Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West

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Ohio borrowed log building techniques from German and Swedish-Finnish settlers in the Delaware valley, but maintained elongation, height, and roof pitch patterns originally developed in Scotland and Ulster. French and German settlers brought their own log techniques, adding to the complexity of Ohio's building patterns.

Hutslar downplays the importance of southern pioneers in establishing Ohio construction styles. He notes that settlers from New England never preferred log structures, and that as the original forests were removed, other settlers began to use more easily transportable sawn lumber imported from relatively distant areas. By the late 1830s, log cabins were rarely built, and memories of cabin construction evoked nostalgia from many Ohioans. Although quite sturdy, log cabins were soon modified or replaced in most regions of Ohio. Log barns and outbuildings remained in use until they were gradually replaced by timber framed structures.

This volume, which thoroughly reviews building techniques and quotes a number of pioneer memoirs, reminds readers that log buildings represented an efficient adaptation to particular environmental and economic conditions. They were labor intensive, inexpensive, and sturdy. Pioneers combined their prior experiences with the particular conditions that they found in western Pennsylvania, western Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio in creating a log civilization. These insights may help other scholars who will study the creation of the built environment of Iowa and other trans-Mississippi states.
In the view of William L. Shea and Earl J. Hess, the full significance of Pea Ridge has not been adequately appreciated by historians. In the preface they declare, "this book is the first detailed study of the Pea Ridge campaign" (xii). The statement is broadly accurate, although their bibliography mentions several other studies of Pea Ridge, including a fairly lengthy series of five articles written by Edward Bearss in 1963–1964 for the *Annals of Iowa*. The Battle of Pea Ridge holds special interest for Iowans, because many of the Union troops and the overall commander of Union forces, Samuel R. Curtis, were from the state.

Shea and Hess give Pea Ridge the full treatment. The general reader who enjoys old-fashioned military history will enjoy *Pea Ridge*. The authors write in a lucid, lively, "just-the-facts" style, which makes the book a pleasant, if unprovocative, read. Their story recounts the minutiae of the battle in painstaking detail. Each change of position, often down to the regimental level, is duly recorded. The text is well supplied with maps to help the reader visualize these movements; nonetheless, because of the depth of detail, there is frequently not a map around when the reader needs one. The names (and photographs) of generals pepper the text, so much so that confusion can result. Not to worry, however; the authors provide an appendix with the "Order of Battle" (that is, the organization of the two armies, listing corps, divisional, brigade, and regimental commanders). One cannot help being impressed by the amount of research that went into the book; for instance, the authors examined manuscript collections in twenty-one states and the District of Columbia, and searched forty-two contemporary newspapers and magazines for references to the battle.

To the reader not well-versed nor very interested in old-fashioned military history, however, *Pea Ridge* will likely be a disappointment. This will be particularly the case for those familiar with its authors' other work and with more recent trends in military history. The reader will find only brief snippets of the appreciation for the common soldier which, for example, marked Hess's 1981 analysis of the 12th Missouri Infantry for the *Missouri Historical Review*. Nor will the reader discover a "face of battle" history comparable to the recent monograph on another battle of special interest to Iowans, "Seeing the Elephant": *Raw Recruits at the Battle of Shiloh*, by Joseph A. Frank and George A. Reaves (1989).

One example will serve to illustrate. In the preface, Shea and Hess promise to discuss ethnic conflicts in the two armies at Pea Ridge, a topic of much potential interest to a wide range of historians. In the text, however, ethnic conflict in the Union army gets
reduced to a personal conflict between General Curtis and one of his corps commanders, the German-born Franz Sigel. But what did the rank-and-file think? How did ethnic splits play out within and between regiments? The authors do not approach these subjects. Ethnic conflict in the Confederate army is even more simplified, revolving around the several American Indian regiments that fought on the Confederate side. The authors "resolve" that conflict by asserting that the Indians did not commit the atrocities usually attributed to them. Were there no immigrants in the Confederate army?

In the final analysis, Shea and Hess argue, the blame for Confederate defeat at Pea Ridge lies squarely on Earl Van Dorn. Three particular mistakes stand out. Van Dorn decided to rush his army to battle without its supply trains, leaving his troops critically short of ammunition on the second day of the battle. Then, during the battle, he lost contact with about half of his army and so never effectively utilized his forces. And he failed to coordinate his numerically superior artillery properly. More generally, Shea and Hess conclude that Van Dorn was impetuous to the point of recklessness, and hence not really fit for command.

Indeed, the authors miss no opportunity to criticize Van Dorn. Sometimes he is even criticized for doing something (such as cutting himself off from his base of supplies) that Curtis is later praised for doing. Curtis, a more stolid figure than Van Dorn, got away with cutting himself off from his supplies as he marched through Arkansas after Pea Ridge; Van Dorn’s army was hampered throughout the battle by his having tried the same maneuver in the days leading up to Pea Ridge. Thus one often gets the impression that Van Dorn is criticized because he failed; Curtis praised because he won.


**REVIEWED BY ELIZABETH D. LEONARD, COLBY COLLEGE**

As Marilyn Mayer Culpepper rightly notes in her introduction, “Every schoolchild has heard about Fort Sumter and Gettysburg and Appomattox, but relatively few Americans, young or old, know much about the activities of women during the Civil War” (1). This generalized ignorance regarding the contributions of women on both sides of the Civil War effort is a result, I believe, of a pro-