Where Was the Wall Then? Where Is It Now?

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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the power of “walls” to constrain thought and silence diverse voices of reason within planning. Using die Mauer (The Berlin Wall) as a linking metaphor, this paper juxtaposes mid-1950s planning in a spatially- and ideologically-divided Berlin (Germany) against Harland Bartholomew’s mid-1950s planning in a racially-divided Louisville, Kentucky (USA). It then juxtaposes the latter against a mid-1950s narrative about efforts to desegregate housing in Louisville. This juxtaposition reveals that some people in Louisville used the Cold War divide between East and West to reinforce the long-standing racial divide between blacks and whites. Moreover, it reveals that, by deferring to Cold War-related racial politics that could not be questioned, Bartholomew’s technical approach to planning silenced other voices of reason and thereby reflected and reproduced the race-inflected politics of the Cold War divide. The paper concludes by briefly considering what Bartholomew might have done differently in the context and by exploring what this juxtaposition of stories implies for planning in the context of the contemporary “war against terrorists.”

Introduction
In Berlin there used to be a wall. For thirty years that wall, die Mauer, physically divided Berlin into East and West. For obvious reasons, that physical division powerfully affected planning in the city. But die Mauer also stood as a powerful symbol of the divide
between “the free world” of the West and “the evil empire” of the East. In most U. S. cities, there also used to be a wall. It was a powerful social divide that separated blacks from whites. I will argue in this paper that these two walls—the Cold War wall between East and West and the race-related wall between blacks and whites—were linked in a way that radically constrained planning thought and action.¹

To do this, I will contrast mid-1950s planning in Berlin with planning conducted by Harland Bartholomew and Associates (Bartholomew) in Louisville, Kentucky, and then set Bartholomew’s plan against a mid-1950s narrative about efforts to desegregate housing in Louisville. These juxtapositions will lead me to conclude that Bartholomew’s ostensibly apolitical technical approach to planning reinforced the wall separating blacks from whites in Louisville by focusing far too narrowly on physical planning, by not discussing the extent to which black presence and “white flight” contributed to the suburbanization of Louisville’s population, and by woefully understating the extent to which suburban whites would use their political power to block Louisville’s ability to annex land in its suburbanizing periphery. By being silent about the race-related context of his practice, by complacently planning as if the city’s segregated way of life was normal, and by not analyzing strategies explicitly designed to improve the quality of life among Louisville’s African-American population, Bartholomew helped to construct and maintain Louisville’s race-related wall and thereby inhibited his ability to plan coherently for the city-region of Louisville as a whole.

Taken by itself, this claim is not especially new or noteworthy. But the contrasts also lead me to claim that Bartholomew’s planning for Louisville in the 1950s was implicitly affected by Cold War-era efforts to repress any transformations that could be
labeled “Communistic” or “Communist-inspired.” As a result, Bartholomew’s planning undermined the city’s claim to be part of “the free world” and helped ensure that the divisions later symbolized by *die Mauer* in Berlin could be used to inhibit imagination, stifle creativity and end conversations about how to make Louisville a better place for all of its residents.

With these conclusions in mind, I end by considering what Bartholomew might have done differently in the context and by exploring what this juxtaposition of stories implies for planning in the contemporary context of the “war against terrorists.” In what ways, I ask, might the new divide that is being constructed between “freedom loving people” and “terrorists” serve to reinforce other walls and thereby make it almost impossible for diverse voices of reason to be heard in the present? If the Cold War-related wall could be found both in Louisville and in Berlin during the 1950s, where is the wall now?

But, to make this case successfully, I must first briefly clarify what I mean by “walls.” So it is to the nature and function of walls that I now turn.

**Walls**

In the most basic and familiar sense, walls separate *this* from *that*. Many of the separations are physical, like *die Mauer*, but many are socio-cultural constructs. There can be sharp divisions and walls between academics and practitioners, between planners and other professionals, between technical experts and the lay public, between racial or ethnic groups, between gays and straights, between diverse cultural groups who share the same space as a result of globalization and migration, between the citizens of neighboring
cities or nations, and even—if Samuel Huntington (1996) and others are to be believed—between civilizations.

Some separations occur quite naturally, as when a wide river courses through the landscape. But often separations are the result of intentional physical or socio-cultural transformations, as with the Berlin Wall. Many of these intentional walls establish clearly demarcated borders that seek to maintain or accentuate one primary difference between “us” and “the Other.” Frequently those walls are designed to keep unwanted, unfamiliar, and fearsome others out (or in, as in the case of prisons), but walls also can aim to maintain and enforce an internal sense of similarity, community, identity, and security. Consequently, intentional walls involve both exclusion and inclusion. Some of these intentional walls are, as exemplified by die Mauer, designed to be closely observed, well-patrolled, and dangerous to cross even at their few official gates.

Not all intentional walls are alike. They can differ in terms of their purpose, transparency, permeability, mutability, construction materials, difficulty of passage, compatibility with their contexts, and effects on the imagination. Indeed, some walls—such as die Mauer as a site for graffiti and murals—can provide raw material for acts of imagination and thereby provide “windows” to other places, times, and possibilities.

And not all intentional walls are bad, or at least not entirely bad. While walls separate this from that, for instance, all walls also link and connect. They accomplish this by incorporating gateways, passages, or bridges, and by providing sites of transition, such as meeting places, playgrounds, shared functions, and shared experiences. Hence even the hardest of walls can also act as “seams” or “zippers” that knit opposing sides together.
Moreover, the meaning of a wall is not an objective fact, independent of interpretation. Rather, its meaning depends on the narrative context (i.e., story) in which it is set (Throgmorton, 2003). One key story is the designer’s. Guided by it, planners seek to shape the physical design and form of city-regions, which might include constructing physical walls of various kinds. The construction of such walls then affects the stories that can be told and to whom they can be told. But diverse users of city-regions are guided by stories that differ from the planners’, and hence often interpret the meaning of any given wall in ways that differ from the designer’s. Consequently, insofar as multiple and contestable stories can be told about city-regions, a wall can act as a flexible trope (persuasive figure of speech or argument). In brief, stories construct walls, but walls construct stories.

With this understanding in mind, let us now turn to one of the hardest of all intentional walls, die Berliner Mauer.

Planning for a Divided Post-War City: Berlin in the Mid-1950s

In May 1945 Berlin lay in ruins, its buildings reduced to shells. It was, Berliners said, Stunde Null (“Zero Hour”), the hour at which the old Nazi order ended and a new world began, and time for der Kahlschlag (a clean sweep or total clearance). Berlin was soon divided into four zones of occupation, with the largest (the Russian) being on the east and the other three being on the west. Gradually the division hardened. In 1948 the Soviet Union imposed a blockade around Berlin, and the West responded by airlifting food and other supplies into Berlin. The blockade was lifted 18 months later, but in May, 1952, the East German government barricaded its border with West Germany. One year
later, on June 17, 1953, workers in East Berlin rose in rebellion against their Soviet overseers. Defining it as a Western-inspired counterrevolution, the Soviet and East German regimes quickly crushed the rebellion, killing 21 people in East Berlin alone (Large, 2000, p. 431). Berlin became a critical “flashpoint” in the emerging “Cold War” between the two post-war “Superpowers,” a political symbol of the conflict between the Soviet-dominated East and the American-dominated West. “I’d rather be atomized than communized,” President Dwight D. Eisenhower said (Large, p. 439). Fear of a new hot war, this time atomic, ran rampant. Fear, spies and suspicion were everywhere.

On August 13, 1961, the East German government sealed the border with West Berlin and began constructing a new physical wall (die Mauer) separating East from West. For a moment, tanks stood face-to-face and war seemed all-too-imminent. But the threat of immediate conflict gradually eased and the tanks withdrew. Two years later, on June 26, 1963, President John F. Kennedy made his famous “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech urging people who did not understand “the great issue between the Free World and the Communist world” to come to Berlin (Large pp. 462-463). As the years passed, the East German government fortified the Wall with a security zone (or “death strip”) accessible only to guards and marked by searches, patrols, observation, and identification checks at the few official crossing points. One could pass through the Wall only at considerable risk, with the risk all-too-frequently resulting in death: at least 78 people, plus an unknown number of East German border guards, died in confrontations at the Wall over its 28 year existence (Ladd, p. 24). Gradually, however, people on both sides became used to the Wall, treating it as an almost normal background to their day-to-day lives. Almost normal. As time passed, the western side of the Wall began to flourish as a mural
for colorful graffiti. Many of the graffiti artists tried to disrupt the solidity and continuity of the Wall’s *thisness* by suggesting the existence of openings in it or the processes of breaking through it. Symbolizing both unity and division, *die Mauer* acted as a “zipper” that simultaneously linked and divided Berliners (Ladd, 1997).

These Cold War divisions and unities provided the core context for planning in the city. In 1945, the new municipal government asked modernist architect Hans Scharoun to form a team of architects and planners to design a new Berlin. Acting in the context of *Stunde Null*, Scharoun and his associates felt free to ignore Berlin’s historical accumulation of streets and buildings and to create a new “city as landscape.” But their plan called for far too much reconstruction of the existing urban infrastructure, went largely ignored, and soon disappeared in the icy mists of the Cold War. Six years later, in 1952, the Soviet regime proposed a plan for rebuilding its part of Berlin and for constructing its vision of a social realist city. The West responded first by sponsoring a design competition for the reconstruction of the *Hansaviertel* (Hansa Quarter) at the northwestern corner of the *Tiergarten* and then by holding an international “Capital City Berlin” design competition in 1957. Sponsored by the Federal Republic of Germany and by the Berlin Senate, the 1957 competition covered the entire center of the city, including the portion under Soviet control. The competitors were permitted to treat the entire area as a clean slate, with the exception of a few historic buildings and highways that already had been planned. However, the plans that were submitted, including ones by Hans Scharoun and Le Corbusier, proved too ambitious, largely because they presumed the ability to plan the center of the city as a whole despite the increasingly hard divide between West and East. Over the next few years the East German government responded
by sponsoring its own design competitions, once again focusing only on its sector of Berlin and largely ignoring and abandoning the land closest to the western sectors.

In sum, planning in Berlin from 1945 through 1961 took place in an extraordinary context. The old Nazi order lay in ruins, but a new Cold War (and ultimately die Mauer) physically divided the city. In this context, the modernist planners and architects of the West sought to wipe the slate clean, to obliterate history and political differences, and to design an entirely new city based on their artistic principles. Scharoun, LeCorbusier, and the other participants in the 1957 “Capital City Berlin” competition planned as if the divide between East and West should not and could not endure, as if the Cold War would eventually melt away. Conversely, the East German planners planned as if their part of Berlin would permanently exclude the fascists of the West. Advocating an essentialized conception of identity, they sought to establish a boundary that would permanently separate internally-homogeneous groups, with each side being perfectly immune to the other. Thousands of miles away, a private consulting firm was just completing its comprehensive plan for creating a new Louisville, Kentucky. Similarly influenced by the Cold War context and guided by modernist planning principles, this firm wrote as if the city was not divided racially while simultaneously recommending physical transformations that would, if not altered by other factors, embed the racial divide ever more firmly into the physical and social fabric of the city.
Planning for a Divided Post-War City: Harland Bartholomew and Associates’ 1957 Comprehensive Plan for Louisville

In May 1945 Louisvillians celebrated the Allies’ victory over Germany. The war had enabled the city to recover from the Great Depression, and it appeared as though life could only get better. Years of growth lay ahead, if a few basic problems could be addressed adequately.

The city and county had jointly created a new Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission in 1942 to deal with problems created by unplanned growth on the city’s suburban fringe. Perhaps most important, the post-war baby boom and the flood of returning veterans had dramatically increased the demand for new housing. Local officials believed additional land had to be provided to meet this demand. The movement of housing to newly suburbanizing areas also set other types of land use into motion. Several new strip malls and clusters of stores had opened in the early- and mid-1950s, all of them touting the availability of convenient free parking. Large industrial and manufacturing firms also were looking for new suburban sites. In 1953 the General Electric Company opened its huge new “Appliance Park” just outside the southeast edge of the city, and two years later the Ford Motor Company opened a new auto/truck assembly plant just beyond the city’s southern limits. This movement of land uses imposed new pressures on the transportation system. Prodded by downtown businessmen and encouraged by highway initiatives at the national level (Rose, 1990; Lewis, 1997), the State began building two new expressways. One of them, the Watterson Expressway (which began in 1949 and later became part of Interstate 264), would enable traffic to bypass the heart of the city. The other, the North-South
Expressway (which began in 1954 and later became part of I-65) would connect the inner belt to the downtown commercial district.

Unsure about how to respond to this wave of suburbanization, the Planning and Zoning Commission turned to experts for advice. In 1954 it hired Harland Bartholomew & Associates, an experienced planning-consultant firm which had also prepared the city’s first comprehensive plan in 1929-31, to study the city’s and county’s long-term planning needs. Bartholomew submitted its new comprehensive plan in 1957, along with a proposed new zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations. The city and county adopted the plan a year later.

A close reading of the plan’s structure and language, of its rhetoric, reveals how Bartholomew constructed the city for which it planned. According to Bartholomew’s planners, Louisville had “had the benefit of planning” since 1930, but there had been no attempt to maintain the earlier plans. Moreover, most of the urban growth after that year had taken place outside the City of Louisville’s official boundary. Population growth, “changing conditions and needs” and new techniques of planning warranted a review, modernization and extension of earlier plans (Bartholomew, 1957, p. 1). Of particular importance to Bartholomew in 1957 was that it had been, in 1930, “impossible to foresee the tremendous volumes of automobiles and trucks which the streets would some day be required to carry” (p. 5). Moreover, legislative authority and methods had not been available in 1930 to solve “the problems of slums and blight” (p. 5). In the light of these changing needs and conditions, the 1957 plan sought to provide “a guide” for “the orderly and economic future growth of the urban area” (p. 2) over the next 25 years. “[P]rimarily concerned with various physical plans needed to serve the entire urban area
irrespective of political boundary lines” (p. 1), it offered plans for the general location and extent of streets, schools, parks, transportation facilities, and water and sewer services, and for the improvement of housing conditions. Bartholomew warned that “[u]nforeseen developments and changing conditions will warrant revisions periodically,” but it also stressed that “any changes should be based on well reasoned planning considerations and not whimsy or expediency” (p. 4) or “to serve special interest groups” (p. 2).

Bartholomew argued that a good plan for the Louisville area should maintain Louisville’s position as a major site of manufacturing and industry, primarily because manufacturing was the “chief basic support of the Louisville area” and future growth would largely depend upon the expansion of present industries and the attraction of new industries (p. 10). Fortunately, it said, “the shift of the center of [national] population and industry toward the south and west [of the United States] will channel much wealth through Louisville as the city is located directly in the path of this movement” (p. 10). In particular, Bartholomew foresaw a continued expansion of chemical and other industries that required electric power, as well as new petrochemical industries. But it also stressed that “much of the economic future of the city will depend upon intelligent execution of the planning program” (p. 11).

Confident about the city’s ability to attract industry, and arguing that future population estimates for Louisville depended upon population estimates for the nation as a whole, Bartholomew simply extrapolated Louisville’s share of national trends to project the city’s future population. In 1950, 484,615 people lived in the County, 369,129 of them in Louisville. By 1980 (or maybe even sooner), 812,000 people would be residing
in the county, 662,000 of them in an urbanized area of 145 square miles. Presuming that most of this population growth would take place on the city’s suburbanizing edge, Bartholomew proposed to control the pattern of new growth in three ways: first, by urging the city to aggressively annex much of the land in which future growth would occur; second, by recommending careful control of water and sewer line extensions; and third, by encouraging adoption and enforcement of the proposed zoning ordinance, which would keep incompatible land uses from intermingling with one another. If the plan successfully determined “the extent and location of areas that should logically be subject to future urbanization,” and if it prevented “undue decreases in the older areas that are suited for continued residential usage,” (p. 16), the city would be able “to obtain a more compact and economical pattern of future urban land uses without sacrificing the open spacious type of development found in the outlying areas” (p. 17).

Despite recognizing, accepting, and preparing for further suburbanization, Bartholomew’s plan anticipated that the central business district (CBD) would continue to meet the commercial and office needs of the city and adjoining trade territories. Although other commercial areas were developing in the suburbs, they would remain subordinate to the CBD.\(^5\)

Bartholomew’s plan paid great attention to streets and highways, claiming that prior street and highway plans were no longer “in scale” with present and future needs and hence required revision. Countywide motor vehicle registration had increased from 64,604 in 1930 to 186,819 in 1950, and Bartholomew estimated that it would grow to about 369,000 in 1980. In light of that increase, Bartholomew sought to “provide for a network of streets and highways that would be adequate to meet present and expected
future population needs in the urban area during the next 25 years” (p. 41), and which would “expedite traffic movements between various sectors of the city and county” (p. 42). Radial surface streets would, by themselves, not be sufficient to meet future needs, so Bartholomew recommended the construction of several new expressways and parkways. The demand for parking in the CBD was expected to grow significantly, so many additional parking spaces would have to be located there. Even if the entire recommended major street plan were executed, however, traffic congestion would remain at certain places and times. So the existing and proposed system would have to be used more efficiently. To this end, the 1957 plan also contained recommendations about improving the transit system, including providing express bus service on expressways, providing parking facilities adjacent to express routes in the suburban fringe, and investigating the possibility of constructing a rapid transit system. These recommendations were explicitly designed to attract suburban commuters. “Particular emphasis has been placed [in the plan] on transporting workers residing in outlying areas to the central business district by the fastest and most direct route” (p. 98), Bartholomew said, and “[t]he particular object of the [express bus] service is to convince the person who works in the downtown area on a fixed schedule that he should leave his automobile at home or in an outlying area” (p. 99).

Housing also received a significant amount of attention in Bartholomew’s plan. The plan clearly recognized that national polices affected residential growth, especially policies pertaining to public housing, slum clearance, urban renewal, and the subsidization of new home construction. It argued that in order to attack “the problem of housing” it would be “necessary to protect the areas that contain standard or good
housing, rehabilitate and improve blighted areas, and rebuild obsolete areas” (pp. 81-82).

Importantly, the task of rebuilding “obsolete” areas would focus primarily on areas that were part of the historical city as it existed prior to 1925. Bartholomew noted, indeed celebrated, the fact that several urban redevelopment and renewal areas were already underway. Although Bartholomew drew no attention to it, one of them, the West Downtown renewal project, would demolish the old Walnut Street district, which was the main cultural and entertainment district serving African-Americans.

One can, 45 years after it was written, find many technical flaws in Bartholomew’s plan. One can, for example, point to its reliance on trend extrapolation for forecasting Louisville’s future population and its failure to foresee factors that would dramatically alter the city’s growth. Just as the 1929-31 plan had failed to foresee the tremendous increases in traffic that would be coming over the next 20 years, so too the 1957 plan failed to foresee the extent to which construction of its recommended expressways would dramatically accelerate the dispersion and decentralization of residential, commercial, and industrial development. Moreover, the plan did not foresee the possibility that excessive reliance on imported oil would provoke an oil embargo and precipitate deindustrialization of the region’s economy. As a consequence of these and other unanticipated trends and events, Louisville’s population actually declined to 298,451 persons in 1980 rather than increasing to 662,000 residents as projected. One could also point to its presumption that Louisville lay “in the path” of the westward and southward movement of the nation’s population and industry and to its assumption that emitting more chemicals into the ambient environment would be good for the people of Louisville. And one could certainly point to its presumption that downtown Louisville
should and would remain the center of the region’s trade activities and to its consequent failure to foresee how the emphasis on building new parkways and interstate highways would dramatically accelerate the suburbanization of retail activities.

But these criticisms are primarily technical in nature. To focus on them alone would be to reproduce a conception of planning as an apolitical technical activity. It is vitally important, therefore, to recognize that the plan was deeply political. It reinforced two walls in Louisville, one separating blacks from whites, and the other separating technical experts from the publics for which they ostensibly planned. It did so by focusing far too narrowly on physical planning, by not discussing the extent to which black presence and “white flight” contributed to the suburbanization of Louisville’s population, and by woefully underestimating the extent to which suburban whites would use their political power to block Louisville’s ability to annex land in its suburbanizing periphery. Where did African-Americans live in Louisville during the mid-1950s? What kind of housing was available to them? Of what quality were the neighborhoods in which they lived? What employment opportunities were available to them? Where? What of education? Health care? To what extent were African-Americans involved in devising the 1957 plan? About these and related questions Bartholomew’s plan was deafeningly silent. It rendered “Negroes,” as African-Americans were called in Louisville at the time, virtually invisible. To understand what Bartholomew’s plan meant, to understand the political content of its physical design prescriptions, to understand how it reinforced race-related walls in Louisville, one has to turn to another story. It is a story about finding (or breaking) a gate through Louisville’s race-related wall.
A Gate through the Wall in a Sleepy, Complacent City?

On May 10, 1954, a white couple bought a new house in an all-white neighborhood in a newly developing area about a mile and a half outside the southwest edge of Louisville. Immediately after completing the purchase of the house, the couple sold the house to a young “Negro” man (Andrew Wade) and his family. That set in motion a train of events which took months to pass. Anne Braden, a member of that white couple, tells her version of those events in her 1958 book, The Wall Between. When read alongside Bartholomew’s plan, Braden’s story reveals the “noir side” of the plan, accents the complacency of its vision, clarifies its relationship to mid-1950s planning in Berlin, and reveals how, in Gaston Bachelard’s words, “An entire past comes to dwell in a new house” (1994, p. 5).

In Braden’s story, Louisville is “a segregated town – a town of unspoken restrictive covenants long after restrictive covenants had been declared non-enforceable by the Supreme Court of the United States” (p. 2), a town that was “complacent, self-satisfied, locked in a fancied security” (p. 5). As she puts it, Andrew Wade and his family had been renting a little apartment in “the Jim Crow sections” of the city, but Wade’s wife (Charlotte Wade) “had her heart set on a new little ranch-type house out in a suburb.” “‘There are hundreds of them going up in all directions from town, you know,’” Braden’s husband Carl said. “‘He’s [Wade’s] tried to buy several of them, but every time when they find out it’s a Negro negotiating for the house, the deal gets squashed’” (p. 2). He had even looked across the Ohio River in Indiana, with the same result.

This was not an unfamiliar experience for Wade. Braden describes an earlier experience Wade had had:
He and his parents and his sister were riding in their car. Andrew was only five or six years old. They passed Louisville’s one big amusement park, Fontaine Ferry….Andrew and his sister asked to stop and go in.

“No, not today. Maybe sometime. Not today,” Andrew says his father replied.

This happened several times, whenever they rode that way. There was always an excuse, always the promise of maybe someday. The park took on even more fascination because it was out of reach. Finally one day, evidently realizing he could no longer make excuses, Andrew’s father told him the truth.

“Son, I can’t take you there,” he said. Andrew recalls that his father seemed to be chagrined, almost guilty as he spoke. “That park is for white people. We’re colored people. There are some places colored people are not allowed to go.”

Andrew was stunned. A door had slammed in his face, the first of many slamming doors that he and every Negro child encounters. Forbidden parks, forbidden buildings, forbidden movies, forbidden restaurants…a hemmed-in world – a wall around your life” (p. 8).

Wade had to find a gate through the wall and people on the other side to meet him. So too, Braden says, did white children grow up in a world of walls. In her
husband’s case, she says, the walls were economic. Growing up in a tough white working class neighborhood on Louisville’s northwest side, and seeing his father lose his job in a labor dispute early in the 1920s, he had come to understand that the world was divided into have and have-nots and that he was one of the have-nots. He became “a confirmed socialist” (p. 16) who put his energy into the organized labor movement. Hers were “of the spirit” (p. 13). Having grown up as part of an elite family in a small Alabama town, she gradually came to conclude that “Racial bars build a wall not only around the Negro people but around the white people as well, cramping their spirits and causing them to grow in distorted shapes” (p. 24, emphasis in the original). Inspired by her vision of “a world without walls” (p. 35), she joined Leftist organizations that sought to eliminate racial segregation and discrimination. After moving to Louisville in 1947 she could see that Negroes were better off than they were in the deeper South (they were permitted to sit anywhere on a bus, could vote, often held the balance of power in local elections, and were supported by a significant number of white Liberals), but she also learned that the whites and Negroes of Louisville “lived out their lives with a world between them” (p. 38):

I soon found out that if you were a Negro in Louisville, you almost invariably had to live in one of two parts of town. One was the central section, bordering on the business district, mostly slums. If you were lucky, you might have a place in one of the public housing projects which were pleasant and attractive…. [But] it was much more likely that you would live in one of the old two- and three-story buildings abutting on the
sidewalks. Maybe you and your five or six children all lived in one room. Maybe you
shared a bath with nine or ten other families…. The other section where you might live would be the West End. This is the old part of town, blocked to expansion by the Ohio River. It was formerly all-white, and many white people still live there—it is here that Carl and I live—but in recent years more and more of its homes have been occupied by Negroes, as the white people have moved to the suburbs to the south and east of town. If you were one of the city’s few wealthy Negroes, you might live in a very handsome house in this section; if you were poor, you would probably live on one of the West End’s rutted dirt streets—in a tumbledown cottage without indoor toilet facilities…. It was common knowledge that the banks and real estate companies and builders had unwritten agreements that no one would sell or lend money on property in white sections to Negroes. The one exception was when the realtors agreed in advance to “break a block”…[and] make the section all-Negro (pp. 38-39).

Most job opportunities were closed to Negroes, Louisville’s schools were segregated, its park system was divided white and Negro, most of its private hospitals refused to admit Negroes, and most public places in the city were “behind the color bar” (p. 41). Braden recognized that many cracks had appeared in the wall between 1947 and 1954, but in her view these advances toward desegregation “affected only a few people—and didn’t affect
them much….To most of Louisville’s people in 1954, segregation was a way of life that one did not question” (pp. 45-46).

The house that the Bradens bought was located in an area that used to be farmland but had by 1954 been quickly filling up with new houses. The Bradens bought the house and then sold it to the Wades because they believed that was the only way to break down the wall of segregated housing. The sale immediately produced panic among the neighbors. That panic led to a series of actions over the next few days and weeks. A hostile crowd gathered outside the house, someone threw a rock with a threatening message through a window, someone fired rifle shots into the house, a group of men set fire to a cross in an adjoining field, and someone destroyed half the house with a dynamite charge.14 More important, perhaps, it also led—especially after the house was dynamited early on June 27—to claims that the purchase represented a Communist-inspired effort to, as the editor of a local suburban newspaper, put it, “encourage panic, chaos, and riot to lower the morale of the American people” (p. 89). In part this panic stemmed from a belief that people are happier and better off if they live among their own kind. It also stemmed from fear that the presence of Negroes would cause the value of white-owned property to drop. In Braden’s view, these beliefs were myths propagated in part by banking and real estate men. These were “not evil men” in her view. They were “trapped men” who had learned that a segregated housing pattern is the best for all concerned “as they learned their ABC’s; they had absorbed it in the air they breathed….And so when the time came to act on it, they acted—convinced, or nearly so, that the values they accepted were eternal ones” (p. 115).
The Commonwealth’s (State’s) Attorney took the dynamiting case to a county grand jury, and in his hands the jury’s investigation quickly transformed into a probe of a Communist-inspired white plot to stir up trouble between the races. In Braden’s reading, the prosecutor and the jury were “completely unable to understand Andrew Wade and his determination to live in his house” (p. 198). They were “utterly unable to comprehend the loneliness a Negro family feels when it is under attack and surrounded by a hostile white world” (p. 200). They were “unable to comprehend the feeling of solidarity that arises among the Negro people when one of their number is under attack as Andrew Wade was” (p. 201). And they simply could not understand why white people would want to associate with Negroes (p. 203). Police and representatives of the State’s Attorney’s office raided the apartment of one of the Bradens’ associates. And later they raided the Bradens’ home itself. They found many books, some of them by Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. The Attorney said that finding that literature “more or less convinces me that this thing was Communist inspired” (p. 210). (Communists, right in the heart of Louisville! Fear, spies, and suspicion were everywhere!) As Braden put it, “the result was an explosive merger of anti-Negro and anti-Communist hysteria” which soon became a distinguishing feature of much of the opposition to racial integration throughout the South. It was “an atmosphere in which it was almost impossible for a voice of reason to be heard” (p. 210). The grand jury indicted Carl Braden for allegedly violating an old state sedition law, which had been passed in the early 1920s as part of an effort to squelch the Socialist Party. The grand jury’s report said, “this case seems to follow the pattern used by the Communist Party in this country to create trouble between the respective races …, and that one of the specific methods of doing this is by the purchase of property for negroes
in areas which normally are occupied by white persons, and then causing incidents such as this’’ (p. 213). Practically no one in Louisville was willing to speak out on the Bradens’ behalf, Braden says, largely because anyone who did so ran the very large risk of also being tarred as a Communist. Many white people in the city apparently came to regard the Bradens as “the personification of all Evil” (p. 242), and some said the Bradens should be tortured, killed, or lynched.

Carl Braden went to trial in late November, 1954. In his closing argument in that trial, the assistant prosecutor told the jurors, “[one of the witnesses in the case] told you the Negro problem was founded in Moscow itself” (p. 245). “‘We must ruthlessly cut out this cancer of communism,’” he said, “‘and here is one place to start….And we will start it…. [Y]ou will do it gentlemen, just as sure as there is a living God to give you strength to do it’” (p. 252). The Negro problem was founded in Moscow? Anne Braden found the notion to be ludicrous: “This sweeping statement that blotted out three hundred years of American history was a simple explanation,” she wrote, “and Louisville needed a simple explanation” (p. 245). The jury found Carl Braden guilty, fined him $5,000, and sentenced him to 15 years in prison. Roughly six months later, however, Braden was released on bond pending appeal, and a year later—after the U. S. Supreme Court ruled state sedition laws to be unconstitutional—the Kentucky Court of Appeals overthrew Braden’s conviction. Andrew Wade repaired his house, sold it, and moved to another house in one of Louisville’s older sections, which white people were abandoning.

Reflecting back on the experience in 1957, Anne Braden considered what would be required to tear down the wall in Louisville (and similar places):
It was a situation we inflicted upon ourselves when we built the wall—or when our ancestors built it…. We put a whole race of people away from us and behind a wall; no white man should be shocked if these [Negro] people do not now accept at face value his statements about his desire ultimately to crumble the wall…. White humanity has not earned the trust of the black man.

I think that trust can be established across the wall…. But it is white men who built the wall, and it is they who must take the initiative if the trust is to be established (pp. 300-301).

Where the Wall Was Then

A wall divided Berlin. A wall also divided Louisville. The wall in Berlin, later symbolized by die Mauer, was a Cold War divide separating West from East. In Louisville the wall was simultaneously a racial divide that separated whites from blacks and a political/cultural divide that separated expert planners from the public for which they planned. In both cases, the wall marked a sharp polarization, an either/or divide which one could cross only at great peril. And yet in Louisville as in 1957 Berlin, expert planners planned as if the city was one, whole, undivided. They sought to obliterate differences in the interest of a unified city vision which, while allegedly shunning politics, actually reflected and reproduced the polarized politics of the Cold War divide. In Louisville, the polarized politics of West versus East combined with Bartholomew’s apolitical conception of planning to maintain and reinforce Louisville’s racial divide and to, as Anne Braden put it, make it “almost impossible for a voice of reason to be heard.”
Much like the closed circle of planners that Klaus Kunzmann (2001) refers to in a recent article about contemporary planning in Germany, Bartholomew believed that “well reasoned planning considerations” focused exclusively on physical development—that is, technical expertise—should supplant “expediency” or the desires of “special interest groups.” But Bartholomew understood that “intelligent execution of the planning program” meant that a few key appointed and elected officials (and the businessmen allied with them) would have to adopt the plan and associated ordinances. Persuading that narrow audience meant deferring to its assumptions about what was politically desirable and feasible. In part that meant devising a “city practical” (Foglesong, 1986) plan for guiding the physical growth of the urbanized area “irrespective of political boundary lines.” But it also meant conforming to that narrow audience’s “polite” form of racism (Wright, 1985) and hence being completely silent about race. Bartholomew’s plan never mentions the words “race,” “Negro,” segregation,” “restrictive covenants,” or related terms.

Rejecting Bartholomew’s deference to the racial norms of Louisville’s governing elite, Anne Braden’s counter narrative directs attention to the city’s racial divide. In her telling, Louisville was “a segregated town—a town of unspoken restrictive covenants,” “a hemmed-in world” of “slamming doors” and forbidden parks that expected people to live “a way of life that one did not question” and distorted both whites and Negroes in the process. Reading Braden’s The Wall Between reveals that Bartholomew’s presumably expert voice could be heard because it claimed to be the voice of reason while simultaneously reproducing a way of life that one did not question. It was a voice of expertise that, by deferring to politics that could not be questioned, silenced other voices
of reason. Reading Braden’s narrative also helps us see that Bartholomew’s plan enabled and, to the extent that it was actually fulfilled, accelerated the movement of white middle-class people out of the city while diverting funds away from the city’s Negro and white working class neighborhoods. And it did not analyze strategies that would enable Negroes to move into better neighborhoods or schools or to have better access to jobs at General Electric’s and Ford’s new plants on the city’s periphery. By being silent about race, by complacently planning as if Louisville’s segregated way of life was normal, and by not analyzing strategies explicitly designed to improve the quality of life among Louisville’s African-American population, Bartholomew’s complacent plan for a complacent segregated city transformed the divergent views of people living in a divided city into the unitary voice of one plan for one people and thereby helped ensure that the divisions that would later be symbolized by Berlin’s Wall would be used to inhibit imagination, stifle creativity, and end conversations about how to make Louisville a better place for all of its residents.

I do not mean to trivialize the complexity of the context within which Bartholomew planned. What, a planning student at the Technical University in Berlin recently asked me, could Bartholomew have done differently? Was the firm not compelled by circumstance to defer to the racial norms of the men elected to represent the citizens of Louisville? If Bartholomew had tried to find or break a gate through Louisville’s racial wall, would not those elected officials have fired the firm and hired another more compliant one? I suspect they would have. But, had they wanted to, Harland Bartholomew and his associates could have chosen to emulate Pee Wee Reese, the Brooklyn Dodgers baseball star from Louisville who, in April 1947, publicly
befriended Jackie Robinson when Robinson became the first African-American ballplayer in Major League Baseball. Bartholomew himself could have used his personal prestige and connections (Lovelace, 1992) to draw attention to the existence and adverse consequences of Louisville’s racial wall.

Rather than dwell on a historical hypothetical that can never really be answered, I prefer to bring the question to the present. In Berlin, now that die Mauer has fallen, Berliners talk about “the wall in the head.” If professional planners like Bartholomew and Associates were constrained by “the walls inside their heads” in the mid-1950s, professional planners of the early-2000s should ask, how and in what ways is our planning now being constrained by “the walls in our heads”? What are our “walls”? In what ways are those walls “cramping our spirits” and causing us and our cities to grow “in distorted shapes”? If Bartholomew’s planning undermined Louisville’s claim to be part of “the free world” and helped ensure that the divisions later symbolized by die Mauer could be used to inhibit imagination, stifle creativity, and end conversations about how to make Louisville a better place for all of its residents, in what ways might contemporary planning, which takes place in the context of a “war against terrorists,” do the same thing?

Where Is the Wall Now?

On September 11, 2001, the twin towers of Manhattan’s World Trade Center lay in ruins, brought down by two high-jacked jets. It was “Ground Zero.” Just three days later, President George W. Bush declared that the United States’ “responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil” (National Security
Strategy, 2002, p. 5). Within months, fear of bioterrorism was running rampant, bombs were falling, and more people were dying. The United States and other allied countries attacked the Taliban in Afghanistan and Sadaam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Our cities—even our bedrooms and bodies—had become battlegrounds in a global war.

In September, 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice publicly announced *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The Strategy, or NSS)*, the President’s plan for making the U. S. more secure. In his cover letter to *The Strategy*, President Bush claimed, “The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” (The West had defeated the East, and *die Mauer* had been torn down.) But this decisive victory had been confounded by terrorism: “Terrorists are [now] organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us,” he said, and the resulting “war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration.” “Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong,” he added. “I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities” (NSS, p. 3). *The Strategy* elaborated on the President’s claim by saying, “the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere” (p. 2). “The enemy is terrorism” (p. 5), it said, and “[w]hile the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists” (p. 6).
The attacks of September 11 were horrific, and they deserve an appropriate response. What would constitute an appropriate response? About that, reasonable people can disagree. But that kind of reasoned disagreement can occur only if people have an opportunity to offer their diverse views and safely deliberate about them in public. That opportunity is now at risk, just as it was in the mid-1950s. But there is even more at stake than the important task of responding to the attacks of September 11.

President Bush and his associates have promulgated a new narrative that constructs the world in terms of a conflict between “Our Nation” and “terrorists of global reach” (along with the “rogue states” “who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them”). Almost as important, they claim that this conflict will be “a global enterprise” of “uncertain duration.” Moreover, in late-2001 Attorney General John Ashcroft told a Senate oversight committee that criticism of the administration’s anti-terrorist measures provided “ammunition to America’s enemies.” “To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty,” he added, “my message is this: your tactics only aid terrorists.” This new narrative constructs an entirely new context for planning, a new context that implies a new wall. It implies a wall that will accentuate differences between “freedom-loving people” and “terrorists”; will try to keep evil terrorists out; will strengthen “our” sense of community, identity, and shared culture; and will provide support for all other policies of the Bush Administration, whether foreign or domestic. By limiting its focus to this particular divide, the new narrative implicitly excludes or marginalizes alternative narratives. Moreover, to the degree that this narrative successfully dominates public discourse and action, it will provide the primary context
for planning in U. S. city-regions, just as the Cold War narrative provided the primary context for Bartholomew’s planning in the mid-1950s.\(^\text{16}\)

How should contemporary planners respond to this new wall, to this Second Cold War? We could, as the East German planners and the Wade family’s new white neighbors did, explicitly strive to strengthen the wall, seeking to create an impenetrable barrier to fearsome others. Or we could stand on one side of the wall—as former President Ronald Reagan did in Berlin, as the Bradens did in Louisville, and as many people on the political Left currently do—and proclaim that the other side should simply “tear down these walls.” Or we could—as Scharoun, Le Corbusier, and Harland Bartholomew did—plan as if such walls do not exist, do not matter, or will someday just disappear.

While any one of these responses might conceivably be appropriate under certain circumstances, in general I would suggest that walls, including die Mauer and the physical wall currently being constructed along the 1967 Green Line between Israel and the West Bank (Kifner, 2002), tend to reinforce the notion that “the Other” is a threat who can and must be kept out (Bollens, 2002). By presuming that “the Other” has a uniform identity, such walls deepen fear and distrust, obliterate other differences, silence other voices. Moreover, as die Mauer demonstrates, they almost always fail in the long run. In the present context, it is particularly important to note that, despite the aggressive effort to establish a permanent and impermeable barrier between Good and Evil, there are many good reasons to believe that the actual wall currently being built will be highly transparent, highly porous, and highly mutable, even if closely monitored. Economic globalization, global communication systems, transnational migrations, complex
environmental flows and cycles, and exurbanization of development in the regions of "the North" combine to create a parallel context that transgresses, undermines, and reshapes the wall being constructed by the “war against terrorists.” Similarly, those trends and processes undermine and transgress the conventional technical, political, and epistemological boundaries that underpin planners' work.

This leads me to conclude that the wisest course for contemporary planners is, first, to look for “islands of difference” behind each side of the wall, and, second, to create public spaces and transitional zones that enable safe and generative social interaction between people on opposite sides of the wall. The first approach would recognize that each side contains a “plurality of identities” which cut across and work against the primary identities that the wall seeks to create (Sen, 2001). It would have us look carefully at the common history of both sides of the wall, treating their shared underworld space as a realm that fosters creativity and imagination and which houses memories, fears, and aspirations (Caldwell, 2002). It would have us listen carefully, as Peter Schneider does in his Berlin novel Der Mauerspringer (“The Wall Jumper”), to the stories of people who migrate from one side of a wall to the other.

The second would have us try to open new passages through those walls or improve the quality of existing gateways, bridges, sites of transition, and shared experiences, and thereby make space for diverse voices of reason to be heard. In the present context, this would mean helping diverse publics identify and understand their fears, helping them understand one another better, helping them engage in fruitful dialogue, and helping them build trust in one another. To do this in the context of a “war against terrorists,” planners will have to construct themselves, not as Bartholomewian
apolitical technical experts, but as “skilled-voices” (Throgmorton, 2000) who make physical and narrative space for the actual diverse people of U. S. cities to engage in fruitful dialogue with their fellow strangers (Eckstein and Throgmorton, 2003). As Jim Wallis puts it in *The Soul of Politics* (pp. 162-163):

> In America we build walls we desperately hope will keep people away from us. But these same walls are ultimately unable to prevent us from experiencing the consequences of abandoning our neighbor. The walls divide us but they don’t protect us. Those illusory but oppressive walls must be broken down and nothing does that better than the experience of listening directly to the people on the other side of the wall. Getting close enough to see, hear, touch, smell, and taste the reality of others is what always makes the difference. In listening to the stories of those so seemingly different from us, we find similar but unexpressed voices inside ourselves. Hearing one another’s stories is the beginning of new understanding and the foundation of compassionate action.

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**Endnotes**

1 I thank Carl Abbott, Jerry Anthony, David Forkenbrock, Leonie Sandercock, Barbara Eckstein, and three anonymous reviewers for commenting on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks go also to participants in the “Berlin in America” symposium held at the University of Iowa in June, 2002, and to Deike Peters for enabling me to present an earlier version of this paper to faculty and students at the Institute for City and Regional Planning, Technische Universitat, Berlin, Germany.

2 I introduce the story about planning in Berlin, not to teach Berliners something they do not already know, but to help articulate the Cold War context within which planning took place, both in Berlin and in Louisville. *Die Mauer* symbolized the divide created by that context. For good recent histories of Berlin as it relates to planning, see Balfour (1990), Ladd (1997), Large (2000), Richie (1998), and Strom (2001).

3 Louisville’s first enclosed shopping mall in Louisville opened in 1962 on the eastern edge of the city at the intersection of the Watterson Expressway and Shelbyville Road.

4 A new complex of chemical plants designed to manufacture synthetic rubber (“Rubbertown) had been constructed outside the southwest side of the city during the war, but local industrial leaders complained that more land and better sites were needed for modern industrial plants.
For historical insight into the ways in which downtown businesspeople in other cities sought to maintain their preeminence, see Fogelson (2001).

The Watterson and North-South Expressways would be completed, a new expressway would bypass the CBD, and a second new expressway would connect the downtown with the southwest part of the city. Bartholomew also recommended construction of a new Cross-County Belt, and construction of two new “parkways” leading to the CBD.

Kleber (2001) reports that Louisville’s Urban Renewal and Community Development Agency, which was created in 1959, had initiated three major urban renewal projects in the early-1960s: Southwick, East Downtown (or Medical Center), and West Downtown (or Civic Center). Six low-rise public housing projects had been constructed in the late-1930s and 1940s, with one of them being for whites exclusively and another only for African-Americans. Three more were built during the 1950s.

I do not mean to suggest that Bartholomew’s plan created the race-related wall in Louisville. As Wright (1985) amply documents, many of the city’s institutions were legally segregated until the early 1950s, and a form of “polite racism” had long marked the attitude of the city’s white elite toward blacks. But Louisville was never as strictly segregated as other parts of the South and blacks had, unlike in other parts of the South, retained the right to vote. Moreover, as Kleber (2001) documents, the structure of legal segregation had begun collapsing after WW II.

Or, for that matter, any other members of the general public. Bartholomew encouraged the city to conduct public hearings on the plan, but only after producing a “condensed popular edition” which would enable the plan “to obtain more widespread understanding
… and support” (Bartholomew, Letter of Transmittal). After these hearings, it said, the plan “should be changed or modified where warranted” (p. 3).

10 Leonie Sandercock (1998) would characterize Bartholomew’s plan as exemplifying the “noir side” of planning’s “official story.” She argues that a richer and fuller history of planning requires rendering the invisible visible by telling planning’s “insurgent planning histories.”

11 Muhammed Ali, the future heavyweight boxing champion who is now revered around the world, was 10 years old at the time, living at 3302 Grand in the Parkland neighborhood about two miles north of the Wades’ new house. In October of that same year, someone stole his bicycle. The story of how that led him to become a boxer is now legendary. See Remnick (1998, pp. 91-92).

12 Anne Braden and her husband Carl were very controversial figures in Louisville and the rest of the South throughout the Fifties and Sixties. I do not mean to portray them as unblemished heroes. As can be seen by reading Fosl’s (2002) favorable biography of Anne Braden, they were flawed humans, just like the rest of us. For an insightful critique of Fosl’s biography, see McWhorter (2003).

13 One might say Wade had to be a “wall jumper.” “Seen from the air,” Peter Schneider writes of Berlin in his 1982 novel Der Mauerspringer (“The Wall Jumper”), “the city appears to be perfectly homogenous. Nothing suggests to the stranger that he is nearing a region where two political constructs collide” (quoted in Large, p. 445). One could have said the same thing about the maps in Bartholomew’s 1957 plan.
For rich and insightful analysis of a similar train of events in Detroit, see Sugrue (1996). For more insight into the intersection of race, housing, and interstate highway construction during the 1950s, see Hirsch (1983) and Mohl (1993).

As Eldridge Lovelace (1992, p. 17), an associate of Bartholomew put it, “In an era completely dominated by big business and banking, he [Bartholomew] acted and looked the part of a successful businessman or banker. He…presented the image of a serious and practical man of experience who would give you realistic advice on ‘how to get great things done.’”

As Jacques Derrida recently said, “The dominant power is the one that manages to impose, and, thus, to legitimate, indeed to legalize (for it is always a question of law) on a national or world stage, the terminology and thus the interpretation that best suits in a given situation” (Borradori, 2003, p. 105).