The Hoover Presidency: A Reappraisal

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the company and chairman of the board until 1968, when Darwin Tucker succeeded him as president. A superb salesman, like his predecessor and mentor, Bohen did not attempt to change the rationale of Better Homes and Gardens from its home service orientation. Instead, he wisely supported it and by 1970 the magazine’s circulation neared eight million.

Until 1946 the Meredith family owned the Meredith enterprises. As Meredith Corporation, it is publicly owned and composed of six major divisions, one of which continues to publish Better Homes and Gardens and Successful Farming and dozens of Special Interest Publications developed from the magazines, as well as numerous home project plans that are sold through the magazines.

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Book Reviews


During the past decade Herbert Clark Hoover has received increasing attention from historians. One result of this new attention has been the reassessment of Hoover from fresh perspectives rather than within his usual role as a foil for Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Hoover Presidency: A Reappraisal, a collection of essays originally presented to a conference on Hoover at the State University College at Geneseo, New York, is a welcome addition to the recent scholarship.

In an essay on the election of 1928, Donald R. McCoy finds that Hoover fashioned an astute campaign strategy which emphasized Republican accomplishments during the 1920s and projected Hoover as the candidate best equipped to manage the prosperity everyone was confident would continue. McCoy’s contention that Hoover won the election because he was “a man for the times” is a healthy counterbalance to the usual interpretation that Democratic candidate Alfred E. Smith lost the election be-
cause of his own political liabilities and divisions in his party. Less convincing is the unsupported claim that issues other than who should manage the country’s prosperity “only swelled Hoover’s and Smith’s votes in roughly equal proportion.” A second piece on the pre-crash period by David B. Burner outlines Hoover’s activities in the first eight months of his presidency. Employing the familiar framework of Hoover’s attempt to blend expertise and voluntarism, Burner evaluates the new president’s accomplishments in such areas as civil liberties, conservation, penal reform, health, education, housing, Indian management, waterways improvement, and foreign policy. Burner sees Hoover’s efforts in these areas as an outgrowth of his activities as secretary of commerce and attributes his failure fully to implement these programs to the onset of the Depression.

The three essays on Hoover’s efforts to cope with the Depression are unquestionably the most original and useful of the volume. After reviewing conservative, liberal, and revisionist interpretations of Hoover’s economic programs, Alfred U. Romasco employs an alternative approach in comparing his countercyclical policies with those of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Warren G. Harding, and finds wanting the consensus that “no president, prior to Hoover, accepted federal responsibility for assuring the economic wellbeing of the nation . . . .” Hoover had ample precedence to call upon, Romasco claims, but he added refinements and innovations and was “a significant figure in the evolution of governmental policies for dealing with Depressions.” Jordan H. Schwarz explains Hoover’s hostility toward Congress as a product of his fear that congressional factionalism arising from special interest influence threatened his efforts to bring about economic recovery. Instead of cooperating with the legislative branch in seeking economic solutions, he chose to work through a network of voluntary organizations and local and state governments, which he believed were less susceptible to broker politics. Schwarz also includes an excellent vignette of Hoover’s personality. Ellis W. Hawley’s superb essay evaluates the application of Hoover’s twin concepts of “corporatism” and “cooperative competition,” as the president sought to restore economic order and efficiency while preserving the benefits of individualism and a self-adjusting market mechanism. His failure to bring about recovery led to the discrediting of his model for economic policy.
Still, Hawley concludes, "the Hoover years appear as a distinctive yet integral stage in the continuing process whereby twentieth-century policy-makers have tried to reconcile conflicting visions of a new order with the dreams that they inherited from nineteenth-century liberalism and agrarianism."

Alfred B. Rollins and Frank Freidel assess the relationship between Hoover and Roosevelt. With admirable candor, Rollins observes that Roosevelt's negative view of his presidential predecessor, which emerged during the 1920s and matured as the economic crisis of the thirties deepened, became a presumption for Rollins' generation of New Deal historians, who have been principally responsible for Hoover's poor historical image. He is delighted with the new scholars who are "beginning to break through the New Deal mold" and concludes that since "we no longer feel compelled to destroy or defend Herbert Hoover, we may even begin to approach him as part of a complex society, rather than as the simplistic symbol for an [sic] whole era of history." Perhaps more than any of the other contributors, Freidel finds it difficult to break with habit. Traversing the well worn path of Hoover's unsuccessful efforts during the interregnum to secure a commitment from Roosevelt to maintain the gold standard, he feels compelled to assess blame for the failure of the two men to cooperate in meeting the problems of the Depression. He assigns blame to both but, almost apologetically, apportions more to Hoover.

The remaining two essays deal with Hoover's foreign policy. Selig Adler's short historiographical review praises the work of the moderate revisionists but is critical of the New Leftists' attempt to rehabilitate Hoover. Seeking explanation for Hoover's attraction for the New Leftists, Adler offers the reasonable suggestion that it may be found in their "nostalgic longing for the kind of limited internationalism that Hoover always advocated" and then rather gratuitously speculates that these anti-Roosevelt iconoclasts will seek to refurbish Hoover's image "in order to cut his successor down to size." Joan Hoff Wilson traces the evolution of Hoover's "independent internationalism," the basic tenet of which was cooperation in world affairs without binding commitments, from the early 1920s through his presidency.

Martin L. Fausold and George T. Mazuzan, the organizers of the Hoover conference and editors of the volume, deserve com-
mendation for bringing together such a distinguished group of historians. It is, however, difficult to understand why there is no New Left representative among them. Several of the contributors, to be sure, summarize and evaluate the work of the New Leftists. But in view of their recognized importance in the new Hoover scholarship, it would perhaps have been appropriate to allow at least some of them to speak for themselves. Furthermore, the editors might have provided a more cogent overview of the essays. They tell us that the conference included an “invigorating dialogue” which “cemented the papers into a composite and reappraised view of the Hoover presidency.” Unfortunately, their textbook-like introduction evidences little of this synthesis.

——Donald L. Winters
Vanderbilt University


Both Iowans and historians should appreciate this paperback edition of a 1956 study about a native Iowan and distinguished historian. Since the book focuses primarily on Carl Becker as a historical philosopher and literary craftsman, only approximately one fourth of its contents is formal biography. However, in the extended analysis of Becker’s views of history as an intellectual endeavor, and as an art, references are made to events or phases in his early life which left deep marks on him. Unfortunately, his lack of pretense and generally unimpressive appearance are simplistically attributed to his background, although there is reason to believe that Becker went through a stage of rejecting his heritage.

Any reader familiar with Hamlin Garland will probably see some parallels of the two youths whose fertile minds simmered restlessly in environments which provided limited stimulation. At age eleven Becker, whose family had moved to Waterloo, discovered the public library and read his way through its holdings with a growing awareness of the variety and diverse quality of literature. That led to the resolution to become a writer. After a brief
stint at Cornell College, he transferred to the University of Wisconsin where exposure to the eminent historian Frederick Jackson Turner destined Becker to study and write history.

The work chiefly stresses Becker’s development as a historian and establishes that his chief contribution to the field was as a pioneer relativist who helped free history from the stagnation of “scientific history.” Beyond his effort to liberate history, Becker devoted himself to writing history which conveyed the mood of a period, probed the motivation of historical figures and searched for some comprehension of psychological factors in historical events.

Few would dispute that Becker left permanent impressions on his chosen field, but the type of analysis contained in this work does not lend itself to the graceful prose he produced, and the excessively close tracing of Becker’s writing technique by examining several drafts of a particular paragraph in one of his books is probably something he would have found repugnant. (Those interested in Becker’s own work will find an extensive list in Smith’s bibliography.) Yet professionals and others will be stimulated by Becker’s search for the meaning and essence of history as a process of recalling and using the past.

——Walter Houf
Drake University


The late Charles A. Lindbergh vigorously attempted to divert the United States away from entry into World War II and became a leading spokesman of the America First Committee. But Lindbergh, a loyal American, who as a civilian later flew fifty combat missions against the Japanese, lost the respect of most Americans, who retaliated emotionally instead of answering his numerous penetrating questions.

Wayne S. Cole, Iowa born and reared, a B.A. graduate of the University of Northern Iowa, for several years a history professor at Iowa State University, and now at the University of Maryland, is perhaps the best qualified historian in the country to present
this unbiased, scholarly, and quite readable account of Lindbergh's role in foreign policy before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Cole's *America First* (1953) and *Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations* (1962) both deal with various aspects of isolationism in the nation before December, 1941.

*Charles A. Lindbergh . . .* begins with the focus on Lindbergh's appearance at the Hollywood Bowl on June 20, 1941, one of several America First rallies, then succinctly describes the war picture of desperation for the Allies at the time. Cole next takes the reader back to the early life of the famous aviator in Minnesota and the influence of his lawyer father who served in the U.S. House as a Progressive Republican. Charles A., Sr. was an agrarian radical, an insurgent, who attacked the money interests, opposed U.S. entry into World War I when this struggle began, but lost election to the Senate in 1916. The son later claimed his father had no direct influence on his own foreign-affairs views about World War II, but the similarities are, nevertheless, striking. Lindbergh restricted his efforts to opposing U.S. entry into the second war; he never embraced the agrarian radicalism of Senators William E. Borah, Burton K. Wheeler, or Gerald P. Nye.

Only fifteen-sixteen during World War I, young Lindbergh helped on the family farm, dabbled in the study of mechanical engineering at the University of Wisconsin, then turned to a permanent interest in aviation by 1922, the year of his initial plane ride. He was a military pilot, parachute jumper and wing walker, then mail pilot, but his non-stop solo flight across the Atlantic Ocean in 1927 catapulted him into prominence. Lindbergh married Anne Morrow in 1929; the couple flew together throughout the world, mapped aviation routes, and later wrote stimulating accounts of their feats. They longed for privacy, which never came, and the crowning blow was the kidnapping and murder of their son in 1932.

The Lindberghs lived from 1935 to early 1939 in England and France; from these vantage points Lindbergh could visualize the panorama of political chaos emerging. The British were lethargic and refused to heed his warnings about German ascendancy in aviation. The French, whom he loved, realized their inferior status but frankly acknowledged the inability to correct their political system enough to reverse the trend. The Lindberghs made several visits to the Soviet Union.
The U.S. Air Attache in Berlin, Major Truman Smith, invited Lindbergh to assess the German position in aviation. Immediately Lindbergh became convinced that Germany was the natural air power of Europe and not very far behind the United States. He never embraced National Socialism, never met Hitler, and disapproved of much that he saw in Germany. His third German trip, in 1938, caused havoc. U.S. Ambassador Hugh R. Wilson invited Lindbergh to a stag dinner, at which time, without previous notice to Wilson and Lindbergh, Hermann Goering presented Lindbergh with a German civilian medal, primarily for his earlier aviation contributions. Cole correctly asserts that Lindbergh had no choice but to accept the decoration for the U.S. and Germany were not at war. Moreover, he was the guest of the American Ambassador, who readily condoned the proceedings. Within a month the Nazis stepped up their horrendous Jew-baiting, and the onslaught against Lindbergh ensued. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes led the charge and relentlessly toyed with Lindbergh’s reputation. Lindbergh insisted that he had no desire for popularity based on the press. Nevertheless, Ickes continued his tirades against the “Knight of the German Eagle” and finally got under his skin. In July, 1941, Lindbergh reminded President Franklin D. Roosevelt in an open letter that he had been the guest of the U.S. Ambassador at the time the medal was conferred. He now deserved an apology from Ickes. The President ignored the letter.

Meanwhile, Lindbergh warned the British, French, and his fellow Americans that the German air force was now better than the combined units of these three future allies. Lindbergh urged French leaders to purchase 300 airplane engines the Germans were willing to sell them and to build aircraft factories in southern Canada. The French delayed too long. The infamous Munich Conference transpired followed by Hitler taking the rest of Czechoslovakia. The Lindberghs returned to live in the United States. Lindbergh had worked with other U.S. diplomats and military experts throughout these years in assessing the European scene. General H. H. Arnold, chief of the Army Air Corps, praised Lindbergh’s personal report to him in April, 1939, as the best he had seen to date. Arnold persuaded Lindbergh to return to active duty though the famous aviator did this only for two weeks, after which he served anyway without salary.
Lindbergh shunned the entreaties of former diplomats and the conservative broadcaster Fulton Lewis, Jr., about entering politics. In mid-September, two weeks after the war started, Lindbergh went on radio to express his stand against American entanglement in the struggle. Former President Herbert Hoover, and Senator Borah applauded him. The Roosevelt Administration attempted, through his friend Truman Smith, to halt Lindbergh's approach by offering him a new position in FDR's Cabinet as Secretary of Air. The isolationist refused.

Cole presents valuable evidence of the contrasts between Roosevelt and Lindbergh and the ways in which the Administration frustrated the noninterventionists without FDR publicly entering the fracas. "Warily they stalked each other." (p. 127). FDR was not pro-Communist; Lindbergh not pro-Nazis. Roosevelt overfeared Germany, while Lindbergh believed the Soviet Union to be the greater menace. Lindbergh favored negotiations, but FDR believed no lasting peace could be gained from Germany. The President advocated aid-short-of war; Lindbergh called this defeating in the end to Western civilization as the war would be prolonged. Roosevelt wanted and later got unconditional surrender of Germany; Lindbergh believed before Pearl Harbor this action would only open the West to the Asians. Privately FDR wooed interventionist support, e.g., Editor William Allen White, who founded the American Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. The President told Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., "I am absolutely convinced that Lindbergh is a Nazi." (pp. 128-129). FDR authorized the use of bugging devices in May of 1941. FDR requested a report on our Civil War Copperheads and saw to it that the famous aviator was labelled a Copperhead. Lindbergh resigned from the Army Air Corps but regretted the fact that so many pacifists rallied around him. He was not one of them.

The tone of the Great Debate had much in common with the debacle over McCarthyism a decade or more later. Each featured lavish use of guilt-by-association. Lindbergh stubbornly resisted the pleas of his friends to modify his stance. Disgusted with the fetish to damn the enemy when we were not at war, he doggedly claimed Britain had lost the war, would not publicly condemn German cruelties, and incurred the wrath of accusers calling him a revolutionary when he asked for new American leadership. On
September 11, 1941, at Des Moines, he accused the British, the Jewish, and the Roosevelt Administration as the chief war agitators. He considered the British the worst offenders, but his mention of the Jews brought him the worst reaction. Cole asserts correctly that this reference was a very serious blunder, even though Lindbergh was definitely not anti-Semitic. Even many Jews agreed that his comments were not to be construed as anti-Jewish. Christians joined the attack on Lindbergh. Socialist Norman Thomas quit America First over the incident. Actually the Des Moines speech also hurt Lindbergh by diverting attention from FDR's interventionist antics.

Lindbergh now turned vehemently against Roosevelt, charging there existed government by subterfuge, using the same type of arguments that liberals would direct against President Richard M. Nixon some thirty years later. In a speech prepared for December 12 but never delivered because of Pearl Harbor, Lindbergh hoped that our democracy and freedom might be applied to the blacks in the South rather than involving our future in Europe and Asia. Chester Bowles and Senator Wheeler, among others, saw brilliant political potential in the flier and surmised he could lead a third party after the war. He was not interested.

The events at Pearl Harbor shocked him, and immediately he announced his support of the U.S. war effort. But he learned that Roosevelt was unforgiving and found the way blocked to regaining his military positions. Moreover, at first the White House stymied his efforts to work for other government bodies as well as Pan American Airways, United Aircraft, and Curtiss-Wright. In March of 1942, old Henry Ford, never awed by FDR, employed Lindbergh, who served for the duration without salary, testing and improving such advanced weapons as the P-47, the P-38, and the Corsair bomber here and in the Pacific for Ford and also later United Aircraft. Several other America Firsters never regained their commissions but also served as civilians.

Lindbergh deplored the warfare and the bombing-strafing of targets with unknown occupants, the atrocities committed on both sides. He voiced particular shock at the American atrocities against the Japanese. On a later technical visit to Germany and Austria for United Aircraft (May of 1945), he similarly was sickened by German torture chambers—he saw one—but also by American misdeeds in Europe.
Selig Adler, among other historians, has offered the fairest account of Lindbergh's mistaken judgement. The Cole book, based on primary sources, gives a penetrating analysis of the Great Debate and closes with a series of most appropriate questions which the author believes should be answered before accurate judgment on Lindberg might be rendered. Cole wonders what might have happened if the British, French, and Americans had reacted differently toward Germany at various times after World War I, if these allies had established better defense postures in the 30s, if Britain and France would have allowed Hitler to take more territory in the East but negotiated for the West, if the U.S. had not aided Britain short-of-war, and just how much the Great Debate undermined the country. The author is correct in saying that we must question beyond passion and prejudice to evaluate Lindbergh, who was not always right. Perhaps Cole expects too much of Americans who cannot in 1975 reach beyond prejudice and passion in debating the Middle East question among other disputes.

---Donald R. Whitnah
University of Northern Iowa


Building an American Pedigree purports to be an all purpose reference book and "how-to" guide for genealogists. It is, in this reviewer's opinion, a 640-page advertisement for the Latter Day Saints Genealogical Society in Salt Lake City. It reads like a heavily-padded senior thesis, and suffers greatly from sheer wordiness. A volume of about 200 pages—minus the excess verbiage—would have emphasized the useful information. The book is profusely illustrated, but most of the illustrations are superfluous, except perhaps the migration maps. The majority should have been eliminated since they serve no useful purpose.

Wright sometimes uses both first-person and third-person within the same paragraph, which is distracting (e.g. page 544, second paragraph). Also organization of the material is inconsistent; for example: on page 226, the reader isn't told whether
the heading "Naturalization Records" refers to those records in
general, or merely the records in the District of Columbia—the
subhead on the preceding page. Five pages list American genea-
logical periodicals, but no addresses are included, making the
list rather useless. Furthermore, there is no index, so the table of
contents must be studied closely to determine where to look for a
particular subject of interest.

This large volume might be intimidating to the beginning
genealogist. Reference works, like business letters, should be
both concise and precise. Building an American Pedigree adds
little to a genealogical bookshelf, except perhaps a three-pound
bookend. And it doesn’t even do that task well.

——Steven Coulter
Meredith Publishing Services

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Western Iowa Prehistory, by Duane Anderson. Ames: Iowa
State University Press. 1975. pp. 100, $3.95. Illustrated by
Lennis Moore.

This attractive book presents an account of the ancient peo-
bles who inhabited western Iowa. The simple, direct language
and detailed pictures make it useful to school age children as
well as adults interested in learning about prehistoric cultures.
Weapons, potsherds, and bones found at the archaeological dig-
gings carried out in western Iowa, particularly since the early
1950s, provide important clues to an understanding of the devel-
oping patterns of life, religious concepts, and emerging economic
systems, from the earliest nomadic groups to the later settled vil-
gle farmers. The discussion of the Woodland peoples ("mound
builders"), and the Great Oasis, Glenwood, Mill Creek, and
Oneota cultures is a valuable summary of early man in Iowa.

——J.G.