The State of Disunion: Regional Sources of Modern American Partisanship

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and Society, who has shown the deleterious effects of military life on American families.

The final chapter was not just anticlimactic, but verged on trivializing the argument. Ancillary effects of wartime exigency, such as daylight savings time, standard time, military child care, and income tax withholding, just do not seem significant compared to the starker and more destructive effects of war. Racism is the glaring sin not just of conservatism but of the country at large, and Kauffman frankly admits this. As dazzling as the book is in showing middle American obstinacy against overseas adventurism, Kauffman fails to explain how the ordinary Americans he so empathizes with are cut out of decision making. I find Harry Braverman (on twentieth-century workers) and Richard Sennett (on the current workforce) more persuasive on the effects of centralization and militarization than Kauffman’s defense of parochialism.

After writing an article about radical pacifism at William Penn College in the 1940s, I learned from a friend who had attended a Jasper County Republican forum in 1968 that the Korean War–era draft resister with the iconic Iowa name of Herbert Hoover had continued his activism by running for president as a Republican antiwar candidate for president. That is the kind of defiance of dominant power that Kauffman celebrates. Anyone looking for an Iowa that does not always add up to being the most middle of middle America should mine this book.


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Nicole Mellow has produced a solid study of how region affects partisanship in contemporary America. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, Mellow contends, regionalism has produced a country deeply divided along political lines best understood by an analysis of geographic regions and the differentiation between those regions’ “material and cultural experiences” (3).

Mellow focuses on three major issues that showcase the divide: trade policy, welfare, and abortion. She has studied these issues over time within four regions: North (17 states stretching from Maine to
Illinois all north of the Ohio River and the Mason-Dixon Line); South (all states of the former Confederacy plus Oklahoma and West Virginia); West (all states west of the Mississippi and north of Oklahoma and Arkansas); and Pacific Coast (California, Oregon, and Washington). Alaska and Hawaii are not included in her regional analysis.

Mellow, a political scientist with an eye for historical analysis, deftly explains how the shift of once solidly Democratic regions such as the South to the GOP occurred over issues such as welfare and abortion. In her efforts to explore the growing regional divide in American politics, however, she may cast too wide a net. She is studying what can be called macro-regions. For instance, is there a difference on trade between midwestern farm states such as Iowa and western states such as Nevada that have less of an agricultural basis? In her analysis both states are in the West region and share similar views on the freeing up of trade policy. Both embrace the liberalization of trade and the GOP’s strong support for it. Yet there are major differences between the demographics, ethnic composition, religiosity, and economic situations of states within regions that her analysis cannot take into account. On a surface level she is correct to assume that regional variations in partisanship did occur over the past generation, but it is not clear whether her argument can be sustained on a deeper sub-regional or micro-regional analysis. As political scientists Byron Shafer and Richard Johnston have argued in *The End of Southern Exceptionalism* (2006), there is strong variation within regions over issues such as race, welfare, and abortion. In the South many ardent segregationists (in those counties that supported George Wallace’s candidacy) continued to vote Democratic well into the 1980s, whereas the New South suburbs voted Republican.

Ideology is also not a frame of analysis for Mellow, but it matters more today among partisans than any other indicator. Cultural and social issues continue to be crucial issues for weekly church-goers, according to polls, even when the economy is doing poorly. This does not seem to vary much regionally. Ideology affects the debates over all three issues Mellow focuses on, but is not treated as a consequence of regional partisan change.

Even with those caveats, Mellow’s book should occupy a prominent place in the literature on region and partisan change. She has provided much fodder for discussion and for debate about the deep partisan divisions that continue to affect America today.