In many ways these Indians gave evidence that he still lived in their memories. One instance is worthy of mention. Wapello, one of the chiefs, and at his own request, was brought by the Indians many miles from his camp to be buried at the side of his "father and friend."

The text of his funeral discourse is a fitting conclusion of a life lived in the fear of God and fearless of man: "Say ye to the righteous that it shall be well with him: for they shall eat the fruit of their doings." Isaiah 3. 10.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN M. CORSE.

IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1864.—1. IN THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION. 2. IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 3. AT ROME, GEORGIA, AND IN THE DEFENSE OF ALLATOONA. 4. IN THE MARCH TO THE SEA, AND THE CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.

BY REV. DR. WILLIAM SALTER.

Upon recovering in a measure from his wounds received at Tunnel Hill on Missionary Ridge, General Corse was assigned to the command for a few weeks of the rendezvous for drafted men at Springfield, Ill., and on the 29th of February was ordered to report to General Sherman. Meantime General Grant, understanding that more brigadier-generals had been appointed than could be confirmed by the Senate, submitted to General Halleck a new list of recommendations, giving names in the order of his preference, taking into consideration services rendered and fitness for the position. He was personally acquaint-
ted with them all. Of fourteen names the fifth on the list was John M. Corse.

Early in March General Sherman had sent a force of ten thousand men under General A. J. Smith to co-operate with General Banks in the Red River expedition. With reference to this and other movements General Sherman entrusted a confidential mission to General Corse, the nature of which appears in extracts from orders and dispatches relating thereto, as follows:

**Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, Nashville, April 3, 1864,**

**Brigadier-General Corse, Present:**

I select you for special service, and hereby clothe you with power to use my name to carry out certain plans which I herein describe, and on the exhibition of this letter all commanders subject to my orders will be governed.

You will move with all dispatch to Paducah. Explain to Colonel Hicks my satisfaction at his handsome defense of his post, which he may announce to his troops in orders. Deliver to him a copy of the inclosed memorandum, and one to General Veatch, to be sent up (the Tennessee river) to him by some certain conveyance; then touch at Cairo and explain to General Brayman the same, Columbus and Memphis the same, and then proceed down the Mississippi till you meet the fleet of General A. J. Smith. If you don't meet him this side of Red River you may at your discretion ask for a flat gun-boat or go on in the boat you start with, up Red River, till you find General Smith and deliver to him the orders and instructions for him; also send to Admiral Porter, General Banks, and General Steele the communications for them.

After you have had communication with all these, report to General Smith and act under his orders. If to carry out my plans you find it necessary, you may make written orders, signing by order of General Sherman. I place at your disposal here at Nashville a steamerboat guarded by one hundred armed and dismounted cavalry, which steamboat you can take with you all the way or transfer to others, discharging this at your discretion.

**General Memoranda:**

1. The posts of Columbus, Cairo, and Paducah to be held in force, and mere excursions sent out to occupy the attention of Forrest.
2. General Veatch to occupy a point near Purdy and to strike Forrest in flank as he attempts to pass out.
3. General Hurlburt to operate from Memphis with his infantry
and cavalry, guarding the passes of Big Hatchie and communicating with General Veatch.

4. General A. J. Smith to return from Red River, pause at Vicksburg to replenish supplies, and to push up Yazoo to Greenwood and Sidon, march rapidly to Grenada, and operate in Forrest's rear. If Forrest is escaped, broken up or captured, all the troops to resume the statu quo, and General Smith to conduct his force by steady marches across to the Tombigbee, and up to Decatur, Alabama, where General Dodge will move out to meet him. This column to move light as to wagons and artillery, depending for forage, corn, meal and meat, on the country, reckoning for supplies only at Vicksburg and Decatur; General Smith taking with him the two tried generals, Corse and Mower.

5. General Corse may order in my name any subordinate details to carry out these plans and the instructions of the commanding general.

Copies of this to be sent to Generals McPherson, Veatch, Brayman, Hurlburt, and McArthur, and to the commanding officers at Paducah and Columbus, with express orders of secrecy.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding,

SHERMAN TO GENERAL A. J. SMITH, COMMANDING DETACHMENT ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, UP RED RIVER.

NASHVILLE, April 3, 1864.

General Corse who brings this will explain to you the exact attitude of things and will serve under your orders. You will have in Generals Corse and Mower two of the finest young officers in any army, and I will endeavor to preserve the most absolute secrecy. Should any combinations now unforeseen arise, you may depend on my reaching you with notice; therefore act with the confidence that insures success. I want you and the generals I have named advanced in rank, and you may rely on all the influence I possess.

Call on Admiral Porter or any naval officer you find for co-operation and assistance, and you will find them ever ready.

SHERMAN TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS, COMMANDING DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF, RED RIVER.

NASHVILLE, April 4, 1864.

The thirty days for which I loaned you the command of General A. J. Smith will expire on the 10th. I send down with this Brigadier-General John M. Corse to carry orders to General Smith, and to give directions to a new movement preliminary to the general campaign.

I beg you will expedite their return to Vicksburg, to co-operate against Forrest, after which to march across to Decatur, Alabama,—a big job, therefore should start at once.
SHERMAN TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. A. RAWLINS, CHIEF OF GENERAL GRANT'S STAFF, WASHINGTON, D. C.

NASHVILLE, Tennessee, April 4, 1864.

Last night I sent General Corse down the Cumberland with orders and verbal explanations to the commanders. He is to push on to Memphis, and hurry up Red River to General A. J. Smith, and bring him with all dispatch to Vicksburg and up the Yazoo, and rapidly occupy Grenada. With 10,000 men and two such dashing officers as Corse and Mower, A. J. Smith can whip all the cavalry and infantry (if any) in North Mississippi.

General Banks agreed with me that our troops should form a junction at Alexandria on the 17th of March. Mine were there on time, capturing Fort De Russy en route; but Banks did not leave New Orleans till March 22d. This failure in time in conjoint operations is wrong, because it endangers the troops that punctually obey orders. I suppose that Steele is moving on Shreveport with 7,000 and Banks with 17,000. These are enough to co-operate with the gunboats, and therefore I rightfully claim my 10,000 with General A. J. Smith at the time agreed on, April 10th, at which time General Corse should find them at Alexandria and conduct them to their new field of operations.

SHERMAN TO GENERAL McPHERSON, COMMANDING DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA.

NASHVILLE, April 6, 1864.

General Banks pledged me his word that he would leave New Orleans March 7th, and that my troops will not be wanted up the Red River beyond the thirty days after they enter it. That time will expire the 10th, inst., and General Corse will be at the mouth of Red River by that time. He left Cairo with a good boat and two pilots, on the 4th, at 11 A. M.

CORSE TO SHERMAN.

MEMPHIS, April 6, 1864.

Arrived 11:30 A. M. Saw General Hurlbut. The force of the enemy I think is exaggerated, but underrated by yourself. I leave immediately.

HEADQUARTERS FORT AND DEFENSES, VICKSBURG, Miss., April 8, 1864.

Arrived about 8 A. M. Will coal and leave at 11 A. M. Will make mouth of Red River at about 7 A. M. Gave General McArthur the memoranda, and informed him of the projected plan. He can give us 500 cavalry and will mount the 100 you gave me for an escort, which I will retain and bring back overland. I directed scouts to be sent out immediately, so as to have all information possible by my return; also a
cavalry force thrown out too see whether two brigades of cavalry that were at Mechanicsburg are still there or not. The tendency is to over-estimate the enemy wherever I go, but I think that if we can find a crossing on the Tombigbee we can whip anything they have got. From information I can gather I am induced to believe our best route is from Grenada to Columbus, thence to Decatur on the ridge between the Tombigbee and Black Warrior. However, we will see.

SHERMAN TO CORSE, VICKSBURG.

NASHVILLE, April 9, 1864.

After consultation with General Grant it is determined not to make the march from Grenada. Smith's forces will therefore come up the Mississippi to Cairo, thence up the Tennessee to join McPherson. After Smith is out of Red River you may therefore rejoin me, wherever I may be, via Nashville.

SHERMAN TO GENERAL McPHERSON, HUNTSVILLE, ALA.

NASHVILLE, April 11, 1864.

I want Smith's entire command to come to your right flank for a special reason. I want Mower and his command. He is the boldest soldier we have. He and Corse, with 5,000 men each, would break through any line you encounter. In your operations in the campaign you will need two such officers as Mower and Corse.

ADMIRAL D. D. PORTER TO GENERAL SHERMAN.

FLAG SHIP CRICKET, Off Grand Ecore, La., April 14, 1864.

You will no doubt be much disappointed at not having General A. J. Smith’s division returned to you in the time expected, but you will be reconciled when I assure you that the safety of this army and my whole fleet depend on his staying here. His is the only part of the army not demoralized, and if he was to leave there would be a disastrous retreat. The army has been shamefully beaten. It is too long a tale to write; General Corse has heard it all and will tell you all about it.

CORSE TO GENERAL SHERMAN.

CAIRO, April 21, 1864, 2:30 p. m.

Banks was attacked by Kirby Smith near Mansfield, Louisianna, on the 18th inst., and retreated to Grand Ecore a la Bull Run. He refused to let Smith go for obvious reasons, stating however that he had authority from both Generals Grant and Halleck to retain your troops longer. The Admiral's iron-clads are caught by low water, some above the bars at Grand Ecore, the rest above the falls, and he not only refuses to consent to the removal of Smith, but refuses to allow him
a transport to take him out of the river; stating that to take Smith away would occasion the loss of his fleet, the destruction of General Bank's demoralized command, and enable the enemy to crush General Steele. I have communications from General Banks and Admiral Porter, and will be with you as speedily as possible.

GENERAL BANKS TO GENERAL SHERMAN.

GRAND ECORE, April 14, 1864.

Your dispatch of the 3d was delivered to me by General Corse. I have been compelled to say to General Smith that I could not approve your order for the withdrawal of his force at this time.

SHERMAN TO HALLECK, WASHINGTON, D. C.

NASHVILLE, April 23, 1864.

Corse is here, having just come from Grand Ecore. He describes the battle more satisfactorily than I had it before. Banks had 17,000 men, A. J. Smith, 10,000; that force well handled should have whipped Kirby Smith. General Corse says that General Banks ordered a retreat from the battlefield back to Grand Ecore, near thirty-five miles, that, too, when the enemy was also retreating. Our wounded, dead and trains were left on the field. That is defeat. I would not ask General Banks to send away Smith's command under these circumstances, but I would ask him to renew the attack. General Corse speaks of all the troops being demoralized except those of A. J. Smith.

2.—IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

["To be at the head of a strong column of troops in the execution of some task that requires brain, is the highest pleasure of war—a grim one and terrible."—GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Memoirs, II, 407.]

On the 27th of April General Sherman took the field at Chattanooga for the Atlanta Campaign. The next day he placed General Corse upon his staff as Inspector General. In this capacity General Corse took part in all the movements from Chattanooga to Atlanta, pushing things in every direction, now reconnoitering in front, now building pontoon bridges, now commanding detachments, now supervising the forwarding of supplies, going
back and forth between different commanders with explanations and instructions, enjoying in every situation the unlimited confidence of his chief. In his official report at the close of the Atlanta Campaign, General Sherman spoke of General Corse and of the other officers upon his staff, as "officers of singular energy and intelligence, and of immense assistance to him in handling the large armies of his command."

The death of General McPherson on the 22nd of July necessitated changes in many commands. General Logan was assigned temporarily to command the Army of the Tennessee, and he at once applied for the services of General Corse with that Army. In granting the request General Sherman said, "I give up General Corse because the good of the service demands that at this crisis you should have good division commanders;" and he issued the following orders:

**HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,**

In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 26, 1864.

**SPECIAL FIELD ORDER, No. 43.**

1. Upon the application of Major-General John A. Logan, commanding the Army of the Tennessee in the field, Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, acting inspector general of this army, is hereby relieved and assigned to duty with the Department and Army of the Tennessee, and will report in person to General Logan, that he may be assigned to duty according to his rank with troops.

2. The general commanding in thus relieving General Corse from a purely staff position, to enable him to accept the higher and more appropriate one in connection with troops in actual service, thanks him for his personal and official services rendered during the present campaign near his person.

The same day at the request of Major-General G. M. Dodge, commanding left wing, Sixteenth Army Corps, General Corse was assigned to the second division of that corps. That division was composed of veterans, and now numbered 3,754 effectives. It had repulsed a terrific as-
sault upon its lines the day McPherson was killed, and retrieved disaster with surprising valor and heroism. It was now under marching orders to move from the left to the right and take a new position in the siege of Atlanta. On the following day, July 27th, General Corse occupied a commanding ridge about two and a half miles west of the city. The same day Major-General O. O. Howard took command of the Army of the Tennessee. The ridge was soon entrenched, and a six-gun battery built upon a prominent knoll, the line having an open field in front, beyond which Atlanta was visible. The next day, July 28th, as the enemy made a furious assault upon the Fifteenth Corps which was then getting in position further on the right, General Corse sent two regiments at a double quick to the relief of that corps. Their services at the critical moment proved invaluable, and were warmly appreciated by General Logan who had resumed command of that corps.

From day to day General Corse's force was occupied in strengthening his works, erecting batteries, in skirmishes, digging rifle-pits, advancing his line, and shelling the enemy's works and the city. On the 4th of August the enemy's first rifle-pits were captured, and after severe fighting, being driven from and recapturing these pits three times, the enemy was driven back and the line taken was entrenched that night and held by a double line of skirmishers. On the 12th the command occupied works thrown up in the night on a ridge overlooking part of the city, the skirmishers being about sixty yards from the enemy. From this line a single ravine separated the ridge from that on which Atlanta was located. About 2 a.m. Welker's battery, Lt. Blodgett commanding, moved in to an elevated point that furnished a fine natural position for a battery. As the fog lifted from the intervening space, the enemy, says General Corse, discovered our line, our battery and working parties, and opened all their
metal on the six 12-pounders. Their shot and shell penetrated the parapet, tore out the revetment, burst in front, over and inside, killing and wounding the gunners, and threatening demolition to the entire battery. But our veteran artillerists stuck close to their guns, and handled them so well that Lt. Blodgett was enabled in one hour to silence both forts in his front. The true effect of artillery was best found in volley firing. While one or two guns fired consecutively at an object for a week may produce no effect, six guns fired together and repeatedly will overcome an obstacle in a short time. The great success of this battery throughout the campaign was owing to its concentrated fire. On the 13th of August, a 4½ inch Rodman was placed in battery where the line connected with the right of the Army of the Cumberland. The position overlooked the whole valley, and the gun opened on the city every fifteen minutes through the day and every five minutes during the night. This piece fired 1,080 rounds before being dismounted. A battery of 20-pounder Parrotts was placed in position with Welker's guns; a furnace was built; and hot shot fired from two of them during the night. The heating process seemed to expand the shot so as to take the rifling more perfectly, and the experiment was a perfect success. General Corse was not sure that the hot shot fired any houses, but large fires were visible in the city every night hot shot was used save one.

The command suffered severely as a besieging party. They were so close to the enemy that extreme danger attended exposure at any point on the skirmish line, and batteries on our right and left flanks destroyed many in the reserve lines. There was no safety or security; cooks, grooms, clerks in their offices, were as subject to being hit by random shell or shot as men in the extreme front.

Pursuant to orders, General Corse withdrew from the siege August 25th at 8 p. m. The movement was made with secrecy and celerity to mislead the enemy. The
Army of the Tennessee moved south to break the rebel lines of communication by the West Point and Macon railroads, and after considerable resistance entrenched in front of Jonesborough, and awaited an assault by the Confederate forces under General Hardee. General Corse says: "The morning of the 31st found us bivouacked on the west bank of Flint River, about two miles from Jonesborough. After throwing up a strong line on the river bank and building two bridges, I was directed by Major-General Howard to send Adams' brigade across the river. Lieutenant Blodgett's battery was placed on the right of the brigade, without any protection. The distance to the river from the battery was about 1,000 yards, which was left open for the enemy to come in. At 1 p.m. General Rice's brigade was thrown across the river in reserve. The line we occupied was on a ridge with a cornfield in front, a ravine intervening. Dense woods along the river furnished excellent cover for infantry; along the farther edge of the cornfield was another strip of timber. At 2 p.m. our skirmishers were pushed in, followed by a line of battle which emerged from the forest and came out obliquely into the cornfield. Adams' brigade with Blodgett's battery sent them back. Rice's brigade was now double-quicked to the right of the battery. Again the enemy charged, advancing through the cornfield squarely with our works, their flags floating in the lazy breeze. The men were ordered not to fire till the enemy came out of the field of corn into the meadow in front of our works. Their appearance was welcomed by a tremendous volley along Adams' brigade, and by double-shotted guns from the battery, followed by the rattling of file-firing along the line. A portion of the rebel line broke and ran for life to the woods; the rest, in front of Rice's command, sought shelter in a gully about deep enough to conceal a man, and were temporarily safe. The 66th Indiana rushed into the gully, killing and driving them out, and bringing about sixty
back as prisoners. Rice's brigade built a parapet, from which it would have been impossible to have driven them, so expert had the men become in practical engineering. Meanwhile the enemy reformed his scattered lines, massed, and moved through the woods, but not sufficiently covered to prevent our canister from raking his flanks, so as to compel him to hurry off, leaving his dead and some of his wounded in our hands."

On the 1st of September the command advanced the line and after a brisk skirmish drove the enemy from a portion of his line. At daylight on the 2d the skirmishers found the rebel lines deserted. On pressing into Jonesborough they were too late to capture a train of cars just leaving, but gave it a few farewell shots. The same night that the Confederate forces under Hardee evacuated Jonesborough, the Confederate forces under Hood evacuated Atlanta, and both places were that day occupied by the Union troops.

After a few movements against the retreating enemy, and tearing up the Macon railroad track, General Corse marched his command back to Jonesborough. In the evening of Sept. 5, a terrific thunderstorm overtook them, filling the roads with sink-holes and slush, and flooding the streams so that men must go waist deep to ford them. All night the patient, wet and weary men labored over the roads, now halting and lying in the road until some team was pried out of the mud, now deploying as skirmishers, now moving to the rear to take the place of some other command that had left the rear without orders, or to cover some cavalry brigade. Daylight on the 6th found them dragging their weary way into Jonesborough, and by 7 a. m. they occupied the same works they were in during the battle of August 31st. The next day they marched toward East Point, and went into camp near that place "in good spirits, cheerful, and as strong for mischief as if they had not walked their toilsome miles or fought the most
stubborn struggles of the war." "Words are inadequate," says General Corse's official report, "to convey a fitting eulogium of the brave and gallant officers of this command. Their conduct inspires one with admiration for his species, and their devotion to their country's cause awakens the conviction that with such men the flag of our country will ever be triumphant."

In marching through the enemy's country General Corse gave stringent orders against pillaging. Observing a disregard of this rule by a certain company, he ordered charges preferred against the officers in command of the company, "for conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline. Pillaging, at all times disgraceful and demoralizing, will not be allowed in this command. While brigade commanders can appropriate properly any article of provision or forage necessary, they are to use every exertion to enforce orders against marauding and lawlessness."

On the 10th of September General Corse issued the following address:

TO THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE SECOND DIVISION SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

You have just passed through the most arduous campaign of the war, and by un murmuring endurance of privations and hardships have won the everlasting gratitude of your Government and people. By heroism and gallantry on the field you have earned and now enjoy the reputation of being among the best soldiers the Republic has sent into the field. Your name is historical, and future generations will point with pride to your deeds, and be stimulated to emulate your actions when danger shall menace the institutions for which you have so manfully struggled. It is unnecessary to enumerate the scenes through which you have passed, for they are engraved in the hearts of a grateful people, and the satisfaction of knowing that you have done your duty, and done it well, is sweeter than listening to the catalogue of obstacles overcome and trials endured. You must remember it is equally if not more difficult to sustain a good name than to secure one. Your labors are not finished. Although we have set down for a season of rest, you are not to be idle. You must turn the energies you have hitherto displayed into other channels. Officers must strive to render
themselves proficient in the profession to which they have devoted themselves. Schools of instruction for officers of all grades will be established. Strict attention must be paid to the conduct and military bearing of the men at parades, guard mountings, and roll calls, to the policing of the camp, to the cleanliness of the men and the neatness of their arms and clothing. All must labor to be prompt and vigilant on duty, to be patient to inferiors, and obedient to superiors. The debasing influences of camp vices must be counteracted by the introduction of harmless games; gymnasiaums must be established, where exercises will be introduced to add strength to the body, activity to the limbs, and grace to the motion. The men must be made to understand that it is disgraceful to get drunk, to quarrel, or use profane or coarse language; that they are regarded as gentlemen, and should bear themselves as such. Brigade and regimental commanders will institute a judicious system of rewards and punishments, and all must strive to impress upon their commands that their profession is the most dignified and honorable in the world, that the rank and reputation of each man depends upon his own conduct, and that the success of a cause, the most sacred in which man ever embarked, is dependent upon their labors while in camp.

You have a difficult task before, but you can accomplish it, if you manifest one-half the energy, patience, and perseverance you have displayed throughout the campaign, on the marches, in the trenches, and on the battlefield. Let every man do his duty.

John M. Corse,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

3.—AT ROME, GEORGIA, AND IN THE DEFENSE OF ALLATOONA.

General Corse's anticipations of a "season of rest" and his plan for a "school of instruction" were not to be realized. The enemy was still alert and defiant. General Hood at once began a series of dashing assaults upon General Sherman's rear to break his communications north and cut off his supplies. General Corse was ordered to move to Rome with his command to garrison that post. As he passed through Atlanta General Sherman gave him verbal instructions to be ready at all times to strike in any direction the enemy might be discovered taking.

Rome is situated at the confluence of the Etowah and
Oostenauala rivers, which run parallel on either side of the city until their waters mingle and form the Coosa. It had been occupied since May by the Union forces. Here was a depot of supplies and ordnance for the Army of the Tennessee, also extensive hospitals for that army, containing during the month of October about 2,000 patients. The buildings occupied a commanding eminence to which was given the name of Cemetery Hill.

General Corse immediately provided for the security of the post. He strengthened the fortifications and drilled the troops for rapid work. Citizens were excluded from the lines. Markets, where they might bring vegetables, fruits and meats for sale to the officers and soldiers, were established near the picket-lines. Spies and scouts were sent out to watch the enemy’s movements, and reconnaissances were made with the cavalry. On the first of October Hood sent a force to operate on the railroad north of Marietta. The critical state of affairs and the course of events appear in the following extracts from the correspondence of commanders:

CORSE TO GENERAL SHERMAN.
ROME, GEORGIA, Oct. 1, 1864, 10 p. m.

I have two or three spies in to-day. They all seemed puzzled as to Hood’s movements.

Oct. 2, 1864.

There are one or two regiments of Texas Cavalry in and about Burnt Hickory and Dallas that commit the mischief done our communications. If you will send, permit me to suggest, about 1,000 cavalry to Dallas, via Villa Rica, I will with a less number drive them down, and the two commands can kill or capture the greater portion of them. If this meets your approval please let me know at once. I propose burning Cedartown, Van Wert and Buchanan, for atrocities committed by gangs of thieves having their rendezvous at those places.

SHERMAN TO CORSE, ROME.

Hood is meditating some plan on a large scale. Wait a little before burning those towns, till we see what he is going to attempt.
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN M. CORSE.

GEN. SHERMAN TO COMMANDING OFFICER, ALLATOONA.

In the Field, Atlanta, Oct. 3, 1864.

Hood has some infantry and cavalry about Powder Springs. I am watching him close. He might deceive us and slip up to Acworth and Allatoona. I want the utmost vigilance there. If he goes for Allatoona I want him delayed only long enough for me to reach his rear. His cavalry can only run across the road and bother us, but his infantry would try to capture stores, without which Hood cannot stay where he is. If he moves up toward Allatoona I will surely come in force.

GENERAL SHERMAN TO GENERAL SLOCUM, 20TH CORPS, ATLANTA.

In the Field, Smyrna Camp-Ground, Oct. 4, 1864.

I have reason to believe Wheeler is on our road above Resaca, Hood's main army is between me and Allatoona. I shall attack the latter in force, but advise you to work night and day in perfecting those entrenchments, and to economise provisions; but if I live, you may count on me coming to your rescue.

GEN. VANDEVER TO COMMANDING OFFICER, ALLATOONA.

Kenesaw Mountain, Oct. 4, 6:30 p. m.

General Sherman says: "Hold fort. We are coming."

GENERAL SHERMAN TO GENERAL W. L. ELLIOTT, CHIEF OF CAVALRY, MARIETTA AND DALLAS ROAD.

Smyrna Camp-Ground, Oct. 4, 1864, 11 p. m.

Don't risk the safety of your cavalry until I get up with my whole force, but make bold reconnaissance. My chief object is to prevent the enemy making an attack on Allatoona to-morrow.

Meanwhile a division of the enemy under Major-Gen. Samuel G. French, of Lieutenant-General A. P. Stewart's corps, had struck the railroad on the 3d of October at Big Shanty, nine miles above Marietta, and at Acworth on the 4th, capturing the garrison, destroying the track and the telegraph, and was now under orders to march upon Allatoona, to fill up the deep cut there with logs, brush, rails and dirt, and capture the garrison and the supplies which were stored at the depot, if possible.
At the same time General Sherman was moving his whole force north, except the 20th corps left for the defense of Atlanta. From the hill-top near Vining's Station he signaled to Kenesaw Mountain the message for the commanding officer at Allatoona, reported above, and also a message for General Corse at Rome to hurry to the relief of Allatoona. Though General Sherman's communication to Allatoona was only by signals from mountain tops over the heads of the enemy, yet from Allatoona to Rome communication by railroad and telegraph was not broken.

Immediately on receipt of General Sherman's message, General Corse prepared to move his whole command, but there was only one locomotive at his disposal. With this he made up a train of twenty cars, and at 8:30 p. m. started from Rome with a portion of one brigade, and reached Allatoona, a distance of 35 miles, at 1 a. m. October 5th. Disembarking, and unloading the ammunition, the train started back to bring the balance of the brigade and as many more troops as possible. Heavy rains, however, damaged the track, and an accident delayed the return of the train until more troops were no longer needed.

At once General Corse rode over the ground with the post commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Tourtelotte of the 4th Minnesota. The garrison consisted of 890 men from the 4th Minnesota, 93d Illinois, 18th Wisconsin, and 12th Wisconsin battery with six guns. The reinforcements brought by General Corse consisted of 1,054 men from the 39th Iowa, 7th, 12th, 50th and 57th Illinois.

Allatoona is at the point where the railroad from Chattanooga emerges from the mountains and crosses a high ridge in a deep cut of 65 feet. Fortifications were erected here at the time of General Sherman's advance in June. Each redoubt overlooked the storehouses near the station and each could aid the other defensively by catching in flank the attacking force of the other.
To Officer Commanding Confederate Forces.

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication demanding the surrender of my force to avoid the needless effusion of blood. I respectfully reply that I am prepared for the immediate evacuation of you. When ever it is agreeable to you. Very respectfully, Geo. W. Corse.

Com’d, 15th D’v’n, 15th Corpo. M.S. A.

Fac simile of the reply of Gen. Corse to the demand of the Confederate Commander for the surrender of the Post of Allatoona. See page 121.
At daylight General Corse disposed his troops ready for the enemy, who had been pushing the picket-lines warmly soon after his arrival. The forces were withdrawn from the town to the ridge on either side of the cut. General Corse says in his report of October 7th and 27th to General Sherman:

About 6 a.m. the troops were in the following position: The 7th Illinois and 36th Iowa in line of battle facing west, on a spur that covers the redoubt immediately on the hill over the cut; one battalion of 93d Illinois in reserve, the other in line of skirmishers moving along the ridge in a westerly direction feeling for the enemy, who was endeavoring to push a force around our right flank; the 4th Minnesota, 50th and 12th Illinois were in the works on the hill east of the cut; the balance of the command were on skirmish and outpost duty.

About 7 a.m. the enemy opened artillery fire upon us from Acworth road, to which we responded. Under a brisk cannonade, with sharp skirmishing on our south front and on our west flank the enemy pushed a brigade of infantry around north of us, cut the railroad and telegraph, severing our communication with Cartersville and Rome. At 8:30 a.m. a flag of truce appeared from the north on the Cartersville road, bearing the following summons:

AROUND ALLATOONA, Oct. 5, 1864.

COMMANDING OFFICER U. S. FORCES, ALLATOONA:

Sir: I have placed the forces under my command in such position that you are surrounded, and to avoid a needless effusion of blood I call on you to surrender your forces at once and unconditionally. Five minutes will be allowed you to decide. Should you accede to this, you will be treated in the most honorable manner as prisoners of war.

I have the honor to be very respectfully yours,

S. G. FRENCH,

Major-General Commanding C. S. Forces.

To which I made the following reply:

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

ALLATOONA, GA., Oct. 5, 1864, 8:00 a.m.

To OFFICER COMMANDING CONFEDERATE FORCES:

Your communication demanding surrender of my command I acknowledge receipt of, and would respectfully reply that we are prepared for the "needless effusion of blood" whenever it is agreeable to you.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. CORSE,

Commanding 4th Division, 15th Corps, U. S. A.
I then hastened to my different commanders, informing them of the object of the flag and my answer, and the importance and necessity of their preparing for hard fighting. I directed Colonel Rowett to hold the spur on which the 39th Iowa and 7th Illinois were formed, sent Colonel Tourtelotte over to the east hill with orders to hold it to the last, sending to me for reinforcements if needed. Taking two companies of the 93d Illinois down a spur parallel with the railroad and along the brink of the cut, so disposed them as to hold the north side as long as possible. Three companies of the 93d which had been driven in from the west end of the ridge were distributed in the ditch south of the redoubt, with instructions to keep the town well covered by their fire and watch the depot where were stored over a million rations. The remaining battalion, under Major Fisher, lay between the redoubt and Rowett's line, to re-enforce where most needed.

I had hardly issued these orders when the storm broke in all its fury on the 39th Iowa and 7th Illinois. Young's brigade of Texans gained the west end of the ridge and moved with great impetuosity along its crest until they struck Rowett's command, where they received a severe shock, but undaunted they came again and again. Rowett, reinforced by the 93d Illinois and aided by the gallant Redfield, encouraged me to hope that we were all safe here, when I observed a brigade of the enemy under command of General Sears moving from the north, its left extending across the railroad. I rushed to the two companies of the 93d Illinois, which were on the brink of the cut running north from the redoubt and parallel with the railroad, they having been reinforced by the retreating pickets, and urged them to hold on to the spur, but it was of no avail. The enemy's line of battle swept us back like so much chaff and struck the 39th Iowa in flank, threatening to engulf our little band without further ado. Fortunately for us Colonel Tourtelotte's fire caught Sears in the flank, and broke him so badly as to enable me to get a staff officer over the cut, with orders to bring the 50th Illinois over to re-enforce Rowett, who had lost very heavily. However, before the regiment could arrive, Sears and Young both rallied and made their assault in front and on the flank with so much vigor and in such force as to break Rowett's line, and had not the 39th Iowa fought with the desperation it did, I never would have been able to have brought a man back into the redoubt. As it was, their hand-to-hand struggle and stubborn stand broke the enemy to that extent that he must stop to reform before undertaking the assault on the fort. Under cover of the blows they gave the enemy, the 7th and 93d Illinois, and what remained of the 39th Iowa, fell back into the fort. The fighting up to this time (about 11 a.m.) was of a most extraordinary character. Attacked from the north, from the west, and from the south, these three regiments held Young's and a portion of Sears' and Cockrell's brigades at bay for nearly two hours and a half. The gallant Colonel Redfield of the 39th Iowa fell shot in four places, and the extraordinary valor of the men and officers
of this regiment and of the 7th Illinois saved to us Allatoona. So completely disorganized were the enemy that no regular assault could be made on the fort till I had the trenches all filled and the parapets lined with men. The 13th and 50th Illinois arriving from the east hill enabled us to occupy every foot of trench, and keep up a line of fire that would render our little fort impregnable as long as our ammunition lasted.

We received fire from the north, south and west face of the redoubt, completely enfilading our ditches, and rendering it almost impracticable for a man to expose his person above the parapet. The broken pieces of the enemy enabled them to fill every hollow, and take advantage of the rough ground surrounding the fort, filling every hole and trench, seeking shelter behind every stump and log that lay within musket-range of the fort. An effort was made to carry our works by assault, but the battery (12th Wisconsin) was so ably managed and so gallantly fought as to render it impossible for a column to live within 100 yards of the works. Officers labored constantly to stimulate the men to exertion, and most all that were killed or wounded in the fort met their fate while trying to get the men to expose themselves above the parapet, nobly setting the example. The enemy kept up a constant and intense fire, gradually closing around us and rapidly filling our little fort with the dead and dying.

About 1 p.m. I was wounded by a rifle ball* which rendered me insensible for some thirty or forty minutes, but managed to rally on hearing some person or persons cry, "Cease firing," which conveyed to me the impression that they were trying to surrender the fort. Again I urged my staff, the few officers left unhurt, and the men around me, to renewed exertion, assuring them that Sherman would soon be there with reinforcements. The gallant fellows struggled to keep their heads above the ditch and parapet in the face of the murderous fire the enemy now concentrated upon us. The artillery was silent for want of ammunition, when a brave fellow, whose name I regret to have forgotten, volunteered to cross the cut which was under fire of the enemy, and go to the fort on the east hill and procure ammunition. Having executed his mission successfully he returned in a short time with an arm-load of canister and case shot.

About 2 p.m. the enemy were observed massing a force behind a small house and the ridge on which the house was located, distant northwest from the fort about 150 yards. The dead and wounded were moved aside, so as to enable us to move a piece of artillery to an embrasure commanding the house and ridge. A few shots from the gun threw the enemy's column into great confusion, which being observed by our men, caused them to rush to the parapet and open such a heavy and continuous musketry fire that it was impossible for the enemy to

*It grazed the left side of his face and cut the top of his ear. He was upon his horse at the time.
rally.* From this time until near 4 p. m. we had the advantage of the enemy, and maintained it with such success that they were driven from every position, and finally fled in great confusion, leaving their dead and wounded and our little garrison in possession of the field.

The hill east of the cut was gallantly and successfully defended by Col. Tourtelotte with that portion of the third Division, 15th Army Corps, that fell back from the town early in the morning. Not only did they repulse the assaults made upon them, but rendered me valuable aid in protecting my north front from the repeated attacks by Sears' brigade. Colonel Tourtelotte and his garrison are deserving of the highest praise, and I take special pleasure in recommending that gallant officer for promotion. Though wounded in the early part of the action he remained with the men until the close.

Colonel Rowett, 7th Illinois, commanding 3d Brigade, 4th Division, manifested such zeal, intrepidity and skill as to induce us all to feel that to his personal efforts we owed an eminent degree the safety of the command. Twice wounded, he clung tenaciously to his post, and fully earned the promotion I so cheerfully recommend may be awarded him.

The gallant dead whose loss conveys grief to so many households have left an imperishable memory, and the names of Redfield, Blodgett and Ayers must prove as immortal as the cause for which they sacrificed their lives. I saw so many individual instances of heroism that I regret I cannot do them justice and render the tribute due each particular one. I can only express in general terms the highest satisfaction and pride I entertain in having been with them and amongst them on that occasion. My loss is 6 officers, 136 men killed; 22 officers, 330 men wounded; 6 officers, 206 men missing; total, 706.

We buried 231 rebel dead, and captured 411 prisoners, 4 stand of colors, and about 800 stand of arms. Amongst the prisoners brought in was Brigadier-General Wm. H. Young.

We looked anxiously all day for the arrival of my troops from Rome or reinforcements from you. With a brigade of fresh troops I

*While the defenders of the southwest ridge were too weak to repel another assault, Corse came upon Sergeant Croxton, who had an arm shot away, but was collecting cartridges. The general was seized with an inspiration and joined the sergeant in gathering ammunition. They broke the cartridges, putting the powder in a blanket, the minie balls in a cup. Collecting enough for his purpose, Corse ordered a sergeant to help him heave a dismounted gun upon a point of the redoubt which commanded the ridge. Dead bodies were in the way; to make room for his gun Corse piled them in heaps. Getting the gun in place, powder and balls were rammed home, the piece pointed, and lanyard in hand the sergeant awaited the order. A little later a solid mass of Confederates formed, and with yells rushed toward the fort. Their impetus would have broken through all opposition and carried them up and into the fort. At that moment Corse gave the order and the gun was fired. The Confederates were mowed down as if they had been grass. They disappeared before the blast. It was the last assault.—An Eye Witness, Boston Herald, May 2, 1895
could have captured French's entire division. We saved all the stores. To my personal staff, Captain M. R. Flint, 1st Alabama Cavalry, and Lieutenant A. P. Vaughn, 52d Illinois Infantry, I tender my heartiest thanks and congratulations for their remarkable bravery and efficient services during the entire engagement; also to Lieutenant W. Ludlow, chief engineer, 20th Army Corps, who, sent to Rome to superintend the works there, arrived as we were leaving and volunteered as an aide for the expedition. He rendered with the other gentlemen mentioned valuable services and manifested a personal courage and zeal deserving high praise.

In coming to Allatoona on the night of October 4th General Corse came from the north. Two hours after his arrival the enemy under General French approached Allatoona from the south. General French was a graduate from the U. S. Military Academy in 1843, had distinguished himself at Monterey and Buena Vista in the Mexican war, and at the outbreak of the rebellion was living on a cotton plantation in Mississippi. His troops consisted of the 4th, 35th, 36th, 39th, 46th, and a battalion of 7th Mississippi Infantry under Brigadier-General Claudius W. Sears; the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th Missouri Infantry, and 1st and 3d Missouri Cavalry, under General Francis M. Cockrell, and Ector's brigade of 9th, 10th Texas Infantry, 14th, 22d Texas Cavalry dismounted, 29th and 30th North Carolina Infantry, under General Young. According to the returns of "Hood's Army," Sept. 20, 1864, the division numbered 2,962 effectives.

In his report of Oct. 8 and Nov. 5, 1864, General French gives the following particulars of the movements of his troops:

I left Big Shanty about 3:30 p. m. (Oct. 4) and marched to Acworth, a distance of six miles, arriving before sunset. There I was detained awaiting the arrival of rations. Captain Taylor, of Pinson's cavalry, was directed to send fifteen men under a trusty officer to strike the railroad near the Etowah bridge, and take up rails and hide them, so as to prevent trains from reaching Allatoona with reinforcements, as well as prevent any trains that might be there from escaping. From an eminence near Acworth the enemy could be seen communicating messages by night signals from Allatoona with the station on Kenesaw.
As I knew nothing of the road it was important to procure a guide, and at last a boy was found who knew the roads and had seen the position of the fortifications at Allatoona. About 11 p. m. the march was resumed. The night was dark, the roads bad. After crossing Allatoona Creek the 4th Mississippi was left near the block-house with instructions to capture the garrison and destroy the bridge over the creek. Continuing the march the division arrived near the cut before Allatoona about 3 a. m. Nothing could be seen but one or two twinkling lights on the opposite heights, and nothing was heard except the occasional interchange of shots between our advanced guards and the pickets of the garrison in the valley. All was darkness. I had no knowledge of the place, and it was important to attack at the break of day.

Taking the guide and lights I placed the artillery in position on the hills, with the 39th North Carolina and 32d Texas as a supporting force, and proceeded to gain the heights or ridge crowned by the works. Without roads or paths the head of the line reached the railroad, crossed it, and began ascending and descending the high, steep, and densely-timbered spurs of the mountains, and after about an hour's march it was found we were not on the main ridge. The guide made a second effort to gain the ridge and failed, so dark was it in the woods. I therefore determined to rest where we were, and await daylight. With dawn the march was resumed, and finally by 7:30 o'clock the head of the column was on the ridge and about 600 yards west of the fortifications, and between those occupied and an abandoned redoubt on our left. Here the fortifications for the first time were seen, and instead of two redoubts there were disclosed three redoubts on the west of the railroad cut, and a star fort on the east, with outer works, and the approaches defended to a great distance by abatis and nearer the works by stockades and other obstructions.

Dispositions for the assault were now made by sending General Sears' brigade to the north side of the works, General Cockrell's brigade to rest with center on ridge, while General Young with the four Texas regiments was formed in rear of General Cockrell. So rugged and abrupt were the hills that the troops could not be got into position until about 9 a. m. when I sent in a summons to surrender. No reply being sent me, the order for the assault was given by directing the advance of Cockrell's brigade. Emerging from the woods and passing over a long distance of abatis formed of felled timber, and under a severe fire of musketry and artillery, nobly did it press forward, followed by the gallant Texans. The enemy's outer line and one redoubt soon fell. Resting to gather strength and survey the work before them, again they rushed forward in column; in murderous hand-to-hand conflict, that left the ditches filled with the dead, they became masters of the second redoubt. The third and main redoubt, now filled by those driven from the captured works on the west side of the railroad, was further crowded by those driven out of the fort on the east side by the
attack made by General Sears. They had to cross the deep cut through which our artillery poured a steady and deadly fire. At 12:30 p. m. General Sears sent word to Major-General French as follows: "Our men are fighting bravely. Will get up a grand charge as soon as the men rest a little. We will take this work, if possible. Men are greatly fatigued. We are in enemy's works, but have not the fort yet. The yells of your men do us great good."

The Federal forces were now confined to one redoubt, and we occupied the ditch, and almost silenced their fire, and were preparing for the final attack.

Pending the process of these events I received a note from General Frank C. Armstrong informing me that the enemy had moved up above Kenesaw and encamped there last night. Here, then, was General Sherman's army close behind me, which changed the whole condition of affairs. Ammunition had to be carried from the wagons, a mile distant, at the base of the hills, and it would take two hours to get it up and distribute it before the final assault. My men had marched all day on the 3d, worked all night of the 3d destroying the railroad, had worked and marched all day on the 4th, marched to Allatoona on the night of the 4th, had fought up to the afternoon of the 5th; and could they pass the third day and night without rest or sleep, if we remained to assault the remaining work? I did not doubt that the enemy would endeavor to get in my rear to intercept my return. Under these circumstances, after deliberately surveying matters, I determined to withdraw my forces. Before withdrawing I ordered that the stores be burned at the depot. Parties were sent, but all efforts failed. The enemy's fire, concentrated to protect their stores, was heavy and incessant all the time.

History will record the battle of Allatoona as one of the most sanguinary conflicts of the war; and, when it is remembered that the enemy fought within their strong redoubts, a meed of praise is due to the heroic valor of our troops for their desperate deeds of daring in overcoming so many of the foe. I cannot do justice to their gallantry. No one faltered, and all withdrew from the place with the regret that General Sherman's movements, closing up behind us, forbid our remaining to force a surrender of the last work. The cavalry sent to cut the railroad near the Etowah bridge failed to accomplish it.

After leaving out the three regiments which formed no part of the assaulting force, I had a little over 2,000 men. My entire loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 799 (another "list" makes the number 872).—Vol. 39, Part 1, pp. 813-820.

Lieutenant John Q. Adams, who was in command of the detachment of the Signal Corps operating at the time at Allatoona, says:

A message was received by me during the day, Oct. 4, that the
enemy were marching in force upon Allatoona, also dispatches ordering the movements of troops to this place, and to hold out to the last. On the 5th, as soon as I could see Kenesaw, the atmosphere being smoky and hazy, I sent them a message stating the arrival of reinforcements, "We hold out. General Corse here." This was after I had moved over to the fort with my flag, about 10 a. m. The message was of some length and was flagged under a sharp fire with remarkable coolness and accuracy by J. W. McKenzie and Frank A. West.

The fight lasted about eight hours from the time it became general. With telescope I discovered the enemy withdrawing their artillery, and the musketry had in a measure subsided. I sent a message to General Sherman that we were all right, and General Corse was wounded. While sending this the fire was not so severe as when I sent the former one, but sharp shooters were still firing on us, and it was far from being safe. This message was flagged from the top of the fort.

When I moved to the fort I took three men with me to flag; the balance (nine men) I instructed to see to their revolvers and get into the rifle-pits; also, if they saw a man wounded not to let his musket remain idle. After the fight I found that each of the men had muskets, and had fired each from 30 to 90 rounds of cartridges from the rifle-pits.

In a communication to the Secretary of War, Oct. 27, 1864, General Sherman said:

In several instances the Signal Corps has transmitted orders, and brought me information of the greatest importance that could not have reached me in any other way. I will instance one most remarkable case. When the enemy had cut our wires and made a lodgment on our railroad about Big Shanty, the signal officers on Vining's Hill, Kenesaw and Allatoona, sent my orders to General Corse, at Rome, whereby he was enabled to reach Allatoona just in time to defend it. Had it not been for this corps on that occasion, we should have lost the garrison at Allatoona and a most valuable repository of provisions there, which was worth to us and the country more than the aggregate expense of the whole Signal Corps for one year.

General Sherman reached Kenesaw Mountain about 10 a. m. of the 5th. From the signal station he saw the fires of the burning railroad and the smoke of battle, and could hear faint reverberations of the cannon. During the morning the signal officers had failed of an answer to his call for Allatoona, but while Sherman was standing by, at 10:35 a. m., a glimpse was caught of the "tell-tale flag," through an embrasure at Allatoona, with the message: "We hold out," and the letters "C. R. S. E. H. E. R." It was Sherman's first assurance that Corse
had received his orders, and was himself upon the ground. With painful suspense he watched the indications of the battle, and was dreadfully impatient at the slow progress of the relieving column. At 1:35 p. m. he noted "heavy firing, indicating an assault and repulse; occasional shots, but too smoky to see signals. About 2 p. m. the smoke of battle grew less, and ceased about 4 p. m."

In his report General Sherman says that the defense of Allatoona was "admirably conducted, and General Corse's description of it so graphic that it left nothing for him to add." Recalling these scenes in after years, General Hood wrote: "General Corse won my admiration by his gallant resistance, and not without reason the Federal commander complimented this officer through a general order for his handsome conduct in the defense of Allatoona."—Advance and Retreat, New Orleans, 1880. (Battles and Leaders in the Civil War, iv. 425.)

The following signal dispatches, additional to those referred to, passed between Allatoona and Kenesaw Mountain:

Allatoona, Oct. 5.
Where is General Sherman?

Kenesaw Mountain, Oct. 5.
Near you. Tell Allatoona, hold on. General Sherman says he is working hard for you.

Kenesaw Mountain, Oct. 6.
How is Corse? What news?

Dayton, Aide-de-Camp.

Allatoona, Oct. 6, 2. p. m.

Captain L. M. Dayton, Aide-de-Camp:
I am short a cheek bone and one ear, but am able to whip all hell yet. My losses are very heavy. A force moving from Stilesborough on Kingston gives me some anxiety. Tell me where Sherman is.

John M. Corse,
Brigadier-General.
General Corse:
Am reconnoitering toward Burnt Hickory and Lost Mountain.
Are you badly wounded? If all is right at Allatoona I want you back at Rome.

Sherman.

IN THE FIELD, KENESAW, Oct. 6.

General Corse, Allatoona:
Am just in. Am very sorry at your wound, but all is right with you. If possible, keep the enemy off your lines, and let me know at once what force you have, and what is at Kingston and Rome; also signal some account of your fight. Hood has retreated to Dallas.

W. T. Sherman.

KENESAW, Oct. 6, 9:30 p. m.

General Corse, Allatoona:
Let the Rome force return at once to Rome and protect the road. I will cover Allatoona.

W. T. Sherman.

On the 6th the troops at Allatoona were occupied in strengthening their position, and gathering the rebel dead and wounded, and the arms that were strewn over the field. On the 7th General Corse moved his command to Cartersville, and on the 8th to Kingston and Rome.

KENESAW MOUNTAIN, Oct. 7, 12:15 a. m.

Corse:
I send brigade up to you in the morning.

Sherman.

By this brigade General Sherman forwarded the following letter:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, KENESAW, Oct. 6, 1864.

General Corse, Commanding, Allatoona.

Dear General: This evening I got a signal from you giving me the first real intelligence of the safety of Allatoona and of your command. At some future time I will add my appreciation of your services, but now I want to prevent any more mischief to our roads. Allatoona is now safe on this front. Leave enough to cover the bridge to the rear as against a cavalry dash, and send all you can spare back to Rome to assure the safety of that place. I doubt if any force of Hood will cross.
the Etowah, but still it may. I will to-morrow continue to demonstrate against him and make him keep his people together. Unless your wound is too severe, exercise a general command, for your head is worth more than a dozen of any I have to spare. I have sent these orders by signal, but fear they may reach you mutilated. If possible get a message up to Chattanooga for them to work this way whilst we work the road back. We have abundance of food, but little forage.

Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.

The following is a continuation of signal dispatches:

ALLATOONA, Oct. 7, 1864, 8:40 a.m.

GENERAL SHERMAN:
I have just sent my wounded to Rome. Shall I move my command back to Rome when your brigade arrives?

CORSE.

KENESAW MOUNTAIN, Oct. 7, 9 a.m.

CORSE:
Yes, move to Rome when the brigade arrives.

SHERMAN.

ALLATOONA, Oct. 7, 11 a.m.

GENERAL SHERMAN:
The brigade from 23d corps is here. How long shall it remain?

CORSE.

KENESAW MOUNTAIN, Oct. 7, 11:30 a.m.

GENERAL CORSE:
Brigade will stay until further orders.

SHERMAN.

KENESAW MOUNTAIN, Oct. 7.

ALLATOONA:
Send back courier with full account of all matters of interest and as to road above.

SHERMAN.

KENESAW MOUNTAIN, Oct. 7.

GENERAL SHERMAN:
I sent a staff officer to you this morning with intelligence.

CORSE.
ANNALS OF IOWA.

KENESAW MOUNTAIN, Oct. 7, 5 p. m.

CORSE:

Lieutenant Ludlow is here, all O. K.

EWING.

In the informal report sent on the 7th, General Corse said that the bearer "will give you the minute details of the affair. The pain occasioned by the severe wound on my head prevents me from doing so." General Sherman replied:


GENERAL CORSE, Allatoona:

I received your report. I have so high an appreciation of your services and those of your command, as also that of Colonel Tourtelotte and garrison, that I shall make the defense of Allatoona the subject of a general order. I will move my army one step north to-morrow, and want you to exercise a general care over the operations from Allatoona as far as Kingston. I will so place my command that in one day's work they will replace all the iron burnt between Allatoona and Kenesaw, and leave the laying of the ties to the construction party. We have 2,700,000 rations in Atlanta and can afford to await repairs. I will be much obliged to you if you can manage to send to Generals Thomas and Webster notice that Atlanta is safe in our possession, so that General Slocomb can hold it against Hood's whole army.

I almost share the pain of your wound with you, but you know for quick work I cannot get along without you, and ask you, spite of pain, to keep your head clear and leave others to do your bidding. Your presence alone saved to us Allatoona the day before yesterday, but this does not detract from the merit of others. Rome is of no value at all, save as a flank. Destroy its bridges and factories on the slightest provocation, and cover the vital points of our road.

SPECIAL FIELD ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

The general commanding avails himself of the opportunity, in the handsome defense made of Allatoona, to illustrate the most important principle in war, that fortified posts should be defended to the last, regardless of the relative numbers of the party attacking and attacked.

Allatoona was garrisoned by three regiments commanded by Colonel Tourtelotte, and reinforced by a detachment from a division at Rome under command of Brigadier-General J. M. Corse on the morning of the 5th, and a few hours after was attacked by French's division of Stewart's corps, two other divisions being near at hand and in
support. General French demanded a surrender to "avoid a useless effusion of blood," and gave but five minutes for an answer. General Corse’s answer was emphatic and strong: that he and his command were ready for the "useless effusion of blood" as soon as it was agreeable to General French. This answer was followed by an attack which was prolonged for five hours, resulting in the complete repulse of the enemy, who left his dead on the ground, amounting to more than 200, and 400 prisoners well and wounded. The "effusion of blood" was not "useless," as the position was and is very important to our present and future operations.

The thanks of this army are due, and hereby accorded to General Corse, Colonel Tourtelotte, officers and men, for their determined and gallant defense of Allatoona, and it is made an example to illustrate the importance of preparing in time, and meeting the danger when present, boldly, manfully, and well. This army, though unseen to the garrison, was co-operating by moving toward the road by which the enemy could alone escape, but unfortunately was delayed by the rain and mud; but this fact hastened the retreat of the enemy. Commanders and garrisons of the posts along our railroad are hereby instructed that they must hold their posts to the last minute, sure that the time gained is valuable and necessary to their commands at the front.

CORSE TO GENERAL SHERMAN.

HEADQUARTERS 4TH DIVISION, 15TH A. C.,

The railroad to Chattanooga is all right except the bridges across the Oostenaula and Etowah, the latter having become shaky since 12 m. to-day from an unusual rise and consequent drift against its bents. The bridge across the Oostenaula ought to be done to-day, and that over the Etowah I had a construction party sent to, and will push it in hopes of finishing before daylight. I will go in an ambulance with my command to Cartersville, ready to strike toward Rome, Kingston or the Etowah bridge, as the case may be. My train of wounded is cut off on this side of the Etowah, and I will leave it here to-night. We hear nothing of the enemy.

CARTERSVILLE, Oct. 8, 1864, 12 m.

Finding that the brigade from the 23d corps was to remain at Allatoona, I at once moved my command to this place, being en route for Rome. The wounded, about 300, I had loaded on cars at Allatoona and pushed up toward Kingston, but found the drift had so damaged the bridge across the Etowah as to preclude their crossing until the necessary repairs could be made. The constructing force was sent for yesterday, but has not yet arrived; it will be impossible therefore to
get my wounded to Rome to-day. I have carried across the river seven car loads of wounded, and will send them to Rome, hoping to get them there and a train back in time to take the rest before morning. I am a little anxious for two reasons: first, they suffered from exposure last night and need care; second, I want the cars emptied, to move troops rapidly in case of any emergency. The rebel wounded, about 250, I left at Allatoona. The sound prisoners I have sent to Kingston with the division. I will go to Kingston this afternoon, via railroad. There is a great deficiency in the railroad construction department between Resaca and Allatoona, which occasions all the delays. Tackle and instruments we can't find here are necessary to repair the bridges. I will stay at Kingston to-night with my force, and if nothing further is developed by to-morrow noon will move thence to Rome ready for further movements. I would suggest the propriety of sending a force to guard those 8,000 cattle down near the army. I understand you ordered them to Allatoona. They cannot be protected at Allatoona if that place is again attacked as it was on the 5th. You probably forgot that the Army of the Tennessee has 1,400 sick men at Rome, and it cannot be burned or abandoned very easily. As they have ample accommodation for more, I was induced to send my wounded there, which will increase the number of helpless to about 1,700 or 1,800.

While I would protect them as long as possible, I could not afford to sacrifice my command or your communications for their sake, and in the extreme event would leave supplies and surgeons sufficient to care for them and abandon the place. You must not think that the responsibility of their care will deter me from moving to more important points even without your orders. I, however, respectfully ask you to let me know by bearer your views as regards their protection, and duty towards them. I will be ready to strike wherever you want me at the instant, and will, I assure you, not hesitate to smash any column I find trying to cross the Etowah. I have more or less pain in my head, but with intermittent rests manage to get along very well.

CORSE TO MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, NASHVILLE.
CARTERSVILLE, Oct. 8, 1864.

General Sherman desires I send you word that he is all right at Kenesaw, and repairing road north. He earnestly urges the importance of pushing work on road toward him. His ration question, he says, is all right; the forage question, he desires to have you know, can be improved with your assistance. Hood's efforts are so far a failure.

Brigadier-General T. E. G. Ransom, commanding the 17th Army Corps, congratulated General Corse as follows:
We all feel grateful to God for your brilliant victory, and are proud of our old comrade and his noble division. You have the congratulations and sympathy of the 17th Army Corps.

General Ransom died only three weeks after sending these congratulations. He was "an officer of the highest order of merit, as also a man of pure and elevated character. Hoping the attack of disease which caused his death was but temporary, he did not cease day or night to exert himself to the utmost in his country's service."—O. O. Howard.

Major-General Howard, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, issued the following

GENERAL ORDER.

NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN, Oct. 9, 1864.

Whilst uniting in the high commendation awarded by the general-in-chief, the Army of the Tennessee would tender through me its most hearty appreciation and thanks to Brigadier-General J. M. Corse for his promptitude, energy and eminent success in the defense of Allatoona Pass against a force so largely superior to his own, and our warmest congratulations are extended to him, to Colonel Tourtelotte, and the rest of our comrades-in-arms who fought at Allatoona, for the glorious manner in which they vetoed "the useless effusion of blood."—O. O. Howard, Major-General.

Reaching Rome about 9 p. m. of Oct. 8th, General Corse found the bridges at that place swept away in the recent freshet, and that the force left there had withdrawn into the garrison, supposing Hood to be approaching. He at once directed a small outpost to be thrown across the Etowah that night in boats to Cemetery Hill, which was the key to the situation, and ordered the chief of the pioneer corps to build a pontoon bridge at that point. So prompt and energetic were the pioneer corps that trees standing in the streets of Rome at midnight of the 8th furnished balk and chess for the bridge over which infantry, cavalry, and artillery, that arrived just as the bridge was finished, marched at noon of the 9th.
136 ANNALS OF IOWA.

CORSE TO GENERAL SHERMAN.

Rome, Ga., Oct. 9, 1864.

I have just finished a new pontoon bridge over the Etowah, and have sent a cavalry force to reconnoiter toward Cedartown. I have my flanks and front well patrolled, and can give you more information to-morrow.—7:30 p. m.—The only indication of an enemy since my arrival here being the appearance of a cavalry force at Reynold's Ford, I am ready to fly there in case they should attempt a crossing. I promise to keep you advised of anything transpiring west of Kingston.

The 10th of October was a day of conflicting rumors. At one time it was reported that Hood's entire army was moving on Rome, and General Sherman directed General Corse to get his men into the strongest forts and "hold Rome to the death." Every ax, shovel and pick, was brought into requisition. Men worked all night on the defenses. General Sherman telegraphed: "Fight your men well behind parapets, and risk as few lives as possible. In case Hood attacks, I want you to burn down every house in Rome that interferes with your range of fire." Reporting later the same day what he learned of the enemy's movements, General Corse said: "Their destination is Huntsville, &c. They are to attack Rome at daylight, squelch the, and get the stores, then continue the journey. I have had men and women through their camps to-day; they have various reports. The object of the trip is recruits from Tennessee. They number 10,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry. I will hold them as long as men can stand and guns will shoot. They have pushed their forces against my pickets to-night and are quite close. I will look to you for help, and keep you advised." Later the same day General Sherman telegraphed: "Hood would have attacked you before this if he intended to, for he must know I am near you. Watch his movements close; I think he will only throw a force toward Rome to cover his movements over toward the Tennessee or back to Georgia." The next day, Oct. 11th, Hood's army had disappeared, but in what direction was in doubt.
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN M. CORSE.

GENERAL SHERMAN TO CORSE.

IN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, Oct. 11, 1864, 2:20 p.m.

I think you had better lay down now and take a good long sleep. Give some staff officer general instructions as to scouts, and let him communicate to me direct. You have done all a man could, and my judgment of you has been fully vindicated.

CORSE TO GENERAL SHERMAN.

ROME, GA., Oct. 11, 1864, 4 p.m.

I am profoundly grateful for your sympathy and proud of your confidence; would willingly obey your order, but sleep is out of the question. Nature will assert rights at the proper time, I have no doubt. A squadron of cavalry I sent out this morning attacked the picket on Cave Spring road, about seven miles from here; drove them in until they ran into a line of battle. I just examined a prisoner they brought in from the Second Mississippi Cavalry. He says the men were told that they were en route for Tennessee and Kentucky. He knows that the main body of Hood's army is across the Coosa. (They had crossed at a point about eleven miles below Rome.)

GENERAL SHERMAN TO CORSE.

IN THE Field, KINGSTON, Oct. 11, 4:45 p.m.

I have just received your telegram. I order you to rest. Don't get your mind so nervous as to fail sleep. General Elliott will be at Rome to direct the cavalry, and that will relieve your mind. A good long sleep, plenty of fresh water to your wound, and you will be worth twice as much to-morrow. I appreciate the intensity of your zeal, and will never forget it.

CORSE TO GENERAL SHERMAN.

ROME, GA., Oct. 11, 1864, 11:40 p.m.

A scout has just arrived who was 14 miles out on Summerville road. He reports Martin's division as camping last night at Farmer's Bridge, over the Armuchee River; could hear of no other troops, but the citizens say Hardee crossed the Coosa at Coosaville, and that the movement on this place was merely a feint to cover the other movements.

On the 12th of October General Sherman arrived at Rome, and his army encamped within three miles. The next day General Corse moved with his division in fighting trim across the Etowah to develop the character and
strength of the enemy. In his absence the convalescents from the hospitals marched under arms through the streets of Rome, in order to give the citizens the impression that the force holding the post was not materially weakened. Learning that Hood had gone north with great rapidity, General Sherman ordered other troops in pursuit, and directed General Corse to return to Rome. Here he was employed for a month in work upon the fortifications, in reconnaissances, watching and checking the movements of the enemy, in building bridges, and in looking after army supplies, for which Rome was the depot. The activity of the division was incessant and of great service to the whole army.

CORSE TO GENERAL SHERMAN.

ROME, GA., Oct. 22, 1864.

All quiet along the railroad. The communication with Chattanooga will be opened positively, I am informed, by Monday. I have ten days' rations for my command and about 500,000 for your force. I think I can get the sick and wounded off Monday or Tuesday on through trains. There are about 1,200 here now; when they are gone I am ready to clean the place, and move with ten days' rations. Should you require the place to be abandoned, please give instructions as to disposition of things left here.

GENERAL SHERMAN TO CORSE.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, GAYLERSVILLE, ALABAMA, Oct. 22, 1864.

I want all the preparations continued that I have heretofore marked out, in a quiet way, not to attract too much attention, but it will be some time before I can uncover Tennessee. I must give General George H. Thomas full time to prepare his new lines. Continue to notify all the post commanders where we are, and that absentees fit for honest duty can find us via Rome. Keep me fully posted, and use my name freely in orders sent to the rear to accomplish my purpose and plans.

In a letter to General Halleck, Oct. 24, 1864, General Sherman included Brigadier-General J. M. Corse among division commanders who "should be promoted to the rank of Major-General, men of marked courage, capacity, and merit, who are qualified for separate commands."
On the 29th of October General Corse informed his brigade commanders that they were soon to take the field for a long, arduous and successful campaign, and called them to the greatest energy in fitting up their commands. Baggage, clothing, camp and garrison equipage, not absolutely required in the campaign, were to be shipped to the rear, in charge of those who were not able to endure a march. The sick and wounded were sent north from the hospitals. On the 10th of November the defenses of Rome were destroyed and the forts dismantled. Large pieces of ordnance for which no transportation could be procured were burst or spiked. For the same reason much valuable public property and officers' baggage had to be abandoned. The pontoons had been hauled out of the river and piled up to dry for burning. The machinery in foundries, mills, tanneries, and workshops was broken up so as to be unfit for use. At 10 o'clock at night the property destined for destruction was in flames. Guards and patrols prevented disorder, pillage, or firing of private residences, and no private residence was burned, nor a family disturbed.

At daylight, the next morning, Nov. 11th, General Corse moved with his command to Kingston, and on the following day reached Cartersville and moved near Allatoona. On this day, Nov. 12th, the telegraph wire was severed, and all communications with the north ceased. General Corse crossed the Chattahoochee at Turner's Ferry, and reached the vicinity of Atlanta on the evening of the 14th. His command now numbered 3,710 effective men.

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4—THE MARCH TO SAVANNAH.

On the "March to the Sea" the four corps of General Sherman's army, numbering 62,204 men, followed different routes, covering a tract of country 50 or 60 miles in
width southeasterly from Atlanta. General Corse's position was in the Right Wing, Major-General O. O. Howard commanding, and in the 15th Corps, Major-General Peter J. Osterhaus commanding.

On the morning of Nov. 10th General Corse's division marched into Atlanta, as the rest of the 15th Corps were marching out. The troops drew rations and clothing, loaded twenty days' supplies on the wagon trains, and headed south the same evening. Their route lay through Rough and Ready, McDonough, and near Jackson, where they bivouacked Nov. 18th. On the 20th they crossed the Ocmulgee River at Seven Islands, in rear of the corps. From this point to Gordon the roads were almost impassable by incessant rains. The command was also incumbered by a pontoon train, by 300 wagons belonging to the cavalry division, and by a drove of 3,000 cattle. But they struggled through the mud and swamps, and at Gordon were relieved of the additional trains. The Georgia Central railroad was struck on the 22d, and destroyed for six miles, the ties burnt, the rails bent, twisted and broken. One evening a negro was brought to General Sherman who had been that day to Tenille Station. To the inquiry if he had seen any Yankees there, he said: "Yes—first, there come along some cavalrnymen, and they burnt the depot; then come along some infantry men, and they tore up the track, and burnt it; and just before he left they had sot fire to the well." The next morning, Nov. 27th, General Sherman rode to Tenille Station, and found General Corse's division engaged in destroying the railroad, and saw the well which the negro had seen "sot fire to." It was a square pit, about 28 feet deep, boarded up, with wooden steps leading to the bottom, wherein was a copper pump to lift water to a tank above. The soldiers had broken up the pump, heaved in the steps and lining, and "sot fire to" the mass of lumber in the bottom of the well, which confirmed the negro's description.
Up to this time the troops subsisted mainly upon the country, drawing but little from rations in the army-wagons. Foraging parties of 50 men to a regiment under an officer scoured the plantations and collected food of every description from barns and granaries and smoke-houses. But now the march was through pine barrens, and fresh supplies were scant.

On the 2d of December the Ogeechee River was reached, and the division marched parallel with it for several days, crossing and recrossing at intervals. At Jenks' Ferry, on the 7th, the enemy resisted the crossing, but were forced back by the 2d and 7th Iowa. Brigadier-General Elliott W. Rice, commanding 1st Brigade, says in his report:

The country for about three-quarters of a mile was nearly waist deep with water in the swamps and lagoons, through which the troops waded with a good will, driving the enemy into a small rail-work which they had hastily constructed. I endeavored to turn their position, and gain the rear of their defenses by throwing a portion of the 2d Iowa to their left, under cover of a thick woods in that direction, but the troops in front could not be held back. They dashed right over the rail-works, capturing 20 prisoners, killing 2, and wounding four men. The balance of the rebel force rushed to the railroad, and taking the cars moved off in the direction of Savannah. In this skirmish the 2d Iowa lost 2 men killed and 2 wounded, and the 7th Iowa 2 men wounded.

The following day, Dec. 8th, the Ogeechee and Savannah Canal was reached, and the roads leading into the city were found obstructed by felled timber, and covered by earth-works with artillery. For the first time in the march shovels were sent to the front, and earth-works thrown up. The command entrenched on the north bank of the canal. A reconnaissance developed the enemy in force with artillery at the junction of the Dillon's Bridge road with the King's Bridge and Savannah road.

On the 9th General Corse moved out with two brigades, Adams' and Rice's, and Brunner's battery, to obtain possession of the Cross Roads, and try to open communication with the rest of the corps. The dense
undergrowth made movements in line exceedingly difficult, but the advance soon developed the artillery of the enemy. It was impossible to see through the dense woods, and the enemy’s artillery swept the road so as to render it untenable, compelling the battery to play on their works from a field behind a thick forest and to fire altogether by the sound of their guns. “At this time,” says General Corse, “information was brought that a column of the enemy was moving on my right, and I pushed Rice with two regiments toward the King’s Bridge road, and ordered Adams to push on with vigor. Increased volleys of musketry and a sudden cessation of the enemy’s artillery, with the significant yelling of our men, indicated that the assault was in progress, and before I could reach the center, or Rice could make the road, our troops were in the enemy’s works with quite a squad of prisoners, and one piece of artillery as a trophy. The enemy were pursued for four miles, and the 7th Illinois Mounted Infantry struck for the Gulf railroad, arriving in time to tear up a rail and capture a locomotive and eighteen cars, with about 40 prisoners. The brigade left at the canal was then brought up with the supply and ordnance trains, and the division went into camp with a good line of defense, near the main branch of the Little Ogeechee, about eleven miles from Savannah.” Here General Corse was in close communication with the other divisions of the 15th Corps, and the Right Wing and the Left Wing of General Sherman’s army closed in simultaneously upon the Confederate works which covered the approaches to the city between the Ogeechee and Savannah rivers.

On the 10th General Corse found the enemy in his front apparently in heavy force, but intervening swamps and rice fields made approaches extremely difficult. The Confederates gathered on parapets and unfurled their banners defiantly. By means of the canal and the Little Ogeechee river they were able to flood the country.
There were heavy rains also which converted the roads through the marshy soil into a sea of mud and quagmire, and corduroy tracks had to be constructed, and bridges that the enemy had destroyed were rebuilt, for the movement of troops and of supplies. The enemy's guns were of larger caliber than our light field pieces and gave some annoyance. A staff officer of General Sherman's relates this incident of the situation:

It was bruited about one day that two barrels of old Monongahela had fallen into General Corse's possession from a neighboring plantation, and scores of officers came from all sides in wagons and ambulances, or on horseback, with medical certificates that they required a stimulant. The tide of thirsty visitors was a hindrance to the general's work and, though no less hospitable than gallant, he found a way to stop it. His headquarters were upon a causeway among magnificent live oak trees. Here and there through openings in the evergreen foliage the pale canvas of the white tents was revealing our position to the enemy, a few hundred yards away, and the rebel guns had a habit at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of opening fire until sundown. Perhaps not unmindful of this, General Corse gave out word one morning that official duties would prevent his entertaining visitors until afternoon of the following day. And the sun had hardly crossed the meridian when his friends, officers of all grades from the single-barred lieutenant to the double-starred major-general, began to arrive. They gathered on the parade ground, some stretched upon blankets, others upon boxes and camp-chairs, enjoying the sunshine, the balmy air and the whisky. It was a jovial party of soldiers who had seen the bright and dark side of life, who had endured the pain of wounds and the hardships of campaigning. "Here's your health, General!" cried a staff officer who had known his host when they fought side by side, "and may you never get a closer call than that Allatoona bullet across the cheek."

The host answered with a nod, and fifteen or twenty bronzed and bearded faces were uplifted, and as many pairs of eyes gazed into the sky through a yellow stained tumbler. At this moment a sharp muffled sound, "Boom! boom! boom!" came thumping over the marshes, and the air was filled with a shriek and thir-r-r-r, that seemed exultant to break in upon the social joy. The first of the iron messengers smashed into Adjutant Carper's tent and through his desk, scattering his papers; the second ricocheted into the trees beyond; the third rolled along toward the whisky barrel. The disgust and consternation of the visitors was expressed in grotesque attitudes. For a moment transfixed they changed position as the big cannon across the marshes again found voice; several sought their horses, calling loudly for their orderlies;
others sought their presence of mind which had taken wings with Leo Carper’s papers; but the greater number placed the protecting trunks of the huge oaks between them and the offending guns. At last several found breath: “What is this, Corse? A nice tea-party you have invited us to!” Meanwhile the unperturbed host had taken out his watch—“Precisely on time, 3 o’clock! Pardon me, gentlemen, that I did not notify you that I expected strangers at this hour. The people over the way invariably send their compliments at this hour, and,” he spoke more deliberately as he pointed at the cannon ball, “these fellows continue to come until sundown.”

The words had hardly passed the general’s lips when the files of officers behind the trees broke up. “Won’t you take another drink, gentlemen?” asked the courteous Corse, and then addressing his complimentary friend of a moment before—“Say, Captain, I would like to respond to your toast.” But there was a fast mounting of restive horses, and in half a minute all evidence of the jovial party was a cloud of dust down the long avenue of oaks as the galloping steeds disappeared.—Harper’s Magazine, xxiii, 368-9.

From day to day General Corse pushed forward his line and came closer to the rebel works. On the night of the 19th he obtained permission to attempt a lodgment on the other side of the Little Ogeechee, and sent over Lieutenant Pittman, 81st Ohio, with ten men who volunteered for the purpose. The movement was hazardous, but it was accomplished without loss or awakening suspicion of the enemy. Having demonstrated the practicability of crossing a column, General Corse wanted to put a force over during the night, and the next day move the division over and assault the enemy. But General Sherman had ordered that while all possible preparation should be made, there should be no attack in his absence.

Meanwhile, on the 13th General Hazen, of the 2d division, 15th Corps, had captured Ft. McAllister, and Sherman had gone to the fleet, had obtained heavy ordnance for bombarding the city, and was arranging to invest “Union Causeway” upon the other side of Savannah river, which offered the only line of retreat for the enemy. Under these circumstances, to save his troops, General Hardee evacuated Savannah on the night of the
20th. A few days before, Beauregard had sent word from Charleston to General Hardee: "Whenever you shall have to select between the safety of your forces and that of Savannah, sacrifice the latter."

Upon the morning of December 21st the Union forces marched into Savannah, and General Corse in accordance with orders went into position on the east side of the city, his left resting on the river, his right occupying Ft. Brown on Shell Road.

On returning from the fleet and Port Royal, General Sherman found the city in possession of his troops. He was disappointed at the escape of Hardee, but content that so much was gained without the loss of life which would have attended an assault, and happy that he could present Savannah as a "Christmas Gift" to President Lincoln. On Christmas day a garrison of 80 men from Corse's division was ordered to Fort Thunderbolt, one of the forts by which the Confederates had long held our navy at bay.

The length of the march from Rome to Savannah was 368 miles. The pioneer corps of Corse's division built thirty bridges on the march, and corduroied nearly seven miles of road over marshes and swamps.

At the close of his official report General Corse said: "The march was in some respects an arduous one, but proved on the whole pleasant and beneficial to the command. The health of the men was never better, nor were they ever in better spirits than when they took possession of Savannah. The list of casualties was exceedingly small."

An association has been formed at Sioux City to collect funds and erect a monument to the memory of Sergeant Charles Floyd, of the Lewis and Clark expedition, who died and was buried there August 20, 1804. Hon. C. R. Marks is the secretary.