The Price of Progress: Public Services, Taxation, and the American Corporate State, 1877 to 1929

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church. They challenged racist assumptions of Indian aptitudes in the aftermath of military defeat and the onset of allotment. On their respective reservations, Native ministers became involved in struggles over leadership, residence, and cultural practices. For Lewis, these realities were the sad by-product of a deeper spiritual transformation. According to her, Christianity alone cannot be blamed for these sad consequences.

Lewis’s insightful history reveals much about race and gender after the Civil War. This is not a simple story of steadily improving gender and race relations over time. For example, Lewis shows that the number of Native ministers has steadily declined since 1935. Her detailed and sympathetic analysis of Native ministers will surprise many students of Indian-white relations. Creating Christian Indians will reopen the debate over Christianity and its role in Indian country.


The subtitle of Rudy Higgens-Evenson’s The Price of Progress answers the title’s implied question. The price of progress was not just increased taxation, but also the emergence of the corporate state itself. Moreover, Higgens-Evenson joins a growing number of scholars who argue that early twentieth-century “progress” came most clearly at the state and local level. If “progress” meant governmental willingness to assume new duties, it demanded revenue. Highways, sewer systems, hospitals for the mentally ill, and greatly enlarged public mandatory school systems not only redefined state obligations, but they also demanded new ways to borrow and tax.

Rising tax rates provided a strong incentive for businessmen to take a hard look at these new kinds of governments. In the process, corporate leaders changed tactics. Once content with “bribing and blackmailing” politicians (9), they now demanded that government use business models, which meant standardizing tasks, centralizing purchasing, and concentrating budgetary authority. By 1929, the state had become corporate. Or at least some states had enthusiastically embraced business models. Others remained “Jeffersonian republics”
suspicious of increased governmental power. Among the factors
determined a state’s particular path were its mix of agriculture
and manufacturing, its degree of urbanization, and the kinds of
powers retained by local and county authorities.

The Price of Progress is a slim volume, containing scarcely more
than one hundred pages of text. Its brevity spurs a disappointed wish
for more, but that is a testament to the number of intriguing, though
insufficiently developed, arguments it raises. In common with many
other first books, this volume began as a Ph.D. dissertation. However,
what appears to be draconian editing has apparently governed its
transformation into print. That is unfortunate.

Clearly, Higgens-Evenson’s research into turn-of-the-century state
governments’ fiscal history has been extensive and innovative, using a
wide variety of unpublished annual or biennial reports by state finan-
cial officials. Moreover, the volume relies on a database created when
Higgens-Evenson transcribed and reclassified decades of expenditures
and receipts for seven states to allow different governments’ methods
of counting and categorizing to be compared. The length of The Price of
Progress, however, does not do justice to these efforts.

Higgens-Evenson argues that he created his nationwide sample of
states based on leadership in tax innovation, geographic diversity, and
the quality of available primary data, so that “Jeffersonian” holdouts,
such as Mississippi, Alabama, Michigan, and Kansas balance “corpo-
rate” activists such as Wisconsin, New York, Massachusetts, and Penn-
sylvania. The sample, at least as it appears here, spurs confusion, not
clarity. Just when readers conclude that the book really analyzes in
detail only the political negotiations that prompted different systems
of taxation in the Northeast and the Midwest, the text introduces case
studies in Oregon or California. Kansas is the country’s “most die-
hard Jeffersonian republic” (112), though the entire South, many of
whose states made Kansas’s lean and mean tax policies appear posi-
tively fat, gets the barest of mention.

In a book of this length, perhaps Higgens-Evenson would have
been better advised to confine illustrations to the three states about
which he collected the richest quantitative and qualitative sources:
New York, Massachusetts, and California. Instead, too many far-too-
sketchy examples confound. And the individuals who created the tax
policy revolution analyzed here never receive the kind of pithy charac-
terizations they deserve. Indeed, incomplete description occasionally
courts misidentification. Readers might wonder how early twentieth-
century “planned play” crusader Luther Gulick could still be alive in
1966. He wasn’t. The New York Bureau of Municipal Research expert Higgens-Evenson mentions, without clarification, was his son.

Higgens-Evenson raises a great number of incompletely explored topics, including the roles played by corporate attorneys turned state tax bureaucrats, the nature of American county government, and the signal importance of popular support for road building. All need more extensive treatment. *The Price of Progress* deserves a sequel.


Reviewer Mark Friedberger is adjunct professor of history at Texas Christian University. He is the author of *Farm Families and Change in Twentieth-Century America* (1988).

Over the years, most scholars have taken an empathetic view of the difficulties of farmers. Much less attention was given to the forces that pushed the American population off the land and into towns and cities. Deborah Fitzgerald’s fine monograph fills this gap. She is concerned with the crucial decade of the 1920s when agriculture and rural America were on their knees and when cities were enjoying an economic boom. It was in the twenties that agricultural visionaries offered the template of industrialized agriculture to rationalize farming and bring it to a more professional level. Industrialized agriculture had several elements: (1) it was dependent on machinery; (2) it required specialized knowledge, especially from economists and engineers; (3) skilled management was crucial; and (4) large amounts of outside capital were required to oil the wheels of enterprises. Not surprisingly, the introduction of industrial methods exacerbated tensions between the “farming as a way of life” and “farming as a business” camps.

Even in the “golden age of agriculture,” the nearest most farmers got to an expert was to read a column in a farm paper. To be sure, many farmers depended on credit, and they used horse-drawn machinery, but most ridiculed “book farming.” Management techniques such as “Taylorization,” already common in industry, were unknown. In any case, virtually all farms depended on family labor, and drudgery was the watchword. The high inflation of the war years gave way to depressed conditions. Many farmers who bought high-priced land went bankrupt; banks, retailers, and farm service businesses also suffered. The farm crisis of the early 1920s gave an opportunity for modernizers to push the industrial template.