State and Party in America's New Deal

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only meat for the United States and its allies, but also for a good part of the world after the end of the war. The second instance where Hoover sought Federal Reserve assistance was during the sugar crisis of early 1918. There was a good deal of concern over the state of the Cuban sugar industry. Banks there had exhausted their resources to aid the industry. In order to prevent the collapse of the sugar industry and to avoid a sugar famine, Hoover once again turned to the Federal Reserve Board for assistance. Again, the board responded positively.

The omission, though, does not diminish what amounts to a very well-researched and skillfully written work about Hoover’s years as America’s “Food Czar,” a period that brought Hoover to international prominence. This work is an excellent complement to Nash’s earlier volumes; like those earlier works, it is of great value to scholars of recent American history.


REVIEWED BY ELLIS W. HAWLEY, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

An early effort by Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold to “bring the state back in” as a shaper of political development took the form of a much discussed article arguing that the differing fates of the New Deal’s National Recovery Administration (NRA) and Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) could be explained largely by the differing administrative resources that each had available. The article (“State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal,” Political Science Quarterly 97 [Summer 1982]) brought to bear a “new institutionalism” in political analysis, leading to heated exchanges with defenders of more “society-centered” approaches. Essentially, the book under review continues this controversy.

Synthesizing and analyzing what historians have written rather than bringing to bear any new archival research, Finegold and Skocpol offer an expanded account of why the AAA became a “qualified success” and the NRA an “unqualified failure,” again with emphasis on differing state capacities but also with some attention to the place of agricultural and industrial interests in party politics. The two programs, they argue, had similar goals. But in agriculture, as contrasted with industry, a previously developed structure of state-based institutions and expertise made a degree of planning feasible and allowed disintegrative interest and class conflicts to be contained, the result being institutionalization of the agricultural program while the indus-
trial program collapsed. As the authors see it, moreover, contemporary debates are "in many ways ... conflicts over the limitations, legacies, and lessons" of these New Deal experiments (3).

In presenting their case, the authors divide the book into two major parts and add a conclusion about historical "lessons." In part one they explore the origins, implementation, and consequences of the two programs, noting especially that the New Deal enacted recovery programs favored by organized industry while rejecting those favored by organized agriculture, that the NRA quickly failed while the AAA eventually succeeded, and that industrial intervention brought class conflict and altered class relations while agricultural intervention reinforced class domination. These outcomes, the authors argue, were in part due to a party system that excluded various alternatives. But the key determinant was the presence of state-based agricultural experts with the capacity to generate policy alternatives, resolve conflicts, and implement plans in ways that the "businesscrats" the NRA relied on could not. Industry had nothing comparable, largely because the Commerce Department and business schools had developed differently from the Department of Agriculture and the land-grant colleges. Part two then turns to a "dialogue" with the authors' critics, looking in turn at pluralist, elite, Marxist, and rational choice theory and arguing that each leaves key aspects of the NRA and AAA unexplained. In a provocative conclusion, the authors focus on the legacy of the New Deal experience and argue that the United States still lacks the kind of state capacity needed to implement current industrial policy proposals.

For political historians, *State and Party in America's New Deal* is an important book that cogently demonstrates the value of exploring institutional developments. The authors deserve high marks for their analytical rigor, clear prose, and telling exposure of the inadequacies in rival theoretical approaches. Students of Iowa history will also find particularly interesting their analysis of how a "strong" area of the American state developed in and made a difference for agriculture.

But the work also has weaknesses, most notably its tendency to equate larger administrative capacity with expanded governmental bureaucracy while dismissing evidence that the use of private-sector administrative resources for public purposes has often worked well enough to remain a central feature of a polity torn between desires for economic and social management and a deeply rooted antistatism. Indeed, the AAA can be read as a successful fusion of public and private resources, as can Woodrow Wilson's Federal Reserve System, Herbert Hoover's World War I Food Administration, and the New Deal's Securities and Exchange Commission. Hence, the questions
deserving fuller answers are why the NRA could not achieve such a fusion and why pre-New Deal efforts to develop national managerial capacities outside of government, as exemplified particularly in projects undertaken by the National Bureau of Economic Research, the American Engineering Council, and Hoover's Commerce Department, were not embraced and built upon in 1933. In addition, the authors are not fully persuasive when they insist that agriculture and industry were equally complex or when they downplay the connections between the agricultural experts in their story and private-sector institutions. These, however, are minor flaws. Most of their arguments are sensible and persuasive, and both historians and political scientists can benefit from their insights.


REVIEWED BY NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, MACALESTER COLLEGE

The legal history of the Great Plains remains to be written. To help begin this task, the University of Nebraska's Center for Great Plains Study sponsored a conference in 1991, and Law and the Great Plains somewhat belatedly follows up that meeting by making available eight papers from the gathering. (Three of the best chapters in this volume were published “in substantially similar form” in 1992.)

A very brief introductory chapter by John Wunder and a longer conceptual essay by Kermit Hall begin the collection. Although a focus on regionalism has long marked the writing of legal history, Wunder notes, the Great Plains has rarely captured the attention of legal writers. Things might have been different. “What if the modern scholarship of law and race had not initially considered slavery and African-Americans,” Wunder asks, and instead begun with the legal relationships between the indigenous and white populations on the Great Plains (5)? He concludes that, in light of new directions in both legal and western history, the Great Plains might still provide “a meeting point” where these two scholarly fields could converge.

Kermit Hall, expanding on Wunder’s historiographical sketch, highlights some of the problems “of thinking of the Great Plains as a legal unity” (19). How should legal scholarship, for example, consider intraregional differences? What about the relationship, so evident in the Populist revolt, between law and economics? And how should historians measure the legal impact of the national government on