DOI

10.17077/etd.v10v-yo6p

Document Type

Dissertation

Date of Degree

Summer 2019

Degree Name

PhD (Doctor of Philosophy)

Degree In

Business Administration

First Advisor

Lie, Erik

First Committee Member

Sa-Aadu, Jarjisu

Second Committee Member

Qian, Yiming

Third Committee Member

Tiwari, Ashish

Fourth Committee Member

Li, Wei

Abstract

In this dissertation, I examine two main topics in corporate finance: executive compensation and corporate investment.

First, in the chapter titled “Import Penetration and Executive Compensation”, we investigate the impact of import penetration on executive compensation. We find that import penetration reduces executives’ total compensation, stock grants, and opportunistic grant timing, suggesting that competition mitigates agency problems and the need for conventional alignment mechanisms. Furthermore, we show that import penetration increases option grants and option duration, thus incentivizing more innovation and risk-taking.

Second, I study the relationship between entrenchment and corporate investment. In the chapter titled “Entrenchment, Managerial Shirking, and Investment”, I find that entrenchment reduces capital expenditures, R&D, and productivity, weakens a firm’s competitiveness in the product market, and diminishes firm value. These findings are consistent with the shirking hypothesis that entrenchment enables managers to evade the responsibilities of overseeing investment projects.

Pages

ix, 100 pages

Bibliography

Includes bibliographical references (pages 95-100).

Copyright

Copyright © 2019 Keyang Yang

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