themes and subthemes at times obscures the major trends developed in the book. But Elazar clearly has made thoughtful generalizations about city building and political culture in America’s heartland, and his study places these in a broader context. The book will be of interest to political scientists, students of public administration, and historians.

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In The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade, Harvey Klehr, professor of political science at Emory University, succeeded in writing the definitive study of the Communist Party in the United States (CPUSA) during the depression decade of the 1930s. He has relied heavily on the Draper collection now housed at Emory University, FBI files obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (although of marginal value because of the way they have been organized), and numerous party publications, including the New Masses and the Daily Worker. Klehr believes the party’s own publications provide the most authoritative sources because the party was quite open about how “its decisions were made and carried out” (xii). The Draper file contains oral interviews with important American Communists during the 1930s, including Earl Browder.

While Klehr’s volume abounds in necessary detail, the central theme is simple: the CPUSA took its cue from Moscow. The cement that bound the party’s most faithful members through a series of ideological shifts, oppression, and rejection was loyalty to the Soviet Union. As Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti boasted, “one of the Soviet Union’s strategic assets was that in the capitalist world ‘millions of people are ready to fight for the defense of the Soviet Union with all their strength’” (416). However, many were not that steadfast and often could not tolerate the tortured labyrinths of Comintern directives, party factionalism, or the dreary inner life and burdens of being a party member. Thus, while the party recruited thousands, total membership remained small even during the halcyon days of the Popular Front.

Klehr also goes far beyond attention to party subservience to the Soviet Union; he focuses on accomplishments, decision making, impact on American life and institutions, social composition, and rationale for party actions. Although Klehr is critical and at times even con-
temptuous of party leadership and decision making, he does not ignore the party’s organizational skills, its ostensible concern for unskilled workers (as in the Gastonia textile strike) and minorities (as in the Scotsboro case), or its attraction for intellectuals during the Popular Front era. As Klehr implies, the party might have been more successful had it not been guilty of so many tactical errors (failure to jump on the New Deal bandwagon until the reform impetus of the Roosevelt administration had been spent, support of black self-determination, and the continued domination of the foreign language federations). Nevertheless, the CPUSA’s rapprochement with John L. Lewis during the formative days of the CIO gave it a foothold within the labor movement and an influence in excess of actual membership.

Klehr is best at contrasting the unsuccessful Third Period of the American party’s history with the Popular Front era, when Communist parties around the globe were directed to cooperate with democratic forces opposed to fascism. No treatment of the Popular Front era has been as complete as Klehr’s as he deals intimately with the ebb and tide of party fortunes. Although the author insists that party factionalism and ineptitude did not cease, during this period the party came to share common ground with progressive forces within the American political system. It ceased denunciation of Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, burrowed within the Farmer Labor party of Minnesota, and wooed a significant number of American intellectuals who, if not actual party members, found the CPUSA compatible with reform goals. The Communist assault on fascism and its support of labor and welfare measures, along with the subordination of world revolution goals, asserts Klehr, won the party a sympathetic following even among some non-members. Meanwhile, party membership was more widely distributed geographically; native-born Americans constituted a higher percentage of members than immigrants; and total membership reached a high point of more than one hundred thousand in 1939. During this period, the notorious Dies Committee endeavored to link the party and the New Deal. Klehr demonstrates, however, that the Communists went over to the New Deal—the New Deal did not go over to the Communists.

One of the least satisfying chapters is Klehr’s chronicle of the party’s impact on agriculture. Although he capably discusses the role of Harold Ware in the farm belt and the failure of the party to work effectively with the Holiday movement or to recruit agricultural workers, his treatment of the energetic effort of the party to woo farmers is somewhat skimpy. Klehr does not contradict Lowell Dyson’s claim that the CPUSA played a marginal role in depression-decade American ag-
riculture (Red Harvest, 1982), but he is more cautious and provides little analysis concerning the party's lack of appeal.

The party's honeymoon with reform elements in the United States ended with the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939. Klehr expertly relates the shock of this bombshell which caught American Communists as unaware as their European counterparts. The ideological switch back to the concepts of the Third Period minimized the differences between the bourgeois democracies and fascism and left no doubt that the party's policies were dictated from the Soviet Union. Klehr concludes that the costs were serious and permanent: a substantial decline in membership, the emergence of new enemies, and the depletion of hard-won goodwill were among the consequences. Popular Front organizations were devastated. Not even a return to the Popular Front position after the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 could undo the damage.

Klehr's book skillfully portrays the failure of the CPUSA during the depression decade—a period when, he points out, the party should have succeeded. For during this period there was less hostility towards the Soviet Union and less government repression of radicals. During the Popular Front era, Communists and progressive forces often occupied a common ground in the struggle against depression at home and fascist aggression abroad. Overall, "The Heyday of American Communism" was in Klehr's view not much of a heyday, although the party did reach the pinnacle of its influence. The party's domination by Soviet policy and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact relegated it to a shadowy background in American political life.

Those interested in the Communist Party in the United States may want to consult Theodore Draper's The Roots of American Communism (New York, 1957), which covers the 1920s and whose theme is similar to Klehr's, or a more comprehensive but less original history, The American Communist Party: A Critical History (New York, 1962), by Irving Howe and Lewis Coser. Klehr's well-documented work may upset some whose perspectives are farther left, but for the time being it is the most authoritative study of the CPUSA during the 1930s.