1918

The diplomatic relations of England with the Quadruple Alliance

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Chapter 1.

England's Entrance into the Quadruple Alliance.

1. The Congress of Vienna - a primary cause of a continued alliance of the powers.
   A. The failures of the congress.
      1. England's position,
         a. Inferior part.
         b. Failure to recognize her responsibility.
      2. Unsettled questions.
         a. The colonial situation.
         b. The eastern question.
         c. The slave trade.
      3. Need of force to sustain its work,

II. Evolution of the alliance.
   A. Alliances during the Napoleonic wars.
   B. Opinions expressed in Parliament.
   C. Castlereagh's generous statement.
   D. The Holy Alliance.
      2. General character.

E. The Quadruple Alliance.
   1. Terms bearing upon Congresses.
   2. Confusion with the Holy Alliance.
a. Distinctions of modern historians.
b. Views of men of the period.

III. Necessity of England's becoming a party to the alliances.

Chapter II.

The General Policy of Castlereagh and Canning toward the Interpretation of the Quadruple Alliance.

I. Condemnation of Castlereagh by historians.

III. Basis of Castlereagh's policy,

A. Castlereagh's conservatism.

B. Apprehension of liberal movement and revolutionary tendencies.

III. Partial justification of Castlereagh.

A. Conservative policy not necessarily an approval of interference.

B. Concurrence in alliance not a proof of absolute approval of the Metternich system.

C. Correspondence and public communications not a condemnation of duplicity.

IV. Canning's policy.

A. Tory principles.

C. Recognition of England's position as one not of isolation,
D. Support of the alliance.
E. Opposition to congresses.
F. Claim of superiority of Parliament.
V. Beginning of the breach with the alliance under Castlereagh.

Chapter III.

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.

I. Purpose of congresses.

II. Preliminaries to the congress.
   A. Opinions regarding the meetings.
   B. Petitions to the English ministers.
   C. Correspondence and interviews.
   D. The expected results.

III. Chief work of the Congress.
   A. The evacuation of France.
   B. Pecuniary settlement.
   C. Admission of French king to future congresses.

IV. The slave question.
   B. Opposition of her allies.

V. Points to which England would not agree,
   A. A call of congresses by circular letter.
   B. New treaty.
   C. Act of Guarantee.
D. Spanish mediation.

VI. Chief protocols of the congress.

VII. Difficulties of the English ministers.

VIII. Results.

A. Castlereagh's opinion.

B. Gentz's statement.

IX. Importance.

Chapter IV.

I. The period of the Austrian congresses.

A. A formal meeting.

B. Causes for the assemblies.

C. The opinions regarding a congress.

. England's demand for non-interference.

II. Work preliminary to the congress.

A. Comparative indifference of England on Italian questions.

B. Active policy regarding Spain.

C. Metternich's anxiety concerning England's course.

III. The work of the congress.

A. The winning of Russia over to the Austrian policy.

B. Unofficial alliances.

C. Austria's statement of conditions in Naples.

D. Documents drawn up.
1. Declaration and invitation to the King of Sicily.

2. Circular to the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian ministers.


V. The economic basis of the English policy.

Chapter V.

The Congress of Laibach.

1. The representatives at Laibach.
   A. England's unofficial representatives.
   B. France's early withdrawal.

II. Chart business before the congress.
   A. Elimination of all but the Italian questions.
   B. Procedure.
      1. Statement of King Ferdinand,
      2. The letter of the King to Naples.
      3. Declaration of the allies to Naples.
      4. Declaration issued by the Austrian government.
         a. Dissatisfaction in Austria.

III. Adjournment - February 28.

IV. Work during the spring.
Chapter VI.

The Congress of Verona.

I. General tendencies for federation.
   A. No common bond for union.
   B. Attempts to secure an ally previous to the congress.

II. The work in the congress.
   A. Instructions to British potentiary on non-interference.
   B. Questions in which England took little part.
   C. Questions in which England took an active part.
      1. Spanish situation.
      3. Slave traffic.

III. Breach in the congress.
Chapter VII.


   A. Widespread distress and discontent in England.
   B. The financial situation.
   C. Condition of commerce and industry.
   D. Foreign investments.

2. Relations of the conditions in the chief problems confronting the congresses.
   A. Financial settlement of Aix-la-Chapelle.
   B. Intervention in Italy
   C. Restoration of Spanish American colonies.
   D. Abolition of slave trade.
   E. Interferences in Spain.
   F. The Greek revolution.

Summary
Chapter 1

England's Entrance into the Quadruple Alliance.

With the overthrow of Napoleon, the victors of France were confronted with the task of reconstructing the map of Europe and of restoring peace and order. For this purpose the Congress of Vienna was assembled, and a year later the Quadruple Alliance was formulated, destined to become the most powerful concert of powers ever maintained in time of peace. A discussion of the origin, character, purposes, and justification of such a union arouses numerous questions that demand consideration and solution if possible.

Was this dominating alliance, this strong concert of England and Austria, Russia and Prussia, in the period from 1815-1830, necessary to the reconstruction of Europe following the Napoleonic regime? Was it an acknowledgment of the failure of the Congress of Vienna in establishing order and the regard of one nation for another's rights? Was this Alliance, then, a logical outgrowth of the Vienna conferences, or was its need foreseen in the dreary days of desolation, and its form gradually evolved? Was it a great machine of repression, and instrument of war projected into time of peace? Did England see in such an alliance a noble means of guiding a right an erring nation? Was she actuated by selfish motives in casting aside the policy of Pitt, the policy of non-interference, or was she forced to a realization that what concerned Europe was of consequence to England, that she could
could no longer be a self-sufficing national unit? For forty years following the Second Treaty of Paris, the peace of Europe was steadfastly maintained without a single encounter between any of the powers. Is this a justification for the reactionary character of the alliance?

In order to answer these questions and to understand the origin of the Alliance together with the work confronting it, the work left undone by the Congress of Vienna, its shortcomings or failures should be passed in brief review.

In that assembly of crowned heads and dictating diplomatists, powerful though the Czar Alexander and Prince Metternich were, the responsibility of adjusting the infinite disputes should necessarily have fallen to England, that mistress of the seas which overwhelmed Napoleon's schemes for Africa and Asia; it was English money subsidizing the armies of Austria and Russia which enabled them to continue in the field; it was England's army, finally, and England's general that conquered the European foe. Moreover, England, alone of the powers against France, because of her geographical location and her general foreign relations could have been a disinterested force and an equitable judge in deciding upon continental readjustments. Furthermore, the English people, among whom for the decade past there had been developing a moral sense as a nation, a comprehension that out of the French Revolu-
tion there had emerged certain rights of man, expected and rightfully demanded that the settlement of Europe be made upon a higher basis than the principle of legitimacy, that it be founded upon a higher moral law. Lord Castle-

leagh himself recognized this new attitude not only of England but of Europe. In a letter written in May, 1814 to Lord Bentinck he said, "It is impossible not to perceive a great moral change coming on in Europe, and that the principles of freedom are in full operation. The danger is, that the transition may be too sudden to ripen into anything likely to make the world better or happier." Lord Castlereagh, then, was not oblivious to this change, but as a reactionary failed to respond to the awakened era. And so in the Congress, England was content to take an inferior part, to permit Metternich "that mind which never erred." to be the dominating personality.

Surely there was in the Polish questions a right to be upheld, and a principle of justice upon which to act. But in this the opportunity for England to interfere was allowed to pass by.

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"Up to the period of the Congress of Vienna, no British statesman had ever set his hand to an instrument, acknowledging as valid acts, the two partitions of Poland. Had the British plenipotentiary founded his objections upon
this principle, he positively refused to commit his
Government to any such acknowledgement, and had he insisted
on the erection of an independent Polish state, he would
have been applauded by the whole of Europe whilst Aus-
tria and Prussia would not only have opposed it, but, on
the contrary, would have acquiesced in it with pleasure."

"Backed by such powerful support, as well as by the
voice of public opinion throughout Europe, it is more than
probable that (Castlereagh) might have been successful;
but the moment when he gave up the principle, and told
the emperor that he was not indisposed to witness even
with satisfaction that his Imperial Majesty should receive
a liberal and important aggrandizement on his Polish
frontier, and that it was to the degree and the mode to
which he alone objected, he threw away the only weapon
which he could successfully wield."  
That Lord Castlereagh was not taking this moral stand
was felt by the under secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Cook. He exhorted his superior to fling aside the trea-
ties and "to declare that nothing should induce Great
Britain to acknowledge the validity of those acts."

Again England failed to appreciate an ideal for
which she had been fighting, the building up of British
Empire. It is true that in the Congress and in the Treaty
of Paris, England made important acquisitions, and certainly

2 Stapleton: George Canning and his
expanded very materially in her colonial possessions, keeping islands of no consequence to the imperial ideal. It was merely acquisition of land regardless of its use to England. That not even Liverpool was alive to the colonial situation is clear from the following extract from a letter to Castlereagh: "We have Guadeloupe and the Saintes in our hands, which have in fact been conquered. We have no desire for any more colonies, but it may not be amiss to consider them as fair pledges for the just claims of our own subjects."

Then, too, in the Eastern question, concerning the unrest of the Balkan states. England could without doubt have used her influence to allay discord, indeed even to settle definitely the position and rights of those states in Europe. Austria did not dare broach the subject nor did Russia question it. It was England's part, a responsibility she would have taken upon herself.

Again in the question of the slave trade, the congress of Vienna failed to respond to the demands of the reform party of England. Castlereagh appeared satisfied to receive a general declaration of the powers against it.

Following the Congress of Vienna, treaties between the powers were made with the idea of supporting

3 Stapleton, George Canning and his Times, p 354.
4 Ibid, p 356
5 Castlereagh Correspondence, p 48. Liverpool to Caslte Oct 5, 1815.
the work of Vienna. The Treaty of Ghent was entered into in the spring of 1815, and in the November following the second treaty of Paris was concluded. It confirmed the work of the Congress with its glaring defects. To the potentates of its making, it was obvious enough that a means of enforcing the terms and of maintaining the status of things as therein provided would be necessary. That instrument proved to be an alliance. The Congress of Vienna, therefore, was directly responsible for a continued union of powers.

But even before the treaty, there had been expressed opinions concerning concord of action for the maintenance of peace, and the repression of revolutionary developments. As early as 1800 this note appeared in the Parliamentary Debates:

"In order to render this security as complete as possible it seems necessary at the period of a general pacification to form a treaty to which all the principal powers of Europe should be parties, by which their respective rights and possessions, as they shall then have been established, shall be fixed and recognized; and they should all bind themselves mutually to protect and support each other against any attempt to infringe them. It should re-establish a general and comprehensive system of

6 Hansard Debates XXI, 182.
7 Ibid, 172.
public law in Europe, and provide as far as possible, for repressing future attempts to disturb general tranquillity; and above all for restraining any projects of aggrandizement and the ambition similar to those which have produced all the calamities inflicted on Europe since the disastrous war of the French Revolution."

Castlereagh in his desire and plan for an alliance to secure the future peace of Europe showed himself magnanimous, a statesman, having at heart the interests not only of England, but also the welfare of the continent. He made the statement,

"It is the province of Great Britain to turn the confidence she has inspired to the account of peace, by exercising a conciliatory influence between the Powers, rather than put herself at the head of any combination of Courts to keep others in check. The immediate object to be kept in view is to inspire the states of Europe, as long as we can, with a sense of the dangers which they have surmounted by their union, of the hazards they will incur by a relaxation of vigilance, to make them feel that the existing concert is their only perfect security against the revolutionary embers more or less existing in every state of Europe."

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8 Castlereagh Correspondence XI. p 105. Castlereagh to Mr. Rose Dec. 28, 1815.
Before the definitive Treaty of Paris was signed, the sovereigns of Russia and Austria and Prussia in person became parties to a solemn compact, the Holy Alliance, formulated in September 1815. To this document England never signed her name, allied though she had been with these nations through the Napoleonic wars, and at the same time of its promulgation united with them in the occupation of France. It was declared in the articles, "in consequence of the great events which have marked the course of the three last years in Europe, and especially of the blessings which it has pleased Divine Providence to shower down upon those states which place their confidence and hope in it alone (their majesties) acquired the intimate conviction of the necessity of founding the conduct to be observed by the powers in their reciprocal relations upon the sublime truths which the Holy religion of our Savior teaches." In this holy union it was further decreed, "the three contracting monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity and considering each other as fellow country men, they will on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance and regarding themselves as fathers of families, they will lead them in the same spirit of fraternity with

9 Hertlet, I, 317.
which they are animated to protect religion, peace, and justice.

"In consequence, the sole purpose in force shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service."10

Why such an Alliance should be formed to the exclusion of England was perplexing and irritating to the English House of Commons, chiefly to the Whigs. Why the three powers which had entered into a treaty with England, pledging all the contracting parties to an identity of interest and object, should have entered into a triple alliance, why its sole negotiation and signing had taken place outside the usual medium of diplomacy, and what its real purposes were, were problems exciting the suspicion of England.11

Mr. Brougham in his attack in the House on the unusual manner in which it had been drawn up, and on the character of its terms, demanded from Lord Castlereagh the reason for England's exclusion, and the necessity of the powers' entering the solemn pledge. Such a treaty unheard of in history since the crusades, an unhthinkable product of modern Europe gave rise to unwarranted alarm, bitter jealousy, and prophecies of despotism based upon false analogies. "When crowned heads met", it was declared, "the result of their united councils was not always favorable to the interests of humanity."12 The war against Poland had been prefaced by a proclamation of
similar language to that which this treaty contained. Castlereagh in reply to the opposition stated that the sovereigns had addressed a joint letter to the Prince Regent inviting him into the Holy Alliance, but although the latter approved highly of its terms, he was unable to become a party, as the forms of England did not permit such a procedure.

Two months after the formation of the Holy Alliance, the Quadruple Alliance was formed. To this England became a party. This compact, providing for the employment of means to maintain the peace of Europe, binding the contracting parties to aid each other against all attempts to disturb the established succession, providing for meetings of the allies from time to time to arrange difficulties which might arise, and to discuss and settle any differences occurring between any two powers, has often been confused with the Holy Alliance. But in reality in the minds of the statesmen of the period there appears to have been no distinction. In the correspondence of Canning and Wellington and in the memoirs of Gentz, the expressions Holy Alliance and Quadruple Alliance are used synonymously.

Modern historians make much of the point that the Holy Alliance was from its inception a dead letter.
and maintain that it was the Quadruple Alliance, or the
Pentarchy (as it was sometime called after the admission
of France to its councils) which became an influence
in European affairs. That the congresses were called
in accordance with the provisions of the Quadruple
Alliance is unquestionable, but whether the two alliances
were ever considered by their authors as distinct or
unrelated raised a point.

Josceline Bagot, in his "Life of Canning" declares; "By the treaty drawn up in November, the five
Powers of the Pentarchy, pledged themselves to act in
concord for the maintenance of the European peace.
There is a clear distinction between this committee
and what is known as the Holy Alliance, although the
policy to be pursued has been generally known as that
of the Alliance only." Bagot, himself, however, has
failed to maintain the distinction. He says, "Whether
the attitude of Great Britain which finally disconcerted
the Holy Alliance and made for more liberal government
of Europe, etc. In the following statement of
Gentz he recognizes no distinction. "Now, this truly
sacred union, of which the Holy Alliance is but an
imperfect symbol, was never manifested in a more reassu­
ing manner than at the time of the conferences at Aix­
de-Chapelle." Greville in his Memoirs makes the
statement, "While Lord Castlereagh was obliged to pre-
tend to disapprove of the Continental System of the
Holy Alliance. In like manner, re-
ognizing the alliances as one and the same thing,
Wellsington in 1724 wrote, "Although, therefore, the
Holy Alliance, properly so called, would be applicable
to transactions with the Porte, the system of the
Holy Alliance supposed to be established by the
treaties of Paris and Aix-la Chapelle, was never con-
sidered applicable to those transactions."
Canning in response to a call for a conference on the
Greek and Turkish situation declared, "I will not be
replunged into what is vulgarly called the Holy Alli-

Whether the alliance which became the active force
in European affairs be called the Holy Alliance, the
Moral Pentarchy or the Quadruple Alliance, England
was a member for very definite reasons. First the doubt-
ful tranquillity of Europe, England's long alliance
with the powers, and her temporary occupation of France

15 Josceline Bagot, George Canning in Times L, p 118
17 Greville Memoirs 1, p 107.
18 Well Supp. Des II, p 360, Well to Canning,
were powerful influences impelling her to remain an ally against France. In the second place, she was actuated by an active purpose. "To carry into execution not only the maintenance of the treaties of peace connected with the settlement of Europe (just then concluded) but also for the purpose of controlling the ambition and jealousies of the great Allied Powers themselves in relation to each other."

England, at the time of her entrance into the Alliance may have foreseen a divergence of opinion respecting the interpretation of the duties of the allies as provided in the treaty, and may have anticipated the impossibility of acting in harmony with her allies. And yet by the pressure of existing conditions, she had of necessity to become a participant in European affairs, not definitely changing her former policy of isolation but temporarily suspending it.

19, Joseline Begot-Canning II, p.513.
Chapter II.

The general policy of Castlereagh and Canning toward the interpretation of the Quadruple Alliance.

Diplomatic transactions are always to a greater or less degree veiled in obscurity; they are always in large part hidden records of history, ciphers to which time and chance may furnish the key. Features of greatest importance are purposely omitted; motives, fears, and prophecies in the recorded volumes of diplomatic papers, and in their stead, generalizations, summaries, and memorials fill the pages. The results of conferences, the conclusion of long and heated debates, of differences tending either toward war or peace, appear; but the arguments pro and con upon courses of action eventually determined, the significant conversations among diplomats carried on outside the regular conference hall, the dinners at which intrigues are inaugurated, fathomed or adjusted—in diplomatic correspondence all these have no recognition. They are the omitted chapters. The necessity of an envoy's sparing the feelings of a colleague or of hiding the mistakes
of a home minister imposes a silence which is often misconstrued. Upon the construction placed upon these incomplete records and the surmises and suspicions they arouse, is based the public condemnation of justification of ministers and nations.

Lord Castlereagh in the period before the Congress of Vienna, like most European ministers in that era of revolutionary ideas and excesses, was so strongly conservative as to be reactionary; and although his attitude following 1818 became more liberal, and his policy, one of non-acquiescence in the policy of restriction supported by his allies, he was condemned by his contemporaries and by historians since, for his adhering to the system of repression. To Englishmen, dissatisfied with the outcome of Vienna, and alarmed by the assumption of the Holy Alliance and by the coalition of the four great powers in times of peace, it was self-evident that Castlereagh upheld the entire continental policy. His former actions confirmed them in the
ppimption, and the courtesy with which he spoke of the allies in public seemed further proof of his agreement with the powers. It is with difficulty that a man can again secure confidence when his past acts have condemned him. So it was with Castlereagh, until recently the blame of the English support of the Quadruple Alliance has fallen upon him, and the glory of disconcerting that council has redounded to Canning alone.

That Castlereagh pursued the policy which he truly felt to be of advantage to England is more creditable today, as we view in retrospect the period from 1814-22, the time during which, as foreign minister, he practically dictated foreign policy. His policy of repression as indicated in a note in December 1815, is but the expression of a natural fear.

In regard to the liberal movement in Prussia, he said that he felt great anxiety and that it was impossible to foretell to what end the new ideas of government and revolutionary tendencies there prevalent would be carried. His distrust of the revolutionary principles was often voiced in his letters to English representatives abroad.
He saw new constitutions launched in France, Spain, Holland, Sicily, and was of the conservative opinion that such attempts at republican government should not be encouraged, and that it was the duty of England to retard rather than to accelerate the new principles. Although fearing the results of sudden revolutionary outbursts, and proclaiming it to be "true wisdom to keep down the petty contentions of ordinary times, and to stand together in support of the established principles of social order," Castlereagh did not necessarily approve of England's entering into congress with Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to which all internal affairs of the smaller countries were to be subjected. Against such a policy of interference he wrote,

"It is not my wish to encourage, on the part of this country, an unnecessary interference in the ordinary affairs of the Continent. The interposition of Great Britain will always be most authoritative in proportion as it is not compromised by being mixed in the daily concerns of these states."

Castlereagh's concurrence in the Quadruple Metternich system. At its inception he could see
an advantage in giving England some voice in the European conferences. Would not her interests have suffered without any representative to present her views? The divergence of opinion which showed itself in 1815 became wider with the calling of each congress. At Aix-le-Chapelle, Castlereagh opposed prevailing sentiment; At Troppeau and at Lai-

castlereagh, he objected to the presence of English representatives, lest he be accused of acquiescing in the European policy. The instructions he drew up for the congress of Vienna were to the effect that England must not join in the policy of the Quadruple Alliance. The break with the Alliance then, was not to take place with the death of Castlereagh.

It should not be construed purely as the new policy of a new minister.

1. Castlereagh Correspondence XI, p 106
   Castlereagh to Mr. Rose.
2. Castlereagh Correspondence Castlereagh to Bentinck; May 17, 1814.
Metternich's esteem for Castlereagh had been employed by critics of Castlereagh to show that he must have been in the confidence of Metternich, and that he approved of the Prince's policy of interference. Metternich had met Castlereagh in 1814 at Basel and there he "had laid the foundations of a good feeling." It has been supposed that there had been some understanding between them previous to the congress of Verona for otherwise, he would not have expressed the hope that Castlereagh would be the English representative, and have written, "I waited here as my second self."

Although the correspondence would not support the statement that Castlereagh upheld the methods of what is known as Metternich system, and although Castlereagh's communications to the House of Commons

3, Ibid. p 105, Castlereagh to Mr. Rose.
4, Ibid. p 107.
5, Josceline Bagot; Canning. p 145.
6, Ibid. p 144.
7, Metternich, Autobiography.
do not sustain the alliance in the broader powers it assumed, opponents have, nevertheless, suspected him of secret agreement with Metternich. Greville in his "Memoirs" claims that, "While Castlereagh was obliged to pretend to disapprove of the continental Alliance he gave to Metternich every assurance of his private concurrence, and it was not till long after Canning's accession that Metternich could be persuaded of his sincerity in opposing their views, always fancying that he was obliged to act a part as his predecessors had done to keep the House of Commons quiet;"

This secret agreement if such existed, is the closed chapter in Castlereagh's relations with Metternich and the Quadruple Alliance. It is not to be found in the diplomatic correspondence of Castlereagh himself or in the correspondences of Metternich that is available. The question, therefore, as to the duplicity of Castlereagh in his relations to Parliament, and the question as to his part in the disruption of the alliance are unanswered, and his condemnation or praise will rest with his adherents or opponents.

8 Greville Memoirs I. p. 107
With the diplomatic correspondence as evidence it must honestly be acknowledged by the supporters of either Castlereagh or Canning that neither countenanced the Quadruple Alliance in its more fully developed policies. But to Canning must be accredited greater rigor, more effective opposition in counteracting the tendencies of the other powers. Castlereagh's stand was one of non-agreement with their policies. It was negative. Canning's objections, on the other hand, his declarations of the policy of England, were the course of active resistance.

In the settlement of Vienna, Canning had no part, nor was it concluded on principles upon which he approved. "But from the time when they were signed to the end of his life, he always held the provisions were to be accepted as inviolable by England." The Alliance, the means decided upon to maintain the peace, Canning recognized. It was the extent of its power to which he took exception.

Canning was not a lover of revolution. On the contrary he passed "nearly thirty years of his life fighting for old institutions in the House of Commons" but he could not as he himself stated, "shut my eyes to the real state of things."

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9, Stapleton, Canning p 352.
The glory of England, its prestige on the continent and throughout the whole world were ever before Canning in his relations with Europe. His policy was apparently more selfish than that of Castlereagh. "England has not only to maintain herself on the basis of her own solid foundation and settled constitution, firm, unshaken, not interested in the contest only by her sympathies; not a partisan on either side, but for the sake of both, a model, and ultimately perhaps an umpire." His hope for a greater England appeared in numerous speeches and letters. At Plymouth in 1823 he outlined the policy he intended to pursue, and made the statement, "For Europe he would be desirous, now and then, to read England."

10, Ibid. 360-361
Canning to H. Sept. 16, 1823.
11, Ibid.
12. Ibid. 368. Canning's speech Aug. 30, 1822 at Liverpool.

13, Ibid. 364 Canning to Sir Charles Bagot
It was not to the Alliance that Canning objected but to the Congresses. "No more Congresses, thank God," he exclaimed shortly before taking office. He was of the opinion that the allies had no right to demand aid for interference in the national affairs of a state, but that it was England's place to check aggression and to maintain the balance of power in Europe. To Metternich, Canning's policy was unintelligible. Why, he wondered did not Canning withdraw altogether from the alliance, since he opposed its methods? In 1823 he wrote, "What, then does Canning want? Whose part will he take? What is he about? For after all, a man must have some object or end in view. I really begin to lose the very small portion of respect I had (not without difficulty, God forgive me) attained for the man."


It is not surprising that Metternich was unable to determine Canning's intentions, when the many instances of misunderstanding between them and the members of his own foreign service are recalled. David Montague Erskine, the minister to the United States in 1809 failed to understand his purposes. The American minister during the same period to England was likewise misled by his statements. Henry Adams declares that Canning's policies do not admit of understanding, and in speaking of his policy toward the American embargo, he states, "Yet motives were enigmas too obscure for search, and the motives of Canning in this instance were more perplexing than usual."

To the continental powers to whom the responsibility of a minister to a Parliament was beyond comprehension, the refusal of Canning to act in concord could only be constructed as the policy of the minister alone. The contention that the demands of Parliament were being fulfilled by Canning's position or that acquiescence in the policy desired by the powers would meet with the disapproval of the House of Commons, was looked upon by Metternich as a mere excuse.

He believed that its opinions, if adverse, might be overruled. Until 1825 he laboured under the delusion that the English foreign ministers secretly agreed to measures which officially they denied, and that their real policies were not represented by their language in Parliament. "It is as essential a part of the national council," Canning wrote to Henry Wellesley, "and woe to the ministers who should undertake to conduct the affairs of this country upon the principle of settling the course of its foreign policy with a Grand Alliance, and should rely upon carrying their decisions into effect by throwing a little dust in the eyes of the House of Commons." Canning repeatedly insisted that the English ministers abroad should make it clear to the allies that when differences arose in the foreign relations they must not be viewed as a "faint to avoid public opinion." His policy, Canning wished it understood, was one of conviction and not one to meet the parliamentary exigencies of the time.

18. *Stapleton to Canning, p. 378
   Canning to H. Wellesley
19. *Bagot to Canning Vol. 11. p 221
   Canning to Chas. Bagot
20. Ibid. p. 118.
Metternich's inability to influence Canning or to shake him from a determined policy led him to write that England had entered upon a false and dangerous liberalism, and that Canning was certainly "a very awkward opponent."

With this lack of sympathy between Canning and Metternich, with a misunderstanding of the part that the English Parliament exercised in foreign relations, the congresses after Castlereagh seemed doomed to failure. The policy of Castlereagh to refuse assent to the usurped power of the congresses, and to hold aloof on solitary opposition to the wish of the combined allies will doubtless be seen to foreshadow the breach of England with the Quadruple Alliance, a breach which culminated under Canning.
Chapter 111

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.

The allied powers, as a means of executing the work of the congress of Vienna and the Quadruple Alliance, agreed to unite from time to time in congress, "to arrange together any matters of general interest which might arise and to settle and discuss any differences which might occur between any two Powers." It was further stipulated that there should be no discussion of the affairs of any power without the representation of that country in the deliberation. In accordance with this general agreement, the sixth article of the Quadruple Alliance provided more specifically for the assembly of the sovereigns. The purposes were stated, and the objects of the conferences were declared to be the greatest common interest and the consideration of measures which would be the most beneficial to the peace and prosperity of the world.

In Metternich's opinion the terms imposed a duty upon the powers which they were under obligation to perform. "The five courts which were assembled at Aix," he wrote, "are not only invited there, but by the treaty of November 20,1915, they are bound to come."

1, Greville Memoirs Vol. II. p 67.
Accordingly in the fall of 1818, the sovereigns of Russia, Austria and Russia together with the Austrian diplomatists; Metternich, Vincent, and Gentz; the Russian, Cape d'Istria, Nessel rode, Lieven, the Prussian, Hardenberg, Humboldt, Berstoff; the English, Wellington and Castlereagh; and the French, Richelieu, Rayneval, and Mounier, met for their first congress. Preliminary to the meeting, petitions to the English representatives requesting the consideration of certain measures, expressions of opinion regarding the meeting, together with statements of the results expected from the congress, and the arranging of private interviews and meetings previous to the congress were among the important preparations. They are of significance in reflecting the attitude which prevailed at the meeting, that of good will or reserved suspicion, and in portending points of disagreement, should wide discussion be permitted.

The opening of the congress to the consideration of new questions was looked upon by both England and Austria as dangerous. Metternich and Castlereagh in the early part of September concurred in the opinion that it would be unwise to permit miscellaneous discussion; to the discussion of Spanish affairs they were particularly opposed. France and Russia on the other hand, seem to have been agreed as to the necessity of bringing the Spanish question before the Congress. The Emperor having heard the request of the Spanish charge d'affaires at St. Petersburg, for the admission
of a Spanish minister to the conference, referred the matter to France. France approved, and the attitude of these two powers was made known to Castlereagh in August through private conversation with the Duc de Richlieu and Pozzo di Borgo. The Duc considered it necessary for the conference to take some step for the mediation of Spain and her colonies. He proposed sending a member of a younger branch of the Spanish dynasty to be King of Buenos Ayres. Pozzo di Borgo was of the opinion that the Spanish king should be admitted to Aix-la-Chappelle as "the only mode of settling all Spanish questions." Against these proposals Castlereagh protested. His chief arguments were that if the King of Spain were admitted his ministers also would have to attend, that inconveniences would probably result and the whole work of the conference would be rendered impracticable; and that the other European nations though submitting to the dominion of the four powers would resent the admittance of Spain to the councils. The fear of the introduction of Spanish


6, Ibid. p 665 Wellington to Castlereagh.
affairs appears to have been paramount in the minds of the English. "I cannot conceive," wrote Mr. Cook to Castlereagh, "that you would go further in mediation with Spain than the good offices and possible guarantees, -- a mediation by arms is out of the question." The Emperor of Russia, although he did not protest before the congress against wide discussion, was anxious to avoid embarrassing questions; had suggested that the meeting should be brief as his early return to Russia was necessary.

The situation was viewed as precarious. In August, Castlereagh, while in Paris, heard it both rumored and openly stated that the meeting had been postponed until later in the fall so as to give time for summoning the King of Spain. Metternich, in the same month, learned that the approaching contest was looked upon by the Diet of Frankfurt with suspicion, and that "intriguers" were planning to carry measures to Aix-la-Chapelle, "to interrupt the progress of affairs." Castlereagh received communication from the government suggesting the inexpediency of the Powers entering upon transatlantic and colonial questions, but later received a long petition from Mr.

7, Ibid.

Wellington to Earl Bathurst.
James Stephens* suggesting African and colonial conditions which should have consideration in the congress. Reasons were given against the restoration of Haiti to France, both with regard to the welfare of Haiti and to the advantage of England. The demand for consideration of the abolition of slaves was made, and a statement of two important measures which should be put before the congress; first, whether France might not be reasonably invited to declare herself in regard to her views on St. Domingo, on account of their connections with the abolition of the slave trade and the peace of the Indies; second, whether if she meditate new expeditions the influence of Great Britain and other powers at the congress might not be properly employed to induce her to desist from that purpose? Not only was there a demand for the discussion of the slave situation in this particular case, but also a sentiment on the part of the English people for a declaration of the powers against the slave trade.

9, Ibid. 665 Wellington to Castlereagh.

*, Mr Stephen, a native of the West Indies was sent at an early age to England to pursue the profession of the law. By means of a matrimonial alliance with the family of Mr. Wilberforce, he obtained a seat in Parliament which he resigned on being appointed master in Chancery.
With these conditions confronting them at the opening of the congress, it was but natural that the confidence of one nation toward another should be strained. Castlereagh wrote,

"I do not expect good from Metternich's negotiation at Paris, and should not wish myself mixed in it. The less a British minister dabbles in Monsieur's politics the better." (Charles) will be of considerable use to me in keeping Metternich steady and apprising me of what he is about."

By the Prime Minister little trust was placed in Emperor Alexander. Liverpool, in his correspondence with Castlereagh wrote,

"I think you will find no difficulty in keeping the Emperor of Russia from coming in November; this visit might certainly lead to intrigues."

Mr. Jas. Stephens to Castlereagh.


* Charles Stewart, minister to Austria.
By the time of the meeting many of the suspicions and fears which the statesmen had harboured through the year 1817 and the summer of 1818 had disappeared. The sinister fear that the Emperor had contemplated an alliance with the Bourbons of France, Spain and Italy, the belief on the part of Russia that there were secret negotiations between Great Britain and Austria; had in the main given way to a spirit of extreme caution. After the first few days of the congress Castlereagh, knowing well the anxiety of Liverpool concerning the feeling prevailing there, sent this message. "You will probably wish to know my real opinion upon the sincerity of all that is passing around me. My opinion has always been that, whether sincere or not we ought to meet it as if it was;" ---"but my belief is that the Emperor of Russia is, in the main, in earnest in what he says." Castlereagh was persuaded that the Emperor was, though desiring sway, intending to pursue a peace policy and to maintain his connection with the allies.

17, Ibid. p 48.
England did not enter this conference with the hope of accomplishing a great work; on the contrary, it was her purpose only to prevent innovations and to support the alliance without giving to it a new aspect. An English official stated that he did not expect much from Aix-la-Chappelle "except the admission of France to the confederacy and the withdrawing of the troops from her frontier." Fear of discussion of the work done in congress by the new Parliament which would convene in the winter was the primary motive forcing England to take a conservative stand, to avoid secret protocols and to reject new treaties.

The time and place for the first congress was made known through regular diplomatic channels. The intentions appear to have been to assemble early in September, but owing to the rise of the question concerning the admission of the Spanish King, the meeting was deferred several weeks. No definite date for the formal opening appears. There was apparently an understanding that all should be present by the first of October. Wellington upon his arrival in September the twenty-seventh

found the King of Russia already there. Castlereagh and Richelieu had also arrived, and the Emperor of Russia was expected the next day. As in the Congress of Vienna the real work took place in private interviews, and for the most part the results were not written down. At the official conferences themselves no minutes were kept, and the documents which were to form the official reports preserved in the form of protocols.

The first work before the powers, that for which they had been assembled, was the substitution of a permanent policy toward France in place of the temporary measures that had been adopted in the Treaty of Paris. The Treaty contained an article providing that at the end of three years the four allies together with the King of France were to meet for the purpose of deciding whether the army of occupation should be withdrawn from France or whether the condition of that state was such as to necessitate its maintenance for a further period of five years. The three important questions to be settled were therefore, the evacuation of France, the pecuniary settlement, and the position of the French King in the European councils. That the troops would be withdrawn and that some terms for a financial settlement would be made also that the King would be admitted were generally
understood. The point was to what extent the work
would be carried.

By October fifth, the work of French settlement
had so far progressed that it was certain evacuation
would take place. Wellington began immediately the
plan of withdrawal. Shipping of stores, transporta-
tion of the English troops, mapping out of routes
by which the different armies were to depart for their
respective countries, all were supervised by Wellington.
A grand review of the troops before the sovereigns
was planned, and necessary arrangements for the reception
and entertainment of royalty were delegated to him.
These military concerns occupied most of his time, and with
the exception of very detailed work on the state of the
finances he had little part in the remaining business of
the congress,

On the first of October, Wellington reported
to the ministers upon the financial arrangements. He
declared that the French government was prepared by
loans arranged with the Bankers, Hope Baring and Co-
pany to meet its obligations. Calculations had
been made for the French by Monsieur Mounier, whose
accounts later had been reviewed by Alexander Baring.
Mr. Baring reported the method of calculations to be
correct. The sum of ten millions of francs he consid-
ered fair as discount to France. A further allowance
of 30 sous upon the price of the rentes to be given for
the hundred million francs would be two million francs.

The total debt amounted to two hundred and eighty mil­

ions. Allowing ten million for discount and two million
for rentes; the amount of two hundred and sixty eight
millions, it was estimated would be the amount
due the allies. It was proposed that this sum should be
met in nine equal payments, "to be made the sixth of
each month from January to September." The final state­
ment was as follows;

"170,000,000 frs. by the French Treas. in drafts upon
the two houses.

98,000,000 frs. by the two Houses for the purchase
of Rentes for 100 millions less the
reduction of 30 sous.

268,000,000 frs."

England had in 1815 postponed her right to re­
ceive payment until the second, third, fourth, and fifth
years. She had at this time demanded no compensation
'in interest, and so at this time, Wellington held that
she would demand none. In the whole transaction Great
Wellington to E. Bathurst.
Britain being the largest creditor had more voice in the settlement than did her allies. The question of the cost to France of the maintenance of the army of occupation and the diminution of the indemnity in consequence of expenditures for the army having been greater than had been estimated in 1815, complicated the settlement. The French ministers held that the allies ought to bear this cost. They claimed that according to the military convention of 1815, it was incumbent upon France to pay no more than one hundred and fifty millions of francs annually for the support of the army. This amount she had exceeded in the three years by thirty-eight thousand francs and consequently the demand was made that this amount be deducted from her debt.

Wellington to the ministers of the congress.


Wellington in his observations upon the demand admitted that it had not been anticipated in 1815 that it would be necessary for France to go beyond One hundred fifty millions. "If the allies had agreed to take this excess of expense upon themselves, then the diminution of the army effected in April 1817, tended and all subsequent diminutions would have tended, to the pecuniary benefit and relief of the allies themselves, and not of France, which is quite contrary to sense, reason and fact." 24 This demand, Wellington was unwilling to grant, but that France had a claim for interest for sums paid previous to the fifth year 1820, he admitted.

In his memorandum, checking the accounts, and the claims brought forth by France, Wellington was of inestimable value to England. His liberality toward France facilitated greatly a peaceable agreement. He was willing to allow France fifteen million francs as indemnity, basing this amount upon "8 mill. frs. discount not due until 1819-1820
4 mill. frs. int. for sums paid by France on account of 3 mill. for the solde in 1817-1818." due in 1820.
3 mill. frs. for the solde of November 1818.
The terms of final settlement as drawn up in the

24 Ibid.
{p. 729}
protocol of the ninth of October were based largely upon the two reports of Baring and Wellington. The agreement provided for the payment of two hundred sixty-five million francs of which sum, one hundred million was payable by "inscriptions of rentes," bearing interest from the second of September, 1818. The one hundred sixty-five million remaining was to be paid in nine monthly installments commencing on the sixth of the following January, by bills on the House of Hope and Company. Castlereagh objected to the confidence thus placed in the banking houses. There appeared greater risk thought he, in placing so great an amount of public money in private firms. The only safeguard was their personal security, for according to the arrangement the allies did not even have the security of the French government. So great was the fear of Prussia of danger resulting from a falling of French rentes that her ministers demanded for themselves security from Baring and Company. To allay distrust the demand had to be complied with.

This caution on the part of Prussia seems justifiable, for within a few weeks of the settlement the public credit in France was severely shaken. Cash in the banks fell from one hundred seventeen million to thirty-seven million; the rente fell from seventy-six to seventy-one. The great remittances abroad had taken the specie from the country. This, although merely a temporary crisis, make it necessary for the allies to alter the terms of the settlement. After the close of the congress, several of the ministers, therefore, went to Paris and there agreed, to keep on deposit the inscriptions from the one hundred millions and to postpone the payment until the first of June, 1820.

The pecuniary settlement with France, though the most tedious business before the congress, was not considered the most difficult to handle. The difficulty of determining the method of inviting the King of France to participate in future congresses demanded more delicate treatment on the part of the allies. To a supplementary article of the alliance recognizing France as an ally and openly declaring the Alliance no longer quadruple but quintuple, England would not consent.


(Annex E.) Arrangement definitely, pour régler le mode et les époques de l’acquittement des derniers 100,000,000 de l’indemnité réciproque à fournir par la France.
There was a danger, the English thought, in giving a new character to the alliance, and in risking the resentment of nations that were excluded. Lord Bathurst wrote, "I should like it better if the invitation was given to any meetings which might take place, than say that the King was invited to become a part of the engagements to meet under the sixth article." Toward the new treaty England felt even greater anxiety." "We have been made very nervous," Liverpool wrote, "even by the possibility of a new treaty to which France might be a party." The recognition of France as an ally, therefore, was not made by treaty, but by one of the protocols of the congress, a convention entered into by the plenipotentiaries of the four courts. In the third article, it was announced, that "France associated with the other powers by the restoration..."

Liverpool to Castlereagh

of the legitimate and constitutional monarchy, is engaged to concur from now on for the maintenance and establishment of a system which has given peace to Europe and which alone can assure the duration of it.

Closely allied with this question was the determination of a method by which meetings in the future should be announced. Bathurst informed Castlereagh of the necessity of bearing constantly in mind the doubtful reception of an innovation by the English Parliament. "We were all more or less impressed with the apprehension of great inconvenience arising from a decision being now publicly announced of continued meetings at fixed points." The whole cabinet was of the opinion that the time of the next meeting should be decided and announced, but that an announcement and statement of the same general purpose of such deliberation by circular letter should be avoided.

Liverpool to Castlereagh,


Bathurst to Castlereagh Protocole de la conférence entre les Plenipotentiaires des Courts d'Autriche, de France de la Lande Bretagne, de Russie, Aix-la-Chapelle, le 15 Novembre, 1818.
Canning was the most emphatic of the cabinet members in denouncing a call by circular letter. There existed, he believed, no basis for such a proceeding. The ninth article of the Treaty, he construed as applicable only to a meeting called for the purpose of "watching the internal state of France; as far as it may endanger the public tranquillity." England won her point and in the protocol of November 15, it was announced that the powers which had concurred in the Act judged it necessary to establish definite assemblies. Let there be it provided, "assemblies among the august sovereigns themselves, or among their ministers and respective plenipotentiaries, the time and place of their meetings will be each time arranged by means of diplomatic communications."

33, Ibid, p56.

34, British and Foreign State Papers. Protocoles de la Conférence entre les Plénipotentaires des Cours d'Austrie, de France, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, à Aix-la-Chapelle, le 15 November 1818.
Besides acting in accordance with the principles of the English cabinet Castlereagh in the congress had to represent the English people in urging abolition of the slave trade. A proposition had been made in the preceding February relating to the slavery question, and had been presented to the several ministers of the various countries. But previous to the meeting of Aix-la-Chapelle no answer had been received. At this time, to press the matter further Castlereagh in the congress had to represent the English people in urging abolition of the slave trade. A proposition had been made in the preceding February relating to the slavery question, and had been presented to the several ministers of the various countries. But previous to the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle no answer had been received.

At this time, to press the matter further Castlereagh proposed measures. Two particular propositions were submitted.

The first, for addressing a direct appeal on the part of the five Courts to the King of Portugal, founded upon the Declaration made in His Majesty's name by his Plenipotentiary at Vienna, and urging His 35, British, Foreign and State Papers, Vol VIII. p 259. also V1. p26.
Majesty to give effect to that declaration at the period fixed by Spain for final abolition, viz, on the 20th of May, 1820.

The second, would be, that the Powers there represented should accept the principle of a qualified right of mutual visit, as adopted by the courts of Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal and the Netherlands, and should apply the same to the case of their respective flags, as circumstances might point out."

The votes on these points were unfavorable, and a request for objections on the part of the different countries to the Right of Visit was complied with. Russia, though approving of the principle of abolition, was reluctant to yield to the proposed measure. She looked forward to the final abolition on the part of Portugal, and in accordance with the visionary and idealistic dreams of the Emperor, formulated a plan for the creation of a new institution, to control the right of visit! and execute the laws against piracy and other breaches of abolition. "The Russian Memoir," Castlereagh
reported, "seems expressly to withhold, or rather to delay its adherence, until there is reason to presume that a general concurrence is attainable; but surely in all such cases, the most certain mode of obtaining a general concurrence, is to augment the ranks of the concurring parties." Austria also preferred to await universal abolition.

France, unlike Russia, agreed with England that the right of visit as outlined in the English memorandum was no infraction of the Law of Nations. She approved the principle of limiting "exercise of this power to the immediate purpose for which it is granted," and the confining of the work to the African coasts. The objections were that, should she enter into such a measure it might be looked upon as a concession for the evacuation of France; and further, that she could not approve of the principle of subjecting French property to the jurisdiction of authorities other than her own tribunals.

Prussia feared the abuse of the right of Search, and foresaw the possibility of molesting commerce in the open seas. England's purpose consequently failed for the time being. Why the powers postponed the passage of such a measure until the slave trade should have been universally abolished, Castlereagh attempted to answer as follows:
"Perhaps it is because no instance can be quoted that any slave trader, under either the Russian, Prussian or Austrian flags has yet appeared on the coast of Africa, that these Powers, from a sentiment of delicacy towards the States more directly interested both in the local and maritime question, have felt some reluctance to take a lead in giving the sanction to this principle."

In addition to the disagreement on the slavery situation, dissent among the allies appeared in several other noteworthy instances. An Act of Guarantee brought forth by the Emperor Alexander and concurred in by the continental powers roused serious opposition on the part of the English emissaries. The act was concerned with a reciprocal safeguarding of possessions of each of the countries which were parties to the agreement. It proposed the establishment of the Casus foederis "on a common basis, against any extension, whatever, by any of the parties, of his present possessions." This

38, British Foreign and State Papers Vol. VI. p80.
39, British Foreign and State Papers Vol. VI. p80

Memorandum of the British Government.
guarantee was to apply to European possessions. The proposal met with the hearty approbation of Metternich, who saw it an advantage to both Austria and Prussia. Not so with the British government, Metternich wrote, "who will find it impossible to take a direct and obligatory part in so extensive an act of guarantee." He believed, however, the proposition should not be rejected because of England's inability to accept it. His prophecy with regard to England's position proved correct.

Liverpool, alarmed by such a suggestion, and fearing that "it would set the mind of Europe again afoul," urged the prevention of the act. "We cannot on any account be parties to any guarantee which may be maintained in it, we cannot enter into any new engagements." The situation presented a serious aspect to England, for the conclusion of this act which would supersede the Quadruple Alliance would necessitate her compliance with it, or her exclusion thereafter from continental affairs.


Liverpool to Castlereagh.
The general desire among the continental powers to hold England as an ally led to the rejection of the plan. Again, on another question England's objection carried weight, namely on the Spanish situation, on the question of mediation between Spain and the colonies. Liverpool was anxious that the point should not be urged by Spain, but as a precaution sent word to Castlereagh to bear in mind the interests of English commerce in his treatment of the matter. He mentioned the distinction which England should maintain between the colonies of South America that had declared their independence formally and those which had not. With the colonies that had not yet made such a declaration mediation could be permitted. Since none of the powers were desirous of undertaking the task of mediation an invitation was sent by the French and Russian ministers to the Duke of Wellington asking him to mediate. To him, the proposition seemed impracticable, as he considered that the powers had no right to interfere unless requested by at least one of the parties implicated; and still less would they have such a right should Spain refuse the right of intervention. He believed that little could be accomplished without perfect agreement on the subject among the powers. As a consequence of his reply, no settlement of the Spanish trouble was made.
England had successfully resisted the demands made by the allies in the congress for continued interferences in French affairs. She prevented the formation of a new alliance. She relegated to a position of unimportance the Spanish question. She opposed the summoning of congresses by circular letter. Work, which it would seem should have found a place in the conferences, remained untouched, discussed neither the form of governments, nor the representative system, nor the maintenance or modification of the privileges of the nobility nor the liberty of the press, nor anything touching the interest of religion."

There was reserve and timidity in the introduction of new questions on the part of all. The English cabinet in particular expressed uneasiness during the whole course of the proceedings. "You will be glad to find that there had not appeared the slightest disposition to push the discussions here beyond the line that had been chalked out by the circular from Paris" was a message to Liverpool from Castlereagh.


Castlereagh to Liverpool.
Knowing well that the foreign correspondence could be demanded in Parliament, both Castlereagh and the Cabinet desired few papers to be drawn up. The real debates on the questions considered at Aix-la-Chapelle, they knew would take place in the English Parliament. For this reason such warning as "I think it would be the safest thing to separate without any declaration, as "we know how roughly these state papers are apt to be handled in Parliament." and, "the more general the declaration the better," were among the expressions of Castlereagh of the anxiety prevailing in the Foreign Office.

One of the greatest difficulties that the English experienced was the inability on the part of the allies to recognize the subservience of the Department of Foreign Affairs to Parliament. Liverpool distressed by the Russian attempts to inveigle Castlereagh, urged him to convince the Russians that the foreign service dared not be drawn into politics that would be at variance with the spirit of the government. During the whole procedure of the conferences the ministers of England in deciding upon the measures confronting them, had constantly to bear in mind the reception of their work at home. In the financial settlement, the question raised in Castlereagh's mind was "How will such an arrangement be looked upon by the home government?" In his objections he urged not so much his own as the probable remonstrance of the home treasurer. "I do not believe that our Treasurer would trust so large a sum
as four million of our treasury bills for sale out of their hands, upon any private security whatsoever, was the note sent to Wellington. If the English diplomats could have adopted a motto for their mode of procedure at Aix-la-Chapelle, it would certainly have been to this effect: Let us produce as few documents as possible for the perusal and criticism of our Parliament.

So few were the important documents drawn up and the protocols entered into that a brief summary of the significant ones may be given here. The protocol of October ninth between France and Great Britain was the first essential agreement contracted. It provided for the evacuation of France, for the surrender of the fortresses and for the payment of the French indemnity. The next fundamental convention, one which was of value for future work, was that of November fifteenth signed by the four
powers; its chief terms being the provisions for the concurrence of the French King with allies in future congresses and for the method of convening the powers. The protocol of November 4, addressed to the Duke of Richelieu, announces the satisfaction felt on the part of Europe of the internal conditions of France and extends a formal invitation to the King of France to participate in future meetings. The two most noteworthy of the remaining agreements appear as annexes to other protocols. One is a note of the French King in acknowledgement of the invitation; the other, a general declaration of the five courts, on the principles which are to be upheld and which had been adhered to by the congresses. All of these documents with the exception of the one concerning financial settlement possess as their chief characteristic, very general statements. It is probable that in their last draft the English had the final word. The anxiety of Liverpool and Baxthurst must have been greatly relieved when they read the declarations in which little was contained of "practical questions," and which were more discussions as "to words than things."

The work of the congress was concluded, and its results, unforotold, were to be products of time. The real opinions of the participants concerning the value of the union of the chief European nations, in many instances, are probably, like the documents themselves, sentiments and expressions for a public to read.
Castlereagh, guarded as he had necessarily been in every utterance and in every written argument, distrustful though he had been toward his allies, fearful though he had been of condemnation at home, yet declared,

"It really appears to me to be a new discovery in the European government, at once extinguishing the cobwebs with which diplomacy obscures the horizon, bringing the whole bearing of the system into its true light, and giving to the counsels of the great Powers the efficiency and almost the simplicity of a single state."

Approving as this statement seems to do of the system of congresses; it cannot be taken as proof of the desire to give any great amount of power to the congress. Before subsequent conferences were called, Castlereagh stated that with all respect to the work of Aix-la-Chapelle, he would "question the prudence or in truth, the efficacy, of any formal exercise of its forms and provisions."


Castle. to Liverpool.
Gentz, in a memoir drawn up at Aix-la-Chapelle, affirmed that in his opinion, the policy of holding a congress was best suited to European needs. As a conclusion to the meeting, his Memoir was read extolling the conference in its lofty idealism, in the harmony among its members, in the delicacy with which the work was handled. Two great benefits he proclaimed, in generalizations which would be ineffective to a most exacting critic, result from the congress.

"First, that of having entirely cleared the ground, removed all doubts, and fully re-established the confidence of each of the Cabinets in the proceedings and principles of the others and in the stability of the general harmony.

"Secondly, that of having by confidential interviews, earnest discussions, and the contact of intelligent minds, imbued the sovereigns and their ministers with the necessity of maintaining intact a system which, whatever its theoretical merits or defects, is at present the only one practicable in the anchor of salvation for Europe."

Was the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle a success? The answer must be in the affirmative if we consider its result in relation to the purposes for which it was called, but in the light of the work which it might have done, like the congress of Vienna, it is found lacking. The slavery situation remained unsettled, and the Spanish difficulties, both colonial and domestic were prolonged, to become considerations of a coming congress.
Its chief importance lay in the establishment of a precedent for the reunion of sovereigns and ministers in accordance with the Quadruple Alliance. Furthermore, the beginning of a breach between England and her allies was forecast at this early date, for all powers began to realize, though vaguely perhaps, that there existed in England a governmental power which by the English would ever be looked upon as superior to an international congress, a power to which all English policy must bend.

52 Gentz Memoir, in Mett.
Autobiography, 111. pl92/
Chapter IV.

The Congress of Troppau.

The period of 1820-1823 in the history of the Quadruple Alliance was marked by three important assemblies of the allied powers. It was the period of the Austrian congresses, as the conferences were rightly designated. All were held in Austrian territory; that of Troppau in Silesia in 1820; that of Laibach in Carniola in 1821; that of Verona in Venetia in 1823. For still another reason these congresses should be termed Austrian. In the case of Troppau and Laibach, it was a question in which Austria alone was vitally concerned, which led to their assembly. Verona saw the completion of Austrian interference in Italy. It was Austria that outlined the policy and saw to its execution. It was the period of supremacy of the Austrian reactionary policy.

The first formal meeting of the Quadruple Alliance took place at Troppau in November and December of 1820. Though the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had been held in 1818, it was specifically provided for by the treaty of Paris. That of Troppau, on the contrary was the first congress to be called in accordance with the general principles of the Quadruple Alliance, the principles declaring for the maintenance of peace and tran-
quillity in Europe, and for the meetings of the sovereigns to consider together threatening evils and means of promoting the welfare of the European states.

In 1820- and 1821 such events transpired within a few months as seemed to threaten the destruction of the old system. Revolution broke out in Spain, in Portugal, Naples and Piedmont. Prussia was on the verge of revolution. Military plots in practically every state added to the anxiety of the monarchs. Metternich's theory seemed justified, that revolution was a contagion and that so long as France remained alive, every state was in danger of contamination. With the spectacle of actual revolution in progress, it was with little difficulty that Metternich secured the approval of the Emperor of Russia and the king of Prussia for a congress.

To England, the expediency of a congress for the very evident purpose of interfering with the internal affairs of a state, was doubtful. In September, 1820, Castlereagh in a despatch to the British minister at Vienna wrote,

"With all the respect and attachment which I feel for the system of the Alliance, as regulated by the transactions of Aix-la-Chapelle, I should much question the prudence, or, in truth, the efficacy, of any formal exercise of its forms and provisions in the
Present occasion "when the danger springs from the internal convulsions of independent states, the policy of hazarding such a step is much more questionable."

Castlereagh was desirous that general questions should not be admitted if a congress convened. It seemed to him that Austria because of her proximity to the revolution in Italy should act independently of the Alliance and propose the course to be taken there.

In reply to the memoir of the Austrian minister calling for a conference to adopt a policy toward revolutionary Naples, Castlereagh stated his objections. He would not consent to the proposed hostile league of the five powers against Naples.

"If all are pledged not to recognize but with common consent the order of things now subsisting, that force, if requisitem is to be employed for its overthrow, all are principals, not only morally but de jure in the war, though all may not bear arms in the execution of the common purpose.

1, Castlereagh Correspondence Vol. XII. p 512. Castlereagh to Lord Stewart.

2, Castlereagh Correspondence Vol. XII. p 312.

3, Ibid.
Now, this is a concert which the British govern-
ment cannot enter into."

This declaration of Castlereagh is a definite
statement of a policy absolutely opposed to inter-
ference by the alliance. It was a policy formulated
by Castlereagh and forcefully maintained and executed
by his successor Canning. Against such a league,
Castlereagh urged six objections of which the first
and last are particularly significant. It was a re-
cognition of that same higher power that had been a
check in Aix-la-Chapelle. The first reason he stated
for England's not entering into such an agreement was
that, "it binds to engagements which they could not be
justified in taking without laying the whole before
Parliament; and as if to emphasize the influence of this
branch of government, the final summary of his objection
denounced the league as "most certainly to be dis-
approved by our Parliament."

The loss to English commerce was likewise rec-
koned upon in coming to the decision that the powers
ought not interfere.

In the course of the despatch, Castlereagh made
it clear that England's interference was out of the
question in the name of the alliance was opposed; but to
the propriety of Austria's interference, he would agree. "Austria must, at least as far as we are concerned, make the measure, whatever it is, her own."

From this attitude, Canning would have dissented for he stood for non-interference on the part not only of the alliance, but also on the part of any individual state in the internal affairs of another state.

England had little interest in Italian affairs, and consequently any hostile action taken by Austria against the Italian kingdoms would affect her but slightly. A disinterested policy or one little forceful was, therefore, possible. With Spain, however, her position was firmer. Russia and Austria had for some time been watching the development of liberalism in Spain, and had directed notes to England disclaiming the tendencies there. They had insinuated that England was secretly giving to the constitutionalists of Spain

4, Ibid. p 314
5, Ibid. p 356.
her approval, if not actual aid. Russia had proposed intervention. The ultra-royalists in France likewise feared the effects upon them of the overthrow of the Bourbon power in Spain. In April, 1820, Wellington, apprehending the attitude of the European powers, wrote to Castlereagh opposing any interference in Spain. The king, he said, had not called for assistance and it was doubtful whether it would be possible for the powers to intervene at that time, fitted against each other as they appeared to be. But of this he was convinced, "No foreign Power ought to interfere!" There is no country in Europe in the affairs of which foreigners can interfere with so little advantage as in those of Spain. There is no country in which foreigners are so much disliked and even despised.

When the call for congress came, therefore, England was prepared to resist any attack upon Spain. Austria had mentioned particularly the Italian question as the significant one to be considered, and Castlereagh was anxious that the Emperor of Russia should not attempt to introduce any new subject of discussion. Russia, as England had feared, did propose
in the congress, intervention in Spain, but England vehemently protested. The Spanish question was then dropped.

In September it was definitely arranged that the conferences would begin on October 20. The greatest concern was felt on the part of Metternich as to what England intended to do. In his memoirs, September 17, he wrote, "Will anyone come from London? and who? Castlereagh is desired by many, but he will not be able to come; for this matter Wellington would be nominated. Will he come or will they choose to send him?" Neither Castlereagh nor Wellington was sent to represent England. It was deemed sufficient to authorize Lord Stewart, the British minister to Vienna, to attend the congress and to look after English interests.

Metternich found his strongest ally in the Emperor Alexander. "The Emperor Alexander has become much wiser than he was in 1813." After several private interviews, Metternich recorded in his diary, November 10, "The friendliness of the Russian Emperor for me continues. It is a return to the year 1813. If he had been in the year 1815 as he was in the year 1813, there would have been no 1820."
The Russian policy because of the opposing views of the ministers and the Emperor was to Metternich an interesting object of observation. Nesselrode, he could manage. "Nesslerode is morally dead; it is just as if he were not there at all." Capo d' Istria, however, at one time the most influential advisor of the Emperor opposed the principles and policies of Metternich. He was England's strongest friend in the congress and Metternich's most powerful opponent. Metternich wrote he was a "small, mean, intellect," but one which must be made to turn even against his will. It was only after weeks of persuasion that Metternich forced the emperor to cease depending upon his minister's opinions. The effect was to prolong the congress. November 27, Metternich recorded his progress in the congress.

"We are gradually attaining results. They are unhappily not successful to the degree I had wished; with Capo d' Istria it is even difficult to carry out a plain benefit. Capo d' Istria is not a bad man, but honestly speaking he is a complete and thorough fool; a perfect miracle of wrong-headedness."

Insignificant though England appeared in the congress, and strong as the unanimity seemed to be between

the Emperors of Russia and Austria from being natural allies. England could still find in Austria, a check against Russia, and in France likewise an ally against Russia. In the matter of Russian interferences in the Greek revolution it was early seen in the congress that Austria would view with suspicion and jealousy any move on the part of Russia in the south-east. Austria, had been apprised of England's support in this matter previous to the meeting. With France, England found a bond of sympathy, because of French fear that Russia would demand the entrance of a Russian army into Spain.

As a result of the unofficial alliances, but nevertheless strong tendencies ready to become active forces upon provocation, neither the Spanish situation nor the Greek revolution dared be acted upon in the congress. The revolution of Naples, therefore, remained the only subject open to consideration.

The congress opened with a statement by Austria of the conditions in Naples, and the urgent necessity of the allies to perform their duty in restoring peace. It was unnecessary for England's representatives to raise any objections, for both objections and passive approval had been given to Austria in the September preceding. Castlereagh had notified Lord Stewart that
according to a strict interpretation of the alliance the revolution in Naples did not come under its surveillance. "It is, nevertheless, an event of such great importance in itself and of such probable moral influence upon the social and political system of Europe, that, in the fortunate intimacy of counsel which prevails between the five principal powers of Europe, it necessarily occupies their most anxious attention." This statement might be construed as an acceptance of the principle of interference by the powers, but since it is contradictory to the opinions frequently expressed opposing the principle of intervention by the alliance, it is probable he meant to say that it was only natural that the Neapolitan revolution, an event of far-reaching effects, should be a subject of serious deliberation on the part of the powers. It does not necessarily carry with it the idea that they were to interfere.

England expected that Austria would interfere, but if force should be employed, she demanded that Austria satisfy the allies she was aiming at no

Castle to Lord. Stewart.
aggrandizement or supremacy in Italy, but that she was merely acting in self-defense. The stand for interference by the powers having been taken, England no longer had voice in the congress. During the rest of the session there was no attempt made by England to oppose the course decided upon. It seemed to be the attitude that what was of no direct concern to England should be allowed to go as it might. Castlereagh’s policy does not appear as straightforward as it might, and leaves a basis for opponents to suspect him of duplicity in the affair. Metternich was certainly led to understand that Austrian interferences in Italy would be tolerated but that intervention by the powers would be opposed in principle. But it was equally clear to Metternich that if the powers did undertake interference two courses were open to the English; one of withdrawing from the congress, the other of resisting the powers by arms. The second alternative would not be resorted to. Either Austria or the powers therefore, were free to act as they saw fit without fear of England.
Very few documents were drawn up by the congress, but the few which were formulated show in the general sentiment expressed, the absolute dictatorship of Metternich. He himself boastfully declared, "In all the documents sent forth the thoughts are mine; but the drawing up is by Capo d' Istria." In loftiness of purpose, the objects proclaimed from Troppau are only secondary to the noble expressions of the Holy Alliance. The first declaration to the King of Sicily by the three kings was dated November 20. Prefaced by several paragraphs dealing with the duty imposed upon the allies of restoring peace, the invitation to the King to join with them at Laibach was issued.

Had it not been for the strong appeal of France that a reconciliation of the King of Naples with his subjects be undertaken by the allies, before recourse was had to arms, the meeting with King Ferdinand would most probably not have been proposed, and the congress of Laibach would have been rendered unnecessary. Although England and France did not sign the declarations drawn up at congress, or join with the three sovereigns in issuing the invitation to Naples, the King of France on December 5 sent a message to Naples, expressing his approval of the action.
taken by congress, urging his attendance at Laibach, and regretting that he himself was unable to be present.

A second document of significance did not appear until December 8. It was this, the circular to the Austrian, Prussian and Russian ministers at the court of London which led to the attack in the English Parliament on the foreign policy of Liverpool and Castlereagh. This circular is a statement of the policy adopted at Troppau. The sovereigns declared their intentions of repressing rebellion that opposed legitimate governments. Upon this principle, which they recognized as not a new one, but as one founded upon the principles laid down in the treaties of 1814 and 1815, they based the right of intervention. The inference was made that the courts of London and Paris would approve the proceeding.

The opposition to the policy outlined in the circular, and to Castlereagh's apparent approval of it, was led in the English Parliament by Lord Holland and Earl Grey. The only evidence presented by Liverpool in defense of this attitude and as proof of his disapproval

12, Br. For. and St. Papers Vol. VIII. p 1147-1170
of the course taken, was his circular letter from the foreign office to the British ministers at foreign courts, dated January 19, 1821. Why England had not protested earlier against the principles of despotism laid down at Troppau was a question to which the English ministers failed to make a strong reply. The statement that the events of Troppau had been known in England only through a despatch from Troppau in the latter part of December was a weak apology, for the policy prevailing at Troppau had been discussed in European papers long before this time, and England was certainly aware of the course that was being adopted at the congress.

Both Liverpool and Castlereagh attempted to justify the allies somewhat by declaring before Parliament that the revolution in Naples was not a popular one, but that it had been the work of a military clique. In restoring the monarchy, therefore, the powers were acting in accordance with the wishes of the populace. The English ministers preferred to look upon the interference in Naples as an exception and not to admit it as the accepted policy of the alliance. The general principles set forth by the sovereigns, they strongly disclaimed. Liverpool declared, "Never did Russia
Austria, and Prussia do a more ill advised act, than when they put forth the declaration."

In answer to the question, why England had not remonstrated against the work of the Allies, Earl Liverpool without doubt touched the keynote of the policy England had adopted."

"The country must not put itself into the situation of having made a vain remonstrance, which it has not the courage or the means to enforce."

From this it would appear that the policy taken with regard to the conduct of the congress was based upon economic interest. The problems of whether England desired to maintain her neutrality with Naples, of whether she approved of restoring legitimate rule, of whether she resented the interference of the allies, all had to be answered not upon theories, sentiment, or precedent but upon the basis of the advantages or disadvantages to her. Russia and Austria, it was known, had immense armies that could be put into the field upon a few weeks notice. A vehement remonstrance by England supported by arms would have been necessary to make the opposition effective, and this was deemed inexpedient. There was nothing for England to gain.

Having issued the invitation to the King and the circular to the foreign courts, the congress stood ready for adjournment. Instead, it was decided to await the answer of the King of Naples. This prolonged the meeting until the end of December. "Metternich on December 11 wrote, "The King of Naples may come or he may stay away; measures must be taken to suit both cases." The waiting was wearisome. Troppau was little accommodated to the entertainment of royalty and the inclemency of the weather added to the disagreeableness of the surroundings. December 21 Metternich recorded, "Still no news from Naples." At last on December 24 the courier arrived bearing the news that the King would go to Laibach. "I start to morrow morning, my Emperor, the next morning, the Emperor Alexander on the 27th." Metternich wrote.

Would England be present at Laibach? Metternich hoped she would join the allies there. "France and England have been asked to take part in the step, and it is to be expected that they will not refuse their consent, since the principle on which the invitation rests is in perfect harmony with the agreements formerly concluded by them."

16, Ibid.
18, Ibid. 446
Chapter V

The Congress of Laibach

When it was decided at Troppau that the congress should be continued, it was very wisely agreed to adjourn to Laibach, a city better suited to accommodate the members. Situated in southern Austrian territory it was not an undesirable wintering place. A winter resort it proved to be to the sovereigns and ministers of the congress, for with little to do but await developments in Naples, there was opportunity and leisure to enjoy the sunshine and soft winds, Italian in nature.

The members began to assemble. January 4. Metternich, ever ready to seize the advantage of preliminary conversations and an opportunity of observing tendencies, was the first to arrive. A few days later, the Emperors of Austria, Naples, and Russia were present. Their first meeting January 6, Metternich dubbed, the "Festival of the Three Kings."

England's policy opposing the principle of interference in the name of the alliance had not been changed, and consequently Metternich's hopes that England might send representatives to participate at Laibach were not realized. The Honorable Robert Gordon
was present, but since he was not officially ac-
credited to the congress, did not attend the
conferences. However, toward the end of February,
Austria was disposed to look with comparative compla-
cence upon England's stand, and went so far as to in-
vite the unofficial English representative into
private conference.

France, after armed intervention was deter-
minded upon, refused to countenance the conferences.
Any determined opposition on her part would have
aroused the indignation of Russia and Austria,
both of which would have seen in such action, the
old revolutionary spirit attempting to assert itself.
Therefore, to preserve her friendly relations with
the European powers, France had recourse only to
silent disapproval and eventual withdrawal.

The work of the congress commended with a call
upon King Ferdinand to declare his opinions concern-
ing the revolution. As was expected, he implored the
sovereigns to restore the old monarchy and to es-
ablish the power of kingship as it had been previous
to the events of 1820.

Under the direction of the powers, he framed a letter on January 20, to his son, the Prince Regent of Sicily, informing him of the action of the congress.

"I have found them irrevocably determined not to admit the state of things which had resulted from these events or which could result from them, to regard it as incompatible with the tranquillity of my realm, as well as with the security of neighboring states, and to combat it by force of arms, in the case where forces of persuasion could not effect an immediate cessation of them."

The declaration of the allies themselves to Naples were transmitted by two circulars, dated January 19, to the ministers of the three powers residing at Naples. The conditions calling forth intervention was reviewed, and the general principles, so often proclaimed as the bases of their action, were again set forth. The policy upon which the allies had agreed was also declared. When the news reached Naples, the French chargé d'affaires there, addressed a note on February 9, declaring that France could act in compliance with the instructions sent to the ministers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

2. British For. and St. Papers Vol. VIII. p1162-3
3. Ibid. p1165-1172
The decision upon Sicilian affairs made at Laibach was made known to the Austrian people by a declaration issued by the Austrian government, February, 13. Again the events in Naples necessitating action by the allies were developed in minute detail, and the marching of troops into the Italian provinces was announced to be a measure of greatest need.

The congress in consequence, the report stated, had ordered troops to cross the Po, and if the conflict proved more severe than anticipated, the Russian emperor stood prepared to join his forces with those of Austria.

Neither the Austrian government nor the English felt content with this decree. The possible union of the great military power of Russia with that of Austria appeared to England to forebode grave dangers. There was no assurance that a compromise had not been effected by Russia whereby aid would be given Austria in Italy, provided Austria in turn

4, Ibid. p 1172.
5, British For. and St. Papers Vol.V, p 1175
Declaration of Austrian Government to Vienna.
6, Mett. Autobiography Vol. 111. p 480
would give her consent to any Russian aggression in the East. To the Austrian government in Vienna and to the Austrian people, the mere proposal of a Russian army crossing Austrian territory was obnoxious. Capodistria had opposed the declaration, but his influence had ceased to be of any consequence.

February 6, the Austrian army numbering 60,000 men crossed into Italy. A proclamation dated February 27, and signed by Baron Frimont, General of the Austrian forces, was proclaimed to the Neapolitians, urging them to rally to the support of the King. The offensive was taken by the army March 4. Little resistance was offered and the army within less than two weeks had entered Naples.

On February 28, the congress, having previously provided for another conference for September, 1822, dissolved. The King of Naples and the Italian princes accompanying him, left Naples early in March, but the Austrian and Russian sovereigns and diplomats remained until late in May. From the adjournment in February, the formal sessions of the congress gave way to informal meetings and the work accomplished after that date in the nature of private interviews and agreements.
Had it not been for the revolution in Piedmont, any arrangements entered into after February would have been treated best as unrelated to the Quadruple Alliance. But the interference of the powers in the Sardinian kingdom, as a furtherance of the policy adopted toward Naples, must necessarily be associated with the work of the allies at Laibach. News of the insurrection was received March 15, and straightway an agreement was consummated between Austria and Russia by which 80,000 men were to march from Austria into Italy, and 90,000 Russians were to cross the Austrian borders.

If England could have understood Metternich's motives, as he recorded them, in demanding the mobilization of the Russian army on the Austrian frontier, all suspicion of a secret compact between the powers would have been dissipated. In reply to a letter condemning Austria's power in recognizing her inefficiency to cope with the revolutions of Italy and her apparent pleasure in receiving Russian aid, Metternich showed the artful cunning of diplomacy.

"I had to think of destroying Russian Liberalism, and proving to Europe that henceforth the Radicals will have no deal with the two Powers possessing most freedom of action.

All the promises, all the speeches of the Emperor of Russia would have been valueless; but his setting in motion some hundred thousand men, their effective march, the expenditure on them of ten-millions, these are facts. The command to halt is another fact not less important; and a hundred twenty thousand men placed in the Russian provinces nearest to our frontiers, with orders to march at the first request of Austria, is certainly a third fact, which will prevent these disturbers from counting so rapidly on the Emperor Alexander in the future."

From Laibach, the Italian rebellions were quelled; the reactionary principles were supreme. Metternich tried to persuade himself that the Greek situation would settle itself, and a compact with respect to Greece was signed by the Emperors of Russia and Austria whereby it was agreed that,

"As it (Greece) has remained up to this time estranged from all the affairs of Europe, we do not feel called upon to interfere in its affairs."

The Spanish question here as at Troppau was left untouched.

The stand which England had taken at Troppau was maintained at Laibach. At Troppau it was clearly shown that if interference were admitted she would not become a party to the agreement, and at Laibach England let it be known that though she might dissent from the policy of the allies, remonstrance would not be made in the form of an ultimatum. Castlereagh was determined that upon the Italian question, England should not take the field. England was apparently little concerned with the events at Laibach, and made no arrangement for the rapid communication of information as in the preceding congresses. February 7, Castlereagh wrote, "We are yet without any intelligence from Laibach of the course of measures intended to be pursued."

Upon the question with whom England felt herself most strongly in accord, the views of the men of the period strangely differ. Since France opposed the course taken in the congresses, the natural supposition would be that France and England were in sympathy, Metternich, however, declared "France

10. Ibid. p. 523
and England, far from being on good terms completely distrust each other, England is entirely with us."

Others than Metternich were likewise of the opinion that England and Austria were agreed, and that as a matter of fact, England had, preceding the time of actual interference, taken more hostile measures against Naples, than had been adopted by the Congress. The presence of the British fleet at Naples was looked upon by them and by the opposition in Parliament as a breach of neutrality. Castlereagh affirmed that the purpose of the fleet was the defense of British citizens. With these conflicting statements the motive of the action must be left undecided.

In January, Castlereagh declared that Metternich should not have made the Italian revolution in Naples a European question, and in April, before Parliament he stated, "the illustrious monarchs have been ill-advised in adopting principles which were not consistent with sound policy."

Castlereagh dared go thus far in his replies to Parliament, but to have explained the real situation of England would have been impossible. No English minister would have had the courage to expose the weakness of British influence abroad, and to ex-
plain that war was her only effective recourse.
Then to have explained further that intervention was tolerated because it was against England's economic interest to oppose by arms would have degraded British policy before the world.

With the conclusion of the conferences at Laibach Castlereagh's policy of the part England should take in the meetings of the allies came to an end. At Aix-la-Chapelle, the position of England had been one of force and prominence. On significant points her remonstrance had been effective. At Troppau and Laibach disapproval of interference by the powers was passed by unheeded. Castlereagh may have looked with less disfavor upon the proceedings than his public utterances and official correspondence indicated, but, nevertheless, in the fact that he had registered the remonstrance in his public acts is to be found the real importance of his attitude.

The recognition that England must not interfere within a state, and the economic interest of the nation

11. Castlereagh Correspondence Vol. XII. p 264
12. Ibid. p 366.
forebade England's engaging in war to uphold a remonstrance upon a situation of little consequence to her, were Castlereagh's chief contributions to England's foreign policy. In his policy therefore, were laid the foundations of the inevitable disruption of a system governing Europe by congresses. When the point had been reached where accredited ministers would not be sent by England to the conferences a wide breach was effected; when action was taken based upon principles abhorrent to the English nature the breach was widened, and when at last, English economic interests would be unfavorably affected by a congress, the allies and England would be found in opposing camps.

13, Castlereagh's Correspondence Vol. XII. p 341.

Castlereagh to Stewart.
Chapter VI

The Congress of Verona,

In the few years between 1815-1822 there were without doubt more attempt made to unite the powers of Europe under treaties, alliances and combinations for a common purpose than in any other corresponding-ly short period of peace. The Congress of Vienna, the Treaty of Paris, the Holy Alliance and the Quad-ruple Alliance, the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Leibach and Troppau all suggested a union of the powers, and a combination of federated interests.

And yet, the summer preceding the conferences of Vienna and Verona found the European powers widely separated in policies. The general alliance alone tended to unite the great nations. There was no federative system. Having settled the French situation the Alliance was shorn of its only common pur-pose. The foreign relations of Europe were at this period in a state of transition. Attention had been turned from the French power, and statesmen were necessarily influenced by probable future de-velopments rather than by present conditions.

In this period of uncertainty, in which no power could feel that it had unequivocal support of an ally
intervention within the internal affair of a state was admitted. It called denunciation on the part of Great Britain but did not provoke resistance. No federative policy had been combined which the British would have been bound in policy to maintain, and no demand of its assistance was made in the right of an existing treaty. Great Britain consequently, though vigilant in her watch of European affairs, refrained from interfering so far as her interests did not suffer. It was undoubtedly her policy to unite with no power until the event or situation calling forth the federated interests of states should have developed.

"Russia has long looked to the dismemberment of Turkey as affording the opportunity of her own most valuable aggrandizement. Austria is eager to obtain possession of the Slavonian provinces bordering her own territories, and adjacent to Italy, her favorite object. France, connected with the Mediterranean and desirous of acquiring the advantage of commerce, looks with hope and expectation at the independence of Greece; and Great Britain interested generally in the protection of commerce, and specially in the maintenance of her own maritime importance, must re-
gard with anxious apprehension, every power which seeks to obtain a preponderance in a country so favorably situated for maritime purposes. Here, there is a country which Russia seeks to magnify in her already vast domain, and where Austria, France and Great Britain have each a direct and urgent interest in restraining and moderating her enroachments."

Perhaps this was to be the basis of a new federative policy. In 1822, it was still uncertain and the failure to agree in the Congress is traceable largely to the failure of diplomats to foresee who the common enemy was to be; the danger from Russia being, however, the most zealously guarded.

In the spring preceding the Congress of Verona, Metternich and the Marquis of Londonderry at a meeting in Germany discussed the Russian situation as related to the Greek revolution, and the war with Turkey. They agreed that the Congress the powers must not only refuse the intervention in the name of the Alliance, but must deny Russia the right of interference. It was definitely understood that the at-
tention of Russia must be turned from the South-
East.

Great Britain was alive to the approaching
storm in Europe, and before the Congress had sound-
ed Metternich on Austria's attitude toward Russia,
and likewise through the Duke of Wellington's con-
ferences with Monsieur de Villele, the French foreign
minister, had attempted and determined the course
France would adopt toward the Spanish revolution.
Here, Wellington agreed that the Spanish revolution
was not a subject for the Congress, that it was
purely a French problem.

From these two instances it may be seen that
the Congress could not be a union of federated al-
lies; the factions were doomed to be of greater im-
portance than the combined powers. Out of this
discussion, two powers were to be found whose in-
terests were united on the various questions, such as
the Turkish, the Spanish, the slave trade, there
would have been formed the foundation of federative
policies.

1, Quarterly Review (1828) XXVIII, p. 177
2, Wellington Despatches, 1. 288-294
   Wellington to Canning to Paris, Sept. 21, 1823
3, Wellington Despatches, 1, 292
   Chateaubriand, Congrès de Vérone 1, Chapter XIX
The Congress of Verona, held in the fall of 1822, was not only the last of the series of Italian Congresses; but what is of greater significance, the last union of the powers is accordance with the principles of the Quadruple Alliance.

The instructions to Wellington to hold England aloof from interference within the internal affairs of any nation were first sent by Castlereagh in May, 1822. The revolution in Spain was recognized as an evil tendency to be steadfastly watched by the allies, yet the opinion was advanced that there was no ground for believing Europe to be endangered by it. It was hoped that England and the allied countries in conference would agree on the subject, and realize that the purpose of the alliance was not interference.

"With respect to Spain, Castlereagh wrote in the instructions, there seems nothing to add too or vary, in the course of policy hitherto pursued; Solicitude for the safety of the Royal Family; observance of our engagements with Portugal; and a rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country, must be considered as forming the basis of his Majesty's policy."

In the Turkish question (the war between Greeks and Turks) Great Britain was instructed to be no party to intervention. Between Turkey and Russia
the instruction declared it to be Great Britain's policy to insist upon the observance of treaties, and to oppose any breach between the countries.

On the subject of the American colonies, England could join in no declaration affirming the rights of Spain. The purport of the instructions was non-interference on the part of the Alliance. This policy was retained and enforced by Canning. The credit, however, of declaring the principle is here seen to belong to Castlereagh.

After his conversation Vileile in Paris, Wellington applied to the new foreign minister, Canning, for 'any further instructions he might have. The reply gives' due credit to the policy outlined by the Marquis of Londonderry.

"On the affairs of Spain, whether European or American, I have nothing to communicate to your Grace which can in any degree vary the tenor of the sentiments expressed in the heads of institutions of which your Grace is already in possession, or of the

4, British Foreign and State Papers I, p74

Castlereagh to Wellington; instructions drawn up by the Marquis of Londonderry and transferred to the Duke of Wellington. Sept. 4, 1822."
conduct which your Grace is therein directed to observe."

Since the time the instructions were drafted, such occurrences had taken place in the diplomatic intercourse with the powers as to suggest that without question, a determined project of interference was afoot, and that at the Congress of Verona measures for action would be taken. Canning, therefore, reasserted the English position in a note to Wellington saying, "I am to instruct your Grace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare, that to any such interference, come what may, his majesty will not be a party."

From time to time suggestions and semi-instructions appear in the communication from the British foreign office to Wellington. They are not significant of any change in policy and so may be passed by without comment. But because of the question often raised as to whether Austria would have been permitted to interfere in Italian affairs, had Canning then been directing the English policy, a reference in his letter to Wellington is noteworthy, in which he refers to the question of Austria's withdrawing her troops.


Draft of Memorandum of Instructions for the Duke of Wellington.
one of the questions for discussion at the con-
fferences of Verona. He shows no disapproval of
the Austrian occupation of the Italian territory.
"Should it appear to your Grace's conviction, that
the continuance of an Austrian garrison in Pied-
mont is still absolutely necessary, your Grace has
only to keep yourself within the lines of your
original instructions, and preserve an absolute
silence in any discussion of Italian affairs."

The work before the Congress of Verona in
which Great Britain was to take the part of the un-
yielding opponent to the continental powers, was
concerned chiefly with three questions: the
Spanish situation, the abolition of the slave trade,
and the policy to be adopted toward the Spanish
American colonies. Of these, the Spanish question
became the leading problem, and the one upon which
the alliance split into three parts.

6. Ibid. p 301, Canning to Wellington,
7. Ibid. p 304,
8. Ibid. p 308.
Early in the session, Wellington wrote to Canning, "It is obvious that the contest of Verona will fall principally upon me. Prince Metternich and Count Bernstorff will remain behind and leave to the French ministers and to me to fight the whole battle."

As had been anticipated from the conversation between Wellington and France brought forward the possibility of war with Spain. The army of observation maintained by France on the Spanish border, was objected to by Spain, French ministers stated. But the protection of the French border demanded that it be retained there, was the French contention. The revolution in Spain was declared to be a menace to France and might necessitate war at any time.

In view of this situation Montmorency, the French plenipotentiary read a paper before the Congress in which he represented the situation as a purely French one. He desired however the support of the Alliance in case of war and made three demands of the allies.

9. Ibid. 346 Wellington to Canning.

First, what their attitude would be toward the situation, whether they would follow France in recalling their ministers, second, what moral aid they would give, and third, what material aid they would guarantee. Alexander, having surrendered his aggressive policy in the East, was anxious to employ his army in the West. It would tend to avert popular disfavor at home with his policy toward Turkey. His 150,000 troops were ready to march and it was his purpose to find use for them. At Vienna therefore, before going to Verona, he had showed his readiness to march them into Piedmont through Germany, there to await developments in Spain, and to assist France if necessary.

Metternich posing as a great friend to Alexander, in a half-hearted manner upheld the Russian offer in public meetings, but secretly advised France to oppose it. Wellington the first of the ministers to reply to the French overture, declared that Great Britain disapproved of any intervention or declaration by the allies against Spain, and that she looked with almost equal disfavor upon any

rupture between France and Spain. Wellington re-
viewed the British line of conduct since April, 1820,
showing that it had been the policy of the government
to avail itself of every opportunity of recommending
to the allies that they abstained from interference
in Spain. England, Wellington stated, would decline
to engage in any measure on the hypothetical case as
presented by Montenay. Before taking any action
it would be necessary for Great Britain to have
knowledge of all the circumstances which had occurred
between the two countries. The three continental
powers in their separate replies to the French paper
were agreed that they would act as "France should, in
respect to their ministers in Spain, and would give
to France every countenance and assistance she should
require; the cause for such assistance, and the
period and the mode of giving it, being reserved to
be specified in a treaty."

13, Ibid. p 460
14, British Foreign and state papers Vol. X. p 4
     Canning to Wellington.
     Memorandum of the Duke of Wellington.
It was decided that despatches be written to the respective ministers of Madrid, in which the courts were to make known their wishes and intentions to Spain. Having failed to prevent the Congresses' taking action on the Spanish question, and of course refusing to send a similar despatch to the British envoy at Madrid, Wellington recommended that the powers confine themselves solely to the external quarrel between France and Spain, and that they suggest nothing with regard to the internal situation and that they do not menace. Great Britain then offered to mediate between France and Spain if France approved. To France, however, Great Britain appeared an interested party, one not only in sympathy with the constitutionalists of Spain, but directly opposed to a strong Bourbon monarchy in Spain, lest it be a source of strength to the French Bourbons. England had concluded treaties with Spain which aroused naturally enough the suspicions of France. Chateaubriand remarks that he learned from good authority England had already given 2,000,000 to Spain to obtain what she wished, and that she had promised 4,000,000 more.

17, Wellington Des. Vol. 1. p. 520, Wellington to Canning
18, British, foreign and state papers, Vol. X p. 12
Canning to Wellington.
In the offer of mediation sent to Spain Great Britain declared her willingness to mediate provided Spain redressed the grievances between them. From this it would appear that Great Britain was acting not solely in the capacity of champion of liberty and non-intervention, but that her own interests were the basis of her policy.

Again throughout the pages of the diplomacy of this period there are continually allusions to a war between France and England if France invaded Spain. Should that occur, the opinion prevalent was that it would mean continental war, a certain war with Russia, a necessary one, with Austria, which would be forced to give France the assistance she promised at Verona.

In this condition the Spanish situation closed, with the allies in three groups: Great Britain absolutely opposed to war whether by the alliance or by France, France claiming it to be her war, Russia and Austria believing it to be concerned with the alliance.

The Spanish American situation was given little discussion in this Congress. The internal conditions in Spain were too entirely disrupted to authorize

20, British, foreign and state papers Vol. X. p 28
Memorandum from Canning to Wellington.
a discussion of returning the lost colonies to the
king. Wellington made known to the Allies that Great Britain would admit of no
general discussion of the colonies, but that they
must be considered in three groups, and that three
distinctions must be maintained,

"1, the territories within which the contest
still subsists.

2, the territories in which the struggle may
be said to be over, and the possession
become complete on the part of the local
government, and

3, the states in actual or in intended ne-
gotiation with Old Spain."

Chateaubriand ignoring the distinctions made by Great
Britain proposed in the Congress to extend the princi-
ple of intervention to the colonies and to help the
king of Spain subdue them. No conclusions were reached.
In light of future events, however, it may be fair to
state that without declaring it, the allies understood
that should this situation become more urgent, a con-
grress could be assembled to deliberate upon Spanish
American affairs.

22, Wellington Des. Vol. 1 p 287, Instructions to
Wellington.
At this Congress at Vienna and at Aix-la-Chapelle, the British minister was instructed to urge the allied powers to take active measures against the slave trade. Of the continental powers, France was the one most actively engaged in maritime pursuits, and so it was to France, England first put the question of abolition of the slave traffic. In Paris, Wellington approached the French minister on this point. He was assured that the "king and the French government were sincerely anxious to put an end to this traffic, but that they could devise no measures which could have that effect which they could hope to prevail upon the chambers to adopt; that the measure so often recommended to their attention by the British ambassador at this court, that of attaching a peine infamante to the conviction of this crime would be inefficient if passed into a law."

With this little encouragement to a solution of the evil practice the British potentiary carried the subject into the Congress:

In the paper read before the assembly on the subject, denounced France very openly, declaring that he had positive proof that the great contraband trade was carried on under the protection of the French flag. The reason being that "France is the only one of the great maritime powers of Europe whose government has not entered into the treaties which have been completed with His British Majesty for giving to certain of the ships of each of the contracting party, a limited power of search and capture of ships engaged in this horrible traffic." Wellington proposed that arrangement be made for executing the existing law against the trade or that a convention be entered into by the powers to prohibit the importation of foreign produce from slave trading colonies. This latter suggestion was denounced as striking particularly at Portugal. Portugal, it was claimed, had no representative at the congress and had the right of having its case heard before such an agreement should be made.

The suggestion of an executive council to punish offenders was repulsive to the French. "This according to the nature of governments is the judicial and legislative body that is called upon to decide it."
Chateaubriand denied the charge that the French flag covered this illicit trade. He stated, "To retire the protection of the French flag from foreign individuals who make use of the flag to cover commerce in slaves is entirely just, but France has no need to prohibit that which it has never committed."

The French people were suspicious of England's apparently high moral purpose in urging the abolition. Chateaubriand says, "One must admire here the Christ-like spirit, the progress of civilization, that has been made and continues increasing without ceasing, but it is a singular thing that this perseverance of the cabinet of Saint James has introduced in all the Congresses in the midst of questions most vital and of present interest, this question incidental and rambling of the abolition of the trade in blacks.

27, Ibid. p 36.
The English had sold their whites as slaves in America in a time as near ours as the time of Cromwell. The secret of these contradictions is to be found in the private interests and mercantile interests of England. This is necessary to understand in order not to be a dupe of a philanthropy so ardent and so lately evident."

Ardent as Great Britain appeared in behalf of the negro trade she was unwilling to permit the alliance to declare the slave trade piracy lest it give the powers too much authority. In the end the powers united in declaring the trade "abominable" and in declaring themselves ready to agree to measures judged "executable" in order to assure the total abolition. It was more of a moral triumph than a practicable one.

This was the last important problem to be brought before the Congress. The allies had failed to agree as a whole, and as factions had been unable to have common interest throughout. The congress closed with France's heartily disliking England, not only because of the Spanish situation but because of what she considered an

28, Chateaubriand, Congres, de Vérona Vol. 1 p35.
30, Chateaubriand Congrès de Vérona Vol. I. p34.
absolutely selfish policy, on the part of Great Britain in the slave trade. England had united with Austria in distrust of Russia, but Austria stood with France on the Spanish difficulties. No power through these conferences was able to find an ally with whom she could be federated for a common purpose.

The strength of the Quadruple Alliance was broken at Verona. The union failed to become a permanent federation. It may have been that it was doomed to failure because of its wrong foundation, a league of the strong against the weak, rather than a union of the weak against some formidable power. The superior power, the one which would menace continental Europe could not yet be clearly foreseen.
The Economic Basis of English Diplomacy in the Congress.

The course of English diplomacy in the period of the Congresses cannot be said to have been determined by any one factor, the social, the political or the economic. Each had its share in moulding the policy of the British ministers and representatives abroad. The force of public opinion as a moral force was certainly a direct impulse to the English diplomats to secure the abolition of the slave trade; the recognition of responsibility to Parliament, the fear of entering into any relations which might strengthen the opposition and threaten the government at home, likewise had their effects, as political forces upon the European relations. Though to no one force may be attributed the sole motive power, yet it is possible for one to appear predominant. The purpose of this chapter will be to analyse the economic force, as the predominant factor in determining England's foreign re-
lations with the Quadruple Alliance.

The years immediately following the peace were in England a period of universal distress. Trade and commerce were disorganized, agriculture and industry had not yet evolved through the industrial and agricultural Revolutions into the new system. Millions were unemployed, and to this great mass seeking a means of livelihood there was added in 1815, 1816 and 1817 another million, the discharged soldiers and sailors. The vast majority of England's workingmen were starving; even the employed were unable to subsist on the low wages and were forced to become recipients of "poor relief." Under such conditions the work of the government was not to provide primarily for the growth of England, not to seek prestige abroad; it was not to uphold principles of democracy by the sword. This was the period in which home interests had first to be dealt with. The first duty of Parliament was therefore, to establish the stability of the state. Peace had to be maintained at home, riots and all uprisings of the masses had to be quelled. The people
had to be led gradually into new fields of industry.
The discontented ever eager for a demonstration against
capital and government, must from the state's point
of view be given as little opportunity as possible to
for opposition to the new policies. Parliament in its
extreme caution and timidity was opposed to inter-
tangling foreign relations, such as might rouse the
nation. In short, the interest with which Parliament
watched negotiations abroad was due principally to the
economic condition at home.

To trace the influence of economic conditions
upon each act of the English ministers, or upon every
subject considered in the congresses would be a work
impossible as well as impracticable. Such an influence must necessarily react on a movement,
a policy, a general situation, rather than upon mere
occurences. Such as the admittance of the French King
on his representatives to the congresses, it is with
the former class, an attempt will be made to relate
economic influence. To this belongs the part taken
by England in the financial settlement at Aix-la-Chapelle
the opposition

to interference in Spain, the stand of comparative indifference on the question of Naples and Piedmont, the position of the slave trade, the definite policy of non-interference in the American colonies, the policy of non-intervention towards the Greek revolution in its early stages.

The financial depression resulting from the wars led to the cry for retrenchment by the people. The immense national debt which had steadily accumulated within a few years amounted in 1815 to 861,000,000 pounds. In that year 74,000,000 pounds was raised by taxation alone. Even with the war taxes and the laying aside annually of a sinking fund amounting to £14,000,000, "the capital of the debt rose by much more than the difference between the amount of money and the amount applied to the liquidation of old liabilities." With peace restored and expenditures reduced, the people of all classes, who had been overwhelmed with war taxes for a quarter of a century, hoped to obtain relief.

4. *Historic*.
The plan of depending upon the sinking fund to liquidate the debt was doomed to failure, as "the scheme, in fact, depended on the surplus income of the country being equal to the whole amount of the sinking fund, and, as the result proved, it rarely exceeded one-tenth of it. The plan, in a heavily taxed community, with constituencies clamoring for fiscal relief, was certain to fail."

The financial situation in addition to the debt was further embarrassed by the currency situation. With peace it was hoped that the hoarding of money which had resulted from the contraction of the currency and fall of prices would cease, and that money would no longer leave the country. In 1817-18, however, specie continued to be drawn from England in even greater amounts than during the last two years of the war. The deficient harvest of 1816 and very ordinary one of 1817 necessitated the importation of foreign grain; exports and imports fell off. Although France paid the expenses of the army of occupation, even then, large sums of English money were expended by the army. Subsidies

Traill, Social England 89, VI.
paid by England to her allies during the war gave way in the first years of peace to loans. In 1816 France raised 6 million francs and again in 1817 made provision for 30 millions raised in loans. The rates of exchange in these years began to be unfavorable to England, and in one of the debates on the currency situation the statement was made that, "If the committee would compare the dates of these loans with the periods at which the rate of exchange began to be unfavorable towards the country it would be found to fall soon after the conclusion of the first French loan."

As a result of this financial condition, secret treaties entered into by England were viewed with suspicion, lest they require money for their fulfillment.

All the great nations were creditors to England. Through the great financial houses such as the Rothschilds and Baring, England had a most efficient organization for floating the loans. Not only the European countries but the Americas as well borrowed from England. "Over 10 millions were lent and lost in South America between 1822-1826."

6. Annual Register 1818. p66
7. Cambridge Modern History, 743. X
Until 1825 resumption of specie payments had not been made. In 1817-18 after long debates on the currency situation, Parliament fixed rates at which notes were to be converted at a reduced premium until May of 1823, after which all notes were to be redeemed in gold. In 1818 the statement was made officially that cash payment would probably not be resumed at the appointed time, due not to any situation in the country itself but to "something in foreign relations," "What that something was," the Earl of Landerdale stated, in an opposition speech, "he, (Secretary of Treasurer) had not chosen to explain, but this much appeared that this most important of all measures no longer depended upon the decision of the British Parliament but on what might be done by the government of France or of any other foreign country."

The foreign situation referred to was the approaching congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, in which the status of France was to be determined. If the armies of France were withdrawn, Parliament foresaw France would want a further loan, and at the same time the government was
concerned over the method which would be adopted to pay the present debt.

In the congress of Aix, therefore, England drew up the conditions of the financial settlement. Being the biggest creditor not only of France but of the other powers, England was left to arrange the settlement with France. It was as the banking houses of England would have demanded. Castlereagh, having in mind the situation of the currency in England, was worried during the congress as to whether the plan of payment to Hope Baring and Company, a private firm, would be acceptable to the British Secretary.

In the congresses succeeding that of Aix-la-Chapelle the financial distress was ever a check in foreign relations. The congresses were looked upon as a needless expense, and a time when the government was almost bankrupt, when taxes were excessive, even this unimportant item was denounced as needless extravagance. The result of his (Castlereagh's) policy is this, that we are mixed up in the affairs of

9, Annual Register 1818, p17-18.
the continent in a manner we have never been before which entails upon us endless negotiations and enormous expenses."

The war while incurring such expense upon England as to almost bankrupt the nation, at the same time developed the wealth of certain classes. Twenty years of war had destroyed European commerce but had raised Great Britain to the position of the greatest carrying power, the strongest commercial nation of the world. Great Commercial houses sprang up to benefit from the new traffic suddenly thrown open to England. Rights of the European nations on the seas were ignored; the navigation acts of Spain limiting the trade with the Spanish West Indies had little weight in checking the British merchantmen.

During the same period in which European industry was interrupted for lack of raw materials and was hampered by the late introduction of modern machinery, England was developing into the greatest industrial nation of the world. England and the Spanish American colonies became commercially
supplementary, the one, the producer of the manufactur-
ed commodity, the other, the producer of the raw ma-
terial. Spain about 1808 relaxed for a few years
her navigation acts in favor of Great Britain, and from
that moment, the colonies were lost to Spain commercially.

The wealth, thus suddenly thrown to England in
commerce and industry through the exigencies of war,
easily made, was invested widely, often recklessly.
Stock companies like the wild cat banks in our history
sprang into existence over night. Millions of pounds
were used for speculation in Spanish American mines;
Portugal for years a strong ally, almost a dependency
of England was invested with British capital. Even
Greece, not yet an independent nation opened a new
field for British capital.

As a result of this economic condition at home,
the relations of England with foreign nations were
naturally affected. With wealth acquired the capi-
talist, desired social and political position. He
purchased a seat in Parliament and in that capacity, 
ed denounced or approved the foreign policy. Though
during the period of the Congresses, the capitalist

10 Greville Memoirs, 1, 55.
class was a small minority, its influence can be traced in foreign relations. It acted with the Tory party; it supported the landed interests, and its interests were in turn supported by the Tories.

Such were the general conditions of England. The way in which they react upon the foreign relations will be seen in the policies adopted by the British ministers in dealing with the most significant problems confronting the congresses.

In the intervention of Austria in Naples and Piedmont, England would remonstrate but not forcibly oppose. English capital was not invested in the Italian provinces to any considerable amount. Trade with Italy would be little affected whether the monarch were deposed or restored.

Austria was determined upon invasion; she could speak with authority for in addition to her own immense army, Russia's several hundred thousand troops would assist if necessary. England financially was in no condition to oppose an aggressive policy within a state in which she was little concerned. Furthermore, there were military revolts in England at the time, and the loyal troops could not be spared abroad. The only efficient remonstrance would be by arms, and England was in no condition
to maintain such a stand. Her statesmen could uphold such a principle, the principle of non-interference in this case. The formulation of a principle, however, did not necessarily mean that it would be upheld.

In addition to the lack of funds, and to the general opinion that where England received no benefit, she should remain passive, of the effects of the French Revolution upon the European states, still clearly pictured in the English mind, tended to make the government conservative.

Castlereagh shared the opinion of the Tories and of the Whigs who had temporarily joined with them that there was danger of revolution at home. He was not certain but that revolution in any state threatened the status of other nations. Although the government shared with the European powers this fear of revolution, with England the question of economic interest in cases of nation in revolution was first of all considered.

When Spain asked for the aid of the Alliance to restore to her the revolting American colonies, England refused. "The four allied powers and France had protested against the seizure of Monte Video, but
otherwise Spain had been left to herself. Great Britain seemed to have more to gain than to lose by the insurrection. The revolted colonies were open to her commerce and by weakening Spain they had strengthened the maritime supremacy of Great Britain. Great Britain was willing to mediate on condition that Spain would make reasonable concessions. Spain was unwilling.

England had for centuries suffered under the Spanish trade monopoly. If the colonies were reduced to Spanish authority, England feared the reinforcement of the old colonial system. Therefore, instead of upholding the principle of legitimacy, a policy of the alliance, English diplomatists yielded to the interests of their commercial classes. It was well known that agents in the colonies had raised loans and engaged soldiers in London, that regiments had left England to aid the insurgents, that ships with cargoes of military stores cleared for Spanish American ports and that the mercantile interests favored revolution.

11, Brodrich and Fotheringham 1811-37

:Political History of England p 190

12, Cambridge X. Modern History X.
In the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Castlereagh showed a comprehension of the English commercial interests in his statement, "This refers to intervention in the colonies at once revives the whole colonial policy system, and even if it were sufficient to satisfy our interested views, it would reduce the colonies to that state of dependence upon the mother country to which it is impossible to presuppose that any of them will in future submit." The discussion in the Congresses of mediation between Spain and her colonies, England prevented. But during these years British agents were attempting to negotiate a favorable commercial treaty with Spain. From 1820 until the time of the independence of the colonies, the trade relations between Spain and Great Britain played a conspicuous part in the diplomatic relations. In a despatch of January 1820 to Castlereagh, Sir Henry Wellesley states,

"Your lordship will see by my despatches that the Duke of San Fernando complains of the frequency of my representations upon commercial subjects.

14, Castlereagh Correspondence XII, p 90.
15, Hell. Correspondence. I Hell Canning p 641.
In other respects we are upon very good terms."

Suspicious that an attempt would be made to re-conquer the colonies for Spain, after the invasion of Spain by France in 1822, Canning entered into negotiations with the United States minister to London, Richard Rush, suggesting joint action against the European alliance's extending its power to the American continents. The result was the Monroe Doctrine on the part of the United States and the recognition of the independence of the colonies a year later of the part of Great Britain. Canning realizing the commercial advantage to Great Britain made the remark,

"Spanish America is free, and if we do not mismanage our matters sadly, she is English.

In urging the abolition of the slave trade English representatives were actuated without doubt more by the popular cry against slave traffic,

16, Stapleton Canning 421.
and the demand for this social reform than by economic motives, but in the minds of the European statesmen, the proposals made at the various congresses for a general abolition were viewed in the light of England's self interest.

France being the country most concerned in the abolition question was the one England sought to win over to the cause. Three modes were proposed by Canning; persuasion, coercion, and interest. Of the means of coercion he mentioned the possibility of having the alliance declare it piracy, but was perfectly confident France could not concede to British cruisers the right of visit and capture of the French ships. Nor was Canning himself desirous that such a method should be put into practice, it was a suggestion rather than a desired result.

"As to letting the Holy Alliance declare it piracy, it would be to give them an authority, which they might turn to worse purposes."

A second mode of coercion, suggested by Canning, that of forbidding the importation of produce from the colonies of states permitting the slave trade, he was

17, Wellington, Des. 1, p525.

Ibid., Canning.

18, Ibid. Canning to Wellington 1, p554.
also quite certain that Europe would not accept. England, it is quite clear from the following note to Wilberforce, could not accede to such a proposition. At the time of the proposition for increasing re-
quirements from colonies of a country engaged in the slave trade, seeing that it was not so necessarily.

"You are surprised at the Duke of Wellington has not been instructed to say that we will give up the trade with Brazil (for that is, I am afraid, the amount of giving up the export of her sugar and cotton) if Austria, Russia and Prussia will prohibit her produce. In fair reasoning we have a right to be surprised for we ought to be ready to make sacrifices when we ask them and I am for making them; but who dares to promise such a one as this, without full knowledge of the opinions of the commercial part of the nation."*

19, Wellington 1. Canning to Wellington 325-29
At Aix-la-Chapelle the plan of England met with counter-proposals to which England would not accede.

The Russian plan, for the establishment of an international board of control on the West coast of Africa with an international fleet, commissioned to suppress the trade met with no success, neither did his suggestions for the establishment of an international fleet in the Mediterranean against the Bar-bary pirates.

"The sea power of Russia was a dangerous because an unknown quantity, the activities of the Czar's agents in Spain and Italy had excited the suspicions of his ultimate aims, and Great Britain refused to be a party to a plan which would have involved the establishment of Russian warships on the Mediterranean."

In the congress of Verona, England again pressed the subject of abolition. Here the failure to carry the measure was due, Canning states, "partly from the notions sedulously inculcated by the Powers having..."
colonies that self-interest now mingle with our humanity and that by our persevering efforts to bring about the abolition in other countries, we are only seeking to inflict upon the colonial possessions of our rivals a portion of the evils which the partial abolition is alleged to have brought upon our own."  

England, instead of approaching the Congress upon this subject had the alternative of negotiating separately with different countries. This matter was, in fact, attempted in several cases, but the practice of purchasing the recognition of this evil by the different countries entailed an expense upon the nation which was openly criticised. In 1818, Great Britain agreed to pay Spain 400,000 pounds, in consequence of Spain's agreeing to the abolition of the trade. At this date the suffering of the poor in England was intense, and the opinion was expressed in Parliament that the "400,000 pounds might be more advantageously disposed of in this country. It would furnish the means of giving to 8000 individuals the sum of 50 pounds each." Seeking foreign channels for benevolent purposes was looked upon as false humanity.

Abolition through single treaties was therefore impractical, and resort was had toward making it a general European question. Owing to the pressure at home for
the suppression of the slave traffic, abolition was strongly advocated by England in the congresses. But the commercial interests of England were too much at variance with those of France to permit a final solution of the problem.

It was upon a situation of little importance itself, yet of greatest concern to England that the British policy so diverged from the European interests as to lead to the immediate withdrawal of England's representative from the conferences of the allied powers.

With the overthrow of the Spanish monarchy in 1820, England could hope for a liberal commercial agreement. When, therefore, at Verona, the Congress determined to intervene in behalf of monarchy, England's interests and those of her allies were in conflict. When neither side would yield the breach in the Quadruple Alliance was completed.

When the Congress met, Metternich proposed a process verbal specifying the cases in which the powers should intervene, but the Duke flatly refused to subscribe. This was the end of the Congress. The differences between the Alliance and Great Britain were proclaimed to the world, and Canning wrote to Frere soon after, "The history of all I could tell in the words or rather in the substitution of one word for another,
for "alliance" read "England" and you have the clue to my policy." 24

The French armies were marched into Spain and the absolute monarchy was restored. England, though in the position of an indifferent bystander, kept close watch. Just as in the Austrian intervention in Naples, the British warships appeared in the bay of Naples with secret orders, and so at this time, the British fleet, always prepared, was stationed off the coast of Portugal with the ostensible purpose of preserving Portugal from foreign invasion and aggression. It was a country in which British investments were to be protected.

Of the important problems before the Congresses, there remains the Greek situation. In the Greek revolution, Russia for obvious reasons espoused the cause against Turkey. The Greeks were unquestionably
deserving of the sympathy and aid of Europeans, which was denied them as a result of the action of the Congresses. British commerce in the Black Sea was flourishing and commercial interests would permit of no intervention which might weaken that trade, or make Russia dominant in the Eastern waters. The apprehension of this danger is expressed by Wellington in a note to Canning dated at Verona.

"I have explained to the Count (Nesselrode) that it was impossible for Great Britain to adopt or to attempt to enforce upon the Porte the principle of making the Black Sea another Baltic, or of the Bosphorus a Sound." The question united Austria and Great Britain, Great Britain agreeing with Metternich to let the revolution burn itself out beyond the pale of civilization."

Aside from the danger of Russian supremacy in the East, there was another reason for England's reticence to succor the Greek cause.

"Should we be led by any false impulse of chivalrous benevolence to participate in the struggle itself, we commit, and thereby impair our authority; we abandon

22, Wellington Correspondence 1, p 325.
23, Annual Register, 1818, 1, p20.
24, Bagot: Canning 120
the position in which we might hereafter do most good, and may bring the danger of a foreign struggle home to our own shores, and to our own institutions."

As late, then, as 1822 liberal ideas were dis-countenanced in England as forerunners of revolution. About five years later, however, the British fleet again loomed up in the waters of a country in revolt. English capital in Greece was in need of protection.

With the failure of England to agree with her allies at Verona, England's representation in the councils of the Quadruple Alliance was at an end. She had entered the alliance and had acceded to the government of Europe by congressey in the belief that English interests would suffer without representatives in the Europecouncils to guard them. Emerging from the war as the greatest European power, England had reason to suppose she would dominate the Alliance as she had done the powers against Napoleon. After Aix-la-Chapelle, her influence had passed, due largely

25, Wellington 1, p523. Wellington; Canning.
26, Stapleton; Cunning, 358.
to the new economic relations between herself and the European states. Her armies were no longer needed in Europe, her subsidies belonged to the war period. After 1818 there was little need of English loans. No longer did economic obligations necessitate a dependent attitude upon Great Britain. With economic independence secured, the powers were at liberty to oppose British interests,
Summary

The Quadruple Alliance though successful in maintaining peace between the great European powers was never a strong federation. It was essentially weak, and the power which it wielded over all Europe was never recognized by the smaller nations as legitimate. It was a dictatorship of the powers.

Within the alliance itself, the wielders of this usurped power failed to act in harmony through the congresses. And so from without and within it was ever threatened with disruption. During the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle the King of Sweden protested against the action of this league; the German states protested against the Carlsbad Decrees, which they considered the work of the alliance, and again after Verona there was a remonstrance made by the King of Württemberg.

From the time of the first congress to the breach at Verona, it has been seen, the various powers failed to agree or to act together on a common basis. Austria was interested chiefly in maintaining her supremacy in Italy and in supporting everywhere the old regime. France, up to the congress of Verona was chiefly concerned in reestablishing herself in the councils of the powers, and from that time was interested in carrying out a national policy against Spain. Russia agreed with
Austria that liberal tendencies must be thwarted, and England ostensibly the champion of liberal movements and non-interference, opposed or tacitly acquiesced, depending as her commercial interests were involved. The alliance from within, therefore, could only exist as long as the varied interests did not conflict. Each of the members found difficulty in supporting such an international alliance, organized on broad principles capable of unlimited expansion.

With the defection of England at Verona, the congresses held in accordance with the alliance were discontinued, but the Quadruple Alliance itself was not at that time dissolved. Though its power in European politics was broken then, it existed in theory until 1848.

After Verona, England's policy rapidly diverged from that of the continent and she gradually developed her isolation policy or rather returned to it.

Metternich wrote that the British government seemed to be devoting itself to a system of complete isolation but that he did not believe such a position possible. Unquestionably, Canning's purpose after Verona was to hold England aloof from the continent. "Henceforward, England must be content to move steadily on in her own orbit."

One of the chief purposes of the alliance was the maintenance of peace in Europe, not only between the powers but within the individual states. The alliance
consequently adopted a reactionary policy and succeeded in quelling liberal outbursts in Naples, Piedmont, and Spain, and in checking liberal outbursts in other states. It raises the question as to whether this was a reactionary policy belonging to the work of the congresses or whether it would be the inevitable result of any international alliance whose purpose is the maintenance of peace. If peace within states must be maintained, reform by revolution would be impossible.

In spite of the work of the Quadruple Alliance, the spirit of unrest and reform asserts itself in the revolutions of 1820, 1830 and 1848. Though for a time retarding the social, political, and economic development of Europe, the Alliance was unable to check the natural progress of reform.

Before condemning the Alliance for its repressive measures which were in large part framed in the interest of peace, one should consider the situation in a broader aspect and ask himself whether any international organization for the maintenance of peace, either between states or within the individual states, would not of necessity be reactionary. New ideas or innovations could not be admitted for fear they would lead to rebellion or threaten the established order.


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