The Army of the South-West, and the First Campaign in Arkansas. Chapter Second (pt. 2)

Sam'l Prentis Curtis

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By a general order, pilfering and plundering were expressly forbidden, and severe punishment was awarded to all offenders. This order was subsequently, while in the field, frequently renewed and republished, to prevent, as far as possible, the marauding so common to an invading army. But of course it could not be very strictly enforced in the field. Although this campaign was before the era of "Bummers," yet our soldiers could not well be entirely restrained from pillaging. The following is the order:

"HEADQUARTERS, SOUTH-WESTERN DISTRICT OF MO., [1]
Rolla, Mo., Jan'y 23d, 1862. [2]

"General Orders, No. 3.
"Taking property by our Troops.

"Plundering and pilfering by the troops, in garrison or in the field, is strictly prohibited, and will be punished with the full measure of military law.

"On marches, and returning from expeditions, frequent and careful inspections will be made of wagons, tents, knapsacks, bundles and boxes. This must be done when the men are standing under arms, so as to detect stolen property."
A soldier's proper equipment is all that he needs, and plunder is an incumbrance. Where plunder is found in the possession of a soldier, he will be severely punished; if found in a mess, the squad must be made accountable. Property taken in battle, or from prisoners, must be turned over to the proper Quartermaster, accompanied by a complete description of the property, showing by whom and when taken, especially if it be arms, flags and other trophies, for which proper credit should be given, or distribution hereafter made.

This does not relinquish the military right of taking property for our own use, or for retaliation, or to strengthen ourselves and weaken our foes, in a legal and proper way, as designated in Gen. Halleck's Order No. 8; but that right cannot and must not be assumed by subordinates, and commanders taking property will be required to show the necessity and propriety of exercising such extraordinary power. Peaceable citizens must be secure in their persons and property, and every American soldier should take pride in guarding the feeble, the innocent, and especially the Union people of the District. Our flag should be a shield to the innocent, and our eagles a terror to our foes. This order must be communicated to all the troops of this command, and officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, will see to its careful observance.

By order of Brig. Gen'l S. R. Curtis.

The army of Price was, at this time, variously estimated at from 10,000 to 40,000. It was certain that he had a large force. Curtis appealed to Halleck for additional troops. His army could not number in the field over 8,000 men, and would be still further reduced by post garrisons and other causes, so that upon reaching Springfield it would fall far short of the rebels in numbers. Halleck expressed the opinion that Price would evacuate Springfield on the approach of the Federal army. The authorities at Washington, he wrote, were pressing him to send troops elsewhere, and but few, if any, could be spared. The Division of Davis was ordered to march from Otterville to the Osage, there to remain as a reserve, unless absolutely needed in the field. It was then intended to send this Division elsewhere, but subsequently, upon urgent solicitations, and representations of the importance of additional troops, and the uselessness of a reserve so remote from an impending battle, joined with the inertness of Price before the advance of the Federal forces, indicating a disposition to maintain his position, the consent of Halleck was given to its march to Springfield.
Rolla was established as a base of operations, and Captain M. P. Small, Commissary of Subsistence, was placed in the management and charge of all supplies for the army at that point, Captain P. H. Sheridan being Chief Quartermaster of the army in the field. Major William H. English, of the 4th Iowa Infantry, was stationed at Rolla as Chief of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores, and rendered very effective service in that capacity.

Major Norton P. Chipman, of the 2d Iowa Infantry, had first acted as Chief of Staff to General Curtis at Rolla, but, by order of Halleck, he was returned to his regiment, as being of too high rank to serve on the staff of a Brigadier General, and his place was then supplied in the field, first by Adjutant Thomas Irvin McKenny, of the same regiment. After the arrival of the army at Lebanon, and subsequently in the field, the staff of Curtis was augmented by the addition of Captains Henry Z. Curtis, Assistant Adjutant General, William H. Stark and John Ahlefeldt, of the Missouri Volunteers, aids-de-camp, Lieutenant John W. Noble, of the 3d Iowa Cavalry, Judge Advocate, and other worthy and competent officers.

On January 14th commenced the advance of the infantry. Two battalions of cavalry and three infantry regiments under Colonel P. J. Osterhaus, were ordered to proceed to Waynesville. On January 17th, "Phelps' Missouri Regiment," under Colonel John S. Phelps, and on January 22d, the 4th Iowa, 24th Missouri and 35th Illinois infantry regiments, and the 1st Iowa Battery, under Col. G. M. Dodge, of the 4th Iowa, were also ordered forward. The 9th Iowa Infantry, Dubuque Battery, and Major William D. Bowen's Missouri Cavalry (which had returned from Carr), were directed to move on the 26th. Captain John W. Stephens, Company "A," of Bowen's Battalion, was placed in charge of a battery of mountain howitzers before again taking the field.

The infantry experienced great difficulty in moving forward. The coldest part of the season was the time selected for the advance. No great depth of snow fell at any time during the
campaign, but the frosts were severe, and the roads, traversing an extremely broken and hilly country, were alternately deep mud and rough, frozen ground. The crossings of the Gasconade River, Big and Little Piney, and other streams, were difficult. A pontoon train had been asked from St. Louis, but it could not be obtained.

At Waynesville, Carr assumed command of the troops. After a brief rest, the whole force of infantry, cavalry and artillery at Waynesville was ordered forward and reoccupied Lebanon. Curtis was averse to taking the field in person until it became necessary. "The movement of Generals to the front," he said, "always attracted the enemy's attention and gave him alarm. It was inexpedient to do this so long as it could be avoided."

At length, on January 26th, 1862, Curtis, with one staff officer, Lieutenant McKenny, set forward in person. After four days' cold, comfortless travel, crossing Gasconade River twelve miles from Rolla, and going by the northern or "Union" road, avoiding Waynesville, he arrived in Lebanon on the 29th, and established his headquarters in an old two-story frame house in the edge of the town, with one room in a habitable condition, his staff and military family camping in the yard.

The troops at Otterville, constituting the old 2d Division of Fremont's Army of the West, principally composed of Indiana troops, and under command of Colonel Jefferson C. Davis, of the same State, had been ordered by Halleck to move to the Osage, to be used, if possible, only as a reserve supporting the army advancing upon Springfield. But the necessity of a further advance of this division became apparent, and it was ordered to move to Lebanon, now the rallying point for the army. Crossing the Osage River at Lynn Creek, the command of Davis arrived at and encamped three miles west of Lebanon, and Davis reported himself ready to move at once on Springfield.

Sigel was absent in St. Louis when Curtis left Rolla. Upon
his return, the troops remaining under his command and under Asboth, were ordered to Lebanon. The 13th Illinois Infantry and Major S. N. Wood's Battalion of Cavalry were left as a garrison at Rolla, Colonel Wyman still commanding that post.

The roads had already been rendered almost impassable from the movements of troops and trains. The mud between Rolla and the crossing of the Gasconade, for a distance of twelve miles, was very deep, and many teams were "stuck," vainly struggling to extricate themselves. Asboth moved slowly, taking the Waynesville road, and was followed next day by Sigel, who crossed the Gasconade, moving by the northern road, and bringing up the rear with the last troops from Rolla. The troops were urged forward to avoid the danger of swollen streams. Reports of their progress through mud, frost and snow were daily received, and at length all the army was concentrated at Lebanon.

The advance from Rolla had been delayed to the last moment by Halleck, in order to ascertain the disposition of the War Department. A rapid advance was now urged. The campaign in Tennessee had actively commenced. Fort Henry was captured. "I leave Price to you," wrote Halleck to Curtis, "I have Johnson, Polk, Beauregard and Hardee to deal with."

The troops had advanced to Lebanon by three routes: one, south of the Gasconade, crossing the streams of Little and Big Piney, to Waynesville, and there crossing the Gasconade; another, the northern, or, as it was called, the "Union" road, crossing the Gasconade twelve miles from Rolla, and moving on the north bank; another, from Otterville, on the northern branch of the Pacific Railroad, far north and west of the routes from Rolla, via Lynn Creek, crossing the Osage. By moving upon different roads, the troops were enabled to advance with greater rapidity, over roads not previously worn and rendered so difficult of passage by travel; greater supplies of forage were obtained, and the enemy was the less able to
estimate the force and count the troops moving against him. A similar arrangement was subsequently adopted for the advance on Springfield.

The advance pickets on the Springfield road were under command of Lieutenant Colonel Clark Wright, about fourteen miles from Lebanon. Wright was an old resident of southwestern Missouri, and very familiar with the country and people. He established a system of scouts and spies to ascertain the movements and condition of the enemy. He reported to Curtis that he had six different lines of communication direct with Springfield. His spies were known only to himself, and were unknown even to each other. This was necessary to their safety and the perfection of his system. There were additional means of receiving information from Springfield, through Colonel Phelps, through spies who reported directly to the commanding General, and through other sources.

The news received through these various sources was somewhat contradictory. In substance it was nearly as follows:

A rebel cavalry force occupied Marshfield, and worked the mill for the rebel army. The enemy's pickets were frequently seen by ours, fourteen miles from Lebanon. Wright made a dash on Marshfield, with cavalry, capturing a large amount of flour. The rebels returned in search of this flour.

Price, with his whole force, was in Springfield, and manifested no signs of retreating. The particular locality of his camps and pickets was accurately described. He had received a reinforcement of artillery and a valuable supply train. The term of enlistment of many of his men was expiring, and he had issued a call for volunteers for fourteen days. This brought him no great reinforcement, but he remained quiet, and appeared fully determined to contest his position. He had selected various battle grounds: one, on the level prairie north of Springfield; one, on the old ground at Wilson's Creek, where he had already sent his artillery, &c. His Generals were Frost, McBride, Rains, Slack, Parsons and Stein.

On the contrary, it was asserted that he had caused sup-
plies of corn to be hauled and deposited at the distances of each day's march on the entire route to Arkansas. He had erected no field defenses or fortifications at Springfield, and secession families throughout the country were making hasty preparations to depart. From these, and various other facts, it was inferred that he intended to evacuate. It was even reported that he had practiced the use of moving his troops around Springfield, and (causing them to enter from another direction,) marching them through the town as reinforcements, to create an appearance of greater strength.

But it was satisfactorily ascertained that his force numbered from eight to ten thousand men, with some seventy pieces of artillery. It was reported that Van Dorn would soon join him with large reinforcements, and assume command. The prevention of this junction was an additional reason for an immediate advance, without waiting for additional troops which had been promised. "Beware of Van Dorn," wrote Halleck, "he is a wary and energetic officer."

In the quartermaster's department, the scarcity of funds had been a serious embarrassment. Pay for supplies, forage, &c., had not been prompt, but Capt. Sheridan here received forty thousand dollars, which greatly aided the forward movement. The difficult state of the roads and the inclement weather had rendered the hauling of supplies from Rolla a great trouble. Mills at all available points were put in military use, and furnished a supply of flour and meal from grain procured from the adjoining country. Fresh meat was very abundant, and in consequence of the last fact, and the scarcity of bread-stuffs and salt meat, a change in the ration was ordered, reducing the allowance of flour and doubling the allowance of fresh meat, with an ample allowance of corn meal.

At Lebanon the "Army of the South-West" received its organization. The troops were arranged in four divisions. The 1st division was placed under the direct command of Gen. Sigel, who subsequently assigned the command to Col.
P. J. Osterhaus. The 2d division was under Gen. Asboth, and the 1st and 2d divisions were under the command of Sigel, who was thus made second in command. The 3d division was under Col. Jefferson C. Davis, and the 4th division was under Col. Eugene A. Carr.

Maj. William D. Bowen’s battalion of Missouri cavalry was assigned to duty as body guard to the commanding general, one company being in charge of a battery of mountain howitzers.

Maj. Eli W. Weston was made chief officer of pickets and subsequently Provost Marshal General of the army, with six companies of his regiment, the 24th Missouri Infantry, under his command as a police force. The whole army was commanded by Gen. Curtis.

The following statement will serve to show the disposal of troops about this period. Occasionally the various corps constituting the army, were shifted about or rearranged. New troops came into the command. Phelps’ Missouri regiment of six months men was mustered out of service soon after the fight at Pea Ridge, and S. N. Wood’s and Clark Wright’s battalions were consolidated under the name of the 6th cavalry Missouri Volunteers. The 5th Kansas Cavalry came into the command from Fort Scott, via Carthage and Springfield, in March 1862. The 3d Infantry Missouri Volunteers, joined the army in April.

**Army of the South-West, as organized at Lebanon, Missouri, February, 1862—Commanded by Brigadier General Samuel Ryan Curtis, U. S. Vols.**

*First and Second Divisions, Brigadier General Franz Sigel, U. S. Vols.*

**First Division, Colonel Peter Joseph Osterhaus, 12th Mo. Infy.**

25th Inf’y Ills. Vols., Colonel W. N. Coler.
36th " " " " Nicholas Greusel.
44th " " " " Knobelsdorff.
12th " Mo. " Major Hugo Wangelin.
17th " " " " Colonel Franz Hassendiebel.
Welfley’s Battery, Mo. Vols, Captain Martin Welfley.
Hoffman’s " " " " Hoffman.

2d Inf'y Mo. Vols., Colonel Ferdinand Schaffer.

15th " " " " Francis J. Joliat.

4th Cav. " " " " George E. Waring (Fremont Hussars).

5th " " " " Joseph Nemett (Benton Hussars).

2d Battery Ohio " " " " Captain Carlin.

Elbert's Flying Battery Mo. Vols., Captain Elbert.

Third Division, Colonel Jefferson C. Davis, 22d Indiana Inf'y.

8th Inf'y Indiana Vols., Colonel W. P. Benton.

18th " " " " Thomas Pattison.

22d " " " " Lieut. Colonel Hendricks.

37th " Illinois " " Colonel Myron S. Barnes.

59th " " " " White (formerly 9th Mo. Inf'y).

1st Cav. Mo. " " " Calvin A. Ellis and Frederick Wm. Lewis.

1st Battery Indiana " " " Captain Klans.

Peoria Battery, Ills. " " " Davidson.

Fourth Division, Colonel Eugene A. Carr, 3d Ills. Cav.

4th Inf'y Iowa Vols., Colonel Grenville M. Dodge.

9th " " " " Lieut. Col. Frank J. Herron and Col. Wm. Vandever.

35th " " Ills. " " Colonel George A. Smith.

24th " " " " Sempronius H. Boyd and Major Eli W. Weston (Lyon Legion).

Phelps' Inf'y Mo. Vols., Colonel John S. Phelps.


1st Battery Iowa " " " Lieutenant Virgin J. David.

Dubuque Battery Iowa Vols., Captain M. M. Hayden (3d Iowa Battery).

Unattached Corps.


3d " " Iowa " " " Cyrus Bussey.

4th " " " " " A. B. Porter.

5th " " Kansas Vols. " " Powell Clayton.

13th Inf'y Ills. " " " John B. Wyman.

The several divisions were each divided into two brigades. The command of the brigades was assigned by division commanders, as follows:

1st Brigade, 1st Division, Colonel Hassendeubel.

2d " " " " " Greusel.

1st " " 2d " " " Joliat.

2d " " " " " Schaffer.

1st " " 3d " " " Pattison.

2d " " " " " White.

1st " " 4th " " " Dodge.

2d " " " " " Vandever.
Gen. Franz Sigel was an officer of European distinction, and had early and constantly taken an active and distinguished part in the war in Missouri. He was in command at Rolla when superseded by Curtis, and his position was now that of second in command.

In speaking of the relative merits of Curtis and Sigel, the writer hopes to avoid any display of undue partiality to either. While he regards Curtis as being throughout the leader and director of this south-western campaign, he has ever felt a sincere admiration for, and high appreciation of the peculiar talents and distinguished services of Sigel. In the conduct of either general, he never saw any of the smallness of envy and personal jealousy sometimes manifested by partizans, or attributed to them by shallow newspaper writers and correspondents. During the continuance of Sigel with the army, their personal intercourse was cordial and that of gentlemen, and their relations such as were appropriate between the chief and second in command.

Sigel was a thorough soldier, quick of perception, ready of movement, although not perhaps so much a director and great general, fitted to manoeuvre a large army in the field, as an active and daring leader, suited to sudden movements, forays, or the manoeuving of a division in the immediate presence of the enemy. His skill in conducting a retreat is proverbial.

The general of an army in the field, occupying a hostile or rebellious territory, is required to possess qualifications beyond those of the soldier. The power to understand and quell factions among the people; to dispel rebellion and conciliate a conquered country, to discriminate between those who would be friends, and those whose concealed sentiments are in opposition to the conqueror, to continue in force appropriate local laws, and in civil office men suitable to the emergency, to make conquest itself as light a burden as possible, at the same time enforcing the rule of the conqueror, and obtaining all the real objects of subjugation, require statesmanship, political knowledge, and a deep insight into
human nature. To provide for the sustenance and safety of a large army, remote from its base of operations, to master the details of army business and see that they are in the hands of appropriate men, to guard against danger with a cool deliberation and forethought, to know the force, condition and position of an enemy, to be ready to strike him at the right moment, and to prevent him from surprising, defeating or capturing detachments, or the whole army, are some of the qualities which mark the general. Curtis possessed these qualifications in a high degree. He had been long in public life, and in addition to his military education at West Point, in Mexico, and in the great rebellion, he was eminent as a business man, a lawyer, a politician, and a statesman. The management of the army of the South-west as an army in the field, during the entire campaign, was done by him through his division commanders and other agents.

We are not required, from any of the events of this campaign, to presume that Gen. Sigel was lacking in any of these or other necessary qualifications. But no opportunity offered, during his connection with the Army of the South-West, which called for the exercise, on his part, of any degree of talent, beyond his position as second in command. There can be no presumption against his ability to have conducted the campaign with the most perfect success; but he had no occasion to display such ability. Commanding two of the four divisions of the army, under the orders of his superior officer, until after the battle of Pea Ridge, he was compelled by sickness to go to St. Louis, from whence he never returned to the south-west, being ordered for duty elsewhere. The ungenerous and unjust attempts, made by mistaken partisans, to give to Sigel the honors of the campaign, were, with the true spirit of a gentleman and a soldier, as will be hereafter seen, by him expressly denied and disclaimed. Curtis, guided and controlled by Halleck alone, conducted the campaign, manoeuvred the several divisions and various detachments of the army, commanded in the country, and is entitled to whatever
of credit may be due to the General who won the victory of Pea Ridge, and first successfully planted the federal flag on the soil of rebellious Arkansas.

Col. P. J. Osterhaus was an old German soldier and an excellent officer. At the commencement of the rebellion, he was a clerk in the commercial house of Pomeroy and Benton in St. Louis. To enable him to support his family, his salary as clerk was continued after he had entered the military service as a non-commissioned officer. He soon rose to the rank of Colonel, and when Curtis arrived at Rolla, he had long had command of a brigade. He had led the first infantry on this expedition to Lebanon. Being a great favorite with Sigel, the latter assigned him to the command of the 1st division, and when Sigel subsequently left the army, Osterhaus was continued in command, and was, on the recommendation of Curtis, promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General while in Arkansas.

General A. Asboth was an exiled Hungarian patriot and soldier, having originally come to the United States with Kossuth, and remained as a citizen. He was a brave and chivalrous gentleman, of a kind and noble disposition. The commonest soldier with whom he had intercourse, met with the most considerate politeness. He was known throughout the army by his huge iron-grey moustache and side whiskers, and by the blanket of camel’s hair, with large and slightly faded black and white stripes, which he wore on all occasions in lieu of an overcoat. He was generally accompanied by a large and noble dog of the St. Bernard species. Personally brave and an excellent officer, he yet seemed to lack self-confidence. He was disposed to magnify coming dangers, and entertain doubts of his own ability to overcome them.

Col. Jefferson C. Davis, of the 22d Indiana Infantry, was an officer of the regular army. He had seen service in Mexico, and at the commencement of the rebellion was a Lieutenant, and one of the immortal band that surrendered with Anderson at the fall of Fort Sumter. He brought a division from
Otterville to the Army of the South West. This was afterwards the 3d division of the army. He was a brave officer, and a thorough and efficient soldier, not given to boasting but prompt in execution.

Col. Eugene A. Carr belonged to the regular cavalry service before the war. He was made Colonel of the 3d Illinois Cavalry, and was the ranking officer of cavalry at Rolla, when Curtis assumed command. He was therefore placed in command of the cavalry expedition towards Springfield. The importance of this undertaking, and the efficient manner in which he had performed his duties, entitled him to the command of a division. The bloody record of his command at Pea Ridge, and his courage elsewhere shown, attest the gallantry of this officer. At Pea Ridge, repeatedly wounded, he held the field for hours against the rebel's strongest force, in a manner which furnishes sufficient evidence of his ability and personal courage.

But, like Asboth, he was extremely cautious. He advised against the advance on Springfield, saying it was useless to thrice recapture a point we might not hold; and after its capture, he feared that his troops were not in a condition to pursue Price. At Pea Ridge, while performing his duties in the most gallant manner, and against the strongest odds, his appeals to the commanding General for reinforcements were most frequent, and his doubts of his ability to hold the field, great. At Little Red River, in Arkansas, he was the strongest opponent of a further advance on Little Rock, constantly urging many reasons why the attempt must fail, and for the impracticability of maintaining our then present position.

In this quality of cautiousness, both he and Asboth were the reverse of Sigel. No words of doubt ever came from the latter in advance of the trial. His boldness was extreme, and ever prompted him to hazardous and separate undertakings. This adventurous disposition was viewed with uneasiness by the Department commander. "Beware of detached movements," wrote Halleck to Curtis; "remember that Sigel's detour lost the battle of Wilson's Creek."
Besides division commanders, may be cited the names of a few of the more prominent and particularly distinguished, or who have since become known to fame.

Frank J. Herron, Lieutenant-Colonel of the 9th Iowa Infantry, a captain at Wilson’s Creek, in the 1st Iowa Infantry, three months’ volunteers; taken prisoner at Pea Ridge, and exchanged, with others, for Col. Hebert and Maj. Tunnard, of Louisiana; since a Major-General; one of the heroes of Prairie Grove, commanding General of the “Army of the Frontier,” and distinguished in the south-west; a fine-looking, talented and gallant officer, and, when promoted, one of the youngest of our Generals.

John B. Wyman, Colonel of the 13th Illinois Infantry, commanding the post of Rolla; a good-hearted, brave and efficient officer, much given to profanity, and very popular with his regiment. He had early entered the service, and felt extremely sore on account of never having been made a Brigadier General. His regiment was one of the best disciplined in the service, and although not present at Pea Ridge, fought nobly at Vicksburg, in Sherman’s first assault, where Wyman fell.

Colonel John S. Phelps, of “Phelps’ regiment,” Missouri Infantry, six months’ volunteers; an old politician, a resident of Springfield, and, at the time, Congressman from the Springfield District; since Military Governor of Arkansas. He was the friend of Lyon, and the corpse of the latter had been interred in his yard subsequent to the battle of Wilson’s Creek. In common with the men of his regiment, he was an exile from home and family, in south-west Missouri.

Colonel Sempronius H. Boyd, of the 24th Missouri Infantry, or “Lyon Legion,” commonly called “Pony Boyd;” a slight, boyish-looking man, also a resident of Springfield; since Congressman from the Springfield District, and one of the most radical of Missouri anti-slavery politicians. He was especially useful from his knowledge of the topography of the country, and the character of the south-western people. Like Phelps, he and his regiment were exiles from the south-west.
Captain Philip H. Sheridan, of the 13th U. S. Infantry, was ordered by Halleck to report to General Curtis as Chief Quartermaster. Upon arriving at Rolla, he found his department in a very disorganized state; but with great energy he went to work and soon produced a change infinitely for the better. To his efforts was in a great measure due the ability of the army to make its rapid march into the enemy’s country.

When the army had advanced into Arkansas, a great scarcity of mules and horses began to prevail. Transportation over the long line of communication became difficult, and the troops were suffering from want of supplies. Curtis directed Sheridan, then at Springfield, to use every effort to obtain animals; if necessary, they were to be seized, wherever found, and pressed into the service. Sheridan then held very conservative views of the war and its causes. He objected to this mode of procuring stock. He would not, he wrote, engage in “jayhawking,” and requested to be relieved from his duties. The language of his letter was disrespectful and insubordinate, and he was accordingly ordered to report, under arrest, to the Chief Quartermaster at St. Louis, and the duties of Chief Quartermaster of the army were devolved upon Captain F. S. Winslow, an officer who filled the position with great ability. But “Phil. Sheridan” was not destined to remain in obscurity. He was almost immediately made Chief Quartermaster on Halleck’s staff, at Corinth; next, Colonel of the 1st Michigan Cavalry; and next promoted Brigadier-General, and serving with distinction under Rosecrans, in Tennessee. It is not necessary here to say more of one who has since become one of the nation’s best and favorite Generals.

There were also Colonel Grenville M. Dodge, of the 4th Iowa Infantry, and brigade commander in the 4th division—since a Major-General, distinguished in northern Mississippi, Alabama and the West, and an energetic and very useful officer; Col. William Vandever, of the 9th Iowa Infantry, brigade commander in the 4th division, and at the time a Con-
gressman from Iowa, and a prominent Iowa politician—since a General; Col. Nicholas Greuisel, of the 36th Illinois Infantry, an old and able soldier; and also the subsequently promoted Generals, Cyrus Bussey and T. I. McKenny, of Iowa; W. P. Benton, of Indiana; George E. Waring, of Missouri; and Powell Clayton, of Kansas.

HISTORY OF DAVIS COUNTY, IOWA.

CHAPTER IV.

[Continued from page 688.]

PRINTING PRESS.

It has been said that Printing Presses, Pulpits and Petticoats are the three great levers that govern the world. This we have no disposition to dispute, even if we doubted its truth, for all good citizens (and we claim to be one among that class, if not one of them,) must admit that without the ladies there would be but little use for pulpits, as there would be wanting one of the greatest attractions usually found at the churches; and without pulpits there would be a want of religion and morality. But as it is our purpose merely to give a brief sketch of the history of the Press in our town, it must not be expected of us to remark further upon the Pulpit, or to enlarge upon the influence, the sunny smiles, and tender affections of the better half of creation which has been cast about the rugged pathway of the sterner sex of Davis during his onward course to fame and to glory. The influence of the Press upon every branch of trade, every profession, and even the morals of the people, is too well known and understood to require a single remark in this connection. But the Printer, that "chap" who makes the newspaper, we are inclined to think is a more singular fellow then he is generally thought to be. It is true that many people are aware that he lives without eating, and that he never wears out any clothes, for they have been regular