Beyond Party: Cultures of Antipartisanship in Northern Politics Before the Civil War
adventures of Iktomi, the spider, who repeatedly challenges the boundaries of life around him, often in humorous ways.

Readers gain insight into such Dakota values as hospitality, bravery, and reverence for nature and the interaction between species, in particular humans and animals. We are shown new perspectives on the world around us, universal truths, and the complexity of life. Midwestern readers, especially those from the Dakotas, Minnesota, and Iowa, will find Being Dakota a solid source of material for enriching their understanding of the indigenous peoples common to their states. For a companion piece, Iowa readers may also want to read Skinner’s article in the Journal of American Folklore (vol. 38), “Traditions of the Iowa Indians,” published in 1925. Skinner noted that the Iowa tribe had a “special similarity” to the eastern Dakota, especially in their tales (425). Being Dakota joins a growing list of titles that provide the voices of Indian people, sharing a unique worldview.


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Historians of antebellum politics traditionally stress the power of party in voter behavior, and how competing political loyalties contributed to the coming of the Civil War. This revealing study challenges the familiar approach by stressing how an antiparty political culture undermined the prewar party system. Mark Voss-Hubbard accomplishes this by re-examining and in some ways refurbishing the nativist Know Nothing movement of the critical 1850s. Due to Know Nothingism’s silly secret rituals as well as its quite serious anti-Catholicism, historians long treated the nativist movement with distance and even disdain. Study of mass voting behavior revived interest in the infamous Know Nothing movement. Expert in the methods of this “new political” school of analysis, Voss-Hubbard deepens our understanding of the Know Nothing phenomenon by probing politicking in the 1850s and the decade’s distinctive antipartisanship.

Alternately both appreciative and contemptuous of the Know Nothings’ brand of political reform, Voss-Hubbard thereupon carefully crafts a convincing appraisal of the movement’s significance, at least for the Northeast. He focuses primarily on developments in three
critical counties in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania, leaving unexplored his promising approach's relevance to a western state such as Iowa. His unconventional emphasis on antipartisanship nonetheless shows scholarly sophistication as well as sensitivity to the nuances of party rhetoric and political behavior.

Beginning with an intriguing (if somewhat confining) analysis of Jesse Ventura's election as governor of Minnesota, Voss-Hubbard next sketches how social and economic changes essential to the Market Revolution sowed the seeds of the Know Nothing revolt. While seemingly suggesting that nativism might have remained quiescent had the patterns of life remained familiar and the work steady, Voss-Hubbard goes beyond this to depict how popular discontent with politics as usual led to widespread rejection of discredited parties. In particular, he shows how voter preference for the nonpartisan nature of local government and reform encouraged political upheaval when parties failed to respond to vital new cultural issues of the 1850s.

Most significantly, Voss-Hubbard portrays how Know Nothing politics drew inspiration from the movement's fraternal organization and appeal. While instructive, his focus on the nativists' fraternalism and forgotten reform agenda may understate the role of anti-Catholicism and overvalue nativist antiparty rhetoric. Such self-serving proclamations typically emanate from insurgent political movements—even the apolitical Liberty Party espoused similar statements. Nativism thrived, however, as anti-Catholic prejudice proved more powerful than commitment to racial justice. What did distinguish the nativists was their secretive style (initially). Voss-Hubbard's emphasis on Know Nothing fraternalism thus seems mostly justified. Equally intriguing is how this fraternal style necessarily limited the movement's appeal to women; left unstated is how this too may have contributed to the movement's demise.

Politicians leading an opposition party based on antiparty rhetoric pose obvious questions of consistency, if not hypocrisy. Acutely aware of this inherent contradiction, Voss-Hubbard dutifully details the movement's difficulty in governing according to its antiparty promise. In recounting the Know Nothings' collapse, the author's argument comes full circle. The Republicans assumed power by adopting much of the Know Nothings' following, nativist agenda, and antiparty stance. Yet Republicans proved more adept in forging party loyalty and in governing effectively.

Voss-Hubbard largely verifies findings of such new political historians as Michael Holt and William Gienapp; yet in other respects his probing of antebellum antipartyism offers surprising challenges to this
now standard school. His approach is not without controversy. Some may object to taking seriously Know Nothing politicos’ pretensions to social and labor reform. Purists may likewise regret his rather anachronistic portrayal of the Know Nothing political style as “populist.” Presentism may also be evident in the extended Ventura analogy. Nonetheless, Voss-Hubbard’s meticulous attention to the Know Nothings’ local roots and antiparty spirit offers intriguing insights on pre-Civil War political developments.


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Civil War historians have often recognized the importance of intelligence, yet they have rarely explored it beyond narrow studies of particular battles and campaigns or sensational accounts of behind-the-lines espionage. With the notable exception of Edwin Fishel (to whom this book is co-dedicated), few scholars have systematically examined the impact of intelligence on any facet of the war. William B. Feis changes that with Grant’s Secret Service, an in-depth examination and evaluation of Ulysses S. Grant’s collection and use of intelligence. Feis contends that determining “what a commander knew, when he knew it, and how he used what he knew offers a valuable—and perhaps more evenhanded—perspective from which to view the nature of command in the Civil War” (3). He applies that perspective to Grant with a chapter on each major battle or campaign, from Belmont in 1861 to Appomattox in 1865.

What emerges is a picture of a discriminating, confident, often daring mind committed to offensive operations and not overly concerned with the enemy’s own plans—a recipe for military success. Grant possessed coup d’oeil, the ability to make sound decisions in the midst of chaos and to make sense out of uncertainty. Unlike some of his counterparts, who disdained the “secret service,” Grant actively pursued intelligence and supported its gatherers faithfully. During the Vicksburg campaign, he used Grenville Dodge’s network of scouts and spies to discover Confederate whereabouts and intentions. (Housed at the State Historical Society of Iowa, Dodge’s papers provide ample opportunity for historians wishing to follow Feis’s lead.) Facing Lee in the East, a more difficult task, Grant looked to the Army of the Potomac’s Bureau of Military Information (BMI), created in