Moscow, the Third Rome: The Origins and Transformations of a “Pivotal Moment”

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If we look for things in the course of history only because we have found them already in the world of to-day, if we seize upon those things in the sixteenth century which are most analogous to what we know in the twentieth, the upshot of all our history is only to send us back finally to the place where we began, and to ratify whatever conceptions we originally had in regard to our own times.  

Any reader of modern history will recognize the historiographical phenomenon of the “pivotal moment.” The pivotal moment occurs in “the hour of decision” at the “crossroads of history.” In it, a “nation” or “epoch” is faced with a number of historical “paths,” one of which is chosen. After the crucial period has passed, the “future” unfolds according to the pivotal moment’s “logic” until the reader arrives at the present. Many examples spring to mind: the granting of the Magna Carta, the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the French Revolution. Turning points are, of course, not entirely the invention of historians, for it cannot be denied that particularly momentous events actually altered the course of history and in some sense gave birth to the modern world. Nonetheless, it is equally certain that there is something artificial about many pivotal moments. Turning points do not simply emerge out of the historical record, rather they must be uncovered by scholars who, it must be admitted, are sometimes over-enthusiastic in their pursuit of historical drama. Hence modern historical writing has come to be populated by numerous “revolutions,” some of which, one imagines, do not entirely live up to their billing. Moreover, though pivotal moments seem to provide an index to the “roots” of the modern world, they are sometimes the product of an over-zealous search for distant historical origins. Hence modern historians often claim to have found the beginnings of this or that contemporary phenomenon in improbably early times.

Russian history provides an excellent example of the mischief that can be wrought by the immoderate pursuit of historical turning points. The formation of the doctrine “Moscow, the Third Rome” (hereafter “Third Rome”) is doubtless one of the most familiar and misunderstood episodes in all of Russian history. For over a century the birth of “Third Rome” has been described in monographs, surveys, and the popular press as a fundamental break in Russian historical evolution. The standard scenario neatly divides Russian history into halves: before “Third Rome,” Muscovy busied itself with the prosaic task of “gathering the Russian lands”; after “Third Rome,” Russia embarked on a “mission” of limitless imperial conquest. The influence of the doctrine has been seen in the “expansionist” foreign policy of the Imperial era, the “messianic” thought of the Slavophiles and Panslavs of the later nineteenth century, and the Bolshevik “drive for world domination.”

In an effort to elucidate the ways and means of pivotal moments, this essay will explore the process by which “Third Rome” came to be seen as the Rosetta Stone of the Russian historical process. “Third Rome” began its career as an admonitory rhetorical flourish in a series of letters attributed to Filofei, a Pskovian monk of the early sixteenth century. Though it was widely known among Muscovite bookmen, it enjoyed no official favor in Old Russia. Quite the contrary:

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the doctrine was ignored by secular authorities, who were uninterested in its imperial implications, and it was later banned by clerics, who recognized it as an article of the heretical Old Believer faith. In the eighteenth century, “Third Rome” survived in Old Believer writings, but it was almost entirely forgotten by mainstream Russian culture. The doctrine was revived in the 1860s, when Filofei’s writings on “Third Rome” were first published. Thereafter it drew the attention of late Imperial historians, who were convinced that “Third Rome” was a reflection of Muscovite imperial ideology. According to their interpretation, the Muscovites believed they had succeeded the Byzantine “Romans” and become the lords of a new universal empire. In the last quarter of the nineteenth-century “Third Rome” came to be identified with the idea of a “Russian mission.” For Panslavs, “Third Rome” meant that Russia was fated to resurrect the Eastern Empire. For Neo-Romantic philosophers, Filofei’s doctrine suggested that Russia was destined to save the world from the stagnant East and rationalist West. At the turn of the century “Third Rome,” understood in the narrow sense of a Muscovite theory of *translatio imperii* or in the wider sense of the transhistorical “Russian mission,” had become common coin in Russia and the West. In the 1940s and 1950s the idea underwent further transformation. Stalin used “Third Rome” as a symbol of Russian greatness and independence from hostile “imperialist” powers. Western commentators adduced the doctrine as proof of the congenital nature of Russian aggression. “Third Rome” remains in circulation today among Russians attempting to set the course of their troubled nation and among Westerners who fear that Russia will return to “messianic imperialism.”

“Third Rome” in Muscovite and Imperial Russia, 1523-1800

Contrary to the claims of a long scholarly tradition, there is no evidence of Moscow or Russia being called the “Third Rome” in any Slavic text prior to the first half of the sixteenth century. There existed, of course, a classical tradition of rhetorical flattery in which various places far and near were called “Rome” and their inhabitants “Romans.” The best and indeed most appropriate example is Constantinople, which had been called “New Rome” since 381. More questionable was the eleventh-century attribution (by Metropolitan Ilarion) of the name “New Constantine” to Grand Prince Vladimir, the leader of a marginally Christian outpost, Kiev, in the northern marches of the Byzantine sphere of influence. More dubious still was the fourteenth-century identification of Grand Prince Ivan Kalita of Moscow, a provincial center still further culturally and spatially from Byzantium, with “Constantine.” Though many historians have seen in these comparisons a theory of *translatio imperii*, such an interpretation would seem to go beyond the evidence. To call a Rus’ grand prince “Constantine” was at best to draw an analogy: the “Roman” emperor was a great Christian leader, and so were Vladimir and Ivan Kalita. After all, at the time when the Rus’ princes were praised as “New

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Constantines,” the actual heirs to Constantine were alive, well, and ruling in Byzantium. Thus there could be no question of any *translatio imperii*, for the “second” *imperium* still stood. Once it collapsed the analogy could be justifiably made into a theory of succession.

Evidence of such a transformation is found in two sources: a lamentation on the fall of Constantinople written in the second half of the fifteenth century and the Paschal Canon of Metropolitan Zosima written in 1492. The lamentation is appended to the Russian Chronograph of 1512. Its editor used as his source, *inter alia*, a fourteenth-century Bulgarian translation of the twelfth-century Greek chronicle of Manasses. In describing the fall of Rome in the fifth century, the Bulgarian translator implied *translatio imperii* by identifying Tarnovo as the “New Tsar’grad” (that is, “New Imperial City”). The Russian editor of the Chronograph repeated this passage, but he excised any reference to Tarnovo, instead indicating that the “New Tsar’grad” was, as Manasses intended, Constantinople. Having re-established that Byzantium had succeeded Rome, he then hinted that Russia had succeeded Byzantium. The Russian editor wrote that the “Greek, Serbian, Bosnian, Albanian and many other empires” had been captured by the Turks, but the “Russian land” (*Rosiskaia zemlia*) continues to flourish by God’s grace.

Zosima’s Canon is still more suggestive of a Muscovite theory of *translatio imperii*. In the Canon, the Russian cleric comments on the Byzantine prediction that a succession of empires would take place before the end of the world *circa* 7000 (1492/93). In this connection, Zosima may have described the movement of the spiritual center of Christianity from Rome to Constantinople: “And by the will of God, he [Constantine] created a city in his own name that is Constantinople, which is Tsar’grad, that is to say New Rome.” It is not entirely clear, however, that Zosima believed Constantinople was the successor to Rome. In only one early copy of Zosima’s letter (1490s) does “New Rome” appear in the above cited passage — more frequently “New Jerusalem” is found. The substitution of “Rome” for “Jerusalem” may have been a simple scribal error, or the copyist may have believed he was correcting a mistake, for, as we have seen, Constantinople had been called the “New Rome” since the fourth century. In any case, from Zosima’s perspective the important fact seems to have been that Constantinople — as “New Rome” or “New Jerusalem” — had fallen to the Turks in 1453. The vacancy of the imperial throne, so it is often argued, allowed Zosima to hint that Muscovy was the “New Rome.” Thus he refers to Ivan III as “the new Emperor Constantine of the new Constantinople — Moscow and of all the Rus”.

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7 All the relevant texts — the passage from Manasses, its Bulgarian translation, and the lamentation — are found in Hildegard Schaeder, *Moskau das Dritte Rom. Studien zur Geschichte der politischen Theorien in der slavischen Welt* (Hamburg: Friederichsen, de Gruyter & Co., 1929), 51.
12 “Mitropolita Zosimy izveshchenie,” col. 799.
Though they hint at *translatio imperii*, neither the lamentation nor Zosima’s letter includes a clear exposition of the theory of the succession of empires, which, by the way, was available to any cleric well-read in the Book of Daniel. Moreover, neither of these sources identifies Moscow as the “Third Rome,” or even “Rome.” Thus it is difficult to agree with the traditional view that Filofei had predecessors who believed, as he may have, that Moscow was the successor to the Roman empire. If they did believe this, they did not say so. A more reasonable interpretation of pre-Filofeian Roman analogies is this: prior to the fall of Constantinople, Rus’ churchmen used a well-known rhetorical trope to flatter their secular leaders, calling them “Constantine” or their capitals “Constantinople”; after the fall of the empire, they continued to employ this literary figure, though it had greater force in light of the fact that the “Roman” emperor no longer reigned in “New Rome.”

By all evidence, then, Filofei was the first to find a “Third Rome” in Muscovy. The traditional historiography has it that he proclaimed his discovery in a series of letters, the number, addresses, and dates of which are the subject of some controversy. This confusion need not detain us: all authorities agree that he penned one or more letters containing “Third Rome” in the early decades of the sixteenth century. Filofei most likely first introduced the idea in an epistle to a grand princely official written in 1523/24. In the majority of the surviving copies, the crucial and oft-quoted passage of this missive reads:

> So be aware, lover of God and Christ, that all Christian empires have come to an end and are gathered together in the singular empire of our sovereign in accordance to the books of prophecy, and this is the Russian empire: because two Romes have fallen, and a third stands, and a fourth there shall not be.

Nineteenth-century Russian historians found in these words the ideology of a burgeoning empire, and their interpretation has since passed into mainstream Russian historiography.

A careful reading of the letter demonstrates that Filofei indeed expounded a theory of *translatio imperii*. The entity being transferred is called the “Roman empire” (*Romeiskoe tsarstvo*), for, as Aleksandr Gol’dberg has pointed out, the archetype of the letter read “this is the Roman empire,” and not “this is the Russian Empire.” Confused by Filofei’s subtle use of metaphor, later copyists substituted “Russian” for “Roman.” What is the “Roman empire?” In one sense it is clearly temporal Rome, the correspondent of what Filofei called the “Greek empire” (*grecheskoe tsarstvo*) and “the empire of our sovereign” (*tsarstvo nashego gosudaria*). Yet it is also the name given any political entity charged with the protection of the universal church, and it is in this sense that there could be and in fact were a succession of

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13Since the second half of the nineteenth-century three epistles containing “Third Rome” have been attributed to Filofei: (using Gol’dberg’s terminology) 1) “Letter Against the Astrologers” (*Poslanie na zvezdochetsev*) to Mikhail Grigor’evich Misuir’ Munekhin, grand princely secretary in Pskov; 2) “Letter About the Sign of the Cross” (*Poslanie o krestnom znamenii*); and 3) “Essay About the Offences Against the Church” (*Scheviochn ob obidakh tsarstva*) to “Ivan Vasil’evich.” Gol’dberg, who has conducted the most thorough analysis of the letters, believes that only the “Letter Against the Astrologers” can conclusively be attributed to Filofei. He argues that it was written in 1523/24 and that the other two texts, both of which borrow from the “Letter Against the Astrologers,” were drafted in the 1540s. Further, he argues that the third text was not written to any “Ivan Vasil’evich” because it is not an epistle at all. See Aleksandr L. Gol’dberg, “Tri ‘poslaniia Filofeia’: (opryt tekstologicheskogo analiza),” *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literature* (hereafter “TODRL”) 29 (1974), 68-97.


“Romes.” Filofei made clear that temporal Rome, though it still stood, could not be the guardian of the Church because the Latins were heretics. Neither could Byzantium accomplish this task, for while the Greeks were Christians, they had no empire. This left only Muscovy, and Filofei concluded that Vasilii III was “the single tsar to Christians and the preserver of the holy divine thrones of the holy universal apostolic church, which arose in the stead of the Roman and Constantinopolitan [churches] and which now exists in the God-protected city of Moscow.”

Divorced from the general context of the letter, Filofei’s translatio imperii could be interpreted as a triumphal ode to the sovereign of a newly born universal empire. But if the doctrine is interpreted within that context, a very different picture of Filofei’s intent emerges. Even a cursory reading of the letter demonstrates that though Filofei mentioned “Third Rome,” he was not offering an extended commentary on the doctrine. Rather, his missive is a detailed exposition of the evils of astrology and Catholicism. And in this sense the letter is plainly admonitory: the authorities, Filofei suggested, must stamp out heresy and protect the church. To make this warning more palatable, Filofei compared Muscovy to the “Roman” empire. Yet he went beyond simple analogy: he placed the Russian/“Roman” imperium within a theory of religio-political succession. Filofei stated unequivocally that temporal Rome had not fallen and could not fail, for no matter how heretical the Catholics were, “the Lord had settled in the Roman land.” The presence of God exempted temporal Rome (though not the Romans) from the moral calculus that decided the fate of empires, and in this way the “First Rome” had been by-passed without being permanently destroyed. Not so the “Second Rome,” which had fallen when the Greeks had given themselves over to Catholicism. By inference, the fate of the “Third Rome” was similarly precarious: if the Muscovite authorities allowed Orthodoxy to lapse, the Russians would meet the same end as the Greeks. In fact the situation was more dire. The eclipse of the Greek empire meant only a transfer of “Rome” to Russia, but the demise of the Russian church would spell the end of the world, for there would be no “Fourth Rome.” Filofei succeeded in transforming flattery into a subtle warning. True, Vasilii was the emperor of “Rome,” but this title carried with it an awesome responsibility to the church.

Filofei’s idea gained considerable currency in Muscovite literary circles, but it was most definitely not the centerpiece of the Muscovite world view. Slightly more than one hundred copies of the three “Third Rome” letters commonly attributed to the monk have been discovered, the vast majority of which (sixty-nine) were transcribed in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In addition, “Third Rome” made its way into a variety of Muscovite tales, most notably: the “Kazan’ History” (circa 1560s; over 200 mss.); the expanded redaction of the “Tale of the Novgorodian

16 “And truly such people are insane, and not wise, for though the walls, towers, and many-roofed mansions of great Rome are free, their [the Catholics] souls are held captive by the devil.” “Poslanie o zlykh dnekh i chasekh,” 448.

17 Ibid., 448: “The Greek empire was destroyed and will not be revived, and all this occurred because of our sins, because they [the Greeks] gave the Orthodox Greek faith over to Catholicism.”

18 Ibid., 452.

19 Ibid., 448.

20 Ibid.


White Cowl" (circa 1600; over 120 mss.24); and the “Tale of the Founding of Moscow” (circa 1625-50; twenty-nine mss.25). It is important to note that the meaning of “Third Rome” in these stories is somewhat different than that found in Filofei. First, “Third Rome” is not an isolated trope in the tales, but is rather an integral part of complicated historical plots. For example, in the “White Cowl” the Patriarch of Constantinople sent the robe representing guardianship of the Church to the archbishop of Novgorod because he learned in a dream that “the Rus’ land” was the “Third Rome.” Second, the idea is removed from its original apocalyptic context: in none of the tales do we find any hint of “a fourth [Rome] there shall not be.” The impression given by the tales, then, is not one of impending doom, but of a bright future for the Third Rome.

While a few disgruntled clerics warned of the impending apocalypse and the tiny readership of historical fiction took pride in their new eternal city, Muscovite authorities ignored the imperial implications of “Third Rome.” In a strict sense, their silence on the matter was nearly complete: almost never do we find in an official document any mention of “Third Rome.” Nonetheless, it cannot be said that Muscovite officials were unaware of the more general and related notion of the “Byzantine inheritance,” for a stream of papal officials traveled to Moscow in the sixteenth century to remind the Russians of their “Roman” heritage. The legates told the Muscovites that their church had succeeded that of Byzantium and therefore that they need no longer seek spiritual council in Constantinople.26 The Muscovites would hear none of this: they maintained their subordinate status, as is suggested by the fact that Ivan IV sought and conditionally gained permission for the use of the title “tsar” from the Patriarch of “Tsar’grad.”27 Even after the foundation of the patriarchate in 1589, the Russian Church rightly continued to recognize its inferiority to Constantinople, for the bishop of Moscow occupied the fifth place in the hierarchy of patriarchal sees. Further, Papal emissaries informed the Russians that by virtue of their Byzantine heritage they were obliged to conquer Constantinople, or at least aid other Christian powers in doing so.28 Again the Muscovites paid no attention: they pursued a policy of neutrality with the Turks while, much to the dismay of the Papacy, they fought the Livonian Order, Lithuanians, and Poles. Not until 1676 did the Muscovites enter into direct hostilities with the Ottomans, a conflict that had nothing to do with Papal prodding or Byzantine pretensions.

On only two occasions did Muscovite authorities cite Filofei’s idea. The doctrine was repeated in a laudatory “speech” on the virtues of the Russian church attributed to the Patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremiah, who had come to Moscow to authorize the foundation of the patriarchate in 1589.29 Given that the patriarch was probably not familiar with Filofei’s obscure missives and that he could neither speak nor read Russian, it seems very probable that Muscovite

26 See the instructions given to Papal diplomats in 1594, printed in Russkaya istoricheskaia biblioteka (hereafter “RIB”) 8 (1884), 33-34.
27 See the conditional allowance reprinted in RIB 22 (1908), 67-75.
28 RIB 8, 31-32.
29 “Gramota ulozhennia ob uchrezhdenii v Rossi i Patriarcheskogo prestola,” Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov (Moscow: Tip. Selivanskovskogo, 1819), part 2, nos. 59 and 97.
hierarchs placed the self-serving doctrine in Jeremiah’s mouth. If the Russian church found “Third Rome” useful in 1589, it had changed its mind by 1666/7 when an ecclesiastical council banned the “White Cowl” and, by implication, the doctrines of *translatio imperii* contained in it.\(^\text{30}\) The reason for the censure of the tale and its peculiar message was two-fold. The council stated explicitly that the doctrine detailed in the “White Cowl” was false: the metropolitans of Rus’ wore the hallowed robe by “ancient tradition,” not due to any fictional Byzantine succession.\(^\text{31}\) More important, though never made explicit by the council, was the fact that schismatic sects had appropriated ideas found in the “White Cowl” to argue against the on-going Nikonian liturgical reforms. These groups, who would collectively become the “Old Believers,” reasoned as follows. A number of early sources — Filofei’s letters, the “White Cowl,” Patriarch Jeremiah’s “speech” — called Russia the “Third Rome” because its church was purer than the Greek, which had of course fallen to the “Hagarites.”\(^\text{32}\) If Russia was the “Third Rome,” what right did Nikon have to replace the righteous practices of the Russian church with the wayward rites of the apostate Greeks?\(^\text{33}\)

The adoption of “Third Rome” by the Old Believers marks an important moment in the history of the idea. They were the first to see the formulation of “Third Rome” in the sixteenth century as the pivotal moment in Russian history. Imperial authorities, occupied with the practical necessities of running a vast realm, certainly would not have understood the drafting of an obscure proposition concerning the succession of distant empires as a turning point in *their* history. From the perspective of the political elite, the end of the Muscovite civil war, the annexation of Novgorod, or the crowning of Ivan IV as “tsar” were all much more important than “Third Rome.” But for men such as Avvakum, “Saint Filofei” had announced a new era in world history, for they accepted the fact that the mantle of Orthodox Christianity had passed from Byzantium to Rus’. Furthermore, the dissenters were the first to believe in the doctrine. Filofei and those clergymen who followed him seemed to have understood “Third Rome” as a trope to be used in ecclesiastical discourse. If the secular or clerical authorities accepted “Third Rome,” they certainly pursued none of its implications. But the Old Believers clearly demonstrated their faith in Filofei’s idea: when Orthodoxy was defiled by the Antichrist Nikon, they removed themselves and the promise of “Third Rome” to the wilderness. Finally, the Old Believers continued to propound the doctrine of “Third Rome” in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Though some have seen Filofei’s doctrine at work in the “expansionist” foreign policy of Petrine and Catherinian regimes, it seems to have been utterly forgotten by the Imperial elite. To be sure, Peter, Catherine, and their minions were quite fond of comparing themselves to Romans, but they never cite “Third Rome” when doing so.\(^\text{34}\) To offer one particularly telling example, in 1697 the Greek Likhudi brothers offered a panegyric to Peter the Great in which they describe the tsar’ as

\(^{30}\)See *Dopolnenie k Aktam istoricheskim*, 15 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tip. II-go Otdellenii Sobstvennoi E. I. V. Kantselierii, 1846-75), vol. 5, no. 102, art. 21. In article 26 Constantinople is called “New Rome.”

\(^{31}\)Ibid.


the successor to the throne in Constantinople.\textsuperscript{35} Nowhere in this ode, or others like it, does “Third Rome” appear. In contrast, numerous eighteenth-century Old Believer tracts cite “Third Rome” as a fundamental moment in Russian history and an important article of the dissenting faith.\textsuperscript{36}

The Creation of the “Theory” of the Third Rome, 1800-1914

In the first half of the nineteenth century “Third Rome” remained an obscure and insignificant doctrine outside Old Believer communities. Even among the Slavophiles, who believed that Muscovy had superseded both Rome and Constantinople, there is no direct indication of familiarity with Filofei’s idea. Nonetheless, knowledge of “Third Rome” slowly spread. In 1819 the foundation charter of the patriarchate was published in a popular series of historical documents, thereby making “Third Rome” available to the wider reading public.\textsuperscript{37} It drew the attention of historians but few others. Given their source, scholars of the day understandably interpreted the doctrine exclusively in relation to the elevation of the Muscovite see in 1589. For example, Nikolai Karamzin noted that “Third Rome” was cited in support of the creation of the patriarchate, but he went no further in his interpretation.\textsuperscript{38} Indeed, mention of “Third Rome” was not seen as essential in this context. In 1840 Andrei Murav’ev devoted a special study to the foundation of the patriarchate, but he avoided Jeremiah’s “speech” completely.\textsuperscript{39} Even the exhaustive Sergei Solov’ev discussed the foundation charter without touching on “Third Rome.”\textsuperscript{40} And it was by no means clear to those who cited the charter that it was indicative of Russian beliefs. In his treatment of Jeremiah’s “speech,” A. Zernin argued that it was the Greeks who believed Russia was the “Third Rome,” not the Muscovites.\textsuperscript{41} Zernin was probably not alone in this judgment, for historians of his day seem to have been unaware that a Russian — Filofei — had created the doctrine. As far as Russian scholars knew, a Greek had formulated “Third Rome” and to Greeks it belonged.

In addition to historians, many clerics were undoubtedly aware of “Third Rome” before 1850. This is particularly true of those churchmen who wrote about or had contact with the Old Believers. In both histories of the schism and...
works designed to refute the Old Believer faith, Orthodox clerics were compelled to describe the origin and nature of the schismatic view that the Greek church had lapsed and the (Old Believer) Russian church had taken its place. Even in this regard, however, it was not seen as necessary to mention “Third Rome” directly. For example, in his *Instruction on How to Contend Properly with the Schismatics*, Bishop Simon described the Old Believers’ position on the apostasy of the Greek Church without reference to “Third Rome.” Similarly, Bishop Makarii’s history of Russian religious dissent outlined the Old Believer position without mentioning the *translatio* doctrine. Those missionary manuals and histories that cite “Third Rome” mention it only in passing. Why were clerics hesitant to discuss “Third Rome”? The answer may have something to do with an attempt to make it seem that the Old Believers alone were responsible for the heretical opinion that the Greek church had strayed. Mentioning “Third Rome” would link Old Believer theology with the deep current of anti-Greek feeling that ran through many sixteenth-century Russian Orthodox texts and would thereby legitimize the opinions of the schismatics. The entry for “Filofei” in a historical dictionary of clerical writers of 1827 is interesting in this regard. The article identifies Filofei as the author of the “Letter Against the Astrologers” and praises the monk for exposing the “superstition” of star-gazing. Yet Filofei’s criticism of the Greek church and his doctrine of three Romes are passed over in silence. Other biographical dictionaries of the day omitted Filofei altogether.

Interest in “Third Rome,” or even knowledge of it, did not begin to grow appreciably until the cultural thaw that marked the ascension of Alexander II in 1855. At that time a number of texts containing the doctrine were published, including the tale of the “White Cowl,” Old Believer tracts, and Iurii Krizhanich’s writings. But the most important “Third Rome” publication of the 1860s was Filofei’s “Letter Against the Astrologers,” which was issued by the historian Aleksei Pavlov in a prestigious clerical journal in 1861. Pavlov’s commentary on the document marks a mild departure from previous interpretations of “Third Rome” and Filofei. He could not suppose, as had many historians, that the Greeks had invented and imported “Third Rome” circa 1589. The “Letter Against the Astrologers” was written by a Russian monk, and there was no reason to believe that the doctrine contained in it did not reflect Russian belief. Nonetheless, in keeping with the clerical understanding of the Pskovian monk, Pavlov was able to soften the heretical implications of “Third Rome.” He accomplished this by claiming that Filofei developed the doctrine in opposition to the

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42 Bishop Simon, *Nastavenie pravil’no sotiasiat’ia s raskol’nikami* (Moscow: Sinodal’naiia tip., 1839), 55-61.
44 See, for example, Afanasii P. Shchapov, *Ruskii raskol staroobriadchestva* (Kazan’: Izd. Ivana Duhrovina, 1859), 88, fn. 2.
46 See, for example, *Slovar’ dostopamiatnykh liudei russkoi zemli*, ed. by Dmitri N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, 5 vols. (Moscow: A. Siriaev, 1836).
“then-current notion concerning the desecration of the Christian faith in countries held captive by infidels.” Readers of the letter would find that Filofei indeed wrote that the Greeks had preserved their faith under the Turks. Yet they would also discover that the monk believed the Ottomans had triumphed in 1453 because the Greeks had given the Orthodox church over to Catholicism. Despite these inconsistencies, Pavlov’s interpretation was useful. Having said that Filofei rejected notions of Greek apostasy, he could then separate the monk’s pro-Greek “Third Rome” from the Old Believers’ “misinterpretation” of it. Thus Pavlov noted that the idea of Greek apostasy against which Filofei had deployed “Third Rome” would “later be developed by Schismatics.”

Several years after Pavlov’s publication of Filofei, the historian Vladimir Ikonnikov offered a radically new interpretation of “Third Rome,” one that would have a monumental impact on the Russian understanding of Muscovy. He suggested a new context for interpreting Filofei’s idea: “Third Rome” was a reflection of imperial ideology, not of ecclesiastical opinions about the captive Greek church. Ikonnikov knew that Russian historians had long possessed evidence that the Muscovites believed in translatio imperii. The passage of the “crown of Monomach,” the adoption of the Byzantine emblem, the use of the title “tsar,” and Ivan III’s marriage to the niece of the last emperor of Byzantium all supported this thesis. To Ikonnikov, Filofei’s doctrine seemed to be confirmation that there was in fact a new Muscovite ideology circa 1500 based on translatio imperii: the Byzantine empire had fallen, Moscow had taken its place, and Filofei had expressed the court’s new understanding of its place in the world as the third great historical empire. Yet as anyone who had read Filofei would know, such an interpretation was not complete. It explained “Third Rome,” but not “a fourth there shall not be.” Here again Ikonnikov was able to provide a new interpretive context: “a fourth there shall not be” was the beginning of Muscovite messianism, not a simple statement of prophesy. Imperial historiography had long suggested that millenarian thought was prevalent in the era of Ivan III. Muscovite authors cited approvingly Byzantine prophecies foretelling the fall of Constantinople to the Ishmalites, the rise of a great power that would liberate the city, and, nearing the year 7000, the end of the world in the reign of the Antichrist.

Ikonnikov argued that Filofei’s doctrine was a reflection of this mode of thought: the Pskovian monk and Muscovites generally saw the apocalypse approaching and believed that it was their responsibility to prevent the catastrophe by means of their righteous behavior.

Ikonnikov’s interpretation — “Third Rome” as universal empire and world savior — proved to be the foundation of the standard academic gloss of Filofei in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In this form, “Third Rome” was rapidly disseminated among historians and the literate public. In whole or in part, it was imitated and elaborated in works on the history of Russian political ideas, relations with the Vatican, contact with Byzantium and the Orthodox

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49Ibid., 83.
50Ibid.
51Vladimir S. Ikonnikov, Опыт исследования культурного значения Византии в русской истории (Kiev: Univ. Tipografiia, 1869), 364.
East, ecclesiastical history, and Old Russian literature. Naturally, the spread of “Third Rome” led to more intensive investigation of Filofei and his works. Perhaps the best indicator of the popularity of the idea in the last quarter of the nineteenth century is its appearance in the most popular historical surveys and encyclopedias of the day. It would not be an exaggeration to say that by the 1900, the idea of “Third Rome” was inseparably linked in the minds of educated Russians to the history of Muscovy.

For most readers of the later nineteenth century, “Third Rome” provided a new way to understand the early history of Russia. They could learn in any number of historical works that the Muscovites were inspired to build their expansive state by a belief that they bore the imperial and eschatological mantle of “Rome.” Few considered the possibility that these ancient burdens had implications for modern Russia. The Panslavists of the 1870s and 1880s constitute a significant exception to this rule. Given their interest in protecting their “Slavic brothers” and even conquering Constantinople, the Panslavists found Filofei’s doctrine useful insofar as it seemed to demonstrate the historical continuity of the Russian “mission” to save Slavic Orthodoxy from both the “East” (the Ottomans) and the “West” (Europe). For example, the Panslav scholar Vladimir Lamanskii wrote that “the notion of Moscow as the third Rome” was not a “vacuous, prideful falsehood,” but rather “a gigantic cultural and political task, a world-historical triumph, intentionally entrusted to the Great Russian people and its ruling leaders by millions of co-religionists and kinsmen.” He went on to say that the adoption of “Third Rome” marked “a new period in Russian history,” one that presumably continued to his day.

While “Third Rome” found a place in Panslavism, it was by no means central to the movement’s thought. The doctrine appeared very rarely in the writings of even the most prolific Panslavists. Though Alexander II fought a war with the Turks in 1877, his foreign policy does not seem to have been influenced by Panslavism or “Third Rome.” Filofei’s

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doctrine found limited favor under the reactionary Alexander III, who was praised during his coronation banquet as protector of the Slavs, successor to Constantine, and ruler of the “Third Rome.”

While “Third Rome” was unknown to the Slavophiles and of marginal interest to the Panslavs, the idea proved to be much more important for their immediate successors, the Neo-Romantic and idealist philosophers of the late nineteenth century and “Silver Age.” They shared much with the Slavophiles and Panslavs, most particularly a desire to chart a Russian Sonderweg between what they characterized as the stagnant formalism of an imaginary “East” and the materialism, rationalism, and liberalism of an idealized “West.” Still, they rejected the Slavophiles’ and Panslavs’ Russian nationalism in favor of a universalism borne by Russia, but not essentially Russian in nature. For these men, Russia represented an “idea” of world-historical and eschatological significance. Konstantin Leont’ev, for example, suggested what he called “Byzantinism” should be the Russian “third way.” Byzantinism was essentially a harsh combination of ascetic Orthodoxy and brutal autocracy which, Leont’ev thought, would help Russia chart a way between the atavistic East and liberal West. Remarkably, despite his intense interest in the idea of a cultural translatio from Byzantium to Russia, Leont’ev paid no attention whatsoever to “Third Rome,” a fact that suggests the obscurity of the idea even a decade after Pavlov’s publication of Filofei’s epistle. In contrast, Vladimir Solov’ev, who might rightly be considered Leont’ev’s successor, made extensive use of the idea. In the place of Leont’ev’s “Byzantinism,” Solov’ev substituted Christian universalism. He argued that Russia’s mission was to reconcile the East and West, overcome all forms of particularism, and usher in an age of world-wide organic unity. In this regard “Third Rome” was immediately relevant, because it demonstrated the historicity of Russia’s mission and stood as a metaphor for the “Russian idea.” According to Solov’ev, Russia was not only third in succession after ancient Rome, but the representative of a “third principle,” capable of uniting East and West by its very selflessness. The reforms of Peter the Great and the opening to the West demonstrated “that Russia was not called to be only eastern, that in the great conflict between East and West she should not stand on one side representing one of the struggling parties — that in this matter she possessed a mediational and conciliatory obligation, that she should be in the highest sense a third judge of the conflict.”

After the violent upheavals of the 1905 revolution “Third Rome” found new resonance among Russian intellectuals, particularly those who, like the vekhovtsy, rejected the radicalism of the political left. They proposed a reinvigoration of the “Russian idea,” understood as a native commitment to Christian enlightenment. The Symbolist poet Dmitri Merezhkovskii believed “Third Rome” to be part of a vain Muscovite dream of universal caesaro-papism, a fantasy he saw ending with the destruction of autocracy and the emergence of a new Christian consciousness.
Viacheslav Ivanov, interpreted “Third Rome” much like Solov’ev, as an expression of the Russian capacity for national self-denial and a symbol of its mission to unite mankind in Christian brotherhood, in a “Rome of the spirit.” Nikolai Berdiaev, one time contributor to Vekhi, identified “Third Rome” with what he believed was an essential “Russian messianism,” the historical characteristic that differentiated the Russian people from all others and informed its world-historical mission. Importantly, Berdiaev was the first to argue that “Third Rome” was crucial to the development of Slavophilism, an opinion that would find favor in years to come.

The appearance of the first history of the idea of “Third Rome” in 1914 properly marks both the culmination of its pre-Revolutionary evolution and the end of an era. I. Kirillov’s book begins with a spirited attack on the historian Pavel Miliukov, who argued (according to Kirillov’s skewed characterization) that “Third Rome” was borrowed from the South Slavs, intentionally spread by arrogant courtiers and scheming foreigners, and therefore had no “organic” connection to Russian consciousness.

Kirillov assured his readers that this was false: the idea was so widespread in Muscovy that it could not have been spread by the tiny governing elite and thus must have been “organically” embedded in the Russian mind. For Kirillov, “Third Rome” was not the novel propaganda of Ivan III, but a fundamental shift in the mentality of the Russian people that marked a new era in Russian history. It reflected the fact that the Russian nation had come to self-consciousness and assumed its world-historical mission as the divinely-chosen guardian of Orthodox Christianity. His history aptly summed up what had come to be the conventional wisdom since Ikonnikov and Solov’ev: Prior to Filofei, Russia was aimless; “Third Rome” provided the Muscovite state and the Russian people with its mission; the Old Believers — representing the intuitive popular comprehension of the “Russian idea” — fought to protect the “Third Rome” against alien doctrinal incursions; in Peter’s time the intelligentsia was separated from the people and “Third Rome” was not spoken of by the educated elite until the 1840s; the idea was then revived by the Slavophiles, who were the first intellectuals to grasp the “Russian idea”; their thought was further developed by the Panslavs and Solov’ev. With Kirillov, the transformation of “Third Rome” from an obscure doctrine supposedly espoused by a Greek patriarch into the pivotal moment in Russian history was complete.


In the inter-war period “Third Rome” remained an object of academic attention much as before: new monographs appeared, the doctrine became a standard element in textbooks of Russian history, Soviet and Western, and it was generally seen as a synonym for Muscovite Russia. The advent of Communism in Russia gave “Third Rome” new and

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unexpected relevance. To many, the strident millenarianism of the Bolsheviks seemed to be the latest and most radical expression of “Russian messianism.” The primary exponent of this argument was Berdiaev, who had been expelled from the Soviet Union in 1923. In a series of books and articles, but most forcefully in The Russian Revolution and The Origin of Russian Communism, Berdiaev explained that “Russian messianism,” the fundamental element in “Russian religious psychology,” was the primary force behind Bolshevism.\(^{75}\)

The ancient Russian messianic idea goes on living in the deep spiritual layers of the Russian people. But in the conscious mind its formula changes, the thing “in the name” of which it acts; the messianic idea rises out the collective unconsciousness of the people’s life and takes on another name. Instead of the monk Philothey’s [sic] “Third Rome” we get Lenin’s Third International.\(^{76}\)

Berdiaev’s message that internationalist Communism was actually a transmogrified “Russian messianism” was widely propagated: his works were often translated and he became the best known Russian philosopher in the West. His views were sympathetically received by conservatives and non-Communist liberals who were ill-disposed to make subtle distinctions between Communism and its national agent, particularly after Stalin’s “Socialism in One Country” seemed to conflate the two.

The revival of Russian nationalism under Stalin had a tangible effect on the understanding of “Third Rome” within the Soviet Union itself. In a series of decrees issued in the 1930s the Party announced that the “School of Pokrovskii” had been over-zealous in its condemnation of the Russian imperial past. Henceforth historians were to recognize the “progressive” role of Muscovy in “gathering the Russian lands” and in bringing non-Russian peoples under the aegis of what would be the world’s first Communist state. Thus “Third Rome” was transformed from the “imperialist” ideology of an oppressive feudal class into the “progressive” program of a rapidly centralizing Great Russian state. Ivan IV, rehabilitated by Soviet historical science in 1942, was made the official agent of “progressive” centralization.\(^{77}\) In that year, Robert Vipper’s heroic biography of the “Terrible” tsar’ was re-issued and Aleksei Tolstoi completed a drama based on his life. Both placed Ivan’s activities in the context of “Third Rome.”\(^{78}\)

The culmination of the national Bolshevik interpretation of “Third Rome” can be seen in Sergei Eisenstein’s film Ivan the Terrible and the historian Nikolai Chaev’s article “Third Rome in the Political Practice of the Muscovite Government,” both of which appeared in 1945. In the opening scene of Ivan the Terrible, the tsar’ explains his mission to unify the Russian lands, destroy internal opposition, and defend the realm against the imperialist Germans. Ivan concludes his speech with a few boastful words from Filofei: “Two Romes have fallen, Moscow is the third, there will be no fourth, for I am absolute master of this

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\(^{76}\) Berdiaev, The Russian Revolution, 41.


third Rome, the Muscovite state.”79 There is no evidence that Ivan ever said this, or that he had any knowledge of Filofei’s doctrine. Yet in an inventive attempt to adapt “Third Rome” to the purposes of Russian nationalism, Chaev suggested that the doctrine was indeed the official policy of Ivan’s government.80 According to the Soviet historian, Filofei’s idea was not a theory of imperial succession, but a declaration of independence from predatory imperialist powers. In the sixteenth century the Papacy and Habsburgs attempted to gain control over the Russians by denying the sovereignty of both their church and state. They insisted that only the Catholic Church and its secular arm, the Holy Roman Empire, were truly sovereign entities. In response, the Muscovites claimed that their realm was itself an empire, in fact the empire — the “Third Rome.” Armed with this official ideology, the Russians founded the patriarchate and crowned their grand prince “tsar,” in effect creating their own Pope and Emperor. The obscure Pskovian monk, it turned out, was the ideologist of “Tsarism in One Country.”

Far and away the most intensive discussion of “Third Rome” in the entire history of the idea occurred in the first decade of the Cold War. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe raised the specter of what came to be called “Soviet expansionism” and led to an intensive search for its roots. For many post-war commentators, Berdiaev’s interpretation of Bolshevism as modified “Russian messianism” gained new relevance as an explanation for “Soviet expansionism.” “Communist” imperialism, it seemed, could be understood as a modern reflection of the long-time Russian aspiration to be the “Third Rome.” This argument, often accompanied by relevant citations of Filofei, was made in a variety of fora: academic articles and books (some more scholarly than others)81; foreign policy journals82; the popular press83; and even in the State Department.84 The most vehement proponents of the “Russian messianism” line were found in the Ukrainian emigre community. In the early 1950s a group of Ukrainian scholars in Munich produced a series of booklets in which they argued that every moment in Russian history was informed by the “messianic” doctrine of the “Third Rome.”85

The notion that “Soviet expansionism” was motivated by “Russian messianism” was by no means universally accepted. The most vehement opponents of this theory were Russian emigres, who saw the attempt to Russianize

79Sergei M. Eisenstein, Ivan the Terrible (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1989), 34.
84See, for example, Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s many statements about the traditional Russian goals for world domination, especially “Statement of the Hon. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State [June 26, 1951],” The Mutual Security Program. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-Second Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), 7-18. Truman was a strong believer in Russian-Soviet continuity. See J. Garry Clifford, “President Truman and Peter the Great’s Will,” Diplomatic History 4: 4 (1980), especially 379, fn. 28.
85At least eight booklets were published by the Ecclesiastical-Archeographic Commission of the Apostolic Visitor for Ukrainians in Western Europe. Every title contains “Third Rome.” English abstracts of these works are available in The Ukrainian Review 8: 3 (Autumn, 1961), 45-71. Similarly, see any number of statements on “Third Rome” by Iaroslav S. Stetsko, Prime Minister of Ukraine in 1941 and later a leader in the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations and the Revolutionary Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Iaroslav S. Stetsko, Ukraine and the Subjugated Nations; Their Struggle for National Liberation, ed. by John Kolasky (New York: Philosophical Library, 1989).
Bolshevism as both offensive and erroneous. The historian Mikhail Karpovich, for example, insisted that Filofei’s idea had nothing to do with Muscovite expansion or Soviet imperialism.\textsuperscript{86} When the emigre Socialist Courier published an article about the profound effects of “Filofeism” on Russian history and Bolshevism, Karpovich’s own New Journal fired back with a piece arguing that “Third Rome” was of little significance in premodern or modern times.\textsuperscript{87} Oddly enough, the Russian emigres were joined in their attack on “Third Rome” by Soviet scholars. In the very year Chaev offered his nationalist interpretation of “Third Rome,” the Soviet academic establishment decreed that his understanding of the doctrine was incorrect. “Third Rome,” Dmitri Likhachev railed, was a Greek plot designed to undermine budding Russian independence. The doctrine had no currency outside the clergy, who were the toadies of the Greeks, and it had no impact on Muscovite foreign or domestic policy. Russian authority and national consciousness did not depend on any “Byzantine inheritance.”\textsuperscript{88} Likhachev’s interpretation (with certain variations) became the Soviet standard and considerable scholastic effort was expended in demonstrating its validity.\textsuperscript{89} Even more offensive to the Soviets was the contention that contemporary Russian behavior could be explained with reference to the “messianism” supposedly implied by Filofei’s doctrine. More than once the Soviets mounted spirited attacks on the thesis of “Third-Romism.”\textsuperscript{90}

“Third Rome” remains alive and well today. Scholarly opinion concerning the doctrine is divided: though many specialists argue that “Third Rome” was never very important in Old Russia,\textsuperscript{91} one can still read, particularly in textbooks, that Filofei’s doctrine was the official ideology of Muscovy.\textsuperscript{92} “Third Rome” enjoys broad appeal outside the academy in both Russia and the West. Russians have turned to Filofei’s idea in search of a post-Communist “Russian idea.” Berdiaev’s meditations on “Third Rome,” banned in Soviet times, are now being published, read, and widely

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\textsuperscript{88}Dmitri S. Likhachev, Nacional’noe samosoznanie drevnei Rusi (Moscow and Leningrad: Izd. Akad. nauk SSSR, 1945), 100.

\textsuperscript{89}From 1969 to 1983 Gol’dberg published no fewer than eight major articles devoted to “Third Rome,” many of which appeared in the prestigious TODRL.


discussed. Pro-Soviet and Russian nationalist groups (notably Pamiat') have adopted “Third Rome” as a symbol of Russian renewal. In the West, newspaper articles, book reviews, and editorials cite the doctrine as historical “background” for “Russian messianism” or “expansionism.” Even Western political leaders will sometimes find the origins of modern Russian behavior in Filofei’s idea. For example, Chancellor Helmut Kohl explained that the Russian “drive for expansion and . . . belief that Mother Russia will bring salvation to the world” may be traced to the idea of “Moscow as the Third Rome, after Byzantium.” Though Kohl propounded this theory a number of years ago, many in the West continue to share his fear of Russian “Third-Romism.”

Conclusion

As Butterfield warned years ago, the attempt to find the origins of the present in a distant pivotal moment is a very dangerous pursuit, for it leads almost inevitably to the “discovery” of analogies that lead the mind further and further back in time and deeper and deeper into anachronistic error. The history of the idea “Moscow, the Third Rome” clearly illustrates the pitfalls of origins-seeking in the sphere of national histories. Since the mid-nineteenth century a variety of scholars, philosophers and publicists have “discovered” in the writings of Filofei the “roots” of what they believed to be a fundamental characteristic of the “Russian idea”: Lamanskii located the origins of Panslavism; Solov’ev found the roots of Christian universalism; Berdiaev uncovered the lineages of Bolshevism; Chaev traced the beginnings of Russian nationalism; and numerous Cold-Warriors identified the bedrock of Soviet “expansionism.” Yet a sober assessment of the early history of the doctrine suggests that none of these things was ever dreamt of by Filofei. “Third Rome,” then, is the result of the projection of a modern idea — notably, the “Russian mission” — onto a superficially analogous early modern concept. Ironically, it is only in this sense that “Third Rome” can be seen as having any significant impact on Russian history — as an anachronistic artifact that reinforced a pre-existing modern belief that Russians are imbued with some kind of messianic impulse. One could reasonably guess that careful investigations of other pivotal moments in other national histories might lead to similar conclusions.

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