The Life of Herbert Hoover: Master of Emergencies, 1917-1918

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material for these audiences, including the full text of the Flexner Report and the indigent care laws. But the general, educated public will find Anderson’s work more accessible in terms of the overall history of the institutions and more interesting for the questions it raises about the nature of medical care in Iowa and the nation.


REVIEWED BY SILVANO A. WUESCHNER, WILLIAM PENN COLLEGE

The third volume in George Nash’s definitive biography of Herbert Hoover is a well-written and well-researched account of Hoover’s activities as U.S. Food Administrator during the Wilson administration. Nash skillfully recounts Hoover’s appointment as food czar and his efforts to develop the Food Administration into an effective component of the American war effort in World War I. That job, as Nash points up, was not an easy one. First, the concept had to be sold to a skeptical Congress. And second, Hoover had to mobilize public support. The latter, the reader learns, was easier to obtain.

There emerges in this account a picture of Hoover that is different from the one readers may be accustomed to. Hoover has usually been portrayed as opposing government intervention in the private sector. Indeed, the Hoover most are familiar with is an energetic, behind-the-scenes manager working to marshall a force of volunteers to achieve a specific goal. Nash’s picture does support this image, but at the same time we see a Hoover who is not at all hesitant to employ decisive government intervention in the economy to achieve the goals of his organization.

If there is a criticism of this work, it is that Nash did not include Hoover’s reliance on the fledgling Federal Reserve System (FRS) in carrying out the work of the Food Administration. In the same way that the Treasury Department at the time was using the FRS to establish an artificial money market, Hoover sought to use it to establish artificial commodity markets. Like other war administrators, he tended to treat the FRS as a part of a larger apparatus intended to redirect credit expansion in accordance with war needs. Two examples, in particular, point up Hoover’s willingness to rely on the Federal Reserve Board’s intervention. The first was in 1917 when he sought the board’s help to hold down interest rates on cattle loans. At the time he had undertaken a campaign to bring about a larger amount of cattle feeding in the United States in order to be prepared to furnish not
only meat for the United States and its allies, but also for a good part of the world after the end of the war. The second instance where Hoover sought Federal Reserve assistance was during the sugar crisis of early 1918. There was a good deal of concern over the state of the Cuban sugar industry. Banks there had exhausted their resources to aid the industry. In order to prevent the collapse of the sugar industry and to avoid a sugar famine, Hoover once again turned to the Federal Reserve Board for assistance. Again, the board responded positively.

The omission, though, does not diminish what amounts to a very well-researched and skillfully written work about Hoover’s years as America’s “Food Czar,” a period that brought Hoover to international prominence. This work is an excellent complement to Nash’s earlier volumes; like those earlier works, it is of great value to scholars of recent American history.


**REVIEWED BY ELLIS W. HAWLEY, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA**

An early effort by Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold to “bring the state back in” as a shaper of political development took the form of a much discussed article arguing that the differing fates of the New Deal’s National Recovery Administration (NRA) and Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) could be explained largely by the differing administrative resources that each had available. The article (“State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal,” *Political Science Quarterly* 97 [Summer 1982]) brought to bear a “new institutionalism” in political analysis, leading to heated exchanges with defenders of more “society-centered” approaches. Essentially, the book under review continues this controversy.

Synthesizing and analyzing what historians have written rather than bringing to bear any new archival research, Finegold and Skocpol offer an expanded account of why the AAA became a “qualified success” and the NRA an “unqualified failure,” again with emphasis on differing state capacities but also with some attention to the place of agricultural and industrial interests in party politics. The two programs, they argue, had similar goals. But in agriculture, as contrasted with industry, a previously developed structure of state-based institutions and expertise made a degree of planning feasible and allowed disintegrative interest and class conflicts to be contained, the result being institutionalization of the agricultural program while the indus-