"POIS DOMPNA S'AVE / D'AMAR": NA CASTELLOSA'S CANSOS AND MEDIEVAL FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP

Despite the rapidly spreading popularity of troubadour poetry throughout Western Europe (to northern France, Italy, Spain, Germany), only in Occitania do we find significant numbers of women poets participating in the tradition alongside their male counterparts—about twenty known by name, with another seventeen mentioned by other medieval writers but whose compositions have evidently been lost. Of all the *trobairitz*, it is Na Castelloza who most closely aligns herself with the "self-consciousness of the early troubadours and the self-effacing humility of the troubadour lover in general;" she situates her female speaker in the same rhetorical position occupied by the male speaker of the troubadour *canso* and fully participates in the conventions of the *canso* genre. One of these generic conventions is the use of feudal metaphors to describe the relationship between speaker and beloved. After a brief discussion of how these feudal metaphors function in the *canso* as symbolic social capital, I will examine several of the scholarly interpretations of Castelloza's *cansos* to determine how our own normative expectations of medieval feminine experience have shaped and nuanced our perception of these poems. I shall argue that historicizing the position of Castelloza's speaker with greater precision suggests new ways of perceiving and interpreting women in the Middle Ages.

In the *canso*, *joi*, or joy, is the reward for love service. *Joi* is typically understood to mean joy in general and sexual gratification especially, but there is linguistic evidence which suggests that it also refers to courtly reward. The word *joi* is derived from the Latin *jocula* (the neuter form of *joculum*, "play," "jest"), "which bore the meaning of gifts, reward, prize bestowed upon him who played the game well and won it." Of all the troubadour lyrics, the *canso* was the most prestigious and thus the best suited to assist the troubadour as he jockeyed for status, since its convention of supplication opens up the reciprocal obligation of lord to vassal—both within the immediate context of the song itself and within the sphere of courtly patronage. As R. Howard Bloch observes,

> Though the *canso* usually contains a declaration of love, assurances of the honesty of the poet's intentions, praise of his virtue and of the lady's perfection, it is, above all, a request. All the declarations, promises, praise, and flattery are motivated by the expectation of reward. . . . The most convincing plea is that which can claim superior poetic merit; and conversely, that which is superior poetically is the most persuasive. 4

Ultimately, the *canso*'s reward is admittance into or retention of elite status through its demonstration of the poet's courtliness. Participation in the nobles' tradition of *fin'amor* claimed for the poet a certain nobility, of spirit if not necessarily of birth.

In this sense, the *canso* functioned as a sort of social capital by which the troubadour might obtain political favor at court. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the nobility did not constitute a distinct or clearly definable group, nor
were the terms “noble” and “aristocratic” strictly synonymous. Knights themselves were not originally noble, though they were aristocratic in that they were differentiated from the great mass of society, often possessing wealth and power if not lineage. However, they might aspire to become noble through strategic marriages. The ambiguity of the definition of nobility led to the institution of highly regularized, even ritualized, courtly behaviors, by which individuals could “prove” their claims to noble status. *Fin’amor* provided an opportunity through which “men belonging to the lower nobility, the so-called new men who provided administrative services for a newly emerging state, could articulate their relations of patronage to their feudal overlords, using women as a medium of exchange.” Accordingly, there is much emphasis in the *canso* placed upon the speaker’s knightly worth as an argument for the bestowal of joi.

*Canso* language frequently replicates Occitania’s particular emphasis on loyalty and reciprocity. Only nominally under the control of the Capetian kings in the Île de France, Occitan counts and dukes such as William IX of Poitiers—grandfather of Eleanor of Aquitaine, and himself one of the first troubadours—wielded a great deal of power, and were loath to give much more than a semblance of subservience as vassals of the Capetian monarchy. Nor were they inclined to swear subservience to any other authority:

> When the western armies of the First Crusade arrived at Byzantium on their way to the Holy Land, the Emperor Alexius required their leaders to swear him vassalic allegiance. The northern barons readily complied. Only the Occitan Raimon of Saint-Gilles refused, even though he was on better terms with Alexius than any of the other crusaders, and subsequently proved a more reliable ally. Instead he swore a modified oath, in which he promised that neither he nor his men would do anything to threaten the emperor’s life or possessions.

Oaths of vassalage emphasized loyalty and fidelity rather than obedience, with vassals making “a pact of non-belligerence, involving no personal tie or the subordination of one man to another.”

The feudal relationship in the *canso* may simply stand for fidelity in love, but it may also be a highly codified way of talking about political loyalty by providing a means to articulate the exchange of service and reward, loyalty and honor, between patron and vassal, and thereby legitimate and perpetuate feudal ideology:

> For this audience of aristocrats and castellans, fidelity and service and the expectation of reward in return were at the heart of their social being. The loyalty of village lords, of castellans and knights, without which dynastic politics would have become a masquerade and armies a sham, depended on these ideals and expectations. Here was the
It is important to note that this relationship works in both directions, reinforcing the courtly reputations of patron and vassal: the former receives public praise and is given an opportunity to demonstrate magnanimity, while the latter enjoys recognition and approbation of his or her claim to the civilized qualities and refined manners that distinguish courtly life. Fredric Cheyette suggests that the *canso* implicitly compares or contrasts the behavior of the patron to the invented beloved. He cites Bernart de Ventadorn's *canso* in which the speaker decries his lady for her failure to uphold her obligations under the oath of fidelity and refuses to serve her any longer; this song is dedicated to Bernart's patron, Ermengarde of Narbonne, of whom Bernart claims "every act is so perfect that one cannot speak foolishness of her." This compliment, Cheyette argues, implies that Ermengarde "is the exact opposite of the traitorous lady in the lyric." This contrast would have the effect of reassuring Ermengarde of Bernart's continued loyalty, given her exemplary conduct. Conversely, though, it might also serve as a warning: if the patron does not behave in the manner demanded by the feudal contract, then the oath of fidelity may be forfeit.

Although the notion of feudal metaphors and feudal patronage implied within these metaphors have become commonplace in troubadour scholarship, less emphasis has been placed on their symbolic function in the songs of the *trobairitz*, even while their presence is acknowledged. Throughout Na Castelloza's songs, we find examples of the feudal metaphors encountered in the troubadour *cansos*. Her speaker figures her loving as feudal service and emphasizes her loyalty and willingness to follow her liege/beloved's commands. Just as the lady frequently refuses to show mercy to the troubadour's speaker, the beloved of Castelloza's speaker denies her any relief from the agonies which she fears will kill her; such denial is ignoble, and she tells her beloved, "si.m laissatz morir / faretz pechat" [if you let me die / you'll commit a sin] ("Amics" 46-7). She accuses her beloved of being a bad lover, who will be criticized for not returning the speaker's unfailing devotion:

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... l'amador
vos tenon per salvatge,
car ioia no.m ave
de vos, don no.m recre
d'amar per bona fe
totz temps ses cor volatge.
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(“Ia de chantar” 13-18)

This criticism suggests the damage incurred to the beloved's courtly reputation as he violates the expected standards of noble, aristocratic behavior.

The speaker is of course very concerned with her own reputation at court as well. The first stanza of “Amics, s’ie.us trobes avinen” is an almost comic
portrayal of a woman who doesn’t want her lover to make a fool of her through his inappropriate behavior:

... fauc chanssos per tal q’eu fassa auzir
vostre bon pretz, dont eu non puosc sofrir
que no.us fassa lauzar a tota gen,
on plus mi faitz mal et diramen.

[I sing in order to make known your great worth and therefore I cannot bear not to have you praised by everyone at the moment when you harm and rile me most.]

(5–8)

Not only does the beloved tarnish his reputation among the members of the court, he also risks the speaker’s; in order for her loving to garner her the most praise, the object of that loving must himself be honorable and worthy of loving in the first place. By calling his own honor into question, the beloved opens the speaker to ridicule for her continued service to him.

Through her singing, Castelloza’s speaker gains the recognition of “all lovers” for her fidelity. Her lover’s cruelty allows her to demonstrate by contrast just how perfect and ideal a lover she is herself. In “Amics, s’ie.us trobes avinen,” the speaker claims that she sings only in order to extol her lover’s fine qualities, finding satisfaction in the simple act of courtship: “preiar ai un gran revenimen / qan prec cellui don ai greu pessamen” [I find great renewal/when I court the one who gives me heavy pain] (5–6, 23–4). In fact, however, she is really praising her own constancy and willingness to undergo many torments in the name of love; the “renewal” she experiences is less a cathartic release through song than the production of a constituted self within the sociopolitical sphere of the court. In “Ia de chantar” the speaker chides her lover that he is ill-regarded by others—possibly the community of courtly love poets—for his neglectful treatment of her. These others, she implies, are well-aware of her faithfulness and devotion to him; her own reputation as a lover is securely established. In “Mout avetz” she refers to her family and her husband, who seem to be cognizant of the speaker’s courtship of her beloved, and she defends the (public) example she sets for other women (21–30; see also “Ia de chantar” 17–24). All of these others who listen to the speaker’s song witness her performance as the behavior most befitting a courtly lover.

The speaker’s references to family and husband recall the idea of courtly poetry as social capital. Though one might expect a husband to be somewhat less than pleased when his wife sings plaintive love songs to another man, the husband of Castelloza’s speaker is grateful:
Certainly these lines invite an ironic reading; this is the reading Peter Dronke prefers, arguing that here the speaker is saying “since I am of lower birth than you, it is inevitable that I should suffer through loving you, and my husband is glad that you do not bring me unalloyed happiness through extramarital love.”

However, emphasis in Occitan society upon the prestige of the canso and of fin’amor prompts another reading of these lines, though one that doesn’t necessarily preclude the former. Metonymically, the “damage and harm”—that is, the suffering incurred as a result of the beloved’s rejection or inattention but, at the same time, that which provides the impetus for singing and therefore the speaker’s participation in courtly culture—may, on another level, refer to status and nobility derived from the speaker’s participation in the literary discourse of the courts. Through the speaker’s song, her husband and family share in the honor she gains for herself as a lover.

In “Ia de chantar,” Castelloza’s speaker refers quite explicitly to the social capital gained through canso courtship: “qe ill plus pros n’es enriquida/s’a de vos calc’aondanssa/de baisar o d’acoindanssa” [the noblest lady is exalted/to obtain the gift/of your kisses or embraces] (“Mout avetz” 28–30). Like Bernart de Ventadorn’s speaker in “Lo gens terns de pascor,” Castelloza’s speaker is righteously indignant that her beloved does not reward her service appropriately:

qu’enoia me si no.m voletz gauzir
de calque ioi, e si.m laissatz morir
faretz pechat e serai n’en tormen
e seretz ne blasmatz vilanamen.

[I’m angry if you refuse me any joy, and if you let me die you’ll commit a sin. I’ll be in torment, and you’ll be vilely blamed.]

(“Amics” 45–9)

This stanza has been read by Paden and others as a threat; if the speaker doesn’t receive satisfaction from her lover, she intends to kill herself, and at Judgment Day the beloved will be held responsible for causing the speaker to damn herself to hell through suicide. It is also possible that, keeping in mind the canso conventions, the speaker refers again to courtly reputation; in this sense, her “death” is a metaphorical expression of one of the more theatrical conventions of fin’amor, and may be equated with the beloved’s failure to reward and recognize the speaker as the feudal contract of the canso demands.

Castelloza’s speaker places herself in the same social position as the typical male speaker of a troubadour canso; that is, she is lower in rank than her beloved, even
though this means upending the conventional male/female hierarchy of the *canso*:

![Alignment issues in the extracted text]

This hierarchical upheaval emerges again in the fifth stanza, as the speaker reminds her beloved that she had once stolen his glove as a token, but returned it because she admits to demand such a token is beyond her place: “car ben cre/qeu non ai poderatge” [for I know well/that I have no rightful claim] (43–4). Castelloza’s speaker herself encapsulates the paradox: she is miserable because “cel qui pretz mante/a vas mi cor volatge” [he who upholds honor/has an inconstant heart towards me] (“Ia de chantar” 56–7). Her lover can only uphold honor by rejecting her because of her status, even while he faces a simultaneous obligation to reward her service under the feudal contract she has extended to him.

The reversal of the gender hierarchy in Castelloza’s songs causes a certain amount of uneasy confusion among modern scholars and may be why scholars have resisted acknowledging Castelloza’s usurpation of the position of the male troubadour speaker for her own speaker. There is a marked tendency in *trobairitz* scholarship to assume that when a female voice is speaking in a *canso* written by a woman, she must necessarily be giving voice to the silent lady of the troubadour *cansos*. On the contrary, Castelloza refuses to position her speaker within the space occupied by the troubadour’s lady. Whereas the *trobairitz* Comtessa de Dia “retains for herself part of the description typically offered by the troubadour in praise of his lady,” Castelloza refuses it for her speaker entirely: she “evokes, and just as quickly rejects, the persona of capricious lady; she herself prefers to remain in the most humble of positions before her beloved, honored even when he treats her badly.” Instead she transfers this persona to the beloved in order to more strongly contrast the speaker’s own, courtly behavior against that of her cruel lover.

It is odd, therefore, that the further away we get from Castelloza’s immediate present, the harder her audiences and critics try to move her speaker out of the position occupied by the male *canso* speaker into that of his beloved. Scholars such as Eva Rosenn applaud the *trobairitz* for “daring to speak on behalf of the silent Lady” of the troubadour *canso*, a view that would seem to limit Castelloza’s speaker to responding to the male speaker’s suit rather than initiating her own. This view seems predicated on the assumption that women’s participation in the feudal network was limited to serving as a “conduit of status” between lord and vassal. Laurie Finke argues that troubadour lyrics reflect the homosocial tradition of men using women as a “medium of exchange”; women themselves are patronesses insofar as they are able to influence their husbands, the true holders of power and favor. Taking this
argument a step further, Simon Gaunt contends that women are excluded from troubadour lyrics altogether: “the troubadour love lyric is usually not an articulation of love for a woman but a representation of a man, talking about himself or other men to a male audience.” When the troubadour speaker “does finally turn to his lady, he can conceive of their relationship only as a simulacrum of a male one.”

However, that a number of women in southern France did in fact hold land in their own names, and accepted homage from vassals in their own right and not simply as proxies for their husbands, problematizes these arguments. The following is a representative oath of fidelity, in keeping with Occitan feudal custom, which Ermessen, Viscountess of Avignon, swears to her liege lady, Azalais, Countess of Forcalquier, circa 1102-1105:

Hear ye Azalais, Countess, daughter of Azalais, Countess! I Ermessen, wife of Rostaing Berenguer, will not, by ruse, deprive you of life or members, nor will man or woman by my counsel or consent; nor will I, by ruse, deprive you of the three quarters of the castles in the cities of Provence on this side of the Durance; and I will not take them from you nor will I have them taken from you, nor will man or woman with my counsel or consent.

In this oath, male participation and privilege are almost entirely excluded from the feudal network; not only is the oath itself between two women, but Ermessen also invokes matrilineal descent, rather than patrilineal, in her address to Azalais. The language of the oath is carefully balanced, admitting the further possibility of women other than Ermessen herself who might attempt to seize her liege lady’s lands. This inclusivity appears to have become part of the ritualized language for oaths of fidelity in Occitania around the eleventh century: despite the availability of gendered but semantically neutral pronouns, such as “homo” or “persona,” the oaths employ the formula “homo aut femina” to ensure the most exact binding possible. Such evidence leads to the conclusion that an exchange of female feudal loyalty is not out of keeping with the time and custom of the trobairitz milieu.

A number of scholars, most notably David Herhily and Martí Aurell i Cardona, have argued that Occitanian inheritance laws and marriage customs during the period of trobairitz activity were relatively favorable to women, though they represent a small cossurrent against a stronger tide of general decline in female status during a period which witnessed a process of abjectification of the female subject, from autonomous adult to dependent minor status. Beginning in the eleventh century, a patrilineal system of inheritance gradually gained prominence as nobles sought to preserve the integrity of the patrimony by giving precedence to the oldest son, to the detriment of daughters and younger sons. Under this new system, women “lost their traditional claim to an equal share with their brothers in their parents’ property.” Changes in the disposition and administration of the dowry were also unfavorable to women; whereas
previously it had remained largely under the wife's control, by 1250 "the husband obtained the right exclusively to dispose of it [the dowry], which his wife regained only after her husband's death or in the case of repudiation." With the loss of the autonomy and power granted by property inheritance and control of the dowry, women largely fade from view in the legislative and juridical documents, excluded from participation in the dominant sociopolitical discourse.

However, the years 1180–1230 witness a "renaissance féministe" in Occitania, referred to by historians as the "golden interlude," during which women recovered the rights and political power they had held in the tenth century and earlier. Aurell i Cardona gives as an example the case of Guilhema Garcin. After her husband Peire Garcin's death in 1172, his estate was divided among his brother, foster father, and son; however, Guilhema herself receives the largest portion of the inheritance by far. What is more, she also was able to administer and distribute that fortune by the dictates of her own will. Another source records the quarrel between Ermengarde of Narbonne and her vassal, Béranger of Puisserguier, who contested her right as a woman to render justice. After both disputants wrote to Louis VII of France for mediation, the case was eventually decided in Ermengarde's favor; Louis wrote to Ermengarde:

"Sit therefore in judgment on legal cases, examining carefully all affairs with the zeal of Him who created you a woman when He could have made you a man, and out of His goodness placed in the hand of a woman the government of the Province of Narbonne. And to no one is it permitted, because of the fact that you are a woman, to refuse or withdraw from your jurisdiction."

Incidents such as these during the "golden interlude"—an era which corresponds closely to the period of troubairitz activity charted by William D. Paden—suggest that, at least in part, Occitania's sociopolitical atmosphere during this time encouraged female participation in courtly power plays. The historical reality of women's participation in the feudal network can only reinforce the legitimacy of Castelloza’s decision to position her speaker as she does.

Many of those who do acknowledge the supplicant position of Castelloza's speaker nevertheless insist that the troubairitz speaker's abasement is representational (or, according to Kathryn Gravdal, "metonymical") rather than metaphorical, as in the case of the troubadours' male speaker.

In their extant corpus, the women suggest that the position of the Amairitz [the speaker] bears a necessary relation to female subordination; the Amairitz's powerlessness bears a necessary relation to female disempowerment in culture; the Lady's moral self-consciousness and sexual reticence bear a necessary relation to sexual and moral double standards in Christian ideology; the Amairitz's humiliation bears a necessary relation to inferior female status in patriarchy. When these
women poets compose, the logic underlying their poetic stance is metonymical: “I sing as a woman.”

Gravdal’s argument here is based on her assumption that, for the men, powerlessness is a pose, a rhetorical strategy; the male speaker adopts an abased position only to use it as a springboard to higher status and sociopolitical clout. That Castelloza’s speaker does this as well is frequently overlooked, because it is assumed that for the women, powerlessness is a reality. This assumption is not supported by the evidence for noblewomen’s sociopolitical situation in Occitania during the time of the *trobairitz*. Insistence that the *trobairitz* speaker’s inferior, apparently powerless position is not a rhetorical choice but necessarily her true historical, sociopolitical status has dangerous implications, tempting us to interpret her songs as literally representative of the *trobairitz*’s own experience and the experience of medieval women in general.

Nor is the *canso* speaker truly powerless, in spite of his or her apparently abject position. The speaker initiates the feudal contract, offering himself or herself to the service of the beloved, who is honor-bound to accept that service. The seriousness of the beloved’s obligation is underscored by Constance Brittain Bouchard, who describes the act of homage as “a delicate balance between two men who were at the same time social equals and political unequals”:

The delicacy of this balance can be seen most clearly in the fact that a knight or noble could, in essence, impel another to accept him as his vassal. If two men were fighting, say, over control of a castle, one of them—even the one who was losing—could supplicate the other with the request to become his vassal. Such a request was difficult to refuse if made humbly enough. This man would thus receive the castle in fief and gain unquestioned authority over it, in return for recognizing the other as its ultimate lord and giving promises to aid the man he had so recently been fighting.

Because one’s own courtly reputation is at stake, one is honor-bound to accede to another’s request to be made vassal, even if the request is undesired. Thus, the supplicant—male or female—wields a very real power within the feudal relationship. In the *canso*, the convention of supplication opens up the reciprocal obligation of lord to vassal—both within the immediate context of the song itself and within the sphere of courtly patronage.

It is not, of course, as simple as claiming that Castelloza’s speaker unambiguously holds the same power as does the troubadour speaker. There are definite gendered tensions in both *trobairitz* and troubadour *cansos*. Castelloza’s speaker, for example, has to defend her right as a woman to sing in the first place, and acknowledges that she will “set a bad precedent / to other loving ladies” (“Mout avetz” 21–2); the troubadours do not seem to feel obligated to
justify themselves in such a way. Clearly, the conventions do not translate perfectly from male speaker to female. Rather than resolving these tensions, the historicized approach I have been suggesting here further complicates gender issues in the *canso*; they become particularly significant precisely because women participate in the feudal exchange of power and fidelity, honor and service.

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8 For a detailed discussion of feudalism in Occitanian society, see Chapter 2 in Paterson.


12 Ibid.


14 Ibid 141.
15 if she hates me for this cause, then she commits a heinous sin. 
E si d'aissom vol mal, pechat n'a criminal. (47–48)


17 Bruckner 244–5.


22 Ibid. 320.

23 "Aus tu Adalax comitissa, filia Adalax comitissal Eu Ermensenz, multer Rostagno Berenguerio, non ti decebrai de ta vida ne de ta membra que a tuo corpore juncta sunt, ne homo nec femina per meum consilium ne per meum consintiment, ne non ti decebrai des castels ne las civitates de Provincia des Durencia en za de las tres partes, non las ti tolrai ne tolre las ti larai, ne homo nee lemina ab meum consilium ne ab meum consintiment." Clovis Brunei, Les plus anciennes chartes en langue provençale (Geneva, 1973 repr.), II, 11–12. Trans. Fredric Cheyette in "The House of Provence," Maria of Montpellier: A Life (National Endowment for the Humanities seminar, 1983), 64, courtesy of Dhira B. Mahoney.


26 Herlihy 13.

27 "Le mari obtient le droit de disposer exclusivement de ce bien que l'épouse récupère uniquement à la mort de son conjoint ou en cas de répudiation" (Aurell i Cardona 24).

28 Ibid. 20–3.


31 Bouchard 43.