Furthermore, Faulkes often must have had no alternative than to pillage if he were to be able to maintain his forces in food, clothing and mounts. Finally, it would not do to leave in perfect order, lands which the enemy could strip to maintain himself when he passed through the country.

Medieval armies had no highly organized services of supply and were dependent on the countryside for their everyday wants. A "scorched earth" policy could be effective in keeping the enemy from entering areas which could not be otherwise defended. Perhaps Faulkes was more cruel than the rest of the military leaders of the time. He must have been to have been singled out by so many chroniclers as a principal object of their vituperation. On the other hand he may have been more effective than the rest of his contemporaries. After all, General Sherman was not uniquely cruel, only more methodical and effective than his predecessors in the American Civil War.

During the summer and early fall of 1217, the anti-Royalist forces were deserted by many supporters who had lost hope of eventual victory after the crushing defeat at Lincoln. Faulkes was concerned very largely during that period with increasing the rolls of the reversi and of restoring their lands to those of his counties. Faulkes was probably so busy with the matters of the returning rebels that he had little time to devote to actual participation in the war and almost certainly was not at Kingston when the truce ending the war was signed between the Marshal and the representatives of the Dauphin of France in September.
That truce contained several articles which were likely to be of great interest to men such as Faulkes who had benefited greatly from the war by the gifts of escheated baronies of the King's enemies. By the treaty's stipulation, all English landholders who had fought against the King were to be restored to the feudal position they had held before the war. What this meant was the eventual invalidation of many outright grants and custodies made by John and Henry III during the war. Faulkes' claim to many of his possessions were in great jeopardy. For the time, however, other concerns were more pressing to the men of the King, than those relative to the loss of property.

The first thing that had to be done was to restore the machinery of government to working order, on both the central and local level. Only with the resumption of the customary practices of administration could the King's law come again to rule the land. Secondly, and not unrelated to the first point, was the necessity of replenishing the empty treasury of the King. Finally, the job of restoring to the rebellious barons their lands, and of relieving the powerful group of Royal Constables of their dangerously extensive castle and shrieval holdings would have to be undertaken if these men proved to be overbearing.

Faulkes was concerned with the restoration of customary local administration and in collecting the King's revenue as sheriff of eight midlands counties, as well as custodian of several baronies and lord of others. The prosaic story of his routine collection of the sheriff's farm, of his dealings with the King's Jews and with the boroughs under his administrative supervision makes uninteresting reading, but it must be recognized these things probably took up
much of his time during the years from the end of the war until he was relieved of control of castles and counties late in 1223 and early in 1224. His effective presence at many trials during the period are also mundane but important aspects of his career. For the most part, he must have fulfilled these duties methodically and well. In the summer of 1218 he was in the southwest helping to collect scutage from the lands of William of Torinton and lands in his own custody which had been held by William fitz Martin. In January and February of the same year he was making preparations for a great council which was to be held in his bailiwick at Northampton. The King spent Christmas of 1220 with Faulkes at Oxford. Faulkes testified at a trial which concerned the disposition of certain lands of the honour of Gloucester in the summer of 1218. In February of 1221 he was collecting the scutage of Bytham, and in the same month two years later was collecting tallage in his counties. Faulkes' duties were still varied and extensive, for the King's chroniclers found in him a mainstay of the post-war regime.

The chronicles disclose two stories of Faulkes' activities during these years which are of a more irregular nature than his ordinary shrieval duties. In Oxford, a certain deacon recanted his faith in order to marry a beautiful Jewess of that city. Faulkes acted with dispatch and caused the poor lovestruck man to be burned at the stake. This must have been a fairly rare sort of punishment because the chronicles all remark at its uniqueness. Another time, in 1222, Faulkes helped Hubert de Burgh put down an incipient rebellion among the lower orders of London. He hanged Constatine, the leader, a great man of the city who had been unwise enough to organize a riot against the Abbot of Westminster with the cry,
"Montjoy, Montjoy, God and our lord Lewis be our aid".

Faulkes had organized his midlands shrievalties in a way that they need not demand his full personal attention. In most of the counties he had appointed deputies to undertake the ordinary duties of the sheriff. The castles in his counties were also parcelled out among constables in whom he placed considerable trust. It is not surprising that he could take time off from his shrieval duties to pay attention to the needs of his own baronies, that he could find the time to be a justice itinerant in the fall of 1219, and could be a valuable supporter to the King in the matter of rebellious constables during the years before he was shorn of his official dignities.

The problem of the castles is very complicated for several reasons. No one, Henry, his advisors, or the Constables could have been precisely sure what was the nature of castle tenure. The matter is of the utmost importance, because certain historians have argued that the events leading to the fall of Faulkes must be seen as the culminating incident in a series of rebellions by royal constables against the Royal authority which was trying to deprive them of dignities which they had earned by loyal service to the Crown during the war. This is much too simplified a view of the whole matter, although the resumption of royal castles was a source of antagonism between Faulkes and the King and his advisors.

The castles of England can be divided into three major groups according to the type of tenure which their constables had in ordinary times. First were purely private castles, belonging to some other lord than the King. If the constable were the owner of the castle or an appointee of the owner, there was little the King could
do to dislodge him. The second variety of castle tenure was a heritable custody of a royal castle, such as that which the family of Nicolaá de Haye held for the castle of Lincoln. The third form was the non-heritable custody of a royal castle, which was the type of tenure by which most of the royal constables held castles. The factor which complicated everything was that since Henry III was a minor, there were certain limitations imposed on his power to make grants. For instance, he could make no outright grants in perpetuity. Some of the constables claimed that by the terms of John's grant and in view of the King's minority, they were to hold their castles until the King came of age. Indeed, so Faulkes later was to claim in his story of his rebellion submitted to the Pope.

The tenure of royal castles, and of counties, was confused both because no one was sure of his legal rights and because the King's advisors were wary of antagonizing the powerful constables and usurping lords in a time when the power of the Crown was still relatively weak. There were three minor usurpations concerning castles in England in the years when Faulkes was still the sheriff of eight counties. In the spring of 1219, William Longspee, who had been given the county and castle of Lincoln as a gift for his valor at the Battle of Lincoln, but whose right to the castle had been subsequently disclaimed in the favor of Nicolaá, was besieging that lady in her castle. Faulkes, who seems to have taken a gentlemanly interest in the welfare of Nicolaá, wrote to the King complaining of the actions of Longspee, and was directed in a return communication to go to the aid of the legitimate holder of the castle. Faulkes, who undoubtedly did not endear himself to
the powerful Earl of Salisbury by his timely interference, was successful in protecting Nicola, and Longspée had to give up his attempt to extend his power in the northern county. 38

In the next year, William Marshal was found in opposition to the wishes of the King by having taken possession of the castles of Marleborough and Fotheringay. The former, he claimed as a heritable castellany, the latter, he had been granted during the war in much the same circumstances as the grant of Lincoln to William Longspée. In November, 1220, Faulkes, Richard de Revers, and William de Forz, titular Count of Albermarle, were sent by the King to discuss with the young Marshal his claims to these castles. Faulkes again was in the position of defending a lady, Maud de Balliol, the sister of Ranulf of Chester, who claimed Fotheringay as part of her dower rights as relict of David de Balliol, Earl of Huntingdon. Apparently these talks were of some avail, for the Earl Marshal actually did deliver the castle to an appointee of the King late in November. 40

The third and most spectacular of the rebellions of the Constables was that of William de Forz almost immediately after he returned to the King at Northampton from the mission to William Marshal, Jr. late in 1220. On the night before Christmas, Albermarle stole away from the assembled worthies at Northampton and attempted to take possession of the castle of Bytham which he had claimed as a hereditary private castle for several years. His claim to this castle and the castle of Rockingham, a royal castle for which he claimed the grant by King John of tenure until Henry should come of age, had been disallowed in the courts, and it
is likely that at Northampton his appeal of this decision had again been disallowed.

Although he was directed by the King to leave Bytham in the possession of its Constable, he siezed and then went to Fotheringay with a small force, where he intended to resist by force the attempt of the King to deprive him of the castle. Faulkes, among others, was sent by the King to besiege Albermarle at Fotheringay and to neutralize the force which had been left at Bytham. Roger of Wendover would have Faulkes collaborating with Albermarle on the occasion of this rebellion. He ways that Faulkes, Phillip Marc, Peter de Maulay, Engelard de Athée (Cygony) and many others were clamoring to disturb the peace. As Turner has pointed out there is no evidence which confirms this statement. Quite to the contrary, it seems highly unlikely that Faulkes would be sent to besiege the rebellious count if he had been included in the rebellion. After Fotheringay had been retaken and Forz had made his peace with the King, Faulkes was given the custody of the castle. In the following spring, Faulkes was collecting the scutage bo Bytham, was credited for the expenses which he had encurred at the siege of that castle, and directed to bring the Constable of Bytham before the King. In every respect his activities had been quite loyal to the king and devoted to the maintenance of peace.

- Faulkes was later to be put in much the same position as Albermarle, Longspée and Marshal when it was his turn to be deprived of certain constabular and shrieval dignities. Actually, it was not the custody of a castle that had been given to him as
an officer of the Crown that was at stake on this later occasion. The castle of Plympton, of which we will have more to say, had been made his as part of the dower of his wife, so that quite another issue was involved than the resumption of a royal castle. As we shall see, Faulkes seems to have given up his official dignities with little hesitation, and only those privileges which he thought he held as of feudal right were withheld by him from the agents of the royal authority. It is wrong, then, to see Faulkes' rebellion growing out of a resistance to the policy of changing royal constables and sheriffs appointed by John because, as we have seen, Faulkes cooperated and took a leading part in repressing three of the minor rebellions which did have their origin in such resistance.

During the period we have been discussing Faulkes came more and more to take a baronial attitude toward the activities of the royal authority. He was now a very great lord, the controller of over 150 knights' fees, and outright lord of close to one hundred fees as the husband of Margaret de Ripariis and the holder of the baronies of Baldwin de Bethune. As such it is probably inevitable that he should have conflicted from time to time with the crown and with certain great lords who claimed lands which he held. During this period he was granted some very substantial custodies, the greatest of which was that of the Honour of Eye in the eastern counties, as the seneschal of Richard of Cornwall, the younger brother of Henry III. In addition, he was given the custody of the lands and heirs of Geoffrey de Pavilly (1217), Walter de Neville (1218), the Countess of Melleunt, Walter de Ely (1220) and Ely de Beauchamp (1223).
One event which must have antagonized Faulkes was a Inquest of Custodies of 1221 which Henry caused to have taken, wherein all the custodies of the crown were taken directly in the hand of the Crown and then redistributed. Among Faulkes lands which were affected by this process were the lands of Margaret de Revers and Baldwin, her son. Strictly speaking, the crown had little right to consider the dower of Margaret as a royal custody, because since she had married again, her lands became the right of her husband. Faulkes must have complained of this Inquest, because shortly after he returned from the siege of Bytham and Fotheringay the King had all of Faulkes custodies regranted to him.

Another source of irritation in the relations of Faulkes as a feudal lord and his King was the Inquest of the Forests, wherein Faulkes was found to have encroached in several ways on the Royal Forests. In the spring of 1223, Faulkes was granted a quittance for some such incursion in a forest in the custody of Hugh de Neville, one of his foremost enemies. On several other occasions Faulkes was granted certain privileges in the forests which he had probably already been exercising before the grants. If he was already pasturing his hogs in the Forest of Brikstok, he must have found it rather annoying that he must receive a royal grant in order to continue to do so. He was granted in 1223 the right to run his dogs in the forest of Northampton, and in the same year was allowed a certain amount of timber for a mill which he was building on the Isle of Wight. These royal grants of small favors show that the King still held Faulkes in high esteem, or that he felt that it would not do to antagonize the man who had been so useful to the Crown in former times.
On two different occasions, the King's advisors were forced to deliver mild admonishments to Faulkes for harsh treatment of people in his shrievalties. On another occasion he was accused of having misused royal monies in the course of his administration. On 12 November 1221 Faulkes was directed to restore to the burghers of Bedford that which he had encroached upon. Unfortunately the letter does not make clear precisely what sort of encroachment Faulkes was making on this occasion, but a later letter gives us a rough idea of what type of forcible entry was concerned. On 13 February 1222, Faulkes was directed to give back to William de Beauchamp, the principal lord in Bedfordshire, a mill outside Bedford which the men of Faulkes were holding. Faulkes relations with the Burghers and principal lord of Bedford were probably never of a cordial nature, since one of his first acts upon taking over control of the city was to destroy two of the churches of the town to make use of the stone for rebuilding the castle. Since William de Beauchamp was constantly petitioning the King to be resiezied of his lands in Bedford, it is highly likely that Faulkes retained for his own use much more than the single mill to which the letter refers.

After Faulkes had been relieved of his shrievalties, early in 1224, a royal letter accused him of having padded his expense account for periodic repairs to the royal hunting lodge at Woodstock in Oxfordshire. He was directed in 1218 to turn over Woodstock to John Marshal, although he still seems to have been credited at the exchequer for the expenses of the lodge later in his career. Actually, it is surprising for a man who had the control of eight counties for almost seven years that there is recorded no more evidence of malfeasance in office. Faulkes was
certainly not the sort of person that the League of Woman Voters would have chosen as a reform candidate for office. On the other hand the accusations which are implied in the chroniclers characterizations of de Bréauté are not borne out by the evidence remaining in the records. We must search beyond the grounds of misuse of his offices if we are to discover the motives which caused Faulkes to revolt and for Henry to visit a most wrathful sentence upon him for his rebellion.

Although he was never destined to be able to fulfill his vow, Faulkes, along with Peter des Roches and Ranulf of Chester, took a Crusader's oath in 1220. It would be interesting to know under what circumstances this oath was taken. Did Faulkes actually have the modicum of popular piety which is associated with the assumption of such an oath? Did he feel that this would be one more sign of his rise to important baronial status? Did he see with the eye of the cynic that conditions in England would not allow of his absence, and that the guise of the potential Crusader might protect him in future times of crisis?

One cannot say that Faulkes was an overly pious man, certainly the chroniclers thought quite the reverse. On the other hand, he did have a household chaplain, for whom he begged a pension from the King. He did not, to be sure, endow any churches or take any pilgrimages, but at least two of his brothers were clerics. On two occasions when he was declared excommunicate by Stephen Langton, he was disturbed enough by the action to surrender himself to the mercy and flogging of the churchmen. I think it improper to say, as has one historian, that "Faulkes was a wicked and Godless man". It would be proper to take the Crusader's vow at face value,
as Pope Honorius III seems to have done when he supported Faulkes in 1224.70

The events which probably would explain the motives behind the eventual excommunications, deprivations of office and fief, rebellion and exile of Faulkes are but meagrely reported by chroniclers and not at all in record sources. One searches in vain for evidence from record sources which explain why Faulkes, Earl Ranulf and Brian de L'isle took part in an abortive attempt to capture the Tower of London in Advent season 1223.71 Faulkes' name is absent from the records from June to December of that year, and the silence is ominous indeed, considering the numerous references to de Bréauté in previous years.

Faulkes must have had almost no official duties other than those which were being handled by his deputies in the counties under his authority. The law suits which would be handled in the next spring at Luton were probably being discussed at the time, perhaps in a way which made Faulkes fearful of an adverse decision. William Marshal, Jr. had come into full royal favor73 and he was the greatest single enemy which Faulkes had in England. Hubert de Burgh, almost alone, controlled the King, and Faulkes' sometime friend and later advocate, Peter des Roches, was out of the country. In the Querimonia Falcasii Coram Domino Papa, his account of the events which led up to his exile and deprivation presented by way of appeal to the Papal curia, Faulkes represented the Advent rebellion as a reaction to the personal rule of Hubert de Burgh, although most scholars agree in disbelieving most of the stories of Hubert's misrule.74 No definitive answer can be given to the question of why Faulkes and the others made their rebellion in
the fall of 1223. It seems likely that the barons knew that their offices were shortly to be redistributed among men more trusted by de Burgh. Faulkes probably knew that only as the sheriff of Bedford could he maintain his Honour of Luton against William Marshal, Jr., who was never unwilling to use force to press a claim which he could not validate in a court of law. Many petty annoyances such as the Inquest of Widows and minor heirs, and the accusations of encroachment in the royal forests, and in his counties must have helped Faulkes to come to his decision to defy the authority of an "evil counselor" of the King.

Faulkes had come a long way from the position of the minor officer of the Crown who had done without question whatever his master willed. He was a great baron who had suffered insults from King's men in Devon, in the Forests, in Bedford, and no doubt elsewhere. He felt himself ill used and improperly rewarded for his many services to the Crown. He respected his rights, his idea of A Rule of Law, and saw as the only means of exercising such rights, rebellion against the rule of Hubert de Burgh, William Marshal, William Longspée and a whole new set of rising ministeriales, such as Eustace Falconbridge and Peter des Rivaux.

The chronicles report, and the records reflect the effects of the Advent rebellion on its principals. They were excommunicated by the clergymen who were with the King at Northampton, but then, submitting to the King, the excommunication was lifted and they were received back into the King's grace. None of this procedure was extraordinary. Several times in Henry's reign, men had been given full royal pardon for insurrections of as great magnitude.
On this occasion when three of the very most powerful men in the kingdom tried, among other things, to take the Tower of London, the men around the King decided to make a move to relieve the dissident rebels of their official dignities.

On 30 December, 1223, a wholesale redistribution of shrievalties and castle custodies was embarked upon by Hubert de Burgh and Stephen Langton, the Archbishop of Canterbury. Loyal churchmen were chosen to receive the bulk of these offices, but in Faulkes' shrievalties secular officers were chosen. On this date Faulkes was directed to turn over the castle and county of Oxford to Richard de Rivere, that of Hertford to Willam de Einford, and that of Northampton to Ralph de Trubleville. The same day, Ramulf of Chester was relieved of the castles of Salisbury and Bruges, and the counties of Shropshire and Cheshire, while Brian de L'Isle was directed to turn over his offices to another new man. Three weeks later, on 18 January 1224, Faulkes was asked to deliver the castles and counties of Bedford, Bucks, Cambridge and Huntingdon to new sheriffs. At two bold strokes Faulkes had been pared down to size, for only his feudal dignities remained to him.

With office gone, his feudal rights became hard to defend. His enemies now came forward pressing their claims against him, claims which had been unenforcible as long as he had a monopoly of power in the Midlands. Not only did his enemies, large and small, now come out in the open, but the Crown was not finished in the matter of Faulkes' deprivation. On 16 February came the first order to deliver the Honour and Castle of Plymton to Waleran the German, one of the King's new mercenary officials. On 29 February Faulkes
was further directed to deliver to the same Constable the castles of Carrebroc and Christchurch. All three of these castles belonged to the Honour of Devon, and without their possession, Faulkes custody of the Honour would have been rendered less effective. We have described elsewhere the succession of royal letters which were sent to Faulkes demanding in an ever more petulant tone the delivery of these castles and their appurtenances. The relations of Faulkes and the advisors of the King must have become very bitter during these early months of 1224.

A further vexation to Faulkes was a letter of 13 April, in which he was accused of having deprived the King of some of his revenue for Oxford by having padded the expense accounts for the royal hunting lodge at Woodstock. In the same month, Faulkes was probably summoned first to appear before "twelve good men and true" and the Justice Itinerant at Dunstable, to answer the charges of the men of Luton that they had been deseized by Faulkes. To these demands for the castle of the Honour of Devon and to appear in the royal court at Dunstable, Faulkes seems to have been remarkably silent. He certainly did not submit, nor did he take any positive action to counter the opposition which had arisen against him.

Miss Norgate believes that a problem involving the chronology of three writs has led to confusion about the events immediately prior to Faulkes' revolt. Her argument is that three writs entered on the back of a membrane of the close roll of 9 Henry III dated October 1224-1225 actually belong to April-May 1224. These writs, indicating that Faulkes was to be outlawed on a charge of capital crime if he did not appear at the Bedfordshire court by 17 June, would have been meaningful only if Faulkes
were still in England. As she maintains, they fit perfectly with the chronological data for April and May of 1224 because Faulkes had already been sent from England by October of 1224. Therefore, although the editors of the Close Rolls and the Chancery clerks who dictated the order of the letters contained therein have designated them otherwise, I believe that Miss Norgate is correct in her contention. If so, Faulkes was given a respite from outlawry until 17 June, the day on which the overt rebellion began. On May 30 this respite from outlawry was revoked and Faulkes was declared to be out of the King's peace. In the first half of June, Henry de Braybrok and others were holding shire court at Dunstable, at which time Faulkes was probably declared guilty in sixteen counts of novel disseisen. On 16 June Faulkes was at Northampton at a great council of the King, while the Assize of Dunstable was being completed. The following day Henry de Braybroc was seized by men of Faulkes' brother, William de Breauté, while riding to Northampton to join the king and to report on the decisions reached at that shire court. Braybroc was taken to Bedford castle and held there probably as a hostage against Faulkes' return from the presence of the King. By 18 June Faulkes had returned to Bedford and was summoned again to Northampton. The next day Faulkes sent his excuses to the King, which seem not to have been well received, for on that day King determined to send against the men of William de Breauté, the troops he had intended to use in the defense of La Rochelle against Louis VIII of France. On 20 June Faulkes had hastily betaken himself to the Welsh Marches where he hoped to receive the protection of Llewellyn, Prince of North Wales, and may have hoped
to find an active ally in that proud Welsh "King". By 21 June
the King had encamped in front of Bedford castle and was busily
writing for men and supplies to hasten its reduction.

The siege lasted all through July and well into August, during
which time Plympton and Christchurch were being besieged by smaller
forces of the King, and Faulkes was attempting to find refuge
in Wales and the palatine jurisdictions of Ranulf of Chester, Faulkes' protector. Ranulf probably wrote to Pope Honorius III
at this time trying to obtain papal intervention with Henry III
on behalf of de Bréauté. Honorius did write to Henry III for
Faulkes, but was told that he was ill-informed by the advocates
of Faulkes about the nature of the rebellion and its causes.
Ranulf managed to attain a safe conduct to the King for Faulkes
to go to Northampton, where he was absolved of the excommunication
pronounced against him.

By 14 August, Bedford Castle had been mined by the royal engi-
neers, and Henry de Braybroc and the women in the castle, among
whom was Margaret de Revers, were allowed to leave the castle.
The following day the castle was surrendered, and all but four
of the defenders were hanged. Faulkes meanwhile was being kept
under the supervision of the Bishop of Coventry, until such
time as the King would deign to receive him to pronounce on
his fate. Finally on 22 August Faulkes was brought to Westminster
where he was spared his life because of his many services to
Henry and his father, but was deprived of all of his lands and
custodies, and was forced to surrender all his money to the King.
Thereafter, he was banished forever from England and was escorted
to the channel and put on a boat to France by the Earl Warren.
The end of Faulkes' life is charged with a pathos which deprives him of some of the heroic stature he had before his exile. In France, we are told by one of the Chroniclers, he was for a time imprisoned by Louis, who remembered well Faulkes' opposition in the civil war. Finally freed from a French gaol, Faulkes made his way to the court of the Pope where he presented his claims to the nominal overlord of Henry III in a document which is preserved in the chronicle of Walter of Coventry. Honorius wrote to Henry III in Faulkes' favor a second time, but was again rebuffed by the proud heir of the Angevins, who had by that time discovered that Faulkes had secreted some of his money at the Temple in London, making it unobtainable.

The end of Faulkes' life, like its beginning, is left quite obscure, the speculation of the chroniclers notwithstanding. It is not important, except to the biographer, the artist who would make of his life a unity. He probably died in 1228, a penniless friendless man in early middle age. He may have met his end in a duel in the south of France. He had played out his role in history four years before, and the rest was anti-climax, not silence.
The fall of Faulkes from power was more swift than his relatively rapid rise. He had come to hold much of central England for his King and had at the same time acquired the trappings and power of a feudal magnate of the highest rank. The man who in November 1223 could count himself among the very greatest men of the English nation, was within a year a ruined man.

The cause of his ruin was, in the largest sense, his inability to convert, in seven years, his privileges into rights. In a period when definition of rights in the concrete language and usage of the common law was, more than any other factor, causing a really permanent tone to be impressed upon English society, the aspiring baron had to use every means at his command to have his privileges confirmed and extended again and again, until he became an accepted member of the feudal elite. Office reinforced Feudality, and Feudality reinforced Office, and to the bold, the clever, the legally adept, and the adventurous, belonged fabulous opportunities of creating almost princely houses.

We shall probably never be quite positive why Henry visited upon Faulkes such a singular revenge. Faulkes must have been a great threat to the men about the King, for they, more than the minor King, were responsible for the policy of redistribution of offices and the later siege of Bedford and exile of Faulkes. An unsatisfactory answer this, to the question which must continue to vex the reader: why the severe penalty for activities which had been undertaken at least three other times in the minority by other barons than Faulkes?

It would be possible to give speculative answers, but that would take us away from history and into a field midway between post-mortem psychoanalysis and divination. It seems wise to spare
CONCLUSION


4. On 29 January, 1214, Faulkes was directed to turn over those castles to William Marshal. Rotuli Litterarum Patentum in Turri Londinensi Asservati. Hardy, T. D. ed. London, 1833, pp. 85b, 105. refer to two earlier entries in the Patent Roles indicate that Faulkes was for undetermined periods the castellan of Haverford and that he was to turn over the custody of the castle which he had taken at Cardigan to William of London.

5. Great Role of the Pipe, 10-11 John, Stenton, Doris, ed. passim.


8. Norgate, op. cit. pp. 226-7. Faulkes had held Glamorgan, as had William de Braose, as a custody of the King, who in turn held it as the husband of Isabelle of Gloucester. Glamorgan was held by Isabelle as an appurtenance of the Honor of Gloucester. After John divorced Isabelle, he held Glamorgan in his own hand until late in 1213, but upon Isabelle's remarriage, this time to the Earl of Essex, it reverted to her, and through her to the Earl of Essex.


10. Ibid. 136.

11. Ibid. 190.

12. Ibid. 190.

13. Ibid. 145b.

14. Ibid. 156.

15. Rot. Pat. 117.


19. Ibid., 178b.

20. Ibid., 178b.

21. Ibid., 176.

22. Coggeshall, 204.

23. Magna Carta, Ch. 50, refers to Gerard d’Athee, Engelard "et totam sequelem eorumdem".

24. op. cit. 190 "sequelem eorumdem".

25. Ibid. 197.

26. Ibid. 180.

27. Ibid. 214.

FOOTNOTES

30. Ibid., 143. These lands had apparently been in Faulkes custody for some time previous to this date, for at that time John directed that the lands be delivered to Rhys fitz Griffin, the son of Griffin fitz Rhys, which "Faulkes had held". Some doubt must exist as to the exact name of the donee, for the membrane has been partially destroyed.

34. Ibid., 223.
35. Ibid., 228.
37. Ibid., 159b.
38. Ibid., 179b.
40. Ibid., 282.
42. Ibid., 169b.
44. Ibid., 263.
45. Ibid., 264.
47. Ibid., 179.
49. It is difficult to date Faulkes' marriage with exactitude. The first reference to it is contained in the first volume of close rolls for the reign of Henry (page 293b) in a directive that Faulkes be given possession of the castle of Stokescurcy, which was his of the right of his wife. Her former husband probably died in 1215 and Margeryt de Rivere was given to Faulkes shortly thereafter.
Chapter II: FOOTNOTES

1. He is listed in the witnesses to the reissued and revised chapter.


3. Ibid. 293b.

4. Ibid. 293b.


9. op. cit. IV. 22.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Perhaps the best discussion of the general aspects of the "Fair of Lincoln" has been supplied by Tout, F. in the English Historical Review, April, 1903 (Vol. 18).


14. Certainly the Chronicler of William Marshal would have lauded such brave, if idiotic, action. His whole treatment is a romanticization of William Marshal in particular, and the "flower" of English chivalry in general. It remains the best secular biography of the high middle age and a treasurehouse for the literary and historical student of chivalry.

15. Hist. le Mar., II. 16729-68.


19. Ibid. 183.


26. Ibid. 352.


29. Coggeshall, 94.

30. Ibid. 104.


32. Rot. Pat. 177. Primae litterae novi sigilli domini regis, de cartis vel litteris patentibus non faciendis; et hic incepit sigillum domini regis currere.

33. In the "querimonia".

34. Rot. Pat. 65.

35. Rot. Claus. 3h4.


FOOTNOTES

40. Rot Claus. 348.
41. Wendover, IV. 66.
43. Ibid.
45. Rot. Claus. 452.
46. Rot. Claus. 49.
47. Ibid. 455.
48. Faulkes held four major honours by various tenures, plus minor holdings which amounted to over 150 knights fees in toto.
49. Rot. Pat. 299.
51. Ibid. 352.
52. Ibid. 419b.
53. Ibid. 470b.
54. Ibid. 535b.
55. Ibid. 473b.
56. Ibid. 473b.
57. Ibid. 510.
58. Ibid. 556.
59. Ibid. 552.
60. Ibid. 513.
61. Ibid. 448b.
64. Rot. Pat. 126.
68. Peter actually went on a crusade to the Near East, while Ranulf went to Santiago da Compostella.
69. After he had participated in the Advent Rebellion and later just before his exile in summer, 1224.
70. Royal Letters. 513.
71. As usual the chroniclers explained it merely in the nature of a "clamoring to disturb the peace".
73. Ibid. 68-83.
74. Curia Regis Rolls. Vol. VIII. pp. 248-52. William Marshal was willing to pay 1000 marks for the privilege of fighting Faulkes in single combat to determine the validity of his claim to Luton.
75. Royal Letters. 105.
76. Rot. Pat. 418.
77. Ibid.
78. Rot Claus. 581b.
79. Ibid. 588.
80. Rot Pat. 427.
81. Rot Claus. H. Vol II. 72b, 73.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Dunstable Chronicle. 90.
88. Royal Letters. 225.
89. Ibid. 225-6.
FOOTNOTES

92. Coventry. 264-5 (Querimonia).
93. Matthew Paris accuses Faulkes of having caused the fall of La Rochelle.
95. Royal Letters. 229.
97. The men of Devon could not come to Bedford because they were besieging Faulkes' castles in the Southwest.
96. where the writ of outlawry was not a royal writ.
100. Royal Letters. I. 229.
101. Such a letter must have existed for it was reported by several chroniclers.
104. Two promised to go on crusade, and two others were recruited to fight for the King in Poitou.
105. Coventry II. 254.
108. Coventry. II. 254.
109. The Querimonia was probably drawn up by a professional lawyer of English extraction at Rome, a Robert Passelaw. It was the brief of Faulkes' case against Henry III presented to Honorious III as the appellate judge in the case.
111. Most of the Chroniclers thought him to have died in Rome, as he probably did.
112. This story is probably the figment of an unusually active monastic imagination.
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