English Radicals and the American Revolution
Girded with the belief that their doctrines were scientific facts, they opposed romantic notions about the subjectivity or relativity of religious language and teachings. Far from being anti-intellectual, they were aggressively academic. Their faith in empiricism and emphasis on doctrines as immutable facts exacerbated their theological rigidity, making their rejection of subsequent, more hostile scientific theories—most notably Darwinian evolution—virtually inevitable.

An earlier version of this study, a doctoral thesis completed at Duke University in 1974, was explicitly limited to American Presbyterians. Regrettably, the title and subtitle of the published version suggest a considerably broader scope than Bozeman has given us. He probes only one wing of one medium-sized confessional tradition to determine its attitudes toward appropriation of scientific thought. Bozeman is judiciously reserved in his claims; despite the sweeping title, he admits in his concluding paragraph that "no attempt can be made here to assess the impact of Christianized Baconianism upon the nation..." Had he been willing to examine also the place of scientific thought among Baptists and Methodists (easily the two largest Protestant traditions in nineteenth-century America), he would have been in a far better position to determine whether antebellum American Protestantism really did turn its back to intellectual currents. By dismissing them as "less thoughtful churches" which were "championing religious emotion," Bozeman leaves one wondering whether Sidney Mead’s already qualified generalization is not valid after all.

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"England must be saved in America." These words by John Dickinson could stand as the motto of the Commonwealthmen, or Real Whigs, who are the focus of this work. Oldest and most moderate of the English radicals during the reign of George III, they were most deeply influenced by the American Revolution and its aftermath. The later radicals of the 1790's—the Benthamites and Paineites—owed a debt to the American experience, but they were more affected by the French Revolution and the industrialization of England. The philosophical roots of the Commonwealthmen lay in earlier times, as did, in fact, those of their American counterparts. Caroline Robbins’ The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman makes more of this latter point, but Professor Bonwick goes beyond Robbins’ work to show how, after 1789, the new radicals acknowledged their debt to the American experience and how the Commonwealthmen adapted their views to shape something of a synthesis which molded nineteenth-century radicalism in England. Thus, Bonwick’s book is a valuable complement to Robbins’ work.

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As England and her North American colonies moved toward a breach during the early 1770's, the Commonwealthmen gave consistent support to the claims of liberty made by the colonists. Missing the point of the American desire for full independence, they sought to persuade king, lords, and commons to cease the forcible repression of resistance in America and, instead, to accommodate the colonists as political equals-within-the-empire. If the government heeded their arguments, it was assumed that a backwash of liberty and religious tolerance would inevitably sweep across England to wash away the corruption and injustice which prevailed. While some Commonwealthmen spoke of American independence as desirable, they did not expect it to be "total separation," but rather, as Major John Cartwright called it, a "legislative separation" to "cement a lasting union" between England and the colonies. (p. 71).

From 1774 to 1789, as total independence became a reality, and the United States took form under the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, the Commonwealthmen adapted their advocacy of America from that of colonial liberty-within-the-empire to that of the American nation as "an asylum of liberty" to which England and Europe should look for example in reforming their own constitutions. Thus, America remained the lodestar of the Commonwealthmen's hopes of reform in England—a middle way between tyranny and democracy.

Why did not these men and women succeed in convincing their compatriots and government to save the empire by granting liberty to the colonists to forestall separation? Professor Bonwick gives several reasons, some of which echo the Robbins book—their arguments were not popular in England; they did not possess "a firm political base," standing for the most part outside the inner circles of power due to a lack of effective leadership; finally, and most important to Bonwick, the Real Whigs failed to understand that the Americans no longer felt like Englishmen, that they did not wish to remain within the empire. When that fact dawned upon them late in the war for independence, they tended to conclude that England, like "Sodom and Gomorrah . . . guilty of grievous sins" was being punished "for her waywardness" by the loss of the colonies. (p. 124).

After independence, as the Americans groped their way toward the Constitution through the morass of the Confederation experiment, the Commonwealthmen shifted their theme to that of America as "an asylum of liberty" and praised the Constitution for its moderate tone-cum-guarantee of liberty and protection of religious dissenters. Realizing, however, that the American pattern could not be transplanted intact to England, because of differing conditions, the radicals sought "to translate the American experience into terms that would be comprehensible in English politics," first by pointing out the "elements of similarity" and then by proposing reforms which could graft on other aspects not similar. (p. 184). But here again, the Commonwealthmen met with little success in changing the political face of England.

With the outbreak of the French Revolution, English radicalism turned leftward, the English government became repressive at home, and the Com-
monwealthmen were caught somewhere in between. The new radicals were less concerned with the universal, more insular, and more democratic. Thomas Paine supplanted John Locke as the radical Moses. The implications for property and moderation appalled the old radicals who now looked to America more fervently than ever as the counterbalance to terror and the levelling-down of society. France cannot save England, they insisted. England must be saved in America.

What might have been a fatal split within radicalism did not happen. First of all, Commonwealthmen, such as Cartwright, adapted their thinking to conclude that broader representation which would include the “lower orders” was not to be feared after all. Again, the American experience was used as the lodestar. In that country’s fifteen state assemblies, “representation based on personality instead of property did not lead to anarchy, but was, if correctly understood, ‘the most complete specific against that popular phrenzy.’” (p. 240). Secondly, the new radicals came to acknowledge the example of America, and their debt to it, as a bastion of egalitarianism. Even Jeremy Bentham, who had once “ridiculed the natural rights philosophy of the Declaration of Independence, came to see the United States as a successful example of the democratic ideal in operation.” (p. 241). Thus, old radicalism became the rootstock upon which the new radicalism was grafted for growth in the nineteenth century.

Professor Bonwick’s sources are extensive and helpful. His style is lucid, carrying the reader along through the maturation process of radical ideas in England against the backdrop of the American and French Revolutions. He builds on where Caroline Robbins left off, at 1789, but he only whets the appetite of the reader for details of the old and new radical synthesis; he does not satisfy it. Perhaps he plans a second volume. It would be appreciated.

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Horwitz’s book is an important contribution to the literature on nineteenth century American law. It is also a nice complement to it for, as Horwitz observes, historians have overemphasized constitutional law and its impact on American economic development. To correct this imbalance Horwitz has undertaken a careful study of private law—torts, contracts, property and commercial law—which became the major vehicle utilized by merchant entrepreneurial groups to stimulate economic development and to secure for themselves a disproportionate share of the benefits of such development. By 1860, private law was, as Horwitz sees it, as different from its eighteenth cen-
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