Warrior Nations: The United States and Indian Peoples

Robert Wooster
Texas A&M University–Corpus Christi

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America, Warren’s work does not overturn those studies that emphasize place, but he demonstrates that Native peoples construct identities in many ways. Second, although he perhaps understates the vulnerability of migrants (see, for example, the fate of the Westos), Warren reveals that movement was a source of power, as the Shawnees used connections made in their travels as weapons in the fight against colonialism. Only through their alliances with other Indian nations could the Shawnees reject both France and Britain. Finally, Warren begins the history of Indian removal in the early 1700s, when Pennsylvanians swindled territory from neighboring Indian nations. He rightly argues that Indian removal was not a single event but a centuries-long process of dispossession of Native peoples by colonists.

*The Worlds the Shawnees Made* is a valuable history of the Shawnees from the pre-colonial era to the Seven Years’ War, but Warren assumes that his readers will have substantial knowledge about the Shawnees’ experiences in the 60 years that followed. Two of his arguments depend on that knowledge. First, he alludes to the diplomatic work of Blue Jacket and Tecumseh as the culmination of the coalitions Shawnees forged during the mid-1700s. Some discussion of those alliances would buttress Warren’s argument that the Shawnees gained power from their trans-regional movements. Second, and more significantly, Warren proposes a “long history of removal,” of which the Indian Removal Act of 1830 was only part, but in 1754, the Shawnees remained on the Ohio valley homelands of their ancestors (155). A century of further removals lay ahead of them. Those interested in the conclusion of that story will have to look elsewhere. Minor qualms aside, Warren offers a welcome addition to the growing literature on the Native peoples of the Midwest and their adaptations in the face of colonialism.


Reviewer Robert Wooster is Regents Professor of History at Texas A&M University–Corpus Christi. His books include *The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783–1900* (2009).

Were the conflicts between Indians and the United States of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries inevitable? In *Warrior Nations*, featuring case studies that examine the causes of warfare between the United States and the Indians of the Ohio Valley (1786–1795), the Red Stick War (1813–1814), the Arikara War (1823), the Black Hawk War (1832), the Minnesota Sioux War (1862), the wars on the Southern Plains
against the Cheyenne and Arapaho (1864–1865), the conflicts against the Chiricahua Apaches (1861–1872), and the Nez Perce War (1877), Roger Nichols concludes that they were indeed inevitable. Throughout the ongoing invasions of North America, newcomers saw Native peoples as barriers to the rightful expansion of western civilization who should be either pushed aside or forced to change their ways. Indians, on the other hand, were equally determined to retain their traditional lands, independence, and existing cultures. “Looking back over these wars,” Nichols argues, “it is hard to see how they might have been avoided. No doubt people of goodwill occasionally represented one or both sides, but their actions had little impact on the existing disputes between the invaders and the indigenous people. Ethnocentrism drove both groups” (194).

Based on the wisdom gleaned from a half-century of scholarship on the subject rather than on significant new research, Nichols’s comparative survey represents a laudable attempt to craft a systematic assessment of the causes of Indian-white conflict. Neither side, he insists, made much of an effort to understand the other. Whites expected Indians to reject their traditional notions of clan retaliation against injuries inflicted by outsiders; Indians expected whites to accept that young men of the tribes could not be prevented from seeking fame and fortune through raids and warfare. Incessant pioneer demands that Indians be shunted aside, the ham-handedness of the federal government (in failing to check excesses by white frontiersmen and insisting on the acculturation of the tribes), and the militarized, decentralized nature of most tribal societies were common features of these conflicts, but Nichols also recognizes the importance of local circumstances. Religion, inter- and intra-tribal divisions, international border issues, questionable treaties, corruption, the American Civil War, and aggression by Indians, pioneers, and the U.S. Army alike often added to the ugly mix.

Iowa readers will find the assessment of the causes of the Black Hawk War to be of particular interest. Nichols identifies this as the lone “accidental war” (98, 190) of the conflicts under review. Following tradition, he identifies General Henry Atkinson’s mistaken decision to send volunteer rangers ready to “shoot first and ask questions later” (80) ahead of his more disciplined regular infantrymen as the immediate trigger of a war the Sauk and Meskwaki neither wanted nor expected. More fundamental conflicts over land and its resources, however, had set the necessary preconditions for such an accident. The federal government demanded removal of the tribes; beset by white intrusions, internal divisions, and shrinking resources, most Sauk and Meskwaki moved to Iowa in 1831. But Black Hawk and most of the so-called
British Band returned to Illinois the next year, a decision Nichols sees as resulting from disaffection among Indian women with the unbroken soil of Iowa and the “frustrations and fears” that convinced the disaffected Natives “to ignore the reality of their circumstances” (97). Many of their Sauk and Meskwaki cousins refused to join the move; the federal government would not or could not police unruly pioneers; British assistance never materialized; and neighboring Winnebagos and Potawatomis had no intention of offering refuge, and even allied with the United States.

The results of this and other conflicts, Nichols demonstrates, are sobering. Both the British Band and their cousins who had remained in Iowa suffered the same fate, giving up another 6 million acres of land before eventually being forced to move again, first to Kansas and then to present-day Oklahoma (although some Meskwaki eventually settled on their settlement near Tama, Iowa). The neighboring tribes who had allied with the federal government likewise had to cede their traditional areas, albeit a bit more slowly. In the end, white insistence that the tribes give up their land, customs, and culture gave Indians few real options; “because these contests pitted groups with vastly differing demographic, economic, and military resources, it comes as no surprise that the invaders won” (194).


Reviewer David A. Walker is emeritus professor of history at the University of Northern Iowa, where he taught western history for 37 years.

When Zebulon Montgomery Pike died in 1813, he was more highly regarded than Meriwether Lewis. Today, however, Pike is not deemed worthy of three years of bicentennial adulation as Lewis was. Unlike previous biographers who often portrayed Pike as the “lost pathfinder” — perhaps even a traitor — Jared Orsi establishes the explorer’s ardent nationalism and idealistic response to hardship through a core question: “How did Pike himself and the early republic more generally develop and sustain nationalism when their ideals bumped up against the physical challenges of the North American environment?” (6). Orsi answers, “Pike’s life . . . opens up a window for understanding nature and nationalism in the early republic—not because he was typical of the nation or causally essential to its development—but because he and the nation grew up together” (6).