Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln's Opponents in the North

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The chapters by Brian Dirck and Dennis Boman illustrate the difficulties that Lincoln faced in developing his plan for emancipation. Whether it was a U.S. Supreme Court hostile to Lincoln’s war policies or the volatile uncertainties of circumstances in the Border States, Lincoln faced many challenges that impinged on his views, his policies, and his power to end slavery. The essays by Dirck and Boman illustrate how the Lincoln administration functioned within a political context that was as much a historical actor as President Lincoln himself.

Kevin Gutzman and James Leiker examine Lincoln’s Jeffersonian ideas about freedom and race and his views concerning African Americans, American Indians, and Mexicans. Leiker stresses the idea that while Lerone Bennett’s interpretation of Lincoln reveals Bennett as a product of the civil rights era of the 1960s, Lincoln’s perspective illustrates the racial context of the nineteenth century of which he was a product. In his essay, Michael Vorenberg admits that it is easy for a modern, post–civil rights American to wish that Lincoln had been more progressive in his views of freedom and race. However, unlike Bennett, Vorenberg deems Lincoln worthy of status as an important historical role model and acknowledges the complexities of Lincoln’s developing views on race.

The essays in *Lincoln Emancipated* reveal a myriad of contexts that controlled or influenced Lincoln’s personal views and made an impact on his presidential politics and executive decisions. From the essays, Lincoln emerges as a fallible but honorable human being who, on one hand, exhibited views and ideas that epitomized the social, political, and racial context of his era, but who, on the other hand, demonstrated an ability to rise above the harsh, antebellum racist views of many of his contemporary politicians and fellow Americans. Lincoln was no Wendell Phillips, but he was no George Fitzhugh, either. To dismiss Lincoln as a racist is to ignore the historical circumstances of the era and the human complexities of the president who presided over the American Civil War.


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Comprehending the contingency of the American Civil War—how that great struggle was perceived by the participants themselves—is
not the least of the challenges facing those who would understand the war on its own terms. Uncertainty loomed large. Opposition to the war in the North gave encouragement to the Confederate government at Richmond that war weariness and morale issues might weaken the Union’s resolve to fight and lead to a negotiated settlement. Although that did not happen, there were those in the North and the South who favored such a settlement and thought it likely. The Civil War was not only a battle of armies arrayed against each other in the field but also a battle for the hearts and minds of opinion brokers at home—politicians, newspaper editors, family members, and neighbors. No one was more cognizant of that nagging reality and the uncertainties it poised than the beleaguered Abraham Lincoln, who fought a rearguard action against the northern Peace Democrats, or Copperheads. The Copperheads were Confederate sympathizers who wanted an immediate armistice and a return to the status quo ante bellum. They did not believe that the Lincoln administration had the constitutional authority to use force to repudiate the doctrine of secession or that the war was winnable militarily. Copperheads rallied themselves under the motto, “The Constitution as It Is and the Union as It Was.”

Antiwar sentiment in the North created suspicions, fears, and tensions in several northern communities that estranged families and neighbors and occasionally erupted into violence. Sympathy for the Confederate cause often manifested itself in areas along the Mississippi River or southern border of Iowa, but was by no means confined to those communities. Eight percent of Iowa’s population during the war was of southern extraction. Iowans who were born in the South or whose parents had emigrated from the South were, on the whole, more likely to sympathize with the aspirations of southern nationalism than those of northern birth and ancestry. Dubuque County was the home of Dennis A. Mahony, “one of the most notorious copperhead editors in the North” (20). In the Dubuque Herald, Mahony denounced the policies of the Lincoln administration for treating the Constitution as “so much blank paper” that he could ignore so long as he thought that popular sentiment was with him in prosecuting the war. Lincoln’s disregard for the Constitution, Mahony wrote, was “menacing and dangerous” and foreshadowed worse tidings (30). The expression of such views, far from anomalous in the Northern press, ultimately got Mahony and several other Northern editors arrested. Charles Mason, chief justice of the Iowa Supreme Court, also opposed the war. Mason was an antiwar candidate for governor in the summer of 1861 before Iowa Democrats asked him to step down as the party’s nominee. Opposition to the war in Iowa was never the ascendant public sentiment,
but was nonetheless palpable and based on firm convictions by those who rejected the use of force in compelling the southern states to remain within the Union.

Jennifer L. Weber’s *Copperheads* is a welcome addition to the literature on the Copperheads. The book speaks directly, and at times eloquently, to the complexities of the war within the war—the opposition and dissension that in January 1863 Lincoln called “the fire in the rear.” Weber, assistant professor of history at the University of Kansas and a former journalist, researched and wrote her 2003 doctoral dissertation at Princeton University under the direction of James M. McPherson. *Copperheads*, an extension of that work, is the most important book on the subject to appear since the work of the late Frank L. Klement, whose thesis Weber revises in important ways. In *The Copperheads in the Middle West* (1960), *Dark Lanterns: Secret Political Societies, Conspiracies, and Treason Trials in the Civil War* (1984), and *Lincoln’s Critics: The Copperheads of the North* (1999), Klement argued that fears about Copperhead sympathies and activities undermining the war effort were greatly exaggerated by Republican editors, who exploited those anxieties as a means of rallying support for the Lincoln administration and vilifying Peace Democrats. Joel H. Silbey adopts a similar view in *A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, 1860–1868* (1977). Weber does not dispute the contention of Klement and Silbey that concerns over so-called Copperhead conspiracies were greatly exaggerated, but she does reject the idea that Lincoln’s concern over “the fire in the rear” was in anyway misplaced. The Copperheads may not have been a self-conscious and organized fifth column in the North, but the opposition of the Peace Democrats nonetheless presented a clear and present danger to the Union cause. Weber advances her revisionist thesis in convincing detail.


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County seat wars have been an intriguing phenomenon on the American frontier. Winning county seat recognition could help ensure the long-term success of a newly established community during a time of economic and social uncertainty. There is evidence of county seat wars in the East, but the vast majority took place in the Midwest and Great