DOI

10.17077/etd.8x8886pj

Document Type

Dissertation

Date of Degree

Summer 2018

Access Restrictions

Access restricted until 08/31/2020

Degree Name

PhD (Doctor of Philosophy)

Degree In

Business Administration

First Advisor

Collins, Daniel

Second Advisor

Hribar, Paul

First Committee Member

Lie, Erik

Second Committee Member

Gleason, Cristi

Third Committee Member

Melessa, Sam

Abstract

I use a quasi-exogeneous shock to information asymmetry among shareholders to evaluate the effect of information asymmetry on corporate disclosure. In the post-Regulation FD period, the merger between a shareholder and a lender of the same firm provides a shock to the information asymmetry among equity investors, because Regulation FD applies to shareholders but not lenders. After the merger, the shareholder gains access to the firm-specific private information held by the lender. I first provide evidence that information asymmetry among shareholders increases after the shareholder-lender mergers. I then use a difference-in-differences research design to show that after shareholder-lender merger transactions, firms issue more quarterly forecasts (including earnings, sales, capital expenditure, EBITDA, and gross margin), and the quarterly earnings forecasts are more precise. This study provides direct empirical evidence that information asymmetry among investors affects corporate disclosure.

Keywords

Disclosure, Information Asymmetry, Mergers and Acquisitions

Pages

viii, 66 pages

Bibliography

Includes bibliographical references (pages 40-44).

Copyright

Copyright © 2018 Wei Chen

Available for download on Monday, August 31, 2020

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